CHAPTER - II

US POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH ASIA : POLITICAL, ECONOMIC

The developments in South Asia during 1968-1980 period had far reaching implications for the US strategic interests in the region as well as the other parts of the globe. In South Asia, India and Pakistan were the major actors which became the focal point of US strategy. The role of Pakistan in facilitating Sino-US rapprochement, Bangladesh crisis, Indo-Soviet peace treaty increased US arms assistance to Pakistan especially in the wake of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had been the major events that proved instrumental in determining US policy towards the region. With a view to have indepths assessment of US policy towards the region the chapter is divided into two parts; (A) dealing with Pak-US relations; and (B) Indo-US relations.

(A) US-Pakistan Relations

As analysed in the preceding chapter I, in the wake of Indo-Pak war of 1965, the embargo on the sale of US arms to both India and Pakistan had been imposed but was modified later to provide "non-lethal arms" to Pakistan. The new Republican administrations with Richard Nixon as new US President did not make any pronounced change in US
policy toward the Indian sub-continent. However, the advent of Nixon administration had raised hopes in Pakistan of increased US economic and military assistance to be given to Pakistan in the near future. This was partly because Nixon's warmer attitude toward Pakistan as Vice-President during 1950s had not completely cooled during the intervening years.\(^1\) According to William J. Barndt, President Nixon found it easier to establish a rapport with General Yahya Khan of Pakistan, than with Indian Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, which was an "important unmeasurable element in U.S. policy."\(^2\)

During his visit to Pakistan in August 1969, President Nixon was given an enthusiastic welcome as "one of the architect of United States Pakistan alliance of the 1950s."\(^3\) President Nixon assures his hosts that he would again work for friendship between Washington and Islamabad.\(^4\) It is worth mentioning here that prior to President Nixon's visit, the then US Secretary of State had visited Pakistan during the third week of May 1969. At a meeting of the US Secretary of State with Pakistan's President in Lahore on 24 May, 1969, talks about supply of American arms to

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2. Ibid.
Pakistan were held. It was hinted that Pakistan's arms needs were being studied. And President Nixon's visit to Pakistan in August 1969 laid a firm foundation for restoring US-Pakistan relations to the stable and cordial basis that had existed prior to the 1965 war and the subsequent arms embargo. While expressing his desire to resume the old ties President Nixon said:

"There have been strains in our relations over these years ... what we intend to do on this visit is to restore a relationship of friendship based on mutual trust which is so essential to good relations between two countries..."

During the course of these discussions, no commitment was made regarding the renewal of the arms aid but it seems that the US President had decided to back the Yahya regime by providing military aid as could be discerned from the efforts made after this meeting to lift the ban on lethal weapons imposed in 1965.

On 8 November 1969, the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee advised the Nixon administration to reconsider its ban on providing lethal material to both India and Pakistan as it had caused both the countries

to turn to the communist world. However, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee expressed itself against the resumption of arms supplies. Despite US Senate's disapproval of renewing arms supplies to Pakistan, a marked change was discernible in President Nixon's arms aid to Pakistan.

In 1970, the House Armed Services Committee approved the Administration sponsored bill that extended a long term loan of a submarine to Pakistan, which was against the professed policy of the Administration.\(^9\)

During his visit to the United States in late October 1970 Pakistan's President Yahya Khan was assured that economic assistance to Pakistan would be higher than so far received.\(^10\) Pakistani President tried to procure electronic equipments like radars and even various types of missiles which did not fall under the category of offensive weapons.\(^11\) President Yahya Khan also made efforts to soften the terms of payment for the weapons purchased.\(^12\)

President Yahya Khan's visit to the United States soon bore fruits because subsequently Washington negotiated with Islamabad over the price of a heavy U.S. arms deal

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11. Leela Yadav, n. 6 p. 110
involving an exception to the embargo. Under this, Pakistan received seven Canberra B-57 bombers, six F-104 jet fighter and 300 armoured personnel carriers.¹³

Justifying Pakistan's acquisition of arms from United States, Agha Shahi, Pakistan's representative, told the U.N. Political Committee that his government hoped to "restore" a military equilibrium of one to three with India.¹¹

According to Chester Bowles, former US Ambassador to India, it was announced that pressures had developed within the Nixon administration to approve the sale of 100 American tanks to Pakistan which had previously been given to Turkey under a NATO agreement. He further opined that the beneficiaries would be the military leaders in Pakistan and the U.S. firms which manufactured the tanks.¹⁵

In its arms package to Pakistan in 1970, Washington had offered an alternative to the sale of six F-104 supersonic aircraft under which it could either receive replacements for the six F-104 fighter that it had lost and complete its squadron of F-5 aircraft.¹⁶

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¹⁴. Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 15 October 1970.
¹⁵. The Baltimore Sun, 6 June 1970.
Prior to December 1971, Pakistan comprised two wings - East Pakistan and West Pakistan. The developments in East Pakistan had started taking traumatic turn from 1968 onwards whereby, the people of East Pakistan demanded regional autonomy, economic and social justice. During 1969-70, the people took to agitation to press for their demands. Awami League under Sheikh Mujibur Rehman raised the demand for regional autonomy as a political plank which caught with the imagination of native population.

