Uninterrupted supply of sophisticated American arms to Pakistan during the period under review had created a strategic imbalance in the Indian subcontinent. The United States while formulating its policy of arms supplies towards South Asia had "pro-Pakistan tilt" and India was denied equal share. Thus, in order to maintain strategic parity with Pakistan, India sought arms assistance from Soviet Union, France and elsewhere to meet its defence requirements. This trend had envisaged proliferation of arms in the subcontinent. Pakistan has also sought arms procurement from People's Republic of China. In the preceding second chapter, Pakistan's acquisition of arms from the United States has been analysed. Hence in the present chapter, India's procurement of arms from Soviet Union, France etc. and China's arms assistance to Pakistan and US attitude to this arms race in the sub-continent will be analysed. Thereafter US approach to the problem of nuclearization in South Asia will be dealt with.

SOVIET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO INDIA;

By the time Nixon administration was installed in the White House and its "pro-Pakistan tilt" had become known,
the relations between India and Soviet Union had become friendly and cordial. Moscow had emerged as the single largest source for supplying sophisticated weapons to India. The growing Sino-US rapproachment, induction of sophisticated US arms into Pakistan and growing Sino-Pak entente cordiale during 1970-71, were the major developments which portended serious implications for the Soviet Union on the one hand and the emergence of US-Pakistan-China axis as a matter of grave concern for India. The growing civil unrest in east Pakistan portended serious geopolitical implications for India. And the Chinese open support for Pakistan as well as United States uninterrupted supply of arms to Pakistan were the developments seriously viewed by New Delhi.

In the eventuality of a war with Pakistan, India could meet the threats emanating from any US or Chinese interventions only with the tangible support of the Soviet Union. Consequently after preliminary negotiations, India and Soviet Union signed a treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation on 9 August 1971.¹ Both in its substance and timing, the treaty was viewed by New Delhi and Moscow as serving their respective foreign policy objectives. For the Soviet Union, it appeared to legitimise further the Soviet

security role in South Asia at low political cost. And from the Indian security perspective, the Treaty provided a checkmate on what was held to be the nascent political axis between Washington, Beijing and Islamabad. The consultative mechanisms delineated in Article IX of the Treaty were not viewed as an impediment to India's unilateral military option against Pakistan.

There was no immediate sharp or adverse reaction by the United States towards Indo-Soviet treaty. The US Secretary of State, William Rogers said in the New York on 10 August, 1971 that it was hoped that Treaty would help avoid war between India and Pakistan. The officials of the State Department said that the statement of Secretary Rogers did not "constituted an endorsement of the Treaty." However it was felt in India that the Treaty symbolises a serious diplomatic defeat for the United States in South Asia.

The then Indian Ambassador to Washington, L.K. Jha during his meeting with US Secretary of State on 12 August 1971 assured that "the Treaty contains nothing in letter or spirit which may adversely affect its relations

with America. The State Department officials in Washington feel that conclusion of the treaty at this particular juncture was a somewhat panicky reactions to signs of an impending Sino-US thaw and Pakistan's aggressive posture over Bangladesh.

It was reported in famous news weekly Time:

The Soviet-Indian friendship treaty caught the Nixon administration flat footed. Indian officials in New Delhi and Washington hastened to assure American policy makers that the document was in no way directed against the United States. But there was no disguising that Washington was wounded and that the wound was largely self inflicted. In its overriding preoccupation with India's two greatest enemies, Pakistan and China, the United States simply left New Delhi nowhere to go but Moscow.

The Treaty stood in India's good stead during the Indo-Pak War. Though United States tried to build psychological pressure on India by moving its Seventh Fleet in Bay of Bengal and China expressed verbal support for Pakistan, but neither wanted to involve in the conflict.

In the aftermath of Indo-Pak War, India's defence requirements had augmented. The U.S. embargo on sales of

arms to India and Pakistan but continued clandestine supplies of weapons to Islamabad despite India's repeated protests, had enhanced India's concern for acquiring weapons to have military parity with its immediate adversary. India had not only to recoup its defence losses suffered during the war but match Pakistan's growing military arsenal. Thus "a sharpened sense of regional security led to a greater willingness to allocate funds for that purpose".  

India's quest for sophisticated arms to match American arms acquired by Pakistan was met by Soviet Union. During the Moscow visit of Indian Defence Minister, Jagjivan Ram in July 1972, Soviet Union agreed to provide one "Petya class frigate." India's Defence Minister in his talks with the Soviet leaders, also discussed the question of Pakistan getting arms from Washington and China and its adverse impact on India's security.  

