The history of the Middle East conflict goes back well over half a century and more specially to 1948, the year the British terminated their mandate in Palestine. It was the Balfour Declaration of 1917 which sowed the seeds of perennial enmity between the Arabs and Jews—the communities which had learnt to live together in peace and amity for centuries past. One of the factors that rendered the situation more complex and averse to a solution were the mutually contradictory promises that the big powers of the day held out to the parties involved.

All this had its spill-over on the international scene, so much so that the problem seems to be going farther and still farther away with the passage of time. Today, it is by far the most complex and vital problem that the world body is called upon to disentangle. Its human aspect is the amelioration of the plight of a huge mass of refugees deprived of their homes and hearths, while its political aspect is the threat it poses to world peace.
and security which has been endangered repeatedly in the past and is again take the world to the brink of a disaster.

In all fairness to the United Nations, the body has attempted to do what it could do diffuse the situation and bring peace to the tormented land, through protracted negotiations in the General Assembly and in the Security Council over more than a quarter of a century. From the Partition Plan for Palestine adopted by the General Assembly in 1947 until the Security Council resolution of 1967 affirming the need to "establish" a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, the United Nations has made persistent efforts to resolve the dangerous conflict in the area.

However, the big-power rivalry in the area has awkwardly enough placed the credibility of the U.N. at stake.

Were it not for their own narrow ends that the Big powers pursued treating the United Nations as their plaything and exploiting the forum of this
August World Body, its authority and credibility would not stand so awkwardly eroded as it does today.

The role of the U.N. in the Arab Israeli conflict began with the frustration of the British Government's plan for the future set up of Palestine in 1947 at the hands of the Zionists.

It was on February 14, 1947, that Aneurin Bevin terminated the Conference proceedings with the announcement - the momentous announcement, as it turned out to be - that Britain had decided to refer the entire Palestine problem to the United Nations. The cost of supporting one hundred thousand British soldiers in Palestine and the even more incalculable loss of a running battle with American and world opinion, could no longer be borne. It was Bevin's final admission of failure. (1)

Bevin's failure, along with those of his predecessors, can be interpreted as a "Failure of communication". He and the Jewish leaders could never

A special session of the General Assembly was called in April at the request of the British Government to "place the question of Palestine on the agenda of the General Assembly at its next regular Annual Session and summon a special session to constitute and instruct a special committee to prepare for the consideration of the question by the regular session."

The subject was deliberated at two sessions of the General Assembly which appointed the UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) to consider the problem.

The UNSCOP submitted to the General Assembly two plans, a majority plan and a minority plan. The former proposed termination of the mandate and partition of Palestine into two states, an Arab State and a Jewish State, with economic union between them, and a corpus separatum for the city of Jerusalem under an international regime to be administered by the U.N. The minority plan did not differ with

+ See Appendix No.1, p.
with the majority plan in as much as it also recommended the termination of the mandate, but it proposed the establishment of a federal State comprising an Arab State as well as a Jewish State with Jerusalem as the capital. (3)

The conditions which the UNSCOP discovered in Palestine were much the same as the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry had found through the year which followed the latter's investigation and rendered the situation even more distressing. UNSCOP assessed the situation as such.

"The atmosphere in Palestine today is one of profound tension. In many respects the country is living under a semi-military regime. In the streets of Jerusalem and other key areas barbed wire defences, road blocks, machine gun posts and constant armoured car patrols are routine measures. In areas of doubtful security Administration officials and the military forces

live within strictly policed security zones and work within fortified and closely guarded buildings. Freedom of personal movement is liable to be severely restricted and the curfew and martial law have become not an uncommon experience. (4)

The Arabs rejected the partition proposal as they argued that it violated their rights and was incompatible with law and justice and with the principles of democracy. They also held that the U.N. was not competent to recommend the partition of their homeland into two states and thus to destroy its territorial integrity.

Before the resolution was finally adopted by the Plenary session of the General Assembly, a vigorous debate took place in the first Committee between protagonists of the Arab and Jewish points of view on the operation. Representatives of the Jewish Agency and Arab High Committee of Palestine were also

afforded an opportunity to place their views on record. Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia made an unsuccessful attempt to have "the termination of the Mandate over Palestine and the declaration of its independence", placed on the agenda.

But all delegates agreed that independence for Palestine was the ultimate objective. The Arab representatives, however, stressed that independence was the real issue, all that was necessary was to apply the principles of the Charter and declare Palestine as an independent democratic State. The only proper way, in their view, to make the General Assembly become seized of the issue, was to notify the termination of the Mandate and submit a draft Trusteeship Agreement preparatory to Palestine's emergence as a sovereign State.

The USSR Representative expressed the view in the General Assembly that the task of the UNSCOP was "to reconcile the Lawful interests of Arabs and Jews in Palestine, if possible by the creation of a single Arab-Jewish State with equal rights for Arabs and Jews, and if not, by two separate States, one Arab

and one Jewish". This marked a shift in the earlier policy of the Soviet Union and the Palestine Communist Party favouring the creation of an Arab State of Palestine. Von wanted that no instructions be issued by Governments to members of the Committee. (6)

Meanwhile the other side resorted to intense lobbying, canvassing and pressurizing to secure a UN vote in favour of partition.

In Palestine the war between the British Army and the Jewish terrorists was continuing unabated. In the meantime, the threatened reprisal and the death sentences were carried out. On July 27, 1947, the three Iraqi members were executed; four days later the two British hostages were found hanging from a tree, their bodies badly trapped. When an officer arrived to cut down the bodies, a booby-trap exploded, wounding the officer and destroying a body. (7) This incident received wide publicity and a feeling against the terrorists. Another affair, that of the Exodus (8)

(6) Ibid., p.171
(7) New York Herald Tribune, August, 1947
(8) C.F.p.67 for the reaction on British feelings.
1947, which was drawn but over two months and followed constantly by reports in the Press evoking compassion, stirred deep resentment in Palestine.

In August, 1947, the UNSCOP members unanimously (10) approved the following eleven recommendations and adopted a twelfth with two abstentions.

1. The Mandate for Palestine should be terminated at the earliest practicable date.

2. Independence should be granted in Palestine at the earliest practicable date.

3. A short transitional period should precede the granting of independence.

4. During the transitional period, the authority entrusted with the task of administering Palestine and preparing it for independence should be responsible to the United Nations.

5. In any solution adopted, provisions should be made for the protection of religious rights and for safeguards to the Holy Places.

6. The General Assembly should undertake steps whereby the distressed European Jews, of whom approximately 250,000 are in assembly centers, will be dealt with as a matter of extreme urgency for the alleviation of their plight and the Palestine problem.


(10) UNGAOR, A.1364, pp.105-121.
7. The United Nations should ensure that the Constitution of the new State or States in Palestine is basically democratic.

8. The Constitution of the new State or States should provide for the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means and should accept the obligation to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purpose of the United Nations.

9. The preservation of economic unity should be accepted as a cardinal principle in any solution to the Palestine question.

