CONCLUSION
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Zionism and imperialism were the roots of the Palestine problem. The problem stands as a challenge to the principles of law and humanity in the post imperial age. It is remarkable that when after the World War II actual decolonization had started it was only in Palestine that a colonial settler state was established. The contradiction between the principles of Western liberalism and support for a colonizing movement became obvious and resulted in the confirmation of Western duplicity and double standard. The powers involved in the question mainly U.K., U.S.A., and U.S.S.R. not only failed to resolve the original contradiction but also actively confirmed it by supporting the Jewish colonization and expulsion of the Arabs from their own country effecting the establishment of a Zionist state in Palestine. This was the amazing achievement of Zionism in the second half of the 20th Century, supposed to be an enlightened and democratic part of the century.

Zionism as a movement originated in the efforts of nineteenth century European Jews for creating a congenial atmosphere in which the Jews taking advantage of the modern ideas of emancipation and enlightenment attempted to retain at the beginning their own identity. This was however a
beginning but ultimately it culminated in the catastrophe for another people. From a Jewish point of view this was an essential endeavour and gave rise to many traditions. Among them the most important was the cultural renaissance which was based on the Jewish tradition and the Hebrew language. One of the results of this renaissance was the Jewish nationalism which contradicted the on going process of Jewish assimilation in the various West European nationalisms.

The movement that Herzl laid foundation of at Basel Congress in 1897 embraced a variety of Zionist interpretations: cultural, religious, socialist and political. The political "faction" remained dominant since its inception. It gathered added strength from religious and socialist faction. However Zionism gradually began to fashion itself as a settler movement with an aspiration of transforming Palestine into an exclusive Jewish state. It threw to winds the question of ethics, law and political realities to wrest for itself a political entity in Palestine.

It would be a misnomer to regard Zionism as a democratic movement that the Jewish intellectuals developed
and acquired for it a popular support. It will not be in appropriate to describe Zionist movement as directive populism in the words of Allan R. Taylor. Theodor Herzl was the self appointed founder director of this popular movement. In this movement many so-called factions developed which formed themselves into different organisations within the Zionist Congress. Thus Zionism consolidated itself through divergent methods. It therefore allowed diverse factions to assert for themselves while retaining a central leadership for providing unity of direction and purpose.

The establishment of the state of Israel was the culmination of a careful planning and organised activity for a "secular" national ideal. Long before anti-Semitism had reached its climax in Nazi Germany the Jewish national idea was formulated by the Zionist ideologies as the only effective programme for regeneration of the Jews as a modern people, though many Jewish thinkers and communities did not conform to this thesis. Though it was juxtaposed with the ideals of faith, the Zionist political leadership embarked on an intensive programme to convert the Jewish world to Zionism and to found a Jewish state in Palestine. One can discern the essential nature of Zionism by examining
the character of the movement in operation and by analysing its ideological foundations.

Herzl's vision and the search of its realization led the Zionists to develop a premise that end justified the means. With the issuance of the Balfour Declaration the Zionists made up their mind and threw themselves resolutely into the cause of advancement of the establishment of a Jewish state. The Zionists who had promised to engender the humanistic renaissance among the Jews, by the very nature of contradictions and compulsions of the Zionist movement degenerated into a bitter struggle over real estate with the Arabs of Palestine who constituted an absolute majority.

Inspite of objections from saner Jewish quarters and protests by the Arabs the narrower concept of Zionism prevailed. Political leaders and ideologists coloured the Zionist movement with intense Jewish nationalism and gave it over to lesser considerations and motivations. On this plane three leaders played the most crucial role. Weizmann was a past master as far as sophisticated manipulation was concerned. Ben Gurion was a genius at mass conversion to Zionism and settlement, and Jabotinsky, of expansionist designs and armed strategy. These three pragmatic approaches lay at the root of Zionism's evolution.
Weizmann adopted the policy of "gradualism" and developed it into a political technique, in which aims were concealed, adhoc compromises arrived, and various forms of pressure and persuasion applied. The problem with this political method stance was that it cast an aura of secrecy and duplicity about the movement. When Weizmann accepted the Balfour Declaration, the Churchill White Paper, and the partition plan of the Royal Commission, he did not really agree to their terms or intend to abide by them.

