Virtues, as we have seen in the previous Chapter, consists in the functioning of the natural impulses and faculties in accordance with the dictates of reason. It is the result of the subordination of the animal aptitudes of man to his rational soul. Since man's animal aptitudes are unruly and often strongly inclined to violate and overpower commands of reason, virtue is the outcome of persistent efforts by which natural and instinctive impulses are gradually brought under the control of reason. Further, virtue is not the occasional, the incidental and the momentary performance of good deeds, but a permanent state of the soul, its everlasting character. Therefore, the cultivation of virtues takes time and demands sustained endeavour, endeavour which continues throughout the life. It is called a Journey unto death. The pursuit of virtue never ends because there is no limit for human perfection. The never-ending pursuit of virtues and excellence produces moral insight which provides guidance to the man and facilitates his progress towards attainment of virtuous life. The only way to develop this insight, is in a nutshell, to go on acting morally.

The purity of motive, too, is an essential ingredient of the Virtuous character. Pursuit of Virtues should only be with a view to making oneself the true Vice-gerent of God,
so that one could succeed in seeking His pleasure and blessing both, in this life and the life hereafter. One should aspire for virtuous accomplishments only in order to achieve his own perfection and to obtain the divine bliss. If he performs virtuous deeds for something else such as for wealth, honour, or for fear of one's disapproval, his endeavour loses its moral substance and, subsequently the act ceases to be virtuous. It is, in fact, the purity of motive which distinguishes between the true virtues and their false imitations.

**Pseudo Virtues:**

al-Dawwâni, keeping in mind the aforesaid fundamental conditions of virtue, proceeds to make distinction between what is virtue and what is not the true virtue, i.e., pseudo-virtue. He has devoted one full section of his book, *Ašhâq-i Jalâlī*, exclusively to explanation of this distinction. There are certain qualities, he maintains, which bear false resemblance to the true virtues and are frequently mistaken for them. They are, consequently, liable to deceive those persons who lack the moral insight. Therefore, the need to distinguish between the real virtues and the pseudo-virtues assumes great significance. It is, as if, to make discrimination between the jewels and their imitations. It would render a valuable service to the seekers after "the genuine jewels of human perfection" and the aspirants for "the gems of spiritual excellence". By virtue of this distinction they may neither be deceived or misled nor be attracted by the deceits of the imposters (dughlân) and the tricks of the
pretenders (qalābān). al-Dawwānī uses this forceful metaphorical language simply to state the plain fact that one must have a clear understanding of the real virtues and their imitations.

Corresponding to the four cardinal virtues, al-Dawwānī presents four kinds of pseudo-virtues. They are pseudo-wisdom, pseudo-courage, pseudo-temperance and pseudo-justice respectively. He also refers to the pseudo-generosity in course of the exposition of these counterfeit virtues of moral excellences. Since these so-called virtues apparently seem to be virtuous accomplishments, they are termed as pseudo-virtues. In reality, they are nothing more than vices. We propose to discuss and explain in the following pages the false imitation of the real excellences.

The virtue of wisdom is as we have already seen, to comprehend all the existent things in their essential aspects. It consists in understanding both, that which is divine and that which is human. As a result of this understanding a truly wise man is able to know all that is knowable, i.e., all that ought to be done and also all that is commanded by God and all that is forbidden by God. al-Dawwānī discovers a group of people who are wrongly held to be truly wise and erroneously supposed to be in possession of the aforesaid qualities of wisdom. There is a class of persons who memorise some opinions of reputed scholars and problems of sciences, and in course of dialogues or intellectual disputes advance arguments which they have clearly picked up, and behave in such a manner that their listeners, lacking in true insight
and enlightened sagacity, are filled with admiration, wonder at their excellence and are convinced of their learning and wisdom. But, in reality, the self-confidence and "cool-conviction", which are the characteristic features of wisdom, are lacking in their minds. The result of their beliefs and the outcome of their so-called erudition appear in the form of doubt and perplexity. Such persons are like the monkeys and parrots which are well-known for their imitation or like children who try to imitate the grown up persons.