In 1970, India acquired one 'F' class submarine from Soviet Union, the orders for which had been placed in 1965. During 1970-71, Moscow also provided "Osa" class torpedoboot to India. During this period India also

acquired unspecified number of SA-2 type missiles. By 1971, India had acquired 50 SU-7 Sukhov fighter planes from the Soviet Union. The arms acquisition by India from Soviet Union during the decade of 1970s is shown in the table below:

**Table 3.1**

**Soviet Arms Assistant to India 1970-1979**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Order</th>
<th>Delivery and Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(A)</td>
<td>AIRCRAFT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Sukhov SU-7</td>
<td>Fighter/Bomber</td>
<td>September 1969</td>
<td>1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Ka-25 Hormone</td>
<td>Helicopter</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>MIG-21M</td>
<td>Fighter</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>1976; 20 1977; 20 1978; 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MIG-8-HIP</td>
<td>Helicopter</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MIG-25R</td>
<td>Recce</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(B)</td>
<td>MISSILES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SA-2 Guideline</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td></td>
<td>1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SS-N-9</td>
<td>Sh-Sh-M</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Model</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS-N-2</td>
<td>Styx</td>
<td>Sh-Sh-M</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K-13A</td>
<td>Atoll</td>
<td>AAM</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSN-11</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sh-Sh-M</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSN-2</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sh-Sh-M</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSN-9</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sh-Sh-M</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARMOURERED VEHICLES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150</td>
<td></td>
<td>PT-76</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td></td>
<td>BMP-76</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td></td>
<td>T-72</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVAL VESSELS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Submarine</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Frigate&quot;Petya&quot;</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>Torpedo Boat&quot;Osa&quot; class</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>Illyushin II-38 Maritime &quot;May&quot; Recce/bomber</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>Namutenka Class Fast Missile boat</td>
<td>1975; 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Osa Class Missile Boat</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;F-Class&quot; Submarine</td>
<td>1973; 75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The above table shows that Soviet Union provided sophisticated arms supplies to India during 1970s. In 1972, India has asked for 150 MIG-21 Bis and 100 MIG-21M fighter planes. In 1973, Moscow supplied 5 MIG-21 Bis planes and by 1978 India had acquired 59 such planes. Soviet Union allowed the licensed production of MIG-21M fighter planes in India at Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. at Nasik (Bombay). By 1979, India had acquired 55 MIG-21M fighter planes from Moscow.

During 1972, Moscow agreed to provide 600 K-13A class Atoll missiles to India. By 1979, India had acquired all these missiles. In 1976, Soviet Union agreed to supply SSN-11, SSN-2 and SSN-9 type of missiles, PT-76 and T-72 type of tanks were also provided to India. In 1973, India got seven IL II-38 bomber planes for maritime reconnaissance. Between 1973-75, India acquired 4-F class sub-marines, one Polnocny class landing ship from Soviet Union. Between 1976-79
India signed agreements with Soviet Union for the supply of two "Kashin" ASW destroyers, 8 "OSA-65" type missile patrol boats, Krivak Frigate, etc.

Besides, during 1970s, India also acquired arms from France and U.K. as shown in the tables below:

Table 3.2
India's Acquisition of Weapons from France 1970-79

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>No. of Licence</th>
<th>Year of production</th>
<th>No. produced</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>140</td>
<td>SA-315B Lama</td>
<td>Helicopter</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SA-316B Chetak</td>
<td>Helicopter</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3000</td>
<td>SS-11 ATM Missiles</td>
<td></td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>250 each year</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


France provided SA-315B Lama type and SA-316B Chetak type helicopters to India with a licence to produce the same in the country. In 1970, India and France signed an agreement for SS-11 type antitank missiles and India started its licensed production in 1972.
Table 3.3
India's Acquisition of Weapons from U.K.
1970-1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>No. of Licence</th>
<th>Year of production</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gnat A-2</td>
<td>Trainer</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ajeet</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>Gnat-2</td>
<td>Fighter</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ajeet</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>H.S.T48M</td>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>1975-79 Two each year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110</td>
<td>Jaguar</td>
<td>Fighter</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


