CHAPTER VI

REGIONALISM AND SECURITY: FROM MILITARY
FACTS, DIRECTIONS OF REGIONALISM AS MENTIONED
IN THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER

1. Bipolarity and International Organization

Misrepresentation of world politics that resulted soon after the San Francisco Conference before long impaired most suppositions formed in the charter of United Nations, concerning the manner in which peace should be arranged in the international community after World War II. Though many of the transformations effected in the security action of the regional arrangements can be derived directly to the beginning of the Cold War, this was not the single cause at the bottom of changing the character of international politics. Many different elements have been operating in the world order after San Francisco Conference to change the function of regional organizations in the arranging course. Any succession of some chronological direction as of more importance than others is in certain way discretionary, those to be analyzed now are considered most significant because of the prevailing nature of the questions they have aroused and due to their plain effect on the process of diplomatic affairs in regional organizations, and their impact on particular regions especially the nations of South Asia.
The Cold War began from three nearly interweaved origins: disagreement in international affairs, difference of opinion in the requirements of major nations United States and Soviet Union and the political behaviour or strategy of American and Soviet leaders. The main, current result of bipolarity concerning regionalism was production of a recent pattern of regional arrangement, in the series of years, following San Francisco Conference, known as Cold War, a result obviously not for seen by planners of the Charter. Starting with the production of North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949, various multilateral security arrangements sprung up which, while with the purpose to work as regional, combined means of shared security (Chiefly with the understanding that their membership was restricted) cautiously evaded to mark themselves as regional organizations, according to the conditions of Chapter VIII of the United Nation's Charter. Instead, their attachment to the charter was declared in consequence of Article 51. That article, contained in Chapter VII in preference to Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, gave gurity to the members of the "inherent right of individual or collective self defence". Attachment


2. CENRO Article I paragraph 1, Charter Article 51, Article III paragraph 1 of OAS, Article V, NATO.
to Article 51 was contrived to remove the check of the Security Council above the response of "Regional arrangements", to armed attack.

This advancement could be interpreted mainly and precisely as the Western reply to the irreconcilable enmity which now separated them from the Soviet bloc. By permanent membership of the Soviet Union in Security Council of United Nations, the Western bloc acknowledged the absurdity of aiming at regional defense operation to their advantage, by means of the United Nations. In this way Western statesmen made three recent multilateral arrangements in post World War II period which could work beyond the sphere of Chapter VIII of the United Nations, NATO, SEATO, Baghdad Pact afterwards known as Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). Speaking for the Latin American states a Colombian representative even at the San Francisco Conference during 1945 had argued that without inclusion of regionalism in the United Nations Charter it was undermined that the twenty one Republics would have agreed to ratify the charter.

The United States also cherished the acceptance in the organization of American states whose relationship to the United Nations was specified in Chapter VIII of the United

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4. Article III of OAS.
Nations Charter also implored article 51 in arranging its collective security arrangement. Then during 1950 the Arab League whose actions like those of OAS earlier, had been specified in Chapter VIII of the Charter also referred Article 51 in arranging its collective defence grouping. Macdonald, said it can not be explained but the consequence of the artifice has been that the original, regional arrangements and the current collective security arrangements, both implored article 51 of the United Nation's Charter and not article 53 when they framed their military Pacts. This motion possibly was almost not explainable to the point Arab League was concerned. Yet regarding the Biotreaty and in view of the United States statesmanship, in the western block the move definitely inspired to displace defence operation of the OAS, in response to an armed attack from the authority of the Security Council, having USSR its permanent member entitled with a power of veto in it. Of eighteen, present regional arrangements among free nations United States is a member of nine and closely associated with three others.

5. Article II, Inter American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance and Article III paragraph I of OAS.


Thus what primarily had been a Western gamble to evade Soviet inclusion in regional defence operations in which the Western bloc had a venture was taken up by original regional arrangements too in this way changing their lawful mutual connection to the world organization. To whatever extent operations of the earlier regional groupings and the recent multilateral security arrangements likely vary in use. They could henceforth be considered as similar tools of security in their relation to the world organization. Thus a small ambiguity of the charter, incorporated with a view to compromise, with reference to the position of regional arrangements and recent multilateral pacts instead of getting resolved with the lapse of time increased in great measure and these agencies arranged themselves, to operate outside the scope of Security Council in security activities, while seemingly they continued to stay confirmed to the rules of Chapter VII of United Nations Charter in other matters.


This issue of the lawful connection among regional arrangements and United Nations became additionally complicated, when member nations of these regional defence agencies took action in practice in cases of assumed threats against external actors. But such arrangements with restricted memberships can not maintain peace. They must unite with adjoining states, these adjoining states must unite in broader communities and constellations, then take part in the United Nations.

The advancement of bipolarity, further ruined every expectation of major nation agreement likewise helped to change the supposition existing at San Francisco (regarding agreement among the permanent members of the Security Council over major issues) as to the restricted suitability of Council guided collective security means. Three changes in the posture of nations towards usefulness of global collective activity to preserve peace during this period can be seen. First such


deviation came upon, at the start of the cold-war, previous
to conflict in Korea during 1950. This was the time of the
making of NATO. The possibility of any kind of collective
security practice was earnestly subjected to doubt. Collect-
tive security certainly signify the notion of a global or
nearly universal undertaking to oppose intrusion, immaterial
of the state engaged in it.

In the West, these suppositions as to the possibilities
of collective security practice were defeated somewhat promp-
tly at the period of United Nation’s entrance into the Korean
War. At that time, incidental absence of the Soviet Union
representative from the security Council allowed the Council
to take a collective enforcement action rather resembling in
nature which likely have been stipulated by Charter. Even
though aimed in opposition to the satellite of a major nation
and although only one member the America came to be the main
door of the armed action taken on behalf of the United Nations.
It was important that most other nations were inclined to
joint themselves with the Council’s authoritative disposition.
However, leaving Great Britain and Turkey rest of the nations
took part in the struggle in symbolic ability. It was under-
stood that the events which had allowed United Nation’s

1949, p. 331.