For Weizmann the Balfour Declaration was only a beginning and from 1917 onwards he tried ceaselessly to circumvent its restrictive clauses without openly challenging their legality. His attitude towards the Churchill White Paper was also the same, and in the same vein he accepted the partition plan on the basis of its limited territorial concessions which could be expanded in time. Replying to the criticism for handing over Negev desert to Arabs he said that Negev would be there, and that it would not run away. Expansionism was also very much on the mind of Weizmann. The only thing was he always waited for the right moment to act.

David Ben Gurion adhered intensely to the concept of "Ingathering". Gurion may be accused for encompassing the
vast horizons of Jewish vision and endeavour within a parochial national system. His insistence that Zionism demanded immigration to Israel and allegiance to a single Jewish nationality reflected a horizon too limited for the Jews of the world. His parochialism that Zionists in the Diaspora were under obligation to assist the State of Israel unconditionally was said to be reactionary. To an emancipated Jew and the modern man the premises of "ingathering" was retrogressive.

However the Zionists like Weizmann, Ben Gurion, Juda Magnes and Abba Hillel Silver, who happened to be the pivotal actors on behalf of Zionism, activated other actors whom we may call the secondary actors particularly U.K., U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. and ultimately through them the United Nations.

The broad lines of struggle over Palestine had already emerged during World War I when the Western Allies, assuming that the Ottoman Empire would be dismembered upon its defeat, addressed the question of the fate of its non-Turkish territories. Palestine was the object of rivalry between British and French aspirations. It was, moreover, the vital focus of the World Zionist Organisation, which
had already achieved considerable progress in rallying worldwide support for the objective of establishing a Jewish state in Palestine.

The British Government was prompted to take key actions affecting the future of Palestine under the exigencies of the World War I. The British calculated that a public expression of support for the principle of a Jewish national home in Palestine would enable the World Zionist Organisation to mobilize American Jews in support of the United States’ entry into the war on the side of the Allied Powers. It would also influence the German Jews to shift their allegiance to Great Britain and influence the Russian Jews to dissuade the new revolutionary regime in Russia from abandoning the conflict with the Allies. Above all, the British aimed to keep the French out of Palestine. Apart from supposedly assisting "God's will" as they believed to be fulfilling, the above were the main motives of the Balfour Declaration. Balfour was no doubt an ardent convert to Zionism. Arnold Toynbee has remarked, "I will straight out declare Balfour was a wicked man". Fortunately for Balfour his Zionism and his serving of the British imperialist cause did not prove to be incompatible.
Toynbee believed that Balfour and his colleagues knew the catastrophic implications for the Arabs of fostering a White settler community, yet nevertheless decided to support the Jews as a means of sustaining the British influence in the eastern Mediterranean region. This was the callousness of imperialism at its height. The Balfour Declaration, as a historical premise, it was calculated, could be used to develop an argument going in the same direction; from a Jewish 'national home' to the Zionist state.

As part of the post-World War I settlement, Great Britain was awarded a League of Nations mandate over Palestine.

The Balfour Declaration was written into the document as a charge on the mandatory power. The phraseology of the mandate failed to clarify the ambiguous term "national home". The mandate gave discretionary power to Britain to establish a separate administration in the mandatory territory east of the Jordan River, which later became Trans-Jordan.

Animosity between the Jewish communities was probably a factor which prompted Winston Churchill, then Britain's Colonial Secretary, to issue a White Paper in June 1922. In this he asserted that the status of Jews in Palestine under
the existing British administration in fact constituted the "national home" called for by the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate.

Nonetheless, Churchill was a Zionist, though his Zionism was not religious or evangelical in origin as of many other Gentiles. He also believed that Zionism had to 'go slow' so as not to arouse or offend the native Arabs. However he gave intermittent support to it. There were two key elements supporting his good 'British' sense for his sponsorship of Zionism. First, he believed that the Zionist movement commanded powerful political and economic influence particularly in the United States. As late as in December 1939, he lectured his cabinet colleagues on the important role the Zionists could play in mobilising American resources for the British war effort. He told them that it had not been for light or sentimental reasons that the Government had issued the Balfour Declaration in 1917, but in order to mobilise American support. In 1939 Churchill believed that history could repeat itself. He expected that the Zionists through their friends in America could exert considerable influence for an early American entry into the war.

