CHAPTER I

FOREIGN POLICY OF INDIA

The achievement of national independence by India on August 15, 1947 opened a new chapter in the history of foreign relations. Before independence the external relations of the country were conducted by the Britishers. India did not and could not have a foreign policy of its own. In certain minor and purely regional matters the Whitehall allowed a limited autonomy to the Foreign and Political Department of the Government of India. This Department was manned exclusively by the British. But after independence it adopted an independent policy unhindered by any foreign power.

Undoubtedly a country's foreign policy is essentially conditioned by its internal circumstances and this is much more true in the case of a country like India, newly independent and just finding its feet in a world full of perils and difficulties. It is this attitude coupled with the fact that nationalist India under the leadership of the Indian National Congress has in the past stood for certain fundamental principles in the field of international affairs that had given shape to our present foreign policy.

The Indian National Congress showed great interest in question of foreign policy right from its birth in 1885. This interest, at first limited, grew with the broadening of its general political outlook. Gradually certain principles of foreign policy and certain ways of looking at world affairs evolved. These became the foundations of India's foreign policy when she emerged as a Sovereign country on August 15, 1947, which constitutes the subject of this dissertation. The importance of this subject is further underlined by the role of Jawahar Lal Nehru in the formation and implementation of India's foreign policy. As India's Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs, he had been the chief architect of her foreign policy. He had also been equally responsible for shaping the Congress outlook on World Affairs ever since 1927.

The strong stand of Indian National Congress, in the field of international affairs for certain fundamental principles has given shape to our present foreign policy. The foreign policy resolution adopted by the All India Congress committee in Delhi in 1921 was a "landmark in the history of India's foreign relations." The resolution states that, "the present Government of India in no way represents Indian opinion." This was the first significant declaration on the part of nationalist India that its interest in the field of foreign policy were

diamentically opposed to those of Britain. It further laid down the guidelines of an independent India's foreign policy.

The resolution of the Congress in 1925 authorised the AICC to set up a Foreign Department under it "to look after the interest of Indians abroad and to carry on educative propaganda in the country regarding their position in the British Empire and foreign countries." And the Congress set up, after three years, a Foreign Department, with P. Jawaharlal Nehru at its head.

At its Madras session in 1927, it passed resolutions which are still referred to as reflecting basic foreign policies of independent India. In its Tripuri Session of the Congress in 1939, it declared the urgent need for India 'to direct her own foreign policy as an independent nation', keeping aloof from both imperialism and fascism and pursuing her path of peace and freedom.

With the release of most of its leaders in 1945, the Congress resumed for Indian independence. The Congress after gaining political power in August 1947 outlined the foreign policy of free India in its Jaipur Session of December 1948. The resolution stated that the foreign policy of India must

1. For a detailed study of Congress resolutions on foreign policy see, N.V. Raj Kumar, The Background of India's Foreign Policy, (New Delhi, 1952); Also see, BimalaPrasad, The Origins of Indian Foreign Policy, Calcutta, Book Land, 1960.
necessarily be based on the principles that have guided the Congress in the past.

Before going ahead, we shall turn to the basic objectives of India's foreign policy as enunciated by Nehru, the 'architect' of India's foreign policy. The ultimate aim of India's foreign policy, like that of the foreign policies of other countries, is the furtherance of its national interest; we shall also examine how these objectives are co-related with India's national interest. A country's foreign policy always rests upon a priori concept its national interests.

"Therefore", as Murty stated, "the major criterion of a country's foreign policy is the coldly and rationally calculated national interests of the country." In a speech in the constituent Assembly (Legislative) on December 4, 1947, Nehru said:

"Whatever policy you may lay down, the art of conducting the foreign affairs of a country lies in finding out what is most advantageous to the country. We may talk about International goodwill and mean what we say. We may talk about peace and freedom and earnestly what we say. But in the ultimate analysis, a government functions for the good of the country it governs and no government dare do anything which in the short or long run is manifestly to the disadvantage of that"

1. These principles are the promotion of World peace; the freedom of all nations; racial equality and the ending of imperialism and colonialism. N.V. Raj Kumar, The Background of India's Foreign Policy, pp. 25-27.

country. Therefore, whatever a country is imperialistic or socialist or communist, its foreign minister thinks primarily of the interests of that country.1

The concept of national interest is not static; its content changes with changing internal situation so far as India is concerned, there is not much controversy about the content of national interest. It is said "India's foreign policy has the distinction of combining idealism with national interest."2

The principal source of Indian thinking on the subject of foreign affairs is neither Hinduism, Buddhism, Gandhism, the Western European tradition, nor a rational analysis of realities in terms of India's long-range national interest, but the complex biography of the Prime Minister, D.F. Karaka, one of the fiercest critics of Nehru writes: "our attitude to the powers of the West has been conditioned by the personal complexes of Pandit Nehru", and "the translation of these complexes into action has become our foreign policy."3

In his broadcast on 7 September 1946, Nehru outlined the main elements of Indian foreign policy. He stated:

1. Jawahar Lal Nehru's Speeches, September 1946 - May 1949, Delhi, p. 122. He repeated it on other occasions also.
3. For a detailed study of the sources of India's Foreign Policy see, Adden B. Bozeman, "India's Foreign Policy Today: Reflections upon its sources", K.P. Misra Ed., op.cit., pp. 32-50.
"We propose, as far as possible to keep away from the power politics of groups, aligned against one another, which have laid in the past to World Wars and which may again lead to disasters on an even vaster scale. We seek no domination over others and we claim no privileged position over treatment for our people whatever they may go, and we cannot accept any discrimination against them."

At a Press conference held on September 26, 1946 the Prime Minister elaborated these aims which have more or less remained unchanged and which constitute the main aims of India's policy.

The most important national interest of India was the preservation of her national integrity and security. Because of its militarily weakness India proclaimed its friendship with all countries. As Nehru said in his 1958 speeches in Parliament, by its friendship with all countries, India sought to gain its security. In the words of M.S. Rajan, "The primary and overriding goal of India's policy has always been the maintenance and promotion of International peace and security."

It is the world peace which enables nations to plan for prosperity. On June 12, 1952, Nehru said in the Parliament:

2. These aims are: Promotion of international peace, cooperation with the United Nations; friendliness with all nations, more particularly with neighbouring countries in Asia; membership in the Commonwealth of Nations; freedom of dependent people and opposition to racial discrimination.
"If and when disaster comes, it will effect the world as a whole...., our first effort should be to prevent that disaster from happening. If that proves to be beyond us, we must, at any rate, try to avoid disaster or to retain a position in which we shall be able to minimize, as much as possible, the consequences of that disaster even if it comes."

What gave added strength to Nehru's faith in world peace was his conviction that progress, which was so essential for banishing poverty and disease from the new nations, was not possible unless peace was stabilized. In the same vein, Vijay Lakhshmi Pandit observed: "Our need for peace is imperative. It is not merely desirable or preferable, it is a vital necessity and daily prayer."

