CHAPTER I
INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

INTRODUCTION:

The study of India's foreign policy is invariably the study of Nehru's foreign policy. Jawaharlal Nehru has been its chief "architect, engineer and the voice of his country's policy towards the outside world". The speeches of Nehru delivered by him at different times and places give an articulate expression to free India's foreign policy. "In Parliament and party caucus, within India and abroad, he has hammered on .... themes with remarkable consistency".¹

The major determinants and factors which underlie his policy are ancient Indian history and culture,² her geographical


² Elsewhere Nehru said, "This policy is not the product of any inspiration or arbitrary choice but has its roots in the past history and way of thinking as well as in fundamental national exigencies" J.L. Nehru, "Changing India", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 41, No. 3, April 1963, p. 455.
position, moralistic tradition of Buddha and Ashoka, Gandhi's ideology of peace and non-violence, and Nehru's assessment of post war period marked by dominant conflagration of cold war which engulfed the globe and divided the world into two warring camps. Nehru had a vivid sense of power politics. In his first broadcast to the nation after assuming office in 1946, Nehru declared, "We propose, as far as possible, to keep away from the power politics of groups, aligned against one another, which have led in the past to world war and which may again lead to disaster on an even vaster scale".

1. Referring to India's geographical position, Nehru said in the Parliament, on March 17, 1950, "We are in a strategic part of Asia, set in the centre of Indian Ocean with intimate past and present connection with Western Asia, South-East Asia and Far Eastern Asia. Even if we could not want to ignore this fact. Now that a greater part of Asia is free from colonialism, our minds go back to the old days and the relationships with other countries in Western Eastern and South-Eastern countries". T.A. Nizami, The Communist Party and India's Foreign Policy, New Delhi, Associated Publishing House, 1971, p. 27.

2. Even in the Parliament, the policy of the Government was supported on this ground. Seth Govinda Das said that the policy is based on Indian culture and civilization and in accordance with Gandhi's ideal of peace. Lok Sabha Debates November 26, 1959, II Series, No. 9, Vol. xxxv, column 1928. Also see Frank Anthony's statement in the same debate in this regard, col. 1938.


At some other place he said, that for the last three hundred years, since the nation-states in the modern world have emerged, nations have relied for survival on this process of mobilized antagonisms. All these years, the nations of the world have been engaged in futile wars. In a philosophical vein, S. Radhakrishnan also said that he was conscious of power politics and the perils of alignment.

Such pronouncements of Indian leaders have reduced Indian foreign policy to "protest against power politics." Under Nehru's stewardship, India attempted to play a quiet and persuasive role in easing down the cold war tensions. In many a situation, in 1950's particularly, his efforts to iron out differences through discussion, conciliation, and persuasion yielded many good results. At present the irony of it is that it is not possible to decipher pin-pointedly India's role, as many of the state papers are not open to public perusal.

2. S. Radhakrishnan, Occasional speeches and Writings, October, 1952 - January 1956, New Delhi, p. 4.
The immediate roots of Indian foreign policy are found in policy declarations of the All India Congress Committee. This became articulate after the World War I, when Nehru was incharge of the newly created foreign office working under the invigorating leadership of Gandhi. A study of the resolutions passed by the Indian National Congress from its inception throws light on the fact that the Party took keen interest in the external affairs.

The meeting of All India Congress Committee in Delhi in 1921 was a "landmark in the history of India's foreign relations". K.P. Misra cites N.V. Raj Kumar that the resolution of 1921 was important, since it was the first significant declaration on the part of nationalist India. It further laid down the cornerstone of independent India's foreign policy. The Congress Session in Madras in 1927 passed a resolution of protest against the use of Indian troops in China. In 1957 Nehru confirmed that the foundations of India's foreign policy were laid down at the Madras Session of the Congress in 1927.

1. Since its inception in 1885, the Congress always favoured an independent policy. The foundations of the policy of peace were laid by the Congress, when the British Government without consulting the Indian Legislative Assembly sent Indian troops abroad on the out-break of the World War II as quoted infra P. Trikamdas, "India and Empire" Political Science Quarterly, October-December 1938, pp. 607-608.


3. For details of resolutions passed by the A.I.C.C. since 1885, see N.V. Raj Kumar, (ed.), The Background of Indian Foreign Policy, New Delhi, 1952.

NATIONAL INTEREST AND FOREIGN POLICY

National interest is the most significant factor in determining the foreign policy of any country. Nehru said, "Every country's foreign policy, first of all, is concerned with its own security and with protecting its own progress... security is protected by policies..." and a deliberate policy of friendship with other countries goes further in gaining security than almost anything else. On 4th Dec. 1947, in a speech in the Constituent Assembly (Legislative) Nehru said, "Whatever policy we may lay down, the art of conducting the foreign policy of a country lies in finding out what is most advantageous to the country. We may talk about international goodwill and mean what we say. We may talk about peace and freedom and earnestly mean what we say. But in the ultimate analysis, a government functions for the good of a country it governs and no government dare do anything which in short or long run is manifesting to the disadvantage of that country. Therefore, whether a country is imperialistic or socialist or communist, its Foreign Minister thinks primarily of the interests of that country".3

1. Adda B. Bozeman, "India's Foreign Policy Today: Reflections upon its Sources", K.P. Misra, op. cit., p.37
Side by side, a nation's foreign policy ought to be a balanced blend of idealism and enlightened self-interest. C.S. Bajpai cites Palmerston's words to substantiate his proposition that there are no eternal friends or enemies but only eternal interests and that India's foreign policy has to some extent combined idealism with national interest.

To "curb any separatist tendencies" and "to assume the leadership of area" were the two main aims in the minds of Indian foreign policy framers and Indian leaders. (Obviously, there was a consciousness of India's heterogenous composition, its relative problems and existence and partition). In laying down the main tenets of foreign policy, Nehru emphasised non-alignment as a means to attain the goal of national interest.

