CHAPTER III

SOUTH EAST ASIA TREATY ORGANIZATION

1. SOUTH ASIA AND EUROPE

After World War II European political affairs were marked by a comparatively obvious separation among Russian and Western blocks. The Asian sub-system at all times has been unorganized with respect to these questions of political configuration. In the West NATO, Council of Europe, OECD make an interrelated harmonious complex, 'the extended Atlantic System'. This method up to this time has expanded to the distant coasts of the Pacific to cover Australia, New Zealand and Japan. It has exhibited how various powers can join their dominions and by mutual workings attain aims unachievable by one nation.

In spite of the fact, that major nations have tried to stretch their disagreements in Asian sub-system this attempt has met more and more obstructions lately. The Western view of the South East Asia Treaty Organization has at no time come to be sufficiently efficient as a dominant instrument in Asian political affairs. Even in the beginning in 1954, the South East Asia Treaty Organization was notorious because many important Asian states did not join it. It was in fact a tool of the American foreign policy.

From a quite long period, even in past the Sino-Soviet Treaty too was almost an alliance of ideology laden with certain uncertainties instead of free influential suppositions. Even in 1950 there were many factors of the connection amidst Russia and China that were clear causes of possible difference of opinion.

As the long era of colonialism began to end, due to colony after colony getting independence, continued Western leadership in South Asia of Western countries in SEATO became less acceptable not only to neutralists but also to several Western nations in view of preference of non-alignment on the part of new developing nations. Some United States critics commented in later time on Dulles's idea of SEATO as an expansion of Western hegemony and defence in Southern Asia.

This military-political balance has been established more effectively against the Soviet camp than internally. And as international conflicts slow down even reduced burdens of military preparedness are borne with growing unwillingness by nations which have a limited margin of usable economic

---


resources. Within NATO an unilateral stress towards the groupings for security function did not have similar results. Because the motive of both sharing and non-practicing nations was seized as a legal pretext. In NATO the problem is of intensifying their incentives, these concerns were understood substantially enough, for interterritorial security not for developing Western leadership. Even then, by the 1960’s the function of NATO as a significant medium of region’s security was menaced by breaks in the member nations. The gravest nypriot dispute was referred to the United Nations. The security function of NATO is that of protecting freedom of Western Europe short of war. NATO, will not be successful in its basic intention at the instant of the atomic battle extends to Europe. Likewise it is frequently indicated, that the strictness of the Austro-German Treaty converted the World War I from a restricted to a complete battle, for it compelled hostility with one country of Europe to be opposition with every other. As was acknowledged usually on the occasion of the function of NATO. The recent treaty


varied extremely from the common forms of earlier combinations existing before the war time concerning its ideological consistency. Both rigidly contrary blocs of nations henceforth opposed each other, every claiming its pacific motives and the protective characteristics of its alignment, and each blaming the other for sabotaging the fundamental aims of the Charter. The complicated structural constructional peculiarity of the NATO could be considered as the effect of free bipolarity that had appeared, mixed with the anticipative demands of the nuclear era.

Still neither in the NATO nor its counterparts (like Warsaw Pact), complicated structural form has at all changed in an unitary grouping. Though there has for some time been discussion in the NATO of the undivided control formation of the treaty, this does not signify inevitability that final command concerning the practice of atomic arms has been integrated. Co-ordinated unity denote a real supernatural military organization. Solely a single signatory nation had the "chief" ability to carry on effectual atomic war: its colleagues have been compelled to depend, mostly, on that countries guaranteed motives to protect the coalition and

have not got surity that such a choice would come out. The insertion of the atomic element in a structural surroundings has made it almost impracticable for partnership’s allies to judge with logical correctness what could be anticipated from its members in the case of aggression. Hans J. Morgenthau asserts that the accessibility of atomic arms to America and Russia has defeated the NATO, as it has every other association, in the preatomic era a major power could be anticipated to come to the help of a small confederate in case its motives were equally concerned, gauging almost failure in battle, the decrease of the armed forces of region, but no state can be depended on to lose one’s own subsistence because of other nations. (At other places, his opinions on alignment show a prejudice in the approval of coalition making and colleague-ship plan that strengthens world organization). A reasonable reaction to this ambiguity has been distinguished by the French view, which tries the revival of national armed strength in a nuclear era. A substitute reaction would be the real change of the NATO grouping in a common armed power. This


transformation of course has not been efficiently administered by NATO in its orbits prior to French increasing distrust to the alignment during 1963 and 1966. The United States did not establish a common outline of permanent and organized joint working amidst allies who would give up their equitable position in exchange for the common safety of their necessary interest. A traditional pact furnished with nuclear arms has politically gone out of use.

Though lately it is NATO, which illustrates superior claim, realized by nuclear prevention upon regional alliance groupings. That unanimity is somnamb in the other regional organizations in which the United States is also a party. Neither in SEATO nor the OAS nations parties to them apprehended an actual constant threat to the regions involved, in any degree equal to the extent to which NATO participants were completely engaged with this menace in 1950's. Besides, neither the weaker Asian members in SEATO nor the Latin American members of OAS were in a state in comparison to certain Western European nations, to produce even restricted


nuclear abilities independently. Anyhow, when Soviet weapons were identified in Cuba during October 1962, Latin American agreement that they be withdrawn was plain evidence of the complete reliance of these nations on United State’s discretion concerning atomic problems.

