CHAPTER I

BACKGROUND OF AL-DAWKHTI'S
SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

GREEK SOCIAL THOUGHT

Greece is the homeland of almost every scientific and philosophical enquiry. Social Philosophy too proves no exception to this general truth. It certainly owes its scientific origin and systematic beginning to the writings of the Greek philosophers, especially to those of the Sophists, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle and their able commentators, especially Alexanderin summaries of Plato's "Republic" and "Laws" and Plotinus' "Enneads", and to the writings of many other Neo-Platonic Scholars, most noted among them are Porphyry and Proclus. The Syrian medium through which Greek philosophical heritage passed to the Arabic, and the Christian translators who mostly transmitted this material to the Muslim Scholars, contributed a good deal to the development of social thought in Islam. It is the study of Plato's "Republic" and "Laws" together with Aristotle's "Nicomachean Ethics" and his "Politics" which considerably influenced the Muslim philosophers in shaping their philosophical notions. They openly acknowledged Plato and Aristotle as their intellectual masters in sociopolitical philosophy and followed their authority with such modifications and adaptations as their Muslim ethos required. The Platonic and the Aristotelian social thought helped them to see the social character and significance of their own
Further, they are attributed to have made a determined attempt at obtaining a synthesis between Greek (especially the Platonic and the Aristotelian) and Islamic concepts on the basis of the common ground of the central position of law in the State, despite the existence of the fundamental differences. It is but, therefore, indispensable to outline socio-political thought of the Greek masters of learning for a proper assessment of the background of al-Dawwānī's social philosophy.

The powers of the early Greek mind had been directed chiefly to the theoretical solution of the cosmological problems, that are connected with the processes of nature. Almost the whole of the early Greek speculation relevant to human perplexities appears to be mainly concentrated upon the physical world, in order to trace out its true nature and meaning. Only secondary attention was paid to man himself and his ultimate destiny. The early Greek philosophers were cosmologists, concerned basically with the nature of the cosmos which is the object of our knowledge. Man, for them, was a product of the Universe, and had to meet the requirements of the universe or be destroyed. The main problems to which the system-builders of the early Greek period paid attention were the problems of origin and nature of things, Being and Non-Being, substance and number, permanence and change, one and many; and man, as a social animal, did not figure in the picture at all.

Greek philosophy, with the rise of the sophists, the travelling teachers of wisdom, who flourished chiefly
during the 5th century B.C., appears to have taken an abrupt turn. Interest shifted from object to subject, from outwardness to inwardness, from cosmology, cosmogenesis and from theogony to man and humanism. This change in interest, brought by the sophists, marked the beginning of an era of Greek enlightenment, characterized by the spirit of independent reflection and self-criticism. A peculiar kind of "individualism" and "relativism" and the consequent "subjectivism" were infused in the body of Greek philosophical thought by the itinerant professors of virtues of citizenship. In contrast with their predecessors, the sophists chose to concentrate their energies upon the task of understanding man rather than nature. They made the study of man both as an individual and as a member of the State, their chief concern. Man, according to them, was "the measure of all things". Each man, as an individual was a law unto himself in all his personal pursuits and social enterprises. This turn in Greek speculation widened the horizon of philosophical thinking and partly determined the course of subsequent Greek thought. The sophists were highly critical rather immensely sceptical about the universality and objectivity of any metaphysical, epistemological or ethical truths. The critical scepticism of the sophists led to the philosophies of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle which represented the highest point that Greek speculation could reach.²
Socrates

Amidst the destruction of all objective ideals of truth, brought by the sceptical teaching of the Sophists, there appeared in Athens a man of remarkable self-control, moral dignity and capable of great endurance, known as Socrates who was destined to restore order from chaos, and introduce sanity into the disordered intellectual life of the time by transforming the dominant notes of "relativism", "subjectivism", "nihilism" and "anarchism" into a kind of sound "universalism". Indeed, it was Socrates' task to discover universal and authoritative human sanctions for a morality binding upon all mankind.

Socrates was interested neither in physical nor in mathematical or metaphysical speculation. His interest lay mainly in ethics, of which he is rightly said to be the founder. His social philosophy may be simply a derivation from his ethical philosophy.

Man, for Socrates, is the centre or the pivot of all that is worth knowing about. Brushing aside all such high matters as the nature of the universe, the origin of the world, or the nature of the ultimate reality, Socrates directed all his attention to the understanding of truth in human nature not as matter of pure speculation but certainly with a view to leading a good moral life. From early manhood to the day of his death, he believed his mission to be that of improving the moral life of his fellow-beings who were miserably engulfed in the darkness of ignorance.
Socrates started the task of dispelling the darkness of ignorance by stimulating his fellow-men to care properly for their noblest possession — their soul — through the acquisition of knowledge, wisdom and virtue. Opinions seem to have greatly differed in moral matters, but for Socrates it is the philosopher's duty to dig out the eternal and universal truths hidden beneath the confused mass of opinion. Beginning with the real or professed ignorance (his irony) and making self-consistency as the criterion of truth, he brought under discussion views about such matters as good, beauty, ugliness, nobility, wisdom, justice, courage, friendship, State and citizenship, in order to know their real moral significance and to arrive at their precise definitions for the ignorant masses.