1. G.S. Bajpai, "Ethical Stand in World Issues: Cornerstone of India's Foreign Policy," in K.P. Misra (ed.) op. cit., p. 25. Also see, Nehru, op. cit., p. 28 where Nehru says that "idealism alone would not do".

2. Ibid, p. 26. Also see, E.H. Carr, Twenty Years' Crisis, London, 1958, p. 234. Where Carr points out that no realist can wholly disregard the wider moral issues and principles and no idealist can become entirely oblivious of self-interest".

3. Werner Levi, Free India in Asia, Minneapolis, 1952, p. 51. "Many times Nehru has appealed to his countrymen for unity on the ground that the whole of Asia is looking to India for leadership or he has assured them that because of India's high prestige abroad, Asian Countries are looking to her for guidance. Dr. Radhakrishnan has pointed out that leadership in Asia is open to India and that India's role will be very important. Sardar Patel once remarked that India has the potential to take over leadership".

This enlightened self-interest is the most important justification of non-alignment policy. The position of non-alignment is that of a means to achieve the aims. It is not an end in itself.¹

On the eve of the independence of Ghana, President Nkrumah, made the following declaration, clarifying his main stand on the basis of national interest. He said, that in pursuing an independent policy, the Ghana government will have foremost regard, for the interests of the people of Ghana, and their economic and social progress. Every step in the government's power, internally as well as externally, would further the developments of the nation's resources for the common good.² National interest of a country is determined by "geopolitical economic and other factors, obtaining at a particular point of time".³


It is because of it that, the elements of National interest change with the variations in the national and international situations.\footnote{1} Nehru, who gave shape and content to India's foreign policy was fully convinced that it serves India's national interest. The critics, however, ever since the inception of India as an independent nation, criticised and doubted the validity of foreign policy principle, as also the yardstick of national interest, which is always different to different persons.\footnote{2}

Michael Brecher has enunciated the "elite" principle in explaining foreign policy. He hints that the key to understand the foreign policy system is, the world view of the small coterie of men in every state, who take foreign policy decisions in ultimate analysis.\footnote{3} Foreign policy is not the manifesto of cherished ideals and emotional preferences of a leader or of nation, it is the art of reconciling the attitudes with the national interest.\footnote{4}

The crucial point is, the identification of national interest at a particular time by this ruling elite. The national interest has to be an amalgam of constants and variables.\footnote{5}

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2. Editorialy, \textit{National Herald}, (Lucknow), 10.4.69.
5. K.P. Misra, \textit{op. cit.}, p. XV.
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Their importance, to a large part depends on the setting of the instruments by which they are surveyed. Nehru, therefore, emphatically declared, that he had tried to look to the interests of India, as it was his primary duty.

Nehru was conscious of the objective of India's foreign policy. He declared that every intelligent person sees that "a narrow national policy may excite the multitude for the moment just as the communal cry had done, but it is bad for the nation and it is bad internationally, as we lose sight of the ultimate good and thereby endanger our own good. Therefore, we prefer to look after India's interests in the context of World cooperation and World peace, in so far as the world peace can be preserved." In short, India's foreign policy, logically enough is- "cognizant of and responsive to the wider and broader interests" of India as well as of the World, which is based on conception and understanding of a less realistic an idealist like Nehru.

National interest is also wound up inextricably with economic development and interest. On December 4, 1947 in the

Constituent Assembly, Nehru said that in ultimate analysis the foreign policy ought to be the outcome of the economic policy, as foreign policy will be rather vague, inchoate, and groping, without being governed by economic policy. "Survival" and "Security" had been the national interest of India. She wanted survival, external and internal stability, otherwise, India had no empire to hold, no trade monopoly to perpetuate, no ocean routes to safeguard, no international commitments or vested interests to preserve except Kashmir and no ideology to sell, but somehow India like other states is not engaged in quest for power.

In short, it is a policy influenced by a variety of factors. "It is a well "thought out" and "deliberate policy"." "It is a policy", declared Nehru on December 9, 1958, in the Lok Sabha during the reply to debate on Foreign Affairs, "inherent in the circumstances of India, inherent in the past thinking of India, inherent in the circumstances of the World today...."

2. For details in assessing "Security" as the basis of national interest see, J. Bondyopadhyaya, op. cit., pp. 9-15.
5. Ibid., p. 196. (From Speech in the Lok Sabha on the Defence Ministers resolution on nuclear explosions, May 22, 1957).
6. Ibid., p. 80.
MAIN TENETS OF FOREIGN POLICY

It is clear from the above that India's foreign policy is the most important legacy of Nehru. It is his most outstanding contribution to India which made him the path finder of the newly liberated countries of east and west, South and North.¹

Certain principles are defined by Nehru which form the cornerstone of India's foreign policy. These principles are not a matter of abstract definitions but of definite goals. Foreign policy can not be grandiose, unitary or a comprehensive algebraic formula in this complex world.²

The principal source of Indian foreign affairs is neither Hinduism, Buddhism, Gandhianism, the Western European tradition, nor a rational analysis of reality in terms of India's long range national interest, but it is the complex biography of Nehru.³ Apart from the predominant role of Nehru in determining it, the role of other factors is not inconsequential.⁴

² J.D. Sethi, "National Security", Seminar, No.77, Jan. 1966, p. 28. Also see, T.A. Nizami, "The Architect of Modern India", Aligarh Muslim University Gazette, June 30, 1964 that Nehru's foreign policy was not a "Static Concept", but a "dynamic process" - "evolving, changing and upholding itself to meet the exigencies of time".
³ Adda B. Bozeman, op. cit., p. 32. Also see, K. Sadchidanand Murthy, "India's Foreign Policy: Ideological Moorings", Indian Foreign Policy, Calcutta, 1964, pp. 1-8.
⁴ K.P. Misra, op. cit., Editor's Introduction, p. VIII.
It means the inevitable determinants of the foreign policy namely history, geography, cultural background, economic potential, strategic position, military power and its total power position also cannot be overlooked.

