CHAPTER-II
Zionism split into two factions after the death of Herzl in 1904. One supported Herzl's view that the main problem was that of international sanction and the achievement... of an immediate solution to the Jewish Question. The solution of the problem either lay in Palestine or somewhere else. This group came to be known as that of the 'Politicals'. The other faction, strongly influenced by the cultural revivalism of the 'Lovers of Zion Societies, rejected the idea of the building of a Jewish home or a nation in any place other than Palestine. These people were referred to as the 'practicals'. The practicals demonstrated greater show of strength at the seventh Zionist Congress in 1905. A resolution was adopted in which it was declared that Zionism was concerned solely with Palestine.¹ The titles attached to these two groups were of the time of Uganda proposal but they are misleading. Both the factions drew their strength from political Zionism. The only difference was, while one emphasized legalization the other stressed colonization of Palestine, and this was historical cultural romanticism. Eventually, the two trends political realism and romantic nationalism were to merge and form one

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platform. Later, the third element of the programme, i.e. the rallying of world Jewry to the cause, was to become a major Zionist concern in view of the fact that in 1914 only 13,000 of the 13,000,000 million Jews in the world were Zionists.2

Consequently Herzl's three point programme, namely, (1) the promotion of an organized, large-scale Jewish colonization of Palestine, (2) the acquisition of an internationally recognized legal right to colonize Palestine, and (3) the formation of a permanent organization to unite all Jews in the cause of Zionism,3 held together. From 1905 to 1914, colonization of Palestine continued gradually and, at the outbreak of World War I, fifty nine Jewish colonies with some 12,000 inhabitants existed in Palestine.4 There was also a group of Jews who attached greater importance to political recognition. These Jews moved to England in search of sympathetic support.5

Zionist Diplomacy and World War I:

Herzl had regarded England as a potential ally of Zionism. After Herzl’s death, the interest of Zionists in England increased over the decade.6 This interest intensified. The Zionists were quick to perceive that England could be helpful in what had been till now a futile search for unlimited immigration into Palestine and that the establishment of a recognized and legalized Zionist political status could now be successful. Immediately, England became the uppermost concern of the Zionist organization.

Chaim Weizmann was a Russian Jew and Chemist by profession. He moved to England in 1904. He was destined to become the new leader of the Zionist movement. Weizmann had the conviction that British were the most promising potential sympathizers of Zionism. He, in 1905, initiated a diplomatic offensive for establishing a rapport with British politicians. He met Arthur Balfour7 and later Balfour recalled Weizmann, as "the man who made me a Zionist".8


Weizmann, initially a member of the 'practical' faction of the Zionist Organization was the chief dispenser of fusion of the factions within political Zionism. The deadlock between the 'politicals' and the 'practicals' had been broken at the Eighth Congress in 1907, and, with the advent of the World War I, Weizmann's 'organic' Zionism became predominant. The three point programme of Herzl i.e. organization, recognition and colonization, gained in prominence, and the 'synthesis', as it is sometimes called, was symbolized in the person of Dr. Weizmann. Weizmann had a developed sense of the importance of Gentile support of this time when it was so vital to Zionism to win such support. Weizmann already in 1907 had shown his awareness of the importance of Gentile recognition of Zionism, "political Zionism means: to make the Jewish question an international one. It means going to the nations and saying to them: 'We need your help to achieve our aim...'."

Once the decision was taken to concentrate Zionist activity on winning England as Zionism's ally, Weizmann was

10. Ibid., p.122.
joined by two of the leading Zionists on the continent - Sokolow and Tselenow. Two important directions were envisaged in Zionist plan: (1) the winning of British Jews to Zionism, a task which Weizmann had begun just before the war by interesting the Rothschilds in a project to found a university in Palestine, (2) winning over of friends for Zionism among the top leaders in the British Government.

Weizmann started cultivating new contacts though he had already met Balfour in 1914 which was of little consequence, since Balfour was not a cabinet member. There was a chance meeting in 1914 between Weizmann and C.P. Scott, then editor of the Manchester Guardian. Weizmann immediately won Scott to the cause of Zionism and Scott introduced Weizmann, Sokolow and Tschenow to Lloyd George and Herbert Samuel, both members of the cabinet. Lloyd George and Samuel, the latter a Jew himself, showed sympathy and thus began a period of Zionist diplomatic preparation designed to muster British support.

The conversion of Balfour and Scott to the Zionist cause exemplifies the phenomenon of Gentile Zionism. Arnold Toynbee offers two explanations. First, he suggests that the pro-Zionist inclinations of some Gentiles may be derived from a sense of guilt arising out of a subconscious anti-Semitism. He also attributes Gentile Zionism in Anglo-Saxon countries to a characteristically "Anglo Saxon" attitude of combining an unavowed yet patent Machiavellianism with a suspect yet sincere Quixortry... Christopher Sykes offers Christian millenarianism as an explanation of Gentile Zionism in England.

Certainly many Christians supported Zionism because they felt that Biblical prophesy foretells the restoration of the Jew to Palestine.

Thus, if Christians have supported Zionism on religious grounds, what is most surprising is that they have enquired into the biblical justification for Zionism with so uncritical and so unsearching an eye.

16. Ibid., VIII, 308, footnote. As cited by Taylor, n.12, p.11.
17. Sykes, n.7, pp.149-152.
18. Taylor, n.12, p.11.
It may be further explained that the willingness of the Gentile to go out of their way to assist Zionism arises out of a confusion in their minds as to the relationship between Zionism and liberalism. Many Gentiles have supported Zionism with the conviction that they are serving the cause of racial tolerance by so doing. As a matter of fact, it has been the assimilationist Jews who sought a liberal solution to racism, while the Zionists sought a national solution. Yet the confusion in the minds of Gentiles has existed, and this served partially to explain their pro-Zionist leanings.\(^{19}\)

In November 1914, just one month before his meeting with Samuel and Llyod George, Dr. Weizmann outlined the Zionist position to be laid before the British Government. This contained in a letter to Scott, which read:

...we can reasonably say that should Palestine fall within the British sphere of influence, and should Britain encourage Jewish settlement there, as a British dependency, we could have in twenty to thirty years a million Jews out there, perhaps more; they would developed the country, bring back civilization to it and form a very effective guard to the Suez Canal.\(^{20}\)

\(^{19}\) Ibid., p.11-12.