The inability of Pakistani ruling elite to assuage the feelings of the people of East Pakistan led to widespread discontent. However, President Yahya Khan, in a technical move, declared that he would transfer power to the elected representatives of the people who would then make a new constitution. After a lot of confusion, elections were ultimately held on 7 December 1970 in which the Awami League wrested 160 of the 162 seats allotted to East Pakistan and Pakistan Peoples Party got 81 of the 138 seats allotted to West Pakistan. Disagreement between Awami League and People's Party over sharing power prompted the

military of Junta led by Yahya Khan to unleash oppressive measures through army in March 1971 on the people of East Pakistan which led to deterioration in law and order situation, exodus of refugees to India, and outbreak of Indo-Pak hostilities in December 1970 and it finally culminated into the emergence of Bangladesh as a free country.

The United States had adopted an ambivalent attitude towards Bangladesh crisis. Since the Awami League in its election manifesto had pledged that after coming to power it would withdraw Pakistan from the military pacts like SEATO and CENTO, the United States was least interested in seeing Awami League's rise to power. Though in an overt show of sympathy towards East Pakistan, the US warned that "any summary action" against Shaikh Mujibur Rahman could lead to diminished American support for the Pakistan Government and thereby urged Yahya regime to moderate the brutality of the military suppression in the East. However the Nixon administration did not implement this threat.

President Nixon in his Foreign Policy Report to the American congress stated that the United States had

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neither supported nor condoned the military action in East Pakistan. The immediate step he took was to stop issuing and reviewing licences for military shipments to Pakistan and also ceased new commitments for economic development loans. The US President in his report to the Congress, while taking a defensive posture, said:

While the US deplored the fact that military solutions were resorted to the 1971, we did not dispute the aspirations of the people of East Bengal for autonomy... We opposed not independence but the outbreak of international war. Throughout the crisis war of 1971, the United States provided two third of the world's relief to East Bengal and supported the administration of the relief effort by international authorities... our relief effort continued even in the absence of diplomatic relations.

The Nixon administration's move of continuing supply of arms to Pakistan despite the disturbing reports of civil unrest in erstwhile East Pakistan was disapproved by the American Senate. On 6 May 1971, Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, approved in the face of Nixon administration's opposition, a resolution calling for the suspension of all American military aid to Pakistan until the conflict in East Pakistan resolved. Inspite of this resolution Washington offered

military equipment worth about $9 million to Pakistan.

Nixon administration not only continued arms supplies to Pakistan but even manipulated the transfer of arms to Pakistan through third countries. According to the secret correspondence relating to this period which was leaked to the press by eminent journalist Jack Anderson and became famous as Anderson Papers, the US arms were transferred to Pakistan through Jordan. While commenting on President Nixon's decision of such a transfer of arms to Pakistan, the then US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger had stated: "the President may want to honour those requests. The matter has not been brought to the President's attention, but it is quite obvious that the President is not inclined to let the Pakistan be defeated".

President Nixon's statement at news conference in Washington on 4 August 1971 indicated that the U.S. would be leaning towards a self-perpetuating aid relationship to bolster Pakistan's position vis-a-vis India.

Between 1969 and 1971 Pakistan received considerable economic and military assistance from the United States. Through the Aid for International Development (AID) of

26. Ibid., p. 250.
the US, Pakistan received $104 million in 1969 and $124 million in 1970 and the PL-480 agreement signed amounted to $127 million.\(^{28}\) While the Pakistan army was engaged in ruthless oppression of the people of Bangladesh, the Nixon administration continued the clandestine supply of arms to Pakistan. In this regard, Senator Edward Kennedy produced the documents on 20 July 1971 in a hearing on the Senate Sub-committee on Refugees. While the one document authorized the sale of spare parts to Pakistan for various types of fighter aircraft, the second document authorized the sale of ammunition and mine sweepers.\(^{29}\) In view of the barrage of adverse criticism both at home and abroad, Nixon administration was forced to cancel its aid to Pakistan on 8 November 1971 and even placed strict restrictions on third party deliveries.\(^{30}\)

**INDO-PAKISTAN CONFLICT 1971**

Apart from the announcements of US State Department about its ban on shipments of arms to Pakistan, there were at least three Pakistani ships which carried military equipment to that country. The US Congress was informed in July 1971 that on 8 May 1971, a ship called the


\(^{29}\) Vinod Gupta, *Anderson Papers, A Study of Nixon's Blackmail of India* (Delhi; 1972), pp. 91-92.

\(^{30}\) Ibid., p. 184.
Sunderbans, was reported to be carrying parts for armoured vehicles and other parts for Pakistan.  

On 22 June 1971, another ship *S.S. Padma* reportedly carrying spare parts and accessories for aircraft and military vehicles sailed away from New York to Karachi. On 2 July 1971, a third ship *S.S. Kappai* also left for Pakistan. In order to justify its clandestine arms shipments to Pakistan the Nixon administration coined the excuse that these shipments had been sold before 25 March 1971 and before the ban had been imposed.