Established American leadership on the Latin American concerns and the resistance by Latin American politicians to attain freedom for their respective regions, is the particular element that distinguishes the functioning of OAS and differentiates it from different regional groupings. It is significant that more is implicated than the influential strength of America in the Western Bloc. Rio Treaty nations are abandoning attitude of the basic functions of the collective defence in two significant ways, one, the enforcement actions given in the alliance for practice in opposition to outside attack and in collective defence are presently being employed as a way to compulsion on governments that displease the reactionary majority of Latin American Republics, and secondly, current regional practice below American supremacy has been chiefly induced by the extra continental intentions of America. These trends have not been more successful.

II. **South East Asia Treaty Organization and the United Nations**

The South East Asia Treaty Region was determined as the common region of South East Asia including also the complete region of the Asian member states and the common region of the South-West Pacific, South of Latitude 21.30 north. The nations determined by the Protocol were Cambodia, Laos and the free region under the jurisdiction of the State of Vietnam (South Vietnam) to be protected by the treaty.

Conditions were clear cut because only such clear cut conditions could satisfy Dulles. Provisions in SEATO Treaty are not limited to armed attack against the regions of member states but include attacks on chosen non-parties, meanwhile Laos Cambodia and South Vietnam. Thus the new Rusk Doctrine superseded Dulles's explanation with an spreading uncontrolled containment line that knew neither time nor space.

A condition in absence of a "front" in Indochina, the containment line could exist only as a falsehood. C.L. Sulzerberger, comment upon it as Western authority and defence in


South East Asia in his view SEATO was a simple illustration of shutting the kennel gate on a nonexistent horse; in this event Anglo French Empire being the horse. In his view SEATO was created on supposition of British and French missing military power. The developing trends put in place of reality in differentiating concern and result guided the war of Vietnam. The United States considered these military pacts would likewise add to a more vigorous and powerful United Nations and in this way in establishing an expansive universal system. But in actual practice, these alliances gave rise to counter alliances. When the SEATO Pact came before the Senate for debate during 1954, as earlier in the case of NATO in the hearings on South East Asia Collective Defence Treaty Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles gave the assurance that the Pact did not interrupt in the least the United States understanding in accordance with objectives of the United Nations. Despite of repeated assurances both the North Atlantic Organization


and South East Asia Treaty Organization suitably disregarded to set up any regional connections, on obligations undertaken under Articles 52 and 54 of U.N. Charter. As there is no reference to these two articles. The SEATO like its predecessor, the Rio Treaty and NATO Pact does not mention any particular Article of the Charter. Like both Rio Treaty and NATO Pact it does not necessitate that means adopted in opposition to a general risk should be immediately informed to the Security Council, however, it does not necessitate this type of action to end the moment the Security Council is able to reinstate peace and security. Its follower OAU put still lower stress on the United Nations Charter. A change thus evident in the clauses of the Pacts that had been arranged to place different regional organizations. Dag Hammarskjold, expressed his anxiety on these advancements.

The SEATO matched and kept along in line with Annus Pact of 1951 more than with NATO containing peculiar purposes.


and immense military racial and cultural ties. SEATO members pledge if an armed attack occurs in opposition to any of them or of any nation or region which the signatories jointly assert to possibly in some future time a nation would enter its own peace and security and undertake that it will at such an occasion face the common danger in conformity with its legal proceedings. A formal account of the means adopted in pursuance of this end should be given to the Security Council of the United Nations without any delay. In this way SEATO members like NATO nations do not pledge to actual military operation. SEATO do not acknowledge like NATO participants that an attack on a party, is an attack on all and do not like NATO refer armed force as practicable measure for opposing an attack.

East Asian Treaty Organisation or South East Asia Defence Organisation is a South East Asia Defence Organisation. It was organized for the collective security of South East Asia against Communist aggression or subversion. This collective security was organized by United States, Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand along with peak South Asian partners like Pakistan, Philippines and Thailand. It was manifestly and admittedly directed against Communist China and Soviet Union. For this reason, all the important Asian countries

27. Article 4 of SEATO.
including India, Indo-China, Indonesia, Ceylon refused to join it. Most of the nations of South and South East Asia did not join military groupings like SEATO and CSNTO, as it would have involved them in power struggle of the existing cold war.

It is often argued that as the Charter of United Nations approves of regional defence pacts there is nothing wrong with the SEATO. In Western view these military pacts are entirely defensive and are directed towards the common safety of nations who unite together and not aimed against aggression. Does the alliance really stand the test of a regional collective defence organization as envisaged in the U.N. Charter? In the Charter the obligation of members to refrain from war is absolute except for the right of members to act individually or collectively in self-defence. This article is not found in Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. When the United Nations Charter was drawn up at San Francisco nations of the Western Hemisphere had a fear that in the Security Council the U.S.S.R., would


30. Article 51.
enter their security system. Therefore, the fear of Communism gave rise to such alliances. The fear was the power of veto in the Security Council. Vandenberg wanted Inter American security system to be freed from Article 53. This article was in favour of European Great Powers. It was under this article that the Soviet Union negotiated her network of mutual defence treaties, with the Eastern European states and China. As these arrangements are not limited to deal with peace and security matters within a region but are inters regional in character. Inter American system of mutual defence was outlined in the Declaration of Lima 1938. The Act of Havana of 1940 and Act of Chapultepec of 1945 and finally culminated in the U.N. Charter. Winston Churchill likewise supported the idea of regionalism during early World War II period.

This regional international organization is a departure from the nation state as a unit of international relations.