\(^{20}\) Weizmann, n.5, p.149.
This idea of Weizmann developed into Zionism's war policy. Its aims were: (1) an Allied victory (2) the establishment of a British mandate in Palestine (3) an understanding that such a British mandate would then facilitate the entry of a million or more Jews into Palestine within a period of twenty to thirty years after the mandate was established, and (4) an understanding that the mandate would terminate in a Jewish controlled Palestine which could continue to serve Britain's interest in the Suez Canal by acting as a bulwark for the defence of that waterway. It is interesting to note that all four points have been fulfilled. 21

Lloyd George and Herbert Samuel started lending a helping hand to Weizmann in order to enlist the support of the British government. Herbert Samuel who was pro Zionist before his meeting with Weizmann presented the subject of the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine to Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary. 22 Grey agreed to work to fulfill such a task and joined the ranks of pro-zionists in the British Government.

22. The ESCO Foundation, no.3, 1, p.81.
Now the stage was set when the pro-Zionist case was put forward for the British Cabinet support. The then Prime Minister, Herbert Asquith was committed to a policy of replacing the Turks with the Arabs as friends of Great Britain in the Near East.\(^{23}\) The leaders of assimilated British Jewry became active in opposing the idea of the establishment of a Jewish home as an answer to the Jewish Question. They were of the opinion that the national postulate of Zionism would only promote anti-Semitism and that they could not open discussions with a Zionist Organization which contained members in enemy countries.\(^ {24}\) Consequently the Zionists embarked upon an extensive propaganda campaign. This was aimed at to muster supporters among British Jews and non-Jews, and to create the impression that the majority of world Jewry backed the Zionist cause. Herbert Sidebotham, a prominent English journalist associated with the Manchester Guardian and a pro-Zionist organised the British Palestine Committee to spread Zionist ideas throughout the United Kingdom.\(^ {25}\)

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24. Ibid., p.95.
25. Ibid., p.98.
Sidebotham was interested in Zionism from the British strategic point of view. 26

Dr. Weizmann stationed himself in London. It was here that he could be in close contact with government officials. In his first meeting with Lloyd George, Chairman of the War Munitions Committee, Weizmann had learned that the British Government was in need of a method to produce acetone for explosives in large quantities. 27 During 1915, Weizmann developed such a method and informed Scott of his success. Scott made several trips to London to persuade Lloyd George, Balfour and others to make use of Weizmann. 28 Finally Weizmann accompanied Scott to see Lloyd George, and, in February 1916, Weizmann was appointed to the admiralty under the supervision of Balfour. 29 Weizmann deliberately avoided the question of Zionism, but Balfour told Weizmann one day, you know after the war you may get your Jerusalem. 30

29. Ibid., p.99.
30. Ibid.
In the autumn of 1915, Mark Sykes had been appointed as Assistant Secretary to the War Cabinet. There were only two such positions, and the fact that Sykes was given charge primarily of Near Eastern officers made him a very important person in the eyes of Zionist recruiters. Some time before 1914, a British Zionist named Moses Gaster had exposed Sykes to the principles of Zionism and, according to Sykes himself, it was Gaster who converted him to the cause shortly after his appointment to the service of the War Cabinet.31

Sykes, on October 19, was approached by a pro-Zionist Armenian, one James Malcolm, probably, though not certainly, at the instigation of the Zionist Organisation. Malcolm succeeded in reviving Sykes sympathy for Zionism, stressing the fact that Justice Brandeis, a prominent American Zionist, had a special influence with President Wilson and could serve to help bring the United States into the War.32 Sykes heeded to this argument and petitioned the Cabinet on several occasion to enter direct negotiations with the Zionists. This the Cabinet finally agreed to do, but without

any previous commitments. Malcolm was appointed as the go-between, and the Zionists prepared themselves for action in the face of this climactic success.

The Zionists first request was granted i.e. they could use British communication facilities to contact Zionists throughout the world. This particular grant of Zionist request established a precedent of cooperation with the Zionists and making it impossible to reverse this policy, owing to the fact that the communications facilities were used to proclaim British support of Zionism throughout World Jewry. To reverse this support would have resulted in incurring the wrath of Zionist Jews the world over.

At this juncture of Zionist efforts and maneuverings a Zionist proposal was drawn up as the basis of negotiations with the British government. The document called "Programme for a New Administration of Palestine in Accordance with the Aspirations of the Zionist Movement" was put before the British Government. It contained the proposal of the establishment of a semi-governmental Jewish company in

33. Ibid., pp.187-188.
34. The ESCO Foundation, n.3, 1, pp.87-9.
Palestine under the suzerainty of Britain or France. The company was to have a national status and be allowed to encourage Jewish colonization of Palestine. The Zionist case rested on this proposal until December 1916, when Lloyd George replaced Asquith as Prime Minister and became leader of the Second Coalition Government. Lloyd George, as has been noted, had already been recruited to the Zionist cause, and thus the battle was really over. With the Prime Minister in the Zionist camp, and the appointment of Balfour, another pro-Zionist, to the headship of the Foreign Office, a British commitment to Zionism was assured.35

The Balfour Declaration:

Mark Sykes in February 1917, after the formation of the second coalition government of Britain, was designated to represent the government to enter into negotiations with the Zionists. The first meeting36 took place at the home of Moses Gaster who was instrumental in influencing Sykes in favour of Zionism. Gaster stated that the fulfilment of Zionist aim depended on England and could be realized through British suzerainty alone. This reassured the British

35. Taylor, n.12, p.18.
Government that U.K's strategic interest in Palestine would receive consideration as an integral part of any compromise reached between itself and the Zionist organisation. Whatever the British government was doing or intended to do in preparation of a deal with the Zionists, the Zionists were providing a sense of justifications for them.\textsuperscript{37}

Herbert Samuel expressed the hope that complete national status would be given to the Jews of Palestine and that the Jews living in Diaspora would share this national status. The sharing of national status of the Jews of Diaspora was a suggestion which expected them to strive for dual nationality. The concept of the obligations of a citizen to this national state seems to have escaped Samuel completely.\textsuperscript{38}

Weizmann spoke next and laid emphasis on the premise that the Mandatory power of Palestine should direct the administration that nothing should be done which would restrict the Jewish immigration in any manner.\textsuperscript{39}

\textsuperscript{38} Taylor, n.12, p.18.
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid.
At the end of the meeting the Zionists summarised their basic requirements: (1) an international recognized right of the Jews to Palestine, (2) the establishment of juridical nationhood for the Jewish community in Palestine, (3) a chartered Jewish company to be created in Palestine under one administration and (4) the establishment of extraterritoriality in the holy places of Palestine. The first three of these points embody the Zionist aims, while the latter two were designed to placate Great Britain and Russia, respectively.

