INTRODUCTION

A number of factors complicate the task of providing a 25-year overview of education, democratization and liberalization studies of the Arab world, and in assessing the state of this field of study today. The first is that the study of democratization in the Arab world in general and Kuwait in particular does not, and should not, stand alone: it has to be connected up to wider theoretical studies of the phenomena of democracy, liberalization and democratization. Throughout the thesis, varying definitions of the term “democracy” are used and discussed.¹ This reflects the diversity of approaches to evaluate the progress made in the region toward democratization, and it explains the nature of optimism and pessimism about the region’s prospects for both democratization and resulting peace dividends. Such disagreement is of course not unique. As Schmitter argues, “[a]cross time and space – not to mention culture and class – opinions have differed concerning what institutions and rules are to be considered democratic . . . [while] . . . [t]he concrete institutions and rules which have been established in different ‘democratic’ countries have similarly differed.”² Recognizing these differences in definition and expectation and accepting the fact that there is more than one “ideal” model of democracy – in a universal but also, much more significantly, in a regional context – are key to peaceful relations among nascent democracies and to relations between them and established democracies. As Schmitter further notes, “[g]iven the positive connotation which the term [democracy] has acquired, each country tends to claim that the way its institutions and rules are structured is the most democratic . . . [while] . . . [t]he ‘others,’ especially


one’s enemies and competitors, are accused of having some inferior type of democracy or another kind of regime altogether.”\(^3\) Such arrogance breeds resentment, which, in the long run, breeds violence. In particular, the application, experience, and debate surrounding the validity of the democratic peace are thus in no small measure highly dependent on the compatibility of definitions and expectations of what constitutes a democracy, as well as on a thorough understanding and appreciation of the vulnerabilities generated by the transition process from autocracy to democracy.\(^4\) A second factor concerns the time-span covered. Democratization has been a major theme in Arab world studies for only about twenty years. Although earlier theoretical literature is relevant to the issue, there is no body of work on democratization in the Arab world which can be traced through the 25-year period. “When will Arab world countries democratize?” is the normative question that guided the literature on regime change in the Arab world during the 1990s. Since significant political changes but no systemic transitions have occurred, this question needs reformulation: what accounts for the persistence of Arab authoritarianism? Escaping thus from the teleological tunnel permits the identification of two major developments. The first is an oscillation between controlled education, political liberalizations and deliberalizations, and the second consists of five areas of change within regimes: legitimation, elites, institution building, co-optation, and regimes’ reactions to external influences. The second trend is particularly crucial for understanding the durability of authoritarianism in the Arab world. Finally, the academic study of democratization in the Arab world can not be dissociated from the democratization policies pursued by Western governments. Much of the academic work on democratization in the Arab world has been policy-related: geared to recommending to Western governments how they can help promote the process. The relevance of this

\(^3\) Ibid.

stems from the increased willingness of Western governments, over the past decade, to play an active role in promoting liberal democracy in other parts of the world. An assessment of the development of education, liberalization and democratization studies, therefore, needs to take into account the relationship between the academic and governmental agendas, and the degree to which its promotion in the Arab world in general and Kuwait in particular has in fact been a useful policy to pursue. This thesis will attempt to examine, first, the main contributions which have been made to the understanding of education, liberalization democratization in the Arab world and Kuwait in particular. An attempt will then be made to identify inadequacies in the existing literature. Finally, it will be suggested that the international community, both academic and governmental, could achieve more for the peoples of the Arab world by changing the emphasis of its current concerns. Less stress should be placed on the generalized concept of liberal democracy, and a closer focus should be placed on an extensive yet clearly-defined set of characteristics which comprise Islamic ethos, education and good governance.

The thesis addresses a number of key issues that will determine failure or success in establishing sustainable democratization efforts in the region. Peace and stability, both domestic and interstate, and both negative and positive, are necessary for democratization processes to take hold. Simultaneously, democratization is necessary for peace and stability to unfold and, most importantly, to endure. Attempts to pursue peace without democratization, or democratization without peace, exacerbate instead of reduce the prospects of tension and war within and between the countries of the Arab world.