Thus the preservation and enlargement of peace became the watchwords of India's foreign policy.

**NON-ALIGNMENT:**

Non-alignment, the keynote of India's foreign policy, helped India to achieve a degree of influence in the world which was quite proportionate to its power, for beyond its military power. It established India, not as a major power but an important quantity in world Affairs.

2. On the 75th birthday anniversary of Nehru, Prime Minister Shastri said that Nehru had "only one thought in his approach to international problems - to promote peace. He did not take up positions calculated to help India in one way or another." The Statesman (Delhi), November 15, 1964.
What is non-alignment? In this context it is worthwhile to examine three related concepts. These are neutralism, neutrality and non-alignment. Neutralism is an institution which has been in existence for a long time and recognized by international law. It concerns a state which is more or less permanently neutralized either voluntarily or by force of circumstances. Examples are Switzerland, whose neutralism is one of choice, and Laos on whom neutralism was imposed by powers outside the country as a result of Geneva agreement. On the other hand, neutrality is a concept related only to a state of actual war.

The concept of non-alignment when it was first adopted meant, non-participation with great powers in military pacts. It was a response to the cold war and rising nationalism of the newly independent nations. It was also the result of the recognition of the fact that all the interests of great powers are not the same as the interests of small powers. Not to join any one of the big giants in their military pacts, served the best national interests of the developing countries.

Non-alignment was the only one of the many means to serve the national interest of non-aligned states, and not the only means, certainly not all the means.

1. "By neutrality is meant non-involvement in war, while by neutralism is meant non-involvement in the cold-war." Peter Lyon, Neutralism. (Leicester University Press) 1946, p.20.
2. The Indian Express (New Delhi), November 12, 1970.
What is the content and scope of the concept of non-alignment? It is not an institution. And not even a policy in the real sense of the term. It can only tell us what not to do. As a guide it is totally important.

No one would consider that non-alignment is an end in itself. It is only a means to achieve the aims or only a means to an end.

One of the earliest assertions of the policy of non-alignment, occurred in a letter which Jawaharlal Nehru wrote to K.P.S. Menon on the eve of his posting as ambassador to China, a month before India became independent.

"Our General policy," he wrote, "is to avoid entanglement in power politics and not to join any group of powers as against any other group." "The two leading groups today are the Russian bloc and the Anglo-American bloc. We must be friendly to both and yet not to join either. Both America and Russia are extraordinarily suspicious of each other as well as of other countries. This makes our path difficult and we may well be suspected by each of leaning towards the other. This cannot be helped."

1. Ibid.


The first official declaration of the policy of non-alignment was made by Jawaharlal Nehru on 7 December 1946. As early as December 4, 1947 Prime Minister Nehru said before India's Constituent Assembly:

"The main subject in foreign policy today is vaguely talked in terms of 'Do you belong to this group or that group? ..... We have proclaimed during the past year that we will not attach ourselves to this group or that group."

To Nehru non-alignment was an independent "positive" policy, which is "definite and dynamic." Non-alignment does not mean isolation. As Prime Minister proclaimed "where freedom is menaced or justice threatened, or where aggression takes place we cannot be and shall not be neutral."

Some six, seven or eight years ago non-alignment was a rare phenomenon. A few countries here and there asked about it and other countries rather made fun of it or, at any rate, did not take it seriously. The whole course of history of the last, few years has shown a growing opinion spread in favour of non-alignment. Percisely because it was in time with the thinking of vast numbers of people, whether the country concerned was non-alignment or not, because they clamed passionately for

1. See, Ibid.
peace and did not like this massing up of vast armies and nuclear banks on either side. Therefore, their mind turned to those countries who refused to live up.

"We have arrived at a position today where there is no choice left between negotiations for peace or war. If people refuse to negotiate, they must inevitably go to war. I am ashamed that rigid and proud attitudes are taken up by the great countries as being too high and mighty to negotiate for peace. I submit that it is not their prestige which is involved in such attitudes but the future of the human race. It is our duty to function to say that they must negotiate," Nehru once said.

The division of the world into two major armed camps began with the Soviet expansion towards Eastern Europe at the end of the Second World War. By 1948 Albania, Bulgaria, East Germany, Poland and Romania came under the sphere of Soviet influence. In the Far East, Outer Mongolia, China, North Korea and North Vietnam became communist.

Soviet influence also began to grow in Africa and Asia through its aid and trade. Fearing the World balance of power would sway against the West, Western Europe, U.S.A. and Canada formed the NATO. This was soon followed by the SEATO and the Baghdad Pact.

2. See, Socialist India (Weekly), September 10, 1970.
2a. The Indian Express (New Delhi), November 12, 1970.
Thus began the Cold War on the basis of two block policies which was an initial move to induce other countries to join them. It appeared at the time that the two giants with their respective block of nations were leading towards military confrontation, which if it occurred, would annihilate the human race and remove all traces of civilization from earth. The prospect of the third World War with nuclear weapons were too dreadful even to contemplate. It is in these circumstances that Afro-Asian countries decided to form a group of their own to enable them to avoid joining any military pact with great powers.

"What does joining a block means? After all, it can only mean one thing : give up your own view about a particular position adopt the other parties view on the question in order to please it and gain its favour."

Among the non-aligned countries India occupies a position of eminence as it was one of the earliest countries that adopted non-alignment; and later, "Non-alignment came to be regarded as the yard stick of a new nation's independence in international affairs."

The policy of non-alignment is in the best interest of our country. Because of its geographical position, population

or resources, or the historical and philosophical angle, India is not in the way of either bloc and there is no necessity either for it or for the blocs that it should join one of them.

We are geographically situated to play the role of non-alignment and geography points a great deal in such matters. If we are a small country surrounded by great, big and hostile powers, then it is not an easy matter for such a country to face the situation bravely and to call itself non-aligned, ... it (non-alignment) might not suit everybody, although it would seem good for everybody, it might be more difficult for other.

Moreover, India has, from time immemorial remained neutral as between rival religions and ideologies. Ancient Hindu foreign policy was one of isolation. The Gita teaches according to Gandhi non-attachment. Jainism tells us that all doctrines are partial truth, Ashokan edicts speak highly of tolerance of all views. Non-alignment, therefore, came naturally to India and was congenial to her genius.

It is a matter of fact that India's non-alignment contributed to the maintenance of peace and relaxation of tensions. Non-alignment has on several occasions put a break on war. By

2. K.P.S.Menon, op.cit.
its efforts to bring about a cease-fire in the Korean War ultimately in bringing about peace in 1955, more especially the repatriation of the prisoners of War, the cessation of hostilities in Indo-China in 1954, and India's participation as Chairman of the international supervisory commission; the negotiated settlement regarding Pondichery a formal French colony in India and the plea for negotiations, and settlement in the Suez Crisis, its role in bringing about the end of hostilities in Vietnam and from the sidelines the assistance it offered to the conclusion of the Geneva agreement in 1954 supports the same view.