10. Extra-territorial rights in Palestine should be announced by all States holding them.

11. The General Assembly should call on the peoples of Palestine to extend their fullest cooperation to the United Nations in its effort to provide a solution to the Palestine problem.

12. In the appraisal of the Palestine question, it should be accepted as incontrovertible that any solution for Palestine cannot be considered as a solution of the Jewish problem in general.

UNSCOP need present a majority plan for partition with economic union, agreed to by the delegates of Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden and Uruguay and a minority plan for a Federal State for Palestine agreed by the delegates of India.
Iran and Yugoslavia. The majority plan was drawn up on the promise that the claims of the Arabs and Jews to Palestine were irreconcilable and political separation was necessary but in view of the limited area and resources of Palestine, economic unity should be preserved. The minority plan on the other hand was developed because its proponents felt that partition was impracticable, unworkable and anti-Arab; a federal state solution would better serve the interests of both Arabs and Jews in maintaining the political and economic unity indispensable to the life and development of the country.

A majority of the Committee recommended partition and the establishment of independent Jewish and Arab States, to be joined in an economic union, and internationalization of Jerusalem. This partition would follow a transitional period of two years.

(11) The Australian member voted for neither Plan on the ground that the Committee, according to its terms of reference, should confine its work to reporting, recording and fact-finding and that political decisions should be left to the General Assembly (U.N.) G.A. Vol.11, Appendix 1, p.23.


(13) Ibid., pp.147-150.
beginning September 1, 1947 under the administration of the present Mandatory Power working under the auspices of the United Nations.

As a result the UN General Assembly on 29 November, 1947, by a vote of 33 to 13 with 10 abstentions, such as the Arabs resented and resisted, the result came out in the form of a resolution for the partition of Palestine retaining the fundamentals of the majority plan.(14)

The partition resolution sought to divide Palestine as follows:-

1) To the Jewish State it gave more than 56% of the total area, i.e. 5,500 sq.miles more than 13 times what the Jews owned in land property.

2) To the Arab State was given only 42% of the whole country, although the Arabs constituted 67.5% of the population and owned more than 94% of the total area.

3) 497,000 Arabs were placed under the domination of the Jewish State.

4) An international zone including Jerusalem

was created with 6.5% of the area assigned to it.\footnote{15}

The adoption of this resolution set off a chain of protests, demonstrations, and disturbances in Palestine. The events that followed in quick succession made it impossible for the Palestine Commission (appointed by the General Assembly to implement the Partition resolution) to exercise its functions.

If the Jews lent cooperation to the Commission for the implementation of the Plan as suggested by Halpern,\footnote{17} they were motivated more by an urge to consolidate their position and legalise their illegal existence rather than by any respect or honour for the verdict of the world body as has been amply borne by their attitude characterised by scant respect or regard for the latter during the past quarter of


\footnote{17}. Halpern, \textit{The Idea of the Jewish State}, p.376
Another resolution which, if adopted by the UN, could yield far-reaching positive results is that proposed by the 37 Arab and non-aligned nations for granting the Palestinian people the right of self-determination, sovereignty, national independence and to restore to them their rights. Preparations are to have this proposal put to vote.

Similarly the efforts of the 26 countries that come up with another resolution demanding an observer right for the P.L.O. at the U.N.O. its participation in all the conferences of U.N.O. has been accepted in the face of stiff opposition from Israel and its supporters, and Yasser Arafat, the P.L.O. leader and the spokesman of Palestinians was invited to speak from the rostrum on behalf of those whom he represented.

The text of the 1st resolution is as under:

The General Council after considering the Palestinian problem, after hearing the statements of the P.L.O. representative of the Palestine people and after hearing the other statements during the discussion
expresses her great dissatisfaction, because, the Palestinian people have been deprived of their lawful rights especially the right of self-determination.

In the light of objectives and principles of the U.N.O. Charter it reasserts its earlier resolutions which reiterate the right of the Palestinian people for self-determination.

1. The General Council of U.N.O. asserts again the following rights of the Palestinian people in Palestine:
   (a) Self-determination without foreign interference.
   (b) Right of national independence and sovereignty

2. It also asserts again the lawful right of Palestinians to return to their lands and properties from where they have been expelled.

3. It also asserts that the rehabilitation of their all rights is very necessary for the solution of Palestine problem.

4. It recognizes that Palestine people are a basic party for establishing a just and permanent peace in the Middle East.
5. It recognizes also that the Palestinian people have right to adopt every lawful means to regain their just rights according to the objectives and principles of the U.N.O. Charter.

6. It appears to all countries and all international Organizations to increase their assistance for the Palestinian people in their struggle to regain their rights according to the U.N.O. Charter.

7. It demands that the General Assembly of U.N.O. should contact the P.L.O. in all the matters concerning with the Palestine problem.

8. It demands the General Secretary to put a report in the General Assembly during its 30th Session about implementation of this resolution.

9. It decides to insert the Palestine problem under a separate heading in the agenda of 30th Session. (17A)

CEASEFIRE WITHOUT PEACE

Since the end of the fighting between the Jewish State and the Arab countries in June 1967, the

situation in the Middle East has returned to what it was before the war — "a Cease-fire" without peace. The prisoners were exchanged between Israel and Jordan; "Israel returned to Jordan the prisoners of war she had taken and two Israeli Air Force pilots who had been shot down over an Iraqi airfield were returned to Israel. On July 27th the prisoners were exchanged between Syria and Israel; and on January 1968, the exchange of prisoners with Egypt was completed."

Along the Cease-fire line, there had been quite numerous exchange of fire, and serious clashes had taken place on the Suez Canal. On October 21, 1967, the Egyptian Navy sank the Israeli destroyer Bilat (1,710 tons) off the Sinai Coast. A U.A.R. spokesman declared it sunk within Egypt's 12-mile territorial sea-limits, and was believed to have been on an "aggressive" reconnaissance mission. On October 26, 1967, the Israeli

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artillery fired on two oil refineries in the city of Suez.

The emergency Session of the UN General Assembly opened on June 17, 1967, decided on July 21 to end its discussions, and charged the Security Council with taking care of the situation in the Middle East. In the course of the Assembly's discussions, a Soviet proposal "to blame the aggressive actions of Israel and to obligate her to immediately and unconditionally withdraw all armed forces from the territories conquered in the June fighting and to pay compensation to the Arab countries for damages suffered in the War", was rejected. The Assembly also rejected an Indian-Yugoslav proposal, as well as one by the Latin-American countries, which, even with their milder formulation, also demand Israeli withdrawal from the occupied areas. On the other hand, the Assembly decided, by a large majority of votes (ninety-nine votes with eighteen abstentions)\(^{(21)}\) to call on Israel not to change the status of Jerusalem.