The proposal was articulated to muster favour of in England and Russia and new efforts had to be directed towards France and the Arabs who were interested but uncommitted partners. Palestine was predominantly Arab, but the Zionists had never given cognizance to this vital Arab factor. And in many Congresses held since 1897 did not even mention them. Zionists; prime concern was to bring France in their favour. They gave secondary consideration to friendly overtures turns to the United States and Italy.

40. The ESCO Foundation, n.3, 1, 92-93.
41. Ibid.
43. Taylor, n.12, p.19.
Mark Sykes was the first person to foresee the importance to the Zionists of obtaining French approval. Sykes, on 8 February 1917 directed Sokolov to meet M. Georges Picot at the French Embassy in London. Sokolow put the Zionist point across and was successful in winning Georges Picot to the Zionist point of view that mandate for Palestine should be given to England now the official support of the French government was required. The French government at that time was under the influence of a group known as 'Syrian Party' which wanted French mandate over whole of Syria. Sokolow had to play the same game what the Zionist played in England to win the support of this particular Syrian Party and influence the French government. Sokolow started for France in March 1917. He in his mission, was joined by Sykes, who put Sokolow in touch with the proper French authorities. He also used his connections to investigate the thinking of the 'Syrian Party' and to facilitate Sokolows mission.

Sokolow got busy in influencing the French government while Sykes left for Italy to prepare ground for a

44. Sykes, n.7, p.196.
45. Ibid., pp.198-99.
favourable reception of Sokolow in the Italian Government and at the Vatican. Thus, stage was set for Sokolow and when he arrived in Italy he was greeted with open arms, though Sokolow found it difficult to dispel Pope's concern for the fate of the non-Jewish communities in Palestine.

The French government, through an official letter delivered by Jules Camlon, Secretary General to the French Foreign Ministry to Sykes on his return to Paris expressed the sympathy for the Zionist cause. The mission of Sokolow was accomplished. The transfer of the support of the French government from the 'Syrian Party' to the Zionists was due not only to the work of Sykes, but also to the influence of Baron Edmond de Rothschild. 'At the crucial moment this convert of Weizmann talked the anti-Zionist Alliance Israelite Universelle into backing in the Zionist cause before the French Government thus providing the needed extra weight to carry the day for Sokolow'.

46. Ibid., pp.200-01.
47. Ibid.
49. Sykes, n.7, p.211.
As Sokolow was busy in France the Zionists in England were busy preparing the draft of a resolution to be presented to the British Government as the basis of an official British statement on Zionism, while last mantle efforts were made to ensure British acceptance of the draft. Justice Brandeis assured Balfour that President Wilson looked with favour upon Zionism, while Weizmann tried to remove Balfour's fears that Britain's allies would not accept a pro-Zionist policy on the part of Britain. On 20 May 1917, Weizmann announced before the English Zionist Federation that the British Government was prepared to announce its support of the aims of Zionism.

At this stage the anti-Zionist forces in Britain started mobilizing in opposition to Political Zionism. Two leading British Jews David Alexander and Claude Mantefire published a letter in The Times expressing their condemnation for the aims and objectives of political Zionism. Weizmann got apprehensive and wrote a reassuring

51. Ibid., p.21.
52. Ibid.
53. Sykes, n.8, pp.236-40.
letter to Balfour's secretary. He wrote, 'The second category of British Jews [the Assimilationists] will fall into line quickly when the declaration [the Balfour Declaration] is given to us'.\textsuperscript{54} Weizmann being an astute person had already made a public declaration that the British Government was committed to support Zionism. This move of Weizmann, had, in effect, closed the door behind the British Government and made it impossible to turn back on the course it was following.\textsuperscript{55}

Balfour, in June, announced his readiness to receive a draft of Zionist proposals to be incorporated in an official statement of the British Government in support of Zionism. Zionists had prepared a complete formula in July and it was put before Balfour on the eighteenth of that month.\textsuperscript{56} The Zionist formula mooted that the British Government announce its acceptance that Palestine be recognized since quo non as the National Home of the Jewish people, in order to build up their national life in Palestine. They should enjoy

\textsuperscript{54} Weizmann, n.5, p.179.

\textsuperscript{55} Taylor, n.12, p.21.

conditions of internal autonomy and they should also enjoy the privilege of unconditional colonization. The cabinet accepted the principle that Palestine be recognized as the National Home of the Jewish people, but insisted that means and methods be worked out by the British Government and the Zionist organisation. The leading Assimilationist British Jews protested against both the first and second formulas to the Cabinet. It was on account of pressure exerted by them that the final formula, known as the Balfour Declaration called for the following: (1) British support of the establishment of a National Home for the Jews in Palestine. (2) British co-operation in the achievement of this objective, and (3) an understanding that nothing shall be done to prejudice the rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.

This was far less than what the Zionists had expected. The Zionists had envisioned the creation of a Palestine which would be 'as Jewish as England is English.' With such restrictions embodied in the Balfour Declaration a Palestine

57. The ESCO Foundation, n.3, p.105.
58. Taylor, n.12, p.22.
59. Ibid.
envisioned by the Jews could not be established. However, they had to compromise, since a declaration of some sort expressing favour for Zionism was vitally needed before the war ended. Zionists also extracted a favourable statement from Lloyd George that "when the time arrived for according representative institution to Palestine, if the Jews... had become a definite majority of the inhabitants then Palestine would thus become a Jewish Commonwealth".60 This took the task of the Zionists further ahead in a particular direction. They had only to ensure a Jewish majority in Palestine.

The first phase of Zionist diplomacy successfully ended with the inclusion of Balfour Declaration into Herzl's programme. This programme had envisioned enlisting of support of Gentile nations in building a National Home for Jews in Palestine.

The Balfour Declaration was not the result simply of British design to establish a buffer to the Suez Canal and to win the support of world Jewry to the Allied cause. More accurately the coincidence of British and Zionist interests

60. The ESCO Foundation, n.3, p.113.
was employed by the Zionists to engender British support. Thus, the Balfour Declaration was the outcome of planned Zionist diplomacy. 61

A British official who had come into contact with Weizmann summarized this diplomatic victory in the following words:

'Once of the best examples of... successful diplomacy is that by which Dr. Weizmann brought into existence the Jewish National Home... when [the first World War] began, his cause was hardly known to the principal statesmen of the victors. He once told me that 2,000 interviews had gone to the making of the Balfour Declaration. With unerring skill he adopted his arguments to the special circumstances of each statesman. To the British and Americans he could use Biblical language and awake a deep emotional undertone; to other nationalities he more often talked in terms of interest. Mr. Llyod George was told that Palestine was a little mountainous country not unlike Wales; with Lord Balfour the Philosophical background of Zionism could be surveyed, for Lord Cecil the problem was

61. Taylor, n.12, pp.22-3. Balfour Declaration has been discussed elaborately in the third chapter.
placed in the setting of a new world organisation; while to Lord Milner the extension of imperial power could be vividly portrayed. To me, who dealt with these matters as a junior officer of the General Staff, he brought from many source all the evidence that could be obtained of the importance of a Jewish National Home to the strategic position of the British Empire, but he always indicated by a hundred shades and inflections of the voice that he believed that I could also appreciate better than my superiors other more subtle and recondite arguments. This skillful presentation of facts would, however, have been useless unless he had convinced all with whom he came into contact of the probity of his conduct and the reality of his trust in the will and strength of Britain.  