During 1970-79, India also acquired weapons from United Kingdom as shown in table 3.3 above. In 1978, an agreement was signed between U.K. and India under which the former provided some Gnat-A2 type trainer aircraft to India to train the pilots of Indian Air Force. In 1973, under an agreement U.K. had agreed to provide 80 Gnat-2 type fighter planes to India and in 1973 India had started its production within the country under licence. It was named as "Ajeet". The United Kingdom also agreed to provide 20 HS-T48M type transport planes to India in 1972 and by 1979 India had received 10 such planes. India and U.K. signed an agreement on 6 October 1979 for the supply of 110 Jaguar fighter bombers. Of this
the U.K. had delivered 40 aircraft in 1979 and India was to start their licenced production from 1981. 11

ARMS ACQUISITION BY PAKISTAN:

United States had been the single largest arms supplier to Pakistan since early 1950s. However in the wake of outbreak of Sino-Indian hostilities in 1962, when U.K. and United States supplied armament to India, Pakistan expressed its disapproval and took steps to normalise its relations with China. Again in the aftermath of Indo-Pak war of 1965, when United States imposed embargo on sales of arms to India and Pakistan, the leadership in Islamabad looked towards Moscow and Beijing for arms supplies. Soviet Union made limited supplies to Pakistan while China emerged as the second largest supplier after USA, of arms to Pakistan.

ARMS ASSISTANCES FROM SOVIET UNION:

In the aftermath of Tashkent agreement facilitated under the auspicious of Soviet Union, both India and Pakistan had agreed to solve their problems amicably and it had helped in creating Soviet goodwill in Pakistan. Moscow seized this opportunity to cultivate Pakistan and tries to wean it away from American and

Chinese fold. However, in 1968, when Soviet Union agreed to supply SU-7 fighter bombers to India, Pakistan raised a hue and cry over the deal.

Consequently when in April 1968, the Soviet Premier, Kosygin visited Pakistan and first ever visit by a Soviet head of the government he was greeted with slogans like "give us tanks, not tractors".\textsuperscript{12} While Kosygin offered liberal economic aid to Pakistan especially for setting up a steel mill with a view to side track Pakistan's demand for Soviet arms, but Pakistani leadership insisted on procuring Soviet arms. Consequently Moscow was compelled to oblige Islamabad by supply a very limited quantity of arms. The Soviet military aid to Pakistan amounted to $5 million to $10 million only against $600-700 million to India.\textsuperscript{13}

President Yahya Khan's visit to Moscow in June 1970 did not bring success to Pakistan, search for Soviet arms. Instead, the Soviet Union agreed to increase its assistance for a steel plant. In subsequent years, Moscow did not oblige Islamabad by giving arms aid.

**ARMS FROM CHINA**

In the aftermath of Sino-Indian hostilities in


October 1962, relations between Islamabad and Beijing started improving. By signing a border agreement with China on 2 March 1963, Pakistan succeeded in removing an "irritant" from the bilateral relations and strengthened its position against India. The US embargo, on supplies of arms to both India and Pakistan, which imposed in the wake of Indo-Pak war of 1965, prompted Pakistan to seek arms assistance from China.

China also positively responded to Pakistani gestures and expressed its readiness to meet Islamabad's defence requirements. By May 1966, China had supplied to Pakistan large number of tanks, 40 to 60 Mig-19 fighter bombers and ten Id-28 bombers. According to another estimate by January 1968, China had supplied to Pakistan 30 Mig-17s and 60 Mig-19s. An equal number of planes of undisclosed kind were to be delivered by the end of 1968. Besides, 7000 assault guns and about five hundred 60 mm mortars were also supplied to Pakistan.

Between 1970 and 1979, China supplied fighter aircraft and tanks to Pakistan as shown in Table 3.4.

Table 3.4
China's Arms Assistance to Pakistan 1970-1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Order</th>
<th>Delivery Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(A) AIRCRAFT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mig-19</td>
<td>Fighter</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>F-6 Shenyang</td>
<td>Fighter</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>1976; 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F-6 Bis</td>
<td>Fighter</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>1980; 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1981; 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(B) ARMoured VEHICLES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>T-59</td>
<td>Tank</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110</td>
<td>T-54/55</td>
<td>Tank</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MBT</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>50 per year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(C) NAVAL VESSELS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>&quot;W&quot; Class</td>
<td>Submarine</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Gunboat</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1971</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


During the Indo-Pak war of December 1971, Pakistan suffered heavy losses in terms of military hardware and ammunition. Apart from procuring arms supplies from the United States, Pakistan acquired arms and ammunition from Beijing. In February 1972, Pakistan's Prime Minister, Z.A. Bhutto, proceeded to China to discuss Pakistan's defence requirements with the Chinese leaders and to
procure arms. The Chinese Premier Zhou-En-Lai was reported to have told Bhutto: "We are not ammunition merchants. Whatever your defence requirements are, they will be met gratis". During this visit, Prime Minister Bhutto raised the issue of signing a defence pact with China, but he was told by the Chinese leader that they were not in favour of formal alliances and what really mattered was a common interest and not defence pact.

