MANIPUR AT THE END OF THE KUKI INSURGENCY: 1917-19

Since the Manipuri Uprising of 1891 against the British Government, the Kuki Insurgency during 1917-19 was the first of its kind during the entire period of British rule in Manipur. The Kukis who constitute one of the most powerful tribes of Manipur, revolted against foreign domination. Disturbances in the hills upset the State administration. The British Government felt considerably annoyed with frequent troubles which often resulted in losses of life and property. A number of disobedient villages were burnt down to ashes. Some of the Kuki chiefs were arrested in connection with the uprising and punished after a fair trial.

The British Government could, however, bring the situation under control only in 1919. The experience of the Kuki rebellion made the British Government realise the inadequacy of the rules which were framed for the administration of Manipur State in 1916.

Before we go into the details of the British actions, it would be worthwhile if we briefly probe into the causes of the Kuki Insurgency.

Immediate Causes

The year 1917 marks a landmark in the political history of Manipuri tribals. It was in the year of
Bolshevik Revolution of Russia, that the Kukis of Manipur revolted against the British Government of India.

The immediate cause of the Kuki Rebellion was the partial recruitment of forced labour from the Kuki tribe for the service of Labour Company in Mesopotamia during the First World War.¹ In the beginning of 1917, the Assam Government was asked to provide labourers for employment with Army in Mesopotamia. The Assam Government requested the Maharaja of Manipur through the Political Agent. The Maharaja immediately started recruiting labourers with an aim to secure about 4000 labourers.

The British Officers never realised the likely difficulties in the recruiting process. The Kuki tribe had strongly opposed the British system of recruitment. The Kuki chiefs or Pibas adopted an obstructive attitude.²

Regarding the delicacy of the situation the Political Agent of Manipur wisely proposed a dialogue

¹. Home Department, Political File No. 34, July 1917, National Archives of India, New Delhi.

². Chengjapao of Aishan village, head of the Thado Kukis, opposed the recruitment of labourers. He informed all the village chiefs not to obey British Orders, and to resist enrolment of labours, if necessary by force. Foreign Department, Political File No. 4-12, NAI, New Delhi.
between the Government and village chiefs. But the Kuki leaders flatly refused the proposal, and did not turn up for talk with the Political Agent. As the situation became somewhat serious, the Political Agent requested the higher authorities to send force to control the unruly tribals. A small force was sent from Aijal in the month of March 1917, for the purpose of preventing village heads from interfering with recruitment process. This force was able to bring under control the Tangkhuls - one of the sub-Naga tribes of Manipur - and south-western Kuki sections. Thereafter, it was reported that Colonel Cole was able to enrol about 736 labourers in the beginning of April. The number increased further and thus a labour corps could proceed to Mesopotamia.

The Maharaja expressed regret for his inability in raising up the wanted number of labourers. When the Chief Commissioner of Assam was asked a second time for...
raising a Second Labour Corps, the local officers including the Maharaja were confident about doing so. The Chief Commissioner was of the opinion that the Maharaja's proposal of leading a Second Corps to France should be accepted so that the Maharaja himself could have an opportunity to see the outside world. At the same time the Chief Commissioner was doubtful whether the conservative Hindu Brahmins would allow the Maharaja to leave his home State during the war time.

The offer was, however, declined by Chelmsford, the Governor General of India, who wrote to the Maharaja of Manipur, thanking him for his keen interest in raising the Second Labour Corps. He further added that the Maharaja might be asked if any such corps were needed for service (in France) in the near future.

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6. To Viceroy of India, as Maharaja wrote, 'In view of the size and frequency of the drafts required for the first Corps of hillmen, I regret that I shall be unable to raise a Second Corps of hillmen. But I hope to raise a second Corps, when required, from any valley Manipuri subjects (i.e. Meiteis-mine), and it is my desire to accompany it on active service.' Foreign Department, Political File No. 54, 1917, NAI, New Delhi.

7. Foreign Department, Political File No. 40, 1918, NAI, New Delhi.

8. Foreign Department, Political File No. 54, 1918, NAI, New Delhi.

The Army Department of the Government of India, also was of the same opinion because already there were four Manipuri Labour Companies serving in France. Foreign Department, Political File No. 40, 1918, NAI, New Delhi.
After sometime, however, the British Government changed her policy, and the Assam Government was asked for raising a Second Labour Corps. A political conference was held in Shillong in August to discuss the matter. The Political Agent of Manipur was confident about raising up a Second Labour Corps from Manipur. With a view to understand the prevailing situation, and to convince the tribals, he arranged some meetings between the Government and the tribals. The tribal chiefs at this conference declined to supply labourers but they offered money. The Political Agent, not fully conscious of the tribal feelings, threatened those defiant Kuki chiefs with punishment if labourers were not supplied within a fixed time. The Political Agent thought that he would be able to get a large number of coolies from the north-east of the Manipur village of Mombi. It was in view of the fact that Ngulkhup, Mombi chief had promised to him to supply the required labourers whenever needed. Subsequently, however, his attitude changed and it was learnt that Ngulkhup had asked

9. Foreign Department, Political File No. 320, 1922, NAI, New Delhi.
10. Foreign Department, Political File No. 4-12, 1920, NAI, New Delhi.
11. Office of the Political Agent, Special File No. 388, 1919, Secretariat Library & Record Branch, Manipur.
the villagers to burn their villages and to kill their women and children, if they were asked to send labourers to the Government. 12 The Political Agent was surprised to find the change in the attitude of Ngulkhup. He decided to teach a lesson to the defiant Kuki chiefs by taking up punitive measure against them.

Before we discuss details about the punitive steps taken by the Government, it would be worthwhile to know why the Kuki chiefs were unwilling to supply labourers on demands from the Government, and how far their objections were justified.

