Chapter – II

American Foreign Policy: Bases and Dynamics
Chapter – II

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: BASES AND DYNAMICS

NEEDS OF FOREIGN POLICY TODAY

The US moved from being a British colony to being a major international actor in less than a century. After a further fifty years in which the US played a decisive role in securing allied victories in two world wars, the new republic was the number one power in the world. Unlike post 1981, when it turned its back on the world, the US became actively engaged in world politics after 1945. It became the principal opponent of communism, engaged in a continuing ideological battle with the Soviet Union (and communist China) and built up a massive national security apparatus to deal with the threat. With the collapse of Soviet Union in 1991, the US had clearly won the Cold War. One era and one century ended; a new era and new century have begun. But could it change the mindset developed during these four decades? What kind of world would wait the sole remaining super power? Would the end of Soviet threat usher in a "new world order" or would the end of bi-polarity lead to more conflict in the world? All three post Cold War Presidents found it difficult to articulate a new strategy for the US. The differences and debates that may be observed throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as regards idealism vs. realism, unilaterism vs. multilateralism are still on display today and it is unlikely that they will be resolved quickly.¹

The remarks and future objective of American foreign policy by three Presidents after Cold War are different and reveal the fact that US struggles to find a set of guiding principles for its foreign policy after the end of the Cold War. George H.W. Bush (1993) in his speech stated:

¹ Fraser Cameron, *US Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Global Hegemon or Reluctant Sheriff?*, (New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 33.
Our objective must be to exploit the unparallel opportunity presented by the Cold War's end to work toward transforming this new world into a new world order, one of governments that are democratic, tolerant and economically free at home and committed abroad to setting differences peacefully, without the threat or use of force.\(^2\)

William Clinton's speech to the United Nations General Assembly, September 1994\(^3\)

The dangers we face are less stark and more diffuse than those of the cold war, but they are still formidable – the ethnic conflicts that derive millions from their homes; the despots ready to repress their own people or conquer their neighbours, the criminal syndicates selling those arms or drugs or infiltrating the very institutions of a fragile democracy; a global economy that offers great promise but also deep insecurity and, in many places, declining opportunity, diseases like AIDS that threaten to decimate nations, the combined dangers of populations explosion and economic decline..., global and local environmental threats that demand the sustainable development becomes a part of the lives of people all around the world, and finally, within many of our nations, high rates of drug abuse and crime and family breakdown with all their terrible consequences. These are the dangers we face today.

George W Bush, address to a Joint session of Congress and the American people (2002)\(^4\):

Our nation will continue to be steadfast and patient and persistent in the pursuit of two great objectives. First, we will shut down terrorist camps, disrupt terrorist plans and bring terrorist to Justice. And second, we must prevent the terrorist and regimes who seek chemical, biological or nuclear weapons from threatening the United States and the World. States like these (Iraq, Iran, and North Korea) and their terrorist allies constitute an exist of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world.


Just as each of three most recent Presidents has given different emphases to the U.S. role in this new era, so too have prominent scholars and analysts offered a range of views on the nature of this new era. Back 1989 amid the sense of political and ideological triumph over communism, the conservative intellectual Francis Fukuyama envisioned “the end of history... and the universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government”.\(^5\) A few years later Harvard University professor Samuel Huntington offered a much less optimistic view of a “Clash of civilizations”, particularly between the West and Islam, with prospects for political and military conflicts.\(^6\) New York Times Columnist Thomas Friedman pointed to economics as the driving dynamic, to liberalism, clashing civilizations, and power politics as “the old system”, and to globalisation as “the new system.”\(^7\) Colombia University professor Richard Betts was stressing the threat of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons of mass destruction, including those in the hands of terrorists.\(^8\) The Rockefeller Brothers Fund stressed the importance of non-military threats to peace and security”, especially global poverty and environmental degradation.\(^8\)

Whatever the differences among these perspectives, they all share a common view of the importance of foreign policy. For too long too many voices have been claiming that the United States can and should turn inward and can afford to be careless about and do less with the rest of the world. But for five fundamental reasons, the importance of foreign policy must not be underestimated.\(^9\)

\(^5\) Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” *National Interest*, 16 (Summer 1989), p. 3.
\(^9\) Ibid., pp. 6-7.
First, the security threats. September 11 drove this home all too dramatically. No longer was the threat “over there” in some distant corner of the globe; it had arrived right here at home. Moreover, regions such as the Middle East, South Asia (India, Pakistan), East Asia (China, Korea, Taiwan) in which the U.S. still has significant interests and longstanding commitments to allies, are still at serious risk of war.

Second, the American economy is more internationalized than even before. Whereas in 1970, foreign trade accounted for less than 15% of the US gross domestic product (GDP), it now amounts to more than 30%. Exports fund a larger and larger number of American jobs. When the Federal Reserve Board sets interest rates, in addition to domestic factors like inflation, it increasingly also has to consider international ones, such as foreign currency exchange rates and the likely reactions of foreign investors. Private stock markets also have become increasingly globalised.

Third, many other areas of policy that used to be considered “domestic” also have been internationalized. The environmental policy agenda has extended from the largely domestic issues of the 1960s and 1970s to international issues such as global warming and biodiversity. The “Just say no” drug policy of the 1980s is insufficient as a policy when thousands of tons of drugs come into the United States every day from Latin America, Asia, and elsewhere. Public health problems like the spread of AIDS have to be combated globally. In these and other areas the distinction between foreign and domestic policy have become increasingly blurred, as international forces impact in more and more ways on spheres of American life that used to be considered domestic.

Fourth, the increasing racial and ethnic diversity of the American people has produced a larger number and wider range of groups with personal bases for interest in foreign affairs. Some forms of “identity politics” can be traced all the way back to the nineteenth century, and some were quite common during the cold war. But more and more Americans trace their ancestry and
heritage to different countries and regions and are assessing their interests and seeking influence over foreign policy towards those countries and regions.

Fifth, it is hard for the United States to uphold its most basic values if it ignores grievous violations of those values that take place outside its national borders. It is not possible to claim to stand for democracy, freedom, and justice, yet say "not my problem" to genocide, repression, torture, and other horrors. Therefore, the choices it poses are just as crucial for the twenty first century as the cold war choices were for the second half of the twentieth century.

AIMS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

Since the US Policy has been changing in the light of new meaning given to its national interest by its leadership from time to time, some critics have remarked that America lacks any serious tradition to guide its foreign policy. The change in American foreign policy orientation from isolationism to total involvement and from 'non-entangling alliances' to alignments galore in the post-45 period lend some support to their observation. Priestly maintains that "most powerful nation on earth seems to have no continuing foreign policy to guide it". But it is just a superficial view. Rather, it is more correct to say that "throughout its history the United States has pursued a constant foreign policy". Generally speaking, physical security, material wealth, international prestige – these and other tangible and intangible values actuate all foreign policies and so is the case with American foreign policy.

Action by the government of the United States in the conduct of the nation’s foreign relations takes place within a framework of broad aims of policy and principles of international behaviour. Some of the aims and principles are traditional; others are relatively new. Some have been formulated and declared, while some are apparent only from official actions. All of them, however, reflect the present beliefs of the American people regarding the kind of world they want to live in and the conditions that are most likely to assure
their security and well being. It is within this frame of reference that the specific policies that govern the current action of the United States in world affairs are determined.\textsuperscript{11}

The foreign policy of any nation comprises the objective that it seeks in its international relations and the means and the methods by which it pursues them. In the study of a nation’s foreign policy, therefore, it is of basic importance to know what the nations objectives are in its relations with its neighbours.