There are some persons in this group who are so arrogant and proud of their scholarship that they do not submit even to a plain truth. Even about the commonplace matters, they pretend a profound knowledge, insight and wisdom which they do not at all possess. Instead of helping the beginners in pursuit of truth, they perplex them by their false erudition and misleading assertions. Though they do not know even the most established propositions, they do not even hesitate in making the lofty suggestions about the most complicated problems of philosophy and science. Thus they assume the false garb of an intellectual and call their intellectual pursuit the real research, true analysis and original insight. al-Dawwānī considers such people totally devoid of real excellence and declare their so-called erudition as the pseudo-wisdom. The distinction between the pretenders and the real possessors of wisdom is, however, too difficult to be observed by most people. It is incumbent on the truly wise person to help in maintaining this distinction, so that society could develop healthy traditions and sound convictions.
Similarly, the observance of temperance proceeds from persons who are not sincere adherents of its true ideals and real objectives. Like the group of persons who pretend to be wise, there exists a class of people who discard worldly gains and show repugnance to sensual pleasures. They display the momentary abhorrence and dislike towards worldly benefits and delights with a view to obtain the greater quantity or higher quality of the same things in future. This kind of abstinence is mostly practised by the ascetics of the time (zuhhād-i zamān) who make their apparent austerity a snare for deceiving the general masses. By virtue of their austerity and simplicity they seek to secure their vicious motives and worldly benefits. ād-Dawwānī also analyses several other factors which motivate people to turn away from worldly appetites and pleasures. A person may abstain from seeking gratification of his desires either because he happens to be ignorant of their pleasures due to his secluded living or because of his over-indulgence in those pleasures which might have produced a disgust in him for these pleasures. Or such abstinence might be prompted by some defects such as physiological disabilities or psychological complexes that might have impaired his natural appetites and impulses. An apprehension of contracting some physical diseases or anticipation of some evil consequences also motivates a person to abstain from seeking bodily pleasures. Similarly, fear of scandal or fear of incurring public censure, too, prevents a person from gratifying his desires and impulses. Persons who discard worldly gains and show indifference to physical pleasures in
these conditions are not truly temperate. Avoidance of due gratification of their natural appetites and impulses by such men is rightly said to be the manifestation of pseudo-temperance. For a truly temperate man is one who gratifies his desires in the right measure, in the right manner, at the right moment and in the right situation. The virtue of temperance essentially lies in keeping the appetitive faculty of the soul within its proper limits. It neither signifies giving rise to greed nor indicates curbing of man's natural impulses.

The acts of generosity sometimes emanate from persons who are not at all generous. Those who spend their riches, for instance, to secure purely secular pleasures, to augment worldly gains or status, to avoid the loss and to show off are mistakenly considered generous. al-Dawwání also includes those persons in this category who spend wealth on improper occasions and those who are extravagant in spending because of their ignorance either of the value of property or of the suitable and right occasions for investment. The people who get rich or accumulate wealth without really earning it like those who inherit big fortunes suffer from this defect.

Wealth is earned with hard labour, hence it must not, suggests al-Dawwání, be spent lavishly. Generosity inherently implies to accumulate wealth and money, but by honest and fair means. Man needs material riches not only for meeting the requirements of his daily life and for various other secular dealings, but also for perfecting his virtuous qualities. The spending of wealth, if it is not done for
the sake of good and nobility, can rightly be called pseudo-generosity.

Actions analogous to courageous deeds may emanate from persons who are not at all courageous. al-Dawwānī puts in this category those people who enter upon hazardous campaigns, adventures and perilous undertakings with a view to secure wealth, position and similar other worldly objects and gains exclusively for the sake of their own benefits and personal interests. He also includes in this class the imposters (ā′iyārān) who bear severe hardships, prolonged confinements, painful maimings and executions in order that their names and reputations may endure and spread wide among those who are known for following similar wicked pursuits. Likewise, a man who shows courage to avoid reproach of his neighbours and relations, or does so from the fear of King, Government and the like authorities, also belongs to this category. Again, there are persons who, by winning accidental victories on a few occasions, become proud and, in consequence, boast of their courageous accomplishments. None of these categories of persons can be regarded, says al-Dawwānī, as truly courageous, brave and chivalrous. Their acts of valour and bravery, in fact, are nothing more than manifestations of pseudo-courage. For such deeds are generally performed without the real and natural love for courage.6