Even earlier also, (June 14, 1967) the Security Council had called upon Israel to safeguard the peace and the security of the inhabitants who had fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities.\(^{(22)}\)

The General Assembly, on 4 July 1967, confirmed the Security Council Resolution No. 237, concerning the safety of the inhabitants and the return of displaced persons. On the same day the General Assembly, expressed deep concern for the measures taken by Israel to change the status of the Holy City of Jerusalem and considered the measures as null and void.\(^{(24)}\)

**THE RESOLUTION 242, NOVEMBER 22nd 1967**

After protracted discussions and consultations and after several efforts both in the Security Council and the General Assembly a British-sponsored compromise


\(^{(24)}\). General Assembly No. 2253 of 4 July 1967.
resolution was unanimously adopted by the Security Council on November 22, 1967 and was later known as Resolution 242. The text of the resolution is as follows:

**RESOLUTION 242 (1967) of 22 NOVEMBER 1967**

The Security Council,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1. Affirms that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

   (1) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from

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territories occupied in the recent conflict;

(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for an acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

(2) Affirms further the necessity,

(a) for guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;

(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;

(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

(3) Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist
efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible."(26)

THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE REFUGEE QUESTION:

The Arab refugee question was one of the main issues debated in the session of the General Assembly at the end of 1948 that led to the creation of the "Palestine Conciliation Commission".(27) The results of that session regarding Palestine were summed up in the Resolution 194 (III) of December 11, 1948. Paragraph 11 of the resolution dealt specifically with the Palestinian refugee problem, and defined the position of the international agreement in the following terms:

The General Assembly, having considered further

(26). Adopted Unanimously at the 1382nd meeting.
the situation in Palestine,

(11) Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible;
Instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation of the refugees and the payment of compensation; and to maintain close relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and through him, with the appropriate organs and Agencies of the United Nations.

There were also more than 27 resolutions

assessing the rights of the Palestinian refugees, and reaffirm the resolution No.194 of December 11, 1948, concerning the refugees' rights to return and compensation.

Israel continued stubbornly to refuse allowing the refugees to return to their homes and compensating them for their lost property.

On December 10, 1964, the General Assembly:

Recognizing that the problem of the Palestinian Arab Refugees has arisen from the denial of their inalienable rights under the Charter of the United Nations and the universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Generally concerned that the denial of their rights has been aggravated by the reported acts of collective punishment, arbitrary detention, curfews, destruction of homes and property,

Desirous of giving effect to its resolutions for relieving the plight of the displaced persons and the refugees,

1) Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of Palestine;

2) Draws the attention of the Security Council to the grave situation resulting from Israeli policies and practices in the occupied territories and Israel's refusal to implement the above resolutions;

3) Requests the Security Council to take effective in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations to ensure the implementation of these resolution. This resolution was also rejected by Israel.

The Security Council's Resolution No. 89 of November 17, 1950:

The first part of this resolution dealt with the refugees (The eviction of one thousand Palestinian Arabs)

a) Calls upon the parties to deal with this question through the Armistice Commissions.

b) Calls upon the Governments concerned to refrain from any future action affecting the transfer of persons across international boundaries or the

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truce lines without prior consultation through the Armistice Commission. (31)

NATURE OF ISRAEL’S REFUSAL TO IMPLEMENT THE RESOLUTION

1) The Armistice Commission met and decided that the one thousand Palestinian Arabs should return to area from which they were evicted, but Israel did not respond to this decision.

ii) Instead, Israel evicted more Arabs from the area of Negew. (32)

THE REFUGEE PROBLEM: THE ARAB AND ISRAELI VIEWPOINTS

(1) ISRAELI POINT OF VIEW

Israel maintained that the readmission of all the refugees was utterly unrealistic and out of question and that any decision in this regard could be taken only as a part of the over-all political settlement, which would transform the existing armistice agreements into formal peace treaties.

Israel does not accept the resolutions of U.N.O. on Palestine. She thinks that the solution of this problem are the means based what it calls on certain foreign powers. Following the development of

events that took place after the Palestine war, Israel always insisted on holding direct negotiations with her Arab neighbours to solve her differences with them and make a compromise which may result in peace and stability to Palestine. On the 1st. December, 1952 it had published a blue paper on its peace policy highlighting the following problems:

1. **Peace Problem**: Israel considers her armistice agreements with the Arab countries between February and August, 1949 as a basis to start the peace negotiations.

2. **Boundary Problem**: Israel agrees to vacate whole or a part of the occupied lands, but rejects to implement the division scheme. But does not resist to make some "demarcation lines of the four armistice treaties of 1949(34) which caused partition of some villages and reunification of the separated parts on the basis of an exchange between Arab and its occupied regions to ensure the stability of the people who live in these regions.

3. **Refugee Problem**: Israel holds the Arab countries responsible for the flight of these refugees on account of the war allegedly waged by them against her and, therefore, it is the Arabs who must bear the consequences of war themselves. As such she does not accept the principles of return of these refugees to their native lands, because firstly, it is not possible physically to take back all of them on account of a large continent of Jews who, by casualties or under duress have

been made to immigrate from Europe and Arab countries, and secondly it would have defeated the Zionist aims.

4. Economic Aspects: Israel faced economic and monetary hardships. For, the Arab boycott and the economic barriers imposed against her by the Arabs weakened her ability to pay the compensation. 35 This argument is no longer tenable, since a State which can roll billions of dollars worth of arms to keep its war machine in a state of combat readiness, and has incurred a disproportionately big expenditure on account of the wars that is waged against the Arabs can not plead its inability to pay compensation to the refugees.

5. Regional Cooperation and Relations between Arabs and Jews: Arabs and Jews may cooperate with each other by restoring the communications freedom, contributing in social and medical fields and by cultural and scientific exchange, especially in technical and assistance for over-all developments and non-hindrance of the efforts made in the way of such cooperation. Israel is very keen on an immediate accord with the Arab countries on the basis of equality and sovereignty and it is in the interest of Israel to improve her diplomatic relations with her Arab neighbours as a preliminary step for making progress and prosperity.

ARAB POINT OF VIEW

The Arab countries regard the refugee and Palestine problem in its entirety as an indispensable part of their own. They feel that the responsibility

lies on their shoulder, because the Palestinians under the protection of the League of the Nations and Protectorate Powers, became scattered in many countries with whom they have no religious and sentimental ties and this ultimately led to the calamities and sufferings that became this lot and put them in the crucible of fire.

These people have no Government or central power to speak on their behalf, defend their liberties and protect their entities from both the imperial designs and religious prejudices. But now all the Arab world has stood up to speak on their behalf and defend their rights.

1. Peace Problem: Arab countries will never be at peace with Israel unless she specifies her stand vis-a-vis the resolutions of the U.N.O. adopted on Palestine. But since Israel has not honoured these resolutions, the Arab countries have not agreed to make detente with her although this has resulted in continuous Zionist expansion and complete usurpation of the Palestinians' right.

2. Boundary Problem: The Arabs demand to implement the
U.N. Resolution No.181 regarding the division plan of Palestine and start the process of taking back the refugees to the Arab regions under Israeli occupation.