If the United States grew to maturity in happy era, it nevertheless passed its infancy amid scenes of turmoil and violence. Emerging as a nation from the throes of one major European war, it enjoyed a scant ten years of peace before the opening of another, which lasted more than two decades. Small in numbers, poor in liquid wealth, weak in military power, the United States had perforce, in those years of international disorder, to direct much of its attention to its own security. In the long run, the European wars of century and a half ago worked to the advantage of the United States. This is a fact that is clear enough to historical students today; it was less clear to Washington, John Adams, Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe, the Presidents who piloted the young nation through those perilous years. They had sufficient cause to worry over threats to the security and the vital interests of the United States.\textsuperscript{12} Objectives of American foreign policy may be listed in the early twentieth century as follows:

1. To secure independence with satisfactory boundaries-boundaries that would contribute to the national security.

2. To extend those boundaries in the interest of security, navigation and commerce, space for a growing population, and the spread of democracy.


\textsuperscript{11} Major Problems of United States Foreign Policy, \textit{The Brooking Institution}, 1949-1950, p. 21
3. To promote and protect the rights and interests of American citizens in Commerce with and investments in, foreign lands; to safeguard trade on the high seas, in peace and war; and as a special application of this aim in the nineteenth century, to open the Far East to American trade and American influence.

4. To preserve neutrality and peace to keep out of wars of Europe (and Asia) as long as non-participation is compatible with preservation of American security and vital interests and to devise means for the peaceful settlement of all international controversies.

5. To prevent the powers of Europe (and later of Asia) from further colonizing in the Western hemisphere and from interfering in the affairs of the United States and of the America in general. In the twentieth century this has involved the maintenance or the restoration of the "balance of power" in Europe, even by the throwing of American weight into the scales. In 1940s the effort to protect the American from the spread of totalitarianism in its Nazi form involved a struggle to protect all western civilization from the same peril.

6. To these fairly specific objectives of American foreign policy may be added one more general and pervasive-humanitarian desire to do good in the world; to spread democracy to put an end to the slave trade, to halt the massacres or persecutions of racial and religious minorities, to relieve the victims of flood, fire, earth-quack, famine, and civil war to raise standards of living in backward countries. Yet they have, from time to time, deeply influenced that policy – upon occasion with important consequences. In the 1950s, the government itself entered the international campaign against poverty, ignorance, and disease as a means of combating communism.\(^\text{13}\)

---


The events of the Second World War, especially the development of air power, forced the American people to realise that the United States is no longer immune from attack. Moreover, the war and the subsequent developments have also forced them to realise that any serious controversy or disturbance anywhere in the world inevitably concerns the United States from the viewpoint of its own peace and security. These changes have profoundly affected the attitude of the American people toward world affairs. They have come to understand that political isolation from Europe and Asia is no longer possible. They have accepted the fact that the immense power and influence of their country involve it in responsibilities of world leadership, which it must exercise in its own best interest.¹⁴

The broadest aim of United States foreign policy is the maintenance of enduring peace, provided that the peace is based on justice and is achieved through the orderly accommodation of differences among nations. In pursuit of this aim, American policy and action have been directed toward the attainment of a peaceful world order, the establishment and preservation of democratic institutions throughout the world, and the promotion, through international cooperation, of a thriving and expanding world economy. Before the Second World War, the prevailing American view did not regard an international organization as necessary to the maintenance of peace. An overwhelming majority of the American people were convinced by the Second World War that a peaceful world order was possible only if it was based on a world organization of states (UN). And US government therefore became the leading advocate of an organized system of international relations. It was the United States, more than any other country, which saw the world in these terms and rushed for the creation of the UN. It was in San Francisco on June 26, 1945, that the UN charter was signed with 51 original signatories.¹⁵

¹⁴. Major Problems of United States Foreign Policy, n. 11, p. 20.
¹⁵. Ibid., p. 20.
The early Cold War Years were a period of crucial choices for American foreign policy. During the World War II the United States and Soviet Union had been allies yet, fundamentally, the American Soviet Wartime alliance was based on the age-old maximum that *the enemy of my enemy is my friend.* “I can’t take communism”, was how FDR put it, “but to cross this bridge I’d hold hands with the Devil”.16 The end of the Second World War brought in train a new perspective. The world was almost bifurcated into two concerted blocs of states presided over by two powers – the USA and the Soviet Union, rightly called the super powers. The strained relations which steadily developed between the super powers in the aftermath of the Second World War are known as cold war in international Relations. The policies pursued in these years not only addressed the immediate issues, they became the foundations and framework for the decades that followed containment and nuclear deterrence were the central foreign policy doctrines by which American power was exercised. The United Nations was the main political diplomatic institutional structure for the pursuit of peace. The liberal international economic order (LIEO) was the main institutional structure for the international economy and the pursuit of prosperity. Anticommunism was the dominant set of beliefs by which American principles were said to be manifested.17

After the collapse of Soviet Union, no country could match or balance the United States. It had unsurpassed global military, economic, and cultural power. But American was largely indifferent and uncertain about how to shape a foreign policy to guide this power. As a global power with global interests, it was the United States that stood to lose the most if they retreated. Only the United States had the capacity and the vision to consolidate these gains as long as American remains engaged, and lead. American had begun to reshape Europe’s security architecture. Brought the Middle East closer to a comprehensive peace. Set up the framework for the most open global trading

---

17. Bruce W. Jentelson, *n 8.*, p. 142
system in history – through the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs trade (GATT) and the new World Trade Organisation (WTO), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC), and helped secure democracy from central Europe to Asia, and from Southern Africa to Haiti and the Americas. After the September 11, the war on Terrorism became that defining issue for the Bush administrations foreign policy. America had to deal with both the September 10 agenda and the September 11 one.\textsuperscript{18}

American Strategy for foregoing a world in which America can thrive is guided by four main principles. First, America leads. Second, must seek to maintain productive political and economic relations with the world’s most powerful states. Third, must adapt and build lasting institutions to enhance cooperation. Fourth, must support democracy and human rights to advance our interests and our ideals.\textsuperscript{19}

Whatever the issue, and whether past, present, or future, American foreign policy has been, is and will continue to be about the dynamics of choices. The core goals of American foreign policy in different phase of time may be defined as power, peace, prosperity and principles (4 Ps).\textsuperscript{20} The 4 Ps frameworks helps to see the complexity and to analyse how priorities get set and to locate the corresponding debates over what American foreign policy is and what it should be.

The “Four Ps” framework indicates the major “School” of international relations theory to which each is most closely linked. These distinctions are not strict categories in which this policy goes in one box and that one in another. The national interest almost always combines one or more of the 4 Ps. Indeed, although sometimes all four core goals are complementary and can be satisfied

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{19} Warren Christopher, “America’s Leadership, America’s opportunity” \textit{Foreign Policy}, 95-96, no. 98, pp. 7-8.

\textsuperscript{20} Bruce W. Jentleson, \textit{n. 8}, p. 13.
through the same policy, more often they pose trade-offs and tensions, and sometimes fundamental contradictions.\textsuperscript{21}

\textbf{Power:}

Power is the key requirement for the most basic goal of foreign policy, self-defence and the preservation of national independence and territory. It is also essential for deterring aggression and influencing other states on a range of issues. Power enables an actor to shape his environment so as to reflect his interests, professor Samuel Huntington states, "in particular it enables a state to protect its security and prevent, deflect or defeat threats to that security".\textsuperscript{22} Realism is the school of international relations theory that most emphasizes the objective of power. International relations is a "struggle for power" the noted Realist scholar Hans Morgenthau wrote.\textsuperscript{23} The principal foreign policy strategies that follow from this line of reasoning are largely coercive ones. The ultimate coercive strategy of course is war. Starting with its own Revolutionary War and then through the nineteenth century (e.g. the war of 1812, the Mexican-American War, the civil war the Spanish-American war) and the twentieth century (e.g., World War I and II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Persian Gulf War) and into the 21\textsuperscript{st} century with the War on terrorism, the Wars fought by the United states have had varying success in achieving the Clausewitsian objective of "compel opponent to fulfil will". Military interventions are the "Small Wars", the uses of military force in a more limited fashion, as in the overthrow of governments considered hostile to U.S. interest and the protection or bringing to power of pro U.S. leaders, of which there also are numerous historical as well as contemporary examples.\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., p. 13.
\textsuperscript{24} Bruce W. Jentleson, \textit{n.8}, p. 15.
Power is also a key to maintaining a strong defence and credible deterrence. The particular requirements to provide the United States with defence and deterrence have varied dramatically over time with changes in the identity of the potential aggressor – Great Britain in early U.S. history, Germany in the two World Wars, the Soviet Union during the cold war, and terrorism today. But the basic strategy always has been essentially the same to deter aggression and, if deterrence fails, to ensure the defence of the nation.\(^{25}\)