In order to illustrate the characteristic features of pseudo-courage, al-Dawwānī goes to explain the so-called bravery of the wild beasts, especially of tigers and the like animals. The conduct of tigers, though apparently analogous
to courage, is markedly distinct from it for various reasons. Firstly, the tigers entirely rely upon their physical strength and superiority, and by nature happen to be eager to exert their strength. That is, they exercise physical exertion in keeping with their natural strength and power and not, of course, due to courage. Secondly, in their encounter with others they may be compared to a powerful and fully armed warrior or comatant, attacking a weak and helpless creature. The encounter of this kind does not fall, says al-Dawwānī, in the category of courage. Thirdly, they lack the rational deliberation which is the basis of the virtue of courage. The encounters of tigers and the wild animals, are purely instinctive devoid of rational considerations and cool reflections. The truly courageous man is he from whom the acts of courage emanate in accordance with reason and understanding, whose real intention is based on the essential nobility of this virtue, and who invariably dreads committing of an odious act more than he fears self-destruction. He always prefers honourable death to dishonour.

A true act of courage fills the heart of its doer with immense delight and pleasure. A courageous performance may not be accompanied with pleasure and delight in its initial stages, for it involves a fear of destruction. But ultimately it brings pleasure either in this world or in the next. This is true especially when one sacrifices his life in defence of religion or for the consolidation of the institutions of Sharī'ah. A man endowed with the virtue of true courage knows it fully that fleeing away from battle field does not guarantee the safety of life. Hence he fights with pleasure for the
noble ideals without caring for his life. But a man afflicted with the vice of pseudo-courage, on the contrary, does not have any pleasure in his so-called 'courageous pursuits. He often chooses to run away from dangers in order to save his life.\(^8\)

True to the Islamic spirit, al-Dawwānī considers suicide as an act of pseudo-courage. Those persons who commit suicide out of fear for destitution, loss of wealth or position or because of suffering afflictions, their conduct may more appropriately be attributed to cowardice than to courage. For the persons adorned with the virtue of courage observe patience in all vicissitudes of fortune and are strong to endure sufferings and thus secure against trepidation in every situation. Suicide, on the contrary, signifies lack of confidence, and self-control. It is certainly execrable and abominable in the eye of the religions institute and the law of reason.\(^9\)

Finally, al-Dawwānī refers to the manifestation of pseudo-justice. Actions resembling those of equitable or just persons may proceed from men who are not actually just and equitable. They perform seemingly just deeds either on account of hypocrisy or for the sake of reputation or with the intention to attract the regard of the masses so that they may further their wealth and rank. They are not, in fact, truly just persons, but only pretend to be so by means of their so-called just actions. The truly just and equitable man is he who has balanced his powers to such an extent that all his actions are guided by reason and are in a state of
moderation and equilibrium. None of his natural propensities acts in excess of what is assigned to it by reason, nor forcibly encroaches upon the functions of the other faculties. In his dealings with the fellow-beings he observes similarly a sound and normal course of mutual adjustment and peaceful co-existence. He is constantly devoted to the acquisition of virtues and excellences. This however is possible only when the soul has acquired a spiritual character conducive to general discipline, so that all his words and deeds may be embellished with the virtue of equipoise and be free from the blemish of disorder and irregularity.10