Political reform in the Arab world has thus far taken place through a process of formal regime-oppositions, negotiations, and discussions whose content, scope, and timing have been controlled by ruling elites. The basic goal has been to promote a sufficient level of political openness in civil society, media, and the political-electoral arena for opposition elites to let off steam, without affording them the opportunity or capacity to undermine the institutional, legal, and informal props that sustain regime control of the political system.
The top-down nature of this process is by no means unique to the Arab world. On the contrary, regime-initiated liberalizations have been a common feature of regime transitions in many parts of the globe. But what distinguishes the Arab cases is the failure (or perhaps unwillingness) of civil society groups and political parties to take advantage of opportunities to press for genuine democratization as opposed to regime managed liberalization. Arab leaders have been active in working toward a regional response to the crisis as well. At the January, 2009 Arab Economic, Developmental and Social Summit, held in Kuwait, they agreed to work together on consolidating close Arab relations and common goals, especially as pertains to promoting social and economic development, including in the areas of empowerment of youth and women, and in addressing food and water issues. Moreover, the Kuwait Declaration, issued on January 20th, called for cooperation to enhance the ability of Arab countries to confront the repercussions of the international crisis, and to participate in international efforts directed at securing international financial stability.\(^5\)

The absence of opposition effectiveness cannot be attributed solely to the coercive capacity of Arab regimes, or to their distribution of direct and indirect rents to clients. Hand in hand with such sticks and carrots has been a political legacy of personal, institutional, and ideological fragmentation within opposition circles on one side, and popular apathy and depoliticization on the other. Moreover, and partly as a consequence of such internal constraints, opposition leaders have often grudgingly accepted meager benefits from liberalized autocracies over the unknowns of challenging the status quo. The theoretical assumption that democracy is an important prerequisite for international peace, because democratic regimes tend not to fight other democracies. According to this hypothesis, the presence of democratic regimes throughout the Arab world would be the guarantor of stable peace and would, in addition to creating more just and participatory states, effectively prevent interstate conflict in the future. However, democracies do fight non-democratic regimes, so the presence of only one "spoiler," one autocratic regime, would severely limit the opportunities for regional democratic peace and a regional

security community. The application of the democratic peace hypothesis in the Arab world can be little more than an academic exercise because few, if any, of the countries in the region are well-functioning, full-fledged democracies.

Yet in the last two or so years, opposition elites have begun to tire of the informal consensus that has sustained the *modis vivendi* within oppositions and between oppositions and state. This shift is partly a consequence of the political frustrations born of state managed liberalization. As noted before, liberalized autocracies tend to cycle back and forth between periods of political liberalization and deliberation. The process of retreat to greater state control and interference—if not outright repression—is usually provoked by the gains that mainstream Islamist forces acquire under the umbrella of liberalized autocracy. Using networks of preacher-ideologues and mosques, mainstream Islamists have out-organized their non-Islamist competitors to emerge as the only movements and/or parties that have a mass, organic constituency. Emboldened by electoral gains, Islamist leaders have frequently violated ambiguously defined lines of state-tolerated dissent, thus provoking crackdowns from regime hardliners.

Frustrated by the limits of state-managed liberalization, and particularly by the periodic retraction of liberties granted by regimes, both Islamists and non-Islamist leaders have begun talking about ways to cooperate in an effort to step beyond the limits of liberalized autocracy. Granted, these discussions are at an early stage, but they represent a potential learning process that might invigorate oppositions that have traditionally suffered from internal weakness and division.

All rulers need legitimacy and the consent of their citizens to stay in power. Thus, they, on their own or in response to pressure from citizens, may initiate constitutional changes to make education a right for all citizens. They may decide to decentralize the provision of education to subnational levels, as a first step toward democratization, and as a way of allowing citizens to exercise some influence over education policies. And they may change the rules governing information disclosure and make collected information about school performance, national and international test scores, and resource allocation available to the public. These decisions commit the executive branch to meeting certain
objectives and/or provide citizens with mechanisms for expressing themselves. The question is whether Arab world and in particular Kuwait has attempted to do this. Consider first the provisions related to education in the constitutions of some Arab countries. This is one area where most nations in the region have made clear commitments, although the nature of these commitments varies. The constitutions of Algeria, Egypt and Syria not only guarantee the right of education to all citizens, but also to be provided free of charge. Jordan and Lebanon’s constitutions also guarantee the right of education for all, but no commitment is made that education will be provided by the state for free. These constitutional commitments were made typically in the wake of independence from colonial powers and have put pressure on governments to deliver. In recent years, however, most countries are increasingly relying on the private sector for the provision of education and private tutoring is mushrooming, both of which are turning free education gradually into a “false entitlement.” Next, consider decentralization. It was argued that a carefully designed decentralization to local states could empower citizens if it is paired with free local elections and representation of citizens on local councils. If not, decentralization could erode public accountability. It further reduces the consistency of education policies across states while giving citizens no effective voice. Thus, decentralization is a potentially useful instrument for enhancing public accountability, but its usefulness depends on the way it is designed and implemented. In the Arab world, more and more countries are increasingly adopting programs of decentralization of decision making to sub national governments.

