CHAPTER II

VIRTUE

al-Jawwānī opens his celebrated book, Ākhlāq-i Jalālī, with an elaborated description of moral virtues (mākārim-i Ākhlāq) and proceeds to outline their practical significance in human life. Everything in this world, he believes, has been created with a purpose. Man, the most exalted of all creations, has to discharge a special duty, i.e., Vice-gerency of God (Ākhlāq-i ilāhī), which essentially implies attainment of moral perfection through the proper exercise of the qualities that are inherent in his nature. He has to develop those potentialities which facilitate his spiritual progress and subjugate those qualities which come in the way of this progress. He has to build a virtuous character which means, precisely speaking, striving for virtues (faḍā’il) and excellences (Mākārim).

What does al-Jawwānī exactly mean by the term virtue (faḍā’ilat) is difficult to determine. For he has neither offered its precise or comprehensive definition nor has analysed all its significant components in detail. He only enumerates certain qualities and illustrates their practical implications which are considered to be the contents of a virtuous character. We shall, however, try to work out his fundamental approach to virtue and make an attempt to get at its approximate notion which he wants to convey to us, in the following and the consequent sections of this Chapter.
al-Dawwānī distinguishes four distinct faculties of the human soul: the theoretical (nazarī), the practical (ʿamalī), the spirited, i.e., the faculty of the anger (ḥaḍābī) and the appetitive (shafādī). These are, in other words, four fundamental components of the inner constitution of man. To form a virtuous character these elements must work together harmoniously without losing their respective proportion. Their proportionate development produces qualities which prove conducive to the spiritual and moral progress of the self. The qualities which facilitate the spiritual development may be termed as virtues (Faṣā'id). When each one of the aforesaid faculties performs its own function in accordance with the dictates of reason, corresponding virtues, related to each faculty come into existence. Wisdom (ḥikmat) is the outcome of the theoretical faculty, equity or justice (ʿadālat) of the practical faculty, courage (shujā'at) of the faculty of anger, and the purity or temperance (ʿiffat) of the appetitive faculty. These fourfold virtues are practically obtained, explains al-Dawwānī, through the proper culture (tahādīb) of the respective faculties. The virtue of wisdom, for instance, is obtained when the theoretical faculty of the human soul undergoes a proper training and works in accordance with the dictates of reason. The same process applies to other virtues as well.

al-Dawwānī's emphasis on working in accordance with the dictates of reason in pursuance of virtues is very
important and involves certain significant implications. Adherence to the guidance of reason signifies, that the faculties of human soul in their functions should observe moderation (‘itidāl). Moderation, he defines, is the quality of any action that is in accordance with reason.\(^4\)

The working of the soul with moderation and in accordance with reason, thus, are not two distinct principles. Moderation serves as a condition for the harmonious working of all the faculties of the soul. Moderation and harmony go, in fact, hand in hand, and constitute the essence of virtue.

Al-Jawwāni also introduces into the discussion of virtue the doctrine of the mean (waṣṭ) which makes the notion of moderation more precise and that of harmony more explicit. Virtue, he maintains, is the mean (waṣṭ) between the two extremes of deficiency (tafriḥ) and excess (ifrāt). It lies in holding middle positions in exercising emotions and impulses and in the gratification of desires.\(^5\) The significance of the doctrine of the mean lies in its emphasis that the secret of moral life consists of the harmonious development of the whole personality -- an ideal which cannot be attained without keeping all the faculties of the human soul within their proper limits and observing moderation (‘itidāl) in their exercise and satisfaction.

To work with moderation that leads to harmony is quite inherently implied in the very conception of the mean.

It is extremely difficult says al-Jawwāni, to find a true mean (waṣṭ-i ḥaqiqī), and even when it is found, it
is more difficult to hold fast to it in practice. For adherence to the path of moderation and true mean involves great hardships and difficulties. One should, however, strive hard for its attainment. He should not deviate, as far as possible, from the mean in seeking gratification of his desires and impulses. For excellence of character always consists of observing mean between the two extremes. In every walk of life whether individual or social; political or economic; secular or religious; one must observe the doctrine of the mean. It is a key to the success in this life as well as the life hereafter. One who adheres to "the right course" (ṣirāṭ-i mustaqīm) in this life and does not deviate from the path of moderation, shall in the next life, says al-Dawūnī, pass over "the straight way" and reach happily the eternal paradise which is the eternal abode of the virtuous." Likewise, "one who deviates from this life from the right path shall not be able to cross the "straight way" in the life hereafter, and fall helplessly deep into the ditch of hell which is the abode of the vicious." People desirous to cultivate virtuous character must not be disheartened, by the hardships or the difficulties that may come in the way of holding the middle course. On the contrary, they ought to put all their efforts and energies to realize the ideal of the mean in their words and deeds, and seek the grace of God for the success in this life and the salvation in the life hereafter. al-Dawūnī, being an ardent Muslim, makes the formation of virtuous character dependant on Divine Grace. One may succeed in
attaining to virtues when the Grace of God comes to his help; all his efforts some times may prove futile, if he is not blessed with the Divine Grace. But it does not, however, mean that one should only depend on God's Grace, and leave the efforts to realize the virtuous accomplishments of life. The idea of Divine Grace does not, by any means, repudiate the importance of individual efforts in pursuance of virtuous deeds. What it does really repudiate is man's absolute reliance on his own individual efforts, independent of God, which he carries out to obtain any kind of excellence. Man's personal striving is, indeed, an essential rather indispensible condition of success, but it is not all. Besides carrying out individual efforts to their maximum extents, one stands, however, in need of being blessed by Divine Grace in order to reap the harvest of his strife and struggle. One should, therefore, not absolutely rely, concludes al-Dawwani, on his individual efforts. He should adhere himself to both these prescribed important principles; first he ought to strive hard, and then wait for the Divine Grace. For God promises His grace to those who strive hard to realize their coveted ends.

What we have explained till now is only an examination of the notion of the mean and its practical significance. But the vital issue is, What is the right mean and how can it be determined? To provide an answer to this pertinent question, al-Dawwani distinguishes two kinds of the mean: the true mean (wast-i ḥaqqī) and the relative mean (wast ba-iṣfāfat). The true mean (wast-i ḥaqqī) he defines, is one
that bears the same relation to both extremities. It is like digit four which is the right mean of two and six. Just as, the true equipoise or equiliorium (mu'tadil-i ḥa'īqī) is seldom attainable due to varied temperamental latitudes ('ārāḍ al mizājī) similarly the working of the true mean is hardly found existent in human behaviour due to the variations that exist in its motivational force. The relative mean (Wast ba-īḍāfat), he explains, is one that holds only approximate proximity to the true mean. This stands analogous to the equiposes or equilibria (īḍādālāt) that are commonly proved to be existent in species and individuals.9

The true mean resembles a mathematical mean in its precision and exactness. It always remains as it is, and never deviates from its centrality (mārkazīyat). Thus it is not evident that its application in the domain of morality is extremely difficult because morality lacks the mathematical precision and certainty. Its application to the domain of morals cannot possibly be justified. Only it is the relative mean (wast ba-īḍāfat) that can be applied to the determination of moral excellence and virtues.10

Application of the relative mean to the sphere of morality, too, is not free from difficulties and defects. Even the mean that characterizes virtue is relative in spirit, the conditions of virtuous deeds may differ from individual to individual, and in the same individual in different states or occasions. There cannot be, therefore, any absolute objective criterion and judgment of the virtues
and the vices. Moral standard will possess latitudes similar to the latitudes of temperament. It would be extremely difficult rather quite meaningless to provide an exact definition of a truly virtuous character indicating all its pros and cons, i.e., its entire depth.

al-Dawwānī apparently resolves this difficulty with the help of a common sense approach. Just as among the degrees of temperamental latitude, there is some one that is highest of all, and nearest to the true equipoise or equilibrium, so of all the degrees of virtue there should be one superior to the rest and this is the virtue which ought to be sought. It represents the true mean and does not suffer from the ills of excess and deficiency. All the other degrees according to their respective proximity to this highest degree of virtue would more or less suffer from excess or deficiency. To illustrate his point of view al-Dawwānī presents an analogy of species and individuals. Just as species and individuals do not exist in the most perfect forms, yet by virtue of their limited proximity (qurb-i maḥādūd) to the most perfect degree they are able to maintain their respective essence; so is the case with regard to virtues. The true virtue represents that degree of perfection which serves as a standard measure for all other virtues. It is exactly in relation to this standard that the other degrees of excellence are relatively enumerated. Pursuits of life are named virtuous accomplishment according to their respective proximity (qurbat-i bāḥāq) to the degree of perfection which characterizes true virtue. He further
explains his standpoint by making a passing reference to the bodily equipoise or equilibrium ('itidāl-i ḍadānī). All the other degrees though they neither fall within the true equipoise nor happen to be free from the flaws of deviation, yet, if not any obvious disturbance occurs therefrom to the actions, they are reckoned among the class of degrees of equipoise. According to this interpretation difference in the degrees of perfection will be estimated by the difference in their respective proximity to the central point of the true equipoise. Through these analogies and inferences al-Dawwānī simply wants to emphasize the fact that the relative virtues, though they may not happen to be quite free from the alloys of excess and deficiency, ought to represent at least the approximate proximity to the true virtue that follows the true mean. Any individual accomplishment, so far as it fulfills this condition, may relatively be regarded as real virtue that should be sought for. Observance of this condition serves, to some extent, as an objective criterion for judging the worth of a "relative virtue." Every individual cannot attain to a complete proximity to the highest degree; but one can, nevertheless achieve an approximate proximity to the essence of all relatively true virtues.