After all these meetings, debates and manipulation the Zionists were in a position to get the Balfour declaration made on 17 November 1917 by the British government.  

Now it remained for the Zionists to wrest the support of world Jewry and to colonize Palestine. The support of world Jewry would take time while the task of colonization was taken up immediately.


63. Ibid.
Zionists, Paris Peace Conference, and the Mandate:

Balfour Declaration was officially accepted by France, Italy, the United States and Japan by the end of 1918. This was a considerable success of the Zionist movement. After the victory of Allied powers a peace conference was convened in Paris in January 1918. A Zionist delegation represented the Zionist organisation and presented its case before the Supreme Council. Weizmann and Sokolow as members of the delegation addressed the Supreme Council and presented in a sophisticated way the Zionist case touching various aspects of draft resolutions which were contained in an official memorandum sent to the Supreme Council on February 3.

The Zionist resolution demanded:

1. The historic title of the Jews be recognized and admission of the right of Jews to reconstitute their National Home in Palestine.

2. The establishment of certain boundaries for Palestine, designed to include southern Lebanon, Mount Herman, Aqaba, and Transjordan.

3. The establishment of a Mandate for Palestine under the administration of Great Britain.

64. Andrews, n.1, pp.341-42.

65. Hurewitz, n.56, pp.45-50. See also Weizmann, n.5, pp.243-44.
4. Balfour Declaration be realized.
5. The promotion of Jewish colonization of Palestine.
6. The creation of a council of representative of the Jews of Palestine.

This Zionist formula was a framework in which the earlier framework in which the promises were made to them could be carried out.

The first action taken by the Peace Conference in regard to Palestine was the provision, contained in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League, calling for the establishment of temporary mandates in certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire.66

The British delegation opened formal discussions with the Zionists on the matter of drafting what was to be the official mandate for Palestine. The Peace Conference, a month later, adopted the convenant of the League. David Hunter Miller, a member of the British delegation, received a letter dated 28 March 1919, written to him by Felix Frankfurter. In this Frankfurter outlined the basic points which

the Zionists wished to have embodied in the text of the Mandate. These proposals were as follows:

(1) the Balfour Declaration be re-stated in the text of the Mandate,

(2) the establishment in Palestine of a Jewish National Home to be developed into an autonomous commonwealth and should be the guiding principle of the Mandate

(3) when the people of Palestine became ready for autonomy, a representative government be established.

These proposals were subsequently revised. They were presented on 15 July 1919 to the British delegation as a draft to be considered for inclusion in the proposed treaty with Turkey. This draft called for:

(1) the ultimate aim of the mandate should be the creation in Palestine of a self governing commonwealth

(2) the formation of a permanent Jewish council in Palestine

67. The ESCO Foundation, n.3, pp.164-68.
68. Ibid., p.169.
(3) sponsorship of the principle of a Jewish National Home,
(4) facilitation of Jewish immigration and colonization.
(5) the establishment of Hebrew as the official language in Palestine.

There was a third revision. It went a step-further by suggesting that the proposed Jewish National Home should comprise all of Palestine.69

Zionist proposals was that the Mandate for Palestine be dedicated to the creation of a Jewish state. The mandatory administration had to take up as its responsibility to strengthen the Jewish element in Palestine and was to continue in control of the country until such time as there were sufficient Jews in Palestine to make possible the establishment of a defacto Jewish state.70

The British Government was disposed to accept the Zionist proposals and on 25 April 1920 the Supreme Council which was sitting at San Remo, assigned the mandate for Palestine to Great Britain. The text of the Treaty of

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69. Ibid., pp.170-71.
70. Taylor, n.12, p.27.
Severes with Turkey, which was signed the following August, underwrote the Balfour Declaration and thus all that remained to ensure the fulfillment of the aim of Zionism was the adoption of a mandate text which upheld the basic programme of the Zionist proposals.

Lord Curzon, appointed as Foreign Secretary in the spring of 1920, created problems for the Zionists. Curzon was not a supporter of Zionism and was concerned over the growing tide of Arab opposition. Curzon was against Zionist sponsored clauses in the text of the mandate. He particularly opposed the two clauses, one proclaiming the historical connection of the Jews with Palestine and another calling for the eventual establishment of a self-governing commonwealth in Palestine. The Zionists through Balfour and Milner (Milner was a pro-Zionist Cabinet Minister), exerted their influence on the Government, but were successful only in having the clause concerning the historical connection of the Jews with Palestine.

71. Hurewitz, n.56, p.84.
73. Ibid., p.173-74.
Zionists were flexible and were ready to compromise to an extent, as long as British Government officials were sympathetic to the Zionist cause. Weizmann had proclaimed the support of British Government to Zionism in the spring of 1917. He had informed the English Zionist Federation that the aim of Zionism would be realized by stages, and that the first stage would have to be one of British control of Palestine. Later on Jewish connection with Palestine came to be recognized, the Balfour Declaration was under written, the Jews of Palestine were allowed the right of developing self-governing institutions, the mandatory committed itself to the facilitation of Jewish immigration and provisions were made for the establishment of a Jewish Agency to assist the administration. This was all the Zionists really needed and the future was assured. In effect the Mandate granted to Zionism nearly all that the Zionists representative asked for at the Paris Conference in 1919.

The Mandate and its Ratification: The Zionists in 1921 faced some hurdles with regard to the ratification of the draft

74. Ibid., p.98-99.
75. Taylor, n.12, p.28.
Mandate agreed upon by the British cabinet and the Zionist Organisation. The Zionist rights and aspirations became international controversy since riots between Arabs and Jews broke out in Jaffa. An Arab delegation headed by Musa Kazim Pasha, arrived in London and presented its grievances to British Members of Parliament and to the Colonial Office. 77

The Draft Mandate had been presented to the League Council by this time, and had undergone two changes. The clause of the Balfour Declaration concerning the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine was inserted in the preamble of the new draft, whereas it had only. This change was of no great importance, but it did show a general concern over the potential threat of Zionism to the rights of the Arabs of Palestine. 78

The second change was more significant. A new article was inserted specifying that the Balfour Declaration could not apply to the territories east of Jordan. This was the curtailment of the original Zionist aspiration which wanted to create a Zionist state in Palestine including Transjordan. This was done in order to offer Transjordan to Abdullah as an emir.