**Preservation of Peace**

The preservation of peace is the central aim of India's policy. It is in pursuit of this policy that India has chosen the path of non-alignment in any military or like pact of alliance. This preservation and the enlargement of peace formed the backbone of India's policy because, for economic reconstruction, political stability and bringing up socialism in India, India needed tranquil atmosphere within and without. Moreover, PEACE, has been the keyword in Indian culture. Every prayer of an Indian ends in the desire for peace. Thus, the primary goal (of India's policy) has been the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security. Our present policy flows from the past, while incidentally it also helps...
the maintenance of peace and the avoidance of war in the present day world. Peace is also the main mantra for the solitary leader, Nehru who explicitly mentioned, "our main stake in world affairs is peace ...." We want at least two decades of peace in order to be able to develop our resources. Nehru was very certain of the fact that every one wants peace. The great power blocs and the tiny developing nations, all want and talk of peace. It is a quality, it is a way, an approach and objective. Nehru almost passionately wished "peace" for his "One World".

NON-ALIGNMENT

The cardinal feature of India's foreign policy is the policy of non-alignment. Nehru pioneered it in the world of the developing nations, hence almost in every foreign policy.

1. Ibid., p. 195
2. Michael Brecher, op. cit., p. 151
3. Nehru, op. cit., p. 48. Also see, Vijayalaxmi Pandit, India's Foreign Policy, "Foreign Affairs", Vol. 34, No. 3 April 1956, p. 433, where she specifies that this approach of peace is India's traditional philosophical and historical outlook.
5. Ibid., p. 11.
speech by Nehru, there is an insistent proclaim and adoration for this policy. On Sept. 7, 1946, in his first broadcast to the nation Nehru said, "we propose, as far as possible, to keep away from the power politics of groups, aligned against one another, which have led in the past to, world wars and which may again lead to disasters on an even vaster scale."¹

In the post war era, dreadful antagonism existed between the two great powers, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. Nehru was fully conscious of this vital and menacing division. The two blocs were at daggers' drawn on every major and minor issue that the world was confronted with. This gave birth and sustenance to COLD-WAR, which became the stark reality after the World-War II. East and the West formed two warring camps.² It is desirable, Nehru declared, "for all the countries not to insist, not to lay stress on separate groups and separate blocs".³ The two blocs always appeared hostile and on the verge of war. Nehru realised the adverse consequences of cold-war phenomenon and concluded that it is in India's benefit and national interest to remain aloof from bloc politics.⁴ At the

¹ Nehru, op. cit., p. 2
² For details see, T.A. Nizami, op. cit., p. 27.
³ Nehru op. cit., p. 11.
time of independence, India was economically underdeveloped and politically at sixes and sevens. Thus, for economic reconstruction and political stability, India needed economic and military assistance from all quarters. Nehru was against attaching India to any particular group. This external isolation has given to India ample opportunity to remain engaged in internal reconstruction against international bipolarisation. It was utterly realistic "for India to avoid" false step "of bloc-entanglement and Nehru did it consciously. Thus Nehru was earnest in developing a definite foreign policy for the country in the light of fluid conditions of the world. Nehru wanted that India should become the world's leading neutralist power. Generally, the pursuit of peace, liberation of subject peoples, elimination of racial discrimination and furtherance of international peace and security are the objectives for all nations to pursue, India endeavoured to attain these objectives, not through getting aligned with the great power blocs, but through an independent approach, a policy of non-alignment. It caused a great deal of misunderstanding in the USA.

1. Nehru, op. cit., p. 27. (From speech in the Constituent Assembly, Dec. 4, 1947.)
2. It is not isolation as such but just the policy of having an unjaundiced outlook, see, Vijayalaxmi, op. cit., p. 433.
3. Ibid., p. 29. "Even after ten years of this avowed policy, the policy of non-alignment remained valid ... no responsible person has suggested remotely, that there should be a change in India's basic policy, the policy of peace and the policy of non-alignment? Statement by Frank Anthony, Lok Sabha Debate Nov. 6, 1959, Second Series, No. 9, Vol. XXV, Col. 1937.
The policy of non-alignment is an assertion of independence and democratic right of freedom of action whereas neutrality or isolationism, stems from indifference.

In India, non-alignment received applause from almost all quarters. Nehru accepted non-alignment as a part of independence of judgement on the basis of merits of an issue. He said that even from the point of view of opportunism and independent judgement, straightforward and honest policy is the "best policy".\(^1\) Clarifying what is non-alignment Nehru asked, "What does joining a bloc mean? After all it can only mean one thing: give up your view about a particular question, adopt the other party's view on that question in order to please it and gain its favour .... the question only arises when we are opposed to it on that point, therefore we give up our viewpoint and adopt the other one in order to gain favour".\(^2\) Nehru was particular to emphasise that non-alignment did not mean isolation. When he said that we should not align ourselves with any power bloc,

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\(^1\) Ibid., p. 35
\(^2\) Ibid., p. 36
it does not amount to mean that we should not be closer in
our relation with all countries.¹

Non-alignment to Nehru was something positive, dynamic
and definite. It is not in itself a policy but it was "a part
of policy".² It was not "sitting on the fence"³ and it was not
sheer opportunism and wooing of the desired country. However,
this policy should not be confused with neutrality, as
neutrality operates during war. It is more restricted in its
implications. "We are only uncommitted to certain principles,
policies and objectives".⁴

India's desire based on its national interest stems
from the realisation of its own weaknesses—economic and
military.⁵ The other justification of its policy is its
strategic position and geographical situation. India cannot
align with Communist groups for the obvious reason of the
presence of Pakistan, her enemy number one and the Western ally,
in the same way. She cannot align with the west for the mighty
presence of China, the monster of blue ants.⁶

India's policy has not denied her the opportunity to
participate freely in world affairs. Our policy is not a
passive policy or a negative policy, was Nehru's assertion in his

¹ Ibid., p. 47. Also see, M.M. Rehman, Politics of
² Ibid., p. 79
³ Ibid., p. 80
⁴ B.N. Chakravarti, op. cit., p. 12.
⁵ Ibid., p. 13.
⁶ A. Appadorai, op. cit., p. 486
speech in the Constituent Assembly on March 8, 1948. In short, Nehru concluded it as follows, "It is positive, constructive policy deliberately aiming at something and deliberately trying to avoid hostility to other countries, to any country as far as possible".  