During the outbreak of Indo-Pak Hostilities on early December 1971, United States tried to build up tactical pressure on India by moving its Seventh Fleet in the Bay of Bengal on 10 December 1971. The US naval Seventh Fleet consisted of *Enterprise*, the nuclear powered aircraft carrier which carries 100 fighter bombers, helicopters and small cargo planes and a task force of several amphibious ships and destroyers. According to C.L. Suezberger, the Enterprise was despatched to the Bay of Bengal as a token of American intention and it was felt that the U.S.

32. Ibid.
could not assume a "neutral stand" in the sub-continent, for if it did so, it was afraid that it would offend China and look weak before Soviet Union.\footnote{International Herald Tribune, 21 April 1972.}

Jack Anderson expressed the views that the nuclear-powered American task force was sent at a critical phase of the Indo-Pak war as a "show of force."\footnote{Ibid., 3 January 1972.} The documents made public by Jack Anderson which have become famous as Anderson Papers show that the Washington's motive behind sending task force in the Bay of Bengal was three fold:

1) To compel India to divert both ships and planes to shadow the U.S. Task Force;
2) To weaken India's blockade against East Pakistan possibly to divert the Indian aircraft carrier Vikrant from its military mission;
3) To force India to keep planes on defence alert, thus reducing their operations against Pakistani ground groups.\footnote{Ibid.}

The avowed objective of the United States in moving its naval task force in the Bay of Bengal was to build psychological pressure on India so that it could not gain military
leverage against Pakistan and to prevent the Soviets from expanding their naval power in the Indian ocean. Washington believed that the Soviets were supporting India and Bangladesh not because they were interested in the freedom struggle of Bangladesh people but to expand their power in the Indian Ocean.  

However, the United States tried to justify the presence of its Seventh Fleet in Bay of Bengal designed to evacuate the American nationals. But it was argued that the American could be airlifted. What appeared intriguing was the fact that even the US ambassador in India, John Keating, was not informed about the movement of US naval task force. According to Jack Anderson, the evaluation of American citizens was strictly a secondary mission, adopted more as a justification than the reason for the naval move. He further opined that the move was to scare India as Washington was convinced that an Indian victory in the war would disturb the balance of power and stability in the sub-continent.

Though the US naval task force cruised the waters of Bay of Bengal but it did not participate in the Indo-Pak

41. Ibid.
War. Following the surrender of Pakistani forces in Bangladesh and the resolution adopted by the UN Security Council, a ceasefire was observed by 17 December 1971. The tangible outcome of the war was the liberation of Bangladesh. The west Pakistan came to be known as Pakistan. However, Washington still followed the policy of appeasement toward Pakistan and withheld its recognition of Bangladesh. It was only in April 1972 that Washington accorded recognition to Bangladesh.

With view to pamper Bhutto regime in Pakistan, Washington resumed economic aid to Pakistan which had been suspended during the Bangladesh crisis. In this regard President Nixon notified the US Congress in February 1972 that Pakistan was no more in control of Bangladesh and pleaded for resumption of US aid to Pakistan. Consequently between January 1972 to May 1973, Washington not only rescheduled the repayment of debt worth $50 million to Pakistan but also provided assistance worth $300 million. In terms of separate loan agreements signed during this period, the US committed $120 million to facilitate the imports for Pakistan's industrial and agricultural growth. Washington also offered $124 million in food under PL-480, § 5

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42. The Dawn (Karachi) 20 February 1972.

million in technical assistance, and $45 million to support the Indus Basin development programme.\(^{44}\) Equally crucial at that juncture, was American flood disaster relief fund for Pakistan which included aid of $30 million 16000 metric tons of wheat, 40,000 tons of edible oil and a loan of $18 million on emergency basis to raise production in the country.

US ARMS ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN:

Bhutto Government was very eager to procure sophisticated weapons from Beijing, Washington and other sources with a view to make up for losses Pakistan had incurred during the Indo-Pakistan war in December 1971. However in view of the US embargo on arms supplies to Pakistan imposed during the Bangladesh Crisis, Islamabad tried to build up tactical pressure on Washington to lift the embargo. As a tactical move, Pakistan accorded recognition to the Communist regimes in North Vietnam, North Korea and in May 1972 Bhutto in a letter addressed to President Nixon expressed Pakistan's concern over the Vietnam War.\(^{45}\) On 7 November 1972, Pakistan served a notice to terminate its membership of SEATO. In view of Pakistan's close

\(^{44}\) Ibid.

\(^{45}\) For text of Bhutto's letter to President Nixon, See Dawn, 25 May 1972.
relations with Beijing, its membership of SEATO had lost much of its relevance. Pakistan's leaving SEATO did, in no way, affect the pattern of Pakistan-US relationship.