In the post-war world period situations not anticipated by
the framers of the United Nations Charter arose, with the
formation of North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which arranged
Western powers, in a separate group like North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, ANZUS Central Treaty Organization, and
South East Asia Treaty Organization. These multilateral pacts
were created by Western leaders to bypass the Chapter VIII
of United Nations Charter and were labelled as regional
organizations. These intentionally avoided language of
regional arrangements in conformity with Chapter VIII of the
Charter, but were based upon Article 51 of the Charter which
is placed in Chapter VII of the United Nation’s Charter and
which permitted, the inherent right of individual or collec-
tive self-defence, to ignore check of the Security Council to
the responses of regional arrangements in the event of armed
attack.

Because of Soviet veto Western influence in the Security
Council of the United Nations was restricted, Western powers
disagreed and felt hostile with Soviet Union, a permanent
member of the Security Council, and invented SEATO in line with
NATO and CSNTO, with limited membership to help each other
against an armed attack. They tried to solve the problems
of Asia, without the persons of Asia. The Soviet Union and
her East European companions concluded their own joint security
alignments in the Warsaw Pact 1955 and the Sino Soviet Alliance.
Both Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Treaty indicate the strong hegemonial aspects. The hegemonial power in each block takes the main part in increasing armament race. Inside the inner defence circuits of each of the power blocks, the hegemonial nation limit what other sovereign and equal parties of the global organisation may or may not do for instance, O.A.S., in Guatemala made it possible for Guatemalan exiles to throw out by military the existing government.

Differences and incidents among the peoples of North Atlantic region have not turned in the application of strength since World War II. This is not quite true with reference to their mutual dealings with nations beyond this region or of relations in States of Middle Eastern or South Asian sub-systems. The British and the American interests in Asia were then waging an under cover but fierce cold-war. This replacement of uncontrolled regional instrument for ineffective collective security plan is an incompetent act of solving the question of universal arrangement.

III. **The United States and Asian members of SEATO**

In South Asia only Thailand and Philippines were in favour of SEATO; Pakistan and India also supported it. These Asian members of SEATO by their membership in this organization were losing the economy of their nations their national prestige and even the security of their persons. Of the many agreements containing military economic financial help to Pakistan, United States had kept certain conditions that intruded over its prestige and sovereignty for example the economic, "assistance", agreement concluded on December 22, 1953 stipulates, that money given to Pakistan has to be used under the direction of the chief of the American administration for carrying out the aid. Moreover, the United States President is empowered to call back ships with loads on the way to Pakistan if he thinks that in view of changed events the need of help has ceased to be. The Pakistan times wanted to know, if the real conditions on which help was being given were not degrading to the prestige of nation. Moreover,

---


by membership of Pakistan in these alliances it was pledged for circumstances that could have occurred in far separated regions from its boundary.

Deficiency in coordination in the defence sphere is all the more obvious. The single structural SEATO contained only three states of South Asia, Pakistan, Phillipines and Thailand and it is governed by external nations.

Besides, it is disapproved by the different nations of the system. Also, members commitment are not convincing to oppose ordinary instabilities in agreement with their legal procedures in the event of attack and to discuss promptly of expedient means at the incident of revolution (Article 4). And even this is directed at solely on one sort of offence, menace from communist China. Ultimately, the structural bonds are least and the armed influence of the nations in this system is little.

There are deep differences in South Asia to the correct posture towards cold war of major nations. Different from the United States and Western Europe, there are many different cultures here - like Muslims, Buddhists, and Hindus.

40. Ibid., November 22, 1955.
Their economies are full of rivaling. Great distance is an obstacle to meetings. Cultural, linguistic and ethnic differences are very many, traditional hostilities gone, particularly alarm and hatred by the smaller states and races in South Asia. Like in Africa, there are spheres of Dutch, British, and French authority, with various customs of governments, rules, and education. This is the reason for the drive for the interregional grouping here has generally issued from exterior nations, for instance as in SEATO, Colombo Plan, and SCAFE (with the exception of pacific association of South Asian states and Asian Relations Organization) but their presence indicates handling of South Asia by external nations as a precise system or society.

Out of eight members of SEATO, five, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Australia, and New Zealand, represent regions and interests which had hardly anything with South East Asia. These five outside members were much more powerful than their South East Asian partners, Pakistan, Thailand, Philippines, and South Vietnam. The five members dominated the functioning of the organization, both from military and economic point of view. It was the cold war interests of the powerful Western Nations which the alliance intended to serve. The inevitable result was that the South Asian Members had to remain satisfied with the trifles.
Asian countries did not want to be protected by non-
Asian countries yet this protection was forced upon them,
through defence treaties and their actions. SEATO, was to do
all harm and no good and had no place under U.N. Charter. Ceylon
did not participate. Indonesia rejected SEATO. Even western
writers like Walter Lippman criticized SEATO as first methodi-
cal means in current years which was planned to justify inter-
national interference in domestic matters, specially the United
states had attained an indefinite right and an implied legal
attitude to interfere under some events.

British were not such enthusiastic to give effect to the
joint operation programme in Southern Asia in a hurry. When

41. The Hindu 10th September 1964, Madras India, Ceylon Prime
Minister, Sir John Kotelawala, 'The Hindu, 13 December 1964,
Madras, India.

42. Mr. Nehru summarized the Indian view, in House of People,
Indian opposition to SEATO Conference, "Statements by Mr.
Nehru" Kangana Contemporary Archives, Weekly Diary of
World Events September 1953, p.13762.