During 1970s, China supplied massive arms to Pakistan. The Chinese supplies including Mig-19, F-65 Shenyang and F-6, Bis fighter aircraft, tanks and submarines. By 1976, Bhutto was able to persuade China to include Pakistan's defence requirements in Beijing's long term defence production plans.

In 1972, China supplied 6 Shanghai-II motor gun boats, 100T-59 tanks, 4 Hu Chwan-fast attack hydrofoil. In 1973, Pakistan had placed order with China for the supply of Mig-19 fighter planes, unspecified number of SAM-6 missiles and T-59 tanks. By 1977, Pakistan had received 2 Hainan large patrol crafts and 60 F-6 Shenyang fighters.

It emerges from the foregoing analysis that because of their mutual antagonism, which led to three wars in 1947-48, 1965 and 1971, both India and Pakistan wanted to have weapon's superiority over each other. In this regard, United States fueled Pakistan's appetite for arms by supplying sophisticated weapons. In view of US embargo, Pakistan acquired weapons from China. Similarly India acquired weapons from Soviet Union, U.K. and France. Thus an arms race had envisaged in South Asia which proved instrumental in creating instability because of local factors and that making the region vulnerable to super power rivalry.

UNITED STATES AND NUCLEARIZATION OF SOUTH ASIA:

The debate on nuclearization in South Asia embraces mainly two countries - India and Pakistan, which have the nuclear capability to manufacture nuclear weapons. Since India conducted its peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE) in May 1974, there have been doubtful reports in the western media about India having nuclear weapons. Similarly doubts have been cast over Pakistan's capacity to manufacture nuclear weapons. However a detailed analysis about the nuclear capabilities of both India and Pakistan is beyond the scope of the present study. Hence the main thrust of analysis in this chapter veers round US perceptions and policy assessment of nuclear policies of India and Pakistan.
U.S. AND INDIA'S NUCLEAR POLICY:

Prior to India's peaceful nuclear explosion at Pokharan in mid May 1974, there had been no "nuclear irritant" leading to strains in Indo-US relations. However the United States had been impressing upon India the need for signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) despite India's opposition to some of the clauses of the NPT. India embarked upon its nuclear programme almost simultaneously with the multifaceted industrial programme towards the early 1950s. India's underlying objective of developing and building a dependable know how in the field of nuclear energy has been of course, economic, for it promises the possibility of a new "industrial revolution". 21

India's desire to harness the atomic energy for peaceful purposes and to attain self-sufficiency in various fields of technology let its first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru to set up Atomic Energy Commission in 1948. Since then India had spent considerable amount of money on research in the field. About India's steadfast commitment to harness nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes, Jawaharlal Nehru, while inaugurating the Swimming Pool Reactor (APSARA) at Trombay on 20 January 1957 had unilaterally declared even "on behalf of any future

Government of India against using atomic energy "for evil purposes". Although India built much of its infrastructure for nuclear power with Canadian and British collaboration, its first nuclear plant was ordered in 1963 on a turn-key basis from an American company - General Electric. Under a cooperative agreement signed by the American and Indian governments during 1963 the US agreed to supply low enriched uranium for the proposed Tarapur Atomic Power Station (TAPS) near Bombay. In exchange for a US commitment to supply the fuel upto 1993, the Government of India agree to the American monitoring of the two reactors to be installed at TAPS, and to operate the reactors only on fuel supplied by the US or produced at TAPS itself. It appeared as if Washington was satisfied with the safeguards as envisaged under the agreement sufficient enough to meet its non-proliferation objectives.