77. The Weizmann, n.5, p.280.
78. Taylor, n.12, p.34.
It was partly because of these setbacks and partly to raise money that Weizmann decided to make a tour of European capitals. While Weizmann was in Europe trying to prevent any further alteration in the draft Mandate of 1920 and to counter the influence of the Arab delegation on political circles in London, the Zionist executive in London, was busy in extensive correspondence and discussion with the Colonial Office in an attempt to prevent any further changes in the draft of the Mandate.

A number of British newspapers began a campaign against Zionism, and in the House of Lords a motion, introduced by Lord Islington and others calling for the repeal of the Balfour Declaration, was passed. By this time, Weizmann had returned to London, and his first task was to prevent the House of Commons from passing a similar motion. Weizmann later wrote, 'In the Commons, with such champions as Mr. Churchill and Major Ormsby-Gore, we had better luck, and a similar motion was heavily defeated.'

80. Ibid., p.290.
81. Ibid., pp.289-290.
82. Ibid., p.290.
On 1 July 1922, the British Government issued a statement known as Churchill White Paper. This statement was issued in order to placate the objections against the pro-Zionist stance of the British Government. The White Paper denied that it was the intention of the British Government to create a Jewish state in the whole Palestine, that the Zionist representation in Palestine would be accorded a special position. The white paper separated Palestine from Transjordan and Jewish immigration was limited to its absorptive capacity.

The White Paper was regarded by Weizmann as curtailment of the provisions of Balfour Declaration. However he accepted it as far as it reaffirmed the right of the Jews to establish a national home in Palestine.

Weizmann met opposition, on account of its acceptance of the Churchill White Paper, at the annual conference of the World Zionist organisation in August 1922 held at Carlsbad. Realist as he was, he explained that the White Paper was a reality and there was ample risk in pressing for impossible demands. He emphasised on the need of fulfilment of the Zionist aims in stages.

84. Weizmann, n.5, pp.290-91.
85. Ibid., p.280.
The Churchill White Paper paved the way for the acceptance of the Mandate by the League. It subsequently recognized the right of the Zionists to colonize Palestine. Herzl's programme got started for being translated into action with British support.\textsuperscript{86}

**Zionist Movement After World War I:**

The leaders of the Zionist movement at the end of the World War I had the realization that an elaborate organisation which could take up the operations of the movement was vitally needed. In February 1919, Weizmann and Sokolow called a Zionist Conference in London.\textsuperscript{87} In this conference, Weizmann was appointed to the executive, an honour which had not been extended to him before, even though he had served as de facto leader of the Zionist organisation for years.

In the summer of 1920, a second post-war conference was convened in London. At this conference, Weizmann was elected President of the Zionist Organisation, Nahum Sokolow, his close associate, was made Chairman of the

\textsuperscript{86} Taylor, n.12, p.37.

\textsuperscript{87} Israel Cohen, n.27, pp.123-125.
The conference also passed the following resolutions:

(i) the Organization is determined to live at peace with the non-Jewish communities in Palestine.

(ii) all land in Palestine colonized by Jews is eventually to become the common property of the Jewish people.

(iii) a Jewish National Fund will be established to employ voluntary contributions for the purpose of making the land of Palestine the common property of the Jewish people.

(iv) a Central Immigration Office will be created in Palestine and Palestine offices will be opened in all countries expected to furnish contingents of young immigrants.

The London conference concentrated mainly on the second aspect of the programme. A consolidated immigration organisation was provided, and a special fund was established to implement a land policy, articulated to go

88. Ibid., p.125.
89. Ibid., pp.125-26.
'hand in hand' with the immigration policy. The conference resolution to live at peace with the non-Jewish communities in Palestine must be viewed in the light of this programme of planned acquisition.90

The London conference of 1920 appointed a commission to call a Zionist Congress, and accordingly the first Zionist Congress since before the war. The twelfth Zionist Congress was convinced was convinced at Carlsbad in September 1921.91 The 12th Zionist Congress confirmed Weizmann as the President of the organisation and Sokolow as the President of the Executive.92 Weizmann now was heading an elaborate organisation to carry the aims of political Zionism to its fulfillment. He headed a central office, the task of which was to maintain political contact with Colonial Office of the British Government, thus providing the machinery with which to maintain British support and to oversee the activities of Zionists throughout the world. Under the Central office was an executive group composed of the London and Palestine executives, the Actions Committee, and the Central Council. The London offices maintained close

90. Taylor, n.12, p.39.
91. Israel Cohen, n.27, pp.127-32.
92. Ibid., p.131.
relations with the League of Nations, the French Government, and the Italian Government through special Bureaus. The Arabs had no such voice with the permanent Mandate Commission in Geneva. The London office also controlled the colonization funds and were advised on financial matters by a Financial and Economic Council. The Palestine Executive replaced the Zionist Commission in Palestine and was charged with supervision of the Jewish community in Palestine and Jewish immigration into the country. The Jewish community in Palestine was represented by a Constituent Assembly (Asefath Hanivharim) which elected a National Council (Vaad Leumi). A Robbinical Council was also established.

To ensure that the Palestine executive should have, and maintain good support alongwith the British Administration, Weizmann arranged for the appointment of a British officer of Jewish faith to the Palestine Executive. At the end of 1922, Dr. Eder, a leading personality of the Palestine Executive, retired from office. In search of a replacement, Weizmann approached General Macdonough of British Military

93. Antonius, n.37, pp.388-89.
94. Taylor, n.12, p.40.
Intelligence, asking him to suggest a candidate one "...belonging to both worlds, English as well as Jewish...." Macdonough suggested Colonel Fred Kisch, a member of Military Intelligence, a British officer in every sense, and the son of an East European Jew who had belonged to Choveve Zion. "From every point of view, Kisch was the perfect man. He was acquainted with High Commissioner Samuel, he could hold the respect of the British officers in the Palestine Administration, he could feel at home with Zionists, and he was trained in Intelligence, the key to Zionist diplomacy. It is indeed strange that the question of dual loyalty never was brought up in the case of Kisch. Somehow, Weizmann was always a genius at making what would ordinarily be considered unnatural seem innocuous and sensible." 96

Establishment of Jewish Agency: Uptill now Weizmann was successful in retaining and strengthening of British support an in laying the ground work for the Jewish colonization of Palestine. The third requirement of the Jewish programme was

95. Weizmann, n.5, p.295.
96. Taylor, n.12, p.42.
winning the support of World Jewry to the cause of political Zionism. A machinery had to be installed to recruit a large group of non-Zionist Jews. The Jewish Agency was entrusted with this task.