43. Ibid., Mr. Krishna Menon (The Principal Indian representa-
tive of U N. in the same debate, p. 13763.

44. Ceylonese Non-Participation in eight power conference
statement by Sir John Kotelawala, Ibid., p. 13763.

45. Indonesian Rejection of SEATO arrangements, Ibid., p.13763.

46. Walter Lippman, The Hindu, 19 September 1964, Madras,
India.
the plan of SEATO actually materialized British response though fundamentally the same was that the foundation for joining the arrangement should be as liberal as practicable and that states adjoining to Indochina like Thailand and Burma and even neutral states like India or Ceylon must be allowed to share or work together effectively. The British idea of the treaty was thus not in opposition to Communism. British were also unwilling to increase the danger of Chinese involvement in Southern Asia. SEATO, was a Dulles idea, under the guise of joint action a creation of American practice of unilater-ism. Common Americans were of the same opinion in the Cold War period. Bandung meeting the first inter continental conference of coloured people in history of April 1955, standing for more than 1.5 billion neutral people of the globe, was in U.S. opinion only an instance in the justification of Quemoy and Matsu defended by representative of Afro-Asian Nations. United States was not interested in vital principles of Bandung.


51. Cyril E. Black Richard A. Pink, Klaus Knorr, and Oran Young, 'Neutralization in South East Asia', Problems and Prospects. The study examining thoroughly, the idea of neutralization was made on request of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 89th Congress, 2nd Session Washington 1966.
In the pretension of self-defence Pakistan is united with, multilaterally or bilaterally to certain thirteen nations directly and with thirty two nations indirectly. Pakistan is indirectly united with the NATO and the organization of American states (Rio Pact), as she is not a member of NATO or the Inter American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance but certain nations who are members of these pacts are likewise members of SEATO and CENTO with which Pakistan is directly united. Under these circumstances if Pakistan can convince her allies that she is fighting in self-defence in South Asia she can persuade more than half of the world for her support.

Article 51 of the United Nations Charter has recognized the right of states to individual and collective self-defence, but it says that any such action should be referred to the Security Council.

The North Atlantic Treaty contains a large membership. All the members of this treaty and the areas included within their territories are to be defended under this arrangement. This area is so vast, that it is not an easy job to defend it. Moreover, the territories to be defended are scattered, all over the world. Nations would automatically be involved in a war in such an event, and self-defence would mean, if a country

---

thinks it necessary as a measure of self-defence to intervene in the matters of its neighbours, it can do so. The cases of Guatemala, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Tibet, Afghanistan are illustrative of such interventions.

A clear view of the regional appearance was presented to the world. This attitude was employed to conceal one side practices of CIA, intrusion in 1954, in connection to the ruin of Arbens administration of Guatemalan. Intrusion in Hungary, in 1956 and intervention in Czechoslovakia during 1968, based on regionalist models of reasoning, Russian bloc could similarly be diagnosed an arena of domination after the Hungarian case. Satellite position, of the East European nations once correct is definitely more doubtful now as the earlier dummy regimes of Moscow exhibit different grades of freedom. The shift is evident in the tried reaffirmation of the sole command from Moscow. Criticism in United Nations of Russian conduct in Czechoslovakia and Hungary are one of the many significant causes that show slackening of bonds in the Soviet circle. However, it is obvious, one sided solutions


by the Soviet Union to the security issues of Communist states have come to be much difficult to prolong as the bonds remain slackening in the Communist orbit.

Thus it is obvious that this right of selfdefence takes peculiar forms. Often states defend their frontiers by extending their territories. The right of self-defence is practically denied to smaller states which are militarily weak. The big powers really exercise this right but their position is such that they need not fear smaller states. The fact is like veto the right of individual and collective self defence permitted in international organisation is another instrument in favour of big powers based on power differential. It can be utilized by great powers to satisfy their national interests. According to Charter self defence is actually an independent practice with free origin, execution, direction and termination.

Since the signing of the North Atlantic Pact in April 1949, there has been a continuing debate and questioning whether

such treaties are consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, and what are security implications of such treaties for particular area or region. The Egyptian delegate to the San Francisco Conference on the framing of the Charter in 1945 said that it was wrong to consider military alliances as regional arrangements. The Soviet Union has also consistently denied that NATO is a regional organization.

In NATO, lack of integration is quite striking since 1954, there has been a noticeable decline in French and British interest in the region Southern Asian States that is Pakistan, Phillipines and Thailand are military weak. It is the United states presence in the NATO, which gave it some meaning. But this formal alliance maintained active by U.S. support do not add much to its influence.


In the Johnson period 1965-67, involving United States in Vietnamese War in Far East was meant to show respect for Charter obligation, arouse confidence in SEATO arrangement and mobilize public opinion by showing engaging United States in war was above its own national interest. If United States does not spend for SEATO commitments it can additionally support NATO in Europe, but role of United States in case of checking Communist aggression in SEATO is quite ambiguous. Disintegration is evident when at London Conference during May 1965, Pakistan and France rejected American policy concerning Vietnam.

Added to the SEATO is an understanding of the United States, that its recognition of the effect of aggression as provided in Article 4(1) applied to Communist aggression. This emphasis on the part of the United States to protect South East Asian Members and Protocol members in the region only in the event of Communist aggression is rather ambiguous as compared to NATO this function of United States is a bit confusing, because neither United States is affected nor there is complete agreement among SEATO members to make it only authoritative organization to protect this South East Asia Region against Communism. Word Communists, is not included in the treaty, so that the United States had to arrange additional declaration, to clear its attachment to the treaty is
valid only in case of Communist aggression. Constitution of
SEATO was half complete to certain degree because Joint Chiefs
of Staff were not much interested to set aside forces for
SEATO purpose.