The second element was that the Zionist could be hired for some other purposes quite apart from the influence to be
acquired in Washington, e.g. Zionist capital and technology could develop Palestine as an imperial outpost at a minimal cost to the British tax payer. In his imperial mould Churchill thought of the Zionists nothing more than the policemen in the region to safeguard and further the British imperial interests in Palestine.

The British also attempted to refute the contention of Shariff Hussein and the Arab nationalists that the McMohan correspondence had promised Palestine independence as part of a fully sovereign Arab state.

The period of the British administration may be summed up by stating that no common ground could be found for the accommodation of the two nationalisms, whether by the partition proposed by the Royal Commission report of 1937 (the Peel Report), a by the "binational" solution of the White Paper of 1939;

The British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, sought the solution of a "binational state" in the hope that concerted action with the United States might guarantee the security of the Jewish minority in Palestine, thereby allowing Britain to remain on good terms with the Arab world in general.
The Labour Government's Palestine policy revolved round the role of Ernest Bevin. It all started with the initial effort to cling to Palestine that gave way to internationalizing the issue. Recent studies have shown that Bevin was not anti-semitic as he was sometimes accused to be by the Zionists. He was only pro-British. The Labour's strategy in the Middle East may be summed up in "non intervention" and "conciliation". But the American President Truman's political behaviour was different. It depended completely on his electoral politics. This was exasperating to Bevin. This was the result of a seeming incomprehension, on the part of the British statesmen and diplomats, of the working of the American political system particularly in the making of the foreign policy.

American political system, as we know, is dominated by the President. His Secretaries, who are members of his so-called cabinet are only hand picked by him. Their departments do have expertise on the regions or the international scene as a whole. Therefore, their advice to the President is based on their expert knowledge. But the President can ignore this advice in the context of his domestic politics. On the crucial moments with reference to the Palestine issue the domestic compulsions proved to be
more compelling for the President than the almost objective advice of the Secretaries of State and Defense. Here came the Zionists. Through their influence mechanism and electoral weight they were able to influence the President’s mind for their own end.

American Presidents were at that time unfamiliar with the realities of the Middle East. The fantasies of President Roosevelt on 'peacefully' resolving the Arab Zionist dispute were shocking. Far more significant were Truman’s decisions. There were erratic shifts in United States policies on Palestine, particularly after the question was placed on the agenda of the United Nations’ General Assembly. The American position before the General Assembly’s Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine in the fall of 1947 was developed essentially by the Department of State, and the pressures on friendly delegations before the final vote in the plenary Assembly session by the White House, thanks to the Zionists and their access to Truman. The latter went all alone pulling his weight for partition resolution and never consulted the State Department. He could not afford to be inimical to his Jewish electorate and Zionist supporters.

Like the policies of the United States, Soviet policies were determined by an interplay between an internal "Jewish
factor" and the perceived requirements of the Soviet interest in the Middle East as a whole in the context of the super power struggle.

As the political and social ferment in Russia exploded in Revolution of 1917 Britain's support to the Jewish National Home in Palestine through the Balfour Declaration provided added impetus to Communist hostility toward Zionism. For not only did the Declaration threaten to deflect or subvert the support of Jews for the Revolution at a critical moment, but also seemed to reveal Zionism as a vehicle of British imperialism and as a means of keeping suppressed the presumably revolutionary toiling Arab masses.

However, with the advent of World War II Stalin started to cultivating the Jews and the Zionists alike. Arab, especially the Palestinian leadership, fell from grace. Nonetheless, given the traditional Soviet hostility toward Zionism, it came as a surprise when in the fall of 1947 Soviet spokesmen in the United Nations declared their support for the idea of partition and the creation of independent Jewish and Arab states in Palestine. Ideology took a back seat while political expediency ruled the roost. This more than benevolent attitude toward the Zionists seems surprising not only in the light of the previous Soviet
hostility to Zionism but also in the perspective of subsequent Soviet policies which continue to the present days.