From the above discussion of Pseudo-virtues it becomes obvious that the virtues of temperance, generosity and even justice cannot be achieved in their fullest measure by any one but only by a person adorned with the virtue of wisdom. If any of these virtues is performed without paying due attention to the dictates of reason or its performance happens to be purely occasional for the sake of attaining some worldly benefits and gains, it falls under the category of pseudo-virtues. The same consideration must be observed in respect of all other excellences and sub-virtues in order to distinguish their true natures from their false imitations. "Other qualities may also be dealt with," says al-Dawwānī, "in a similar fashion so that distinction could easily be made between the counterfeit and the genuine, a natural standard and a counterfeit". He does not, however, work out in detail the application of the aforesaid consideration as regards all those sub-virtues which ensue from the four Cardinal virtues.
Al-Dawwānī now turns his attention to the enumeration of vices and the various modes of their manifestation. If virtues are the excellences of the individual springing from his natural propensities, the vices are the unethical manifestations of the same. Man's natural propensities prove conducive to his moral progress and perfection when they work in harmony, observe the golden mean and adhere to the dictates of reason. They become injurious to his spiritual development and moral excellence when they engender the love for worldly gains and benefits at the cost of spiritual benefits and it is considered to be the root-cause of all vices. It motivates man's natural propensities to disobey the dictates of reason, transgress their proper limits and subject the self to humiliation, censure and gradual decay. It is the transgression which takes the shape and colour of so many vices. Vices, then, are the wrong development of human propensities and act as obstacles between man and his goal, i.e., the spiritual development.

Man's natural propensities, when proceeding in right direction, give rise, as we have already seen, to the four Cardinal virtues, wisdom, courage, temperance and justice. Every one of these virtues has got a corresponding vice which results when the natural propensity to which it belongs transgresses its proper limits. The vice of "Ignorance" (Jahal) corresponds to the virtue of wisdom, "Cowardice".
(jubn) to courage, "Lust" (Sharh) to temperance and "Tyranny" (Jaur) to justice. This goes to explain that every virtue has got its limit, the transgression of which, in the direction either of excess or deficiency, turns into vice. It also signifies that virtues are like 'means' and the vices like 'extremes'. To make this point clear al-Dawwání presents the illustration of a circle. He compares virtues with the centre of a circle and the vices with its circumference. The centre is the farthest point from both the ends of a diameter, so is virtue, farthest from the extremes, i.e., of vices. Again, as the Centre of a circle happens to be the only one point, just in the middle and that can be definitely located against the various points either within the circle or on its circumference, whose place is not fixed; so the true virtue in relation to any natural propensity would be always the one which is the mean, and can be definitely determined as against its vices which take the different forms, and, therefore, cannot be definitely determined. On this analogy al-Dawwání concludes that there will be infinite number of vices corresponding to every cardinal virtue. Adherence to the path of virtue is like moving along a straight line, while the commission of vices resembles deviation from that line. It is quite obvious that a straight line is the shortest path between any two points, and it cannot be more than one, whereas those that are not straight may be infinite in number.

Although deviation from the path of virtue may assume infinite shapes and forms, it will always proceed only in two diametrically opposed directions, i.e., either towards
excess or towards deficiency. Therefore, corresponding to every cardinal virtue there must be two classes of vices, one indicating the extreme of excess and the other, the extreme of deficiency. As the cardinal virtues are four in number, so the classes of vices must be eight. The two classes of vices in relation to the virtue of wisdom are "astuteness" (safah) and "stupidity" (balah). The vice of astuteness results when the development of wisdom follows the extreme of excess. It lies in employing the power of reflection and contemplation on such matters which are not obligatory (wājib) or are beyond the proper limit of obligation. It is also called cunnig, or cleverness (gurbuzi). The vice of stupidity originates when the virtue of wisdom proceeds towards the extreme of deficiency. It involves intentional disuse of the reflective power and suspension of its utilization in obligatory matters. It refers to the adoption of wrong and deficient methods for the realization of one's ends and ideals.

The two classes of vice corresponding to the virtue of courage are "foolhardiness" (tahawur) and "cowardice" (Jubn). The former is manifested when the development of man's courage follows the extreme of excess. It denotes the undertaking of such perils as are not approved by reason. It would be sheer foolhardiness, for instance, if any ordinary person marches against the united power of a King and the government. A person afflicted with the vice of foolhardiness unnecessarily ventures to court dangers and death. The latter (i.e., cowardice) comes into operation
when man's courage follows the deficient course. It represents the avoidance of something whose avoidance is not considered to be commendable and praiseworthy. Take, for instance, the case of vengeance. Although it is said that one should try to refrain from revenge, yet on certain occasions and in some situations returning of an evil with the equal evil becomes quite indispensable. If one avoids taking revenge in all circumstances, he is a sheer coward and is likely to suffer from disrepute and humiliation. It indicates that a man afflicted with cowardice shrinks from facing dangers and perils on account of fear in a situation when one ought to face perilous situations courageously. A cowardly person lacks self-confidence and firmness of mind. He is, consequently, rendered incapable of asserting himself in his words and deeds.