3. Refugee Problem: The Arab countries agreed on the proposals of employment and rehabilitation of the refugees in their homelands. But these proposals adopted till now do not take into account more than half of the numbers of the refugees. And recommends the release of their deposits frozen in the Israeli banks as already recommended by the International Reconciliation Commission and calls upon Israel to give compensation for the assets left behind by them in the areas now under Israeli occupation.

THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE (UNEF) : A new "weapon for peace" as it was called, was created by the General Assembly in the autumn of 1956 as a result of the deliberations of a special emergency session held on 5 and 7 November 1956 to help resolve the grave crisis that compounded the Middle East because of the tripartite invasion of Egypt by the armed forces of Great Britain, France and Israel.
The UNEF, though designed as a temporary police force in response to a crisis situation has come to stay as an honest Supervisor of Peace in a strife-torn troubled situation. It proved a positive step in the United Nations preventive diplomacy as proved during the Suez Crisis of 1956 as well as on numerous other similar occasions.

The United Nations Emergency Force's practical job in the early phase of its operation was to ensure quit by mere United Nations presence. The United Nations soldiers reported upon the observation of the cease-fire, policed the Zone between the opposing forces, and guaranteed order while taking over from the Anglo-French Israeli troops, following the successive stages of their withdrawal from the Suez Canal area and the Sinai Peninsula. The British and French had wanted the Force to be stationed along the canal, after their own withdrawal and pending a settlement of the Suez question, backed by the Soviet Union. Egypt firmly opposed such a move, it would violate United Nations assurances that UNEF would not be used in any way to affect the political balance in the Middle East.
At midnight of November 6, the cease-fire was instituted, nine days later, the first Units of UNEF troops entered Port Said. Britain and French, through their delegates speaking in the Assembly on November 21 and 24 respectively, made known their willingness to withdraw their troops as soon as the United Nations Force 'becomes effective and competent to discharge its functions. Quoting Mr. Pearson, the Israeli delegate asserted that there is a relationship between the withdrawal of the forces and the arrival and functioning of the United Nations Force. Accordingly each invading State, despite considerable protests, made the effective functioning of UNEF a prerequisite to withdrawal of their forces.

It was on 3 December that Britain and France publicly confirmed their belief that an effective police force was arriving in Egypt and in consequence, instructed their Allied Commander, General Keightely, to negotiate with the Commander of UNEF regarding a


(37). Ibid., p.275

(38). Speech by the delegate at the 11th Session, 26 November 1956—p.337.
time table for withdrawal. Thus, between 15 November and 22 December the day when Anglo-French troops left the Suez Canal area, UNEF soldiers, operating mainly in the vicinity of Suez, were required to act as a shield between the Anglo-French and Egyptian forces through occupation of a buffer zone.

The UNEF made arrangements for and undertook supervision of the exchange between Egypt and the Anglo-French Command of hundreds of prisoners, detainees, and internees. Investigation of complaints and inquiries on the part of both the invaders and the invaded regarding matters of cease-fire violations, smuggling, and missing personnel was undertaken by the United Nations soldiers. Administration of public utilities, finance, communications, fuel and food distribution, legal affairs, safety, health and damage claims were surrendered to the Emergency Force by the withdrawing armies and turned over to the Egyptian authorities. Similar duties devolved upon the Force in the Sinai Peninsula where centred the second period of activities.

from December to March 1957.

In sum, the mission of the United Nations Emergency Force was not completely clarified and the Assembly's resolution left UNEF somewhat at the mercy of time and circumstances and daily events. The Emergency Force has not played role in the definitive settlement of long standing problems in the Middle East. Nonetheless, it has by its action and its presence helped to avert further hostilities possibly even an extended war and to achieve an atmosphere of calm and quite along the Egypt-Israel frontier. The United Nations Emergency Force remains after all, of great value as a background for efforts towards resolving pending problems, although it is not in itself a means to that end.

In creating the UNEF to help effect peaceful conditions in Egypt and Israel, the General Assembly had indeed moved with vigour and imagination. The States of the United Nations were able, at a moment of acute danger, to establish a general consensus, to move along

the middle way the road of compromise which has not failed to lead towards success.

First in accomplishment was the realization of peace. Immediate danger of world war was averted and the invasion retained its character of an incursion - a 'Sinai Campaign'.

Although Soviet and American pressure no doubt exercised considerable influence upon the British, French and Israeli Governments to cease-fire and to withdraw, the genesis of a neutral police force, designed for the purpose of supervision, control, and representation, was of cardinal importance. UNEF represented a 'face-saving' mechanism for the parties to the conflict. It established a United Nations presence in zones of special sensitivity in the Middle East. It undertook grave tasks at times of keenest tension. The UNEF itself, unique machinery for peace making, was a triumph for international organization. As such, the Force helped to raise the prestige of the world assembly and the authority of its Secretary-General. His 'Office' has developed into field action of so
extensive a character that wide diplomacy and security responsibilities seed 'naturally' to have gravitated to that office.

THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS AS A MEDIATOR

The Palestine problem put the capacity of the U.N. as an international arbitrator to a severe test. It was not simply resolving the problem between Arabs and Jews. It was the delicate task to steer clear through the morass of the Big Power Conflict. Circumstances placed the United Nations to assume the role of a mediator.

**A. Count Folke Bernadotte:**

In place of the proposed United Nations Commissioner, (whose institution was rejected by both Arabs and Jews) Count Folke Bernadotte, President of the Swedish Red Cross was appointed as "mediator" on the 20th of May. Count Folke Bernadotte, considered new proposals for the demilitarisation or international control of Haifa; the surrender of large blocks of territory in Southern Palestine which had been allocated to Israel by the UN Partition in return for Western Galilee, which had been allocated to the Arabs. He was the first to be appointed as a United Nations mediator for Palestine, to bring about a settlement between Israel and the Arab States; the incorporation of the proposed Palestine Arab State - including the Wagar, in the

(42). Christopher Sykes, *Cross Roads to Israel*, p. 435
south (and, at one time, the Jerusalem area originally to have been internationalised) — in the kingdom of Transjordan; and the joint control of immigration into Israel by Jews and Arabs through the union of the two territories in a dual State. These proposals, which were in accord with British strategic requirements were generally understood, by Israel among others, to have been drawn up in agreement with the foreign affairs policy planners of Britain and the United States. (44)

The Security Council Resolutions of March 5, April 1, April 17, and May 22 called upon all parties involved to end the fighting in Palestine. It, however, needed a new Security Council resolution for a temporary cease-fire, passed on May 29, and a period of negotiations even after that to secure the first truce, which went into effect on June 11.

Bernadotte obtained a cease-fire of four weeks effective from June 11, and put forward proposals for the settlement which were rejected by both sides


(44). Halpern (fn.17), p.379

(45). Halpern, Ibid., p.379
(the Arabs and the Jewish leaders).

The Arabs refused the prolongation of the cease-fire and hostilities broke out again in July. The Jews again succeeded in nearly all sectors. They occupied Ramle and Lydda, Nazareth and Western Galilee (which had been allotted to the Arabs) and advanced their position to the South. A second cease-fire was effected on 18 July. On 16 September Bernadotte recommended to the United Nations General Assembly a change in the proposed partition boundaries, which amounted to assigning the Negev to the Arab State.