There was a shift in the significance of "containment
line", during Johnson's administration in 1966, under the new
Rusk Doctrine even Secretary Dulles acknowledged that the
kind of aggression peculiarity of condition in Vietnam should
not be put in the class of Monroe Doctrine fundamental as
an armed attack but as second kind of aggression coming under
paragraph 2 article 4 of SEATO, Treaty. Chief traditions of
20 presidents. The debated issue President versus Congress
supremacy are significant. After great presidential lead in
the Vietnam War, Congressional influence was resumed during
1970.

62. Kenneth T. Young Jr., "The South East Asia Crisis", Background Papers and Proceedings of Right Hemmerykold
Forum, 1966, pp. 57-68.

63. Pentagon Papers, Senator Gravel Edition, Boston Beacon
1971, pp. 1-212.

64. John Morton Blum, The Progressive Presidents Roosevelt,

65. Thomas M. Franck, Edward Weisband, Foreign Policy by
Congress, Oxford University Press 1979, p. 357.
IV. SOUTH EAST ASIA TREATY ORGANIZATION

The South East Asia Treaty Organization also known as Manila Pact was formed on September 8, 1954, following the military overthrow of French strength in Indo-china and accompanying political overthrow of the major Western nations at the 1954 Geneva Conference concerning the question of successor states in that Island. The delegates of the United Kingdom, United States, France, New Zealand, Thailand, and Phillipines, ratified the SEACDT (South East Asia Collective Defence Treaty) at Manila. Later in November 1955, it was resolved without a dissent that it should be called SEATO (South East Treaty Organization) instead of SEACDT. The Late Ramon Magsaysay the then President of Phillipine Republic, 66 expressed his opinion to uphold the Treaty. Its member nations are United States, United Kingdom, France, two British dominions of New Zealand, and Australia, three Asian States, Pakistan, Phillipines, and Thailand. Western nations considered Soviet 67 policy to be aggressive and expensive. In view of future 68 security of United States they arranged this Pact. Australia

also perceived this risk and backed United States saying breaking down of the China was the worst calamity since
their victory.

V. BASIC DISAGREEMENTS

When the United States sponsored Formosa and South Korea for SEATO membership, on the reasoning that if the
SEATO is to include Communist China then the two states that were most anti-Communist and anti-Chinese should be taken in
other members specially Britain resisted the U.S. proposal.

Early following SEATO Pact France ceased to have almost any
concern in it and during 1955 publicly observed Treaty practice
as wrong, provocative, unjudicious show of power. France in
contrast to the U.S. views defended economic and cultural
practical experiments for the SEATO organisation while U.S.
felt to convert SEATO into a powerful anti-Communist military
Pact. The three super nations, in SEATO had some basic dis-
agreements in their foreign policies towards Southern Asia.
This reality put SEATO out of action from very start. The


71. George Modelski, SEATO Alliances : Latent War Communities
in the Contemporary World, Francis Beer edition, New York,
Britain acknowledged the legality of Communist China and its approach towards it was basically unlike from United State's unyielding, hostile approach towards it.

VI. Terms of the Treaty

SEATO Treaty is composed of eleven articles. The members of the Pact declared their allegiance to the fundamental legal provisions of United Nation's Charter. In the Preamble to the Treaty they insisted their support to the fundamentals of equal right and self determination of peoples, and their resolution to help forward self-government, and to try to get the independence of all nations, whose subjects were capable to assume its responsibilities. The members undertook to settle every international conflict, by taking resort to peaceful means, in a way that international peace, security and justice were not endangered and to abstain in their international relations from the threats or practices of force in any way not compatible with the aims of the United Nations. The members stressed, separately and jointly by means of continuous and actual self-help and reciprocal help to keep up and advance their individual and collective ability to oppose armed attack and to stop each counter-subversive practice guided from outside

72. Article 1.
73. Article 2.
against their territorial integrity and political stability and to work together in elaborating their economic advancement and social welfare.

In the event of an armed attack in opposition to any of their region in the Pact area or in opposition to the region of any nation marked out by Protocol, to their interference each member undertook, that it would act to encounter the common dangers in conformity with its constitutional proceedings. In the event of other threats to the peace of the region, the signatories agreed to decide on measures for general protection. Added to the Pact was an agreement of the United States that aggression is stipulated in Article 4(1) was relevant to Communist aggression. Other states could become a member of the Pact by unanimous invitation of the signatories. Parties agreed to set up a council to deliberate on subjects regarding the fulfilment of the Pact and any other planning. Any member could resign on one year's intimation.

74. Article 3.
75. Article 4(2) of South East Asia Treaty Organization, Article 5 of NATO.
76. Article 10.
77. Article 4(1).
78. Article 5.
79. Article 7.
VII. Structure of Council of Ministers

The Organization of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, the administering part of SEATO, the Council of Ministers is the single formal organizational arrangement set up in the Pact itself. It is formed of the Foreign Ministers of signatory nations. In yearly meetings at different capitals, the council settled policy and retrospected advancement in the attempts of SEATO in different spheres. The Council met once annually from 1955, in the capital of one of the member nations. No such meeting was convened in 1960 a year of crisis for the Treaty but an irregular meeting of the Foreign Ministers was held in Washington in September of that year. The fulfillment of Council’s judgment was left to the good faith of each one nation of the Treaty separately. At the first meeting of the SEATO convened in Bangkok, it was decided to set up the permanent headquarters of the Pact in that town. Advisory Committees of specialists were established to operate under the Council delegates, in three major spheres of interest, defence, economic, social and cultural well being.