The two classes of vice pertaining to the virtue of temperance are "lust" (Sharah) and "abstention" (Khumūd). A man suffers from the vice of lust when his appetites transgress the limit of temperance towards the extreme of excess. It keeps him busy in pleasure-seeking pursuits beyond the prescribed and reasonable extent. It stands for a shameless and an open indulgence in gratification of natural impulses without any fear of disgrace and dishonour. The vice of abstention becomes manifest when, man's appetites deviate from the limit of temperance towards the extreme of deficiency. It lies in withdrawing intentionally from those pleasures which have been permitted by both reason as well as religion.
The two classes of vice as regards the virtue of justice are "tyranny" (zulm) and "sufferance" (inzilām). The former takes place when one deviates from the path of justice towards the extreme of excess. It involves usurpation of man's rights and fortunes. The latter (i.e., sufferance) is obviously manifested when one deviates from the just course and chooses instead the extreme of deficiency. It lies in lending support and assistance to a tyrant in his tyranny as well as in surrendering to his oppressive doings in servility. Sometimes both these classes of vice are designated by a single term, oppression (Jaur). The term oppression includes, says al-Dawwānī, a tyranny exercised either against one's own self or in relation to other persons. Just as justice is comprehensive of all other virtues, similarly oppression, which includes both the extremes of injustice, covers all the vices.

al-Dawwānī further says that the vices, relating to the sub-virtues of these cardinal virtues may in like manner be determined.

In addition to these vices, al-Dawwānī mentions numerous other vices relating to the fundamental elements of man's inner constitution, i.e., his natural propensities in the last section of the first Discourse of his book, Akhlāq-Jalālī. Man's natural propensities and powers are broadly divided into three distinct categories. These are, as we have already seen in the last chapter, (i) the power of discrimination, i.e., reason (ii) the power of anger, which is also called the power of repulsion (quwat-i dafa'), and (iii) the power of appetite, also known as the power of attraction (quwat-i jadhb).
When these powers deviate in their functioning from their middle-course, they give rise to certain vices. The deviation in each of these powers from its equilibrium may, take place either in its inherent quality (kaifyyat) or in its quantity (kamyyat). Again, the deviation in the latter case (i.e., quantity) may occur either towards its excess or deficiency. Thus the vices corresponding to each power may arise by three factors, viz., excess (arfrāt), deficiency (tāfīt) and perversity of state (radā'at-i kafyyat). We shall now briefly examine the application of these factors in relation to man's natural propensities and powers in order to analyse their respective vices.

The power of discrimination, i.e., reason is divided into two kinds: theoretical reason and the practical reason. Excess in the former consists of over-application to, and over-indulgence in frivolous contentions, futile investigations and uncalled for apprehension due to groundless doubts and baseless suppositions. Those who lack the quality of certainty call these fruitless pursuits as genuine research and real discoveries, while in reality they fail to obtain the true objectives of learning and knowledge. In the opinion of al-Dawwānī these so-called painstaking pursuits are nothing more than evil and vicious undertakings of man's theoretical reason. Excess in latter kind (i.e., practical reason) may proceed in two ways: (i) if it finds access in particular matters (umūr-i juzvī), it is termed "deceitfulness", "cunningness" or "treachery" (gurbuzī); and (ii) if it exists in general matters (umūr-i kullī), it is called "craftiness" and "ingenuity" (dahā'). Prof. M. Umaruddin explaining the
main point of al-Ghazālī on 'Dahā' says that 'Dahā' lies in selecting means which are not straight forward, and are only seemingly but not really good for realizing one's motives.²¹

Deficiency in the theoretical reason signifies emergence of such vices as dullness (Khumūd) and obtusity (balādat). As regards the practical reason it is manifested in the form of "foolishness" and "culmsiness" (balāhat). Deficiency in relation to both the kinds of the discriminative power, lies, precisely speaking, in falling short of the right standard of application to learning and practice.