Non-alignment enabled us to strengthen ourselves and prevented from becoming a satellite state. Even today the Americans are trying to rope us into their orbit. It gave us a considerable degree of self-confidence, inner strength, things of that kind. It has become a sort of ideology, a faith for us.

In 1961, at Bandung Conference non-alignment was reassessed and attempt to constitute a decisive Afro-Asia body in the United Nations. The Second Non-Aligned Nations Conference

4. This Conference was held on April 18, 1955.
viewed that the principles of non-alignment are becoming increasingly dynamic and powerful force for the promotion of peace and welfare of mankind. The conference emphasized the rightness, efficacy and the vigour of the policy of non-alignment.

Non-alignment enabled India to express her views on international questions differing from or agreeing with, either bloc, and also to keep friendly relations. Prime Minister Nehru once said, "There is no meaning in alignment for a country like India, situated as we are, when we happen to be friendly with all countries belonging to both the blocs." On several questions related to human rights, the progress of independent peoples, the freedom of Indonesia, 1949, aggression of North and South Korea, 1950, aggression of Britain and France on Egypt, 1966, India's views were more or less identified with those of the U.S.A.

Non-alignment has not looked upon the military pacts with favour. They are often treated as unfruitful for world peace as well as for the defence of the parties to these pacts. As Nehru has observed:

"I think that the policy of military alliance and of the Cold War has not brought any such results to the world......It

2. New Age (New Delhi), March 24, 1963, p.16.
3. On the conclusion of regional pacts such as SEATO and CENTO (1954), American military aid to Pakistan, 1954, the passing of uniting of peace resolution, 1950, the holding of nuclear tests, Kashmir and the admission of the People's Republic of China, India followed the United States of America.
has deviated people from thinking on economic progress and developing inner strength, and tried to bolster up countries by military means which can only be temporary. It has really come in the way of country's progress."

Despite the fact that India's joining with either of the blocs would have brought immediate economic gain, India opted for an independent policy notwithstanding the wishes of either of the blocs. Commented on this Nehru aptly observed, "There have been times when a word from us would have brought as many good things of life. We preferred not to give that word ... if at any time help from abroad depends upon a variation, however slight, in our, policy, we shall relinquish that help completely and prefer starvation and privation to taking such help." Such a policy proved advantageous to India in the long run without, however, bearing the odium of communism on the one hand and a western stooge on the other.

The nature of the commitment of non-alignment is different; it has no legal foundations. Its basis is political. It can change, and in fact has changed with the coming of new governments.

India's policy of non-alignment underwent some change, when China attacked its territorial integrity. India refused to accept military aid from any country until 1962, maintaining

3. The Change in the politics of Iran and Iraq bear testimony to this.
that such a move would compromise its non-alignment policy. But the military reverses it suffered in October-November 1962, compelled India to strengthen its defences; thereafter it turned to friendly nations, communist as well as western, for military aid. Countries like China and Pakistan thereupon said that India has ceased to be non-aligned. A section of public opinion inside the country also hold more or less the same view. A typical peace of noisy feeling could be seem in the Indian Express under the heading "Non-alignment proves a halter to defence."

But the acceptance of military aid by India did not amount a fundamental change in its position as a non-aligned state because the foreign aid taken by India to face Chinese aggression was from both the blocs. Whatever may be trace, one fact is certain that the policy remained thoroughly unchanged.

Following the guidelines laid down by Jawaharlal Nehru in regard to India's foreign policy his successor Lal Bahadur Shastri, time and again affirmed his faith in the policy of non-alignment. So was the case with Indira Gandhi. For instance in his speech on June 11, 1964, Lal Bahadur Shastri declared:

1. K. Raman Pillai, India's Foreign Policy: Basic issues and Political attitudes, Mserut, Meenakshi Prakashan, 1969, p. 110.


"Non-alignment will continue to be the fundamental basis of our approach to world problems and our relation with other countries.

But to Werner Levi, Shastri's era was distinguished from the Nehru era not so much by the further development of trend whose origin could be traced in many cases to the last years of Nehru's regime.

Towards the end of the Nehru era and throughout the Shastri regime non-alignment was stripped of its missionary connotations.

Indira Gandhi in her statement on January 26, 1966, after the death of Lal Bahadur Shastri on 10th January 1966, said, that the principles of her father Jawaharlal Nehru would continue to guide her. "The fundamental principles laid down by my father, to which he and Shastri dedicated their lives will continue to guide us."

But the new Government of India no longer believes that non-alignment in itself ensures security or that the development of military strength and acceptance of external assistance to

3. Ibid., p. 187.
do so are not incompitable with non-alignment. They no longer treat non-alignment as an end itself or as a permanent changing policy, as they used to do in 1950's "India and Indians no longer treat non-alignment and non-aligned countries as sacred cows and look down upon the alignment and the aligned nations at they used to do alone time." They now believe that non-alignment and alignment are matters of preferred choice and that either means promotion of peace and security throughout the world. World peace cannot be yet said out of danger. There are war clouds still in many parts of the horizon, and war itself in some parts of the earth.

India's very existence is now in peril. It is seriously threatened by two 'sabre-rattling and war-hungry' neighbours China and Pakistan. And a sudden change in alignment of the world powers has compelled India to seek a new alignment with U.S.S.R. which came into effect as a result of 20 years friendship treaty signed by India and the Soviet Union. The 'treaty of peace' proved that the policy of non-alignment is a dynamic policy which can be adopted to the changing situations. Emphasising that the treaty was "in a true sense a treaty of peace" Mr. Swaran Singh said that it would strengthen the policy of non-alignment. Addressing a mammoth rally on the sprawling laws of India Gate, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi also said that "the

2. The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), August 10, 1971; Also see, The Indian Express (New Delhi), August 10, 1971.
pact will strengthen India by further promoting friendship between the two nations. But there is no change in our policy of non-alignment in which we have full faith. But there are many critics who contend that India has given up its non-alignment or it has put an end to non-alignment. They think that all their preaching about the virtues of non-alignment and opposition to military pacts has been cast to the winds by a slight change in the wind. Now it can be said that 'Instead of finding faults with the concept of non-alignment it would be more better to give it greater substance and content to meet the need situations that are arising there is no other policy that developing countries can adopt with greater advantage that the policy of non-alignment.'

DISARMAMENT:

The question of disarmament is the most crucial problem with which the whole world is faced. It is an imperative need and the most urgent task of mankind. It has been a problem of international discussion now for over a century. To deal with the problem many disarmament negotiations were made by the big powers. But the long and tortuous record of disarmament negotiations has shown that the rigid stand taken by the big powers on

1. Ibid.
one issue or the other have not made any noticeable progress in the direction of a solution.

India has been deeply interested in disarmament and in the efforts towards disarmament like now. The All India Congress Committee of the Indian National Congress in its famous quite 1 India resolution of August 8, 1942 declared ........ "The Committee is of opinion that the future peace, security and ordered progress of the world demand a world federation of free nations.....