16. Olga Stepanova, A Policy Raisenial that had to be
operation in Korea would not possibly recur. The interest that developed in collective security following United Nation's operation in Korea, resulted in Uniting for Peace Resolution, which was approved by the General Assembly during November 17, 1950. With the purpose to bring back, in so far as practicable at least, almost exact United Nation's collective security order, to the Security Council, these, at least, were the main points of the many of the remarks, supporting approval of the resolution, set forth in the General Assembly at that time. Specifically, it stipulated General Assembly operation in the circumstances of United Nation's standstill, the General Assembly to name the aggressor on the ground of a majority vote, the resolution then stipulated for collective operation—although essentially on the principle of freewill—rather like to that which the Charter had empowered Council to guide. Developing as it did out of Korean Event it was plain that Uniting for Peace Resolution signified to stipulate the means required for global collective action even in opposition of a major nation engaged in circumstances of a conflict.

17. Uniting for Peace Resolution, General Assembly Resolution 577, V.

This was a development beyond what had been settled at San Francisco, and it readily came to be plain that the Western nations that introduced this resolution did so on the presumption that it would merely come into action to allow collective action in opposition to developing moves of the Communist nations. France asserted peace keeping operations likely be decided only by the Security Council. As the Security Council is the organ which is permanently responsible for the maintenance of peace and security and, the right to action in regard to any matter threatening international peace is reserved to the Security Council. Therefore certain activities of United Nations peace keeping forces on the power of that resolution have not been accepted by different permanent members of the council, because General Assembly can only make recommendations to member nations.

Another change in position and working began, possibly, in United Nations practice in making the United Nations Emergency Fund at the period of Suez problem during 1956. That event, and various from then, have proved United Nation advances

to peace and security concerns that make a rather new adjustment of collective security theory to act with one kind of threat to the peace that is peculiar quality of the vague bipolar time. In Swet matter as after wards in Congo and in Cypress, United Nation interference assumed the shape of dispatching in an universal military force, not to carry on conflict on account of the United Nations against a marked out "aggressor", but to attempt to regulate the equilibrium of an afflicted political condition and to prevent equally effective interference by external major nations. During 1960, Dag Hammarskjold accounted the underling principle for United Nation practice of this kind which would try to limit wars prior to they come to be established in an burning cold-war setting, describing such a function, "preventive diplomacy." It was advanced as a device for the containment of cold-war. Preventive diplomacy, containing the cold war, therefore assist to regulate the equilibrium of disturbed zone and possibly still inspire neutralism on the side of the nations, non-members of the polar blocs. Also in practice it must rest on the political backing of neutrals to be successful.


Ernst B. Haas giving an account of the advantageous, duty and practice of the United Nations in allowing the non-aligned nation, to counterpoise Eastern and Western blocs observed, United Nations implied in these limits would not evolve development and arrangement supposed by enthusiastic defenders of universal cooperation. But it possibly ensure the universal peace expedient to produce a 'multipolar and multi-functional', model of policy prospects and thus develop the tendencies of peaceful settlement of fundamental hostilities.

2. Military Facts and United Nations:

This study exhibits an effort to unroll and realize developing relations in the regional arrangements and global organization in the security and political realm. Although OAS is only one of many regional arrangements up to this time, it project as the only one engaged in formal debates regarding the explanation and use of clauses of United Nations Charter contributing upon the part of regional arrangements in relationship to the United Nations. The most related


26. Ibid., p. 263.
measures of the United Nations Charter are to be established in articles 33 and 51-54. An investigation of the mutual action in OAS and the world organization, in the political security sphere will bear an apprehension of the common political course by which the practical relations of United Nations and regional agencies are decided and changed.

The emphasis in the Charter is not on negative restrictions concerning the use of force but on the positive role which may be played by the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security. But in real functional—peace and security. But in real functioning and the evolution of post-war system of international organization have indicated that the Charter principles for interconnecting regional bodies to the global organization has been extremely changed. Regional arrangements have returned to be independent, and have formed more distinctly in universal affairs and performed more of their own, of the world organization than was anticipated in the Charter. In practice, in the name of regional arrangements the position of the United Nations has somewhat been circumscribed. There has not emerged any substantial relationships between regional and international systems whatever connection exists between them is on the behest of regional systems.

In practice regional arrangements in common have been more operative in defence field and less effective in the field of pacific settlement of disputes than the founders of the Charter seemed to anticipate or contemplate. The scheme of Article 53, that regional agencies should not take enforcement action without the authorization of the Security Council, has been shaded by the exceptions mentioned in that Article and Article 51, for the maintenance of international peace and security, nations have revived to depend neither upon the Security Council nor upon the arrangements in the range of its authority, but upon military facts that have been made for the plain intention of actually performing more independently of the United Nations. With reference to scheme in Article 52 (2-3), that members of the regional arrangements and the Security Council itself should stress the function of those arrangement in the settlement of local disputes, at large events have been somewhat contrary, the presence of regional agencies has not, in general, served to decrease the burden of universal organization by solving problems at regional level. In brief, the two basic ideas of the United Nations to the function of regional arrangements have been sabotaged. Neither the negative restraint nor the positive operation of such arrangements by the Security Council has turned out to be a striking factor of newly come international affairs. These

evolutions can be interpreted by the events that have caused the making and evolution of the most of Military Pacts, working in the political security sphere.

These arrangements are basically external in their adjustment, they stand to give mutual safety against powerful external enemies. Therefore, states parties to them are suspicious of being exposed to the probable stabilization of the Security Council, in which the authority or voting power of the outside opponent would possibly operate. For instance, NATO, SEATO, CEDO, would mean nothing if the Russian veto could be effective in the Security Council to prohibit their influence to function. Hence Soviet wish to become a Member of NATO, was rejected by the United States. In brief, treaties decline under Article 53 but they grow under Article 51. And so, their absorbed attention with outside threat assist to show their similar indifference as facilitators of pacific settlement of local disputes. Their involvement with outside threat indicates the disregard of this intrinsic interest, though this should not be the condition. For instance NATO is basically a military alliance a collective defence association under Article 51 of the Charter, rather than a regional arrangement, it had no policy or jurisdiction to deal with conflicts as between the members, although it

29. OLGA STEPANOVA, op.cit., p. 31.
might be given such a role.

The American nations tried to introduce provisional obligations to avail agencies of the OAS before going to the world organizations in both of the original tools of their recent institutional plan. Neglecting the problem of the permitted force in the surroundings of the Charter of the United Nations, these creations showed an effort to re-strengthen the Charter's confusing acceptance of regional precedence in pacific settlement of disputes, and even to provide the OAS the explicit legal prescription of the regional responsibility for dealing initially with local disputes that certain American delegates had pleaded at San Francisco. These OAS commitments placed the foundation for a political conflict to insert OAS as an obstruction to Security Council discretion of Inter American disputes especially when regional secrecy was possibly wished for. The opposite side of the picture takes to mean Security Council keep out of the way.