The permanent operating section consisted of members of embassies (and of the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs) which deliberated on proposals handed over to it for consideration by Council of representatives, and worked out exhaustive details of getting on together. This section assembled together at
different times in a week. Budget concerns and financial mode of proceedings were under the Budget Sub-Committee. It also consisted of the representative of Embassies of signatory nations and of the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs. There were three special committees that reported to the Council of representative or to the Secretary General. These committees consisted of specially appointed representatives.

1. The Committee of the Defence Specialist acted with questions of Communist subversion in the region of the Pact, through exchange of knowledge and designs of actual operation like meeting of specialists on counter subversion in Baguio during 1967 and Lahore during 1968. Signatory nations made better maneuvers to overthrow the enemy.

11. The Committee of the Economic Specialist advised the signatory nations on economic affairs.

111. The Committee on Information, Cultural, Educational, and Labour Activities, was an advantageous meeting place for deliberation of different questions facing signatory nations. It also critically examined the works of the SEATO Cultural Relation Office, Research Service Office, The Public Information Office, and suggested schemes and instructed about the rules of accomplishing the end.
E. The Secretary General was the chief of the permanent Civil offices of NATO. He was helped in his works by the Deputy Secretary General and large staff. The work of Pact was performed by different subordinate offices.

1. The Economic Service Office considered and reported on existing advancements in the region of the Pact, problems like better development of independent countries, reciprocal assistance programs, and the efforts of Communist bloc to ruin their freedom were given careful regard.

2. The Cultural Relations Office encouraged signatory nations and considered and managed schemes maintained by the eight signatory nations by means of general budget. Although cultural matters were not referred, a graduate school of engineering was setup at Bangkok. Research fellowships were granted yearly; vacation training schemes were made to increase the skilled labor market in Thailand. Seminars of regional concerns were also managed.

3. The Research Services Office determined and conveyed on existing and then prevailing tendencies and Communist maneuvers in the region of the Pact. Signatory nations were furnished, harmonized and comparative facts, to enable them to ascertain extent of means to, their ends aimed at.
iv. The Community Development Office supplied a well considered actual participation to signatory nations on the designing and actual operation of such plans in their relative nations.

v. The Security Office was responsible for the internal defence of SEATO nations.

vi. The Public Information Office gave information to public and disclosed Communist manoeuvres and dis-proved Communist plans.

vii. The Central Services Office managed the money affairs of the Pact.

viii. Military Planning Office.

Every signatory country appointed a senior military person as a military adviser to the SEATO. In half yearly meetings the Military advisors were administered by the Council of Ministers. Every Military Adviser had his substitute at the Military Planning Office. The Military advisers representative Committee worked as an advisory and retrospecting part, for all military affairs, which asked for opinion of military advisers. They exhibited national opinion on all affairs, aimed at, and the activity and functions of the Military Planning Office. Particular accounts of the Military Planning for the Security of the Pact region were regularly maintained at its headquarters under the command of military advisers. The
Military Planning Office, commanded by the Chief and helped by a Deputy and a big staff kept continuous watch so that SEATO signatory countries could be prepared to adopt and exert sound, direct, joint force to drive back any armed aggression.

VIII. SEATO IN ACTUAL OPERATION

SEATO's actual yearly military security operation included military arrangements, several meetings, conferences and extensive military practices. In making schemes and arrangements, the Military Planning staff made continuous security schemes for the Pact region. This intentional constant trust was carried on by chosen persons from different employments of armed forces of the signatory nations. Under the supervision of the military advisers, the chief of the Military Planning Office ensured that planning security schemes were continuously reviewed and improved to encounter any probable event. However, SEATO had no established regular joined armed strength. Since 1960 military practices were organised annually to train defence personnel of the signatory countries resulting in training of lack of persons. There was a inclination, in SEATO and other such organisations to make themselves first if not chief authority to protect these regions. Six months after U.S. initiated SEATO came into power in February 1955. The struggle in the Communist and
anti-Communist forces flared up in Laos during July 1953. In this way Laos event came to be first trial for SEATO.

In July 1953 conflict began in Laos in the neutralist government forces and Communist forces (Pathet Lao). Thailand tried to invoke SEATO but failed because SEATO wanted to be very sure and careful in the beginning. Major nations were quite conscious of Asian indignation at the very start and discardment when it came into actual existence.

Again in 1955 Thailand introduced China-Burma border dispute to SEATO meeting. But SEATO did not debate the issue. SEATO stood nonplus during the Indonesian 'Perempuan' revolt near the beginning of year 1953. Those who rebelled, to curb the prevailing Communist government of Sukarno looked at SEATO for their legal acknowledgement. The SEATO Council deliberated the request, however, majority opinion opposed interference in Indonesia.

Between August-September 1955 crisis about bombardment of Quemoy and Matsu in their conflict with main land China, the Eisenhower regime got very busy and looked forward to SEATO for the same, but SEATO stood standstill, because majority of its members were not willing to extend SEATO power resulting in confrontation with Red China.

The early moves of the SEATO of course frustrated the United States which then reverted to unilateral entanglement in matters of Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand.
The chief event in Laos that called aims and practices of SEATO is important. An analysis of the events in Laos from year 1955 to year 1962 prove total break down and complete failure of the multi-lateral character of the regional SEATO military pact to ensure regional peace even in a small state like Laos.