In the spring of 1948, the Arab States, taken as a whole, were better equipped than the Zionists; Iraq, Transjordan and Egypt had arms treaties with England. But by the autumn of 1948 the situation was fully reversed. Numerous shipments of smuggled arms from the United States arrived in Israel; and generous dollar gifts collected in the United States purchased for Israel, quantities of first-class arms from Czechoslovakia.

On September 16, 1948, Count Bernadotte completed his special report to the General Assembly. His recommendations for a political settlement were broadly similar to those he had proposed to the parties during the first truce, though there were several notable changes. He called for the truce to be succeeded by a formal peace, or at least an armistice. He recommended that the frontiers between Arab and Jewish territories, in the absence of agreement between Jews and Arabs, should be established by the United Nations with the following suggestions to make them "more equitable, workable and consistent with the existence realities in Palestine":

(1) The Negev should be defined as Arab territory.
(2) Ramleh and Lydda should be included in the Arab territory.
(3) Galilee should be defined as Jewish territory.
(4) Though the city of Haifa should remain in the Jewish State, the port of Haifa, including the oil refineries and terminals, should be declared a free port, with assurances of free access to interested Arab countries.
(5) The airport at Lydda should be declared a free airport.
In this plan Count Bernadotte, modifying his earlier suggestions, recommended that the territory of Jerusalem be internationalised. He no longer recommended an economic union of the Arab and Jewish territories, advising, instead, that the disposition of the Arab territories, should be left to the Government of the Arab States in full consultation with the Arab inhabitants of Palestine with the recommendation, however, "that in view of the historical connection and common interests of Transjordan and Palestine there should be compelling reasons for merging the Arab territory of Palestine with the territory of Transjordan." As for the Arab refugees, Count Bernadotte felt that they should have the right to return to their homes in Jewish-controlled territory at the earliest possible date and that adequate compensation for property should be paid to those choosing not to return. To carry out his recommendation, Count Bernadotte suggested that a conciliation commission should be established by the United Nations to replace the office of Mediator.\(^{(47)}\)

\(^{(47)}\) A 1638, September 18, 1948, p.18.
The publication, on 20 September, of Count Bernadotte's last report and the recommendations contained therein were not relished by the Zionists. It proposed that the General Assembly's partition plan of Palestine should be altered to take into account the exiting military frontiers: the Jews were to retain Galilee but give up the entire south of the Negev to the Arabs. It declared that the refugees have every right to return to their homes "at the earliest practicable date" and by the 11th December 1948 General Assembly Resolution 194(III/1), which called for the return 'as soon as practicable', of those refugees who were willing to live in peace with their neighbours. Israel, in turn, pointed to the two qualifying phrases in the text to justify its refusal to implement the resolution.

On September 17, Bernadotte was assassinated as he was driving through Jerusalem. Bernadotte's car

(49). Resolution 194(III/1), Sharett to Knesset (OK721( June 15, 1949).
was halted at a Jewish road block and ambushed, apparently by Jewish terrorists who escaped after shooting Count Folke Bernadotte and Colonel Setrot, a French Truce Observer accompanying the Mediator. On September 18, 1948, the Security Council issued resolution No. 57 stating that: "...The United Nations Mediator in Palestine Count Folke Bernadotte, was assassinated as a result of a cowardly act, committed by a criminal group of terrorists in Jerusalem while he was fulfilling his peace-seeking mission in the Holy Land".

Ben-Gurion used the Bernadotte assassination as the occasion to crack down vigorously on all private armies and terrorist groups but the damage done to Israel's prestige as a responsible State was nevertheless severe.

B. Dr. Ralph Bunche:

After the assassination of Count Bernadotte,

(51). The assassin was a member of the Stern Gang. It seems that Sternists arrested after the murder were allowed to escape. The Head of the Stern Gang had been elected later to Parliament, and took his seat. (Kirk). See Sykes, (fn. 42), p. 486.

Dr. Ralph Bunche, the Principal Secretary to the United Nations Secretariat group with the Mediator, was named Acting Mediator. Bunche took over his duties and aided by the Conciliation Commission, initiated armistice talks between the parties at the Island of Bhodes, for consideration of all the issues referred to in its terms of reference.

On December 11, 1948, the General Assembly passed a resolution establishing a Conciliation Commission whose terms of reference allowed it a relatively free scope in attempting to bring about peaceful settlement of the Palestine dispute.

Though no reference was made to general boundary adjustments, the Assembly reaffirmed its decision that Jerusalem and its surrounding area should be internationalised and instructed the Conciliation Commission to present to the General Assembly at its fourth regular session detailed proposals for a permanent international regime. The resolution also included a provision that those refugees wishing to return to their homes should be permitted to do so at the earliest practical date and that compensation be paid for.

(53). U.N.S.C.O.R., 3rd Year, No.110
property of those choosing not to return.

On December 22nd, 1948, fighting broke out in the Negev between the Israelis and the Egyptians. Since Israel had first prevented the United Nations truce observers from moving freely in southern Palestine, the Mediator could not indicate definitely who started the hostilities, but there is little doubt that Israel took advantage of a minor breach of the truce by Egypt to launch a full scale attack on the Egyptian forces. In the renewed fighting, the Israeli forces with air support inflicted sizeable losses upon the Egyptians, driving them into a three mile wide strip of land along the Coast, stretching from Gaza to the Egyptian border.

One mobile Israeli Column penetrated approximately twenty miles inside Egypt and attached the fort of Abu A Weigila and the air fields in the neighbourhood of Elarich.

On 12, January, Egyptian and Israeli delegates went to the headquarters of the Mediator at Rhodes for armistice talks. Once the armistice agreement between

(55). Acting Mediator Reports, 8/1152 and 8/1153.
Egypt and Israel was signed on February 24, 1949, the other Arab States were urged by Bunch to join in the negotiations. A cease-fire agreement between Jordan and Israel was signed on 11th March at Rhodes, after ten days of negotiations, Israel and Syria also concluded an agreement on 13th April. On 23rd March, an armistice between Lebanon and Israel was signed which fixed the frontier on the international boundary, largely recognising the existing military situation. Iraq and Saudi Arabia did not sign separate armistices, but indicated that they had considered themselves bound by the terms of the armistice agreements already signed.

The third important link in the chain of U.N. Mediators was Gunnar Jarring. The Security Council decided to designate a Special Representative "to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement."

The United Nations Secretary General U Thant,

chose Dr. Gunnar Jarring, the Swedish diplomat and his
country's Ambassador to the Soviet Union, to undertake
this task. (58) By the middle of December 1967, Jarring
began a series of contacts with Israel, and with
Jordan and Egypt; Syria and Iraq had rejected the
U.N. resolution 242 as well as the special represent-
ative designated under its terms. (59)

The progress of Jarring mission was obstructed
by Israel's insistence on direct talks and Arabs
refused on the ground, as aptly put by the UAR's
Mr. El Zayyat, that, "Israel was the creation of force
and a U.N. Resolution, not direct talks and hence any
peace negotiations must be through the U.N.". The
Jarring Mission was also stalled by Israeli stand
reflected in Premier Eshkol's declaration of June 22,
(60) 1968 that the River Jordan must form the security border.