The problem of the self-determination of the OAS to lay
legislation upon states parties to it involves the implications
of Articles 53 and 54. Controversy on this issue is con-
cerning the question of explaining the enforcement action which
the OAS is prohibited to assume except with the sanction of
the Security Council. A constant attempt has been done to
eliminate the control of the Security Council, laid on the
OAS by the stipulations of article 53 permitting that body
only the duty mentioned in Article 54 of reporting to Security
Council its movements and schemes.

To understand the problem clearly it is essential to
consider the theory and practice of major nations sphere of
action. Theories stipulating a world order of regional arrange-
ment were expounded during World War II by E.H.Carr and Walter
Lippmann and it is necessary to consider clearly their prac-
tical employment brought about by the "disintegration of the
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World War II alliance system". Most noticeable reality about
the efforts to raise the position of OAS is that ability to
lead was lately assumed by the United States. At San Francisco,

33. E.H.Carr, "The Twenty Year Crisis" (London Macmillan, 1946)
pp. 222-231.
Walter Lippmann, "A War Aims (Boston: Little, Brown and
Company 1943, pp. 30-35. Edward Hallett Carr, Conditions of
Peace Macmillan New York 1942, pp. 7-13, 51-52, 56-58 Cobban,
E.R.H.Fox, The Super Powers - The United States, Britain and
the Soviet Union their responsibilities for peace,
New York, 1943, pp. 95-96.
F.L.Schuman, "Regionalism and Spheres of Influence" Hans
J.Morgenstern, Peace, Security and the United Nations,
New York, p. 105.
the United States followed Latin American urge to belittle U.N. Charter's belief in universalism, and, at Rio, it was prominent amidst the countries laying down plans for the Inter American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance in its falling short to put forward in outspoken language of the try OAS fundamentals. However, the major nation of the Western Hemisphere had following existence of the United Nations took upon itself the position to fight, with incomplete dubitable political strength of Latin America and Europe.

Subsequent study of the disputes in which the questions relating to the function of the OAS have outlined clearly is right away an analysis of meshing of regionalism and globalism, and a research of the quarrel of the America and Russia which process the political power for such an inter-connection.

The first instance of the use of United Nations Charter rules regarding the part of regional arrangements in connection

34. Intem American Conference for the maintenance of continental peace and security, Guatamalpa, Brazil, August 18-September 2, 1937: Report of the delegation of the United States of America, United States, Department of State Publication 3019 (Washington CPO 1938) the United States, proposal p.32; Brasil, proposal, p.77, Chile, p.73, Guatemala, p.79, Mexico, p.31, Panama, p.33, Salvia, p.112.

to the United Nations case into view on June 19, 1954 when the Guatemalan regime asserted that it was the sufferer of aggressive attacks initiated by Nicaragua and Honduras with the backing of the United States, and immediately asked the U.N. Council to adopt means to check the aggression.

CASE STUDIES

1. The Guatemalan Case

Although Guatemala simultaneously asked the Inter American Peace Committee, it entirely took back the case from OAS on 21 June. In referring the issue to the Security Council, the Guatemalan regime in reality side tracked the OAS, debating that it had a claim within UN Charter to straightforwardly resort to the Council for assistance. The United States backed by some Latin American nations maintained that OAS signatories were under moral and legal bond to refer this kind of quarrels originally to OAS which worked as the foremost tribunal of appeal. The Caracas Declaration of 1934 was taken


as the main device for containment of Communism from Western Hemisphere, and was instigated by the reality that a communist regime had come in authority in an American state ultimately, however, the United States took concealed one sided practice to get the expulsion of the Arbenj government, and as a consequence, was put into difficulties. And was forced to secure the backing of Latin Americans and of its other friends in pressing upon the claim of OAS to deal with the Guatemalan issue.

In the Security Council debates only Turkey and Columbia were inclined to support United States clearly in its argument that Security Council was not obliged to endorse the OAS opinion of the issue before such action could be taken as legal under the conditions of the Charter. In reality OAS rules did not bind Guatemala as it had not ratified it. A regional false front was employed to misrepresent one sidedness in connection to the over turn of the Arbenj government.


of Guatemala by CIA interference during 1954. After continued
tedious debates Security Council failed to adopt the agenda
by a vote of four in favour, five against 2 abstained, thus
left the case to OAS.

Although debates were legally sound, the intention
in turning was mainly political. The United States along-
with Nicaragua expected to oust the procommunist Guatemalan
regime and in this way maintain regional authority, in order
to prevent Security Council out of dispute. Finally, United
States got what it wished, because it had the votes. What
insignificant to mark however, is that Security Council did
neither acknowledge sole authority of the OAS nor did it
acknowledge any want of jurisdiction to act with the dispute.
Delegate of United Kingdom expressed the majority of the member
of the Council, when he said, for Security Council, to deprive
itself of the final trust would be seriously to bias the
moral jurisdiction of the United Nations. The success of the

of United States Foreign Policy", American Political
Science Review, Volume 50, No.3, September 1956, pp.787-
806.

41. Security Council Official Records, 9th Year, 675th
Meeting, 20th June 1954, pp. 239-41.

42. United States Department of State Bulletin 6 July 1954,
p.28.

43. ECR 9th Year 675th Meeting 20th June 1954.
United States was obscure and imperfect. The fact that America contended regional action to hold good in Guatemalan issue revealed nearly all members of the Security Council were reluctant to take the U.S. representation of the problem, stipulating regional grouping's freedom of action to assume sole authority in such events in future. While the Guatemalan event did not stipulate an actual United Nation's option to the interference of a hegemonic nation in the matters of members of its own group. It at any rate have incited such states to get the favor of their regional colleagues beforehand when attainable. In place of fixing a mode, that the international organization would tend to pursue it increased constant caution in opposition to permit repetition of such incidents.

ii. Cuban Case:

The dispute in Cuba and the United States tried the chief problem in nearly the same manner with nearly the identical outcome. Does a nation entangled in a conflict have a claim to practice its priority and resort to the United Nations even though a regional arrangement possibly be transacting with the issue at the moment? Cuba in invoking