First, the Kukis were afraid of going to an unknown place far off their villages. 13 Besides, it was rumoured that following the outbreak of the Great War the Maharaja and Political Agent had been killed in the field. And the British force was also defeated in the war. The garrison which was stationed in Manipur was also withdrawn. As Higgins said, 'A garbled version of the retreat from Mons and the substitution of the

12. Foreign Department, Political File No. 7-131, 1918, NAI, New Delhi.

Darrang Military Police battalion for the regular regiment in Manipur were probably responsible for the stories of disaster and the withdrawal of the garrison.\(^{14}\) Probably the ignorant tribals might have been afraid of going to France, and facing dangerous consequences. It was also felt that Kamhaos of the north Chin Hills were planning to attack suddenly the Manipur State. The Kamhao tribe had always been a source of trouble on the border areas of Manipur. This was undoubtedly one of the important reasons for the opposition by tribal chiefs to the proposal for second recruitment. At the same time the Kukis also apprehended that if they left their homes for France at such a critical juncture, the Angamis taking the advantage of their long absence would surely kill their women-folk and children.\(^{15}\)

Another reason for opposition to the recruitment was its resemblance to the old system of forced labour.\(^{16}\)

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15. As to how these rumours spread the Political Agent in Manipur said, 'The sources of the rumours could not be traced. They were probably attributable to the ignorance of the people'.

16. Under the system of forced labour every male citizen above sixteen years of age had to perform the assigned work for ten days in every forty days. They would be given wages for their service. In certain case if any one failed to pay taxes, one had to give labour instead of taxes. E.W. Dunn (Com.), *Abridged Gazetteer of Manipur* (Simla: Government Central Printing Office, 1891), p. 33.
C.C. Watson, a British Officer, Home Department, expressed similar views when he wrote: 'The requisition to the tribal chiefs to supply coolies looks rather like a revival of the system (force labour).’\(^\text{17}\)

Finally, the riotous and superstitious Kuki chiefs became a victim of Chingakhamba Sana Chaoba Singh. He claimed himself to have supernatural power.\(^\text{18}\) He openly incited the Kukis of Manipur to revolt against the regime of Maharaja, Sir Chura Chand Singh. The Charlatan, Chinga Khamba Sana Chaoba Singh, propagated that rule of British Government was going to end very soon, and so, their loyal subjects should be annihilated.\(^\text{19}\) He went from village to village for this. He was at least to some extent successful in creating a stir among the Kukis.\(^\text{20}\)

\(^{17}\) Foreign Department, Political File No. 7-131, 1918, NAI, New Delhi.


\(^{19}\) Foreign Department, Political File No. 4-12, 1920, NAI, New Delhi.

\(^{20}\) Most of the Kuki Chiefs admitted that they were instigated by Chinga Khamba Sana Chaoba Singh to rise against the British Government and Maharaja. A Government report also stated that Chinga Khamba Sana Chaoba Singh claimed himself as the elder brother of the present Maharaja. The report charged him with the responsibility of incitement of the Kukis and others to make war on the local government with a selfish motive of establishing himself as the Raja of Manipur. Office of the Political Agent, Special File No. 388, 1919, SLRS, Manipur.
Chinga Khamba Sana Chaoba Singh was arrested in Burma. The Advisory Committee was of the opinion that he should not be allowed to return to Manipur. The Maharaja held the same view. He was tried by a special tribunal like other Kuki chiefs, and deported under Regulation 111 of 1818 and sentenced to life imprisonment.

Punitive Measures

As the Kuki movement took a serious turn, the local Government felt the need for punitive measures. The disturbances among the Kukis also had an impact on the adjacent areas. In Burma, Chin Hills north of Haka and all other parts except Upper Chindwin, and including unadministered Somra Tract, were affected by the influence of the Kuki unrest in Manipur. The Kukis of Tuzu river or Nantaleik situated east of the


23. Foreign Department, Political File No.7-131, 1918, NAI, New Delhi.
Naga Hills, were also agitated. In January 1918, it was quite apparent that Kukis of Burma were ready to help their brotheren Kukis of Manipur in their fighting to overthrow the Government. The Kukis of Naga Hills were also prepared to help them. Pachei, an old Kuki leader of Chassad, in the unadministered area of Somra Tract, also pledged to support with men and arms the Kuki insurgents of Manipur.

Encouraged by this, in most of the villages, the Kuki rebels in Manipur posed a serious threat to the Government. The Government was alarmed. On October 14, 1917, the Political Agent with an escort of Fifty Rifles of the Darrang Battalion set out for Mombi village with the intention to arrest its leader, Ngulkhup who was the first Kuki chief to commit an offence against the Government. He asked Ngulkhup to meet him. But he failed to come. The Political Agent in anger burnt the Mombi village on October 17, 1917.

The news of the burning of Mombi village alarmed the Kukis. Now onwards they became more aggressive.

24. Ibid.

In the Upper Chindwin, the trouble was '... due to no local grievance but solely caused by rebellion in Manipur since Kukis on Burma side are offshoots of Chassads in Manipur'. Home Department, Police File No. 181-184, 1918, NAI, New Delhi.

25. Ibid.
Finding the situation tense once again, Higgins arranged a meeting with some leaders of Uktal village, situated in the west of Manipur Hills, some twenty-six miles away from Imphal. The discussions did not produce any results. Meanwhile, the Political Agent learnt that twenty-two Kuki chiefs were meeting in order to mobilize opposition against the Government.

The Government of Assam had never contemplated the use of force for the purpose of enlisting labour for the establishment of a Second Labour Corps. The Political Agent, however, argued that in view of the changing attitude of the Kuki chiefs it had become necessary to take a few punitive measures which could teach them a lesson. When the matter came to the notice of the Government of India, it was decided to abandon further recruitment. But at the same time it also passed an order to punish the recalcitrant Kuki chiefs.

Arrangements were made to send out a column in order to arrest the unruly Kuki chiefs, as they did not turn up in compliance with the summons. By this time

26. Ibid.

27. Foreign Department, Political File No. 4-12, 1920, NAI, New Delhi.

28. Ibid.
the Kukis had already prepared to attack the valley of Manipur. Before any action was taken by the Government, the Kukis from Hinglep, Ukha and neighbouring villages, raided and looted the Manipur State Forest Toll Station at Ithai in December 1917. It was learnt that this incident took place at the instigation of Chinga Khamba Sana Chaoba Singh who had also planned with the help of the Kukis an attack on Imphal. This however did not take place since the Assam Rifles had been employed to defend Imphal.

As a precautionary measure several outposts were opened at different hill areas of Manipur, when disturbance was expected. The Government was under the impression that the Kuki trouble would subside as soon as a few of the recalcitrant chiefs were brought to book. But it did not happen. The Kukis became more violent after the military operation. But they had

29. Office of the Political Agent, Special File No. 388, 1919, SLRB, Manipur.
31. Since December 22, 1917, the column of Assam Rifles and Burma Military Police were on duty. Foreign Department, Political File No. 4-12, 1920, NAI, New Delhi.
32. After the military operation, they had expanded their area of raids. First, they launched raids on friendly and neighbouring Naga villages. Secondly, the plain people became a target to be attacked. Lastly, they did not spare the Government force.
never anticipated the consequences of their armed revolt against a mighty British Empire. The news of the Kuki raids and infiltrations had been very often coming to the Headquarters. The Kukis treated Nagas and Manipuris (Meiteis) as their formidable enemies, because they had remained loyal to the British Government.