Perversion in the discriminative faculty is expressed through such knowledge which does not lead to perfection, i.e., as the knowledge of the science of disputation, controversy and sophistry or through such knowledge which is not definite and certain such as fortune-telling (kahānat), of geomancy (rāmmāli) and jugglery. These sciences do not aim, says al-Dawwānī, at the ascertainment of realities. One should refrain from cultivating as well as practising these sciences. These are evil pursuits and business of those whose power of discrimination gets perverted.²²

Excess in the power of repulsion (i.e., anger) gives rise to such vices as "violent resentment" (Shiddat-i ghaiz) "exceeding vindictiveness" (Kasrat-i intiqām) and "infuriation of passion" (ishte‘āl-i mārah-i ghadāb).

Deficiency in this power gives rise to the vices of "lack of self-respect" (bi-'izzatī) and "faint-heartedness" (bad-dilī). It signifies remaining absolutely unprovoked and un-moved even by the grossest insult.
The person suffering from the perversion of the power of anger does not take revenge from the people who ignite the fire of anger in him; on the contrary, he seeks vengeance from such objects as inanimates (jamādāt), brutes (bahā'im), children and others under his control who are not guilty of provoking the feeling of anger in his mind. 23

Excess in the power of appetite engenders "greed for food and drinking", and breeds inordinate lust for matrimonial alliances or conjugal connections.

Deficiency in this power implies to refrain from taking food and drinks as well as other things essential for sustenance. It also signifies refraining from act of procreation from legitimate matrimonial alliance and even from wholesome pleasures.

Perversion of this power denotes such things as "longing to eat clay and coal, and the homo-sexuality."

All the above-mentioned excessive deficient and perverse states of man's natural propensities are the main diseases (amrāz-i basīṭ). There are numerous sub-diseases or vices connected with each of these main disease. Moreover, their intermixture gives rise to certain other compound and composite evils which prove fatal to man's moral progress and among them are perplexity (hairat), ignorance (Jahl), dominance of anger or rage (ghalban-i ghadab), faithlessness (bad-dilī), despondency (ḥuzn) envy (ḥasad), false hope (aml), love (iṣhq) and levity (baṭālat). al-Dawwani calls these evils as "chronic maladies" (amrāz-i muzmina) which inflict
serious injuries on the soul and prevent it from attaining its highest perfection. We shall discuss these evils in details when we would take up the problem of mental diseases and their remedies.

al-Dawâni's second classification of vices, enumerated just above, is more comprehensive and systematic than his previous one which distinguishes only four pairs of eight vices corresponding to the four cardinal virtues. It implies that he has a sound insight into the psychological nature of man. Vice, according to this classification, does not consist simply of deviation from the golden mean towards the extreme of excess or deficiency; but it also lies in the perversion which takes place in human disposition due to some psychological factors. Man occupies a middle position between animals and angels. He can either rise to the level of angels with the help of his virtuous pursuits or fall to the level of animals by letting his anger, appetites and desires to dominate over him. His soul is equally susceptible to both, the angelic and the beastly influences. The former (i.e., the angelic) is guided by reason while the latter (i.e., the beastly element) is dominated by passions. It is the equilibrium of these diametrically opposed forces of the soul that produces results which are conducive to the realization of the ideal of the attainment of the perfection. When the equilibrium is lost through the domination of one over the other, the vices and evils come into existence. There are three main passages through which the vices and the evils generally enter into one's heart: excess, deficiency and perversion. The vices caused by excess or deficiency are,
in fact, quite serious in their consequences. They could, however, be successfully treated by some special training and persistent effort to restore the lost equilibrium. But the vices which approach through the passage of perversion, comparatively, prove more injurious and fatal to one's moral progress and mental health. Perversity of state seldom happens to be curable. Perversity becomes the second nature of a perverted person. He is rarely found prone to amend his bad and unnatural habits. Moreover, the perverted habits brings the moral degeneration in one's self. His soul becomes quite amenable to vicious pursuits and undesirable deeds, and is rendered almost incapable of seeing their evil consequences. That is why, al-Dawwání rightly emphasises the role of perversion in generating the vices.