The doctrine of the mean, as it is explained above, works in the system of al-Dawwānī simply as a theoretical principle for general guidance; it is not the only formula for the precise determination of virtuous acts. It is, a formal principle which, when fully grasped, may help a
person in deciding the path of virtue in particular cases. But here, too, his success would mostly depend on something else which he calls "moral insight". The theoretical conception of the mean must be guided by moral insight in choosing the middle course (middle) on particular occasions, circumstances and situations. The precise determination of the right mean or the moderate path is exclusively the function of moral insight which is obviously a product of habit. It is by dint of the constant practice in accordance with the dictates of reason that one becomes capable of cultivating the quality of moral insight. Every act that is morally good should also be right according to the injunctions of reason. Moral insight and reason, therefore, are not two different things. The former is a particular application of the latter. It is, in the word of Kant, practical reason, judging what is morally right and good. It is perhaps due to this fact that al-Dawwání attributes the origin of virtues to the harmonious functioning of the faculties of soul under the guidance of reason. Reason, he maintain, is the arbiter of harmony and proportion. It is through the exercise of wisdom, i.e., the moral insight, that one acquires an understanding of moderation of the right mean. 13

The above discussion fully brings out the importance of moral insight and reason in determining the right actions and virtuous deeds. To emphasize the supremacy of moral insight Socrates was right in his declaration that knowledge is virtue. Although this doctrine was subsequently modified by Plato, yet the basic idea that wisdom distinguishes
between virtue and vice was fully subscribed by him. This enabled him to maintain the essential unity of virtues which was identified with wisdom. al-Dawwānī also subscribes to the idea of the unity of virtues. Virtues come into existence when all the faculties of the human soul are set to work in accordance with the dictates of reason, i.e., wisdom. Wisdom, in other words, serves as a guiding factor. A man of wisdom, besides being wise, is courageous, temperate and just. The unity of virtues, however, is not arithmetical but organic: a unity in diversity, as the human soul is a unity in spite of its diversities in the form of different faculties.

In the analysis of virtue, as we shall examine in detail in the next section, al-Dawwānī lays a great emphasis on the social character of virtues. Virtues, he says, must not be treated purely as private affairs; they should rather be practised in enhancing the public good and the welfare of the humanity at large. It is incumbent upon the men of virtue to objectify their excellences in society, so that people may directly or indirectly be benefited by their virtuous characters. Virtues necessarily entitle their possessor to praise and commendation, provided they are communicated through him to other members of society either in the form of social welfare training schemes or in any other form which may best be suited to him according to the resource and convenience available at his disposal. "Until a virtue does not affect others' well-being, its possessor', declares al-Dawwānī, 'can never be entitled to any commendation". Only those virtuous persons, may rightly be held
worthy of praise who stand for the good of their fellow individuals. According to his interpretation, a person though he may happen to be a spender and that too on appropriate occasions, yet so long as others are not benefited by his money, he may be called spendthrift (minfaq) rather than bountiful or generous (saijhy). Similarly, a person gifted with the power of anger (quwat-i ghadaab) may be styled jealous (Ghuyur) instead of crave, if he does not succeed in providing benefits to others in their moments of anxiety, dread or fear by his courageous pursuits. Likewise, a man of refined intellect, if he fails to provide benefits to others through his wisdom, may be called clever rather than wise. This applies more or less to all the categories of virtues. To be virtuous unto oneself alone neither makes any person worthy of praise nor allows his deed to be treated as a commendable. To be called virtuous and deserve commendation it is necessary that one should execute his excellences in society in the most beneficial forms. When a person makes his virtuous accomplishments, explains al-Dawwâni, conducive to the welfare of the public through some constructive means, he obviously excites a feeling of hope and fear, glory and awe in the hearts of his fellow citizens. This -- the feeling of hope, fear, glory and awe-- entitles him to command their reverence and respect which they readily express in the form of due praise and commendation. Although reason necessarily compels the people to praise such virtuous persons, yet it cannot, however, do so unless there is a feeling of hope or fear in their minds.
For howsoever richly endowed with manifold virtues one may be, argues al-Dawwānī, unless one expects to be benefited, or apprehends injury from him, reason cannot extract praise from him for the virtuous person. A virtuous person should, therefore, try to invoke the feeling of fear and hope in the minds of the people by transforming his excellences into social enterprises. If he fails to succeed in fulfilling this condition, he then ceases to be a virtuous person.

Here it seems reasonable to clear one point which may be confused in the presentation of al-Dawwānī. A virtuous person, in the opinion of al-Dawwānī, should try to invoke hope and fear by his actions in his fellow citizens. Apparently it seems a contradiction. A man may expect a virtuous man of generating hope but how can he give rise to fear. But if we go deep into it, it becomes clear. al-Dawwānī refers here to the aggressor and the aggrieved. An aggressor must have the fear from the virtuous man because a virtuous man can not help an aggressor, but the aggrieved, on the contrary, should have a hope, because a virtuous man, at every cost, would help him.

Thus from the above discussion it follows that al-Dawwānī recommends the social virtues (virtues practised in society) in comparison to individual one.

II

CARDINAL VIRTUES

al-Dawwānī's fundamental approach to virtue, briefly outlined above, is Platonic in spirit. He deduces the four cardinal virtues—wisdom, equity or justice, temperance or
purity, and courage—from the four faculties of the human soul. Each of these cardinal virtues has been conceived like Plato, in terms of perfection or realization of the distinctive function of the corresponding faculties through the observance of moderation in its working and harmony with other faculties under the guidance of reason. In order to make the conception of moderation more precise he has also incorporated the Aristotelian doctrine of the mean into his own discussion of virtue. Al-Dawwānī does not introduce the doctrine of the mean, it may be recalled, into his earlier discussion of virtue which he presents in the very first Chapter of his book, ʿAqlīq-i Jalālī. It is only towards the later part of the book, where he tries to classify various categories of vices, that he discusses the idea of the mean. Thus it seems that he makes use of Aristotelian doctrine of the mean more as a device to point out vices than to define or determine virtue. It is, however, this blend of Platonism and Aristotelianism that constitutes the characteristic feature of al-Dawwānī's conception of virtue.

We have already noted the general description of virtue. Now we intend to examine the content of the particular virtues, the extent to which they differ from the Greek conceptions, and the improvement, if any, made on the Greek notions. It is in the content and not in the form that the influence of the changed condition of the time and the new ideal and cultural background is most evident. The individual virtues that have been mentioned by al-Dawwānī in his treatise appear to be quite good in number. All these virtues have
been categorised under four cardinal virtues on the ground of genus and species - one cardinal virtue has been taken as the genus having so many instances as the species. al-Dawwani begins his treatment of the cardinal virtues with wisdom, then takes up courage, then purity or temperance, and finally discusses justice at considerable length. We shall follow the same order in our study of these virtues.

**WISDOM**

Wisdom (Hikmat), as we have been above is the perfection of the theoretical faculty of the human soul. It comes into operation, when this faculty functions with moderation and in harmony with other faculties. It is technically defined as "attaining the knowledge about the natures (ahwāl) of the existing things (mawjūdāt), as they essentially belong to them, as far as it lies within the bounds of the human power to ascertain them." al-Dawwānī distinguishes two distinct categories of the things existent. To the first category belong the things whose attributes (ahwāl) and existence, i.e., being (wujūd), do not depend on human power or will; they are, in other words, self-existent or self-manifested realities. This level of existence may be termed as higher or divine or noumenal (in the Kantian terminology) level of existence. The second category, contrary to it, consists of those things whose nature or attributes are ascertained by human power and will. It may be termed as lower or human or phenomenal (in the words of Kant) level of existence. The knowledge relating to the former category is called "theoretical wisdom" (Hikmat-i Nazarī) and that relating to the
latter "practical wisdom" (ḥikmat-ī 'amalī).

This exposition of the virtue of wisdom is significant in many respects. Firstly, it conceives of two distinct levels of existence; the higher and the lower; the divine and the human; the noumenal and the phenomenal. The realities that belong to the higher, the divine or the noumenal domain are above the limitations of the time and space; their true essences or precise natures, therefore, can never be fully grasped by the human senses purely on experimental grounds. It is only things of the lower, the human or the phenomenal world whose essential natures can be experienced and known through observation and experiment.

Secondly, it brings a sharp distinction between the "theoretical wisdom" (ḥikmat-ī nazari) and the "practical wisdom" (ḥikmat-ī 'amali) as regards their respective functions. Theoretical wisdom operates in higher regions. It distinguishes the true from the false in the field of judgment, the right from the wrong in the domain of belief and the good from the evil in the sphere of actions. It grasps all abstract and universal truths and acquires exact knowledge which holds good for all times, places and conditions, like the knowledge of God, and His attributes, of the mysteries of the material world, of the heaven, and so on. Practical wisdom, on the other hand, functions in lower regions. It controls man's appetitive power and the power of anger and their numerous offshoots, and helps to form all personal and social virtues. This also depicts al-Dawwānī's epistemology.
The virtue of wisdom, however, is one whole, its bifurcation into theoretical and the practical is more imaginary than real. Each implies the other in such a way that none can be conceived of as independent of the other. Their functions, of course, are different, but not quite unconnected with one another. Wisdom, comprehends the entire existences either divine or human, material or spiritual. The knowledge of the good and evil is inseparably interwoven, with the knowledge of things, the valuational with the factual. Rather, the knowledge of the right and the wrong follows from the understanding of things of their essential aspects. The theoretical and the practical wisdom, in short, are not two different things, they are rather two relative facts of the same reality. They are so closely related to each other, that in some respect the practical wisdom is deemed to be the autocratic head (rais-i mutlaq), of all human powers, whereas in other respect, the theoretical one assumes the position of being the supreme head of man's inner dispositions.