In March 1973, Nixon Administration suddenly announced its decision to resume supply of arms to Pakistan. Washington tried to give the impression that it was not revocation of embargo decision but it was to fulfil its commitment undertaken long before the war of 1971. With a view to appease India, Washington also announced that India could also purchase "communication equipment" worth $91 million and providing $87.6 million in economic aid. The decision to resume arms supplies to Pakistan was taken by Washington in its overall decision to supply arms to Iran and other countries of the Gulf region. President Nixon's statement that the United States was not "giving" but "selling arms especially in case of Pakistan" had acquired specific significance. This showed US readiness to continue arms supplies to Pakistan.

During 1973, Pakistan got 7 Martin B-57 Canberra bombers, 12 Northrop F-5 fighter planes, 6 Lock-head


F-104 fighter planes, 4 Cessna T-37 trainer planes, 300 M-113 armoured personnel carriers. According to SIPRI Yearbook, the orders were placed by Pakistan in October 1970 and deliveries were made in 1973 by the United States.49

Even the avowed objective of Bhutto's visit to the United States in September 1973 was to acquire latest sophisticated weapons for Pakistan. While addressing a press conference in Washington on 19 September 1973, Bhutto pointed to his country's need for modern "red hot weapons." In the backdrop of Bhutto's proclaimed belief in socialism and his past criticism of United States, Bhutto's assumption of power in 1972 might have created some misgivings in the Washington. But Bhutto's visit to US in September 1973, as he himself stated, proved instrumental in "eradicating the differences" that existed between the countries.51

President Nixon assumed strong US support for "Pakistan's independence and territorial integrity which is a cornerstone of American foreign policy."52 The joint statement issued after Bhutto's visit to Washington reiterated "warm support for the process of reconciliation underway"

in South Asia and for the resolution of other outstanding issues through peaceful means. 53

Thus Bhutto's visit to the United States proved instrumental in putting Pak-US relations on a smooth level despite the differences between Islamabad and Washington over arms supply and divergent approaches during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Pakistan's open support to the Arabs did not evoke any overt resentment from Washington but the US Congress did take a serious view while deliberating on the policy towards arms supplies to Pakistan. As Bhutto later remarked, "We are also told that Pakistan's pro-Arab policy has made the Senate sensitive to arms assistance to Pakistan. 54 Pakistan assumed added significance in US policy towards Middle East in view of Arab oil embargo and Pakistan's growing entente with Arab countries especially Saudi Arabia. During his visit to Pakistan in November 1973, the then US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger remarked that Pakistan could play an important and useful role in the task on which we are engaged - settlement in the Middle East. 55 Despite the difference of opinion, both Kissinger and Bhutto agreed

53. For full text see, Ibid., p. 483.
to undertake in their "own way, major efforts towards lasting peace in the Middle East.\textsuperscript{56}

The ostensible purpose of Kissinger's visit to Pakistan could not be ascertained immediately and four years later, Bhutto, however, claimed that Kissinger had tried to dissuade Pakistan from hosting the Islamic Summit meeting.\textsuperscript{57} "The pressure if any, was resisted as evidenced from Pakistan's continued solidarity with the Arabs and the holding of the Islamic meeting at Lahore in 1974.\textsuperscript{58}

India's peaceful nuclear explosion in May 1974 became a handy play to plead its case for soliciting more arms from the United States. Thus Islamabad impressed upon Washington the need to revoke the arms embargo otherwise the former would have to consider developing its own nuclear capability. The US Defence Department's first public listing of its technical assistance contract with "foreign countries", as disclosed in February 1975, revealed that in 1974, the Pentagon had contracted to render assistance to Pakistan for the modification of HH-43-B bomber into HH-43-F fighter planes for $47,509.\textsuperscript{59} The United States had developed suspicion of Pakistan's nuclear

\textsuperscript{56} Joint Communique issued after Kissinger's visit see, Ibid, 14 November 1973.

\textsuperscript{57} Bhutto's speech in the National Assembly on 28 April 1977, \textit{National Assembly Debate} 28 April 1977, pp. 119-120.

\textsuperscript{58} Mehrunisa Ali, n. 55 p.40.

programme and consequently it agreed to meet Pakistan's requirement of conventional weapons provided Pakistan was willing to place its atomic reactors under international supervision to prevent the secret production of nuclear weapons. In early February 1975, Islamabad while playing on Washington's susceptibilities, or argued that embargo was in effect "a discrimination" against a steadfast ally. During his visit to the United States in the early days of February 1975, Bhutto pleaded for the lifting of embargo on supply of arms to Pakistan. The US President, Gerald Ford said that the question of lifting the ban would receive "active consideration." However the joint communique issued after Bhutto's visit omitted any mention in that regard except reaffirming the US support for Pakistan's integrity and independence.