It is written in the text of the Mandate that ..."an appropriate Jewish Agency shall be recognised as a public body for the purpose of advising and co-operating with the administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish population in Palestine..." 97 According to the text of the Mandate the Zionist Organisation was to serve as such an agency. At the Carlsbad Zionist conference of 1922, the Zionist Organisation formally accepted the rights and duties of the Jewish Agency expressing that 'the Jewish Agency shall represent the whole Jewish people'. 98

As far as the fulfillment of the aims of political Zionism were concerned the Jewish Agency, till now, could hardly be considered a representative body of world Jewry. Winning the support of world Jewry was the third Herzelian plan and Jewish Agency presented itself as the ideal

solution. There was another obstacle - the opposition to the extension of the Jewish Agency among Zionists. The group led by Brandeis regarded the extension as unnecessary since he was apprehensive of the influence of non-Zionists in the agency. Weizmann was lucky enough to see the passage of the leadership of American Zionism from the hands of Brandeis. In February 1923, the Action Committee passed a resolution stating; that the controlling organ of the Jewish Agency shall be responsible to a body representative of the Jewish people. The committee resolved to enter into negotiations with leading Jewish communities in order to gain their participation in the Jewish Agency. At the Congress of 1925, a party known as the Revisionists led by Vladimir Jabotinsky opposed extension on the basis that Zionist policy could not be entrusted to Jews lacking strong nationalist convictions. However, the Congress passed a resolution favouring the establishment of a Council composed equally of Zionists and non-Zionist Jews. An action plan was envisaged for the Jewish Agency on the following principles:

100. Weizmann, n.5, p.307.
102. Ibid., p.125.
(1) the development of a continuously increasing volume of Jewish immigration into Palestine,
(2) the redemption of the land in Palestine as Jewish public property,
(3) agricultural colonization based on Jewish labour.
(4) the promotion of Hebrew language and culture in Palestine.\textsuperscript{103}

The Congress agreed to the extension of the Agency, even though the matter remained controversial until 1929, and specifications ensuring the fulfilment of Zionist policy were established. The Congress further guaranteed that the President of the Zionist Organisation would be the President of the enlarged Jewish Agency. It also stated that of the non-Zionist participants forty percent should be from America, which contained a large number of non-Zionist Jews and therefore was a major objective in the Zionist bid for universal Jewish support.

Louis Marchall and Felix Warburg were two recognised leaders of American Jewry. Warburg was a convert Zionist about whom Weizmann remarked, 'I have seldom witnessed a more complete conversion'.\textsuperscript{104} Through Marshall and Warburg.


\textsuperscript{104} Weizmann, n.5, p.310.
American Jewry began to join the Zionist movement, to assist its work and to bear much of its financial burden. It was for this reason that the Congress of 1925 specified that 40% of the non-Zionist representation on the Jewish Agency was to be American. Marshall and Warburg assured Weizmann of financial and moral support from American Jewry.¹⁰⁵

Moreover, as a safeguard, that the new Agency would not fall under non-Zionist control, the Zionists obtained an assurance from the British Government to the effect that, should the partnership between Zionists and non-Zionists dissolve, the Zionist Organisation alone would be recognized as the Jewish Agency.¹⁰⁶

Zionist Diplomacy Till the end of World War II:

In the 1920s Zionists had succeeded in building up the infrastructure and were ready, to implement their policies. They had started building the struggle for Palestine which came to ahead in the 1930s.¹⁰⁷

The Conservatives were in power from October 1922 to June 1929, except for a brief period of the first Macdonald

¹⁰⁵. Ibid., p.314.
¹⁰⁷. Taylor, n.12, p.47.
Government from January to November of 1924. The Conservatives stood by the Balfour Declaration¹⁰⁸ and there was no hindrance created with the change of Government. In Geneva, the Permanent Mandate Commission started getting concerned over the problem of Palestine Arabs in 1924 but the Zionists opened a special Bureau there in the following year. However the succeeding sessions of the Mandates Commission were to show traces of its effect.¹⁰⁹ Weizmann's personal contacts with leading members of the Commission served to develop a favourable attitude towards Zionism in that body.¹¹⁰

After the issue of the Churchill White Paper in 1922, a Labour Schedule was established to regulate the immigrate of Jewish workers in accordance with the economic absorptive capacity of Palestine.¹¹¹ The Zionist Organisation guaranteed the support of many of the immigrants for the first year of their stay in Palestine,¹¹² and the Histadrut, or General Federation of Jewish Labour in Palestine, served

¹⁰⁹. Weizmann, n.5, p.326.
¹¹⁰. Ibid.
¹¹². Ibid., p. 316.
as on employment agency for the new comers. In 1923, Jews possessing capital assets amounting to $ 2,500 or more were allowed to immigrate outside of the Labour Schedule.

It is particularly of interest to note the attitude of Weizmann towards this Jewish immigration, since it shows the true character of political Zionism: '... We must see to it that we direct this stream, ' and do not allow it to deflect us from our goal'.

The leaders and responsible officers of the Zionist movement regarded themselves as a disciplined vanguard, an inner elite, of a Jewish movement which they considered to be the one answer to the Jewish Question. And their attitude, even towards Jews, was coloured by their zeal to complete the work of Zionism. Thus, they were impatient with anything connected with Palestine which did not clearly contribute to the establishment of Jewish statehood, and resentful of those things which in anyway acted against the interests of the movement.