(61)

Israel's Prime Minister declared his Government's rejection of
(62)
the Security Council's resolution.

(60). Lakhamal (fn. 5), p. 374.
(61). Yosef Tekoa, Israeli Delegate to the UN.
(62). News Agencies, 4/7/1969; Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
United Nations Resolutions Disregarded by Israel
At the beginning of May 1968, the Government of Egypt declared that it accepted the decision of the Security Council in its entirety and awaited Dr. Gunner Jarring's schedule for carrying it out. The Arabs, to reiterate their position, insisted on Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied territories it had gained in 1967, refused to negotiate directly or to sign a comprehensive and formal peace treaty with Israel. The Israelis on the other hand demanded direct peace talks following an initial stage of indirect negotiations, and they refused to clarify what kind of border changes they had in mind when they talked about 'secure' (64) recognised and agreed boundaries. Egypt demanded, withdrawal of all Israeli forces from the occupied territories as a first step in carrying out the resolution. The Government of Israel had interpreted it as an individual entity in which no one section (65) should be separated from the rest.


(64) Ibid., p.24

(65) Cohen (fn.18), p.342.
There were separate talks between Dr. Jarring and Egyptian, Jordanian and Israeli representatives for five weeks in New York in the summer of 1968 but they showed that there was no common ground. The attempt to institute a second round of talks in 1969 failed altogether, mainly because the Israeli reply to Dr. Jarring's proposals on Jerusalem stated that "it would not retreat to the lines that had existed before the Six Day War." (66)

The Egyptian Foreign Minister announced before the UN General Assembly on 10th October 1968 the stand of Egypt vis-a-vis the resolution of the Security Council and Dr. Gunnar Jarring. As compared to the Israeli insistence on aggression and on her repeated refusal for peaceful solution approved by the Security Council, the A.R.E. has adopted a very clear and consistent stand which was to make effort to implement this peaceful solution according to the resolution of 22nd November. The A.R.E. spokesman declared: "We have


already informed the representative of the General Secretary from the very stand of our talks about our total acceptance of the said resolution and our readiness to implement it. We had announced this stand officially more than on one occasion and I have reiterated about our acceptance of this resolution on the 13th March and it was distributed as an official document of the U.N.O. Similarly we had reiterated it again in a letter forwarded to the special representative of the Secretary General on the last 9th May."

"We have made every effort to cooperate with the special representative of the Secretary General for implementing the resolution of Security Council and in the discussions which lasted from now about one year. We have reaffirmed that full implementation of the Security Council's resolution is the only way of the peace and we on our part are ready to implement this resolution."

"We had proposed to the representative of the Secretary General in the course of discussion to set a time table for implementing the resolution of 22nd
November. We had explained to him that setting of a
time table to implement all the provisions of the
resolution and to shift the peaceful solution approved
by the Security Council towards specified practical
application". (69)

"Alongwith forwarding this proposal to Dr. Gunnar
Jarring in a letter sent to him on the last 9th May we
had explained to him our stand in full detail for every
provision of the resolution and the way in which these
provisions can be implemented with a specific time schedule".

But Israel refused to hold any talks with Dr. Gunnar
Jarring on this issue.

Our proposal was that Dr. Gunnar Jarring fix a
time table to implement this resolution under the super-
vision and guarantee of the U.N.O.

We regard the supervision and guarantee of the
Security Council a fundamental thing, because Israel had
always broken
breached the international agreements on which it has
signed earlier. Similarly its old record of aggression
and territorial ambitions made it necessary to implement
the resolution under the supervision and guarantee from

(69). Ibid., p.32.
the Security Council to establish a lasting peace in the Middle East.

Israel's stand vis-a-vis the resolution of Security Council and Dr. Gunnar Jarring.

The news Agency of Associated Press had announced on 21st May 1968 from the occupied Jerusalem that the Government of Israel had issued a statement denying the news that she had informed Dr. Gunnar Jarring of her acceptance of the resolution passed by the Security Council. The official statement said that the latter sent by Mr. Jarring to the Secretary General informing him that Israel had accepted the resolution to solve the problem was untrue and was not binding upon Israel.

Israel, subsequently, started playing with words about her acceptance of the Security Council's resolution and avoided to give a clear reply in this respect which ultimately crippled the efforts of Dr. Jarring and left the Middle East problem unsettled.

The refugee problem remains unsolved on account of Israel's refusal to pull back from the occupied areas.

(70). Ibid., p. 33.
The city of Jerusalem and other Holy Places have remained, over the years, a bone of contention between Jews, Christians and Moslems. To Jews, the City was the site of the Temple; to Christians the place of the death and resurrection of Christ; to Moslems a place of pilgrimage second only to Mecca in sacredness.

The Holy places and Jerusalem in Palestine, have been the subject matter of special consideration in different international instruments. The Sykes-Picot Agreement of May, 1916, speaks in terms of securing the religious interests of the Entente Powers by stipulating that Palestine, with the Holy Places, should be subjected to a special regime.

The Balfour Declaration 1917, stipulated that "nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine". The Mandate also made reference to the Holy Places by providing in Article 13 that:

(71). See, Encyclopaedia Britannica, p.136
(73). Laqueur, Israel Arab Reader. See also Lakhempal, (fn.5).
"All responsibility in connection with the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites in Palestine, including that of preserving rights existing and of securing free access to the Holy Places, religious buildings, and sites, and the free exercise of worship, while ensuring the requirements of public order and decorum, is assumed by the Mandatory, who shall be responsible solely to the League of Nations in all matters connected herewith, provided that nothing in the Article shall prevent the Mandatory from entering into such arrangements as he may deem reasonable with the Administration for the purpose of carrying the provisions of this Article into effect; and provided also that nothing in this Mandate shall be construed as conferring upon the Mandatory authority to interfere with the fabric or the management of purely Moslem sacred shrines, the immunities of which are guaranteed" (74)

Several clashes took place between the Moslems and the Jews, asking their rights to the Wailing Wall in Jerusalem. The international Commission, in its report (75)
favoured the retention of the ante quem; the Wall was Moslem property but the Moslems were not to modify it in any way which would interfere with the access of the Jews for devotion, and the Jews were not to erect any structure of furniture of the pavement near the Wall. Political demonstrations were banned.

From the start beginning Israel trained its legislative and administrative measures aiming to change the status of the Holy City of Jerusalem including the expropriation of land and properties. In April 4, 1961, the Security Council adopted a resolution called upon Israel to comply with the decision taken by the joint armistice Commission on March 20, 1961, calling upon Israel to refrain in future from bringing to Jerusalem any military equipment in excess of those allowed and the general armistice agreement.