The Government intensified the military operation. During the month of January, Cosgrave, Political Agent, Manipur, with an escort of the Assam Rifles proceeded to Tamru to burn nine hostile villages and destroy their properties. Higgins also destroyed fourteen rebel Kuki villages after fairly continuous fighting. Hutton with the help of the Column of the Naga Hills Rifles conducted an operation in the western hillside of Manipur. There he occupied a Kuki village, Chongjan on February 12, 1918. As a result of this operation, Laipi, chief of the Senting Kuki village, surrendered to Hutton. It was proposed to send further force, from Silchar to Imphal to suppress the Kuki rebellion.

On February 20, 1918, Colonel Cloete led a force from Silchar for Imphal. During the same time Cosgrave with another force had marched on to the south-west of

33. Home Department, Political File No. 40, 1918, NAI, New Delhi.
Manipur. Cloete's operation in Maphitel Hills resulted in success. With the exception of one Kuki chief, all surrendered before the British forces. The forces which were operating in the southern hills faced a strong opposition but the party at last emerged victorious. Next they launched attack on Manchangs in the south-hills. On March 14, 1918, Higgins and Coote left Imphal to join Burmese Column in fighting against Chassad which was supposed to be the strongest, and most disobedient Kuki village. Reaching Kongal Thana they compelled nine villages to surrender to them. Sixteen Ayuparel villages situated between the areas of Jammu and Chassad were also ready to surrender. On the Upper Chindwin, Captain Patrick’s column had commenced its advance on Chassad in Manipur from the south. The military operations were expected to stop in April, i.e. before the start of rainy season, to be resumed if necessary in the next winter.

In the meanwhile, the British Government was keen to find out why the force was comparatively weak in

34. Home Department, File No. 181-184, 1918, NAI, New Delhi.

35. Ibid.
dealing with the Kuki rebels. One of the factors was to be the lack of modern equipment. Military was also not well organised. There was also lack of efficient trainees in Manipur.

For the next military operation, the Chief Commissioner of Assam felt the need of complete rearmament of the Assam Rifles because in his opinion the integrity and security of the North-East Frontier of India depended on its success. A Home Department communication dated the 28th May 1918 approved the proposal made by the Assam Chief Commissioner.

As soon as the rainy season ended in Manipur, the military operation again started. There were reports of fresh attacks by the Kukis in several villages. One Kuki leader Khuthinthang of Jampi claimed himself as Maharaja. According to his instructions some of his followers started collecting revenues and guns from weaker villages. In the meantime, it was reported that out of dissatisfaction with the Maharaja of Manipur,

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36. Bealson-Dell, Chief Commissioner of Assam, said, "...Our casualties have been heavier than those of the enemy. Of we have inflicted 'Punishment' and a good many chiefs and their villages have 'come in'." Foreign Department, Political File No. 7-131, 1918, NAI, New Delhi.


38. Home Department, Police File No. 190-191, 1918, NAI, New Delhi.
Moirang had established some unauthorised courts. The Political Agent said that they were in touch with the Charlatan Chinga Khamba Sana Chaoba Singh.

In June, the Kuki rebels renewed their attack on Khwata, Khongde and Iringbam villages. Immediately an outpost was established to deal with these rebels. The Kuki insurgents even threatened to attack neighbouring areas beyond Manipur boundary. It was reported that seventy-five Kukis had entered the North Cachar Hills from Manipur side.

The Political situation in Manipur became very serious as the Kuki movement could not be fully crushed. The Government decided to stop active military operation since it realized that the military operation in the hills were not as successful as expected. Describing the development in Manipur, in a letter to Secretary of State for India, the Viceroy commented, 'Operations against Kukis in Manipur and Burma and Chins have already been a failure and we are considering advisability

39. Home Department, Political File No. 29, 1918, NAI, New Delhi.

40. Foreign Department, Political File No. 7-131, 1918, NAI, New Delhi.
of putting operations next cold weather under one military control, ...".\(^41\)

The administration confined itself to protected valley, Imphal. Eight police outposts were established at different places for the security of the valley.

On May 10, 1918, Beatson-Bell, Chief Commissioner of Assam, arrived at Imphal in order to have consultations with the local officers in connection with the suppression of Kuki rebellion and further continuation of military operation in the next winter. Later in July 1918, he visited Simla where he discussed the problem of Kuki rebels in Manipur with the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief.\(^42\) Thereafter, the Political Agent and Deputy Commissioner, Naga Hills, were summoned to a conference in Shillong to decide further measures pending the renewal of operations next winter under the command of General Keary.\(^43\)

At the close of August General Keary who had to command the military operation in Assam (and Burma), came

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41. Home Department, Police File No. 251, 1918, NAI, New Delhi.

42. Home Department, Political File No. 31, 1918, NAI, New Delhi.

43. Home Department, Police File No. 185, 1918, NAI, New Delhi.
to Shillong in order to discuss the situation with the Chief Commissioner of Assam, and plan military campaign. It was decided that in accordance with the usual procedure the General Officer Commanding would assume complete political as well as military control of area of operation. He would inform the local Government regarding any development having political implications, so that the Government of India could be posted with the latest developments.

Before the planned military operation in the winter could materialise the Assam Rifles were badly affected by influenza which spread in Assam. As a result of this, the Government of India even thought of suspension of active military expedition. Yet the military operation took place on the scheduled day. The operations started in January and continued up to February 13, 1919. These were undoubtedly among the most active military expeditions against the defiant

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44. Home Department, Political File No. 221, 1918, NAI, New Delhi.