The delegation of responsibilities covers many areas of service delivery, including education. However, there are no systematic assessments of the effectiveness of decentralization in the region. Thus, we cannot ascertain its value from the point of view of enhancing public accountability. Finally, consider information, which is fundamental to public accountability. Indeed, it is almost impossible to see how accountability could be enhanced in the absence of relevant information about different aspects of education. Even if the media were fully independent, NGO associations and advocacy groups unrestricted, and citizens able to express themselves freely, the lack of information would prevent them from holding politicians accountable for outcomes. The examples of how information can change policies are numerous. From the World Development Report

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6 When voice cannot be expressed within an institutional framework, it is sometimes expressed in an extralegal manner (e.g., student demonstrations, protests by parents by not sending their kids to school).
(WDR) on making services reach the poor, making the information available about the resources allocated to schools and how much actually reached them in Uganda caused a strong reaction from citizens and led to a shift in favor of schools. In the MENA region, information disclosure acts leave much to be desired and NGO laws are restrictive, but there are signs that things are changing for the better. Civil society is now playing a more active role in several areas, including education. Newspapers, television shows, and the Internet regularly feature education debates, sometimes with scathing analysis of government efforts. Also, a number of independent institutes and academics are conducting and disseminating research on education issues.  

During the 1950s and 1960s, after independence, most Arab countries have struggled to develop systems of higher education that would enable their societies to build an educational system that would flourish and grow. The search to develop such educational systems was consistent with a global trend in which the expansion of higher education had been the most important single post war trend worldwide. Arab governments have rapidly established a great number of universities in recent decades. In 1950, there were no more than ten universities scattered across the region, whereas today, there are more than 200 higher education providers. At the same time, Arab states have, as never before, witnessed a remarkable increase in enrollment rates in higher education institutions. This increase has resulted from a growing public demand for education, an enlarged population, and the governments' commitments to make higher education as accessible as possible.

Policymakers, social planners, and external evaluators are often, and rightly so, concerned with the clarity of government goals regarding education. Five- or ten-year plans regarding education can be impressive blueprints from which to evaluate a

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country's progress, but stated government goals are not sufficient for evaluating the effectiveness of the educational system. There may, for example, be class differences in the perception of the educational system. The working class may view universal education as a mechanism for personal upward mobility into white-collar jobs. In contrast, elite views of education goals may be quite different, and the intentions of power holders need to be considered. Is education to them a mechanism for citizenship training, humanistic development, or job/career training?

Not only may there be divergent perceptions of goals between segments of a society, but "external" evaluators may reflect cultural bias and misunderstanding. Although socioeconomic development is a multilinear rather than a unilinear process, involving different forms of adaptive change and different combinations of traits, many Western scholars have tended to assume that the industrialization and modernization of Third World countries would lead to essentially Western patterns. These views ignore the fact that in a given developing country goals may be interpreted or implemented in such a way as to produce a new version of modernization which is adapted to the country's history and cultural traditions. Indeed, such has been the experience with Japan. In short, differences between the ways in which goals are perceived, interpreted, and implemented may influence the way in which formal education impinges on other aspects of development.

The functional contribution of formal education to development must be examined within the broader context of change in other institutional areas. Education cannot be examined in terms of enrollment statistics alone. Since societal institutions are interconnected, the "isolated" development of one may not only have far-ranging repercussions on other institutional areas, but it may also have intrainstitutional ramifications. These ramifications may actually be detrimental to the goals which were being sought by rapid development in the first place. There is a need for wider institutional context in

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attempting to examine the developmental impact of the educational system. In the enthusiasm to cite education as a catalyst in democratization, liberalization, and socioeconomic development, it is sometimes overlooked that education can also effectively preserve tradition and the status quo. For that to occur, careful planning and coordination are essential.