On the establishment of such a world federation, disarmament would be practicable in all countries, national armies, navies and air forces would no longer be necessary, and a world federation defence force would keep the world peace and prevent aggression. An Independent India would gladly join such a world federation and co-operation on an equal basis with other countries in the solution of international problems."

No doubt disarmament was realised to be absolutely necessary to remove the threat of war and to lessen the burden of disarmament. During the later half of the Second World War the appearance of some powerful weapons like the pilotless projectiles and the dropping of the Atomic bomb on Hiroshima gave the rise to a general desire to see armaments limited and control by International Agreement. Realising its effective role in


the world peace, Nehru once said on April 2, 1954, "Time appears to challenge us, destruction threatens to catch us up, if not to overtake us on its march to its sinister goal. We must seek to avert it and avoid the dire consequences it threatens. We must endeavour with faith and hope to promote all efforts that seek to bring to a halt, this drift to what appears to be the menace of total destruction." Jawaharlal Nehru said that hardly 15 years back the world was involved in a war which resulted in enormous wastage of money and loss of innocent human lives. Since destructive weapons were manufactured, now any future wars would be much more destructive and devastating, he added. He said that "disarmament was absolutely necessary in the present day world in which destructive weapons threatening annihilation of the entire humanity were being manufactured."

To Nehru it was regrettable that in the present times some big countries should think in terms of war to establish their respective superiority in the world. To him "War in the world today means total destruction." Any talk of war in the context of the present situation was nothing but "childish."

To contemplate such a situation was nothing but "childish."

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3. Ibid.
world is involved The Hindustan Times remarked that "There is a clear duty for all countries to raise their voice in the cause of peace and content of disarmament."

Mr. V.K. Menon, the then Union Defence Minister on April 16, 1961 at the Conference Hall of Vidhan Sabha, explained India's policy of non-alignment as the rational way in the present World situation, when a race for armaments was going on with much talk of disarmament, side by side. He stressed that armaments to-day did not provide national security. The prospect of killing one's enemy and himself, remaining safe was at discount in the present atomic age, and for national security arms had become more or less useless.

A radical solution of this problem, which has become an urgent necessity, in the present state armaments, in the unanimous view of the participating countries, in the Non-aligned Nation Conference, can be achieved only by means of a general complete and strictly and internationally controlled disarmament. Mr. V.K. Menon was of the view that "disarmament did not mean throwing away all armaments, but it was only a step towards peace by a balance production of arms instead of arm race now on."

1. The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), November 24, 1960.
2. The Hindu (Madras), April 17, 1961.
3. This Non-aligned Nations Conference was held in Belgrade in 1961 for the purpose of exchanging views on international problems with a view to contributing more effectively to world peace and security. The participants of the Conference considered that disarmament is an imperative need of mankind.
4. The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), September 6, 1960.
India has consistently tried to channelise peace and disarmament efforts through the UNO and has taken interest in the Geneva negotiations of 17 nations. India has been an eager signatory of the Test Ban Treaty and has welcomed it as a turning point in history towards the direction of complete disarmament, which alone can save succeeding generations from "the scourge of war." Nehru on 5th August 1963 said "Every lover of peace must welcome the signing of Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Although it is only a partial treaty and does not by itself carry us for towards disarmament nevertheless it is extremely significant. It represents the first breaking of the ice presented by the cold war."

Nowadays India is engaged with a serious problem at home. In the light of Indo-China and Indo-Pak war of 1962 and 1965 respectively, the question arises that to disarm or reduce arms, how could it be safe politically and economically for India. No doubt in the present situation having the two enemies at once, India cannot maintain her territorial integrity without the help of armed forces.

1. The Committee of 18 Nations on Disarmament (excluding France) met in Geneva in 1962 to discuss the question of disarmament. Both the U.S.S.R. and U.S.A. brought forward concrete proposals, the former in a draft treaty for general and complete disarmament and the later in a four point plan as the first step in reaching the agreed goal. For years together, meetings are being held but till now nothing has come out of it.


INDIA AND THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION:

Ever since the San Francisco Conference India has become a most consistent defender of the great principles of the United Nations Charter. She realises that this Organization is an essential instrument of peaceful co-operation and a means to bring about desirable changes, as well to promote peaceful settlement of international disputes. Dr. Radhakrishnan told the special session of the General Assembly on 10th June, 1963:

"The United Nations Organization symbolises the hopes and aspirations of the peoples of the world for a central authority which can control the activities of all nations eventually. The United Nations hopes to supply that soul or that conscience to the world community which is emerging."  

India looks upon the United Nations as a great centre for organizing welfare activities on an internal scale. India believes that this organization can help the member states "in regard to such basic matters as human rights, freedom of dependent peoples, and the development of economically backward areas."

Jawaharlal Nehru heartily believed in the utility of the UNO. In an address to the United Nations General Assembly in

Paris November 3, 1948, he told "...we adhere completely and absolutely to the principles and purposes of the UN Charter and that we shall try to the best of our ability to work for the realization of those purposes and principles." It was his faith in the charter that made him take the subjects of Indians in South Africa to the General Assembly. It was the same faith that made him refer the Kashmir issue to the Security Council.

"For the achievement of the most of her foreign policy objectives, India has envoked the UN principally as a vehicle of communications." India's approach to all controversial political questions in the United Nations has been motivated by this basic objective. From the Korean War, 1950, down to the Cuban crisis, 1962, India has all along tried to maintain contacts between the power blocs preferably through the U.N. and seek a negotiated settlement. India's special role was fully recognized by both the power blocs in the international commissions in Korea as well as in Indo-China. India has been able to remove much misunderstanding between the disputants helping, thereby the U.N. to restore peace.

At the same time in 1956 India participated in United Nations Emergency Force and in 1958 in United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon. In 1961 India sent a brigade of combatant

troops of about 6000 and air Unit to UN Force in Congo. On problems like, peaceful employment of atomic energy, universal disarmament and test ban, India has always supported all progressive view points in UNO for an early settlement. India has all along defined the threat of nuclear war as the most crucial problem of mankind. Nehru set this particular problem vigorously, even at the risk of losing his popularity, at the Belgrade neutral summit. The efforts of India and the four neutral power's to carryout a resolution on US - USSR summit negotiations through the General Assembly in 1960 was caused by the same objective to save mankind from 'thermo-nuclear' extinction arising out of the East West Cold War. India has tried its best to maintain peace and disarmament through the UNO and has taken interest in Geneva negotiations of 17 nations.

India has always, desired United Nations "to develop into a true instrument of world-wide prestige" with as broad-based a membership as possible. India seeks United Nations protection so that weaker nations do not suffer for their backwardness. "For India the United Nations .... is less a court of appeal or a forum that can meet out ready-made justice than the symbol of universal assembly of Nations living and working in cooperation with one another....."

Testifying to the effective and useful part that India has played in the work of United Nations, a member of the United Kingdom delegation to the IVth Session of the General Assembly stated that India was, "an effective and balancing influence in world affairs so far as the United Nations Organization is concerned."