45. Home Department, Political File No. 42, 1919, NAI, New Delhi.

46. Home Department, Police File No. 47, 1918, NAI, New Delhi.
Kuki rebels of Manipur. During the operation, Longya, the village of the Kuki chief, Ngulbul, was occupied. His brother and fifty-five persons were arrested. His son died during the operation. The Chief of Ukha was also captured. Two hundred persons including women and children of Umdum had also surrendered. Among the captured were Ngulkhup, Chief of Mombi, and Tinthong, Chief of Longya, with his henchman Enjakhup. Lt. Goldsmith, in his operations in the Chassad area, captured Bongmul and his twenty-six men. All the Mombi area chiefs had surrendered with the exception of Loothang of Gobok. In a combined expedition of Broome and Goldsmith led to the capture of five Kuki rebels. South-west and North-west areas became the victim of harassment by the military police. Further surrender of Chiefs of Makan, Phunjong, Asang, Khulen and Molhang was also reported. In the south-east area Loothang of Gobok surrendered at last on February 22, 1919. Semkhupao of Simol followed him.

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47. On January 15, 1919, General Officer Commanding in Manipur summarising the progress report of the operations, informed the Assam Government that forty-four persons were killed and burnt forty-eight villages and destroyed forty mithuns and large quantities of foodgrain. Fifty-four Kuki rebels also surrendered to the Government.

48. Home Department, Police File No. 8, 1919, NAI, New Delhi.

49. Foreign Department, Political File No. 94-161, NAI, New Delhi.
General Officer Commanding, Kuki punitive measure, Imphal, telegraphed to the Chief of the General Staff, Delhi, on March 1919, that Pachei had submitted to the military force this morning. 50

Following that, Pachei's lieutenant Nokhao also surrendered on the next day. The last of the special list was completed with the submission of Ngukhuka to Montifiore. During the operation in the Chassad area Montifiore burnt and destroyed several villages. The submission of Pachei together with the capture of Tinthong and Enjakhup in Jampi area, marked the end of active rebellion. 51 His followers were left without a leader to guide them during the rebellion.

By the middle of 1919, the active military punitive operation was over, as almost all the recalcitrant Kuki chiefs had been either captured or surrendered. They were tried by Special Tribunal, and awarded punishments under Regulation 111 of 1818.

Gradually, the troops were withdrawn from northwest, south-west, south-east and western areas. The


rebels were completely disarmed. Some seventeen permanent posts were established at different places of Manipur (including Assam area). Important roads which were closed during the Kuki insurgency were opened. Demobilization was nearly completed, and civil power was handed over to the local administration. 52

The old system of administration to which we would now refer, was found inefficient to deal with the situation and many changes were made in it.

The Nemesis of Local Maladministration

Of the factors responsible for the Kuki rebellion the most important was their accumulated dissatisfaction with the local maladministration. The British officers were mainly responsible for the outbreak of the rebellion. Had they realised the strong feelings of the Kukis on labour enrolment, there would have been possibly no such revolt. Here we would highlight the drawbacks in the administrative machinery which failed to check the rebellion.

First, the method of recruitment was not justified from the point of view of 'fair selection'. The Home

52. Home Department, Political File No. 47, 1919, NAI, New Delhi.
Department, Government of India, had already advised the local Government not to use force against the persons who were unwilling to become labourers. It had further warned that action should be taken only if peace and tranquility within the State were threatened. The Political Agent made a mistake by giving warning to the Kukis that they would be punished if they did not enlist themselves in the Labour Corps to be sent to Mesopotamia. With regard to the raising of the Second Labour Corps both the Political Agent and the Maharaja committed a mistake by whole-heartedly enclosing the proposal, even though they had the previous experience of the Kukis (and Nagas) offering resistance at the time of the first such recruitment. The use of force by the Political Agent ultimately led to the Kuki rebellion. Similar feelings were expressed by S.R. Hignell, Army Department, Government of India, who felt that the recruitment procedure adopted by the local administration officers seemed to have been extra-ordinarily ill-advised. 53

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53. Foreign Department, Political File No. 7-131, 1918, NAI, New Delhi. W.S. Mevar, President of the Central Recruiting Board, held the same view of Hignull. As the method of labour enrolment was 'injudicious', the Kukis of 'Unadministered Area' - Somra Tract - rebelled out of brotherly fellow-feeling. Foreign Department, Political File No. 350, 1922, NAI, New Delhi.
When the hostilities actually opened the administration further proved itself incompetent for dealing with the situation. It was highly unimaginative to leave the entire administration covering about 7000 sq. miles of tribal area in the hands of one British officer designated as 'president' of the Manipur State Durbar. It was more serious particularly, in view of the fact, that the President was busy with the valley administration, and could not devote full time to the affairs of the hills. He was understandably not able to frequent visit the hill areas for administrative purposes. Such visits were highly essential for good administration. Naturally the people of hill areas felt neglected. The Political Agent, who shared the responsibility for the administration of the hills, abstained from action which might have weakened the President's authority. Thus lack of 'direct contact' aggravated the situation further and made a compromise difficult. The British Administration later admitted the lacunae in the administration before and during the Kuki rebellion.

Lastly, the lambus or interpreters employed as intermediaries during the first recruitment of labourers

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54. Foreign Department, Political File No. 4-12, 1920, NAI, New Delhi.
were largely responsible for creating a misunderstanding between the British officers and the Kukis. These lambus played a sinister role in inciting the Kukis to revolt against the British Rule. At the same time they took money from those Kukis who did not like to enlist themselves as members of the Labour Corps. It was a crime committed by the lambus against the Government. Thus the role of lambus 'as most unsatisfactory intermediary', was one of the factors in the Kuki insurgency.

Ensuring Political and Administrative Reforms

The Maharaja and British Officers, thus, were made fully aware of the drawbacks in the State administration which had led to the Kuki uprising of 1917. It was realised that one officer was not sufficient to look after the hilly areas as well as the valley of Manipur.

55. Cole, wife of the late Political Agent in Manipur, having an opportunity to know well about the Kuki uprising, once said, '... the interpreters used when the first endeavours were made to recruit in the Kuki country were to a large extent responsible for the trouble that they themselves did not want to be sent overseas as interpreters.' Foreign Department, Political File No. 7-131, 1918, NAI, New Delhi.

56. It was a fact that when the Kuki chiefs were against the enrolment of labourers the lambus used it unscrupulously as an opportunity to make money for themselves. Robert Reid, History of the Frontier Areas Bordering on Assam, Shillong: Assam Government Press, 1942, p. 5.