However it was in 1954 that American concerns about India's proliferation potential began to grow as a sequel to the indigenous construction of a chemical separation plant. India's purchase of a Canadian CANDU reactor for the Rajasthan Atomic Power Project (RAPP) entailed


minimal safeguards subsequently indigenous designs were to be used for new plants to be set up at Kalpakkam and Narora. India's refusal to sign the NiT had also given cause for US concern. In an aide memoire delivered to the Indian Atomic Energy Commission, Washington tried to plug the loophole regarding PNEs by now interpreting them as non-peaceful; 

The United States interprets the safeguards and guarantees provisions of the Tarapur agreement as prohibiting the use of American materials and equipment or materials produced from such materials or equipment, for research on or development of any nuclear explosive devices regarding (sic) of stated applications... The United States would not consider the use of plutonium produced in CIRUS peaceful nuclear explosives intended for any purpose to be researched into and use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.24

India's PNE of 1974 was not denounced by Washington as being in violation of the 1963 agreement. Nor was an immediate attempt made to backtrack on the matter of supplying fuel for TAPS. Nevertheless, response of the Nixon administration was so cautious that anti-proliferation criticism came centred increasingly on the US congress.

The advent of Carter administration witnessed lightening of screws of American non-proliferation

treaty, Carter's early statements envisioned concerted efforts, both through internal bipartisan collaboration and through cooperation among the nuclear countries to prevent the closing of the nuclear fuel cycle by the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). In view of President Carter's pronounced stand on non-proliferation, the US administration had taken a number of significant steps.

Fuel shipments had been delayed and a policy review undertaken. The review led, among other things, to the development of anti-proliferation guidelines for exporters by the Nuclear suppliers Group (NSG) and the establishment of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE), and the first step towards the enactment of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA).

However, India had consistently maintained that the United States was bound under international law to continue the supply of nuclear fuel. The anti-proliferationists within the US Congress had started building pressure on President Carter on the issue of American nuclear fuel supply. In the summer of 1977, discussions commenced with regard to the repurchase of spent fuel from TAPS by the


27. For text of the NNPA, see, Congressional Research Service, Nuclear Proliferation Factbook (Washington D.C. 1980), pp. 71-84.
United States in accordance with the 1963 agreement. This would have foreclosed the possibility of the spent fuel being reprocessed for the extraction of plutonium by India. However the idea was shelved because under the relevant provision, India would then have acquired the right to inspect US facilities where TAPS spent fuel was sent, "a prospect with political implications that the US did not wish to address." With fuel shipments for India approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in July 1977. However India's application for the supply of a third shipment was disapproved by the NRC in April 1978 for lack of quorum among its members. Consequently within a week, President Carter overrode the NRC, and the US congress endorsed presidential decision by a vote of 227 to 181.

With coming into force of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Act (NNPA), it was enjoined upon American nuclear customers to accept fullscope safeguards on all their nuclear facilities. Nuclear transfers were subject to NRC approval which could only be overridden by the President. However the Act vested power in the US Congress to veto the President's order by a majority.

29. Basrur, n. 23, p. 117.
vote in both Houses within sixty days. Grace periods were provided for; fullscopesafeguards would be mandatory only for applications filed after 10 September 1979, and shipments without acceptance of safeguards were allowed up to 10 March 1980. Under this provision of the Act the NRC approved yet another Indian application for fuel in March 1979. 30

In May 1980, the PRC gave its disapproval to shipment of 38 tonnes of nuclear fuel to India on the plea that the deadline for acceptance of fullscope safeguards had passed. Following President Carter’s overriding the NRC in June 1980, the issue came up before the Congress. 31 In view of this development, the Carter administration nursed the apprehension that American failure to meet India’s request might result in the termination of the 1963 agreement by India, Leave it free of existing safeguards and India might turn to Soviet Union for further supplies. 32

Mc George Bundy, in an article in Washington Post, came out strongly in support of Carter's policy, saying that failure to allow these shipments will predictably serve all the forces already working against nuclear restraint in India - it will be a self-inflicted wound for the general

30. Ibid.
cause of non-proliferation. The Carter administration took pains to push its case in the Senate and House of Representatives. Deputy Secretary of State, Warren Christopher told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that 10 March 1980 deadline should not apply to India since its applications had been filed in September 1978 and August 1979 and the shipments had been delayed by the American Government. Eventually the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, House Foreign Affairs Committee and the House of Representatives as a whole voted to disapprove the shipment, the Carter administration managed to win the Senate floor vote by the narrowest margin - 48 to 46. Consequently on 5 October 1980, the first 19 tonnes of low enriched uranium reached India.

PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAMME:

Pakistan's nuclear programme has developed in response to India's nuclear programme and the successful detonation of PNE by the latter in 1974 provided impetus to Pakistan's penchant of attaining nuclear parity with India. The late Z.A. Bhutto is generally accredited for having pioneered the programme of developing nuclear energy in Pakistan.