As the Palestine issue came up for decision, the United Nations had before it three alternatives. The first, recommended by the majority of its own special committee on Palestine urged partition; the second advanced by the minority of the Committee, advocated a federal Jewish-Arab state; and the third, pressed by the Arab delegations, insisted on independence for Palestine under the rule of its Arab majority. All these proposals envisaged the termination of the British Mandate, which was what the Soviets were interested in most. Moreover, the Soviets had already visualized that partition was the only proposal that had the chance of commanding the necessary two thirds majority, and was therefore the only proposal that promised to bring the end of the British rule in Palestine. Consequently, even though the Soviets would have intrinsically favored the federal proposal as Gromyko indicated in one of his speeches, they cast their vote and weight in favour of partition for the "practical reasons", that otherwise the United Nations would have reached a deadlock that would have allowed Britain to prolong its stay in Palestine.
In the context of the Soviet support for the Zionists, the Arabs could have thought of taking the support of the West which as a bloc was against the East, that is the Soviet Union. However this would not have paid any dividends. The West at its best was divided (due to the British Labour Party's opposition to the American support to Zionism) and at its worst was basically united against them (Arabs). Despite the transient British policy under the Labour Government the British society was as prozionist as the American one.

Moscow knew that Britain was so strongly entrenched in the Arab world that the Soviet Union would not be able to cash in on any pro-Arab position. In addition the real prospect, i.e. the ouster of the British would be jeopardized for the sake of an ungainful popularity.

The Soviets had some other reasons also. They were resentful of the fact that Arab nationalist movements had taken a pro-axis orientation e.g. in Palestine it was led by the Mufti of Jerusalem Haj Amin Al-Husseini and in Egypt by Aziz al-Masri. The argument generally advanced by some writer was that Stalin approved of the partition of Palestine in a fit of absent-mindedness. Them does not seem to be plausible.
Inspite of Soviet Union's support of partition the thrust of Arab anger was against the United States, which was seen as the architect of the partition plan. The Arab countries, ironically were staunchly "pro-Western" in the sense of being "anti Bolshevik". Half-hearted attempts to contact the Soviets were made only by some members of the Syrian delegation, though Haj Amin also might have been in contact with them.

The signal achievement of the Zionist diplomacy was the U.N. partition resolution of November 19, 1947. The Zionists for the first time in the history of their movement got an international sanction for the establishment of their own state.

The origins of the November resolution lay in the UNSCOP report, which at the end of August 1947 recommended British evacuation and termination of the Mandate.

The Zionists had visualised that without the forthright American support, the solution recommended by the UNSCOP majority report - partition - would not secure the required majority. The Zionists mounted both a widespread and intensive campaign, through Democratic Party channels and their supporters in the Congress.
Inspite of the declared support of both the American and the Soviet delegations the amended partition plan was adopted only narrowly on November 25, 1947, by the United Nations Ad hoc Committee on Palestine. There was just one vote short of the two third majority. The fact that the required majority was secured for the decisive vote just four days later was due to an unprecedently intensive Zionist campaigning that finally mobilized, at the eleventh hour, the support of the White House.

Witnesses on both the American and the Zionist side have nevertheless established that the White House, with or without the President's personal sanction, was involved in a pressure campaign to change the votes of those smaller countries that had either opposed or abstained from the vote on November 25.

Three days after the decisive passage of the partition resolution, the incharge of the Jewish Agency's New York office, Michael Camay wrote to a friend that the President Truman has got upset and threw his personal weight behind the effort to secure a decision. It was only in the last forty eight hours on Friday and Saturday that they got the full backing of the United States.
However, it would be fallacious to think that the Zionists and their supporters held any monopoly on pressure tactics. Since the beginning of the General Assembly, the Arab delegates had warned the Americans frequently that they would defect to the Soviet camp if the United States voted for partition. The Arab warning was of no consequence however, when the Soviets themselves declared in favour of partition in October 1947. The domestic political influence of the Zionists in America also out smarted the threat of oil sanction by the Arabs. Ibn Saud himself had made it perfectly clear to American diplomats that, quite contrary to what the oil lobby in Washington was telling the State Department, he would not impose oil sanctions against the West due to any differences over Palestine.

Whatever the oil lobby might have conceived of pressuring the Americans or whatever the Arab oil-rich countries might have thought of influencing the West using oil as a force, the stark fact was that in 1947 the Arabs had no oil power whatsoever which they came to acquire only in 1973. Even in this latter year (1973) when they used oil as a political weapon they failed. Therefore to think of using oil as an instrument of pressure in 1947 was too transparent a bluff not to be called.