57. Robert Reid, op. cit., p. 4.
Even before the completion of the Kuki punitive action, the British Government in India felt the necessity of reform in the administrative machinery of the Manipur State. The Chief Commissioner of Assam himself went to Manipur, to discuss with the Maharaja and local British officers the arrangements regarding the future administration of the hill tribes. The Maharaja and the Chief Commissioner agreed to establish three sub-divisions in three separate areas of the hills. It was further agreed that each of the sub-divisions would be administered by one European officer designated as 'Sub-divisional Officer'. The three sub-divisions were as follows:

1. The South-West Area with headquarters at Chura Chandpur.
2. The North-West Area with headquarters at Tamenglong.
3. The North-East Area with headquarters at Ukhrul.

The hill areas in the north of Manipur including the Mao and Maram Naga groups, the whole of the Mombi

58. Foreign Department, Political File No. 135, 1919, NAI, New Delhi.
area in the south-east, and the various tribes bordering the valley were to be administered directly by the Durbar President. 60

The new scheme was likely to be a burden on the State economy as it would involve an amount of ₹1,25,000 on the hill administration. This was facilitated by the declaration of the President in an open Durbar that the Government of India had offered certain 'financial concessions'. 61 The annual subsidy of ₹50,000 payable by the state was reduced to ₹5,000 for a period of ten years. The Government also announced to forego the annual contribution of ₹30,000, which had been paid hitherto towards the upkeep of the Kohima - Imphal road, and deferred the payment of annual instalments towards the repayment of annual instalments of the loan taken by the Durbar from ₹60,000 to 30,000. 62

The question of jurisdiction of the Maharaja on collection of revenue was also taken up and after

60. Ibid.

61. Foreign Department, Political File No. 190, 1919, NAI, New Delhi.

62. Foreign Department, Political File No. 105-107, 1920, NAI, New Delhi.
prolonged discussions the Governor-in-Council agreed to the Maharaja being given the power of revision in the revenue matter, as it was given in the civil and criminal cases under the sub-heading 'Administration of Justice' of the 'Rules for the Management of the State of Manipur.' This was approved by the Government of India.

One more revision was brought in the rules which governed the administration of the Manipur State. The Rule 10 initially described the Maharaja as only a forwarding agent. Regarding this point the Governor-in-Council proposed with the approval of the Maharaja to abrogate this clause as it sometimes had resulted in causing unnecessary delay. With regard to the interpretation of the rule 9 which allowed the Maharaja to record his own opinion only with reference to any suggestions made by the Durbar for the modification in the President's draft budget; and took away the Maharaja's right to extend his own suggestions, the Maharaja protested because he considered this as curtailment of his authority. The Governor-in-Council agreed to give to the Maharaja the right to place

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63. Foreign Department, Political File No. 1011, 1923, NAI, New Delhi.
before the Durbar any observations or criticisms on the budget which he thought fit.  

The Governor-in-Council also agreed to the proposal of the Maharaja to restore the power of magistrate to him whereby he could punish any one violating the discipline in the police. Recommendations were made to this effect to the Government of India in the following words:

'The Commandant of the State Military Police shall exercise powers corresponding to the powers of a 1st Class Magistrate, and an officer temporarily officiating as Commandant shall exercise powers corresponding to the powers of a 2nd-class Magistrate, for the purpose of inquiring into or trying any offence committed by a member of the Military Police Act, 1861 (V of 1861), or under the Assam Rifles Act (Assam

64. The revised draft Rule 10 was given approval by the Government of India in its letter No. 1089/1011 A, dated, July 5, 1923.

65. Foreign Department, Political File No. 419, 1924, NAI, New Delhi.
Act 1 of 1920), and any offence committed by a member of the Military Police against the person or property of another member and punishable under any law in force in Manipur.66

The effects of revisions in the 'Rules for the Management of the State of Manipur' could be felt immediately. It helped in bringing to an end the after effects of the Kuki rebellion. The travelling British officers were greeted in a friendly manner and extended due hospitality. In May 1920, Sir Nicholas Beatson-Bell made a long trip, unaccompanied by any escort, through the hill areas which had been in rebellion. He visited also the sub-divisions, and was thoroughly satisfied with the manner in which the new system of administration had been introduced in the hill areas.67


67. Foreign Department, Political File No. 105-107, 1920, NAI, New Delhi.
Chapter III

NAGA UNREST: I. JADONANG'S MOVEMENT

Unrest among the Kacha Nagas and the Kabui Nagas of the north-west of Manipur during the early 1930's was a turning point in the political history of tribal Manipur. Initially, the movement had a religious colouring. Subsequently, it partially assumed political overtones. The progenitor of this movement was one Jadonang, a Rongmai Naga of Puilon, (Kambiron) village in Tamenglong sub-division of Manipur. He was an ordinary soldier enlisted during the First World War, who had served in Mesopotamia (Iraq). On his return to his village, he started preaching a new cult from early 1925 onwards. He was arrested in 1928 on orders of the then Sub-Divisional Officer, S.J. Duncan, for prophesying the imminent replacement of the British Raj by a "Kabui Naga Raj"¹ and was imprisoned in Tamenglong.²

Jadonang's cult was based on animistic beliefs. It was a form of 'debased Hinduism'.³ Like Hindus he

¹. Foreign Department, Political File No. 144, 1931, NAI, New Delhi.
². Office of the Political Agent in Manipur, File No. 12, 1931, SLRB, Imphal.
³. R.C. Johnson to the Editor of The Living Age (New York).
constructed a temple and installed beside others an image of the Hindu god, Vishnu. The new cult was contrary to the ancient beliefs and customs of the Nagas. He justified it on the ground that he had been ordained in a dream by the god of Bhubon Hills (in Lakhipur) to build a temple for the prosperity and good health for everyone. By posing as a medicine-man he got a chance to meet the villagers at large, whenever he went he preached his religion and political cult. His popularity went on increasing day by day and soon people were to regard him as a god.