34. Markey, n.31p. 51.
35. Ibid.
36. Times of India, 6 October 1980.
He was actively associated with the nuclear programme of Pakistan from October 1958 to July 1977. While realizing the significance of nuclear capability for Pakistan, Bhutto wrote in his last testament: "we know that Israel and South Africa have fuel nuclear capability. The Christian, Jewish and Hindu civilizations have this capability. The communist powers also possess it. Only Islamic civilization was without it, but that position was about to change."

Throughout 1960's and especially after the Indo-Pak war of 1965, Bhutto continued to nurse apprehensions about India's nuclear capability. In his book, *The Myth of Independence* which was published in 1969, Bhutto wrote:

> All wars of our age have become total wars... and it will have to be assumed that a war waged against Pakistan is capable of becoming a total war. It would be dangerous to plan for less and our plans should, therefore, include nuclear deterrent... If Pakistan restricts or suspends her nuclear programme, it would not only enable India to blackmail Pakistan with her nuclear advantage, but... our problem, in its essence, is how to obtain such a weapon in time before the crisis begins."

In international disarmament measures like non proliferation treaty (NPT), Pakistan followed India's example and did not sign the NPT.

37. Z.A. Bhutto, "If I am Assassinated...." (New Delhi, 1979), p. 137.

38. Ibid., p. 138.
In the aftermath of Indo-Pak war of 1971 which culminated in the dismemberment of Pakistan with Bangladesh emerging as a sovereign independent country, Pakistan was reduced to the status of a small regional power. And Z.A. Bhutto was at the helm of affairs of new Pakistan. Bhutto's penchant for acquiring nuclear capability for Pakistan was further propped up as a sequel to India's PNE in May 1974.

PAKISTAN AND INDIA'S PNE:

India detonated its nuclear device on 18 May 1974 and it immediately sent shock waves in Pakistan and set a chain reaction. On 19 May 1974 Prime Minister of Pakistan while condemning India's PNE, declared it a threat not only to Pakistan but to all nations of East and West Asia and the countries of Africa. He further stated:

Given the brutal fact of yesterday's (18 May) explosion, Pakistan cannot be expected to restore technicalities and protocol. It would be unfair indeed immoral that India's flagrant violation of the non-proliferation assurances should make the nuclear weapon powers resort to double of perversity of not only condoning it but also giving it a blessing by putting an estoppel or imposing restrictions on the normal nuclear programmes of other states. 40

40. For full text of Bhutto's speech, see Pakistan Horizon (Karachi) Vol.27, No. 2, 1974, pp.131-134.
Pakistan viewed explosion as enhancement in India's prestige, strength and independence. According to a Pakistan commentator, India wanted smaller neighbours, otherwise in equal stage of dependence and underdevelopment, to remain "impressed" by India if not "be in constant awe" from it. 41 Pakistan's media was highly critical of India's PNE. 42 A section of the Urdu press went to the extent of warning the United States that the balance of power which had tilted in favour of India had resulted in India's supremacy and hegemony which in other words meant "Soviet hegemony" over South Asia and "it would be in US's own interest to strengthen the military power of Pakistan." 43

With a view to allay Pakistan's fears and apprehensions about India's PNE, Prime Minister of India Mrs. Gandhi in a letter to her Pakistani counterpart wrote:

"I am sorry that you should have assumed in spite of our categorical declarations that the nuclear test which our scientists have conducted entirely for developing nuclear technology for peaceful purposes somehow poses


42. Both English and Urdu press in Pakistan took a various view of India's explosion as a constant threat for Pakistan see Wholly unacceptable"(edit), Morning News 23 May 1974, Muneer Ahmad Khan", our Nuclear Problem", Pakistan Times, 30 September 1974, "Atomic Proliferation and Pakistan's Stand" (edit.) Jumla, 22 May 1974.

threat to Pakistan's security. 44

Reiterating India's determination to settle all the issues with Pakistan in accordance with the Simla Agreement Mrs. Gandhi further wrote: "There are no political or foreign policy implications of this test. We remain committed to settling all our differences with Pakistan peacefully through bilateral negotiations in accordance with the Simla agreement." 45

The Bhutto government refused to accept India's logic and rather raised the bogey of nuclear India as portending threat to non-nuclear Pakistan. While speaking in the Pakistan National Assembly, Bhutto declared that all roads lead to the conclusion that India was "brandishing the nuclear sword" to extract political concessions from Pakistan. 46 Thus India's PNE provided a prelude to Pakistan to embark on its nuclear programme.