Nehru was not insistent on the point that India should play a dominant role in world affairs. India was not to acquire a predominant position. If ever India was to play a part in world affairs she should be mindful of her own strength, problems and country's affairs. National interest can not be put at stake. Nehru clarified that India did not want to interfere in international affairs, except where she felt that intervention might help others or where something affected India directly. Non-alignment has been India's distinguished mark through which world's attention is attracted towards India.  

1. Nehru, op. cit., p. 32. Also see, p. 148, where Nehru says that our policy is not "escapism" those who think that "our policy is inane .... are mistaken". (From reply to debate in the Constituent Assembly on India's decision to remain in the Commonwealth of Nations, May 17, 1949).  

2. Ibid., p. 45. The rise of non-alignment in the international world is compared with the rise of adult suffrage on the national scene. In theory, any nation can adhere to non-alignment but in practice, it was largely confined to the emerging nations of Asia and Africa who had been and continue to be the weaker nations of the world. G.R.K. "Content of Non-Alignment", Mainstream, V. No.6, Oct. 22, 1964, p. 9  

3. Ibid., p. 70  

4. Nehru, op. cit., p. 82. (From Speech at the Bangalore Session of the Indian National Congress Sadasivnagar, Jan. 17, 1960). Also see Rajdoot, "Sunlight on the Summit or Sunset?" Mainstream, Vol. V, No. 8, October 22, 1964, p. 15. Where the author maintained that in 1950's non-alignment played a big role as it was suited to a bipolar world. Its function was that of a "bridge" between the two cold war camps.
India was also interested in the Asian uplift with the result that the Asian Relations Conference was convened at New Delhi, on March 23, 1947, at a time when the world was standing on the "threshold of a new period of history" and "dynamic Asia", was to take new ventures. But India did not want to create a third power bloc. "In the first place it is not feasible to create an effective third bloc strong enough in a military sense, due to the fact that all the uncommitted countries would appear pygmy-like, compared to either of the two giants, secondly, such a bloc would be undesirable, as it would not serve the mighty cause of peace, .... next, a policy of non-alignment implies non-alignment of the uncommitted countries with one another."

Among the non-aligned, India occupies a position of eminence as India was one of the earliest countries to adopt non-alignment and later, it was regarded as the yard-stick to gauge independence of a new nation in international affairs.

1. Ibid, p. 248. In an inaugural address at the Asian Relations Conference, New Delhi, March 23, 1947 where Nehru laid down new ideals for Asia and Asians and expected Asia "to function effectively in the maintenance of peace", page 251. He said that Asia should, "cooperate together for that larger ideal" of "one world", p. 252.


Nehru dreaded that alignment and pactomania had yielded undesirable results to the world, in the last few years. The spread of this policy to Asia has not added to the world's security. It has deviated people from thinking on economic progress and developing minor strength and bolstered up countries by military means which can only be temporary. It had rather retarded the progress of a country.¹

In fact, the strategic aims of all the non-aligned nations ought to arrange a detente between the two hostile blocs and somehow India did it.² The politics of non-alignment is the politics of peace, a state of military as well as economic powerlessness and desire for survival. Moreover, this policy was more activistic and participating than the independent and the peace-area approach. Undoubtedly, non-alignment was developed as a measure to face the cold-war in the world. Whatever may be true, the fact remains that for India the policy remained thoroughly unchanged.³ In the beginning this policy brought dividends to India, later it started earning indifference and hostility of big powers.⁴

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2. The Problem, *op. cit.*, p. 11
Despite remaining non-aligned, India played a commendable role in Korean-episode and also as the Chairman for Indo-China. Nehru devised it so as to meet all contingencies that may confront India.

While it is probably true to say that the intentions of India's policy makers have remained broadly the same since 1947, the actual course of India's neutralist policy has gone through three stages. ¹ During the years 1947-50, India was preoccupied with immediate tasks flowing from the newly achieved independence. Domestic and foreign policy tasks were closely linked. India showed strong faith in cordialties with Britain and championed Indonesian independence. Indian Neutralism seemed to be pro-Western.

From 1951 to 56, India pursued a fairly active mediatorial role and moved from a western oriented neutralism towards a more positive middle-of-the-road-position. The strength and limitations of Indian neutralist diplomacy were shown by her action or inaction on such issues as Korean, Indo-Chinese, and Suez wars and Hungarian resolution. ² In this period, India's relations with Russia and China showed signs of improvement, with U.S.A. deterioration and with Britain showed fluctuations. From June, 1952, there was a new note of

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¹ Brecher reports that "the term to describe Indian foreign policy has undergone frequent changes. It began with "neutrality" or 'dynamic neutrality', later became 'neutralism' and then 'non-alignment'. Nehru prefers the phrase 'positive policy for peace', he told the author in New Delhi on June 13 1956". Michael Brecher, op. cit., p. 563.

criticism in the Indian Government's reaction to Western alliances. India consistently expressed her disapproval of almost all the western alliances and of western colonial empires. Indian diplomacy had two working assumptions that firstly, the Asian affairs should be decided by Asians and secondly, all the remaining vestiges of colonialism must be crushed.