44. Inis L. Claude Jr., 'The OAS, the U.N. and United States, International Conciliation No. 547, March 1964, p.34.
an assemblage of Security Council, during it July 1960, to attend its grievance in opposition to the United States, had such a claim. The United States argued that Cuba was lawfully bound by Rio Treaty to lay the affair first to OAS, and in any-circumstances the Security Council should not adopt any move till the issue had been treated with by suitable means of the OAS. France and Britain supported this view. Ceylon and Tunisia, supported Cuba's claim to use Security Council, but considered it expedient for that organ to utilize OAS. Ultimately, the Security Council without renouncing its own jurisdiction handed over the issue to OAS on pragmatic grounds. The Latin American members of the Council Argentina and Ecuador contended that conflicts of this type usually be settled in the outline of regional arrangements, but in no event a member be refused recourse to the United Nations. Following discussions in the Security Council and the General Assembly towards the close of Cuban crisis had moved to

46. Ibid., (4383/15th July 1960).
47. SCOR 15th Year 575th Meeting July 1960, p. 45.
49. Ibid., pp. 6-9.
51. SCOR, 15th Year 374th Meeting, 13th July 1960, Argentina statement on pp. 34-35.
stress these principles. By this time the United States was greatly more conscious of the necessity of the real backing of the Latin American Nations. Even though, the authority question was decided somewhat more ambiguously than it had been in Guatemalan issue. More Latin American administra-
tions, by the period case of Castroism arrived to the global organization knew that the belief of actual authority of the OAS, in the regional security matters was of no advantage to them. Latin American backing for American guaranteed hemispheric activity was coming to be a device which had to be planned on.

iii. The Haitian and Panamanian Cases:

Two additional events are noteworthy in this context, a conflict in the Dominican Republic and Haiti, which was turned to the Security Council for consideration, during May 1963 at the latter’s request, and an accuse lodged by Panama.


in opposition to United States in January 1964. In the two
event the complaints consented that the Security Council
should, wait, watch and allow the OAS to play the pacifying
role. In the intervening time, with the assent of the comp-
plainers, the council kept the cases on its agenda. In this
way standing aside remaining ready and alert as the OAS
continued with its work. These joint operations neither
disqualified OAS signatories to have way to the aggressor
nor to the United Nations. Because these means failed to
apply military strength (Article 53), the OAS informed the
activity to the Security Council but obviously did not take
it essential to get the sanction of the Council for their
compliance.

iv. The Dominican Case

But the Soviet delegate invoked a meeting of the
Security Council and insisted the Council to bestow its proper
confirmation, to the Ratification voted by the OAS, in oppo-
sition to Dominican Republic in this way be tried to set up

54. GAOR, 18th Session, Supplement No.2 (A/5302) pp.15-18;

55. SCOR, 15th Year Supplement for July, August and September

for July, August and September 1960 (3/4477, 5 September
a precedent for time to come, regarding the jurisdiction of the United Nations, to harmonise and check OAS, enforcement means, Soviet delegate asserted, without justification from the Security Council, adopting of enforcement means by regional arrangements would be inconsistent with United Nation's Charter.

The legal involvement was quite obvious Security Council would be claiming its jurisdiction to sanction equally to reject and Soviet Union would satisfactorily use the right to veto the judgement of the Council in these affairs. Earlier at Dumbarton Oaks the United States had clearly took in commercial, financial, and economic means, in the class of enforcement action, in its resolutions at Dumbarton Oaks and at Rio Pact. This issue is questionable. The United


61. At San Jose, Secretary of State Christian Herter's declaration, United States Department of State Bulletin, 5th September 1960, p. 336.
states reasoning that Security Council sanction should be restricted to enforcement action that includes the application of armed strength and should not be necessary for the restricted type of political and economic sanctions the OAS called in opposition to Dominican Republic though of recent origin surely had some worth. Obviously any independent nation can interrupt economic or diplomatic connections, or sever its communications with another nation. Why then confirmation of the Security Council be essential for the identical nature of task assumed by some nations either singly or by a number of nations acting in concert?

But because since 1943 some important experience has accumulated to back Soviet argument that financial and economic sanctions should be dealt upon as enforcement means under article 53 and for that reason subordinate to United Nations authority. Council members met to uphold United State's proposal and by a vote of 9 in favour none against with 2 abstentions sanctioned a resolution by which council only 'takes note', of the Regional means in opposition to the Dominican Republic. In any event United States backing rested on lawful or pragmatic principles is not quite obvious.


what is obvious is that the Security Council by its move bestowed considerable incentive, in this event to regional independence.

v. CUBA REVISIT

Yet additional encouragement resulted from the event of Cuba. While during 1962, 438 voted to hinder Cuba from entrance in the Inter American order and lay some economic sanctions upon it. Much efforts were made following Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, to show the legitimacy of American activity to prohibit ship consignments of Russian missiles by recourse to regional measures of legitimization. Regional vindications and functions were advanced by the American administrators to justify judgement proceeding that was markedly one sided and converged in United States government. This real model of choice requires to be compared with regional forms of nationalizations. A definition of the authoritative insistence that the forbiddance of Russian missiles exhibited a legal pleading of regional security was furnished by U.S.

officials. Cuba invoked the Charter debating in absence of Security Council confirmation such means were not legal. Naturally the United States partially took its stand on the model set up in Dominican case. But this time principal issue moved not so much round the claim of the USSR to use enforcement means consistent with Charter as it did round the universal relation in the United Nations and the regional organization. The Soviet Union seriously cautioned in opposition to the suitability to emancipate regional agency from the authority of the Security Council and stressed the dangers that were included in despotic move in Asia, Africa Latin America, if the regional organizations assumed the jurisdiction of the Security Council. The United States likewise seriously warned of the fatal effect of the Soviet veto and diminishing of regional attempts on account of peace if they were put under the guidance and authority of the Security Council. The United


68. SCOR, 17th Year 991 Meeting, 27 February 1962, p. 10.

States Ambassador Adal E. Stevenson asserted, central issue is if in any event a regional agency has the claim to conduct the matters itself and to guard itself against, a extraneous regime or whether Soviet Union is to be permitted to deprive of power, that arrangements activities by the use of veto rule in the Security Council.

Though conclusive votes were indecisive they appeared to confirm the issue, that Security Council’s veto or no veto should not be allowed to restrict regional enforcement activities of this nature.