The virtue of wisdom, begets such qualities in its master as quick-wittedness (zakā'), sharp understanding (sur'at-i fahm), clarity of thought (ṣafā'-i zihn), facility of learning (sahūlat-i ta'llum) excellence of intellect (ḥusn-i ta'qqul), retention (taḥaffuz) and recall (tadha'akkur). Expositions of all these qualities put forward by al-Jawwānī are as follows: 17

**Quick-wittedness** (Zakā') is the quality that helps in making quick deductions, and facilitates to draw right
conclusions from propositions and premises (muqaddamat). One may acquire this quality through an intense practice of logic particularly of conclusive inferences.

**Sharp understanding** (sur'at-i fahm) is an excellence of mind which enables a person to pass quickly from "the necessary causes" to "the possible causes" of row the "relations" to the "co-relations". These two qualities, i.e., "quick-wittedness" and "sharp understanding", superficially appear to be similar in meaning. But in fact they are markedly different in their meaning and application. In the former case the quickness relates to the process of reasoning, whereas in the latter no such process is involved at all, as in passing from relative terms to their co-relatives or from a given proposition to its converse or obverse. In these examples the process of reasoning does not appear to be involved at all.

**Clarity of Mind or Thought** (Safā-i zihn) is that which renders a person competent to draw an inference without any vagueness and confusion.

**Facility of Learning** (sahūlat-i ta'llum) is the quality of paying full attention to the desired objects or the problems, so that mastery over them may readily be attained without being hindered and disturbed by distracting reflections and random thought.

**Excellence of Intellection** (husn-i ta'qqul) signifies having an intense and penetrating look in the examination or explanation of a thing, with all its possible prospects so that neither a point may be ignored nor any irrelevant one may enter.
Retention (taḥaffuz) is characterized as being a capacity for keeping intact all the ideas and thought, either formed by intellect or attained through senses.

Recollection (tadhakkur) is the quality of reproducing the things learnt and retained without any great exertion.

While reflecting critically on these expositions of virtues what naturally strikes a modern mind is their non-ethical nature. As they appear to be the powers or the qualities of the human mind, they are ethically held to be neutral. But when we thoroughly analyse al-Dawwānī's fundamental approach to virtue, this criticism does not hold good. Virtuous life, according to him, is characterized by the supremacy of the rational self. Man's rational self has the supremacy through the excellences or perfection of its powers. Excellences or perfection of man's powers, in other words, serve as a mean towards achieving the end of virtuous life. If the end is moral in nature, the means for attaining this end must also be moral. These aforesaid qualities which appear to be the powers of human mind are, in reality, the excellences which help the rational self to establish its supremacy over his other faculties or inner dispositions. They serve as basis for virtuous life, they are rather distinguished personality-traits of a really virtuous person. The qualities which al-Dawwānī has mentioned under the head of wisdom, therefore, are essentially ethical concepts, they are not ethically neutral notions;
on the contrary, they are the means to attain the virtue of wisdom.

This also precisely explains the specific nature of the relation that exists between these qualities and the virtue of wisdom. Obviously it is not one of the species to their genus. Nor is it the relation of a thing to its manifestations. Relation between them is that of means to an end. This makes a distinct departure from the original idea of species and genus relation.

COURAGE

Courage (Shujā'ah) is the virtue of the faculty of anger of the soul. By the faculty of anger al-Dawwānī means that power of human soul which strives, through its overpowering force, to avoid what is called incognenial or disagreeable. It is the faculty which seeks to repel injuries, to face up perils or dangers and yearn for authority and exaltation. The virtue of courage consists of the moderate and harmonious working of the faculty of anger. It comes into existence when this faculty performs its own functions without transgressing upon the functions of other faculties and willingly remains obedient to the commands of reason (issued to prescribe what is right or wrong, good or bad for it). Al-Dawwānī defines courage as "the quality of subordination of the power of anger to the rational soul, so that it may keep up its firmness on occasions of perils and fears without showing the least amount of mental perplexity. The virtue of courage signifies not giving way to agitation but to act in accordance with right opinion in perilous situation."
This definition serves as a criterion for determining a truly courageous deed. Although courage is the characteristic of the faculty of anger, yet all its activities are not the acts of courage. According to the above definition only those activities would rightly be regarded as courageous which are performed under the guidance of the rational soul. And therefore, rashness, foolhardiness, cowardice, suicide etc; though they are the activities of the Faculty of anger, yet they are not courageous deeds, for they are devoid of rational consideration of the "right opinion". A truly brave man is one who submits his anger to his rational soul, remains firm-footed and steady in dangerous situations, does not give way to agitation and proceeds to work in accordance with "the right opinions". Al-Dawwâni does not define as to what is precisely meant by "the right opinions". We may, however, interpret it "as the correct inferences or conclusions of wisdom". Wisdom inheres in an act of courage as one of its essential ingredients. A truly courageous person, working in accordance with the right opinions, scorns difficulties and hardships encountered in pursuit of noble ideals, stands firm in danger, does not shirk from taking the greatest risk, even staking his life. He performs courageous deeds because they have become the part of his nature.

From a person endowed with the virtue of courage qualities such as greatness of soul (kibar-i hafs), self-reliance (najdat), High-mindedness (uluw-i himmat), firmness (thibât), forbearance (hîlm), cool-mindedness (sukûn), Chivalry (shahâmat), endurance (tağâmâmul) politeness (tawâdu'),
sense of honour (ḥamīyyat) and compassion (riqqat) follow. The exposition of these qualities, according to al-Dawwani, is as follows:

**Greatness of Soul** (kibār-i nafās) is the quality of mind which signifies observance of an attitude of indifference towards elevation or degradation, honour or disrepute, favour or contempt. It denotes a quality of remaining unaffected by affluence or adversity. A man truly gifted with this quality becomes above praise or blame, wealth or want. He does not lose his heart in vicissitudes of fortune, rather he grows impervious to change or alteration, grief or sorrow. This quality is so noble that "its heights are hardly ascended, but by those adept in the art of traversing the path of search after truth, its summits are seldom scaled but only by the choicest of the accomplished."

**Self-reliance** (najdat) applies to mind and comprises of firm confidence with its own steadiness, so as neither to give way to impatience nor to show symptoms of nervousness in case of danger.

**High-mindedness** (ʻlūw-i ḥimmāt) signifies that the soul, in quest of real good (jamīl-i ḥaqīqī) and spiritual perfection (kamīl-i nafsānī), pays no heed to worldly benefits (manāfi') or banes (makārīh), so that it has neither joy for worldly acquisition nor sorrow at its loss. Such an attitude of indifference provides so much courage that a man even does not fear death.
Firmness (thabāt) is the power of withstanding afflictions and sufferings. It qualifies human soul to resist troubles and trials. A person gifted with this quality is unlikely to be unduly affected by detrimental forces in adverse circumstances.

Forbearance (hilm) indicates a kind of inner satisfaction of the soul by virtue of which a person is not at all overcome by anger; he wishes to retain a cordial atmosphere and desires to display a dispassionate attitude of mind in all excited situations.

Calmness (suhūn) is a quality that means to evince no laxity in meeting the enmities (ḥusūmat) and the hostilities (maḥāribāt) which may come in the way of defending the honour of faith, religion and nation or the dignity of the soul in battles fought in defence of the noble causes.

Chivalry (Shahāmat) is a longing of the soul for undertaking great enterprises with a view to learning fair repute and good reward. It denotes engaging oneself in keen and persistent striving for higher ends with the expectation of achieving a good name.

Endurance (tahammul) is the quality to bear the physical pain for attainment of commendable virtues and desirable habits.

Politeness or Humility (tawāḍu') lies in abstaining from the show of superiority over one's own inferiors. It means not to assign to oneself a higher status in comparison to those who are below him in worldly possessions. The fundamental principle which conduces to attain this quality
is to remember that there is, indeed, a natural bond of friendship among all. It is due to original unity (wahdat-i-aṣlī) and natural kinship (qurban-i-fitrī) that all men have the similar bodily features and identical problems such as weakness, wants, helplessness, dependence, etc. Due to the consciousness of original unity and natural kinship a man observes politeness and humility in his social dealings.

Sense of honour (ḥamyyat) does not allow any slackness on the part of individual in preserving the integrity and honour of the community. It implies that it is obligatory to wage wars and struggles up to their farthest limits when integrity and honour of community are jeopardised. It is a kind of jealousy which is directed to obtain some positive ends. al-Dawwānī at this place refers to a Tradition which justifies being jealous in matters of faith and dignity: "Indeed God is jealous and it is on account of His jealousy that He has interdicted sin"—and—"Of course Sa'ad is jealous, but I am more jealous than Sa'ad and God still more jealous than I". This clearly shows the importance of being jealous in pursuit of higher ends and in giving protection to the noble ideal of life.

Compassion (riqqat) is the attribute of being moved by witnessing the afflictions of his fellow-beings without any formal show.