PAKISTAN'S QUEST FOR NUCLEAR CAPABILITY:

While expressing Pakistan's determination, Prime Minister Bhutto said: "If India builds the bomb, we will eat leaves and grass, even go hungry, but we will have to

44. For full text see Foreign Affairs Record (New Delhi), Vol. 20, no. 6, June 1974, p. 194.
45. Ibid.
According to an informed observer, the United States reluctance to recognize the effect of the Indian nuclear explosion on Pakistan's security and refusal to cut off all nuclear cooperation with India might have increased the latter's incentives for achieving a weapons capability.\(^48\)

Pakistan's desire to attain nuclear capability might have also been prompted by the belief that acquisition of even a rudimentary nuclear-weapon capability might allow a country to deter a nuclear rival - an important security related reason for going nuclear.\(^49\) There might have also been a political incentive for acquiring nuclear weapons because of its ability to enhance national power.\(^50\)

In the immediate aftermath of India's PNE in May 1974 that the then Pakistani Prime Minister, Z.A. Bhutto, initiated a nuclear weapon programme and planned to acquire nuclear explosive material by diverting it from a reprocessing plant which was to be set up by a French company, Saint-Gobain Techniques Naiveilles, at Chasma, Pakistan, under an agreement with Pakistan's government.\(^51\)

The fissile materials generally used for making nuclear explosives are plutonium-239 and uranium-235. The government of Pakistan planned to acquire the spent fuel of both heavy water reactors and light water reactors containing plutonium. In order to separate this plutonium from other elements, the spent fuel has to be reprocessed. And it was for this purpose that Islamabad negotiated with the French company for the purchase of a reprocessing plant. Reports appearing in the Western media in early 1978 stated that "more than 95 per cent of the plans for a reprocessing plant" had been delivered to Pakistan by the French company.52

Though the SIPRI believed that Pakistan had chosen the "Plutonium route" to attain weapon capability but since matters at that juncture were still in the embargoic stage, there was no immediate cause for alarm. However, the possibility of Pakistan arriving at the "nuclear threshold" in a few years through plutonium extracted from the spent fuel could not be ruled out.

However, Pakistan's agreement to purchase the Plutonium reprocessing plant from France was eventually

cancelled in mid 1978, largely as a result of pressure from the United States as well as independent French assessment of the agreement later on. Subsequently Pakistan started making clandestine arrangements for the purchase of materials for the centrifuge uranium enrichment facility which it needed for obtaining weapons grade materials for nuclear explosives. Reports appearing in the Indian and international media in the later half of 1980 indicated that Pakistan had succeeded in obtaining from Dutch, British and other sources the equipment that could be used for enriching uranium to weapons grade. Pakistani scientists, A.Q. Khan played a notable role in the entire affairs.

A.Q.Khan brought to Pakistan gas centrifuge technology for enriching uranium. He had got the opportunity of familiarising himself with the secret Dutch-British-West German Plant in Almelo on the Dutch-German border. On his return to Pakistan in 1975, A.Q.Khan made available to Pakistan valuable URENCO design information and the technical experience.

China also extended assistance to Pakistan in

building latter's nuclear capability. In May 1976, prime
Minister Bhutto during his visit to China struck a deal
with the Chinese leaders which involved Beijing's help in
Pakistan's nuclear weapons. In June 1976, a high level
delegation of Chinese scientists visited Pakistan. On
29 January 1977, Pakistan and China signed a protocol on
scientific and technical cooperation and the Chinese
assistance for development of nuclear energy in Pakistan
was implicit in the protocol. Z.A. Bhutto in his last
testament had claimed that his "single most important
achievement was an agreement which he arrived at after
an assiduous and tenacious endeavour spanning over eleven
years of negotiations.... the agreement of mine, concluded
with China in June 1976 will perhaps be my greatest
contribution." Thus by 1980 Pakistan had acquired capa-
bility of extracting plutonium from the spent fuel as
well as gas centrifuge process of enriching uranium and
it had become "threshold nuclear power."