In the wake of Washington's assessment of its own strategic requirements and Pakistan's policy of pressure and persuasion, the United States finally agreed to lift ban on sales of arms to Pakistan on 25 February 1975. Announcing the decision, the Under-Secretary of State for Public affairs, Joseph Sisco, provided the rationale

60. B.K. Shrivastava, n. 46, p. 34.
62. Ibid.
for such a step because India was receiving weapons from the Soviet Union and had its own arms industry, while Pakistan "an ally of the US had been denied this in as far as the US is concerned.\textsuperscript{64} Robert Anderson, a spokesman of the state Department said that Washington's decision to lift the embargo in case of Pakistan aimed at bringing the US policy in consonance with that of UK and France.\textsuperscript{65}

The US decision to lift embargo on arms supplies to Pakistan taken in February 1975 was the result of calculated strategy to further US strategic interests in the Gulf region and South Asia by building up Pakistan as a reliable and dependent ally of United States. The only sacrifice Washington had to make was to provide arms to Pakistan. The policy makers in Washington were also apprehensive that in case US did not accede to Pakistan's request for arms supplies, the latter would seek other channels because of its quest for having defence parity with India. This stance was evidenced from the testimony of Vice Admiral Bay Poet, US Navy Director, Defence Security Agency, before the congress Foreign Affairs Committee on 18 July 1974:

\textsuperscript{64} New York Times, 26 February 1975.
\textsuperscript{65} Ibid., 28 February, 1975.
"as far as Pakistan is concerned, she is going to need to modernize her equipment and she does not have many places to turn. If the United States is not responsive, she will be driven to going to some places else. It has been my experience in this programme that if the countries feel they need military equipment in their own security interest, they are going to get it one way or another."

According to Mehrunisa Ali, a Pakistani scholar, the developments in Afghanistan in the wake of July 1973 leading to the increase in Soviet influence and troubles in Baluchistan also contributed in US decision to lift arms embargo against Pakistan. According to a press report, the Shah of Iran had also persuaded Washington to render arms assistance to Bhutto Government.

The US decision was acclaimed in Pakistan Dawn in an editorial expressed the view that the decision "marks a return to common sense and realism." Pakistan's President, Z.A. Bhutto, while welcoming the US move, called it a contribution to the stability and security of the region. With a view to allay India's misapprehensions, the US State Department said that the United States would ensure that the sales of arms to Pakistan would not contribute to an intensification of an arms race in the sub-

70. Ibid., 26 February 1975.
continent. However Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s remarked: “Maintenance of embargo against a friendly country with which we have an allied relationship while its neighbour (India) was producing and acquiring a billion dollar worth of arms a year was morally politically and symbolically improper.

On 25th February 1975 President Ford was asked at a Press Conference in Florida as to why the United States was “selling” arms to Israel as well as Arabs, to Pakistan as well as to India. He was further asked whether such sales were prompted by the state of American economy or he regarded their as “immoral.” President Ford categorically denied any linkages between the sales of arms to other countries and the state of American economy. He further added:

"...we don’t have a policy of selling arms to other nations if that country feels that it has an internal security problem and No. 2 if it is necessary for one or any other countries to maintain their national integrity or security. We believe that in many areas of the world, a proper military balance is essential for internal as well as external security of the various countries. And where other nations, such as Soviet Union does sell or give arms to one country or another, if any

other country feels that for its own security it needs additional equipment and has the cash then we feel that it is proper to make a sale from the US to that country."74

It is evident from the above statement that even without naming India and Pakistan, President Ford was justifying the lifting of arms embargo against both the countries. However the noteworthy point in President Ford's above statement was that the arms were to be sold to Pakistan and not provided on a grant basis as in the past.

President Ford's statement also reflected a new shift in the American policy of arms transfer to other countries. On 25th February 1975, Senator Gaylord Nelson furnished the following statistics in the Senate:

Table 2.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal year</th>
<th>Military Assistance (in $ billion)</th>
<th>Foreign Military Scale (in $ billion)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


74. Ibid, Emphasis added.
It is evident from the above table that the level of US military assistance was gradually declining and in 1974 it was the lowest during five years while the level of foreign military sales was on increase reaching $8.2 billion in 1974.

According to Senator Nelson the decision of lifting ban on arms sales to Pakistan was taken "without sufficient congressional consideration". He further added that such a decision would obviously "have a great impact on the US-Indian relations, India Pakistan relations and the stability of the area". Without delving into the debatable question whether the lifting of US embargo would result in an arms race in the region, Senator Nelson asked "should not the congress have an opportunity to discuss the policy in this and similar instances".

The decision to undo the ban on arms sales to Pakistan taken by Ford administration failed to arouse any significant opposition within or without the Congress. The only notable exception appeared to be congressman Fortney S. Stark, who in a speech in San Francisco criticized Ford administration's policy.

76. Ibid.
towards India and accused it of assuming the role of a "merchant of death selling guns and playing super power games." The American press took no serious note and only a small number of newspapers commented on the decision. The New York Times reported on 2 March 1975 by quoting "the informed officials" as saying that the US arms sales to Pakistan "will be limited to modest quantities of defensive weapons and the storm in India will blow over as that becomes clear." The new US Ambassador-designate to New Delhi, William Saxbe, who was then in Bangkok enroute to his new post, said on 26 February 1975. At this time American people are saying let India worry about herself we have our problems too. He further speculated that the American decision to sell arms to Pakistan could have been made in order to solve economic and energy problems.