If the virtues mentioned above are carefully studied, one can easily understand that the activity of the faculty of anger is not confined only to situations which involve
risk, danger or fear. Neither does it adhere, in its operation, to only war-time objectives. The aforesaid virtues are equally important for objectives of peace-time. It also stands for yearning for authority and exaltations. Plato and Aristotle assigned the task of performing courageous deeds only to the soldier-class and that too in time of war. The conception of courage entertained by them, therefore, appears to be quite narrow in its application. Although it is not absolutely limited to war, yet in their opinion, the type of true courage "is to be soldier's on the battlefield". "The noblest death", says Aristotle, is the soldier's that he meets in the midst of the greatest and the most glorious dangers.

al-Dawwâni, unlike Plato and Aristotle, entitles every citizen of the state, rather he makes it incumbent upon every individual member of the society, to strive hard for the virtue of courage. His conception of courage, thus, proves to be more comprehensive and multi-dimensional in its operation in comparison to the Greek masters. The cause of this difference lies in the changed conditions of the time, particularly in the changed ideological backgrounds. War in the then Greek cities was the most important and glorious social enterprise, and almost all the free citizens, besides slaves, had to take part in it. Some of the city-states were nothing less than military barracks in which men and women alike were trained as soldiers. For the Muslims, in medieval period, war was, however, the concern of only a small section of the people, consequently the ideals of peace claiming greater attention. With the spread of Islamic ideology and values, the individuals emerged into prominence. Purification
of the soul, and the elevation of moral and spiritual life became more important. Sufism which was the dominant cult of Medieval Islam fostered the values of individuals and intensified the trend towards inwardness (bāṭin) than outwardness (Zāhir). All these factors contributed towards the peaceful pursuits, and the energy of the Faculty of anger was directed to more constructive channels.

al-Dawwānī, like Aristotle, does not distinguish between "Civilian" and military courage. Both, in his opinion, are noble and, therefore, should be given equal importance. His emphasis is not on any particular form of courage, but on the nobility of the cause and the purity of motive activating the individual. To defend one's own religion, to strive for the rule of shari'ah, to struggle in the path of God, to dedicate oneself to the service of humanity in peace and war, and to stand firm to establish social justice are equally commendable acts and true expressions of the virtue of courage.

**TEMPERANCE:**

As courage is the virtue resulting from faculty of anger, temperance ('iffat) is the virtue of the appetitive self (shahwat). By the appetitive self, al-Dawwānī means that faculty of human soul which is the source of acquiring what is called congenial or agreeable. When this faculty functions with moderation, keeps itself within its proper limits, follows the dictates of reason and remains manageable, the virtue of temperance comes into existence.

"Temperance", defines al-Dawwānī, is the quality of obedience
of the appetitive faculty to the rational soul, so that it may be employed to function according to the dictates of intellectual prudence. It also signifies to evince signs of deliverance from the bondage of physical desires and subservience to their manifold impulses.

That person is not truly temperate who abstains temporarily from indulging himself in worldly pleasures or who postpones his immediate gratification of his physical desires in expectation of their greater satisfaction for the sake of greater benefit. A man can only be regarded as temperate when the adherence to reason and control over material pleasures become part of his character. This does not, however, mean that one should completely suppress or annihilate his appetities, passions, desires or impulses. Temperance does presuppose the presence of the impulse and desire and their proper satisfaction. Precisely speaking, it is a mean between greed, on the one hand, and annihilation of desire, on the other.

The virtue of temperance too, gives rise to some other qualities (i.e., sub-virtues) such as, modesty (hayā), affability or gentleness (rifq), righteousness (husn-i hudā) conciliatoriness (masālamat), continence (ṣiḥṭ), patience (ṣabr), contentment (qanā'at), dignity (waqār), piety (war'a), orderliness (intizām), freedom (ḥurriyat) and generosity (ṣakhā). The expositions of these qualities are as follows:

Modesty (ḥayā) means to withhold the soul, from committing a sinful act, the moment it becomes aware of it, so that it may not be exposed to social disgrace.
Affability (rifq), signifies the sub-ordination of the soul to anything that may arise out of good deeds.

Righteousness (husn-i hudâ) is defined as the sole or exclusive devotion of the soul to the attainment of its own perfection.

Conciliatoriness (masâlaadat) is an attitude of forbearance in the midst of opposite or contradictory opinions and conflicting desires. It signifies to maintain cordial relations with fellow-beings without having any sense of uneasiness. It is the golden mean between complete renunciation and over-insistence on one's rights.

Continence (di'at), means the steadiness of the soul at the excitement of passions or lust. It denotes display of calmness and control over passions in exciting situations.

Patience (Sabr): Patience may be defined as endurance of afflictions, trials, and tribulations. It signifies the resistance of the soul to its own desires or passions, so that it may not indulge in odious and lowly pleasures. It is the quality of the soul that enables one to refuse to submit to temptations and to face suffering gladly and willingly. It is the struggle of self, in other words, against passions and appetites.

It is supposed to be the most coveted quality of man. It has remained a distinctive quality of the Prophets and Saints. It is of two kinds; (i) To have the patience in the midst of disappointments, and (ii) to observe patience in trials, and tribulations.

Contentment (qanâ'at) is to restrict oneself from an extravagant use of the worldly things, such as, food, drink etc. It allows making use of these things only as
much as they are necessary for preservation of one's life. Such restriction ought to be actuated says al-Dawwānī, by a contempt of material pleasures, rather than by an intention to accumulate wealth and riches. For the latter is the course of miserliness and is condemned by both, reason and religion. It also signifies to follow the means of honest livelihood and preferring poverty rather than live on dishonest means.

**Dignity** (waqūr) denotes observance of decorum and decency in various pursuits of life and avoidance of indiscrète behaviour. It is the composure of soul, says al-Dawwānī, and its avoidance of undue haste. It signifies to follow, in other words, dispassionate course of action. Haste is supposed to be the act of devil, and steadiness an attribute of God. It is the golden mean between pride and humility.

**Piety** (wara') means adherence of the soul to good deeds and approved actions. It implies leading virtuous life for the elevation of character and nearness to God without any element of hypocrisy in it.

**Orderliness** (intizām) is the habit of the individual to arrange matters according to his capacity and with reference to their expediency. It is the state of the soul that manifests itself in properly conducting and rightly organizing its affairs.

**Freedom** (hurriyat) signifies acquisition of property by fair means and to spend it in approved fashion, i.e., on legitimate items. It interdicts indulgence in odious occupation and adopting reprehensible methods of acquiring fortune.
Generosity (ṣakha) denotes a quality which means spending wealth liberally for helping indigent and needy or those who require such help. This consists of observing moderation in the acts of charity, of spending on the right persons on right occasions, with right amount. It is a golden mean between extravagance and miserliness. The former consists in spending money without any consideration of the person, occasion, time and amount, and the latter in withholding money or riches when it ought to be spent.

Generosity is one of the most important virtues, and because of its importance Aḥmad ibn Ḥusayn and Nāṣiruddin Tusi have regarded it as a class by itself and have analysed it into a number of virtues. Al-Dawwani, however, does not set out the sub-classes of the virtue of generosity, but he fully realizes that to be generous is one of the important factors which may bring salvation in the life hereafter. The paradise is supposed to be the abode of generous people. The virtue of generosity strengthens, he maintains, the true faith, whereas infidelity is connected with miserliness.

It must be borne in mind, says al-Dawwani, that when the soul of a person, becomes sound enough to endure all dangers and hardships, even the horror of death, he does not care for the loss or gains of the material possessions and love of wealth does not overpower him. Thus it can be seen that the virtue of generosity generally follows courage. Courage, however, does not always follow generosity, though it is apparently more closely connected to it, than to other virtues.

If the virtues mentioned above are to be, carefully,
studied, one cannot fail to admire the balanced approach of al-Dawwānī regarding temperance. al-Dawwānī neither recommends the excessive indulgence in pleasure nor he prescribes an ascetic approach. He, on the contrary, preaches the golden mean between the above two courses. Thus his position may rightly be called the via media between the Epicureanism and Stoicism. This relieves al-Dawwānī's notion of temperance from undesirable asceticism. He neither suggests treading the path of epicureans nor an adherence to the ideals of stoics. Temperance is characterized as holding the middle-course between the Epicureanism and the Stoicism.

The second point to be noted is that al-Dawwānī's conception of temperance is more comprehensive and profound than that of the Greek Masters. Aristotle's notion of temperance, for instance, is confined to the pleasures of the body and particularly the pleasures of taste and touch. Even the former is finally excluded, and temperance is apparently confined to a moderate degree of self-restraint upon the gratification of gross senses. But in al-Dawwānī we do not find any limitation of the area of operation of temperance. The terms, bashefulness or modesty (ḥayā), continence (di'at), sedateness, dignity or gravity (Naqār), piety (Mara'), are for instance, quite general and unqualified. He preaches, like an ardent Muslim, to be temperate in all spheres of life.

JUSTICE or EJLTY

al-Dawwānī's interpretation of Justice differs from that of the Greek masters and his predecessors. al-Dawwānī
puts forward, to some extent, a different interpretation of justice which is neither in conformity with the notion of the Greek Masters, nor with the conception of any of the Muslim philosophers. The point of difference, precisely speaking, lies in the derivation of the virtue of justice. al-Dawâni, says that justice is the product of the practical faculty of the soul, whereas others hold it to be the result of the harmonious working of the three faculties of the souls, i.e., rational, spirited and appetitive.