One additional move was taken during October 1962 at the peak of the Cuban missile crisis. At that period the OAS Council sanctioned a resolution asking its signatories to adopt some means involving the application of military strength to maintain the direction pursued beforehand by the United States. This was an important incident amidst different events, it was the first time OAS had sanctioned the use of armed force. In rather ordinary events this possibly have roused a contest regarding authority in some due relation. At this instance

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71. SCOR, 1022 to 1025 Meetings 23 to 25 October 1962.
72. Annual Reports of Secretary General on the work of the organization, 16 June 1962 - 18, June 1963, GAOR, 18th Session, Supplement No.1 (A/5501) p.44.
nevertheless, the United States resorted both to the United Nations and to the OAS, invoking the two arrangements to assist in preventing a likely atomic danger. It is significant to mark that the United States obviously did not claim that it was essential to resort to the confirmation of the Council, in accordance with article 53, for the move assumed by the OAS in preference it rested its contention on the basis of regional independence and the claim of the OAS to take actual action beyond United Nation's intervention.

Although Soviet Union again objected but necessity for major nation mutual working came to be obvious, as an outcome the objection for legal authority was overlooked and both the arrangements co-operated to assist get a means out of this difficult situation. It is significant in these events the Soviet Union changed its dogmatic belief reference jurisdiction of the United Nations and OAS instead took a recent move as a chief protector of a powerful and expensive United Nations. The United States on its part, in defending the authority of the OAS has frequently experienced a difficult situation of objecting a powerful and effective part of the United Nations. The shift in policy is clearly owing to resolution on the side

of the United States to evade the result of Soviet veto resulting in relegation of Article 53 of the U.N. Charter. This fear had been expressed earlier. The United States did not deny the principle of the supremacy of the United Nations in the universal order but it subordinated those principles to the need of effective action for combating communism, what it took as vital policy considerations.

B. OAS, OAU, SEATO, CENTO, NATO:

Like OAS the OAU, has not been implicated in any dispute of authority with the United Nations in relation with collective means. In the opposite direction OAU sanctioned collective means involving breaking of diplomatic relations, a complete economic shut out of Republic of South Africa and Portugal to assist in the freedom of free African states.

Nations interpreted the meaning of enforcement action differently, in no manner did they claim the authority or capacity of the United Nations. Inspite of all this struggle fundamental relations in the regional arrangements and the United Nations continue to be the same nevertheless it is


clear, that the United Nations has given certain authority to OAS, but in all these events although they backed the United States numerous Latin American nations cautiously protected the claim of OAS Signatories to resort to the United Nations at any event.

By their actions and declarations, OAS the OAU, Arab League and to a minor degree SEATO, CEMTO, and NATO have either neglected the control of International organisation or adopted concrete moves to evade the checks above regional activity envisaged by the United Nations. In certain events, economic political and so much as enforcement action have been administered beyond the sanction of the Security Council, in other events the need for submitting the military sanctions to the United Nations seem to be disregarded or not taken notice of as an outcome the check of the Council to adjust or regulate the military sanctions of the regional arrangements has been seriously diminished. For instance, economic shutout of Israeli setup by Arab League in the out line of its policy to choke Israel, was neither consistent with the continued efforts of the (UN) to make better relationship in Israel and in its adjoining nations nor was the event stall reported to the Security Council for proper sanction. In view of the Dominican case during 1960 and Cuban event during January 1962.

Ambassador Francis Plimpton of the United States affirmed, on March 23, 1962, by its move that day Security Council had straight forwardly, determinately, upheld, entireness and competency of the regional arrangements, maneuvering the United Nations to a subordinate position, or rejected totally.

5. The Concept "Regional Arrangements" Clarification:

This regional structural groupings can either hinder of improve efforts of the International Organization in the peace and security sphere. These attempts depend partially upon particular subordinate system, in part on the universal background of the period and place, to a degree on a set of structure variables referring to supremacy, regional political influences, and awareness; for example, regionalism is an obstacle to the working of global organization in the Middle East, South Asia and the Latin America, but a supplement in Africa. Where OAU has contributed by collective effort.


A. Opposite Ideologies

Some evolutions towards regionalism have come out due to short comings of the United Nations. Global organization has frequently been incapable to accomplish influential operation in maintaining inter-state peace and security. The Security Council voting arrangement needs that the five permanent members approve any direction introduced for substantive activity, a regional grouping likely have an still substantial basis of agreement in its establishment manner of organization to agree. Regional arrangements aim, however, to defer governments adopting opposite ideologies, in the geographical limits of the region. Any one can scarcely think South Africa to be a member of Organization of African unity and Israel to be a member of Arab League. A remarkable occurrence of this inclination of regional groupings regarding provisional belonging on an expedient membership took place when Cuba was authoritatively debarred from sharing in the Inter-American System on the declared reason that the Cuban administration had adopted the ideas of communism, which was experienced to be contradictory to aims and purposes of the 82 Inter-American System.

B. Military Strategy

Treaties like regional arrangements for instance RCE, ASPAC and the Association of South Asian Nations likely strictly be viewed as advertising nourished plans, as affording a seat or somewhat places and as instruments of initiating and directing plans which likely, possibly lead to political unification in future.

Regional arrangements vary from conventional kind of alliances. It is significant to discriminate an organization of collective self defence in subject to Chapter VII of Charter of United Nations from a regional arrangement establishes according to Chapter VIII.

Why do national controls try to arrange and take part in regional arrangements? Do regionalizing trends have to do chiefly with stability, economic advancement, and racial unity? Regional organizations are a means to increase the capacity of regional rules to perform their duties and obtain their aim in to a specified social community. Regionalism and globalism can exist together except if their is a special

military strategy in coordination. Joining by its very nature, involve the removal of actions from the national plane to a regional state, and it possibly and finally direct to the mixing up of unconnected dominions into certain recent common union, Independent of a joining mission, the chief function of regional groupings possibly be to encourage national motives and declare international ideas without giving them any effect, like as in Africa where OAU is zealous, before every thing else to the victory of national spontaneous development for South Africa, Mozambique, Rhodesia, Angola, Namibia, and declaration of African fraternity.