During 1957 an agreement was concluded between the government of Laos and Pathet Lao. The three major nations of the SEATO without getting entangled in the conflict or bargain- ing gave their separate backing to the Royal regime. Once more these assurances took place outside the circle of SEATO.

On January 1, 1959 a struggle arose between North Vietnam and Laos. Once more Thailand tried to get SEATO interested in the conflict and once more it was disappointed. But as the international battle amidst the neutralist and rightist forces spread, the United States directed assistance in association with Thailand to Laos. But Pote Sarasin the Secretary General of the SEATO announced the incidents to be in legal local power of Laos.

During September 1959 Laos had recourse to the Security Council of the United Nations. Three major nations of SEATO with their prerogative as members of Security Council of the United Nations could make out a renewed solution of establishing
and sending a United Nation's Committee of investigation to Laos. The U.N. Committee which went to Laos could not succeed in getting any proof of aggression by North Vietnam. During this advancement the U.N. Security Council issued on September 26, 1959, a forceful declaration, in the event of its becoming indispensable to protect the entirety of Laos in opposition to external interference. SEATO had built preliminary arrangements so as to be competent to exert influence against in the out line of SEATO Pact.

Near the start of year 1957, fighting was furious amidst the neutral Royal Government headed by Souvanna Phouma and the Rightist wing headed by Prince Boun Oum and General Phoumi Nosavan. The United States and Thailand's feelings were with rightist wing. But SEATO Secretary General Pote Sarasban made clear that SEATO would not apply force and interfere and would honour neutrality. Neutrality is a fact which it expect Laos can maintain. A nation that maintains neutral policy is quite as convincing as far as SEATO was involved.

As a result of General Phoumi's attack that had United State's backing the proper government of Laos, headed by Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma requested Soviet Union for assistance and immediate Soviet help reached Laos. SEATO did

80. George Modelski, SEATO, Alliances, op.cit., p.201.
nothing but showed anxiety at this development and when United States favoured regime headed by Prince Bao Cung and General Phoumi Nosavan was recognized officially in Vietsiane. The United States and Thailand encouraged and helped it while SEATO did not support it much while the Pakistan and Phillipines were in favour of rightist wing headed by Bao Cung. Australia, Britain, Newzealand and France did not encourage that regime.

Immediately following the Vietsiane regime was in difficulty and tried for cessation of active hostilities with its opponents. United States turned for its help. By this help President Kennedy was able to change the attitudes of France and Great Britain with the consequence that the SEATO Council of March 29, 1961 announced that if the attempts of maintaining liberty and non-alignment of Laos did not succeed, and there remained to be practical military efforts to get authority of Laos SEATO signatories were ready in the limits of the Pact, to adopt whatever course possibly would suit in the contingency.

Despite their suity of military help to Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam, the SEATO members had doubts and disagreements in honouring their promise. This came quite clear, for the first

82. Ibid., p. 304.
time during 1960-61 during the crisis of Laos. The government of Laos asked SEATO for a set of experts to watch the events but the issue was deadlocked by minority, as the Council judgement is based on the principle of unanimity Thailand offered an idea to abolish this rule, but with no effect. To reduce Thailand’s alarm on its trust of the assistance promised by SEATO, in opposition to Communist offensive, the United States during March 1962, declared that the American undertaking to help Thailand does not solely rest on the previous consent of all other SEATO members as this undertaking of the Pact is equally individual as it is collective.

To justify the genuine nature of this trust the United States in the middle of year 1962, without taking SEATO’s advice despatched its military forces to regions within in Thailand, which it sensed were in danger of Communist aggression, by break down of the rightist faction in Laos. Following it small sub-divisions of military troops were sent to Thailand by Newzealand, Britain, Philippines, and Australia. This incident clearly exhibited the grave faults of SEATO first no joint military strength arose in the event as each military sub-division worked under the authority of its own national commander and second the collective image of SEATO broke when states who participated depended on their relative, bilateral agreements.

---

83. Ibid., p. 139.
Moreover, action on the region of a signatory or protocol nation could have been undertaken merely on the request with the consent of the nation involved. Laos never requested SEATO to help it.

In 1962 International Agreement, to neutralise Laos, had hardly any success neither the Communists nor the Americans restrained from interference in local problems of Laos. Following previous refusals United States officially acknowledged during November 1969 that it was helping the Royal Army of Laos with military strength. In the opinion of Neutral observers there were 1000 American councillors in Laos. On February 7, 1971, the United States attacked the so called Communist sanctuaries, 'in a twenty five day time in October 1970, U.S. B-52s lead 800 attacks dropping 25000 tons of explosives costing $20 million. On October 4, 1971, the U.S. Senate settled upper limit to be $250 million on U.S. help to Laos.

Despite the U.S. interference the Laotian peoples armed forces, the military faction of the Communist Pathet Lao, had made considerable gain in the North of Laos. During 1971 on

84. Article 4 of SEATO Treaty.
86. Ibid., March 26 to April 1, 1971, p. 100701.
February 3, South Vietnamese forces went into Laos, defended by American aeroplanes, and heavy offensive weapons of war to destroy Ho Chi Minh. The United Nations strongly disapproved this invasion. In February 1971, the Pathet Lao called upon Britain and Soviet Union as co-chairman of the Geneva Conference on Laos to check the American and South Vietnamese interference while it went on to look for North Vietnam’s assistance. The Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma complained to co-chairman in opposition to North Vietnam’s aggression, and asked for removal of all military force.