Both, Plato and Aristotle have fundamentally attributed the virtues of wisdom, courage and temperance to the proper or the proportionate functioning of the rational spirited and appetitive aspects of the human soul. The excellence of justice is attained in their opinion, through a sound and proper interaction of all these virtuous accomplishments. Justice, in other words, is an aggregate, or a combined result, of wisdom, courage and temperance.

Almost all celebrated Muslim writers on ethics, following Plato and Aristotle, have derived the virtue of wisdom from the reason, the virtue of courage from the anger, and the virtue of temperance from the passion, the three distinguished aspects of the soul. It is the functioning of these aspects in right proportions, they maintain, that produces these cardinal virtues. True to the Platonic and Aristotelian conception of justice, Muslim Scholars consider it to be the outcome of the harmonious working of the virtues of wisdoms, temperance and courage. al-Dawâni summarizes the standpoint of his predecessors in the following words:

"When these genera of virtues (wisdom, courage and temperance)
come into existence and mix up together to co-operate with one another, their commixture gives rise to a condition analogous to each, but comprising them all in their perfection and completeness, and this is termed as the virtue of justice or equity. It is the essence of all the other cardinal virtues.

The virtue of justice, according to the above exposition, is regarded to be a simple as well as a compound attribute. The three genera of virtues (wisdom, courage and temperance) happen to be either parts of justice or equivalent to its parts. Al-Dawwānī subjects the above interpretation of justice to a bitter criticism. He puts forward logical arguments in order to make explicit the defects that lie inherent in this notion of justice. Since justice, as the above exposition shows, is the term applied to the essence of three virtues, it naturally happens to be a composite attribute, and as such it may not be counted as one virtue having an independent existence or entity of its own. For the whole composed of parts, cannot be considered, separate from its parts. Nor, it seems advisable, infers Al-Dawwānī, to categorise either particular vices against it, as its opposites, or certain virtues under it, as its species. The species, he argues further, shall be exactly the species of the collective whole, and its opposites shall naturally be the opposites of its constituent ingredients. Al-Dawwānī, in support of his argument, refers to Ibn Sīnā who maintains that justice is the result of the combination of the three virtues, i.e., wisdom, courage and temperance. But he only
explains the sub-virtues of these three main virtues and their opposites, and leaves the sub-virtues belonging to the virtue of justice unexplained. All those sub-virtues which the other philosophers mention under justice, he has mostly enumerated under the head of wisdom. This clearly shows, he says in conclusion, that the notion of justice which describes equity as the essence of the three virtues and thereby affirms vices as permanent kinds (opposed to it and its parts), is open to question.

Justice, al-Dawānī now formulates his own theory, is a 'simple quality' (malka-ī basīt) basically connected, with the perfection of the practical reason. To call it a simple attribute is more appropriate, because the obvious meaning of the term justice is the equipoise or equilibrium of morals ('ītīdāl-i ḥalqī) analogous to the equilibrium of temperament ('ītīdāl-i mizājī), which results from the composition, commixture and co-ordination of different elements. Temperament according to the admitted principle of thought is understood, he says, to be a simple quality.

Though justice basically lies in the perfection of the practical reason, it is indirectly related to the virtues of wisdom, courage and temperance. These virtues constitute the basis of justice in the sense that perfection of the practical reason, that gives rise to the virtue of justice, itself is based upon the cultivation of all these cardinal virtues. When these virtues are secured, the practical reason necessarily gains domination over all other physical powers, with the result that all come under its sway, and are set to
work under its directions. This characterizes the perfection of the practical reason. The perfection of the practical reason depends, in other words, upon the subordination of every other power to it, so that each may find equal opportunities to function in equilibrium. Any other faculty than Practical Reason can hardly employ all the powers collectively on suitable occasions, in their state of equipoise and according to the dictates of reason. The practical reason, when it attains to its acme of perfection, works, in a sense, like an "autocratic head" (ra'is-i mu'tlaq), and all other powers serve as its servitors (khuddām). It holds the authority by employing all the powers, including the theoretical reason, in the most expedient manner, and in conformity with the requirements of time (Naqt), quantity (Kamyyat) and quality (Naifyyat). When it succeeds in holding such kind of authority, it gives rise to the virtue of justice.  

al-Dawwânî has, therefore, defined justice as "the co-ordination of all the powers of the human soul, and their subordination to the discriminative faculty, i.e., reason, so that a man of justice may not be thrown in the vortex of dismay, or into the whirlpool of perplexity in case of conflict of desires and passions. On the contrary, he may be able to show clear manifestations of giving and taking what, in reality, falls due".  

Justice, according to the above definition, is a state of mind that controls desires, guides passions and impulses, regulates powers and dispositions in accordance with the dictates of reason. It is this directing and
controlling function of justice that has led al-‘azzālī
to describe it as a separate basis of character and as the
fourth faculty of human soul (i.e., quwat-i ‘adl) in addi-
tion to its three traditional powers. His view of this
virtue is one of an executive officer who enforces the rule
of reason on other faculties of the human soul. And that is
why Prof. M. Hamarudin in his book, "Ethical Philosophy of
al-‘azzālī" has rightly remarked that "Justice is applied in
reason." In al-Dawwānī’s system it is the practical reason
that performs the function of an executive office to ensure
the rule of reason in man’s life. It co-ordinates all the
powers of the human soul, renders them subservient to the
commands of reason and enables them to work with moderation
and harmony. This is what justice exactly stands for.
Justice is considered to be as simple a quality, comprising
the threefold cardinal virtues and resulting from the per-
fec tion of the practical reason. This goes to explain, in
a nut-shell, al-Dawwānī’s fundamental approach to the virtue
of justice.

The cardinal virtue of justice begets the following
sub-virtues: sincerity (ṣadaqat), faithfulness (wafā’),
affectation (ulfat), sympathy (ṣahafat), care of kin (gila-i
reḥm) recompense (makāfāt), good Partnership (husn-i shirkat),
fair judgment (husn-ṭ-ṣadā), cordiality (tawaddud), submission
(taslīm) reliance (tawakkul) and devotion (‘ibādāt).

Sincerity (ṣadaqat) is a term that stands for true
comradeship. The sincere friendship is indicated by means
of avoiding duality of character in matters where such
avoidance becomes obligatory by the laws of religion and the
dictates of reason. It also lies in consolidating the bond
of unity or integration to such a degree as to dislike for
his friend what he dislikes for himself as well as to wish
for his friend what he wishes for himself. al-Dawwānī here
refers to a tradition of the Prophet depicting the same
ideal: "None of you be reckoned a true believer, till he
wishes for his brother (in faith) what he wishes for himself."

\textit{Affection or amity (Ulfat) practically prevails among
the people of different classes; when the opinions, beliefs
and convictions of one class of people coincide, and unite
together and they agree on mutual assistance for the regula-
tion of the daily life with the other class, the virtue of
affection seems to have been ensured.}

\textit{Fidelity or Faithfulness (Wafa) implies that there
should be no deviation from adherence to the path of sympathy,
charity or aid. It has also been explained as fulfilment
of promises and discharge of obligations.}

\textit{Tenderness or sympathy (Shafaqat) signifies getting
moved and affected by anything unpleasant or untoward that
befalls upon a person. It also implies a vigorous effort
in seeking compensation of the loss incurred by that affected
person. Inculcation of this quality is more obligatory upon
those individuals who are of equal status and are linked by
the bond of spiritual unity or mental affinity.}

\textit{Care of Kith and kin (Gilat-i rehm): It is to allow
one's relatives to share with him in his wealth, comforts
and worldly possessions. The kinship may be either formal}
or external, or internal or spiritual. The formal or external kinship lies in blood relationship while internal or spiritual kinship is based on the affinity of thought and soul. Therefore the latter is decidedly superior to the former.

Recompense (Mukāfīt) signifies repayment for the good done to one by his fellow-beings. The good repaid must be equivalent, rather more in comparison to the good enjoyed in quantity, quality and intensity. It should, however, in no condition, be less than equal. Recompense also includes retaliation for an alleged evil or a committed offence. One should retaliate, suggests al-Jawāni, for the evil or the offence done to him by his fellows either with an equal evil, or if possible, with a lesser one. It should by no means be more than equal either in quality, quantity or intensity.

Good Partnership (husn-i shirkat) means to conduct or manage one's affairs in such a way as not to offend the feelings of his co-partners, so far as it may be practicable and in accordance with the canons of justice. Good-fellowship prevails, in other words, when one gives and takes equitably in transactions, and keeps his affairs, to extent possible, in accordance with the natural inclinations of his fellow-beings.

Fair Judgment or dealing (husn-i qaḍā) is to discharge properly the rights of others, and to keep oneself free from the blame of favouritism, reproach or censure.

Fidelity (tawādul) implies to seek the friendship of one's own equals or elders by means of good words, fair
deeds, gifts, favours and similar other things which may show regard or evoke respect.

**Submission** (taslīm) signifies to agree to, and to abide willingly by, the commands of Allāh (ṣallā-u al-lāh), the laws of Shari'ah, the recommendations of the Prophet and the like, such as, the examples set forth, or the traditions laid down, by the leaders of religion and the spiritual divines. The quality of submission is supposed to be the pivot of true faith. Al-Dawânî quotes a verse from the holy Qur'an which lays stress on adopting an attitude of submission to the decrees: "No, thy Lord is the witness to it that they are not true believers, till they make thee judge in the dispute that arises between them, and then most submissively accept the decree that thou passest, without feeling the least mental constriction threat".  