**U.S. ATTITUDE**

By 1979, a serious debate had been generated

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within the United States about Pakistan's emergence as a threshold nuclear power. Islamabad's repeated assertions that its nuclear programme was "solely directed towards peaceful purposes and had no other dimensions." However, failed to convince Washington about Pakistan's real intentions. The suspicion was evident in a statement made by the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, Thomas R. Pickering before a Senate sub-committee that, Pakistan's nuclear programme... (which) consists essentially of one research reactor supplied by the United States and one small heavy-water power reactor supplied by Canada does not require enriched uranium. Senator John Glenn, Chairman of Senate sub-committee on Energy went a step further when he said: "With no requirement for fuel enrichment for nuclear electrical generating plants, I can see very little reason for their wanting this equipment (centrifuge enrichment facility) except for bomb manufacture." The Assistant Secretary of State even expressed American helplessness in preventing Pakistan from going ahead with the manufacturing of nuclear devices.

Acquisition of gas centrifuge enrichment facility by Pakistan posed a challenge to nuclear export controls established.

61. Ibid., p. 17.
62. Ibid., p. 16.
lished by the London Nuclear Supplier's Group in 1975 and the U.S. Nuclear Non-proliferation Act of 1978 because of Pakistan's refusal to accept full-scope safeguards.  

By April 1979, the intelligence reports received by Carter administration indicated that Pakistan was gaining the capability to build nuclear weapons. Though Carter administration had no direct antiproliferation leverage to dissuade the Pakistani government from continuing its nuclear programme yet it took some steps in this regard.

In March 1979, Washington, with a view to show its displeasure over Pakistan's suspicious nuclear ambitions withheld an offer made late in 1978 to sell 100 F-5E fighter aircraft and suspended $40 million in development aid. The move to suspend American aid to Pakistan came in the wake of a U.S. legislation prohibiting the U.S. economic and military aid to any country that opted for nuclear enrichment facilities without international safeguards. Though Pakistan was adversely affected by this move but it refused to give up its nuclear programme.

During the later half of 1979, the Carter administration was reportedly considering some policy alternatives with a

view to stopping or slowing down Pakistan's nuclear
programme. These reportedly included an offer of conventional arms to Pakistan, keeping in view the Pakistan's psyche of having an upper hand over India by acquiring sophisticated conventional weapons, some officials in the state Department suggested that an offer of sophisticated U.S. arms could prove instrumental in dissuading Pakistan from its ambitious nuclear programme. The arms package it was suggested, could include about 80 F-16 fighter bombers, 300 M-60 tanks, six frigates and six small patrol boats to modernise Pak navy. The cost of the package was estimated at more than $ 2 billion.

While the officials in Carter administration were still finalising the proposed package deal to be offered to Pakistan, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 changed the strategic scenario in South West Asia and led to rethinking in the White House about the prospective American strategy towards Pakistan. As a consequence of this, President Carter, lifted the ban on aid to Pakistan so as to regain its influence on the excuse that he had decided to lift the ban so that Pakistan

which was a front line state and next target of Soviet Union, could protect itself against any Soviet onslaught. In keeping with this policy President Carter in January 1980 approved a package of $400 million in the U.S. economic and military aid to Pakistan. The military aid was to consist of anti-aircraft equipment and C-130 cargo transport planes. Pakistan's then President, Zia-ul-Haq, rejected American offer of aid package as "peanuts" as he regarded it to be too small for the purpose for which it was being provided and instead demanded aid worth $2 billion to rebuild Pakistan's armed forces.

The Carter administration was yet to take final decision in this regard when presidential elections came. President Reagan in early 1981 announced a package deal for Pakistan worth over $2 billion which included, the supply of sophisticated bomber fighter like F-16 and other equipment.

It emerges from the above analysis that between 1968 and 1980, arms race exacerbated in the region.

The American moves of imposing embargo on supply of arms

to both India and Pakistan failed to curb the arms race. Because Pakistan acquired arms from China and India got from Soviet Union and U.K., the question of nuclear proliferation in South Asia was also beyond the competence of the United States. After conducting its PNE in May 1974, India had convinced the world in general and United States in particular about its steadfast commitment to harness nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes. However, Pakistan embarked on its programme of attaining nuclear capability as a sequel to India’s PNE. Pakistan clandestinely managed to acquire equipment and knowhow for extracting plutonium from the spent fuel and gaseous centrifuge enrichment facilities. China also helped Pakistan to building its nuclear capability. United States had no nonproliferation leverage against Pakistan’s nuclear programme. Even U.S. threat of suspending aid failed to deter Pakistan from its nuclear programme.