Following the lifting of arms embargo on the supplies of US arms to Pakistan, the latter tried to procure sophisticated weaponry from Washington. According to press reports by early 1976, Pakistan showed interest in buying military hardware worth $90 to 100 million. Apart from an arms deal for TOW anti-tank missiles worth $28 million, Pakistan

77. Reported in Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 25 March 1975.
78. For details see, Editorials on File (New York), for, 1975.
80. Quoted in Indian Express, 27 February 1975.
also sought to procure 110 A-7 fighter planes. 82

Table 2.1
US ARMS ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN
(1970-1979)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Ordered</th>
<th>Delivery and number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(A)</td>
<td>AIRCRAFT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Martin B-57</td>
<td>Bomber</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Canberra</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Northrop F-5</td>
<td>Fighter</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Lockheed F-104</td>
<td>Fighter</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(B)</td>
<td>MISSILES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sidewinder</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200</td>
<td>BGM-71A TOW</td>
<td>ATM</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C)</td>
<td>M-113</td>
<td>Armoured Carrier</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M-113-AI</td>
<td>ICV</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>CFB</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(D)</td>
<td>NAVAL VESSELS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>&quot;Gearing&quot;</td>
<td>Destroyer</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>1977; 1978</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It is evident from the above table that Pakistan acquired strategic weapons during the Nixon Administration. During 1973 Pakistan got 7 Martin B-57 class Bombers, 12 Northrop F-5 fighter planes and 6 Lockhead F-104 fighter planes. Besides, United States also supplied 300 M-113 type armoured vehicles to Pakistan during 1973.

During 1976, Pakistan ordered for the supply of 840 AIM-9J missiles which were delivered by 1978. Pakistan also asked for 200 BGM-71A TOW missiles in 1976. During the same year Pakistan placed order with Washington for supply of 2 Gearing class destroyers which it acquired in 1977. Islamabad's request for supplying 350 AIM-9P class missiles in 1978 was acceded to by United States and during 1979 it got 20 and the rest in 1980.

The above table shows the arms assistance rendered by United States to Pakistan during 1971-1979 period. It is clear from the above table that the bulk of arms supplies which Pakistan acquired from the United States in 1973 was the result of orders placed in October 1970. In 1976, Pakistan ordered for the supply of 840 AIM-9J Sidewinder missiles. During 1977, 420 were delivered to Pakistan and

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84. Ibid.
the remaining in 1978. During 1976, Pakistan also urged
the United States to supply 200 BGM-71A TOW anti-tank
missiles. During 1976, Pakistan placed orders with the
US Navy for the supply of 2 "Gearing" destroyers which were
delivered in 1977. In 1978, Pakistan ordered for the
acquisition of an unspecified number of M-113 AI type
armoured personnel carriers and 350 AIM-9P type missiles
which were delivered by 1980. In November 1976, the US
Defence Department had recommended the sale of A-7 fighter
aircraft to Pakistan but the Carter administration cancelled
it owing to Pakistan's refusal to rescind the nuclear deal
with France.

In the event of Jimmy Carter assuming the American
Presidency in 1977, "Pakistan loomed fairly small on the
policy horizon" of United States. In the brief foreign
policy section in his campaign autobiography, Jimmy Carter
had lumped Pakistan with Chile, Kampuchea and Vietnam
where "our government's foreign policy has not exemplified
any commitment to moral principles."

Pakistan's request for the acquisition of 110 A-7


87. Thomas Percy Thornton, "Between the Stools? United
States Policy Towards Pakistan during the Carter
Administration" *Asian Survey* (Berkeley), Vol.XXII,

ground attack aircraft from the United States was still pending when Carter entered the White House. The Secretary of State during Ford Administration, Henry Kissinger, had offered Pakistan the A-7s as an inducement for the latter to abandon its nuclear plan. However the Carter Administration cancelled the deal in early 1977.

On 19 May 1977, Carter Administration announced a comprehensive policy on arms transfer to its military allies which contained two basic ingredients:

(i) The Administration would view arms transfer as an exceptional foreign policy implement that the transfer contributes to our national security interest.

(ii) It would utilize arms transfer to promote our security and the security of our close friends. But in the future the burden of persuasion will be on those who favour a particular arms sale, rather than those who oppose it.

It was evident from the above announcement that Carter Administration's policy of transfer of arms to the allies of the United States became an integral part and an indispensable instrument of its global strategy.


However in case of Pakistan Carter Administration's policy was not governed by the above mentioned criterion. According to Thomas Peary Thorton, the US policy towards Pakistan during the Carter Administration years had three main aspects:

i) There were few countries where as many "new" global concerns intersect as in Pakistan and these concerns were at the fore during the earlier Carter years;

ii) Pakistan has always been of some significance in terms of older global issues related to US-Soviet security concerns and in the latter part of the Administration, these came to the fore;

iii) There were several important regional issues impinging on the US-Pakistan relationship.\textsuperscript{91}

Carter Administration did not adopt liberal attitude towards Pakistan as far as the supplies of US weapons to that country is concerned. The major stumbling block in the process was Pakistan's reported attempts to acquire nuclear capability. 