Alliances against a mutual enemy is a key component of both defence and deterrence strategies. For most of American history, alliances were formed principally in war time: for example, with Britain and France in World War I, with Britain and Soviet Union in World War II, with twenty-six other nations in the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War; with an even wider coalition in the 2001 Afghanistan war; but with a less broadly based coalition in 2003 Iraq War. During the Cold War the United States set up a global network of alliances, including multilateral ones like the North Treaty Organisation (NATO), the Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO).\(^{26}\)

Peace:

The certain sense, all four of the national interest ultimately are about peace for that is what power is supposed to safeguard, what prosperity is supposed to contribute to, what principles are supposed to fix. But in this particular analysis category, the study has specifically in mind theories of International institutionalism and two types of foreign policy strategy. International Institutionalism views world politics as “a cultivable garden”, in contrast to the Realist views of a global “Jungle”.\(^{27}\) International institutions may be formal bodies like United States, but they also can be more informal, in what are often called “international regimes”. Keohane defines international institutions both functionally and structurally, as those rules that govern

\(^{25}\) Ibid., p. 15.
\(^{26}\) Ibid., pp. 15-16.
elements of world politics and the organisation that help implement those rules". This definition encompasses norms and rules of behaviour, procedures for managing and resolving conflicts, and the organizational bases for at least some degree of global governance, albeit well short of full global government.

We can identify five principal types of international institutions: (a) global, such as the league of Nations and United Nations, (b) regional such as the Pan American Conference of the late century; (c) international Legal, such as the International Criminal Court; (d) arms control and non-proliferation, such as the international Atomic Energy Agency; (e) economic, International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade Organisation. In none of these cases has the United States been the only state involved in establishing the institutions and organizations. But in most, if not all, the United States has played a key role.

The other type of foreign policy strategy that fits here is the "peace broker" role the United States has played in wars and conflicts to which it has not been a direct party. Familiarly contemporary examples include the 1973-75 “Shuttle diplomacy” in the Middle East by Henry Kissinger, the 1978 Camp David accord between Egypt and Israel brokered by President Jimmy carter.

**Prosperity:**

Foreign policies motivated by the pursuit of prosperity are those which place the economic national interest above other concerns. They seek gains for the American economy from policies that help provide reliable and low-cost imports, growing markets for American exports, profitable foreign investments, and other international economic opportunities. Some of these involve policies that are specifically foreign economic ones, such as trade policy. Others involve general relations with countries whose significance to U.S. foreign

29. Bruce W. Jentleson, n. 8, p. 17.
30. Ibid., p. 17.
policy is largely economic, as with an oil rich country like Saudi Arabia. Most generally they involve efforts to strengthen global capitalism as the structure of the international economy.  

Among those theories that stress the economic factor in American foreign policy, there are two principal schools of thought. These schools share the emphasis on economics but differ on whether the prime motivator of policy is to serve the general public interest or the more particular interests of the economic elite. The first school of thought, often referred to as economic liberalism, emphasizes the pursuit through foreign policy of general economic benefits to the nation: a favourable balance of trade, strong economic growth, a healthy macro economy. Radicalism includes a number of theories most notably theories of imperialism and neo-colonialism, that see such policies as dominated by and serving the interests of the capitalist class and other elites, such as multinational corporations and major Banks.

In sum their differences notwithstanding, Economic liberalism and Radicalism share an emphasis on economic goals as driving forces behind U.S. foreign policy. They differ over whose prosperity is being served, but they agree on the centrality of prosperity among the 4 Ps.

**Principles:**

The fourth goal, principles, involves the values ideals, and beliefs that the United States has claimed to stand for in the world. As a more general theory, this emphasis on principles is rooted in Democratic idealism. Democratic idealist hold to two central tenets about foreign policy. One is that when trade-offs have to be made, “right” is to be chosen over “might”. We find

---

31 Ibid., p 18  
32 Ibid., p 18  
35 Bruce W Jentleson, *Interface*, p 8
assertions of this notion of “American exceptionalism” throughout U.S. history. President Woodrow Wilson’s famous declaration that U.S. entry into World War I was intended to make the world safe for democracy”. Idealism was also claimed by many a Cold War President from Democrats such as John Kennedy with his call in his inaugural address to “bear any burden, pay any price” to defend democracy and fight communism, to Republican such as Ronald Regan and his crusade against” the evil empire”. It also was part of President George W. Bush’s launching of the war on terrorism as not only a matter of security but also a war against “evil…. The fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom”.

The other key tenet of Democratic idealism is that in the long run “right makes for might”, that in the end interests like peace and power are well served by principles. One of the strongest statements of this view is the democratic peace theory, which asserts that by promoting democracy we promote peace because democracies do not go to war against each other. Given its strong and exceptionalist claims to principles, American foreign policy often has been criticised at home and abroad for not living up to these values. We are seeing this in the post September 11 “why do they hate us?” debate over America’s image in the Muslim world.

Table: 2.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core national interest goals</th>
<th>International relations theory</th>
<th>Conception of the International system</th>
<th>Main types of policies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>Realism</td>
<td>Competition for power</td>
<td>Coercive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace</td>
<td>International Institutionalism</td>
<td>World order</td>
<td>Diplomatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosperity</td>
<td>Economic Liberalism, Radicalism</td>
<td>Global capitalism</td>
<td>Economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principles</td>
<td>Democratic Idealism</td>
<td>Global democracy</td>
<td>Political</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


36 Ibid, p. 20.
The table 2.1 summarise the 4Ps of foreign policy strategy, highlighting differences among core national interest goals, school of international theory, principal conception of international system, and principal types of policies pursued. It is important to emphasise again that these are distinctions of degree and not inflexible one-the-other categorisation. They provide a framework for analysing foreign policy strategy in a ways that push deeper into general conceptions of the national interest and get at the “essence of choice” over what Americans foreign policy is and should be.\textsuperscript{39}

The alteration of the position and interpretations of these goals over different times may be summarised as in fig: 2.1. To represent the smaller number of issue in the earlier time periods, the rectangles for security, prosperity, and moral principles are small. The larger size of the rectangles in later time periods reflects the expanding number of issues affecting these goals during these periods. The number of U.S. security interests and concerns has increased since the 1840s. In addition, the relative priority assigned to some issues, which we would generally consider to be security issues, has changed. Certain issues that might be considered prosperity issues are now of equally high priority. For example, unimpeded access to important markets for U.S. products has become an increasingly important consideration for U.S. policy makers. In the post-world war era, the number and priority issues affecting the prosperity goals of U.S. foreign policy expanded as policy makers perceived that domestic prosperity was becoming increasingly linked to the health of the international economic system. Successive U.S. administrations believed that government should more actively promote the development of an international economic system.\textsuperscript{40}

\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., p. 22.