Factors contributing to industrialization in a given society may be distinct from those contributing to social modernity. Some Arab countries and some of the Gulf oil-producing states, are industrializing in the absence of a "corresponding" progress toward social modernity. These examples illustrate the problem in assuming that socioeconomic development can be achieved through basically a repetition of Western pat-terms, or that particular personality attributes, more or less speculatively associated with modernity, are a precondition of development. In examining the modernizing influence of education, it is necessary to consider the role which alternate or supportive experiences play. For example, the democratizing, liberalizing, modernizing potential of rural-urban migration, mass media exposure, voluntary associations, factory participation, and literacy or adult education programs may reinforce or detract from the educational experience. Clearly, the meshing of these alternate modernizing experiences with educational goals needs to be considered. The factors which identified above draw attention to some neglected issues which should be taken into account in examining the relationship between formal education and liberalization, democratization and overall socioeconomic development. The modernizing potential of education tends to be circumscribed by these and similar socio-cultural factors. To disregard the influence of such factors may perpetuate unrealistic expectations regarding the developmental impact of education. Nevertheless, most Arab states have proven unable to meet the needs of all students desiring to pursue their goals because of dramatic increases in student enrollment unaccompanied by sufficient resources. Confirming this, the 1998 Beirut Declaration of the Arab Regional Conference on Higher Education stated "higher education in the Arab States is under considerable strain, due to high rates of population growth and increasing social demand
for higher education, which lead states and institutions to increase student enrollment, often without adequate allocated financial resources.\textsuperscript{11}

Moreover, faced with the challenges of providing flexible enrollment and lifelong learning availability, Arab higher education institutions have not been able to meet the new demands and needs of their societies. Thus, the urgent need for in-depth reform of university structures is evident. In view of this, the Beirut Declaration calls for harnessing modern information and communication technologies to “contribute in the provision of courses and degree-awarding programs through multiple and advanced means, thus breaking through the traditional barriers of space and time.”\textsuperscript{12} In responding to what is mentioned above, Arab countries have adopted radically new visions that would prevent Arab societies from lagging behind other socio-economically advanced nations.

Meanwhile, there is a lively discussion taking place throughout the Arab world about several aspects of education and reform measures that are needed. This discussion, which has gone largely unnoticed in the West, has been generated by several developments in the region. Those developments include strong demand for education at all levels, the resulting pressure on educational facilities and budgets, and concern on the part of the private sector that the education system is not providing graduates with appropriate skills to deal with the challenge of globalization. Arab students have a variety of opportunities now, including private educational institutions, English-medium schools, religious-curriculum institutions, and study abroad. The thesis also attempts to describe the fundamental attributes of educational systems in the Arab world and then it will review the main issues that are being discussed by Arab leaders in the private sector, government and academia, about areas that need reform.

There are, at present, devastating changes and conflicts of interest in the world which place the Arab countries in the face of long-term changes which could reshape all the dimensions of human life. This situation requires the Arab governments and active forces

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid, p.45.
in Arab society to consolidate their invulnerability, to protect their identity and overall national security, and to measure the time to come in order to secure for themselves an effective foothold at a time of fierce competition and increasing reliance on the products of the information and communication revolution and knowledge explosion. One of the most important engines which could help the Arabs control their own decisions is doubtless to avoid deficit in knowledge capital and enhance the level and quality of the knowledge being produced and applied. In this respect, it should be mentioned that the Arab countries are endowed with a large intellectual elite and a wealth of experience which can provide innovative solutions and alternatives based on a full awareness of changes and on a realistic approach.\textsuperscript{13}

In the backdrop of the aforementioned ground realities the present study has been undertaken to test S.M Lipset’s model of political development on the process and pace of political change in Kuwait. The exercise aims, at testing the hypothesis that there exists an empirical correlation between education and political development. The case of Kuwait has been selected for the simple reason that the country represents differences in terms of growth and pattern of education. However, despite priority to the education sector, Gulf States are no match with Kuwait in terms of political modernization and democratization.\textsuperscript{14}

It may not be an act of unworthiness to repeat that education is of value in itself (intrinsic value) and is valued for what it can do (instrumental value). Education is desired for itself as it opens up a vast world of opportunities and ideas to the educated person. It is also of great instrumental value in the process of economic, social and political growth and development. There is strong empirical correlation between education and political change. Education empowers and, through empowerment, affects larger socio-political processes. Exemplifying this hypothetical correlation as an important phase in the growth of the theory of political development is perhaps best represented by S.M Lipset in his work, \textit{Political Man}, which is widely regarded as representing a major departure from the


\textsuperscript{14} See Table I, Chapter II.
established methodological orientation of American political sociology which at that time was unquestionably dominated by the approach systematized by Talcott Parsons.