It emerges from the foregoing analysis that Pakistan's relations with United States registered new strides in the

beginning of 1970s under the Nixon Administration. During the Bangladesh crisis and Indo-Pakistan war of 1971, United States rendered moral, diplomatic, political and weapons support to Pakistan. However this pattern underwent a change in 1977 following the advent of Carter Administration. In the wake of reports about Pakistan's intentions to go nuclear, Carter Administration slowed down the flow of US arms to Pakistan. This factor is analysed in details in the succeeding fifth chapter. However the developments in Afghanistan took dramatic turn during 1979 culminating in the Soviet armed intervention in December 1979 which changed the old pattern of Pak-US relations and Pakistan acquired added strategic significance in "safeguarding" the US strategic interests in South West Asia.

(B) UNITED STATES AND INDIA

The advent of Nixon administration in Washington did not augur well for Indo-US relations. The clandestine flow of American arms to Pakistan despite the arms embargo was seen in India as a "pro-Pakistan tilt" in President Nixon's policy towards South Asia.

The uninterrupted supply of American arms to Pakistan during 1969-70 caused consternation in India. However, the US State Department wanted to allay India's fears by
saying that American arms deal with Pakistan was an exception and was intended only to replace some of the worn-out equipment. The U.S. Ambassador in India, John Keating, also asserted that the recent decision to sell-military equipment "mostly unsophisticated replacement items" to Pakistan was an exception in order that Pakistan is not totally dependent for its arms on Russia and China. 92

India protested against US aid to Pakistan on the plea that these arms would disturb the peace and stability of the sub-continent as "aggressions committed against India, in the past by Pakistan, were made possible by the US arms." 93

There was sharp reaction in the Indian media to the US move of arming Pakistan to the teeth.

Amrit Bazar Patrika, published from Calcutta wrote:

"The supply was stopped to apply a; break on the Pakistan war machine...what grounds does President Nixon have to hope that the rulers in Islamabad—with their strength restored through the generosity of China—The Soviet arms are essentially defensive and none-too-significant in quality and redoubled by America's basically offensive weapons like B-57 bombers will not leash another war on India." 94

While pointing to the friendly relations of Pakistan with China and Soviet Union, the newspaper wanted to know as to against whom the Americans were to be used. It further added: "It is difficult to believe that the U.S. Government does not comprehend the danger that its decision to resume arms supply to Pakistan poses for India and how it is going to give a fresh spurt to the arms race in the Indian subcontinent." It further added that President Nixon's decision to continue aid to Pakistan was influenced by the fact that the Indo-China war was drawing to a close and the armament industry needed fresh markets and Pakistan readily provided one.  

On 20 July 1971, Senator Edward Kennedy produced two documents in a hearing of the Senate sub-committee on Refugees, which showed that from 1950 to June 1965, the United States gave India $82.9 million in military aid and Pakistan $671.6 million. From July 1965 to June 1970 India got $10.9 million in aid and Pakistan only $0.6 million. From July 1970 to June 1971, India got $10.9 million and Pakistan $0.2 million.

Besides the actual aid, both India and Pakistan were

95. Ibid.
96. Ibid.
allowed to buy directly from the manufacturers. These figures point toward sales trend which is reverse of the aid trends with India buying more than Pakistan before 1965 and less afterwards. Before 1965, India purchased $53.4 million worth of arms from the US while Pakistan brought $37.2 million worth. From 1965 to June 1971, however India procured only $118 million worth of American arms while Pakistan bought arms worth $601 million.\footnote{98}{Ibid.}

In the last year ending five months before the December 1971 war, Pakistan brought $16.7 million worth of American arms while India made purchases worth $1.1 million.\footnote{99}{Ibid.}

As pointed out in part 'A' of this chapter, the developments in East Pakistan had taken serious turn by March 1971 and the use of armed forces by Pakistan's President Yahya Khan had resulted in large scale appression. The U.S. Ambassadors in New Delhi, Kenneth B. Keating was "burning the wires", with his detailed reports to the US Department of State on the tragedy in East Pakistan. A few Senators like Edward Kennedy and Fred R. Harris, condemned on the floor of the Senate the "genocide "

\footnote{98}{Ibid.}
\footnote{99}{Ibid.}
perpetrated by the Pakistan army in East Pakistan and urged the Nixon administration to express "concern" over the happenings there. However on 2 April 1971, the US State Department released a press statement in which it expressed its concern at the reported loss of life, damage and hardship suffered by the people of Pakistan.

With a view to prop up Yahya regime, in Pakistan, United States continued its supplies of arms, knowing the fact that American weapon were being used against the people of East Bengal. In view of the influx of refugees from Bangladesh into India in large scale and deteriorating security scenario in the region Mrs. Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of India airdashed to Washington to appraise President Nixon and the American public on two major issues, the violation of human right, and the use of American arms against the people of Bangladesh. However, Mrs. Gandhi's visit to Washington failed in moving Nixon administration to change its pro-Pak stance. Consequently the Indian Prime Minister informed the national Press club in New York:

"Will the World (White House) be concerned only if people die because of war between two countries and not if hundreds

of thousands are butchered and expelled by a military regime waging war against the people? Who is more important to them, one man and his machine or a whole nation? Commenting on Mrs. Gandhi's US visit, the India's external Affairs Ministry in its annual report for 1971-72 observed. Every stratagem of effort and persuasion was tried by India to make the US administration respond with some human feeling to the epochal carnage in East Bengal,... yet these words seemed to have no meaning for them....