The policy pursued during this period favoured and improved relations with Communist China. India at this period was developing a world role as was evident from advising settlements for the Asian and Algerian questions, her initiatives in proposing a world disarmament agreement beginning with a nuclear test ban, her acceptance of the chairmanship of the committee appointed to supervise the implementation of the 1954 Geneva agreements on Laos, and her active role in the meetings of the Colombo-Powers and at Bandung in April 1955. Thus there was meeting with Tito and Nasser at Broni in Yugoslavia. In the U.N. this bloc became more unwieldy and India's undisputed leadership began to diminish. Later, the limitations of India's mediatory role were soon to became clear as, with the eruption of the Suez and Hungarian crises in 1956, India's neutralist policies were less effective than during the Korean and Indo-China wars.

Another factor which was influencing the course of

1. Ibid., p. 84
Indian policy was the development of Soviet aid programmes to India from 1954 onwards. Thus by the end of 1956, India had evolved a neutralist foreign policy, recognised by both the cold war camps as independent; and if only by contrast with the year 1947-51, it seemed to be slightly inclined towards the Soviet bloc. From 1957, India tended to content with a rather quieter role internationally, in contrast, with Egypt and Yugoslavia to be more moderate, less stridently radical and revisionist, even on anti-colonial issues. These contrasts were more evident during 1960-62. Since October 1962, the dispute with China had made all other issues subordinate.

After one and a half decades of hard won freedom, the first test of non-alignment occurred when, the Chinese invasion took place. In the context of this localised Sino-Indian War, non-alignment played the role of keeping out of cold-war from South-Asian region, where India and China, the biggest and the largest countries were at dagger's drawn. In the same vein, the editorial of the Indian Express of November 29, 1962 declared

1. Ibid., p. 84
2. See Brecher, op. cit., pp. 582-3
3. Peter Lyon, op. cit., p. 85
4. Ibid., p. 86
6. The Times of India, (New Delhi), 27.8. 1963
that the Chinese aggression on India's borders has swept away an accumulated cobwebs and disillusions. A few people held that in the new situations, non-alignment has become all the more relevant and a few held to the contrary. The U.S.A. has been highly critical of non-alignment, which India followed as a diplomatic necessity and moral imperative. Despite the reluctance, U.S.A. came forth with massive aid to India.

A question has often been raised that after the Chinese attack India should have abandoned non-alignment. Almost from all quarters of public opinion, press, journals and the Parliament, a hue and cry was raised that India should get aligned with the west, as USSR remained aloof and cold, whereas the US responded to the Indian cry with warmth and favour. The United Kingdom and USA deserve great credit for not asking the Indian Republic to abandon non-alignment. But the prospects of India's alignment with the west became bleak when "the most Socialist of all Socialists", the Chinese foster brother, USSR emerged as favouring

1. The Indian Express, (New Delhi), 29.11. 1962
3. B. N. Chakravarti, op. cit., p.22
4. Ibid., p. 23. An American study published in August 1962, showed clearly that India had received more foreign aid, in sheer money terms from both the Soviet Union and United States than any other state. A volume of testimony about foreign aid given before the House of Representative appropriation Sub-Committee early in 1962 was published in August 1962. The Times (London) 30.8. 1962. Note K.P.Misra-The Table, p. 87.
5. Ibid., p. 23
India in the Sino-Indian collusion. Hence the question of abandoning non-alignment became less pertinent in the light of the dividends it received in getting aid from both the cold war contending parties.

The policy of peaceful coexistence is closely linked with non-alignment. It is also a natural outcome of India's religious and social background.

Since the signing of the nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963, thaw in cold-war is obvious, a question is asked about the validity and futility of non-alignment. The blocs have come closer in the first half of the last decade. A few hold that when reapproachment is attained, non-alignment and peaceful coexistence would become the order of the day. Yet it is imperative that non-alignment be adjusted to changed conditions of modern international world.

After the death of Nehru, Shastri reaffirmed his support to Nehru's policy. He followed Nehru's foot-steps in all respects. Though this responsibility was too great to be borne by Shastri.

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1. Ibid., p. 25. India received promises of military hardware from the Soviet Union. cf. about the validity of non-alignment G.R.K., op. cit., p. 9.
2. Ibid., p. 36.
3. Ibid., p. 37
5. Lok Sabha Debates, Sept. 14, 1964, Third Series, Vol. XXXIII No.6, IX Session, Column 1459. Also see, Nehru, op. cit., p. 80, where Nehru emphatically predicted, "... I am quite convinced that whoever might have been in-charge of the foreign affairs of India and whatever party might have been in power in India, they could not have deviated very much from this policy".
This new Prime Minister, was not ready to deviate from what Nehru said. Shastri reaffirmed that non-alignment would continue to be the fundamental basis of India's approach to world problems and our relations with other countries. H.N. Mukerjee is cited to have stated in the debate in Lok Sabha that Shastri has to bear the mantle of responsibility which has fallen on him due to passing away of the overpowering personality of Nehru. Moreover, it must be borne in mind that whatever the term denoted, the government of India's policy towards the cold war has throughout remained unchanged in substance. Shastri himself declared that there would be no deviation from the lines of the policy laid down by Nehru.

To some extent, continued adherence to the so-called policy of non-alignment in both eras obscured alterations in the substance of India's foreign policy. But the criticism in official circles, questions and doubts have weakened the usefulness of non-alignment as a dogma. Myron Weiner is quoted to have said that today to be aligned with everybody seems to be aligned with nobody. Towards the end of Nehru era and throughout the Shastri

1. Lok Sabha Debates, September 15, 1964, Third Series, Vol. XXXII, No.6, IX Session, Column 1604, Statement by K.C. Pant that he was a "good man".
5. Ibid., p. 185
6. Ibid., p. 186
era, non-alignment was stripped of its missionary connotations.\(^1\) During this period non-alignment tended to turn into non-involvement \(^2\).

The most solid reality of post-Nehru-era was the lingering of non-alignment.\(^3\) It was, however, noticed that Shastri searched for a new policy while in the meantime he clunged to the remnants of the old.\(^4\) Now the foreign policy tended to turn from appeals to the world to the implementation of concrete interests such as production of weapons, the purchase of war material and the building of strategic roads.\(^5\) The foreign policy shifted to realism from romantic idealism.