The movement of Jadonang had two motives - annihilation of the Kukis and overthrow of the British Rule. The Jadonang movement aimed at the suppression of the Kukis who had made the Nagas their staunch enemies from the time of their rebellion in 1917-1919. The

4. First, Jadonang came forward as a maiba (medicine-man). He also claimed to be a divinely 'healer'. He went from door to door and from village to village treating the ill. Often people came to him for treatment. He took three rupees for treatment, a bottle of zu (wine) for interpreting dreams and four rupees for praying to god for the welfare of the dead. It is noteworthy that he was very considerate towards the patients whom he could not cure and refunded their money. He told the Nagas to sacrifice more mithuna (sacrificial animals) to the gods to gain prosperity. Jadonang displayed mystical qualities by performing magical tricks such as water came out whenever he drew his sword from its case, and whosoever drank that water was to receive the blessings of god. He had two pet pythons also under the plinth of his house. He said that these pythons could talk to him. Thus he impressed the Naga villagers that he had supernatural power.
origin of the enmity between the Nagas and the Kukis lay in the fact that the Nagas did not join the rebellion, and at the same time they were loyal to the British Government. Jadonang thought that time had come to take the revenge on the Kukis for their wiping out of a considerable number of Kabui Naga villages during the Kuki Rebellion of 1917-1919. He reminded the Nagas of the tragic story of two young Naga girls, who had been murdered during the Kuki Rebellion. He knew that this would pinch the hearts of the Nagas. By this story he deliberately incited them for vendetta.

Secondly, Jadonang predicted the end of the British Rule and advent of the Kabui Naga Raj. This was purely political. He whispered to the Nagas that it should be kept very secret from the Kukis, the Government and the Manipuris (Meiteis). He threatened that his miraculous powers were such that he could hear from his house everything that was said, and would kill anyone, who gave the secret away to the Government or to the Kukis.


6. Deputy Commissioner of Naga Hills to Commissioner of Surma Valley, 16 March 1931, Ibid.
He would not allow the Kukis to walk about the earth. He further advised them not to hit the Kukis first unless they committed any hostile act against them, otherwise it would be better to keep peace. A Naga revolt against the Kukis would mean the suppression of the Kukis by force. He wanted the Angami Nagas also to join the Kacha Nagas in their war against the Kukis. He talked of the common origin of the Kacha Nagas and the Angamis even though they lived in different countries and spoke different dialects, and were brothers of the same stock, who drank pita modhu or rice beer. It was only a political approach to the Angamis to get cooperation and help from them. He sent word to the Angamis that he would visit them in the form of a bird or snake. There would be war against those persons who were unwilling to join him. The war might begin in 1930-31 or next generation when the rice plant reached a foot in height. All the Kukis would be wiped out within three years. To prove himself possessing supernatural powers Jadonang said that he would reign for three years, and then would

7. Office of the Political Agent in Manipur, File No. 12, 1931, SLRB, Imphal.

become a bird and fly about, and see exactly what all the Kacha Nagas were doing. If Kacha Nagas wanted to speak to him, they must come forward without delay.

Jadonang ordered all the Nagas not to cooperate with the British Government in any way. He gave out word that the revenue for that year could be paid to the Government but it should be paid to him in the following year, 1931-32. He further said no cotton should be sold, as he wanted all the cotton available to make an airship with. It was an open challenge to the powerful and mighty British Empire and was soon to bring its nemesis. Referring to an English translation from an Assamese Report (June 5, 1931), J.P. Mills, Deputy Commissioner, Naga Hills (now Nagaland), reported the further development of the political situation to J.C. Higgins, Political Agent in Manipur. Jadonang expressed the intention of all the Nagas who had been desirous of independence from British Rule. It was learnt that all the Kacha Naga villages of the Naga Hills were going to welcome him with many mithuns as presents. The report said that Jadonang has secretly

9. Chief Secretary to the Governor of Assam, to Political Secretary of Government of India, 25 February 1931.

10. J.P. Mills to Political Agent, 5 June 1931, Office of the Political Agent, File No. 12, 1931, SLRB, Imphal.
told the Nagas that on hearing a sound in the air following a white cloud they should know that the war was on and they should prepare themselves for it. Only then they should be ready for defence. Another Report from the Sub-Divisional Officer said that about four hundred Nagas had gathered at Lunkao village and Jinam river (in North Cachar Hills) where they decided that, before attacking the Government, they should first of all raid Saipimol, one of the richest villages of the Kukis. This news had alarmed the Kukis. The State Kuki servants of Tamenglong were not in a position to move out for their census work, road works, vaccination and serving of parwanas and summons. The Kukis of Saipimol complained that Jadonang had collected guns with the intention to go to war against the Kukis, and the British Government. They confirmed the contemplated plan of Jadonang of a mass massacre of the Kukis. The Angamis were coming in three batches to fight against the Kukis in the south. This corroborated

11. Ibid.

12. Office of the Political Agent in Manipur, File No. 12, 1931, SLRB, Imphal.
the information gathered by Higgins and Mills. The Political Agent received information from a Naga Christian of Taningjam (a Kacha Naga village) reporting that the Nagas planned to murder the Kuki road Mohurrer who had been working there. In the meanwhile, Jadonang intentionally spread a rumour of victory of the Kabui Nagas in their war against the Kukis. The Deputy Commissioner had also received as many as fifty letters conveying that Jadonang had threatened to launch a war.

Remifications of the Jadonang Cult

Jadonang's movement did not remain confined to the north-west of Manipur but soon spread out to the neighbouring Cachar Hills and Naga Hills.

The Government realized the necessity of despatching a force to control the Naga disturbances

13. Chief Secretary to the Governor of Assam, to Political Secretary of Government of India, 31 March, 1931, Foreign Department File No. 144-P/31-Poll, 1931.

14. The Political Agent was of the opinion that there would have been mass killings of the Kukis and Nagas if the road Mohurrer would have been fatally victimized. Ibid.

15. Henima, Sarema, Injoma, Intema, Jawna, Laloi, Dupema, Insung, etc. were some of the affected villages of the Naga Hills.
and to bring confidence among the Kukis. The Deputy Commissioner sent a small force of three sections of the Assam Rifles to Henima to forestall the possible disorder. He requested the Political Agent of Manipur to arrest Jadonang, who had just left for Bhubon. The Political Agent, J.C. Higgins, employed some Lam Subadars and interpreters as he saw no need of despatching an expedition for the time being. Duncan was to follow the Lam Subadars but Higgins thought an European Officer would not be so much helpful. But the Deputy Commissioner wanted to deal with the Naga unrest with a strong hand. As requested by the Deputy Commissioner, the Political Agent agreed to the sending of a military expedition to the Naga Hills, under the command of one Dallas Smith.