\textsuperscript{40} Christopher Herrick and P.B. Macrae, Issues in American Foreign Policy (New York: Longman, 2003), p. 5.
Figure 2.1 Changing Primacy and Scope of Core Goals of U.S. Foreign Policy

*MP = Moral Principle

Figure 2.1 also indicates the increasing overlap between security and prosperity foreign policy goals or interests of the United States since 1940. Finally it illustrates perceptions of the extent to which issues facing the United States have had a meaningful impact on moral principle goals and interests in U.S. foreign policy over more than two centuries. It also shows the somewhat increased overlap of moral principles U.S. foreign policy goals and core interests with core security and prosperity goals and interests.\(^{41}\)

At any given time, specific issues may be identified as having a significant impact on one more of the basic, or core goals, of security, prosperity and moral principles. When this occurs, those issues begin to move onto the U.S policy agenda.\(^{42}\)

**America Foreign Policy: From Isolationism to Internationalism**

American foreign policy has a history and a long and complicated one at that. Present day Americans are in large measure the heirs of the record, good or bad, made by their ancestors.

In studying history, change often is more readily apparent than continuity. In so many ways the twenty first century and its foreign policy challenges are vastly different from those of even the recent past, let alone those of the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth centuries. Yet many of foreign policy choices we debate today, at their core, are about the same fundamental questions that have been debated over two centuries of U.S. history. Can the U.S. best fulfill its national interest in all its components through isolationism or internationalism? How big a military and how much defence spending are needed to ensure U.S. power and assure the peace? How true to its democratic principles does U.S. foreign policy need to be? Are those who criticize U.S. foreign policy as imperialistic right? How is the record of relations in such major regions as Latin America and Asia to be assessed?


Every one of these questions of foreign policy strategy has a long history that provides important context for current foreign policy choices. It is, therefore, crucial that as American considers the foreign policy challenges today, they not only seek to understand what is new about world, but also seek to learn from the prologue that is the past.

Britain’s American Colonies broke with the mother country in 1776. They were recognised as the new nation of the United States of America, following the treaty of Paris in 1783. During the 19th and 20th centuries, 37 new states were added to the original 13 as the nation expended across the North American continent and acquired a number of overseas possessions. The Spanish in Florida, the French in Louisiana, and the Mexicans in the southwest became citizens on equal terms with the citizens of the original States. Sovereign states were organised in the newly acquired regions and admitted to equal partnership in the Union.43

The US was not always keen to play a global role. After gaining its independence from Britain, the US sought to limit its involvement in international affairs and avoid competition with foreign powers. In particular, a clear majority of the Founding Fathers of the new Republic insisted that America should avoid involvement in the political intrigues and power rivalries of Europe (one can imagine how shocked they would be today to learn of the global environment of the U.S. from Afghanistan to Argentina from Kosovo to Korea).44 In his farewell address in 1996, President George Washington, set out guidelines for American foreign policy that found widespread approval “The great rule of conduct for US in regard to foreign nations is in extending our commercial relations but to have with them as little political connections as possible. It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world.”45

44. Fraser Cameron, n. l, p. 4.
By 1823, the policy of non-intervention moved a step further it was based on the Monroe Doctrine.\(^\text{46}\) The Doctrine established a fundamental principle of American policy-implying two aims: (i) No territorial aggrandizement on American Soil will be allowed and (ii) No intervention in European Politics. The ulterior motive behind this Doctrine, however, was to serve a warning to European powers that the American Continents are henceforth not be considered as subject for colonisation and to assert hegemony over the whole western Hemisphere. The Doctrine gave the US a vast hinterland in control and South American bloc served both as a source of raw material and a captured market. With such ‘natural colonies’ the US had so little interest outside America. American isolationism was thus the political reflection of economic self-sufficiency. From its original concept the Monroe Doctrine was essentially defensive. But it became expansionist by 1840s, when the US became strong enough to implement it. Thus, the Monroe Doctrine became the corner stone of American foreign policy.

Throughout the nineteenth century the US continued to proclaim that its ideas were universal but did little to export them to other countries. This would change in the twentieth century; President Theodore Roosevelt was the first occupant of the White House to acknowledge the importance of the balance of power and a keen proponent of a more robust American approach to world affairs.

The reasons for this change in policy were complex. For some American, it was simply time for their country to enjoy the fruits of being a great power. The US had developed a strong economy; it should therefore have an international voice commensurate with its new status. Others argued that this was the spring time of open door’’ and manifest destiny’’ which involved a moral mission to promote liberty and democracy around the world, and to protect Latin America from European imperialism.\(^\text{47}\) The increased power of


\(^{47}\) Fraser Cameron, n. 1, p. 5.
the federal government after the upheaval of the civil war also played a role. National leaders were able to allocate more resources to support the military, a necessary buttress to a more assertive foreign policy.48

With the out break of the World War I, President Wilson's initial response was to remain neutral. However after German submarines began sinking American merchant ships, the President did not however, seek to win support for the war by appealing to American national interests. Rather he sold the war to the American public in idealist terms, speaking of the US” making the world safe for democracy”.49 America was unlike other powers pursuing narrow national interests. Wilson saw the war as an opportunity "to end the failed balance of power system and replace it with a community of power and an organized peace".50 Wilson made much of America's idealist traditions setting out in 1918 "fourteen points” or principle that should guide US policy. These included a call for open diplomacy, self-determination, general disarmament, and the abandonment of the balance of power principle in favour of a system of collective security. Once an allied victory appeared inevitable, Wilson devoted his presidency to negotiating the Versailles peace treaty and designing the League of Nations, the organization that he hoped would ensure America’s permanent involvement in safeguarding global stability. Despite his huge personal efforts Wilson was unable to convince the senate or a majority of Americans. His opponents argued that the US should look after its own interests and not become involved in settling disputes around the world. The inter war years saw the US retreat into an isolationist and protectionist stance. America Largely turned its back on the world and raised tariffs to protect its own industries from foreign competition.51

Twenty-five years after rejecting the League of Nations, the US Senate ratified almost without objection (89-2 votes) America’s entry into another

50. Fraser Cameron, n. 1, p. 6.
51. Ibid., p. 6.
global collective Security organization, the United Nations (UN). This striking turn about in American policy was the product of years of careful planning and shrewd political maneuvering by President Franklin Roosevelt to build domestic support for America's participation in a post-war security system. The US had again remained neutral at the onset of the Second World War but Roosevelt made clear his sympathy for Britain and its allies fighting against Nazi Germany. It was not until the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbour in December 1941, however, that the US was able to join the hostilities. Surprisingly it was Hitler that declared war on the US and thus made his own defeat inevitable. The US dropped two atomic bombs on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, thus ensuring Japan's defeat.  

From late 1943 until the end of the war, the administration carefully mapped out detailed plans for the UN, involving a restricted security council of the major powers and an American veto, while working to strengthen the bipartisan consensus supporting US participation. The President's clever political and public relations campaign resulted in overwhelming public and congressional support for American participation in the U.N. support for US engagement was helped by the fact that America had become such a dominant political, military, and economic force in the world. In global affairs, most nations now looked to Washington first.

**AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: THE COLD WAR CONTEXT**

Different views are reflected in the debate over origins of the Cold War. This debate is marked by two main schools of thought, the orthodox and the revisionist. In the orthodox view principal responsibility is put squarely on the shoulders of Josef Stalin and the Soviet Union. "We know", historian John Lewis Gaddis contends, that "as long as Stalin was running the Soviet Union, a cold war was unavoidable". The Soviets used the Red Army to make

---

52. Ibid., p. 7.
53. Ibid., p. 7.
Eastern Europe their own sphere of influence. They supported communist parties in Southeast Asia, Latin America, and within Africa anticolonial movements' indeed, one of the fundamental tenets of Soviet communist ideology was to aid revolution everywhere. And in the United States they ran a major spy ring trying, among other things, to steal the secret of the atomic bomb.\textsuperscript{55}

In the revisionist view of the origin of the cold war the United States bears its own significant share of the responsibility.\textsuperscript{56} Some revisionists see the United States as seeking its own empire, for reasons of both power and prosperity. Its methods may have been less direct and more subtle, but its objectives nevertheless were for domination to serve American grand ambitions. In citing evidence for U.S. neo-imperialist ambitions, these critics point as far back as the 1918-19 U.S. "expeditionary force" that, along with European forces, intervened in Russia to try to reverse the Russian Revolution. Other revisionists see the problem more as one of U.S. miscalculation. They maintain that the Soviets were seeking little more than to assure their own security by preserving Poland and Eastern Europe as a cordon Sanitaire to prevent future invasions of Soviet soil. What transpired in those early post World War II years, these revisionists argue was akin to the classic "security dilemma", often present in international politics, in which both sides are motivated less by aggression than by the fear that the other side cannot be trusted and thus see their own actions as defensive while the other side sees them as offensive. Had U.S. policy been more one of reassurance and cooperation, rather than deterrence and containment, there might not have been a cold War.\textsuperscript{57} With this debate in mind, this study now analyse the dynamics of foreign policy choice for the United States as played out during the Cold War.