**Reliance** (tawakkul) is the trust in God. It refrains the man from the belief that either the gain or the loss of any object, the haste or the delay of any action is in the hand of any finite or mortal being. On the contrary, it signifies trusting (tawā'īl) all the actions to the best of all trustees, i.e., Allāh. It requires observance of an attitude of obedience to the decrees issued by Divine Providence. It enjoins upon people to be contented with what one has, and not to hanker after more in worldly benefits or goods.

**Devotion** (tābadāt) means to cultivate the quality of respect to the true originator, i.e., Allāh and those nearest to Him, such as angels, prophets, their companions, their companions' followers, saints, and inspired intellectuals. It also includes adopting an attitude of true obedience to
the Divine laws and sincere adherence to the canons or the
traditions of the "millat" (nation). It implies imposition
of self-restraint and abstinence from committing sinful deeds
which gives perfection to devotion.

The particular of devotion may be found, says al-
Dawwâni, only in the laws of the sharî'ah. He considers
man's intellect to be incapable of providing the details
of the Islamic religious laws. The utmost hold of intellect
on such matters, is only by way of abridgement (ijmal).
Without the light of revelation (of the Prophet) one cannot
find access to the secrets of religion. The religious laws
come, as a matter of fact, within the limits of the practical
reason only in their general aspects. Their details fall
beyond the reach of human intellect.37

The various manifestations of justice mentioned above
are mostly social in character. Recompense (ma'afiat), good-
fellowship (husn-i shirkat), fair judgment or dealing (husn-i
qâdâ) are, for instance, various sub-virtues of justice which
may be realized only in society through mutual transactions.
But al-Dawwâni's conception of justice, cannot be limited
only to the social plane. It is more comprehensive and
includes almost every aspect of human life. The sub-virtues
of friendship (gadaqat), affection (ulfat), fidelity (wafâ),
submission (taslim), reliance (tawhîd) and devotion are
undoubtedly quite multiphased forms of justice. They are
deemed to be the fundamentals for the ideal benevolent
character.
III

Justice seems to be the most important and eminent of all virtues, and has received an elaborate treatment from al-Dawwānī. He has devoted two separate sections of his book, Akhlāq-i-Jalālī, exclusively on the exposition of justice. He has dealt in those sections with the importance and kinds of justice and has outlined the ways in which it works in individual as well as social life. We shall discuss, in the coming pages the chief features of these sections.

THE IMPORTANCE OF JUSTICE

The word "Justice" ('adālat) involves, as we have seen above, the idea of equal proportion, harmonious relation and true equipoise. But these ideas, without taking into account the concept of unity (wahdat), are hardly realizable. The notion of unity is implied in the very idea of justice, since it signifies establishing an integrated, harmonious unified relations, as regards man himself and his associates. al-Dawwānī considers unity (wahdat) to be the highest stage of perfection; God, he believes, is the most perfect Being, for He essentially possesses the absolute unity. The conception of the Unity of God, in its aspects of all-comprehensiveness, is beyond the limits of human understanding. Men of intuition have, however, interpreted it as being a unity in diversity. It is a kind of unity which absorbs all pluralities. The perfection of every attribute, according to this notion of unity, consists in its being
contiguous to, and exhibiting close contact with, its opposites, as it is evident, says al-Dawwānī, from such conception of God as, "He is the first and the last, the manifest and the hidden, and He embraces all in His knowledge." Though unity in diversity is the characteristic feature of Divine perfection, yet other objects of nature may attain excellences, asserts al-Dawwānī, if they follow the same principle. Every existing entity which reveals the elements of unity, inspite of its plurality, may be reckoned the most perfect in worldly things. The more a thing is advancing towards its real unity, the greater it will be in its perfection. Al-Dawwānī explains the grades of perfection in the kingdom of minerals, vegetables and animals on the basis of this principle and then he comes to explain the human beings. 39

The doctrine of the unity in the human kingdom does not operate directly, but quite indirectly, i.e., through the unity of relations (Wahdat-i tanāsūb) or on the basis of the unity of equipoise (Wahdat-i 'itidālī). The harmonious tones, metrical verses and fine figures, beautiful paintings, arts etc., which are the manifestations of human mind, for instance, are due to the dominance of the unity of relations. Similarly, the individual and social perfection of mankind lies in maintaining the unity of equipoise in their temperamental faculties. The unity of relations and the unity of equipoise give rise to harmony. "The element of harmony signifies equality or similarity in proportion which happens to be an image of unity." 40 A pure proportion wherever it is observed serves as a source of attraction
and delight for the human soul. Attraction or delight, in others, results from the comprehension of true proportion which is considered to be a partial form of unity. The highest of all attractions or delights is attached essentially to the sublimest of all unity that is God. It is, in short, through the observance of the right proportion or true harmony that the doctrine of unity is reflected in man's private and social excellences. When it prevails, for instance, in the particles of elements it give rise to the equipoise of temperament. When it is produced in tones, it results in pure and delightful notes. If it operates through gestures, grace is produced. If it is maintained in human organs, it results into beauty. And when it works in mental faculties, the virtue of justice comes into existence. 41

The above exposition clearly shows that justice depends fundamentally on the preservation of such proportion which may be workable into the unity of relation or equipoise. al-Dawwâni distinguishes three distinct kinds of proportion which help to determine and understand the true unity of relations in substance, quality or quantity. They are: (i) the numerical proportion (nisbat-i 'adâdi), (ii) the arithmetical proportion (nisbat-i hindisi) and (iii) the synthetic proportion (nisbat-i tâlifî). The numerical proportion is precisely defined as one which is the golden mean between the two extremes, like the digit four that stands as a mean between two and six. The arithmetical proportion is further divided into two: the one is called "continuous or conjunctive ratio" (nisbat-i mufassilah) and
is explained like this: "the relation of the first to the second is, as that of second to the third (A:B:C); it is a ratio with a common mean. The other one is termed as "Discrete or disjunctive-ratio" (nisbat-i mu'afa'ilah) and is stated like this: "the relation of the first to the second is, as that of the third to the fourth (A:B:C:D); it is a ratio without a common mean. When the ratio of the difference between the middle and the lowest is equivalent to the difference between the middle and the highest it is called synthetic proposition. It is the ratio of the smallest to the greatest. al-Dawwâni has made only passing reference to these proportions. He has explained them in brief, so that one may not have any difficulty in understanding their application to the different kinds of justice. For detailed study of these ratios, al-Dawwâni recommends the books on arithmetic. 42

After the due analysis of proportion al-Dawwâni presents the operation of justice in human life. In order to determine the precise nature of its operation, he classifies those matters that regulate the conduct of life into three categories: The first is connected with the distribution of properties, public funds, distinctions, honour and the like. The second is related to the dealings, transactions, contracts, barter, etc. The third is concerned with discipline, punishment, retribution and correction. In all these categories the principle of proportion does equally operate, but there is a marked difference in the nature of its application in relation to each category both in kind and character. 43
In the first category, which includes distribution of properties, funds and distinctions etc., justice may be obtained, says al-Dawání, by applying the discrete or disjunctive proportion (nisbat-i munfaṣīlah). The application of justice in this category may be expressed in such form as: "Since the ratio of a given person to a given property or distinction is similar to the ratio of a person in a similar predicament to a similar property or distinction, so that person is completely entitled to the given property or distinction." Justice demands that it must be secured to him. If there is an excess or a deficiency, this must be curtailed or compensated respectively. Application of this ratio goes to show that the just distribution in matters of property or distinction should proceed strictly according to merit.

In the second category, which consists of dealings, contracts, exchange of commodities and the like transactions, justice may be obtained by applying either, in some situations, the discrete or disjunctive ratio, or, on some occasions, the conjunctive or contiguous ratio (nisbat-i-munfaṣīlah). The former's application to this category may be illustrated like this: "the ratio of this draper to this cloth is similar to the ratio of this carpenter to this chair, so that there is no harm in exchanging one with the other." The example of the latter (i.e., conjunctive ratio) is "the ratio of this cloth to this money is identical to the ratio of this money to this chair", so there is nothing unfair in exchanging the cloth with the chair. al-Dawání quotes this example, which he admits to have borrowed from Nāṣiruddin Tusi, in
order to illustrate the conjunctive ratio, but at the same
time he says that is is wrong. The mutual exchange of the
cloth with the chair would have involved obviously no harm
to any body, if the ratio of the cloth to the money happens
to be identical, with the ratio of the chair to the money.
But this example, he declares, however is not that of con-
junctive ratio, because it goes against its very definition.46

Both the illustrations, mentioned above, however,
clearly explain that exchange or transaction in such cases
will be on the basis of the value either of the articles or
of the labour involved. In matters of contracts, exchange
of goods, or the like transaction, the question is, therefore,
of the value of the commodity or the labour, which will be
determined by the rules of arithmetical proportion.