The reasons about this mild change were obvious. The foremost among them was the gradual and inevitable awakening of India to the realities of international politics. The concept of Asian Solidarity vanished in the realisation of inevitable hostilities among them. In the changed circumstances, Nehru's idea of an area of peace for the South and the South-East-Asia turned out to be a 'chimera'. There were born conflicts of national interest. The developments in the course of international politics detained India

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1. Ibid., p. 186.
2. Ibid., p. 187.
3. Ibid., p. 223
4. Ibid.
to perform the leadership function either in her region or in
the world which she assigned to herself during the first decade
of her freedom. The second reason for change appeared to be the
gradual disappearance of the prerequisites for successful non-
alignment. This reduced the policy to more modest proportions
during the Shastri era.

**INDIA AND THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION.**

Nehru has been most emphatic and equivocal in
according his staunch support to the United Nations Organisations.\(^1\)
As early as in 1946, Nehru declared, "towards the United Nations,
India's attitude is that of whole-hearted cooperation and unres­
served adherence in both spirit and letter to the charter governing
it. To that end, India will participate fully in its various
activities and endeavour to play that role in its councils to
which her geographical position, population and contribution
towards peaceful progress entitles her".\(^2\) For this solitary
symbol of Hope,\(^3\) the main purpose is the maintenance of inter­
national peace and security. For the uncommitted nations like India

\(^1\) Nehru, *op. cit.* p.166. Nehru said, "... that we adhere
completely and absolutely to the principles and purposes
of the United Nations Charter and that we shall try, to the
best of our ability to work for the realisation of those
principles and purposes." (From Speech in the United Nations

\(^2\) Jafar Raza Bilgrami, "India and the United Nations", *The
Indian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. XXVI, No. 2,
April -June 1965, p. 52.

\(^3\) Nehru, *op. cit.*, p. 167. (From Message broadcast by the U.N.
Radio network from Lake Success, New York, May 5, 1950.)
it is a greater source of inspiration.  

India is in favour of U.N.'s mediatory role, as the U.N. succeeded in its efforts to ease tension in Congo, Korea and Cuba, moreover the task of disarmament also receives attention in the U.N. India feels that it is not only a debating body but also an institution which has undertaken a very heavy task and solved some of the really difficult problems. Likewise Nehru felt that in Tibetan episode in 1950, the U.N. should intervene because of the violation of human rights and aggression there.

Nehru in very clear terms established his close cooperation and sense of attachment to the UNO. He looked at the United Nations as an essential World Organisation to maintain peace. The principles of the UNO, when they aspire to do away with problems like colonialism, racial discrimination, and establish in this world, self-determination and achieve economic development—attract India more than the issues like Capitalism versus Communism, German-Unification and the liberation of satellites.

3. Ibid., p. 220.
5. Ibid., p. 346. (From Statement in the Lok Sabha in reply to a non-official resolution that India should take the Tibetan issue to the United Nations, September 4, 1959).
8. Jafar Raza Bilgrami, op. cit., p. 52
Lal Bahadur Shastri, who seldom deviated from the path set by Nehru, clarified the same attitude in an interview where, it is maintained that the United Nations had won the support of entire non-aligned group and its paramount importance had been recognised. The United Nations is mentioned in every chapter of the Cairo-Declaration. It is, therefore, through the United Nations with which the non-aligned group has identified its common cause, the proposals of the Cairo-Conference would be carried forward. This Cairo-Conference has provided for consultation among the non-aligned countries at each session of the United Nations in the furtherance of the role of the United Nations to preserve international cooperation among the nations.¹

"For India the United Nations with whose creation this country was closely associated and to whose charter India fully subscribes, is less a Court of appeal or a forum that can mete out ready-made justice than the symbol of a universal assembly of Nations living and working in cooperation with one another...."²

India missed no opportunity in impressing upon the world organisation, the imperative necessity of tackling the problems of emerging nationhood and economic development with greater emphasis. India urged and influenced the half of Afro-Asian members to see the organisation as a means of pursuing not

only for the problem of general interest as avoidance of war but also for the particular and peculiar interest in bringing to an end the vast vestiges of foreign colonialism. In the political field, where peace-keeping operations were involved, India's role has been more obvious. When in 1950-51 apprehension of a major world conflagration over Korea was there, India endeavoured to localise the conflict and upheld the cause of the Korean people to decide their fate.

India had been against the "compulsive" character of the U.N. She favoured mediatory role. She believed that the compulsive character would not help creating an atmosphere of peace. India was a passionate supporter of the principle of racial equality, fundamental human rights, equality of rights and status for all and this passion found justification in the Charter in provision against the racial discrimination and apartheid.

India basically believed in the elimination of want, disease and illiteracy which affects badly the greater population of the world. India had extended its full cooperation in the work of its specialised agencies and fields, through bilateral

1. Bilgrami, op. cit., p. 52
2. Link., op. cit., p. 16
arrangements and its approach to economic and technical assistance. Since India is adverse to colonial imperialism, Mrs. Laxmi N. Menon, India's Minister of State for External Affairs said that she felt within herself the dreams, the throbbing hopes and the aspirations of millions of other people, who were no better than what India was a decade ago. For the achievement of the foreign policy objectives, India invokes the United Nations as a 'Vehicle of Communication'.

From the dedication to the realisation of the declared objectives of India's foreign policy, there emerged a subsidiary dedication to and dependence on an effective United Nations, as the essential instrument for their implementation. The U.N. stands for the following three main objectives:

1. Vigilance against strong Great Power polarisation
2. Maximisation of Moral and Political aspect
3. Maximisation of Legal aspect of the U.N.

India emphasises the second aspect most, so she clings more to the II, III, IV paragraphs of Article I of the U.N. Charter, which are categorised under the heading of international cooperation.