\textsuperscript{55} Bruce W. Jentleson, n. 8, p. 110.
\textsuperscript{56} Thomas G. Paterson, \textit{Meeting the Communist Threat: From Truman to Regan} (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).
\textsuperscript{57} Bruce W. Jentleson, n. 8, p. 110.
After a century and half, the US had finally committed itself to play a continuing role on the world stage. But now it was faced with the challenge of communist expansion. As the Soviet Red Army moved toward Berlin in the spring of 1945, it liberated Eastern Europe from the Nazis and became the dominant power factor in the region. Poland was the traditional invasion route to Russia; Stalin had no intention of allowing Western-style democracy to take root in Poland, Czechoslovakia, or anywhere else under his control. Partly as a result of Winston Churchill’s warming in 1946 of an “Iron Curtain” descending in the middle of the European continent, the US became increasingly concerned at the prospect of a communist takeover in Western Europe as well as Eastern Europe. These rival views about the future of Europe led to confrontation between the US, which was in the midst of a massive demobilization of its armed forces, and the Soviet Union, which had maintained its huge army, and which would also soon possess the atomic bomb. This confrontation led to an unprecedented arms race between the US and the Soviet Union that would lead to a fundamental change in American foreign policy.

In that circumstances, the policy makers put forwarded the idea that the US should pursue a patient, but firm, long term policy of containment of Soviet power. The containment strategy of America was designed to destroy Soviet communism over time, by isolating it and exposing its economic and social weakness. President Harry Truman took up the containment idea. In a speech to a joint session of Congress on 12 March 1947, the President laid down the policy that became known as the “Truman Doctrine”.

It must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. The free people of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedom.... If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our nation.

This was a blanket commitment by the American President that would define US foreign policy for the next forty-five years. For the first time in its history, the US had chosen to intervene in peace time outside the Americas. In May 1947, Congress approved $400 million in assistance for Greece and Turkey, the two countries perceived as most threatened by communism. The following month, Secretary of State, George Marshall, announced that the US was also ready to supply Western Europe with economic and financial assistance (the Marshall Plan) in order to help economic recovery and thus slave off the communist threat. Marshall stated:

It is logical that the United State should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace. Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos. It purposes should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist.

American aid had also been offered to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe but Stalin had rejected the offer. The US also moved decisively away from its protectionist trade policies of the inter-War years and helped to establish international organizations aimed at promoting free trade.

In July 1947, Congress passed the National Security Act, which provided for a single Department of defense to replace the three independent services and established the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The act also created the National Security Council (NSC) to advised the President, and set up the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to gather information and to collate and evaluate intelligence activities around the world. Truman further extended US commitments with the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty organization (NATO) in 1949, and sent troops to fight in the Korean War in 1950. The US

---

59. Fraser Cameron, n. 1, p. 8.
61. Fraser Cameron, n. 1, pp. 8-9.
was able to gain UNSC approval to repel the communist, North Korean invasion of South Korea as the Soviet Union was then boycotting UN meetings. Truman worked closely with the Republican chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC), Arthur Vandenberg, to secure bipartisan support for his radical new departure in foreign policy. The President’s achievements were remarkable, when Truman became President in 1945 he led a nation anxious to return to peace time pursuits and non-involvement in global affairs. When he left office eight year later, his Legacy was an American presence on every continent, an unprecedented number of alliance commitments, and an enormously expanded armaments industry. The basis for the militarization of US external policy can be found in NSC 68, a famous memorandum of April 1950, stressing the importance of a strong global military posture.62

The Cold War dominated American foreign policy for the next four decades. Leaders of both parties (Republican and democrat) supported the containment strategy and a special American leadership role in world affairs. Eisenhower, in a message to the Congress on 5th January 1957, announced the U.S policy for the Middle East known as the Eisenhower doctrine. This doctrine proclaimed the American intention to use armed forces against any communist aggression in the region. In fact, it was directed against any intervention by the Soviet Union in the Middle East. Speaking at his inauguration in January 1961, President John F. Kennedy stated that the US “would pay any price and bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foes” to keep the world free from communism. President Jimmy Carter reiterated Wilsonian idealism in proclaiming that the US “ought to be a beacon for nations who search for peace, freedom, individual liberty and basic human rights”. His successor, Ronald Reagan, was equally eloquent asserting that “the US was by destiny rather than choice the Watchman on the walls of world freedom”.63

62. Ibid., p. 9.  
63. Ambrose & Brinkley, Rise to Globalism, 8th edn. (New York: Penguin, 1997.)
After 1947, opposition to communism thus became the guiding principle of American foreign policy and although these were substantial differences over the conduct of the Vietnam War, there was no serious opposition to the containment strategy that the US followed from the late 1940s until the end of the 1980s. During this period, the US developed into a global superpower, unlike any other in history. It established over 200 military bases around the world and committed several hundred thousand troops overseas to defend both Europe and Asia. It also engaged in a public relations and clandestine battle with the Soviet Union for the hearts and minds of the third world spending huge sums in the process. The defence and intelligence agencies expanded enormously and became important players in the formulation as well as the execution of US foreign policy. They also had a major impact on domestic policy, not least because of the number they employed.\textsuperscript{64}

There were various stages of the cold war that resulted in period of high tension and periods of détente between the US and Soviet Union. One of the most dangerous periods was the “thirteen days” of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 when President Kennedy faced down the Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, over the issue of soviet missiles being installed in communist Cuba.\textsuperscript{65} One of the most significant periods of détente was during Richard Nixon’s presidency when the US engaged in several rounds of arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 gave rise to a further period of confrontation with the US supporting groups in Afghanistan fighting to restore the country’s independence.\textsuperscript{66}

In 1985, however, the accession to power in Moscow of Mikhail Gorbachev opened the prospect for an end to the cold war. He withdraw Soviet forces from Afghanistan, stated that Moscow would not use the Red Army to

\textsuperscript{64} Fraser Cameron, \textit{n. l}, p. 10.

\textsuperscript{65} Allison and Zelikow, \textit{Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis}, 2nd edn,( New York: Addison-Wesley, 1999.)