Israel refused to implement the General Assembly and the Security Council resolutions, and on May 15, 1967,


organised a military parade in Jerusalem in breach of the Armistice Agreement with Jordan and in defiance of the U.N. resolutions relating to the status of Jerusalem.\textsuperscript{(78)}

The General Assembly abrogating the measures taken to change the status in Jerusalem and expressed in its resolution No. 2253:

a) Expressing extreme concern for the measures taken by Israel to change the status in the Holy City.

b) Considering such measures as null and void.

The Secretary-General pointed out Israel's failure to comply with General Assembly resolution since it took legislative and administrative measures— including the sequestration of some lands and property with the object of changing the status in Jerusalem.\textsuperscript{(80)}

On August 21st, 1969, a premediated arson was


\textsuperscript{(80)} Secretary-General report dated September 12th, 1967, (Doc. 8/8146).
committed at Al-Aqsa Mosque under the military Israeli occupation of Jerusalem. The Security Council adopted its resolution No. 271, in which it expressed its grief for the perpetration of that arson which caused a great loss to human culture, considered that any such act may seriously endanger international peace and security, and emphasized the immediate necessity of Israel desisting from acting in violation of the Council's previous resolutions which called upon Israel to rescind all measures designed to alter the status of Jerusalem. (81)
The United States and Jews

Although the history of American involvement in Palestine may be stretched back to 1920s, the year when it began to take a definite shape is 1943 — aptly called a watershed in the development of US Palestine Policy. It was Britain rather than the U.S. which mainly governed the affairs of Palestine until it ceased to be the mandatory Power. The latter all along avoided to be caught in between the conflicting Jewish and Arab aspirations.

The reasons for the emergence of US on the scene were numerous. In the early 1940s' the centre of world wide Zionist activity shifted from London to Washington and New York. The first call for the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine was given in 1942 by the Zionist movement in New York City from the platform of the Baltimore Conference wherein participated Jews from Palestine, Europe as well as the United States. The American Zionists emerged from this Conference as the most ardent champions of a Jewish State. It was about the same time that news began to trickle from the Nazi occupied Europe of the systematic annihilation of millions of Jews which stirred the mankind and led...
some Europeans to view the Jewish question in Germany in terms of a minority issue.

An intensive propaganda campaign was mounted in 1943 by the American Zionists with a view to rallying American public opinion round the Zionist objectives, which though succeeded in winning American sympathies nevertheless aroused anxiety and concern among the Arabs. This sympathy in collusion with a set of other factors combined to bring into existence a new State which was the culmination of the dreams and expectations of the leaders of the Zionist movement if not the world Jewry at large.

What forced the U.S. to ignore world public opinion, to estrange almost the entire Arab world, en-risk another global war rather than to make its protege Israel follow a more moderate and conciliatory policy after its establishment in 1948 vis-à-vis the dispossessed Palestinians and the Arab countries needs a closer look at the position the Jewish community occupies in the United States.
The Jewish community in United States has always provided a forceful leverage to the Israeli policy makers in Tel Aviv to twist the arm of United States Administration as and when the former have suspected even a slight wavering in their support to Israel. The statement of an Israeli observer should suffice to indicate the weight that this advantage carries: "If and when we begin to feel some real pressure from the United States, then we will start mobilising the American Jewish Community against Washington's Middle East policies"; (82) or the remarks of a United States official in Washington that: "From past experiences, we have learned to expect a pattern. First there is a request from the Jewish leaders in the United States for an appointment with the President or the Secretary of State. Then we start getting bales of mail. This is accompanied by a spate of speeches in the Congress. Then a few journalists would burst forth in full throat". (83)

The size of the Jewish population - only 2.9 per cent of the United States total - may have proved

(82). *Newsweek*, October 18, 1971, p. 61
inconsequential if not coupled by its geographical and electoral distribution. The Jews are largely concentrated in the industrialised and urbanised States which, under the American electoral College and, therefore, mostly eagerly sought by the Candidates. The population of the major States is as follows:

New York 2,521,755; California 693,085; Pennsylvania 443,525; New Jersey 387,220; Illinois 283,180; Massachusetts 259,635; Florida 189,230; Maryland 177,115; Ohio 160,715; Connecticut 103,730; Michigan 97,995 and Texas 65,520.\(^{(85)}\) While a Presidential candidate needs 270 votes, the total combined electoral college seats of these States is 277. How then, can a Presidential candidate risk his prospects by ignoring or alienating this cluster of votes over Israel. Rabbi Richard G. Hersh, director of the Religious Action Centre, Union of American Hebrew Congregations (Washington) aptly remarked:

\(^{(84)}\) Safran, *The United States and Israel*, p.276

\(^{(85)}\) *Newsweek*, 1st March, 1971, p.58.
major strength of the Jewish vote has come from the fortuitous circumstances of Jewish population concentration in the major States." (86)

Opinion polls show that nearly all US Jews (95 per cent) believe that the United States should offer Israel both diplomatic support and military equipment. Nearly 50% of the American Jews polled by Gallup said that the US should help Israel even at the risk of US involvement in war; only 32 per cent believed that this would be too great a price to pay for helping Israel.

"In the economic and general sphere, the impact of American Jews has led to a uniformly and unequivocally friendly and helpful attitude towards Israel. With the United States giving economic aid to more than two score countries, not all formally allies, one would expect Israel too to be among the beneficiaries; but the level of aid given to her has been quite exceptional. During the first fourteen

(87). Newsweek. (fn. 86)
years of Israel's existence, the United States Government has in fact awarded her close to $850,000,000 of aid in various forms, mostly outright grants of one kind or another. On a per capita basis of the recipient country, this is probably the highest rate of American aid given to any country. Moreover, the American government never seriously attempted to question the classification of the billion dollars of donations made by American Jews as tax-exempt "charity", though this money went, in effect, into the general development budget of Israel. Without this massive aid given or sanctioned by the American Government, Israel would have been unable to develop her economy on the scale she did, absorbs as many immigrants, or perhaps even defend her existence."

The overall impact on voting behaviour of the afore mentioned factors combined with the emotional involvement that practically all Jews have with the State of Israel (during the year Israel became an independent State on the map of Middle East, American Jews sent to it aid in cash and kind valued at over

(88). Safran, (fn.84), p.278.
$200,000,000) is unqualified support for pro-Israel candidates and conversely, almost certain hostility towards a candidate who appears to be anti-Israel.

Israel became the obsession of the American Jewry. "Working for Israel—collecting and giving money, following the country's news and development, caring about its problems and taking pride in its achievements, listening to lectures and sermons about it, attending meeting and rallies and social and cultural benefit functions, promoting and participating in specific pet schemes and so on—has become increasingly a focal point of Jewish community life in America". Perhaps no other people would have tolerated such type of half-baked allegiance and loyalty by a community which not only enjoyed all benefits due to a national but prospered in all spheres of political, social, economic and welfare activities.

Today the Zionist movement in the United States is a major part of the big Jewish capitalists. They helped the Government of Israel from the very beginning to finance its enormous military expenditures.