1. Bilgrami, op. cit., p. 54
3. Bilgrami, op. cit., p.56
What is more related to foreign policy is the attitude of India towards the revision of the Charter. India considers an agreement between the Great Powers on matters of importance as indispensable. This is also in consonance with the avowed purpose of maintenance of peace and peaceful atmosphere. India attaches more importance to the practical organisation than to its structure and theoretical principles and the question of revision of Charter, is invariably related with theoretical aspect. So, what is imperative is the smooth operation of the machinery of the United Nations as it stands today. It should be accorded greater importance.

When the Charter was signed, India was one of the 28 countries which voted for the revision of the Charter within 10 years. India's delegate mostly emphasised the fact of the revision of the voting procedure in the security Council after ten years. A few issues have invoked greater support from India as was the case with the representation of the People's Republic of China. Mr. Menon declared in the General Assembly that this step would be most "substantial contribution" towards establishing stability in South-East-Asia and towards providing for non-interference in the affairs of other states and for arrangements on non-aggression, and that U.N. should be open

2. Ibid., p. 172. (From Speech at the inauguration of the Ninth General Conference of UNESCO, New Delhi, Nov. 5, 1956)
to all peace loving countries of the world.¹

On December 10, 1962, Prime Minister Nehru, in a letter to the U.N. Secretary-General, U. Thant, has once again pledged India's support to the Secretary-General in all his tasks and to the principles and purposes of the U.N. Charter.² India accorded its unflinching support to the decisions and aspirations of the U.N. She gave even armed troops when India was asked for in case of Congo.³

India deems that the United nations should develop more constructive role as the "symbol of the aspiration of the people telling us to stand together and understand each other", it can not assure its task of establishing an effective instrument of international security, if the Great Power harmony lacks otherwise,


2. News Item, The Hindustan Times, (New Delhi), 21.1. 63. It also includes the reply of U. Thant where he confessed that "..... India has demonstrated its devotion of the cause of international peace and cooperation and its dedication to the high purpose of charter...."

3. News Item, The Hindu (Madras), 7,11.62. It is reported that India sent about 6,000 Indian troops to the U.N. India also sent troops to Gaza strip.

the U.N.O. is illusory and self-defeating. Today, it is encouraging that despite the unrelieved frustration and draw-backs, the U.N. remained mankind's only hope against war and settlement of international disputes without recourse to military conflict.

It is said that India's role in the U.N. has been less conspicuous in its activity after the Chinese invasion of 1962. It is true to a larger extent, for, since then India got more obsessed in her own internal problems of utmost importance. Since then, two significant changes are noteworthy: India abandoned its active sponsorship of China's claims to the U.N. and that the representatives of China in the U.N. should require two-third and not simple majority. Since 1962, India's tendency at the U.N. has been to take a back seat to adopt an attitude of self-effacement. Due to India's preoccupation with the unwanted Chinese attack, her diplomatic inertia, lack of initiative, had allowed other countries to take her for granted. Still the U.N. is the only ray of hope and silver lining in the rather chaotic and troubled dark world of today, where shadows of war always loom large. The greatest test of the success of

2. "U.N. Silver Jubilee," The Link, 25.10.70
3. "India and the U.N." The Link, 25.10.70
4. Political Commentary by Inder Malhotra, The Statesman New Delhi, 11.12.1964. For the technical aid which India received from the U.N. See the Eastern Economist, January 15, 1965, XLVI in article under the caption "India and the U.N. Technical Assistance."
the U.N. in its 29th Year is that it still exists. In the latest Arab-Israel War of September-October 1973, it had done commendable job, saved the globe from the devastation of a third World War.

ANTI COLONIALISM

India wants freedom for every dependent nation. Even before India attained her freedom in 1947, she had become a symbol and catalyst of national self-determination for most nationalist movements in India and elsewhere.  

Out of two sources of non-alignment there are material and non-material factors which include legacies of history and philosophy. The legacy of Indian history is two fold - anti-colonialism and anti-racialism. In international conferences also India did not fail to uphold the cause of anti-colonialism as among issues, agreed upon at Bandung in 1955 there was unanimous condemnation of colonialism. Goa is its flagrant example.

Extending his whole-hearted support to China in Spain in 1939, Nehru wrote that Indian reaction was not only on humanitarian grounds, but also to a growing realisation of the significance of the conflicts in the world which did not justify our national interest. Fascism showed a mirror to

2. For details see, Brecher article in K.P. Misra, op. cit., p. 52. Also see, Ibid., p. 101
imperialism which caused immense suffering to India. The growth of Fascism meant, the defeat for freedom and democracy for which we struggled, we followed, perhaps with greater clarity than elsewhere, the development of British foreign policy towards cooperation with the Fascist-Powers, thus our opposition to imperialism and Fascism.¹

India has always championed the freedom of subject peoples and has always raised its voice against the colonial and racial policies of imperialist powers. Herself being subjected to colonial dominations,² India sympathises with all those nations which are still under colonial domination. The political emancipation of subject and colonial peoples, has received India's consistent support. India wants to eliminate every form of colonialism from Asia. She has supported the independence movement in Indonesia, Algeria, Morocco, Tunis etc. This policy also stems from India's national interest as colonialism is still strong and tenacious and as yet it threatens the independence of India and other Asian and African countries.³ The end of colonialism would facilitate the economic and political development of all Asian countries including India herself. This anti-colonial stance

¹ Friedman, "Indian Nationalism and the Far East", Pacific Affairs, March 1940, pp. 24-5.
² For details see, Bandyopadhyaya, op. cit, pp. 69-71.
³ V. Ni Phham, "India's Role in World Affairs", International Affairs, Moscow, No. 1, January 1958, pp. 56-60.
has earned much indignation from the U.S.A., as the USA does not look with favour at this policy of lashing out against every sort of colonialism.¹