\textsuperscript{66} Fraser Cameron, \textit{n. l}, p. 10.
support communist government in Eastern Europe; and his policies of glasnost (openness) and perestroika (economic reform) led to fundamental changes in the Soviet Union. President Reagan, who contributed to the collapse of the Soviet system by being ready to launch a new space arms race (star wars), something he knew that the bankrupt soviet economy could not afford.\textsuperscript{67} Strangely, the US was not directly involved in any of the seminal events that led to the end of the cold war, the fall of the Berlin wall in November 1989, the “velvet revolutions” in Eastern Europe, and the collapse of the Soviet system in 1990-91. The end of the cold war was a demonstration of the new found importance of “people power”. Indeed the US, and its huge expensive intelligence agencies, had failed to predict the sudden collapse of communism.\textsuperscript{68}

Many wondered how the US would react after it was suddenly deprived of the enemy that had dominated US foreign policy thinking and structures for over forty years. Perhaps because the collapse of communism came so quick and perhaps because President George H.W. Bush was such an establishment figure, there was no questioning of the containing rationale for the cold war national security structures that had been established back in 1947. Even the think tanks found it difficult to adjust to the new world that was no longer black and white but different shade of grey.\textsuperscript{69}

\textbf{AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN A NEW ERA:}

The end of cold war did not lead to any rejoicing in Washington. There were no victory speeches, celebration?, or models. A certain justified, quiet satisfaction was apparent, but President George H.W. Bush rightly held that there was no need to rub Soviet faces in the mud, particularly as there were many daunting problems to overcome. President Bush was delighted at the military success in the gulf, believed that the Vietnam syndrome had been

\textsuperscript{67} W. Lafaber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2000 (Boston: McGraw Hill, 2002).
\textsuperscript{68} Fraser Cameron, \textit{Ibid.}, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{69} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 11.
buried in the desert sands, and considered that the world was on the verge of a new era. In his state of the union address in January 1991, the President proclaimed that:

There was the very real prospect of a new order in which the principles of justice and fair play protect the weak against the strong … a world in which freedom and respect for human rights find a home among all nations… a world in which the United Nations – free from Cold War statement – is poised to fulfil the historic vision of its founders. In the wake of the Cold War, “as the remaining super power, it is our responsibility - it is our opportunity - to lead.”

The international system in which U.S. foreign policy operates is being shaped by five sets of broad historical forces: (i) the geopolitics of the end of the cold war; (ii) the “politics of identity” of ethnic, religious and related conflict; (iii) globalisation; (iv) global democratization and human rights; and (v) terrorism as a strategic threat in the wake of September 11.

(i) Post cold war Geopolitics: Relation with other major powers and persisting regional conflict: The cold war defined the international system and dominated American foreign policy for most of the half-century following the end of World War II. The structure of the international system during this time was bipolar, with the United States and the Soviet Union as the two superpowers at each of the poles. U.S. relations with most other countries in the world were based in large part on this bipolarity. With the end of the cold war the alignments and dynamics of major power geopolitics were put in flux. We see this today in U.S. relations both with its former adversaries Russia and China, and with its major allies, the countries of Western Europe and Japan. In sum, the end of the cold war has forced adjustments and in some instances fundamental changes in U.S. relations with the other major power. Yet, there is much ‘old’ in the geopolitics, notably three regional conflicts that persist from the cold war era and that still carry the potential for major war: India and

---

Pakistan, North and South Korea, and the Middle East. Making matters worse than before is the danger that the next war in any of these regions could be a nuclear one, since one or more of the parties to each of these conflicts now possesses nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{72}

**The Politics of Identity:**

Whereas many of the wars and other violent conflicts of the cold war were driven in part by differences in ideology, the post Cold War world has been driven more by differences of identity. The politics of "identity about" are about who I am, who you are, and what the differences are between us. Although the politics of identity extend far back in history and were at work in the cold war as well, extreme mass violence has especially characterised it in post-cold war era. The break up of Yugoslavia and the wars in Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo, and Macedonia in the decade that followed left close to a million people dead or wounded and almost two million displaced, and added a new term, ethnic cleansing to the lexicon of warfare. In Rwanda, for all the semantic hoops that the Clinton administration and other international leaders jumped through trying not to use the "g" word, there was no denying that genocide occurred. In just one month in April 1994, rival ethnic Hutus killed over 700,000 ethnic Tutsis. The politics of identity also fuelled deadly conflicts in Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Congo, and Chechnya, Nagorno-Karabakh, Iraq, Kashmir and other world hot spots.\textsuperscript{73}

**Globalisation:**

Globalisation is not the only thing influencing events in the world today, but to the extent that there is a North Star and a worldwide shaping force, it is this system.\textsuperscript{74} Globalisation can be understood in terms of its dynamics, its dimensions, and its dilemmas. The basic dynamics of

\textsuperscript{71} Bruce W. Jentleson, *n. 8*, p. 289.
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid., pp. 290-292.
\textsuperscript{73} Ibid., pp. 292-294.
globalisation is the increasing interconnectedness across state boundaries interconnections that affect governments, businesses, communities, and people in their everyday lives. Before even getting into whether globalisation is good or bad in policy terms, the analytic reality that globalisation exists has to be recognized. Policies can shape it, but they cannot stop or reverse it.

One key consequence of this reality is the broadening of the foreign policy agenda through the internationalization of many issues traditionally considered domestic. For example, the environment. Environmental issues are now part of the international agenda because, when it comes to problems such as global warming, neither the United States nor any other single country can resolve the issue on its own, and environmental problems arising in one country do not stop at that country’s borders. The same point applies to other issues that have a global dimension, such as AIDS and other global public health issues.75

This dynamic is further impetus for the rethinking of traditional concepts of state sovereignty. States are not as insulated or self-contained as traditional conceptions of state sovereignty presume. Even in an economy as large as that of the US, when the Federal Reserve Board sets interstates it has to give greater weight to international factors such as exchange rate etc. For smaller economics, the external pressures are even greater, often including requirements imposed by the International Monetary Fund or other international institutions. Globalisation also features technological, cultural, political, and human dimensions. Communications technologies bring news instantaneously from one end of the world to other, be it through the BBC, CNN, Al-Jazeera or internet. Cultural influences intermix across the globe. American culture at times seems omnipresent.76

75. Bruce W. Jentleson, n. 8, p. 295.
76. Ibid, p. 295.
Global Democratisation and Human Rights:

The Berlin Wall, that starkest symbol of the cold war, crumbled as young Berliners from East and West danced on it. Nelson Mandela, imprisoned for almost thirty years by the apartheid government of South Africa, was set free, and four years later he was elected President of a post-apartheid South Africa. A coup attempt in the Soviet Union was put down by the Russian people. Amid these and other events there was a sense that the world was witnessing “end of history”, as scholar Francis Fukuyama termed it not just the end of cold war but “the universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government”.

A very different view from Fukuyama’s was offered by Harvard’s Professor Samuel Huntington in his 1993 article “The clash of Civilization”. Huntington wrote, that

the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will be not be primarily ideological or primary economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural.... The paramount axis of world politics will be the relations between “the West and the Rest.”

All told, as the World entered what had been proclaimed as the “democratic century”, the record was more mixed and the outlook less clear than it had seemed in those heady days of 1989. The policy choices facing the United States thus were more complicated than they had seemed. At one level the issue was how much priority to give to democracy promotion and human rights protection in defining the U.S. national interest. Even to the extent that principles were given priority, the next issue was how to ensure that policies aimed at democracy promotion and human rights protection were effective. The holding of free and free elections in countries that had never or rarely had them before clearly was an important goal. But the consolidation and

---

77. Francis Fukuyama, n. 5, p. 3.
78. Samuel Huntington, n. 6, pp. 22-25.
institutionalisation of democracy and human rights were broader and long-term challenges. 79

**September 11 and Terrorism:**

It is true that terrorism goes way back in history, "as far back as does human conflict itself," as historian Caleb Carr has written. 80 It is also true that terrorism has been part of the contemporary U.S. foreign policy agenda since at least the early 1970s. In the 1990s, although terrorism overall declined, the percentage of incidents involving the United States and its citizens increased. Still, most of us always will remember the shock of the crashing twin towers and the gashes in the walls of the Pentagon – seared deeply into the American psyche. Beyond the immediate shock and crisis, September 11, affected U.S. foreign policy strategy in four fundamental ways. 81 First, more than ever before in its modern history, the United States was proven vulnerable right at home. Second, the dangers for the futures are even more ominous. Government and non-governmental experts alike increasingly assess the terrorist use of weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), nuclear, chemical, or biological – as matter of when, not if. Third, terrorism shifted from being a problem that came and went with this or that incident to becoming the top strategic priority for U.S. foreign policy. Fourth, was a major shift in doctrine on the use of force from an emphasis on deterrence to one on pre-emption. Since terrorist did not have capitals, regular military installations or major population centres against which to threaten retaliation, there could not be the same confidence in deterrence.