India's approach to the United Nations Organization has, therefore, been all along been the strengthening the principles of the United Nations charter. India wants the United Nation Organization to be as universal as possible and act as an world organization to remove all sources of international tensions; like colonialism, racialism, economic inequality and differences in standard of living among nations. India's role in the UN has thus greatly strengthened the World Organization in its solemn efforts to maintain international peace and promote human welfare.

INDIA AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS:

The Commonwealth of Nations is an association of the independent sovereign states each responsible for its own policies, but the primary objective of all is world peace and security. The nature of India's relation with the Commonwealth


2. "In all the countries of Commonwealth, the constant objective of policy is to promote peace and economic progress throughout the world and thus to help to create conditions in which mankind can flourish in freedom un fettered by poverty, ignorance or disease." Foreign Policy of India, Text of Documents 1947-64, Lok Sabha Secretariat, Text of third Commonwealth Prime Minister conference final communique, issued in London on September 15, 1962.
engaged the attention of the Indian nationalists during the pre-independence period. In 1946, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, the then President of the Indian National Congress told the Cabinet Mission that, "If the question was left to India, it was not unlikely that India might decide in favour of continuing in the Commonwealth."

The decision arrived at the conference of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers in London, 1949, is of historic importance. It enabled India to remain a member of the Commonwealth inspite of her declaration to become a sovereign independent Republic. It was declared by the Prime Minister of India on the 27th April, 1949 that in view of the historic decision reached at the Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference, the Republic of India shall be glad to continue her membership of the Commonwealth as that was best in the interest of India and the world. Speaking in the constituent Assembly on 16th May 1949, Nehru said:

"We join the Commonwealth obviously because we think it is beneficial to us and to certain causes in the world that we wish to advance." He thought it easier for India, "to develop closest relation with other countries while we are in the Commonwealth then it might have been otherwise........the

Commonwealth does not come in the way of our co-operation and friendship with other countries." The Commonwealth link, Nehru felt, would help India's speedy progress economically and otherwise to promote peace. Nehru at a Press Conference at Madras said, "India's Commonwealth contacts had widened the understanding of India and thus lessened friction in the world." Obviously without this link, he said, "It will be a for more difficult task and will take much longer time. It is not an easy matter to do that."

India agreed to remain in the Commonwealth because the association fully confirmed to the underlying principles of her foreign policy in particular of removing discord and bringing about harmony among nations. No doubt Commonwealth membership was accepted not so much for sentimental reasons, as for the tangible advantage believed to occur from it both in the national and international spheres. As Karmakaran puts it "It was obvious that talking into account India's economic defence and scientific interests, it would be to the advantage of India to continue to remain in the Commonwealth at least for

4. As Nehru believed that Commonwealth was "against war" and worked on the whole for "peace". Amrit Bazar Patrika (Calcutta), November 13, 1948.
sometimes to come; nothing would be gained by going out of the Commonwealth at this stage."

One apprehensive cloud darkened the sky. Prime Minister Nehru did not have the undivided support of all India in his masterly move to stay within the Commonwealth. Mr Sarad Bose, Leader of the Socialist Republicans, spoke of the declaration of Nehru, to remain in the commonwealth, 'the great blunder.' Jaya Prakash Narain asserted that his party would take advantage of the opportunity to undo this great international blunder. The opposition parties of India feared that India was endangered by imperialism as long as she retained her contacts with the Commonwealth. Answering the Communist criticism in the Parliament Pandit Nehru said: "We are in commonwealth, I think because it is good for us and good for the causes which we wish to support and because it does not come in our way at all in the policies that we pursue, and it is ....... and might be helpful." In Kalyani Session of the Congress party, 1954, he remarked: "We are pressed with unfailing regularity to leave the Commonwealth without being cold what good this will bring us."

The opposition parties have oftenly criticized India's membership of the Commonwealth on several occasions. Three

3. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
important opposition parties, the Communist Party, the Hindu Mahasabha and the P.S.P. vehemently opposed the association of India with the Commonwealth. The issue of terminating the Commonwealth convention was raised in Rajya Sabha by S.N. Mazumdar Communist member, on the ground that it was in consistent with Panch Sheela. The political resolution adopted at Maduri Congress, 1953, said:

"A full free India outside the Commonwealth and outside all imperialist influence will be a great factor for world peace and the freedom of all Asian and colonial peoples."

The P.S.P., was also opposed to the connexion because the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth members have paid scant regard to India's vital interests and sided with India's opponents e.g. Britain's support to Pakistan on the Kashmir issue and to Portugal on Goa question. The Hindu Mahasabha and Jan Sangh were also strongly opposed to the Commonwealth link on account of British Imperialist policy in Anglo-French aggression on Egypt. At the All India Congress Committee meeting at Calcutta, Mr. Alguri Shastri demanded withdrawal


2. Mr. Surendra Nath Diwedy, PSP leader, maintained that India should leave the commonwealth, not only on account of sentimental reasons but because of very practical reasons. See, Janata, (Bombay), August 25, 1957, p.5.

3. The Hindu Mahasabha in its 1957 election manifesto demanded India's withdrawal from Commonwealth due to British policy in Egypt, Britain's failure to support India on the Kashmir and Goa question, and racial discrimination against people of Indian origin in many Commonwealth countries.
from the Commonwealth on the ground that it would be a 'warning to all aggressors'. By remaining in the Commonwealth, he asserted, India was "in danger of being tarnished." The attitude of some of the countries towards India vis-a-vis Pakistan with regard to Kashmir also made the public opinion against Commonwealth in 1967. Mr. Raj Gopal Achari wanted India to quit Commonwealth on the issue of stoppage of the British nuclear tests, "to break away over Kashmir would have been selfish and wrong," he said, "equally to remain in Commonwealth now would be a share to guilt of a crime whose magnitude can only be guessed."

Now the question was that whether India should continue in the Commonwealth or not? Nehru was, however, still convinced that India should continue the connection. He reiterated his old arguments and said that since the association was not positively harmful to us it was better to keep it. Speaking in the Lok Sabha, he asserted, "Despite the painful shocks which the present India has experienced it was desirable in/ context to continue

this association with the commonwealth." Again in his speech on July 23, 1957, he said "...how our being in the Common-wealth has in practice injured our policies in the advocacy of any cause that we hold dear? It has helped us in influencing others and has helped us in regard to other matters too....I am against breaking any kind of association." Nehru has insisted that "the Commonwealth helps to support the causes India supports, that it is not an obstacle to Indian foreign policies."

The British action relating to India vis-a-vis Pakistan again provoked better denunciation at all levels of public opinion and also a demand to quit commonwealth was made. Acharya Kriplani said, at a public meeting in New Delhi in September 1965 that India should quit the Commonwealth to teach Britain a lesson for her spearheading anti-India and pro-Pakistani moves whenever India and Pakistan involved in a conflict.