In relation with military pacts in South Asia two doubts have been examined here and two logical conclusions have been advanced. Why has not much been accomplished, and how is it in the presence of so small accomplishment, have so many went on defending regionalism? The first doubt has two replies, SEATO and CENTO have not become successful in Southern Asia because initiation for planning then comes from outside of this region like United States, United Kingdom, and France, first for innumerable political disputes in Southern Asia, and second, for lack of harmony, even in those who defend it, regarding the common end aimed at in actual practice. That similar vagueness likewise aids to answer the second question. In great measure, regionalism go on alluring its advocates because idea is not clear and limits are not fixed. It appears
to assure distinct advantageous to different national statesman. To numerous persons, it is recovery of civilization, and possibly political, bond between Asian members, separated throughout European Colonial rule to another class, regional arrangement has meant to advance weak states a more firm security of security and defence. Gordon appears to set aside applicability of universal political system to the alternatives of regionalism in South Asia. In this regard Grant, Young furnish a right formation for replying to Gordon's minute examination, though powerful nations many a times have tried to expand their mutual struggles in Southern Asia yet this attempt has encountered greater obstructions in current period. On the Western direction, the SEATO and CENTO have not completely suited as a great factor in the politics of South Asia. Such practices are undesirable to international order. It is a supremacy of a major nation in a fixed geographical region.


c. Control and Containment

Political relations among the members of regional groups often pose difficult problems of dependency. A regional grouping likely be interested in problems of control and containment, the powerful state or the state that wishes to be powerful possibly may apply the cover of regionalism to misrepresent models of hegemony and to frame positions of reliance more agreeable to the weaker states. Likewise in entirely opposite way, a regional grouping can be utilized by recent emerging states to utilize to restrain even escape attempts of ascendency by the most powerful state. The two operations proceed side by side, even though in separate directions, one of them is more obvious. Moreover, subordinate and problem region characterization is discretionary to advantageous examination. In some regional environments the chief issue conceivably be more faint than in others, it likely be more manifest in certain regional organization that include one or the other powerful state as an agile member. There is an appearance of pan africanism, concerning individual or communal aspirations. This tendency has been frequently condemned as an appearance of revived imperialism like

90. Monroe Doctrine.


Like application of territorial excuse to intrude in an intra-regional conditions, is the connected question of offensive motives in opposition to a state situated in the region that has been debarred from being a member of the relevant organization. The entire issue of regional compulsion against an inconsistent nation is one of the fundamental problems of universal system. Everyone, South Africa, Israel, Taiwan, and Cuba are marks of an adverse regional hostility. As compulsion that rests on a compatible type of mutual worth accomplishment alone brings forth peace, while strong feelings and clashes merely go on when power is carried on that hinder to reach desired goal.

D. The Changing Concept:

There are restrictions on the right of regional groupings to apply power with or without sanction from the Security Council of the United Nations. But designs of political movements particularly justification of compulsion through OAS in opposition to Cuba, during 1962, in opposition to

91. Article 53 of the Charter.
Dominican Republic during 1965, equally belief of the government of President Johnson's on the NATO alliance framework to rationalize practicability of armed strength in the battle of Vietnam; fighting between Iran and Iraq, Falk Lands War, Israel, PHO War all are important examples of actual security activities in international scene scene, inconsistent with the spirit of charter.

Provisions of the Article 53(I) of the U.N. Charter, of measures which may be taken by a regional agency against former enemy states appears to disclose that the organization may transact as one unit with outside threats to its members however the chief push of the Chapter's provisions tend to internally and articles 53, 53(I), 54 clearly subordinate regional action taken by member nations, to the authority of Security Council. Consequently, NATO, CENTO, ANZUS, NATO, Pact, can not be ascertained as regional arrangements.

2. 'Regional and 'Global' in International System:
Major nations, in global order or groups of states in every direction of these major nations can be described

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94. The Hindu, Times, New Delhi, April 23, September 1960, Front Page.
clearly. Likewise regions of mutual action that advance 'quasi-autonomous', models of policy in global order can also be described clearly and ultimately arranged organizations of free nations on the ground of present regional arrangements in the established conviction can be described clearly. All these ideas help to comprehend the connection between 'regional' and global order in universal system. This study centers on 'regions', that are greater than a single sovereign nation and reciprocal action of these 'regions', with global 'order' and particularly the region southern Asia, its reciprocal action with other regions and with 'global order' as whole in universal system.

F. Theory and Practice

In a powerfully organized order of universal system where in certain pattern of global order would be very powerful still it would be necessary to honour, 'quasi-autonomy',


of weaker regions and regional arrangements. Blocs possibly appear to be inconsistent nearly by description with any strongly disarmed universal surrounding. Regional scheme for accomplishing peace with regional police strength and military capacity can be imagined. The accomplishment of such a scheme would be an example of a 'multibloc Utopia'. Because since last many years the world has been diverting 98 yearly, 350 billion at today's price (in 1978 it increased to $ 500 billion yearly during July 1980) to military efforts. Besides man power an economic strain cost in NATO itself is 100 three to ten times that costed in World War II.

6. SMALL STATE REGIONALISM AND THE THEORY OF MAJOR NATION GROWTH:

The term collective security signify the notion of pledge to oppose first breach of peace immaterial of the nation attempting it. This point is perplexing because many annotators and politicians have asserted upon naming multi-


100. Basic Principles for a Foreign Policy for Democratic Portugal, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Portugal, 1978, p.66.
lateral pacts, which came into existence after World War II, collective security groupings. Possibly they cautiously tried to shape larger quality of authorization on the recent military pacts by suggesting that they were merely change on the agreed rules of keeping security and peace. Use of the expression of these two exceedingly unlike advances to the issue of security has accomplished the bad intention aimed at of making expression very clouded, the primary and vital norms it was intended to outline.

It is advantageous to examine effects of adjustment possibility, in the surroundings of inter-relations among regional and universal performers. Some kinds of regional groupings will not only decrease universal co-ordination possibility more compared to other arrangements but will possibly reduce whatsoever materialization is present there. Unprotected weaker nations liable to be influenced by various powerful states, experience it almost unmanageable to adjust with their obligations in global organization, national


protection, and natural sovereignty. This has been the position of many weaker states in Europe and growingly in Middle East and Southern Asia. Regional arrangements round a paramount power are purely changed appearances of hegemony on smaller partners, they are not able to compel hegemonic powers to obey in protection from any other main power in case they were consistent with the letter of the Charter.

Weaker nations scarcely have enough power to arrange regional organisations, with power of recovering equilibrium of their own.

of regional arrangements
The Plan/sees a number of weaker nations should gather round a focal major power and collect economic, military, and other means in state of quiet and in state of conflict. This plan would give effect to an act of mutual dependence and the necessity for unification of means and promote scheme, for resisting attack. The weaker nations would offer to the local major power means and friendly working conditions and get in exchange actual amount of freedom help, and protection.