The U.S. doctrine on using force, therefore, would have to shift from relying on after the incident retaliations to pre-emptive action. “If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long...” Our Security will require all Americans to be forward looking and resolute, to be ready for pre-emptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives. 82

79 Bruce W. Jentleson, *n 8*, p. 300
81 Bruce W. Jentleson, *n 8*, p. 301-304.
The challenge facing the United States today is dealing with both the September 10 agenda and the September 11 one. The new era as among the most complex that the United States ever has faced. The paradox of the post-cold war era is that international affairs affect America and Americas at least as much, if not more than, during the cold war. It is because of many reasons. The United States still faces significant potential threats to its national security.

- The US economy is more internationalised than ever before.
- Many other areas of policy that used to be considered “domestic” also have been internationalised.
- The increasing ethnic diversity of the American people makes for a larger number and wider range of groups with personal bases for interest in foreign affairs.
- It is hard for the US to claim to be true to its most basic values if it ignores their violation around the world.

Although there was some basic agreement on foreign policy between the mainstream forces in the Democratic and Republican parties, the Clinton and Bush administrations placed different emphasis at different time on various countries, regions, international organisation, global issues as well as missile defence. Under Clinton, the US became closely involved in a new global agenda even if he was unable to persuade Congress to ratify agreements on arm control, climate change, and the creation of the ICC. George Bush was less keen on this global agenda but under prodding from Collin Powell and Condoleezza Rice, his administration slowly began to re-engage in multilateral for, a process that was accelerated after September 2001. External spending has focused more on the military than non-military programme. Under Clinton, Europe was perhaps the top priority given the importance of issue such as NATO enlargement and Balkans. Clinton also devoted considerable attention to the Middle East and paid more consistent attention to Africa than any

83. Bruce W. Jentleson, n. 8, p. 316.
previous President. When Bush came into office in January 2001 he declared that missile defence and the Western hemisphere would be his top priorities. His defence officials also made no secret that Asia would be a greater priorities than Europe in terms of Security issues.\textsuperscript{84}

Clinton’s informal campaign slogan was: “It is the economy - Stupid”. Clinton had also sniped at the Republicans for failing to do more on the human rights front in China and in the Balkans but in reality there were no major foreign policy differences between Clinton and Bush Sr. Perhaps as a sign of the public’s lack of interest in foreign affairs. American were worried about the economic challenge from Japan. These were, however, numerous foreign policy challenges awaiting Clinton, including the spreading conflict in the Balkans, the economic collapse in Russia, the breakdown of law and order in Haiti, several ‘rogue states’ attempting to develop weapons of mass destruction and rising tension in the Middle East. Clinton elaborated on these challenges and introduced globalisation and cyberspace as two central features of his foreign policy.\textsuperscript{85} The President said that his priorities would be\textsuperscript{86}:

- To restore the American economy to good health, as essential prerequisite for foreign policy.
- To increase the importance attached to trade and open markets for American business.
- To demonstrate US leadership in the global economy.
- To help the developing countries grow faster.
- To promote democracy in Russia and elsewhere.

The President also acknowledge the other challenges like ethnic conflict, drugs, crime, AIDS and the environment for good measure.

\textsuperscript{84} Fraser Cameron, \textit{n. l}, pp. 150-151.
\textsuperscript{85} Ibid., p. 18.
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid., pp. 18-19.
Clinton could claim a number of successes on the international economy front. Apart from leading the rescue of Mexico after its financial crisis and securing passage of NAFTA through Congress, Clinton oversaw the completion of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, moved China closer toward membership of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), negotiated new trade deals for African and Caribbean States and supported debt relief for poor countries.

Clinton supporters would also claim many other achievements for his presidency. On the European front, the President had upgraded relations with the EU, revitalised, adapted and expanded NATO, and led the alliance in military operations to end the killing in Bosnia and Kosovo. In Asia, the President had reduced the North Korean threat through a mixture of deterrence and diplomacy and helped bring China into global mainstreams. As regards Russia, Clinton had supported its transition to a market economy and its membership of the G8 and the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation forum (APEC), and helped it establish a new relationship with NATO. Clinton also helped secure the removal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. Clinton also made major efforts to promote peace in the Middle East, the Balkans, North Ireland, East Africa as well as tackling a host of new international issues.  

A President’s national security adviser contrasted the concerns about America’s place in the world in 1992 with the situation in 2000 when the US:

Was not only the unrivalled military and economic power in the world, but was also a catalyst of coalition, a broker of peace and a guarantor of financial stability. Furthermore, the US was widely seen as the country best placed to benefit from globalisation.  

Clinton, however, deserves mixed marks for his conduct of US foreign policy. This was clear from the vote to reject the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), to withhold American UN dues and to micro-manage Balkan

87. Ibid., p. 23.
policy. His administration was divided on the Kyoto Protocol on greenhouse
gas emissions with the result that it never reached the Senate for approval, and it was reluctant to sign up to the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the land mines convention.89

The September 11 attacks changed priorities over night for the US and led to a solid bipartisan front in the effort to combat the terrorist threat. Immediately, State were judged on how they responded to the Call for international co-operation to fight terrorism. In the weeks and months after September 2001, attention was focused more on the Middle East, Persian Gulf, and South Asia at the expense of Europe, Latin America, and Africa. This was likely to continue for some time. According to one NSC Staffer, the next decade would see the US focusing on the “arc of crisis” from the Middle East and Caucasus to the Gulf and South Asia. As the US continued to debate its foreign policy priorities, there was a parallel debate on the extent to which the US should engage with the outside world.90

Up until September 11, 2001, the post-cold War foreign policy agenda had a long list of issues but no single definition one like anti-communism served as during the Cold War. The war on terrorism became that defining issue for the Bush administration’s foreign policy. Foreign policy shift from ABC (any thing but communism) to ABT (any body but terrorist).91

The Iraq war was the first major application of the Bush Doctrine. The rationale was the anticipatory Pre-emptive one. Some allegations were made of Iraqi connections to Al-Qaida, but the main contention was that if Saddam Hussain were not soon disarmed of his weapons of mass destruction (that proved wrong), and if he were not removed from power, the threat he posed would escalate from potential to actual. Pre-emption means striking first based on credible evidence that the adversary is likely to attack you.92

89 . Fraser Cameron, n. 1, p. 27.
90 . Ibid., p. 171.
91 . Bruce W. Jentleson, n. 8, p. 570.
92 . Bruce W. Jentleson, n. 8, pp. 308-401.
No strategy links means to ends, designing tactics capable of achieving goals. Bush’s foreign policy is vulnerable to criticism not because it departs radically from previous administrations but because it can not succeed. The goals are unachievable because the means and ends are out of sync.

Condoleezza Rice says the Bush administration’s strategy rests on three pillars: First, thwarting terrorist and rogue regimes; second, harmonizing relations among the great powers; third, nurturing prosperity and democracy across the globe. But the effort to crush terrorists and destroy rogue regimes through pre-emption, hegemony, and unilateralism shatters great power harmony and diverts resources and attention from the development agenda. An effective strategy can not be sustained when the methods employed to erect one pillar drastically undermine the others.93

Consider, for instance, Bush’s quest for a democratic peace. He says that peoples everywhere, including the Middle East, yearn for freedom and coexistence. The democratic peace theory, which postulates that democratic societies do not wage war against one another, is appealing. But the war on terrorism, as presently conceived makes it more difficult to democratize the Arab World. Waging preventive wars required basing rights throughout the Middle East and central Asia. To satisfy its military needs, the United States must sign agreements with a support repressive, even heinous, regime that despise democratic principles.94

Democratizing the Middle East is a noble goal, but it is one unlikely to be achieved through unilateral initiatives and preventive war. Democratisation required far more resources, imagination, and patience than the Bush administration, or perhaps any US administration, is willing to muster. The ends of Bush’s foreign policy can not be reconciled with domestic priorities that call for lower taxes. A recent Rand Co-operation study concludes that the

93. Melvyn P. Leffler, Bush’s Foreign Policy, Foreign Policy, (September-October 2004), pp. 22-28.
94. Ibid., pp. 22-28.
most important determinants of a successful occupation are related to the "level of effort measured in time, man power, and money". Bush's domestic agenda simply does not allow for this level of effort, and he shows no inclination to alter his programme at home in order to affect his strategic vision abroad.\textsuperscript{95}

**Foreign Policy Approach: Unilateralism Vs Multilateralism:**

The debate about the US role in this changing world often is cast in terms of Unilateralism Vs Multilateralism. Unilaterism can be defined as an approach to foreign policy that emphasizes actions taken by a nation largely on its own, or acting with others but largely on its own terms. Multilateralism emphasizes acting with other nations through processes that are more consultative and consensual as structured by international institutions, alliances, and coalitions.\textsuperscript{96} Although the distinction is one of degree and not a strict dichotomy, this contrast helps frame the debate over how to define the US role in the world.