Attached with this principle to which India adheres strictly, is the abolition of racial-discrimination. India vigorously opposes racial apartheid in South Africa and the U.S.A. India left no stone unturned to do away with it but failed due to imperialist designs of British and USA. In the Commonwealth also India tried to pressurise the Governments of South Africa to abolish it.² Nehru deeply appreciated the Russian Society for lack of racial prejudice and colonialism. Nehru as the Prime Minister of the Interim Government of India, declared that anti-imperialism and anti-racialism were the "kernel of our foreign policy",³ which was evidenced by his subsequent efforts. Speaking at Columbia University in 1949, Nehru explained the basic objectives of his overall policy in which he laid main emphasis on anti-colonialism. The main objectives of that policy were, "the pursuit of peace, not through alignment with any major group of powers but through an independent approach to each controversial or disputed issue; the liberation

² Nehru, op. cit., p. 213 (From Speech in Lok Sabha December 8, 1958. Also see pp. 502, 544, 549 and 550.
³ See for details, Bandyopadhayaya, op. cit., p. 71.
of subjected peoples; the maintenance of freedom, both national and individual; the elimination of racial discrimination; and the elimination of want, disease and ignorance, which afflict the greater part of the world's population".  

**INDIA AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS**

Since the very beginning of independence, Nehru was against any form of military alliance but this basic antipathy towards security alliance system does not amount to eclipse his cordial attitude towards the Commonwealth of Nations. He said, that so far as India was concerned, she prepared to enter into a treaty of friendship with any country in the World, and he regarded Commonwealth ties as a tie of mutual friendship and cooperation and understanding and not of domination and slavery. Moreover, India's internal problems and external policies are not affected by this tie. Commonwealth tie can also help expand area of peace- India's avowed ideal. Nehru once remarked that


2. Nehru, op. cit., p. 20. (From Speech in the Constituent Assembly on the motion by the Hon. B.R. Ambedkar that the Draft Constitution, framed by Drafting Committee be taken into consideration, November 8, 1948).

3. Ibid., p. 61 (From Speech in reply to debate on Foreign Affairs in Lok Sabha, June 12, 1952).

4. Ibid., p. 153. Where Nehru is against the argument of many parliamentarians that the Commonwealth tie has limited in the slightest our independents sovereign status of freedom of action, internal or external. (From Speech in the Lok Sabha on the Citizens Bill, December 5, 1955).

5. Ibid., p. 157
with regard to our internal and external policies India had functioned exactly as this House and the Government wanted to. The Commonwealth relationship did not mar our way in the slightest. India differed from the policies and practice of the other Commonwealth countries. It confirmed that our associations in the Commonwealth has been of great help to the cause of peace and cooperation. It is because of this staunch regard for the Commonwealth ties that our dignity, freedom of action and prestige had enhanced.¹

Nehru said that there was no doubt that our Commonwealth association helped us in extending the area of cooperation and the cause of peace.² India attended almost all Commonwealth conferences and asserted her faith in principles of friendship, cooperation and understanding.

Whenever there was a question whether India should continue in the Commonwealth, Nehru also emphasised the positive side of the question. In his speech in the Lok Sabha on July 23, 1957, Nehru said, that by being in the Commonwealth India was, in no sense, subordinate to anybody, or tied up to something that might come in India's way, then it would compel them to agree,

¹. Ibid., p. 153-4. (From Speech in the Lok Sabha on the Citizenship Bill, December 5, 1955). Also see p. 133, where Nehru said, "Commonwealth is not a super-state in any sense of the term." (From broadcast from New Delhi, on May 10, 1949).
². Ibid., pp. 157-58.
who object to our being in the Commonwealth. Nehru also accepted that there was no sentimental ground for being in the Commonwealth. He rather posed a question: ".... how our being in the Commonwealth has in practice, injured our policies in the advocacy of any cause that we hold dear? It has helped us in influencing others, and has helped us as regard to other matters too..... I am against breaking any kind of association".1

Certain pragmatic changes of historic significance2 have occurred in the Commonwealth, such as the enlargement of its membership by entry of Ghana and Nigeria etc. Our membership is most opportune and fruitful.

Speaking at the Commonwealth Parliamentary Conference, on December 2, 1957, New Delhi, Nehru said that all the nations share something and that something is a tie, a commonwealth tie. This tie has got content and some useful purpose. It makes us think on some common lines, but apart from this commonsense we maintain our independent way of thinking, in approaching the domestic as well as the international problems. The Commonwealth countries shared among them parliamentary system and democratic approach. The Commonwealth represents these democratic institutions and the content of democracy that democracy means peaceful coexistence.3

1. Ibid., p. 158.
2. Ibid., p. 159.
3. Ibid., pp 159-60
India's support to the Commonwealth in no way means that India is in favour of colonialism. We left no stone unturned to do away with the malignant roots of colonialism. In a speech in the General Assembly at Paris dated November 3, 1948, Nehru said, "Asia had suffered all evils of colonialism and imperial domination and pledges to commit herself to save the freedom of every other colonial country. The countries like India having suffered colonial yoke do not apprehend it feasible that other countries should remain under its evil spell." Krishna Menon, along with Nehru, always favoured the Commonwealth ties. Although Shastri lacked all that Nehru possessed—charisma, heritage, experience, travel-wealth and aristocratic arrogance, he always tried to practice what Nehru propagated.

Shastri had little experience in international field. He allowed to cut down India's image according to her size and admitted that India's role in the past, as an international peacemaker was rather odd and unproportionate. He repeatedly assured the Lok Sabha that he would strictly follow the Nehru line in foreign policy. He never feared to adjust Nehru's policy to the changing world. This is what he boldly stated in the first news conference on June 2, 1964, that, "... he would pursue a policy of friendliness towards all without getting involved in military blocs." India has greatly contributed to the evolution of the

1. Ibid., p. 164
4. Ibid., p. 81.
Commonwealth of Nations. He believed it to be an association of great value as it provides a base for building on the common cultural, economic and political links, established when its members were British colonies.¹

The successor of Shastri, Mrs. Indira Gandhi has also tried to follow the architect. Inspite of minor changes the foreign policy of India is still the same as it was during Nehru regime.