114. Weizmann, n.5, p.300.
115. Ibid., p.301.
Arabs of Palestine resented the Zionist moves in Palestine. Land grabbing had displaced many Arabs. Soon after the 16th Zionist Congress rioting broke out in Palestine, which continued intermittently. Numerous commissions were sent by the British government. They suggested restriction of Jewish immigration. But as in the past, a set back to Zionism on account of the report of a Commission which was sent to see for itself, the cause of the troubles of Palestine, was reversed by the activity of Zionist diplomacy in London. Through propaganda, political pressure, and the use of the recruits of Zionism in high places, a government policy decision based on the findings of its own Commission was reversed. Those who saw things for themselves realized, that as Zionism was attaining its goal, there was an accompanying breach in the provision of the Balfour Declaration regarding the rights of the non-Zionist communities in Palestine. Thus, they voiced their objections, remaining true to the provisions of the Declaration. The Cabinets, on the other hand, either did not grasp what was going on or were forced to look the other way because of the pressure that was being applied. The Zionist Organisations of the 1930s were not like the Zionist Organisation of the war years. In those earlier years they had to wait for their friends to come to power, but in the
1930s they did not hesitate to bend even a Prime Minister to their will, if that was necessary.\textsuperscript{117}

With War clouds looming over the European horizon, the British called the London Conference in 1939 to try to settle the Arab-Jewish controversy. The Famous MacDonald White Paper, issued on 17 May 1939, imposed severe restriction on Jewish immigration.\textsuperscript{118} The Zionist Congress rejected the White Paper as illegal. The 1939 White Paper, however, came as a major shock and setback to Zionist diplomacy. The leaders of the movement immediately sought a reorientation of Zionism in the face of the new turn of events. Through the war years, just such a reorientation took place in terms of policy, organisation, and of a shift in political concentration from Great Britain to the United States.\textsuperscript{119}

Throughout the interwar period, the Mandate for Palestine had served the Jewish cause in gradual building up of Jewish immigration to result in the eventual Jewish majority in Palestine. The MacDonald White Paper thwarted

\textsuperscript{117} Taylor, n.12, p.51.


\textsuperscript{119} Taylor, n.12, p.53.
this effort. The policy of gradualism championed by Weizmann was in question. This called for a change. "Previously Mandate had been supported because its existence was consonant with the desires of Zionism, but, once the British showed unwillingness to continue their benign attitude towards the Zionists, the latter turned against their former benefactors and decided to work actively for the termination of the Mandate for Palestine". 120

The attacks on White Paper assumed the form of an onslaught against the Mandate itself. The first indication of this important policy shift was given by Dr. Weizmann himself who, ironically, was the strongest backer of cooperation with the Mandate. Weizmann, in mid December 1939, met Winston Churchill and conveyed to him his intentions of building up a Zionist state with three to four million Jews in it. Churchill replied that such a plan met entirely with his approval. 121 "With this preliminary agreement, Zionism began to depart from a phase of advantageous waiting to enter one characterized by active preparation for the fulfillment of the basic aim of Zionism - the creation of the Jewish State". 122

120. Ibid., p. 54.
121. Ibid.
122. Ibid., pp. 54-5.
The active opposition to Mandate went along with a campaign in the West specially in America. This was necessary in order to reorient Zionist members to the new policy. In early 1940 a conference in Washington was informed by the Jewish National Fund that the policy of the Fund was to preclude any possible partition of Palestine by purchasing frontier areas. Nahum Goldmann defined the territory of Jewish national interest as including Transjordan. This gave the warning that time was at hand to pave the way for the establishment of a Jewish State in all of Palestine. At a convention of Canadian Zionists a similar proclamation was made by the legal adviser of the Jewish Agency, Dr. Bernard Joseph. On 29 March 1941, Dr. Weizmann announced at Chicago that after the war a Jewish commonwealth could be set up side by side with Arab Federation in the Middle East.

These oft repeated pronouncements led the Western Zionist Jewry to support in active way to the idea of the imminent establishment of Israel as a state once the war was

124. Ibid., p.243.
125. Ibid.
126. Ibid.
The Zionist Organisation of America resolved as early as 7 September 1971 to demand the creation of a Jewish commonwealth within the historic boundaries of Palestine.\textsuperscript{127}

However, this was not enough. It was felt necessary for an important body of the Zionist diaspora to hold at a suitable place and unanimously declare the decision of World Zionism to bid for the establishment of Israel upon the completion of the war. An emergency committee was formed in America to serve as the wartime head quarters of the Zionist Organisation. This emergency committee was willing to sponsor the convention.\textsuperscript{128} Thus an extraordinary conference of American, European and Palestinian Zionists was held at the Biltmore Hotel in New York city in May 1942.

The Zionists Conference was addressed by three top leaders of Zionism.\textsuperscript{129} Weizmann, Ben Gurion, and Nahum Goldmann, Chairman of the Administrative Committee of the World Jewish Congress. Ben Gurion demanded that the Jewish Agency be given full control over immigration into Palestine and that the concept of binationalism be discarded if it

\textsuperscript{127} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{128} Hurewitz, n.56, p.234.
\textsuperscript{129} The ESCO Foundation, n.3, II, p.1080-1083.
entailed offering Palestinian Arabs equal representation with Jews in the departments of government.\textsuperscript{130} Here lay the basic formula of the new Zionists policy, for this could lead to only one outcome the creation of a Jewish State. The conference endorsed Ben Gurian's formula. Thus the underlying motive of political Zionists came to surface. Full implementation of Herzelian programme was taken up through already planned policy of activism.\textsuperscript{131}

The Conference on 11 May 1942 adopted a set of resolutions known collectively as the Biltmore Programme.\textsuperscript{132} The programme in short enumerated the following (1) recognition that the purpose of the provisions in the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate declaring the historic connection of the Jewish people with Palestine was to found there a Jewish commonwealth.\textsuperscript{133} This demand of the Biltmore programme was made inspite of the fact that the Churchill White Paper of 1922 denied that the purpose of the Balfour Declaration was to make Palestine 'as Jewish as England is

\textsuperscript{130} Ibid. p.1062.
\textsuperscript{131} Taylor, n.12, p.57.
\textsuperscript{132} Hurewitz, n.56, pp.234-35.
\textsuperscript{133} Ibid.
English' or that the development of the Jewish National Home meant the imposition of Jewish nationality upon the people of Palestine as a whole. The invalidation of the MacDonald White Paper, (3) a solution of the problem of Jewish homelessness as part of the post-war settlement, (4) the transfer of control of immigration into Palestine to the Jewish Agency, (5) the establishment of Palestine as a Jewish commonwealth. The points 'three' and 'four' implied that the Zionists solution was the only solution to the Palestine problem and that the Agency should be accorded essential powers of a sovereign government respectively.

The Biltmore Programme gave tremendous impetus to the new policy of the Zionists leadership. It also was successful in bringing in its fold a great majority of World Zionism, positively behind the platform of imminent statehood. The Zionist Organisation, Haddassah, Mizrachi and other Labour groups adopted the Biltmore programme in October 1942. On 6 November, the General Council of the World Zionist Organisation endorsed the programme. The Biltmore programme had been endorsed by the General Council

134. Taylor, n.12, p.58.
135. Ibid.
in 1942 in spite of opposition among Jews in the United States and Palestine. When the World War came to a close, a Zionist Conference was held in August 1945. The thinking of such a large majority of the Zionists had been geared to the Biltmore programme in such a war that it was strongly endorsed.