The American gunboat diplomacy during the Indo-Pak War of December 1971 when the US had ordered its Seventh Fleet to move into Bay of Bengal, was criticised by the Government of India and several Members of Indian Parliament called upon the Indian Government not to be cowed down by the reported American threat.

The Tangible outcome of the war with the emergence of Bangladesh as a sovereign independent country served a serious blow to US strategic interests in South Asia, India emerged as a dominant power in the sub-continent under the changed geopolitical scenario, Nixon administration was now convinced that India was bound to play a pre-

eminent role in South Asia. Accordingly President Nixon in his foreign policy report to the congress in February 1972, referred to India as the strongest power of South Asia. He pointed out: We are prepared now for a serious dialogue with India on the future of our relations. This will depend not on an identity of policies, but on respect for each other's views and concerns. This should go both ways. In another report, President Nixon stated: The United States respects India as a major power. We are prepared to treat India in accordance with its new stature and responsibilities on the basis of reciprocity.

In the post-Bangladesh crisis period, Washington tried to normalize relations with India. In February 1973, Daniel P. Mognihan was appointed US Ambassador to India and he played an important role in creating an atmosphere of goodwill and better understanding between the two countries. On a strong recommendation of Ambassador Mognihan, the American government wrote off accumulated sum of Rs. 16,640 million it was holding in India in local currency under PL-480 deals.

During the last week of October 1974, the US Secretary

108. Ibid.
of State, Henry Kissinger visited India. In his well-published address to the Indian council of world Affairs in New Delhi on 28 October 1974, the US Secretary of State agreed that there was little to be gained from an attempt to redress the natural military dominance of India over Pakistan by supplying Pakistan with military equipment.  

Stressing the need for close cooperation and correct understanding between the two countries, Henry Kissinger said: "We can now build our relationship free of past distortion and conscious of the interests and values we share."  

The visit of U.S. Secretary of State was availed to set up an Indo-US joint commission for scientific, cultural and economic cooperation. An agreement to this effect was signed in New Delhi on 28 October 1974. Joint Communique issued in New Delhi on 29 October 1974 noted agreement between New Delhi and Washington that peace and harmony would be in the interest of all the countries of the region.

The advent of Carter administration in 1977 had raised some hopes both in Washington as well as in New Delhi for envisaging a period of entente-cordiale in India-US relations.

112. Ibid.  
relations. During the presidential campaign of Jimmy Carter, the Democratic platform contained a substantial section on South Asia with the following major points:

India has now achieved a considerable degree of hegemony over the sub-continent...future American policy should accept this fact. The United States has every reason to hope that India is successful in its struggle for economic improvement and political unity. Our interests, indeed, will not be served by the weakening or disintegrating of any of the major South Asian States... In General, the US should pursue a low-posture policy in South Asia. We should participate as a mediator in local disputes only when all parties are agreed on the usefulness of our presence and we ourselves see some possibility of positive assistance.115

Carter's victory in the American Presidential election in November 1976 was greeted with apprehension in Pakistan and expectation in India.116 Pakistan's apprehensions were accentuated by some of Carter's statements during the campaign, especially his open opposition to the proposed sale of 110 A-7 fighter bombers to Pakistan and his pledge to do what he could to persuade France not to go ahead with its announced deal to provide Pakistan with a nuclear reprocessing plant.117

The year 1977 was significant because it witnessed emergence of Janta Party's rule in New Delhi with Morarji Desai as Prime Minister of India and Carter as US President. By July 1977 it was reported that Prime Minister Desai and President Carter had entered into an extensive private correspondence, in which they exchanged views on a variety of matters of special concern to their two countries.  

Many Indian leaders visited United States in 1977 on good will mission. The US-India Joint Commission which had been quite inactive during 1975-76, was given a new impetus. In May 1977, the sub-commission on Education and culture met in New Delhi. During a visit to New Delhi in July 1977, Warren M. Christopher, US under secretary of state said that the United States had decided "to look to India as the leader of South Asia." The exchange of visits at highest level took place in the beginning of January 1978 when President Carter visited India from 1 to 3 January 1978 and Prime Minister Desai visited Washington in July 1978. The visits were marked by goodwill and warmth but main irritant about the American supply of nuclear fuel to Tarapur atomic plant remained unresolved.

This aspect is analysed in detail in the third chapter.

Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, Pakistan again became the focal point of US Strategy in South Asia.

Thus it emerges from the above analysis that US strategy in terms of political, economic and military, remained steadfastly committed to Pakistan as the bulwark of serving US interests in the region. Though US maintained relations with India but at a very low key. Nixon administration policy towards South Asia had pre-eminent pro-Pakistan tilt. However, the Carter administration had raised some hopes of restoring balanced approach but such hopes remained unfulfilled. The Afghanistan crisis again revived Pakistan's pre-eminence in US strategy towards South Asia.