The Parsonian method whose pedigree is traced to Max Weber and his study of the cultural foundations of the origin of capitalism in Europe led the inquiry into social action and social institutions, including politics and political institutions, through a study of the values and norms of a society. The result was a framework, which stressed the elements of consensus within a social system. Lipset, on the other hand, placed primary emphasis on a study of the interests of various groups in society. In unraveling the "social bases of politics", therefore, Lipset came to grips with the problem of conflict in society. Lipset's method was that of multivariate analysis. Instead of trying to identify any one particular variable, which determined the development of a stable democratic system of the western kind, which still remained the telos of political development, he attempted to find a cluster of variables, which correlated with what he identified a priori as developed political systems. His investigation showed that factors such as wealth, industrialization, education and urbanization all correlated fairly highly with European and English-speaking stable democracies, and then, at a decreasing rate, with European and English-speaking unstable democracies and dictatorships, Latin American democracies and Latin American stable dictatorships. This cluster of variables, which together he called economic development, was, therefore, crucial in estimating the prospects of the growth of a developed polity out of a backward society. But even within this cluster of variables, all were not equally important. Citing Daniel Lerner's study on the Middle East. Lipset emphasized quite strongly that of all these variables, it is education which is definitely a necessary condition for democracy.

Education presumably broadens man's outlook, enables him to understand the need for norms of tolerance, restrains him from adhering to extremist doctrines, and increases his capacity to make rational electoral choices. Further, at the level of individual behavior, the higher one's education, the more likely one is to believe in democratic values and support democratic practices. Thus it is only after there is a sufficient spread of literacy.

and therefore a wide area for the operation of the media of communication that
democracy begins to function as a stable social order.

Long dominated by authoritarian regimes, the Arab World, today, faces the challenge of
change posed by a variety of internal and external factors. In recent years, significant
degrees of political liberalization have already been evident in a number of Arab states —
although the extent to which this presages an eventual democratization of their political
systems is far from evident. Elsewhere, regimes have made more modest, perhaps only
be who, reforms or resisted demands for expanded public freedoms and participation.
Whatever the faults of the regimes, one of their undeniable achievements was free mass
education. Though lacking in quality, this expansion of education has nevertheless
created a higher level of consciousness, expectations and rudimentary organizational skills.
Such attributes have been instrumental in building formal associations.

In this backdrop, the exercise examines and tests the argument that it is education that
provided the base for democratization and liberalization in Kuwait. The globalization
environment opened up a competitive ambience wherein public sphere had different
trajectory of its own, and is like the free market open to all. But the development of
capitalist economy towards monopoly capitalism narrowed the space of the free market
as also that of the public sphere—the space for a rational and the very forces that had
brought it into existence destroyed universalistic politics distinct from both the economy
and the state.

It is no exaggeration to regard, Kuwait as a representative of West Asian societies in
particular and the Third World in general as far as experiments in education, democracy
and liberalization are concerned. Kuwait is beset with the problem of grappling with the
forces of education as a factor in democratization vis-à-vis their indigenous Islamic,
socio-cultural values. A study of this sort signifies not only an understanding of the
emergent responses of the socio-political institutions to the challenges of democratization
in the third world countries but also helps in assessing the future course that events in the
third world are likely to unfold as a result thereof.
The study will also be significant from the point of view of understanding the rapid changes that are taking place in the Arab World towards a democratic and liberal setup with in the broader parameters of an Islamic frame work what in the Arab parlance is termed as *nahdha* (awakening). The process of change and innovation is not yet complete, and the new patterns that have emerged are not yet final. They are part of a current of change of which it is only possible to indicate the general direction. While the old order is being gradually eroded, the study can help in predicting the new shape that is likely to emerge in the Arab world in its quest for modernization.

The study divided into five-chapters including conclusion has been descriptive and analytical in nature. The research design is experimental with education being the causal factor. Kuwait remains an experimental group. Both primary and secondary data sources have been utilized to understand the direction of change. The study is based on data combined in books, articles and government policies on the nature and status of education as a factor and the changing dynamics of democracy and the processes of democratization in the third world country especially Kuwait. The empirical data about Kuwait were gathered from various sources that included documentary analysis of reports, studies, and other documents. The documents were either gathered directly from the institutions or from official Web sites of the related bodies. The information about Kuwait was mainly taken from official Web sites of related agencies.