Shift from U.K. to U.S.A.:

Since the beginning of World War I, political Zionism had recruited Gentile support which was one of the basic tenents of Herzlian programme. It had succeeded in receiving the assistance of the British Government through the recruitment of cabinet ministers and other British political leaders. The Zionist attitude towards Great Britain underwent a fundamental change since the publication of White Paper of 1939 and subsequent formulation of new Zionist policy. As the situation stood now from the Zionist perspective the British Colonial Office and the Mandate


137. Taylor, n.12, p.58.
authorities in particular, were regarded as enemies and hindrance to the realization of fundamental objectives of Zionism. 138

The reasons mentioned above were enough for the Zionists to turn towards America. Initially the tactic was to apply American pressure on the British Policy.

The Zionist search for American support and making America a centre of Zionist activities had two main underlying reasons.

(1) The Zionist opposition to 1939 White Paper and British intransigence over it.

(2) To replace Great Britain for the Gentile support.

There was an anticipation in the Zionist circle that if the Allied powers did win the war the U.S. would emerge as the leader of the West and it would be possible for them to translate the Biltmore programme into action with the gentile support in America. "The Zionists went about their task on three different levels to win for their cause the American people, the Congress and the Administration". 139


139. Ibid., p.75.
Winning American people, Congress and Administration: The American Zionist Emergency Council, previously known as American Emergency Committee for Zionist Affairs started projecting elaborate propaganda for the Zionist cause in America. The committee consisted of 76 state and regional branches with 380 committees on the local level. Another organisation known as American Palestine Committee was established. The objective of this committee was to muster the support of Christians in America. Another Organisation related to above organisations was launched. This was known as the Christian Council on Palestine. The aim and purpose of this Christian Council was to concentrate on the clergymen to inculcate a sense of oneness with Zionism. There was a prevalent Protestant opinion in America. This was congenial to the Zionists and they carefully exploited it.

Besides winning the support of clergymen and church groups, the Zionists also needed the cooperation of...

journalists and persons in eminent positions. Thus Zionist campaign in 1943 got in full swing and its effort was to...inject Zionism political nationalism into every crevice of the American scene'. On the surface level it seemed that Zionist propaganda campaign was launched to unite opposition to the 1939 White Paper but the underlying aim was to promote support for Zionism's new policy of the establishment of Jewish statehood.

The general ignorance of American gentile of Zionism and the Zionist ingenuity led to the building of considerable gentile support for Zionists.

The Zionists in the course of amassing support among the gentile did not neglect American Jewry. American Jewry at that time was assimilationist by tradition. The time was ripe to implement the third point of the Herzelian programme - the development of Jewish support.

To put the plan into action the Palestine Executive sent propaganda officers known as 'schbehim' to the U.S. to

145. Ibid., p.165.
convince American Jewry that political Zionism was the only solution to the crisis then facing world Jewry.\textsuperscript{147}

In this effort Zionists' attempt to win American Jewry was as successful as the campaign to win the American gentile public.

**Congress:** A through going plan was envisaged by the Zionists for ultimate conversion of the United States Congress to the Zionist cause. The enrolment of 67 Senators and 143 Representatives was made in the American Palestine Committee. In December 1942 one third of the Senate alongwith one and a half thousand other public figures signed a proclamation demanding the creation of a Jewish Army.\textsuperscript{148}

The Zionists encouraged by this initial success needed a Congressional declaration backing the Biltmore Programme. In October 1943, a group of 500 rabbis arrived at the Capital Hill and presented Zionist demands to Vice-President

\textsuperscript{147} Kirk, n.123, p.329.

\textsuperscript{148} Ibid., p.247.
Wallace. This move was supported by Zionist lobbies. Resolutions endorsing the Biltmore programme were introduced in both houses of Congress in January 1944. The resolutions were temporarily shelved on the advice of the chief of Staff, General Marshall. Marshall felt that their passage would be detrimental to allied war effort. Nonetheless it is surprising that America came so close to committing itself officially to a movement whose aims and objectives were not clearly understood. However this was the outcome of barely three years of Zionist concentration in America.

Though the resolutions were shelved in the Congress the Zionists pursued their aims at the national conventions the following summer. This resulted in the adoption by both Party Convention of pro-Zionist planks. The Zionist influence was so intense that neither Party hoped to win without the support of Jewish electorate.

150. Hurewitz, n.140, p.213.
152. Lenezkowski, n.126, p.274.
153. Taylor, n.12, p.79.
Administration: To win the U.S. administration's support, Weizmann made three trips to America. He devoted considerable time and energy to win Administrations' commitment to Zionism and the Biltmore programme. He talked to Roosevelt in February 1940 seeking American stand opposing the 1939 White Paper. He carefully avoided the subject of statehood. Nevertheless Roosevelt hesitated to grant special favour to Zionism seeking a joint Arab-Zionist solution to the problem of Palestine. 155

Weizmann traveled to America again in the spring of 1941. There he talked to Summer Welles and other top government officials. However state Department officials and others charged with U.S. policy in the Middle East as a whole would not regard Zionist interests as isolated or special. As the policies suggested by British commissions had been reversed, so, too, could the opinions of American experts on the Middle East be reversed in Washington. Weizmann, therefore continued to concentrate on the top levels, where decisions from below could easily be reversed. 156

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155. Taylor, n.12, pp.80-81.
156. Ibid., pp.81-82.
During the time when Congressional Resolutions endorsing Jewish statehood were kept suspended Rabbis Wise and Silver were successful in convincing Roosevelt to make a statement conveying American opposition to 1939 White Paper.

A year later on 16 March 1945 Wise tried to wrest another statement from Roosevelt regarding his meeting with Ibn Saud after Yalta Conference. Roosevelt stated simply that he had not changed his position on Zionism. 157

Even though the Zionists were by and large unsuccessful in their dealings with Roosevelt, they succeeded during his Administration in seeking to influence American policy on the Middle East through the White House. During the Presidency of Truman this tactic brought handsome reward. With the advent of Truman, the Administration joined the Congress and the public to become a new prize in the Zionist struggle for Jewish statehood. 158

Later on when the Zionist state was created, the new nation felicitated Chaim Weizmann, for decades the recognized

157. Ibid., p.83.
leader of the Zionist movement by electing him the first President. Weizmann minimized his role and insisted that the person, most responsible, for the creation of the state of Israel was Harry S. Truman. \(^{159}\) Truman's support was the master stroke of Zionist diplomacy in the realms of realpolitik.

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159. John Snetsingers, *Truman, the Jewish Vote and the Creation of Israel* (Stanford, 1974), p.11.