In the third category, namely, in matters of disci-
pline, punishment, retribution and correction, the same rule
of arithmetical proportion, suggests al-Dawwānī, will hold
good. The mode of its application may be illustrated by
the formula: "the ratio of this man to his status in life
is analogous to the ratio of that man to his status, therefore
justice demands that in case the latter does any harm or
injustice to the former, in enforcing the due retribution
the same ratio must be observed so that equity may be
maintained.47

It may be noted that al-Dawwānī applies neither
"numerical proportion" nor "synthetic ratio" as regards
man's personal and social activities. The numerical propor-
tion is fixed, precise and exact in its nature, while the
synthetic ratio operates in extremely complex or diverse situations which are found in musical notes. Human behaviour as a whole does not happen to be fixed, exact or precise; nor it is extremely complex. Therefore, in case of human behaviour neither numerical nor synthetic ratio can be applied to determine the fairness of those matters which regulate his personal as well as social life. It is only arithmetical proportion, which works through symbolic equations, that can rightly be applied to ensure justice in distribution of properties, public funds and honour, in exchange of commodities, and in matters of retribution, punishment, discipline and correction.

After pointing out the modes of its operation, al-Jawwani proceeds to enumerate the various agencies entrusted with the task of maintaining justice in individuals as well as in society. The justice in society is maintained through three distinct agencies. (i) the holy Divine Code (Shari'at-i-Ilahi), (ii) the just king (Padshah-i 'Adil), and (iii) the money (Dinar). 48

A just man is one who assigns proportion to disproportionate things. He succeeds in doing so, says al-Jawwani, with the help of Divine Code, i.e., Shari'ah of Islam. The maintenance of justice and its reinforcement cannot be possible without attaining the knowledge of the true mean. Since this knowledge is very difficult to attain, one is bound to observe the Divine Law. It is the divine law which helps a man to have the true mean and to maintain the equality, equity and justice in society. It is the most important of all the three agencies entrusted with the task of ensuring
Money (Dinar) operates as a value-measuring device to help maintain the just transaction and the exchange of the things that differ both in kind and quality. It is supposed to be the equalizer of the inequalities. In order to explain the role of money as a just agent of transactions, al-Dawwānī emphasizes the social aspect of the human being. Men, he says, are social beings. Their survival depends on co-operation, assistance and friendship which necessarily implies the mutual exchange of service, labour and goods. Mutual assistance, in other words, indispensably requires interchange of labour either in terms of service or in the form of articles, so that equitable proportion and compensation may not be disturbed. When the labour involved either in the form of service or goods happens to be equal on both sides, the exchange is simple, just and proportionate. Complexity arises in such situations when labour involved cannot be easily distinguishable due to differences in qualities and kinds. Just equation between things differing in qualities cannot be established without having a common standard and it is money which serves as a common standard in such situation.

But it is not necessary, says al-Dawwānī, that money always should be used as a successful standard. It is a “silent agency” and, therefore, needs to be assisted, by a “rational judge” (fādil-i nātiq) who is the just king. The functions assigned to a just king may, however, be easily entrusted to
any kind of government. It is one of the duties of the king or the government to assign and watch the function of money and set it right whenever it fails to fulfil its function. A just ruler or a good government is supposed to be the arbitrator in matters of maintaining the equality and justice. In all these three agencies, viz., (the divine codes, a just King and the money), Divine Code holds the supreme authority, it is declared to be "First arbitrator" (nāmus-i awwal).

The King or the Government, the "second arbitrator", (nāmus-i thānī) must necessarily submit to the dictates of the divine code, while money, the third arbitrator, (nāmus-i thālith) has to conform to the authority of the second as well as the first arbitrator.51

Al-Jawwānī divides the tyrants, into three categories: The first category consists of those who refuse to adhere to the law of God. They are called infidels (kāfir) or sinners (fasiq), and are found to be in overwhelming majority. The second category contains those who do not obey their king or the Government. They are the rebels or the outlaws (ṣāqī or ṭāghī). To the third category belong the people who have more money than their requirements and do not follow the equitable path. They are called thieves and usurpers (sāriq wa khāsin). The evil ensuing from the first two categories of tyrants is greater than the evil that occurs from the third category. For he who defies the authority of the divine law, injunctive as well as prohibitory, can never be expected, says al-Jawwānī, to submit to the order of the other
two authorities. He may be found susceptible to committing all kinds of evils or blameworthy deeds. Similarly, one who defies the authority of the equitable King, and breaks down the bond of legitimate obedience to the good government should be presumed to be defying God. He is likely to commit all acts of injustice to his fellows. It is incumbent upon everybody, says al-Dawwānī, to dissociate himself as far as possible from such tyrants.  

IV  

DIVISION OF JUSTICE  

Al-Dawwānī classifies justice into two broad categories: (1) Justice in relation to God; and (2) Justice in relation to His creatures. The second again is divided into two: (1) justice in relation to living men, and (2) justice in relation to those who are dead, i.e., one's ancestors or predecessors. This classification of justice stands basically in conformity with Aristotelian division of equity. Aristotle is said to have divided justice into three kinds: (1) justice in relation to the supreme Master, or God; (2) justice in relation to mankind; and (3) justice in relation to one's predecessors or ancestors. The contents of both these classifications of justice appear to be the same. They differ, however, in their formal structure. Aristotle considers justice in relation to the living men and that in relation to one's ancestors as two distinct entities of equity, al-Dawwānī, on the contrary, treats them simply as being the two aspects of one and the same entity of justice, i.e., justice in relation to God's creature. "Reverence to the commands of God, and
kindness to His creatures" encompass, in his opinion, all the three parts of justice. The first clause, i.e., "rever­
ence to the commands of God ", signifies, justice in rela-
tion to God." The second clause, i.e., "kindness to His cre­
tures", conveys the sense of justice in relation to fellow beings whether alive or dead.

Justice in relation to God is to show one's adherence to the Divine commands. It consists of discharging duties of a servant to the Master. It demands following the most praiseworthy course towards the real Benefactor. His blessings are so unbounded, numerous and un-fathomable that man cannot possibly return His graces in equal terms. Nor He needs any kind of return for His favours bestowed upon His creatures. The only thing that a man can do is to show his sincere obligation and gratitude towards Him. A profound sense of gratitude, in al-Dawwānī's opinion, encompasses the whole life and pervades all actions, thoughts and feelings of man. It inspires faith, reverence, obedience and love in the heart of the human beings. Observance of the rules of the Shari'ah, belief in, and respect for, God's angels, prophets and friends (aulīyā') are some of the ways which ensure justice in relation to God. It also signifies employing all powers, faculties and organs for attaining their respective perfections so that man may reach the highest stage to become the Vice-gerent of God upon the earth. The complete application of all the powers, organs and faculties to this end constitutes worship and gratitude, and displays justice in relation to God. On the contrary their counter-application
brings sinfulness or ingratitude which goes to indicate injustice in relation to God. Just service to God consists of three things: true belief, correct utterances, and upright actions. The comprehensive description of each of these items can be had from the books on Islamic law and Jurisprudence, which explains all these things in the minutest detail. al-Dawwānī, therefore, suggests that one must study the authentic books on Islamic Jurisprudence, so that he may succeed in doing full justice to his relationship to God. To study the divine codes is a part and parcel of the observance of justice as regards God.\(^56\)

Justice in relation to fellow individuals consists of fair discharge of trusts and deposits, in showing due allegiance to the Government and the Governor, in observing reverence to the eminent doctors and leaders of the faith and in following the fair course as regards public dealings and mutual transactions.\(^57\)

Justice in relation to one's ancestors or predecessors consists of paying their debt, enforcing their will after their death and observing their precedents and the like. It also includes offering of prayers, the 'fātiḥah' and the like means of supplication for the blessings of the deceased.\(^58\)

In continuation of the above discussion al-Dawwānī points out that the just execution of all these three kinds of justice depends, fundamentally, on an equitable King or a good Government. The most comprehensive form of justice, he declares, is that of a King or a Government; it is the compendium of all aspects of justice; no individual can dare
to observe his just obligations without being assisted by a good administrative agency. The moral training and the management of homes depend essentially upon the efficient administration of the State. The mental composure, which forms the basis of all perfections and prepares the ground for the just execution of all the three kinds of justice, can hardly be realized in the midst of continued or perpetual disturbances, fluctuating political conditions and conflicting social aims. The primary function of a good government or an equitable Governor is to foster the atmosphere of peace, progress and prosperity within the State, so that justice could be established in all kinds of social relations. To maintain justice in the market or to keep the money in circulation is not the sole business of the Government. It is one of its responsibilities. A just Government has to look after all kinds of justice whether it may be in relation to God or in relation to God's creatures. Every problem that has any bearing on the maintenance of any kind of justice should be the concern of the Government. In order to emphasize the necessity of an equitable administrative machinery, al-Dawwâni refers to the traditions of the prophet, who is attributed to have made such declarations as (i) "If the King administers justice, he shares in the benefit of every virtue performed by his subjects; on the contrary, if he becomes a tyrant, he partakes with the subject the bane of every vice and sin committed by them". (ii) "On the day of judgment a just king would be nearest to God - and a tyrant would be at the farthest." There is yet another tradition:
"The justice for an hour is better than the devotion extending over seventy years". For the impact of an hour's justice, explains al-Dawwānī, would extend directly or indirectly to every subject throughout the state, and would last for a prolonged period. He refers to these traditions with a view to justifying his own standpoint that a just King or a Government is indispensable to ensure the execution of all kinds of justice. 59

Tafaddul, i.e., excess of beneficence, kindness and favour in relation to fellow-individuals, is considered, according to the strict criterion of equity, a blame-worthy habit. It is said that excess of benevolence, kindness and favour does not fall under the definition of justice, because justice means treating on equal level. al-Dawwānī does not agree with the above exposition of Tafaddul. Tafaddul, he says, operates as a safeguard against any deficiency in the dispensation of justice. Tafaddul, in such case, demands that one should be kind enough as to give something more than what is due in quantity, so that equitable repayment of obligation may positively be ensured. The importance of Tafaddul, thus, lies in the fact that it safeguards the maintenance of justice in mutual transactions and social dealings. Moreover, it serves as a powerful incentive to show some more kindness over and above what is legitimately due. It is a praiseworthy habit and does not fall under the category of unjust deeds. 60

In all the virtues the safeguard to the mean, however, does not operate alike. In some cases the virtuous course
is inclined towards excess, in some other, it is bent towards deficiency. For example in generosity which constitutes a mean between prodigality (asrāf) and niggardliness (bukhl), the safeguard inclines towards excess, while in temperance, which forms a mean between over-indulgence and total abstention, it leans towards the deficiency. It is also to be noted that tafaddul can never be adequately realized until all the conditions of justice have been duly fulfilled. That is, one should necessarily discharge the due obligation in the first instance, and then by way of safeguard he should add something to that. If one spends, for example, all his assets without fulfilling the obligation that falls due on him, he would by no means be called generous; on the contrary, he may be regarded wasteful or spendthrift, for he is alleged to have neglected the requisite of justice.