103. P. Talbot, 'South and South East Asia', Regional Arrangement for security and the United Nations, pp. 126-130


Clearly in the beginning there is a dismal prospect of the illusion of collective security, its practicability and involvement. Instead of a general and abstract compromise, there should be an actual balance in a nation's strength and its obligations undertaken limited to regions of strategic concerns.

Reasonably, the plan is doubtful about weaker nations. There legal competence, power, ability, to carry on free course of action with respect to another country, to protect themselves, or practice non-involvement in a war or conflict is challenged, their performances of economic independence go out of use, equilibrium of strength of governments are rejected, still a nuclear combination of major powers should stipulate the Universal System as unavoidably as a nuclear major power should sustain regional unification. A common universal arrangement is weakened to a subordinate position or almost disowned. This is more than redefining universal rule like that of concert. Leagues concept of universal democracy is substituted by universal feudalism an order of two sided


109. Liska, op. cit., p. 150.
obligations and legal claims based on regional connections in absence of ethical condition necessary for the right working of the order.

Nations very in ideas and strength. Major nations introduce an intentional grant ranging on relinquishing to geo-political necessatarianism in universal matters and unawarely try to enlighten principles of Germany and joint operation phrase of Japan in British and American experiments weaker nations are proceeding in opposite direction of a satellite.

Over-ruling nations try to control weaker nations and to adjust their legal regional interests with the rights of weaker countries.

Do regional groupings restrict or help the evolution of global instrumentalities? On the premise of earlier theory, impact of the limited including arrangements would serve to hinder the development of more covering global grouping (the


112. Liska, op. cit., p. 152.
United Nations) to the degree that restricted structures are prosperous in nearing their associates' objectives.

If regional politico-economical co-ordination is accomplished in the less advanced areas, concern of common states would apparently change to inside and aside from the United Nations. Such co-ordination has merely advanced importantly inside Western Hemisphere. Conduct of nations inside the non-Western areas is co-operative to United Nations. They repeatedly resort toward universal organization for balancing politico-economical inability by means of different political proportional representation strategy planned to derive from the prosperous nations the highest donation for economical advancement interests, slowly, nevertheless, a rudimentary acknowledgement of the use of regional collaboration is appearing and can develop in organizational structures of a transnational and multi-functional nature.

7. UNITED NATIONS, REGIONALISM AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY:

Wolfers remarked certain times the term collective security is used for organizations of any kind which involve the possibility of mutual military action against a nation.


For instance Dwight D. Eisenhower said world has progressed for the system of collective security with the admittance of alliances like NATO and Baghdad Pact.

But military pacts in the name of regional arrangements organized beyond the United Nations, permitted by article 51 of the United Nation’s Charter, is not collective security, supposed to be the basis of United Nations, but mere toying of words.

The international decision in 1945 was clearly to give superior power to general international organization. What President meant was to assist nations struggling to hold their freedom against communist compulsion or overthrow. Military blocs hinder the workings of United Nations. But because of its ideological belief United States does not believe to give preference, to provide, even sell weapons, to an association, that hold absolute policy of neutrality, a pre-condition for

118. Report to the President on the Results of the San Francisco Conferences, by the Chairman of the United States Delegation, The secretary of state, U.S. Department of State Publication 2349 Conference;
Swedish participation during during 1949. The Scandinavian Defence talk fallout on Sweden's insistence on strict neutrality.

Regional military facts possibly have their reason for existence, the choice to apply military force in events other than those provided by the Charter, or, to state distinctly to accomplish the Charter's aims, purposes activities under events of political standstill of the Security Council. There are several considerations of different importance for universal system underlying at the back of the idea. If regional operation issues from common incapacity to move unanimity in the Security Council of the United Nations, the illustration of regional motives would incline to be more convincing than if military bloc operation contends with the United Nations Charter (for instance, by being assumed for aims other than accomplishment of just demands of individual or collective self-defence). A regional organization like wise is satisfactory in some degree in superior universal estimation if it is a real means of nations unanimity, and not merely disguise for

121. Chris Prebenesen, Norway and NATO, Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo, Norway, 1976, p.11.

the extraneous policy motives of a major nation or conceptually joined number of nations like SEATO and CENTO. The application of the OAS as a legal pretext for intrusion of the arbitrary choice of the United States administration in some events of dispute in Latin America shows to certain extent American effort, to confirm to activity at territorial surface by partaking in the International Organization plan. The trust on SEATO grouping to rationalize American engagement in the Vietnam dispute, in Johnson's time is a similar attempt. The intention was to rally peoples backing for armed activity, by backing regard for the United Nation's considerations and fixing a international foundation for carrying on battle.

There is a difficult connection between regionalism and universalism. Theory of major power's sphere of action is liable to be criticized, if looked as a universal medicine for international durability. It assumes that mutual regional balance is made easy by regionally controlled Major power orders. Yet this scarcely is possibly except if regional arrangements come to an understanding of identical ideas.


This arrangement would demand giving up of by powerful states regional control for balance, in the Universal System. It is doubtful such arrangements of harmony and protection can go on if main power is withdrawn from the global organization and centered with regional blocs. A greater serviceable access to universal system than a sequence of unrestricted regional blocs is one in which regional blocs are under the control and authority of the global arrangement. This balanced opinion, nevertheless, demand a powerful global organization as a peace attempting instrumentality, one envisaged by the framers of the Charter. So far powerful states would charge regional organizations trustworthy means for peace and protection, in preference to global organization, the global organization will be helpless as a peace attempting instrumentality and the universal Regional balance assumed will produce no effect. Moreover, recent tendencies for regional unification will possibly slacken global unification in case unification of regions and their existing side by side in mutual toleration with the global organization will emphasize their individuality and emi concerns. The global order will then


128. David Mitrovic, 'The Prospect for Integration: Federal or Functional', op.cit., pp. 119-149. Ernst B. Haas,

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continue to be in the same place as at present time a place for reducing clashes and raising general concerns in respectful compliance to least general prospect. The principles of the charter forbidding aggressive application of power are certainly applicable to the competitive powerful states in spite of the truth that their enforcement in present circumstances can not be given effect to through United Nations. The Charter released the United Nations, from the attempt to compel these principles in opposition to major nations; nevertheless it does not release the influential states from the duty to honour these norms. Further the United Nations is legally sufficient in the impression that it hold a diversity of means which may be applied to effect the combat of chief countries in the direction of each other and the direction of weaker states to encourage the regulation of clashes. The regional arrangements are the groupings of strength legal in the turning point in dominant polity connections. The legality of the United Nations is of a separate nevertheless not necessarily of subordinate rank.