Chapter I of the thesis entitled *Education, Liberalization and Democratization in Arab world* largely deals with the massive and substantive changes in the world economic, political, social and cultural foundations and their resultant impact in Kuwait. The chapter is principally concerned with liberalization, democratization in Arab world in general and Kuwait in particular with education as a factor insofar as they relate to freedom and human rights. There is a wide interest in the universal trends of democratization and in the various schools of democracy. The literature on civil society and democratization has concentrated on simultaneous process of democratic transition and consolidation. Genuine democratization, if successful and sustained, can produce accountable,
transparent, participatory, inclusive governance, instead of exclusive and repressive rule. Liberalization of political and economic systems throughout the region could support stability with education as an important factor.

Chapter II entitled *Kuwait: Education, Democratization and Development* brings out the changing nature of the state, civil society and the conviction that human capital is the basic foundation in the fulfillment of development tasks, and that education is the cornerstone in the preparation, training and mobilization of the abilities of human capital, in order to meet national and regional needs. Kuwait allows, let alone encourages civil society to thrive and prepare the population, political parties, and movements to contribute constructively to eventual democratization. An attempt has been made to analyze whether education would be an instrumental asset for democracy, peace and justice in Kuwait to evolve a more participatory and accountable, political system as one that would suit the society.

Chapter III entitled *Regional Influences on Experiments in Political Liberalisation* focuses on the nature and levels of political liberalization. Political liberalization and political democratization are two processes that must be distinguished from each other. Political democratization, with its focus on popular political participation and elite accountability, requires political liberalization (the promotion of individual freedoms and rights). The latter cannot happen without the former. Although political liberalization can be witnessed throughout much of the Arab world, movement toward genuine democratization, enshrined and consolidated in both constitutional arrangements and political practices, is rare.

Chapter IV of the thesis entitled *Kuwait's Tryst with Democracy* explores the problems which democratization poses to the traditional political system of Kuwait and its tryst with democracy as a result of the discovery of oil. The intent of the study is to determine first the extent to which the Kuwait has been able to cope with problems of democratization and liberalization, and secondly the effect of the consequent changes upon its political authority and upon the state's traditional political institutions. Next it
analyzes the welfare state with education as a factor established in the aftermath of the oil boom, with special attention to the enormous socio-economic changes in context of liberalization which have swept Kuwait. Finally, the chapter focuses on the political consequences of democratization for these socio-economic transformations in context of liberalization. The chapter also analyzes the weaknesses affecting, and challenges facing, Kuwait’s political system, balancing this assessment with a consideration of more positive factors, which have led to the restoration of parliamentary life after each period of dissolution. On June 29, 2006, for the first time universal suffrage was in force. It saw the participation of women in national elections. The voters selected the 50-members of the country’s national Assembly. It is estimated that there are around 340,000 eligible to vote in Kuwait of which 57 per cent are women; the turnout was 35 per cent. In 2006 elections, there were 27 women candidates among the 249 in the electoral fray. But the repeated (five times) dissolution of Parliament raises many questions about democracy in Kuwait, which is located in a region that does not look favorably on democratic reforms. The Emir Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah dissolved the National Assembly of Kuwait on 18 March 2009 over accusations of supposed abuse of democracy and threats to political stability. An early parliamentary election was held in Kuwait on 16 May 2009, the country's third in a three-year period. It also raises a legitimate question concerning the reason(s) behind the uniqueness of Kuwait, with its relatively open society. Why is there a democracy in Kuwait in the first place? Does it really reflect education as a factor towards empowerment within Kuwaiti society? Why have other states in the region moved so slowly, while Kuwait enacted a constitution in 1962? And what are the major challenges facing democracy in Kuwait? This chapter attempts to answer these questions, and to explore the strengths and weaknesses of a distinct continuing democracy in the Arab world, despite the limitations.

The last chapter explores the extent of genuine progress toward democratization and the degree to which it has in fact been eluding the region despite the urgency with which true change must be pursued if the countries of the region are to overcome the “tremendous challenges . . . in achieving the levels of human development ‘with education’ (sic) that only good governance, including its political aspects, can ensure.”