Apart from the above discussion, independent India's role as a member of Commonwealth has been notable and has been a credit and source of power to the Commonwealth of Nations. It introduced a profound change in the conception of Commonwealth. It carried the anti-imperialist and anti-rationalist policies

4. The Times of India (New Delhi), September 23, 1965.
into the very heart of this unique association. The British Commonwealth Secretary remarked on his visit to India that “nowhere had the growth of Indian influence in world affairs been more widely welcomed than in the United Kingdom and nowhere Prime Minister Nehru’s efforts, to relax world tensions more greatly valued.” He also stated that at the time of his stay in India he did not notice any weakening of ‘alliance’ to the Commonwealth. “The most constructive and original thought at present time on the Commonwealth comes perhaps from India. . . . In many ways the Indian thinking is new.” India’s role in Commonwealth possesses the purpose of championing causes that aim at strengthening its position and lifting the economic level of the small and unprivileged and unfree peoples of the Afro-Asian world.

SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS:

Foreign policy essentially means a bundle of rules governing the relationship of nations with other countries including its neighbours and it also reflects the attitudes and responses towards different international events. In the context of relationships with neighbourly states Indian foreign policy will have

3. Ibid., December 2, 1955.
to be judged against the background of its relations with
China and Pakistan, which have been challenging India's terri-
torial integrity.

An analysis of India's foreign policy towards China in
the post independence years will make us believe that it was
India and not the Communist China that offered the hand of
friendship, and when China appeared to fall in line with India's
aims, as is evident from the "Hindi-Chini, Bhai Bhai" slogan
which was very popular in the mid-fifties, was more to the
interests of China than India. No doubt India was the first
country which recognized China on December 30, 1949. The
writings and speeches of Nehru show that China always fascinated
him very much. He was greatly attracted to its history, its
"greatness" its being a "world power or would be world power"
"mighty power" sitting on our borders.

On June 28, 1954, India and China came to an agreement
in which they laid down certain principles which should guide the
relations between the two countries. On November 28, 1956 Chou
En-Lai said, "The friendship and co-operation between India and
China were the first to initiate the five principles of peace

1. Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, (Delhi, 1961), pp. 363, 375.
2. Foreign Policy of India, Text of first India China joint
statement: Issued in New Delhi on June 28, 1954, p.294; Chou-En-Lai, the Prime Minister of China and Jawarharlal
Nehru Indian Prime Minister signed an agreement which con-
tains five principles, known as Panch Shila, (i) Mutual
respect for each others territorial integrity and sovereignty;
(ii) Non-Agression; (iii) Non-interference in each others
internal affairs; (iv) equality and mutual benefit;(v) peace-
ful co-existence.
co-existence, are of special significance to the promotion of world peace, and international co-operation."

The border dispute which came to light in 1969 shook the nation and India's non-alignment and neutralism was put to hard test and the whole complexion of Indian political life underwent a drastic change. Nehru confessed, in December 1969, that he "did not expect" there would be "aggression" by China. India changed its policy to make a delayed attempt at stemming the tide of Chinese expansionism at its second line of defence. Nehru having already declared, "The Mac Mohan Line is our boundary, map or no map. We will not allow any body to come across the boundary." India took it "for granted" that by now in international politics, the rule of Jungle had been replaced by that of law, and that "naked" and "massive invasions" were "a thing of the past."

The real crisis in Indian foreign policy started with the massive Chinese attack on India during September-November 1962. It seeked and shocked the nation as nothing else had done before. The Chinese unwarranted questioned India's strength, disturbed its stability and threatened its independence. The

1. Ibid., p. 296.
2. Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, op.cit., p. 359.
policy of Non-alignment was bitterly attacked. Tehran Journal declared, "Ironically enough the champion of neutrality, India has been attacked by the armed forces of communist China. The Communist aggression of India once again proves that neutrality has been ruled out by international circumstances." Thus casting off the cloak of non-alignment the Indian Government has openly begged for military aid from the United States of America and is receiving a continuous supply of arms.

The fundamentals of India's policy were now open to questions. The Prime Minister himself said that India had been "living in an artificial atmosphere of our own creation." The concept of non-alignment had little meaning, Indians felt, when Indian was attacked by a Communist power. Speaking in the Lok Sabha, N.C.Ranga said: "Non-alignment has not served us; does not serve us any longer. The sooner we get rid of it, the better; the sooner we turn out back to it, the better." But according to some other the Chinese invasion brought to the forefront the wisdom of India's non-alignment policy. Jai Prakash Narain, at a news conference in Delhi November 3, 1962,

3. The Indian Express (New Delhi), November 1, 1962.
said that the policy of non-alignment "needed no change" and "was not questioned by any of India's friends." According to him, "The real culprit was the mental and emotional alignment that went about in garb of non-alignment." The Communist Party was also in favour of non-alignment. In its Central Executive Committee resolution it was stated that, "The Committee firmly believes that the policy of non-alignment far from obstructing or weakening national defence is on the contrary vital for India's defence. C. Rajagopalachari, an Statesman of India, stated that "non-alignment of India's part was an excellent policy which helped world peace as long as neither party made aggression on India." He further says that non-alignment is a "moral policy connected with the peace of the world" and that "it is very ridiculous, therefore, for people to defend it by saying that it had paid good dividends." It was thought and feared that in attempt to strengthen its defence vis-a-vis China India would move towards the Western camp and non-alignment alone would help to keep India away from the Western camp. So the non-alignment was to remain India's official policy. The border conflict of Himalya's had already caused great damage to the unity and cohesion of the Afro-Asian countries in their joint struggle against imperialism and colonialism. They were very anxious about this position. And in order to break the conflict and to

4. Ibid.
provide a basis of agreed cease-fire arrangements, the leaders of the six Asian-African countries, viz., Ceylon, Burma, the U.A.R., Ghana, Indonesia and Cambodia, drew up certain proposals at the Colombo Conference, 10th and 12th December, aimed at achieving a peaceful settlement of the conflict. The conference expressed the hope that its proposal would contribute to the consolidation of the Armistice and would pave the way to the negotiations between the two countries.

In fact the proposals of the Colombo Conference were nothing but a friendly recommendation of states which are sincerely striving to help in finding a mutually acceptable solution for the dispute. They were used to lure India into her belief that it was possible to ward off the Chinese menace through negotiations with Peking.

India suggested various constructive steps to resolve the problem including international arbitration in a note dated 3rd April 1963. In a note on 9 October 1963, after six months, Chinese rejected the suggestions and accused India of having proposed these steps "to make negotiations impossible by setting up an array of obstacles." The Government of India

sent another note on 16 October 1963 with the hope that, "Wiser counsels would prevail and the Chinese Government would revert to the paths of peace." But, unfortunately, the voice of reason expressing the will of Afro-Asian peoples was not heeded to in Peking. The rejection of the various proposals led to a deadlock in the India-China relations which still persists.

**INDO-PAK RELATIONS:**

Pakistan judging from the situation prevailing at the moment, seems to be the most uncompromising and unfriendly neighbour. The problem of Pakistan is no doubt so much a product of past history and the present internal situation in that country that there is no quick or simple solution to it. India's relation with Pakistan were of great significance. From the beginning these relations were not very friendly. As Michael Brecher observed, "India and Pakistan have been in a state of undeclared war, with varying degrees of intensity, throughout their brief history as independent states."