The Political Agent informed the Deputy Commissioner that Jadonang had left for Binnakandi, a Naga village, some days ago with thirty men taking the presents and offerings with him. He was well guarded by his followers. Higgins advised the Deputy Commissioner to send an armed force to arrest him immediately. It

16. Foreign Department, Political File No. 144, 1931, NAI, New Delhi.

17. Telegram from Political Agent of Manipur to the Deputy Commissioner of Naga Hills, 14 February 1931, Political Agent File No. 12, 1931 (Tel. No. is not mentioned).
was reported that Jadonang had been a frequent visitor to Lakhipur. The Political Agent also informed the Mauzadar of Jiribam that the Nagas should be warned that their villages would be burnt if any of them created trouble. Higgins was not in favour of the withdrawal of the armed force from the trouble-spots until the Naga unrest was controlled.

Mills reported that all the Kacha Naga villages were affected by the movement of Jadonang with one exception. Dallas Smith reported from Henima that Jadonang's movement had been increasing rapidly. He suspected that his movement had spread over Khonoma or portions of Khonoma. But he could not collect definite information that how they had been affected. The Political Agent was doubtful whether Mao and Maram areas might have been affected. The interpreters seemed to be ignorant of the development. Probably the Kabuis kept everything secret. The Manipuris were also supposed to be blind about the Naga unrest. He wrote to W.A. Cosgrave, Chief Secretary, Government of Assam: 'I shall

18. Ibid.

19. Deputy Commissioner of Naga Hills to Political Agent of Manipur, 14 February 1931, Ibid.
also send a detachment up to Tamenglong, to occupy the fort there, to reassure the Kukis and Kacha Nagas. It is possible that the trouble may fizzle out if Jadonang (Sic) is arrested, ...\(^{20}\)

The Kukis were nervous whether they would be attacked by the Nagas. The Nagas had threatened that they would continue the movement even if Jadonang was arrested.\(^{21}\)

The news of Kabui Naga unrest was brought by Harvey from Kohima relating that with exception to Lakema all the villages of Kacha Nagas in the Naga Hills were also affected. Jadonang had taken a large number of mithun from the villagers as a fee of his treatment of the sick and ill persons, and for the improvement of crops and keeping off rats. When some of the Khonoma men tried to see him who flatly refused to meet them on the ground that they were innately suspicious being as they were petty traders. However, there was no restriction, when they saw his sisters. The Sub-divisional Officer of North Cachar wrote to the Deputy Commissioner of the Naga Hills informing the Nagas of this area particularly from the villages of Thinge, Hejaichak, Laisong, Lonkai and

\(^{20}\) Political Agent of Manipur to Chief Secretary to the Government of Assam, 18 February 1931, Ibid.

\(^{21}\) Ibid.
Asalu were sending deputations to Rangkome, a Manipuri Naga. 22

All of a sudden Higgins received a telegram (dated 20,2.31) from J.P. Mills informing him that Jadonang had been captured. 23

The Deputy Commissioner asked to send a police escort and extradition warrant. 24 Jadonang was captured on February 19, 1931, and kept under the custody of the Cachar authorities until taken over by the Political Agent on March 8. In reply to the telegram (dated 20.2.31), the Political Agent informed that the warrant had already been posted. And a column might reach Dirighat, probably on March 6, to take over Jadonang. 25

22. Sub-Divisional Officer of North Cachar Hills, to Deputy Commissioner of Naga Hills, 17 February 1931, Ibid.

23. A Manipuri described the story of Jadonang's arrest, as he narrated to the Sub-Divisional Officer. A large and long procession of the Kabui Nagas and 'Haos' including persons of both sexes went to the temple of Bhubneshwar in Cachar. The party was headed by an 'old Kuki', who was regarded as their god. He rode on a pony. On their return way, they were stopped by Cachar sepoys to find out whether Jadonang was among them. Jadonang was arrested on the spot.

24. Telegram from Deputy Commissioner of Naga Hills to Political Agent of Manipur, 20 February 1931, Political Agent File No. 12 (Tel. No. is not mentioned).

25. Telegram from Political Agent of Manipur to the Deputy Commissioner of Naga Hills, 20 February 1931, Ibid (Tel. No. is not mentioned).
On February 24, 1931, Higgins left Imphal with a column consisting of one platoon of the 4th Assam Rifles and one British and one Gurkha officers with a view to bring Jadonang to Imphal. At last, Higgins reached Jirighat and he brought Jadonang to Imphal via Tamenglong on March 29, 1931.

The Kacha Naga unrest did not subside even after the arrest of Jadonang. Several maibas (medicine-men) had sprung up in different villages. They poised themselves as village leaders in their respective villages. One Naga girl named Gaidinliu became the chief follower of Jadonang cult. She continued the Jadonang cult. About this lady we will have to say something in the next chapter. In Cachar after Jadonang's arrest there was considerable alarm for some days as it was believed

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26. They marched down hundred miles on the bridle path from Imphal to Cachar visiting on their way several Naga villages. On reaching Kambiron village the Political Agent found a decorated temple erected by Jadonang. He destroyed the temple and shot the pet python of Jadonang. Village elders did not raise objection to the Political Agent, because it was not a tradition among the Nagas to have a temple. It was his own style to build a temple. Rather they appreciated the Political Agent. A.G. McCall, Administration Report, Manipur State, 1930-31 (Imphal: State Printing Press, 1931), p. 2.

27. Foreign Department, Political File No. 144, 1931, NAI, New Delhi.

that the Nagas were coming down to the plains to raid villages and tea gardens. A detachment of the Assam Rifles under the command of Manipur and Cachar so as to watch the Kacha Naga villages close to the Manipur border. The Political Agent received a report from Haflong that the Kacha and Kabui Nagas were collecting arms to attack the Kukis. As a security measure, the Political Agent sent out a contingent to Tamenglong, and going out with the Cachar Road column of one platoon. He was already well apprised of the rumour that the Kacha Nagas and Angamis were intending to attack the Kukis of Saipimol. As a matter of fact not a single Angami was issued pass for an entrance into the Manipur territory since February 6. The Political Agent, in the meantime, kept in contact with the Maharaja of Manipur about the developments of the Naga movement. The Sub-divisional Officer reported that the Nagas and the Kukis of Hungrum Mauzas and Changsen were in a state of

29. Foreign Department, Political File No. 144, 1931, NAI, New Delhi.

30. Political Agent of Manipur to the Maharaja of Manipur, 23 February 1931, Political Agent File No. 12, 1931.
unrest or tension. The Nagas had started moving in a large group. And in the night all the Naga villages were barricaded and the whole night they kept vigil. They seemed to apprehend danger from across the State of Manipur. There were chances of clash between the Nagas and the Kukis. The Sub-divisional Officer took timely action to prevent the two tribes from going in a group with spears and daoos or daggers. He ordered them to go to their jhums. In order to restore confidence in the Government, he informed the Nagas about the arrest of Jadonang.