In this connection, it should be further observed, says 1-Dawwāni, that tafaddul can be applied as a safeguard to justice only in relation to a dispute between himself and another person. One may be allowed to exercise tafaddul only as regards his personal loss or gain. There can be no place for tafaddul when one arbitrates between two other persons or parties. In deciding the case of others the principle of equality and the conditions of equity must be observed in the purest form. 61
Al-Dawwâni prescribes a particular order to be followed in the acquisition of cardinal virtues. In order to provide a rational justification for his order, he first analyses the kinds of processes which are conducive to attainment of perfection. Then he proceeds to examine the natural order of the emergence of human faculties and powers. Afterwards he puts forward the particular process which he prescribes for the training of the virtues. He has also discussed in this connection the precise nature and characteristics of the art of cultivating moral excellences.

The progress in the development of virtuous character depends, in his opinion, on two factors (i) inherent tendencies of man and (ii) the voluntary efforts of the individual. The process that leads to perfection is of two kinds: (i) natural and (ii) acquired. The natural process resembles the development of sperm which passes through different stages, until it reaches the perfection of the animal life. The acquired process is like the wood which is cut and polished and given the shape of a plank with the aid of tool, instrument and labourer. In the former case the process of development depends entirely upon inherent tendencies, whereas in the latter the progress is made by the voluntary efforts of the individual.

Innate process has superiority, professes al-Dawwâni, over acquired one both in matters of origin as well as perfection. For it is directly connected with the divine source.
It proceeds straightaway from the divine wisdom and human will has not to intervene in its operation. Acquired process, on the contrary, proceeds from human volition and is totally dependent upon human initiative and efforts. As the perfection of copies lies in the resemblance with their originals, so the perfection of acquired process depends upon its resemblance and assimilation to the innate process. The resemblance and assimilation to innate process may be attained, says al-Dawwānī, by arranging means in order of priority and after the due consideration of the existing situation. Perfections achieved through acquired process, sometimes claim an additional advantage, in their degrees of excellence, over those brought about by innate-process. For example the hatching of eggs, by artificial process a large number of eggs can be hatched through the adjustment of heat at a time which is never possible for a bird to hatch in single incubation. This additional advantage is peculiar to acquired process which is due to the supervision of both the human designs as well as of the divine providence.

After these preliminary remarks, al-Dawwānī prescribes the particular order for attaining cardinal virtues. The training in moral excellences falls under the category of acquired process. But the basic principle in matters of cultivating the virtues, is to follow the order of nature. There is a natural order in the emergence of different instincts, impulses and faculties of man. What takes precedence in the order of natural emergence must also be given priority for culture and training. The task of an aspirant after the perfection of virtues is to understand clearly the natural
order of the instincts and impulses and then to follow that order strictly in training them in virtues.

If we reflect over the natural order of emergence of instincts and impulses, it will become quite clear that the first instinct which emerges in the infant is the instinct of self-preservation. As soon as the child is born he expresses desire for sucking milk. As he grows in strength he supplements this desire by a louder lisping, weeping, crying and the like. In the initial stage after birth he is unable to discriminate between similar things that appear before his eyes, such as the face of his mother and of others. When, however, his sense, external as well as internal, attain strength, and his faculty of imagination enables him to retain the images of things perceived, he clearly recognizes sensual objects. After this power of desire, the power of anger becomes evident in child, so that he may avert harmful things and resist whatever obstructs and forbids him from attaining his desired objects. In case he fails to repel them himself, he seeks the assistance of his neighbours. With the development of this power, the rational soul (nafs-i nāṭiqah), which is the faculty of discrimination, marks its appearance in him. The first manifestation of this power is to display the feeling of shame (ḥayā). The feeling of shame marks the passage of the child from one stage of life to the other. It signifies that the child has developed the power to distinguish between good and evil, and also to dislike and shrink from indulging himself in vicious pursuits.
All these three powers, gradually advancing towards the stages of their perfection, give rise to certain natural aptitudes and impulses in man. For instance, when the power of desire, by means of nourishment and growth helps man attain maturity, he displays the aptitude to preserve the species. Hence there arise in him a passion for marriage and a longing for procreation which may be called the race-preserving instinct. When the power of anger settles down and becomes fully able to protect his individual self, he is motivated to give shelter to others of the species in dangerous situations. He ventures to fight for the legitimate interests of his family and proceeds to defend his country against internal as well as external threats. When the power of discrimination fully matures and he becomes thoroughly skilled in the perception of individuals and particulars, he begins to comprehend universals and is led to form the conception of genera and species. He is gifted at this stage with the power of rationcination and rational insight which constitutes the characteristic feature of mankind. To call man a man before he attains this power is to call the dates and grapes, dates and grapes, when they are raw and thus not ripe. The emergence of the power of intellection, brings perfection to man so far his rational and innate powers are concerned. It leads him to enter upon the active stage of his moral life. He employs his power of intellection and rational insight (ta'aqqu) in making judgments as regards his desired course of action. Man at this stage is required to adopt acquired process in order to have
the perfection, i.e., the Vice-gerency of God upon the earth, which is deemed to be the summit of human attainments.

An aspirant after excellence must keep in his mind all these stages of development and perfection, so that he may face no difficulty in following the same order in his bid to attain the cardinal virtues. He should begin his training-course in excellence with the disciplining of the power of desire. Then he should train the power of anger. Lastly he should concern himself with the training of the power of discrimination. In other words it can be said that first of all one should cultivate the virtue of temperance, than the virtue of courage, and finally the virtue of wisdom.65

If an individual, from the very outset of his physical development has had the chance of being brought up under the protection or guidance of wisdom (hikmat), he should consider it a great blessing, a valuable gift and a special privilege. It is his duty to strive hard to preserve his virtuous qualities in a spirit of gratitude. But if one has not had the above facility, he should not loose heart, but devote himself to apprehend and remove the ills of his training. He should endeavour to keep himself away from bad customs and habits. He should bear in mind that there is not a single individual except the chosen few (and they are the prophets) who are gifted with the innate divine virtues. The others have to put strenuous efforts and constant practice, says al-Dawwâni, if they wish to be virtuous persons. Just as an apprentice in the art of caligraphy or carpentry has to devote himself to strenuous practice in order to become an expert caligraphist
or a carpenter, similarly a seeker of virtues must engage himself in such practice as may bring the perfection to him.  

The art of cultivating virtue bears complete resemblance, says al-Dawwānī, to the science of medicine. The object of a physician is to maintain the equipoise of temperament as far as possible, and to restore it whenever disturbed. The object of the seeker of virtue, similarly is to preserve the equilibrium of disposition as far as it is possible, and to regain it afterwards when it is lost. Just as the science of medicine has two branches, one dealing with the maintenance of health, and the other with the treatment of disease; the art of cultivating virtues, in the same fashion, is divided into two sections: one relating to maintenance of virtues, and the other to removing of vices and restoring of excellences. An aspirant of virtue has, consequently, to look, first of all, to the original state of the triple powers in the order setforth above. If he were to find them all in conformity with the principle of equipoise, he must endeavour to maintain them as such. If, however, he finds them otherwise, he must work to restore them to the state of equipoise, keeping in view the original order. After the proper training of the triple powers he has to devote his attention to maintain the principle of justice, making it, in fact, the mainstay of all his actions and conditions, so that he may attain to the extreme limit of perfection.

As regards justice al-Dawwānī suggests that one should
be just, in the first instance, to himself in all his
private affairs, and then proceed to observe equity in
relation to those matters which are between him and his
associates. "Justice should operate', he says, first in
relation to one's own nature and powers, and then in rela-
tion to one's inter-course with his fellow-beings, either
at home or in the city'. He explains this fact by the
parable — "a lamp which does not light the other lamps
in its immediate vicinity can-not light the lamps at a
distance"; similarly an individual who cannot regulate his
personal affairs according to the canons of justice and
is unable to maintain equity among his bodily powers,
faculties and organs, can never be expected, remarks al-
Dawwâni, to observe the just-course in relation to his
family members or other members of the society. Hence one
should maintain justice, he recommends, firstly in respect
of himself, his children and those who are under his care.
It is only when he maintains equilibrium to his different
faculties, restrains himself from excess or deficiency and
then afterwards accords equitable treatment to his blood
relations, associates and his fellow beings, that he can
attain his perfection and become the true vice-gerent of
God on the earth.69