The Indian Government claims that its policy towards Pakistan has not been different from its general policy towards all other nations, a policy of mutual friendship and accommodation irrespective of political, ideological and other differences.


In a message to the Press on 16 August 1947, Prime Minister Nehru said, "I want to say to all nations of the world, including our neighbour country, that we stand for peace and friendship with them." In a speech at the Indian Council of World Affairs on March 1949, Nehru said: "There is no doubt at all in my mind that it is inevitable for India and Pakistan to have close relations, very close relations sometimes or other in the future. I cannot state when this will take place but situated as we are, with all our past we cannot be just indifferent neighbours. We can be either rather hostile to each other or very friendly with each other. Ultimately we can only be really very friendly, whatever period of hostility may intervene between us because our interests are so closely interlinked." Indeed the essence of India's policy towards Pakistan was its attempt to live in peace with this dissatisfied neighbour. In a broadcast, the Governor-General of Pakistan M.A. Jinnah said, "We want to live peacefully and maintain cordial friendly relations with our immediate neighbours and with world at large." The President of Pakistan General Ayub Khan on September 1, 1969 at New Delhi said:


"Being next-door neighbour, my submission is that whatever might have happened in the past, the time has come when we should think of having more national and neighbourly relations with each other. I have a feeling that it will be in each other's interests." But inspite of these friendly declarations the story of these two countries relations became 'one of discord - sometimes latent, sometimes manifest, but discord all the same.'

KASHMIR:

Apart from other major problems that clouded healthy relations between India and Pakistan, the problem of Kashmir is the most important. It is that dispute in which India has been involved since Independence. It is important to India because it involves an issue fundamental to the secular basis of the Republic. "Here lies the last field of battle over the ideological cleavage which rent the subcontinent as under in 1947. Here is the final test of the validity the two-nation theory, the basis of Pakistan and its continuing resent etc."

The Kashmir issue—principal bones of contention between India and Pakistan was brought before the Security Council on 31 December 1947 in the wake of massive infiltration of Pakistani

1. Foreign Policy of India, op.cit., Extract Text of first India Pakistan Joint Statement, Issued in New Delhi on September 1,1969, p.364.


troops into the territory of Jammu and Kashmir. Despite the best efforts of the United Nations, the problem could not be solved on account of the uncompromising attitude of Pakistani delegates. Even the UN Commission for India and Pakistan (UNC-1P) and three distinguished mediators failed to provide a solution to the Kashmir issue.

The accession of Kashmir is entirely in conformity with the Indian Independence Act, passed by the Parliament in 1947. Kashmir acceded to India on 26 October 1947 when Maharaja Hari Singh signed the instrument of Accession to India which was accepted by the Governor-General on behalf of the crown. Thus the accession of Kashmir to India is as valid as the accession of any other state. According to Nehru, "....Kashmir has at no time been recognized as a sovereign state under international law. It has always been considered an integral part of India...."

India always rejected the theory of nationhood which is the fundamental basis of Pakistan claim to Kashmir. Mr. Chagla in his speech in the Security Council said, "We recognize India and Pakistan as two nations, but we have repudiated the two-nation theory based on religion.... We refuse to subscribe to the

1. For details see Sisir Gupta, Kashmir, A Study in India-Pakistan Relations, New Delhi, Asia Publishing House, 1966.
3. Ibid.
theory that religion can be the sole basis of national unity. We believe in a multi-rational, multi-communal and multi-linguistic society and goodwill in this world depend upon the success of such a society."

To Pakistan, which claims to be an Islamic State. The possession of Kashmir is vital as the fulfilment of the ideal upon which Pakistan rests, a national home and a nation-state for the Muslims of the sub-continent. "Kashmir is vital for Pakistan, not only politically but militarily as well. Kashmir is a matter of life and death." This is what President Ayub Khan said in 1959, "Kashmir is important to us or our physical as well as economic security." Again he said in a statement at Dacca on 18 October that, "Kashmir was a life and death question for Pakistan, and without the solution of this problem we can not be assured of the safety of our territory, especially the Western Wing of our territory." To Nehru, "Kashmir is jurisdic-

ally and politically an integral part of India and at no time have the United Nation's Commission and Security Council challenged this fact." "The whole Jammu and Kashmir including the part occupied by Pakistan is a part of the Indian Union.....there should be no negotiations with Pakistan by any country which

2. This was what President Ayub Khan said at Karachi on July 19, 1961, See, Pakistan Times, July 19, 1961.
implies recognition of the occupied part of Jammu and Kashmir as part of Pakistan territory." No doubt, "the position which India acquired in Kashmir ....... with enough legal and moral sanction ....... is a part of reality and has a natural bearing on the problem."

The main event in Indo-Pakistan relations is the extensive infiltration by armed Pakistanis along the cease-fire line in the Jammu and Kashmir, in which they freely used the arms supplied them by the United States and the SEATO and CENTO powers. No doubt the root cause of the conflict was a large measure due to the frustration of Pakistan over the fact that international mediation had failed to give her control over Kashmir.

"The war had been indecisive; the armies of India and Pakistan were more or less intact; though Pakistan has lost a considerable number of their well-publicized American tanks; 740 square miles of Pakistan's territory were under Indian occupation while 210 square miles of Indian territory were under Pakistani occupation."

1. New Age (New Delhi), February 26, 1961, p.4.
4. "India's Foreign Policy After Nehru," A Appadorai, Essays in Indian Politics and Foreign Policy, op.cit., p. 165.
5. Ibid., p. 170.
While the two countries were thus engaged in a bloody war, the Russian Prime Minister offered his good offices to arrange direct talks between the Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan at Tashkent.

THE TASHKENT DECLARATION:

The Tashkent Meeting commenced from 4th January 1966. It was hoped that the Tashkent meeting would better the relations between India and Pakistan. In a generating Tashkent meeting Prime Minister Kosygin hopefully remarked that this meeting would "mark a turning point in the relation between Pakistan and India .......what is important is to chart the path leading towards their settlement, to create climate of trust and mutual understanding and simultaneously to solve those questions which today constitute an obstacle to normalizing the relations."

In his opening speech on the occasion Prime Minister Shastri expressed the hope that it should be "our endeavour to try to open a new chapter in Indo-Pak relationship.......our objective at this meeting should not be retribution but a new look towards the future." President Ayub Khan very hopefully said that his forthcoming meeting with Shastri at Tashkent "could prove a turning point in the history of the sub-continent."

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1. Tashkent Declaration, New Delhi, Government of India External Publicity Division, 1966, also see, Foreign Affairs Reports, January 1960, pp. 1-6.
2. Ibid.
was no decision on Kashmir. According to the Pakistani Spokesman, 'Jammu and Kashmir' was "the root cause of the trouble." If it was not settled Indo-Pakistani relations would collapse.