The contrast also concern through in comparing the foreign policies of the Clinton and second Bush administrations. The Clinton approach was largely multilateralism whenever possible and unilateral only when necessary whereas the Bush approach is largely unilateralist whenever possible and multilateral only when necessary.

There is, however, no simple inter-party split on foreign policy. There are unilateralists and multilateralists in both major parties but on the whole there are more unilateralists in the Republican ranks and more multilateralists within the Democratic Party. Unilateralists, a different breed from isolationists, may be divided into two schools. The first school (neo-isolationists) advocates a fundamental retrenchment and a limited balancing role for the US. The second, and larger, school (Primacists) seems to preserve America’s current

\textsuperscript{95} Ibid., pp. 22-28.
\textsuperscript{96} Bruce W. Jentleson, n. 8, p. 305.
hegemony and prevent any challenges from arising. Neither school sees any real gains from security co-operation.97

There was considerable speculation following the September 2001 terrorist attacks that the US would be a convert to multilateralism. Now that it had seen the benefits of international co-operation, it was argued, the US would change its approach on other issues. There was little evidence, however, of the Bush administration changing its policies on any of the other issues of major concern to the international community such as Kyoto, the ICC, the CTBT and other arms control treaties. Indeed, in the midst of the campaign against the Taliban, Bush announced a unilateral withdrawal from the ABM treaty. An apt description of the Bush approach to international co-operation might to “unilaterian multilateralism”. In other words, the US would be prepared to work with other countries if necessary to achieve a US foreign policy goal, but the general preference would be to operate without any international constraints.98

As the top dog in the international arena, the US has no wish to see radical changes in international relations. It prefers the status quo, hence no tempering with its alliance system or the international financial and economic mechanisms that it helped establishes. The US feels comfortable operating through NATO, the UNSC, the G8, IMF, World Bank and, for most of the time, the WTO.99

ACHIEVEMENTS OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

The twentieth century saw the United States rise to become one of many great powers; then one of two superpowers; and finally, the sole superpower – the global hegemon. Americans leaders and followers, in and out of government, in groups and as individuals achieved a dozen fundamental successes in the twentieth century world.100

---

97. Fraser Cameron, n. 1, pp. 176-177.
98. Ibid., p. 178.
99. Ibid., p. 185.
1. Force: The United States and its partner prevailed in both world war and ensured peace in different part of the world including, Korea, Kuwait and Afghanistan.

2. Governance: Americas helped forge institutions and habits of collective security and strengthened world order.

3. Interdependence: They helped rebuild Europe and Japan and formed a trilateral community for trade and security.

4. Containment: They won the cold war without a US-Soviet hot war and handled crises such as the Cuban confrontation without suffering a defeat or a major loss of life.

5. Conflict control: They learned, with the USSR and communist China, how adversaries can mitigate conflict and collaborate for parallel objectives.

6. Arm and arm control: They developed the world’s most powerful armed forces but also made arm control an integral part of security planning.

7. Peacemaking: They mediated the peaceful settlement of other’s disputes and contributed to peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

8. Free trade and economic development: They promoted free trade and institutions fostering economic development and financial stability.

9. Modelling a third way: Their market based liberal democracy served as a model not just for many former communists but also for statistics in Japan and Europe.


11. International Understanding: They promoted international exchanges – in science, in culture, and other realms – and open communication.

12. Dependability: They forged a strong reputation for reliability as allies.
Americans learned how to cope with complex challenges at home and abroad, with globalisation and the information age, meeting these challenges mainly by self-organisation. U.S. successes in world affairs demonstrated that value creating strategies for mutual gain enhance the deep, long term interests of all parties’ more than value-claiming exploitation for one-sided rewards.

Failures of United States Foreign Policy

Successes and failures often overlapped and fed one another.

1. Force: Washington sometimes resorted to force too early without good cause or too late. America’s Indochina adventure and Iraq crisis became its greatest debacle in world affairs. But a stronger U.S. stance might well have prevented or limited some wars.


3. Interdependence: Stalin’s USSR and Boris Yeltsin’s post-Soviet Russia did not join the first World.

4. Containment: The strategy to contain Soviet expansion became a global crusade against leftists or nationalists posing little challenge to U.S. interests.

5. Conflict control: Washington failed to explore some opportunities to reduce tensions with Moscow, Beijing, Tehran and other adversaries.


7. Mediation and peacekeeping: Washington should have acted earlier and more forcefully to curtail conflicts in the Middle East, the Balkans, Northern Ireland, and elsewhere.

8. Free trade and economic development: America’s trade and aid policies did little to help Third World development.

9. Modelling a Third way: A rising GDP and stock market left the United States with severe domestic problems.

11. International Understanding: Most Americans remained apathetic to the world, while many U.S. cultural exports gave an unbalanced picture of American life.

12. Dependability: Some U.S. leaders weakened the country's reputation for honesty, integrity and dependability. America's credibility suffered greatly when Woodrow Wilson could not win senate approval for the Versailles treaty and eighty years later when William J. Clinton failed to win senate approval for a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing.¹⁰¹

There are so many issues that are emerging or re-emerging in US foreign policy, because these problems have taken on greater significance at the beginning of 21st century. The security related US foreign policy problem is a high priority on the policy agenda. These issues include conventional force structure, ballistic missile defence, weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, transnational organized crime, and humanitarian intervention. Next two sets of issues associated with environment-environmental degradation and biodiversity – since these have the potential of becoming major threats to US security. These are some issues that are traditionally considered to be significant US foreign policy concerns; because they have an impact on the prosperity of US citizens and can ultimately affect US security. Among these issues are energy, international trade and international financial management. Finally, there are wide ranges of issues – sustainable development, pandemic disease control, international resource management, and democratization – that are important general foreign policy concerns for the United States. They are important not only because they ultimately affect US security and prosperity, but also because the issues resonate with the historic US belief that the country has a responsibility, where possible, to help other people in the world to enjoy a better lifestyle that more closely resembles the standard of living enjoyed by

¹⁰¹ Ibid., pp. 61-62.
US citizens. From the viewpoints of US political decision makers, policy influential and public opinion leaders, these issues are significant because they relate to the basic goals and core values of US foreign policy.102

Making policies about any particular issue occurs not in a single moment, by a single decision, with a consistent set of actors but rather over a series of moments in a lengthy period that typically involves scores of different actors and different types of decisions. Think Tanks are among the most numerous organizational forms devoted to policy research, and they are often among the most focused and visible sources of ideas and analysis in contemporary policy making. The focus of this study, therefore, is that how think-tanks generally become important and influential at different points in the policy process. Besides obtaining visibility with Congress and Journalists, expertise is understood to play active, important but quite different roles in each stage of the policy process. What policy research institutes are, what they do, why they have proliferated and how they makes ideas matter in policy circles are aspects that would be discussed in the next chapter.