By the end of March 1931, the movement of Jadonang seemed to have died down barring some occasional reports of unrest or tension in some affected areas of Manipur and neighbouring hill region of North Cachar and Naga Hills. The Officer Commanding __________________

31. It was also reported that there was tension between the Nagas and Kukis in the north-west hill areas of Manipur. The Officer Commanding, Captain W.K. Phillips, Fourth Assam Rifles, communicated with the Political Agent that there was sign of hostilities between the two rival tribes in some areas of Tamenglong and beyond the boundary of Manipur, i.e. Kohima, Haflong, Silchar boundary and to the south as far as Aegui and Alauba. But the village heads denied such fictitious report. However, it was a fact that the Nagas refused to talk with the Kukis. And they never visited the Kuki villages. Letter from the Political Agent of Manipur to the Maharaja of Manipur, dated 23,2,31, Ibid.
found the Nagas of Mogulong, Impa and Katon villages of Tamenglong area, showing friendly attitude towards the Kukis. The prolonged tour of the Political Agent in Manipur and Deputy Commissioner's in Naga Hills, with escorts of the Assam Rifles through the affected villages immediately resolved tension between the rival tribes.

The Trial and Execution of Jadonang

The Manipur State Government awarded a sum of hundred rupees to the Cachar Police as a reward for the arrest of Jadonang. Some charges of serious nature then were framed against Jadonang for the murder of four Manipuri pan or betelnut dealers some time in March.

32. In some areas of North Cachar Hills the Naga unrest was subsided just after the arrest of their leader, Jadonang. In Manipur, the last meeting of the Nagas, which held at Laishang or Laijang (Tamenglong) was broken up at once because of the information of Jadonang's arrest and demolition of his two temples at Kambiron. Moreover, the Kukis had started jhuming as before the trouble begun. Personal Tour Notes of C. Gimson, Deputy Commissioner, Naga Hills, dated 21.3.31, Ibid.

The murder took place in the servant quarters of the rest-house in the village of Kambiron, at the instigation of Jadonang. First, the news of murder was brought to the road Mohori by Muktikhulen village on March 30, 1931. And later on it was reported to the Sub-Divisional Officer. Immediately after the arrest of Jadonang, the criminal investigation was begun. In the Court of Political Agent of Manipur, he and his five associates were convicted for the murder of four Manipuri pan dealers. All in all there were twenty-four accused persons directly or indirectly involved in the murder case.

Jadonang was ultimately sentenced to death in the Court of Political Agent, Manipur, in the Criminal

34. The names of the deceased pan dealers were namely, (1) Thounaojam Mera Singh, (2) Waikhom Thamban Singh, (3) Waikhom Pheijao Singh, and (4) Waikhom Sajau Singh.

35. Foreign Department, Political File No. 18(7), 1931, NAI, New Delhi.

36. Some of the accused were charged with murder under v/s 302 I.P.C. and a few of them were convicted for the abetment of murder under v/s 109/302 I.P.C. and certain person under v/s 201, I.P.C. for causing evidence of the murderer to disappear. C.W.L. Harvey, Administration Report, Manipur State, 1931-32 (Imphal: State Printing Press, 1932), pp. 3-4.
And his four associates were treated under sections 302, 109, 201, and 202 of the Indian Penal Code. However, Jadonang was allowed to appeal to the Governor-General. He pleaded his innocence and ignorance. He said that he had no personal benefit or motive in killing those four Manipuri pan dealers. He said that he was at Nungkao village when the murder took place. He asserted that he had never advised the villagers to murder the four Manipuris. He pleaded that the other accused when they could find no person, who could be held guilty for the offence (as they lost their leader Gaidinliu) they just tried to pass on the guilt to him. He requested the Governor-General to examine the case, apportion the blame to those really guilty and waive the sentence of death awarded to him.

37. The petition of Jadonang was rejected by the Political Agent on the ground that it did not disclose any new fact which was not before the session and the Governor of Assam when the sentence was confirmed. Moreover, the offence was deliberate and brutal. The petitioner took the main part in the murder and in arranging it. The Political Agent was under the impression that a lesson should be given to put off the tribal traditional head-hunting by giving them punishment. A counsel defended the petitioner in the proceedings before the Governor. In the prosecution, nineteen persons were produced in the court. All of them threw blame upon Jadonang. The Governor commented that this seemed to be a clear case for the death penalty or there were no extenuating circumstances. Foreign Department, Political File No. 18(7), 1931, NAI, New Delhi.

38. Jadonang to Governor-General-in-Council, 30 July 1931, Ibid.
After a detailed study of the petition of Jadonang, the Governor-in-Council did not find any reason to reconsider his case and upheld Jadonang's death sentence. His Order read: "... His Excellency the Governor-in-Council has heard Srijut Rohini Kumar Choudhury, Advocate, on behalf of the six accused sentenced to death and has examined the evidence carefully.

'It is open to the obvious objection that almost entirely the evidence is that of accomplices in the murder, most of the witnesses trying to exculpate themselves. Under the circumstances however no other kind of evidence was available and His Excellency in Council is disposed to accept the Session Judge's findings as to the facts.'

Concluding, the Governor-General-in-Council said:
'The Session Judge, who had the advantage of seeing this witness and hearing him depose regarded his evidence as unreliable and His Excellency sees no reason to differ from this view. But at the same time on the evidence as a whole, His Excellency-in-Council is not prepared to say that various detailed acts of certain individuals can be proved to the extent of justifying such discrimination

39. Foreign Department, Political File No. 18(7), 1931, NAI, New Delhi.
as would make it right to impose the death sentence, even when they pleaded guilty. All took part in the riot. It was a dark night and there must have been confusion. It is true these men have confessed though only admit actual killing'. 40 The Governor, therefore, converted the death sentence of other five convicts namely, Luntong, Machungnong, Dulungpau, Mupuongpau and Siphai, to transportation for life, whereas in the case of Jadonang the former decision was not altered. Moreover, the Governor-General did not like to interfere with the case of condemned prisoner Jadonang. He said that the 'law must take its course'. 41 Eventually, Jadonang was executed by hanging on August 29, 1931.

40. Telegram No. 862-1 from Political Secretary to the Governor-General-in-Council, 18 August 1931, Ibid.