It is sure that the United Nations will not be powerful enough to operate so great and positive part in the event of

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129. Ibid., p. 392.
straightforward continued hostile attitude of leading domains
for instance in Berlin. The United Nations has been successful
chiefly in those fights where predominant nations have not
come face to face like during Suez crisis of 1956 and during
Congo Crisis of 1960 and role played by U.N. peace keeping
forces in Middle East. However, principal nations have evaded
direct confrontation for the reason they completely compre-
end, direct contaposition leads to total destruction. In
these fights United Nations peace forces have worked as
delegates of mediation, to tie away the region in conflict
from the straightforward conflict of the main powers. This
is by far, rather very moderate part for the global organisa-
tion than was envisaged by the framers of the Charter consid-
dering that these universal peace forces were put to profi-
table use merely in agreement with nation concerned in pre-
ference to acting by itself as a compelling strength in the
conflict.

130. Inis L. Claude, "The Containment and Resolution of
Disputes", Francis Wilcox and R Field Haviland, The
United States and the United Nations, Baltimore,
"The United Nations and the Use of Force", op. cit.,
pp. 337-368.

131. The Kingdom of Netherlands, Foreign Policy, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Government Printing Office Hague
9. **Concluding Observations:**

Substitution of regional arrangements into military pacts, because of lack of faith in the United Nations, emergence of small nations, racial trends, ambiguity in the extension of nations and the recurrent attacks of power on the principles of the world organization. All help to deviate central universal diplomatic power. Change of importance from the international organization to military pacts by itself point out and explain breaking up trends in the United Nations. The uselessness of accomplishing unanimity in the center of international society, as a result of extreme conflict caused, nations to search additional interstate arrangements which could possibly be more serviceable and practicable. In a way then rising disposition to adhere to Military Pacts soon after the establishment of the United Nations meant a change from the politics of friendship to the diplomacy of opposition.

A system resting on military pacts is diametrically opposed to the presupposition of easily manageable balance. Its theoretical basis is to favour one region more and subordination on each side. A weaker nation can not apply even trace of government determination without extraneous impulse and mutual direction with different other nations, in its diplomatic relations. Its so-called freedom and authority are withdrawable suitability by a major nation and a grant to the fundamentals of national self direction opposed to self rule.
The major nation has complete authority in the absence of co-relative duties. The weaker nations keep up responsibilities without corresponding rights, the responsibilities lacking a standing among different nations in diplomatic relations. Existence of military pacts in the name of regional arrangements has rendered in recent Europe and Southern Asia, the great mutual action display of Colonialism, comprising a corrupt system of indirect control, the subordinate nation is a means for the major nation's protection, success territorial extension it can only anticipate to accumulate the occasional casual profits of its subserving position.

Viewed in direction of past events the inclination of a local country to insist upon a regional authority look as normal and liberty of unprotected weaker nations as a combination of chance and fiction. The United States removed in regular succession every external intervention in its path, same has been the ambition of Germany and Russia. Upto the present time method of military pacts in the name of regional arrangements though manipulated and practiced at intervals have not been prosperous in recent state order at any time.

132. George Liska, 'Geographic scope, op.cit., pp.142-143.
There is a clear mutual connection in universal and regional groups, which possibly be converted either in reciprocal restrengthening helpful to each and every participation or simple unilateral superiority. For example when regional associations exclude the United Nations and avoid certain interterritorial incidents while get rid of other events by transferring them on to general organization or in complete inconsistency. The Inter-American and Britain's Common-wealth associations include chiefly both previous chances. Soviet bloc is the obvious pattern of the basic disagreement among independent regional military facts, organization and meaning of the universal groupings. A less surprising difference likely be visible in a particular incident concerning the use of United Nations. In this regard the America unwarily cooperated with Russia to afford an important example.

It rotates round the related shapes of Laos, Vietnam, Korea and Guatemalan events. All these features set up a

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sort of reverse resemblance. The Communist permeated Guatemalan regime in the Western Hemisphere signify nearly the same to the America as the favourable American South Korea in the larger country of Asia to Communist China and Soviet Union. The general agreement was being in a small nation of a governmental administration opposite and hostile to regional major nation, which looked upon the region as portion of its authentic geo-political sphere of action. It likely be disputed that America by its position in Japan was a local nation concerning Korea, also, but such a defence will scarcely be acknowledged by the Communist bloc. These are obvious doubtful outstanding features of the theoretical weakness and the diplomatic risks intrinsic in the over ride of major nation's belt model. In the two events, the wish arising from ideological and governmental similarities in its safety zone induced the local major nation to force and powerfully try to get rid of the disagreeing element. The regional prevailing nation explained it as a revolutionary war, while the distant great power, eager to retain its foot diagnosed it as hot war, a breach of peace. When both the acts of aggression Korea and Guatemalan were put to world organization, the America and Russia took in every event a posture to collective enforcement nearly contrary to that adopted in the former event. Both the power blocs argued for their on outposts.

The single agreement in the occurrence was that the distant major nation in the two events supported collective operation, and the regional pre-eminent nation in-activity on the part of the United Nations.

Nearly each idea of Brezhnev Doctrine can be detected to an earlier claim of similar ex rights by the United States versus Latin America. In the two contrary events to the complications of the Military Pacts exists the rivalry of two power blocks. There the controversy of a mutual operation of a weaker or major nation as a member of a regional arrangement or United Nations does not in deed come into view.

In the United Nations major nations, who have a right of veto in the Security Council, are legally enabled to rule large areas of the world outside their frontiers. This is precisely as it should be, because either super powers will


rule the community or it will not be ruled at all. But in so far as it worked effectively the Security Council will be indistinguishable from the superior politics. The militarily weaker states would be policed by the powerful countries. It is not a happy choice. But in this case it conceivably will not prove unhappy since the so-called veto means influential nations will not police each other. This again is as it should be. Because any such effort would spell world war and not universal peace. But the existence of United Nations makes it practicable that the troubles of regions possibly be decided by words in the Security Council and General Assembly rather than by bullets in a dispute.