Thanks to the Soviet Prime Minister's good offices, the Tashkent declaration was agreed upon and signed on 10th January by the heads of both the countries, India and Pakistan. It has two objects. Firstly, to provide for the immediate resumption of normal friendly relations between India and Pakistan.... Secondly, in regard to the future, clause I provided inter alia.

The declaration also embodies several decisions aiming at normalization of relation between the two countries. Though during the discussion the prospects of an agreement between India and Pakistan looked gloomy, but the final outcome gave cheer and hope to the whole world.

Commenting on this Times of India in its editorial observed that the declaration would undoubtedly a turning point in the relation between India and Pakistan. The Hindu in its editorial observed that the declaration was a signal contribution.

1. See, The Statesman (Delhi); and The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), January 5, 1966. The London Economist, Commenting on the reaction to the Tashkent Agreement said "The prevailing reaction is easy to understand, given the diet of illusion with which the people have been fed since the beginning of the fighting in Kashmir right up to the eve of Tashkent Declaration." January 22, 1966, p. 298.
4. The Times of India (New Delhi), January 11, 1966.
to peace in the sub-continent. It promises the start of a new era in the relations between the two countries. The Pakistan news paper Dawn stated that the Tashkent talks have achieved as much as they could possibly be expected to do in the context of the existing state of the Indo-Pakistan relations. The Indian Ambassador in Moscow, Mr. Kaul, said "The Tashkent Agreement marked a reversal of Lord Curzon's policy of keeping Russia out of the sub-continent."

The real nature of the Tashkent Agreement has either been over-estimated or under-estimated. Both in India as well Pakistan, interpretations have been given which are diametically opposed to each other's point of view. "If we closely analyse the Tashkent Declaration it appears to be a compromise formula."

The Indian delegation thought that the significance of the Tashkent Declaration is not that it resolves all outstanding differences between India and Pakistan, but that despite the existence of differences the two countries have pledged to live together in peace as neighbours.

2. Dawn (Karachi), January 11, 1966; The Tribune, (Ambala); January 11, 1966; National Herald (Lucknow), January 12, 1966; The Indian Express, also supported the spirit and nature of declaration. See Ibid., January 11, 1966.
3. The Statesman (Delhi), March 7, 1966.
4. See, the then President Radhakrishnan's broadcast on Republic Day, The Times of India, January 28, 1966; also see, Daily Telegraph (London), January 12, 1966.
5. The Times of India (New Delhi), January 11, 1966.
On the other hand Pakistan's reaction was different. They thought that the declaration did not go far enough nor made it clear that the basic cause of the conflict would be settled. They did not looked upon this as a victory of Pakistan or India, but a victory of common sense. According to Pakistan foreign office "the Declaration opened three avenues for a peaceful solution of the Kashmir dispute. Firstly the implementation of clause 4 of the UN Security Council resolution of September 20, 1965; Secondly direct negotiations provided under paragraph 9 of the Tashkent Declaration; and thirdly continuing with the good office provided by the Soviet Union which emerged as the key faction in the success of the Tashkent conference." In a Statement from Rawalpindi four very important opposition leaders, the Declaration was denounced as it provides for renunciation of force by Pakistan.

"The more immediate gains of Tashkent Declaration" Appadorai remarked can easily be recounted. As the Prime Minister of India and President of Pakistan agreed in Declaration: (a) all armed personnel of the two countries were withdrawn before 26 February 1966 to the position they held prior to 6 August 1965; (b) the High Commissioner of India and Pakistan returned to

1. *Dawn* (Karachi), January 11, 1966. The editorial says: "This is not as much as to say that the prescriptions offered by the joint Declaration are adequate to the requirements of a very difficult situation or that they are capable of establishing by themselves, lasting peace in the region." and "Pakistan's hope was that two countries would agree on a self-executing procedure that might help avoid deadlocks in future efforts to settle the dispute, this hope has not been fulfilled."

2. Ibid.

their posts and the normal functioning of diplomatic missions of both countries which had been disrupted by the conflict, was resorted; (c) the repatriation of prisoners of war was arranged.

The Tashkent meeting and the declaration, no doubt, constitute "a unique experiment in international diplomacy." This in itself is a remarkable achievement which reverses the trends of the past 17 years and marks a new era in the relations between the two countries. The Tashkent Declaration is a monument to the late Prime Minister Shastri's wisdom, statesmen and love of peace. This Declaration is his last gift to our nation. It is up to us to live up to his expectations. But apart this the relation between the two countries as unfortunate as ever. The Tashkent Declaration has not made any change in the stand of Pakistan with regard to Kashmir. India's gestures of peace of cooperation have been regarded by Pakistan as attempts to "confuse the Pakistans." The Declaration is not a lasting solution to the problem between the two countries. Again India is facing a threat of aggression from across the northern border.

However, there is vital difference inasmuch as today the very concept of Pakistan lies buried in the mass graves of East Bengal.


2. It was remarked by the Prime Minister Shastri after signing the declaration and reported by The Times of India (New Delhi), January 11, 1966.

3. The President of Pakistan, Mr. Z.A. Bhutto, on June 5, 1966 said that "We are fully aware of the treacherous nature of India and we do not want to endanger the existence of Pakistan in the name of Co-operation."
Fresh preparations and a heavy military build-up are reportedly taking place along the cease-fire line and the international border. The Pakistan army is reported to have set-up new strategic position along the Uri-Formch bridge, which they had lost in the 1965 conflict. During the last three months, military manoeuvres have been observed along the sector across from Kargil in Ladakh to Chamb Julian in Jammu. In fact the situation is too complex.

**INDO-NEPAL RELATIONS:**

The Indo-Nepal relations are the outcome of historical, political and cultural positions and the external pressures of powerful neighbours. Nepal occupies a key position between India and China. In view of the Chinese attack on the Indian territory India's security and stability are tied up with the security and stability of Nepal. Nehru in a speech in the Parliament on December 6, 1950 said "..... Our interest in the condition of Nepal has become more still acute and personal in view of the developments across our border in China and Tibet." He again said that "apart from our symphathetic interest in Nepal, we were also interested in the security of our own country."


2. J.J. Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 436.

3. Ibid.
So it is understood that the policy of Government of India towards Nepal has also been guided by strategic positions. India fully supported Nepal to meet effectively the Communist challenge. This awareness has determined India's policy toward Nepal and to a great extent. Lately India and Nepal were not seeing things eye to eye. The distrust between the two countries was a legacy of the imperialist powers. The most striking incident which greatly hurt the Indian feelings was the silent attitude of Nepal on the Indo-China conflict of 1962. The Indo-Nepal relations were at the lowest ebb from 1961 to 1964. The relation between the two countries have gradually taken a good turn and further improved by the visit of Mrs. Indira Gandhi to Nepal in 1966.

Recently India and Nepal signed a new five year trade and transit Treaty on August 13, 1971. The treaty "ushers in a new era of understanding and the problems which clouded Indo-Nepal relations in the past have been solved." The treaty is expected to usher in an era of harmonious relations between the two countries.

2. The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), August 14, 1971.