(89). Ibid., p.273
(90). Ibid., p.275
In 1971, Israel bought arms with sum of $716 million from US and its allies. The New York Times reported that this investment is both strengthening Israel and mashing U.S. support: "To the extent that Israel could build tanks and planes and other advanced weapons... There would over shipment of United States arms to Israel. And more advanced arms industry would put Israel in a better position through sales to other nations to finance more her own defense needs.

Hyman Lumer noted, "Financial support to Israel, however, is not limited to Jewish capital and other Jewish contributions. Since its birth, Israel has received well over $1 billion in grants and credits from the U.S. Government, in contrast to less than $60 million received by a country like Syria... More than 200 U.S. firms have invested in Israel, including 30 of the top 500 United States industrial corporations. Among these United States investors are such familiar names as Ford, Chrysler, Monsanto Chemicals, Motorola, International Business Systems, Holiday Inns, American Can, Control Data, General Telephone and Electronics, Xerox

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Data Systems, National Cash Register and others". That means, more than half of all foreign capital invested in Israel is American. Almost of Israel's financial, industrial and commercial institutions are in American hands.

The Israeli Government received a sum of $500 million as loan from the U.S. for the purchase of Phantom jets and other arms. President Nixon made it clear that his Administration was prepared to supply Israel with all the arms required to "maintain the balance of power" in the Middle East - that means just to secure the Israeli military superiority than the Arabs.

It was not merely his generally sympathetic disposition towards Jewish aspirations that made Truman manipulate in an unbecoming manner the birth of Israel, but he recognized fully well the advantage that would accrue from a pro-Israel stance. "How many American voters are Arabs?", he is reported to have retorted when

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(93). Ibid.


criticised by one of his advisers for adopting a pro-Zionist policy. The same vote consciousness made Nixon and other countless for the Democratic nomination express concern for Israel and Soviet Jewry. Nixon even agreed to sell Phantoms and Skyhawks to Israel and indicated that he might discuss the immigration of Soviet Jews with the Kremlin leaders when he visited Moscow in May. The Nixon administration authorised a $50 million loan to help rehabilitate Soviet Jews in Israel.

Any intelligent observer could notice, as a number of publishers and editors of Jewish publications did notice, that it was "obviously a political play." Prospective candidates vied with each other to placate the Jewish opinion to win over their votes as may be seen in columns of New York Times of March 1972 which are full with such statements. During the Florida primary, the paper reports, the Democratic candidates for the Party's nomination for the US Presidency campaigned "as if their real ambition was to sit in the Knesset in Jerusalem!"

Electioneering in United States is a costly affair and this is more so in case of high offices, and Jews have proven themselves as generous givers! That this generosity is not for nothing is borne out by the facts with rhythmic recurrence. The widely held belief that American policy towards the Middle East is shaped to an exceptional extent by the American Jewish Community - much out of proportion with the numerical strength that they enjoy in the United States is not much far off from truth. Political platforms of the major political parties are within easy reach of the influence of the community. The Jews have an active and powerful base in the Congress for continuous pressure on behalf of Israel. There is also a powerful Zionist lobby in the Congress that constantly works to secure favourable attitudes from other members of the legislature.\(^{(97)}\)

The United States has the largest Jewish population in the world, currently estimated to be in the proximity of 6,000,000 or 2.9% of the total population, twice as prosperous as the average American middle class family. They occupy key positions in


\(^{(98)}\) *Newsweek*, March 1, 1971, p.61.
the White House and Executive branch staff e.g., Henry Kissinger, the Secretary of State; William Safire, the President's Chief speech drafter; Edward David, Special Adviser for Science and Technology and they are serving in top positions in a national Administration of either party. At present three members of President Ford's Cabinet are of Jewish origin: Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger (who converted to Lutheranism as a young man) and Attorney General Edmarad Lein, and so on.

In the Executive Office there are Herbert Stein, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers; Ezra Solomon, member of the Council; Donald Rumsfeld, Executive Director of the Cost-of-Living-Council and Ronald Berman, Chairman of the National Endowment for the Humanities. Also prominent are Arthur Burns, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board and Jesse Steinfeld, Surgeon-General of the U.S. At the Sub-Cabinet level, Jews fill the posts of Under Secretary of Labour and Assistant Secretaries of Treasury, Defence, Health, and Education and Welfare, Housing and Urban Development.

(100). The Times, March 10, 1975.
and the office of Management and budget.

How vital and decisive a role the Jewish purse played can be gauged by the remarks of Congressman McGloskey defeated in the New Hampshire Primary, "The harsh reality is that you cannot run a Presidential campaign without large sums of money".

The political impact of the American Jewish Community in this regard is difficult to quantify, but this is an established fact that political finance committees are studded with names of wealthy Jews. Doubtlessly American Jews are "among the major financiers of political parties, especially the Democrats, just as they are the major financiers of Israel itself.

Abraham Feinberg, a hosiery baron and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Israel Bond Organization contributed the Democratic candidate Humphreys' poll campaign a sum that ranged between $250,000 to $1 million.

(102). Washington Post, March 11, 1972, p.1
(104). Ibid.
(105). Jewish Post and Opinion, May 21, 1971, p.2
Eugene Wymace of Los Angeles who had contacts with some of the wealthiest Jews in America promised to raise for Humphrey between $1 million to $2 million. The Jewish contribution to the Humphrey had already reached $2,70,900 up to March 14, 1972. The amount of loans offered to Humphrey by various sources were additional - only two loan sources accounted for $3,70,000. No candidate was an exception as far as Jewish donations for poll campaign is concerned - the difference being only of degree.

The Jewish voice is more than adequately represented both in the Congress as well as the Senate, to promote Israel's cause and ensure sustained US support for the Jewish State.

Isaiah Keren, Executive Director of the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) is a well known champion of Israel in Washington and commands great influence. He dexterously manages support from

(108). Abu Rudneh (fn.97), p.105
both sides - Democrats and Republicans, and Liberals and Conservatives. Once he remarked, "We keep Israel out of partisan politics. We go to both conventions.... While the Arabs exert pressure at the UN, we work with Congress...."(109).

To sum up it can be safely deduced that the pro-Israel lobby is firmly determined to continue using all the means available for influencing US policy on the Middle East. As a consequence, it has now become a permanent feature of the US political scene for politicians to register extreme sensitivity to whatever they feel to be the wishes of the American Jewry.(110)

Golda Meir offered her thanks to Nixon for his strong support to Israel (her speech on July 27, 1972)."This was reflected in public opinion polls there, with one in against showing 77.2 per cent of all Israelis favouring Nixon and only 4.9 per cent favour "somebody else".

(111). Israel and Palestine, (October 13, 1972), p.7. See also Abu Rudneh (fn.97).
No doubt the U.S. and Israel have enjoyed a unique historical relationship. Without U.S. aid and support, it is unlikely that Israel would have been created out of British-controlled Palestine in 1948. Without U.S. aid and contributions from U.S. Jews, it would not have survived.