In the struggle of Vietnam the United States attempted to drag her SEATO partners in. But two major nations France and Great Britain did not move to engage in fighting with the United States, in Laos. France clearly resisted United States attitude, and did not despatch in its military forces to take part in the struggle of Vietnam. Nevertheless, America could persuade weaker nations of the Pact to despatch nominal troops for keep sake for instance by 1960 there were 150 Newzealand, 4500 Australian, 150 Thailand, 2000 Philippine, military men waged war in the conflict of Vietnam besides 16000 military men of South Korea, who was not a member of SEATO Treaty with

---

705,000 South Vietnamese and 38,400 from the United States.
By the end of 1965, the United States had 570 thousand soldiers,
besides the troops of Saigon regime. Pakistan did not agree
to give military help in this conflict. Afterwards all the
members of SEATO called back their forces due to local influence
of the struggle against Vietnam, thus leaving it almost
an American affair.

French dissent with the attitude of United States got
defamed by 1965 as France declined to be present as a SEATO
signatory at tenth SEATO meeting convened in London during
May 1965, called back its six officials employed in high ranks.
To the coming meetings held in London and Canberra it just
sent a delegate to watch the proceedings.

IX. INDIA AND SEATO

From very start the motive underlying Foreign Policy
of Pakistan in joining the Pact of SEATO, was its opposition
to India although declared target of the Treaty was protection
in opposition to China and Russia Pakistan desired to accumulate weapons and wanted backing of SEATO members in opposition

90. U.S.I.S. "Why Vietnam"? Statements of Secretary of State
Dean Rusk 3, August 1965 and of Secretary of Defence,
Robert K. S. McNamara 4th August 1965, United States
Information Service Ottawa, Canada 1965, p.15.

91. Olga Stepnova, A Policyispensable that had to be
to India. America knew the aims of Pakistan and was made conscious of this fact by Indian dissents. On November 31, 1953, a year prior to the establishment of SEATO Pact, the Karachi reporter of New York times expressed, in fact Pakistan was more interested to construct her military might as a negotiating factor in transacting Kashmir problem than as a protection in opposition to Communism or any other nation. Three years following the establishment of SEATO Pact another reporter of the New York Times expressed U.S. opinion, Pakistan wanted weapons in opposition to India not in opposition to Communism. In the Senate, an American Senator asked the defense Secretary Mc Elroy was it not a reality that Pakistan actually sought military help as a force in opposition to India, the Secretary answered, of course you supply the munitions however, and it was they are the ones who will apply it not you. In a powerful comment Krishna Menon remarked on American vindication of force to help Pakistan against Communism not against India standard Krishna Menon said, that there are no rifles that aim just to one point. Pakistan as well as was able to get Western and specially United States diplomatic backing in its own national disputes with India and Afghanistan. Following the Karachi meeting during 1956 the SEATO, Council, in its

94. India Quarterly, New Delhi, India, Volume 16, 1960, p. 97.
official statement stated Kashmir problem should be tackled soon, India retorted commenting if to resist the so called Communism was its aim it should not have meddled with other South Asian matters if not the SEATO was attempting to back its SEATO partners to realize their interfering aspirations heedless of its concern to rival ideologies.

Pakistan started taking interest in Communist China and concluded a boundary pact with it during March 1963, to enhance good terms and mutual connections, for military help. It still looked forward to its SEATO and CENTO partners and equally accepted weapons from them. While it was ascertained Pakistan had applied the arms given to it by United States in opposition to India during 1965 United States was of course perplexed, United States parted with its hold on Pakistan when Pakistan selected Soviet Union to intervene in its dispute with India. Tashkent Declaration during January 1966 was the outcome of Soviet intervening. As Pakistan came closer to Communist China its association with SEATO and its backing to United States began to decrease. Tenth SEATO Council meeting clearly declared its inability to follow U.S. opinions regarding Laos and Vietnam. Pakistan left most of its interest in SEATO by its twelfth Council meeting held in 1967.

SEATO image was entirely different in 1971-72, years of Bangladesh crisis, both the United States and the Communist China supported Pakistan in opposition to India and Bangladesh
and dispatched its nuclear seventh Fleet with in the Bay of Bengal to force India.

Fourteenth meeting of the SEATO Council was convened at Bangkok during May 1969, France remained non-participative. For the third year Pakistan did not attend it.

A little earlier to this meeting Mr. Thanat Khoman in a formal meeting with the Bangkok post asserted, SEATO should not be restricted to military operations. Stress in it should shift from military to political issues, that is the single means to protect its military power of the Treaty was a falsehood. Treaty had no military organization only a military outline, it had no joint practical power similar to NATO. There had not been any example of joint protection endeavor. There had been mere separate activities by separate nations.

This declaration shows uselessness of SEATO. In Asian Politics the South East Asian Alliance never worked as perfect important strategic manoeuvre on Western side.

X. Concluding Observations

South Asian nations require long time of peace to use their free will to economic reconstruction. They can not have

this peace if they participate in East-West Cold War. Consequently the principle of peaceful co-existence found full support at the Bandung Conference. But the interference of major nations in this region changed the whole view. The SEATO has not only heightened the tension in South Asia, but has caused a serious split between the Asian countries themselves. The past unnecessarily imported Cold War where there was little or no tension before. The condition can not improve except if major nations stop participating in the affairs of this region. Major nations could by action, if not by clear approval abstain making South Asia an sphere of rivalry.

99 creation of nuclear weapon free zone in South Asia although desirable and possible is not practicable due to Cold War.