He was convinced that all evil-doing is due to ignorance. If people knew what was right, they would do no wrong. As knowledge alone is needed to make people virtuous, he declared that knowledge is virtue. It is the highest good and the sole end of life and its pursuit is the only source of abiding happiness.

His belief in knowledge as the necessary and the only sufficient condition for leading a good life was so strong that he made it the nucleus not only of his whole moral philosophy but also of his entire social thought. His viewpoint as regards society and social institutions leads to a destination where knowledge has to play a predominant role in getting on to it. The business of a statesman like that of a moral preceptor, is the tendance
of the soul, though his task is to aim at making not only his own soul, but the soul of his fellow-citizens as good as possible. The knowledge of good is also the "royal science", or science of governing, the real foundation of all statesmanship. True statesmanship consists, in his opinion, of promoting the virtues of "righteousness", and "temperance", and improving the spiritual health of the community. Those who measure national greatness by wealth and empire, not by character, cannot be said to be in possession of statesmanship. The national felicity, like individual one, depends on the knowledge of good which inevitably leads, to the action which makes the soul as good as possible.  

The well-known Platonic "Republic" may fairly be said, on its practical side, a picture of the life of society in which the whole system of social and economic life is based on this Socratic conviction that "politics" is the application to the community at large of the principle that knowledge of the absolute good is the necessary and sufficient condition of well-being.

That the man is wholly a product of the social order expresses the beginning and the end of Socratic social and political beliefs. He himself remained a true subject of the state and her laws, and taught the people to observe the same course. Always it is the state that stands first before the welfare of any individual. The benefit and security of the state must, therefore, take precedence over the comforts and liking of individual
citizens. The State expresses itself in the form of laws, which constitute its ribs and backbone. Only by laws may other laws be set aside. Rebellion against them by one displeased, or injured by them, is intolerable. In spite of all his respect for the state and his unflinching devotion to its laws, Socrates appeared to be dissatisfied with the democratic form of government. His intellectualism, in which knowledge became the highest good, was not likely to make him particularly favourable to democracy as practised at Athens in those days. The prime deficiency of ancient democracy, according to him, is that it does not demand any special knowledge in its leaders; it gives the control of affairs of men to those who do not possess adequate knowledge or true insight. Government should be entrusted, believed Socrates, only to wise men, who know what the good really is.

PLATO

The problems of the meaning of human life, human knowledge, human conduct and human institution, broadly enunciated by the "wisest man", Socrates, demanded a solid ground for their adequate justification. It was Plato, "the master mind" and the greatest disciple of Socrates, who set himself to accomplish the task at hand. Plato for the first time in the history of Western Philosophy made a serious attempt to construct a comprehensive and an integrated system of philosophical thought. His system is the mature fruit of the history of Greek philosophy down
to his time. His theory of state or his social philosophy is a part of his general philosophical system which is essentially rooted in his theory of universe.

Plato firmly held the view that the Universe is composed of two diametrically opposed principles: (i) Mind, "the absolute being", and (ii) Matter, "the absolute non-being". Accordingly, there are two distinctly different kinds of world: (i) the supernatural realm of "pure, perfect and permanent ideas", and (ii) the earthly world of many "mistakes, deformities and evils". The objects of this earthly world are sheer "copies" or "reflections" of the "idea" of that real supernatural world.

An individual man, like the other objects of this material world, is an ephemeral expression of the idea of Man. His existence, like that of other things of nature, is a combination of "matter" and "form". He is, however, distinguished from the entire creation by the fact that he possesses rational faculty in which is implied the capacity of logically consistent thinking.

Human soul, the seat of man's rational faculty, is a part of "Pure Reason", i.e., God. But it is debased, hindered, held down or clouded by the impurities of the body, which is purely a matter. The ultimate end of life according to Plato, is the release of the soul from the fetters of the body, so that it may return to its original abode to enjoy eternity. This can be possible by leading a just and virtuous life. A man can lead a good, just and virtuous life when he is governed by his reason, i.e., when
his rational faculty holds sway over his natural appetites and voluntary desires, and renders him, in consequence, "wise", "brave" and "temperate", which are the essential ingredients of a happy, just life.

Social life or corporate living, believes Plato, is a means to attain the individual perfection. It is only in an organised society, only in his capacity as a citizen and social being, that the individual can attain perfection and acquire the cardinal virtues of life which are wisdom, courage, temperance, i.e., self-control, and justice. Plato perceives a perfect "social form" in the realm of ideas. Through an intellectual play of imagination he has outlined the formal structure of an ideal social organization in his well-known Dialogue, the "Republic", the outcome of his mature thought. The Republic depicts a picture of an ideal commonwealth devised to illustrate, precisely speaking, the conception of social justice. 13

Plato has strongly emphasized in the Republic that society, social institutions and state have come into being primarily to fulfil man's natural as well as ethical necessity. Man is naturally a social being; he cannot fulfil his economic needs, nor attain his moral excellences without cooperation of his fellow-men in an organized society. Necessity is the mother of all inventions. Ethical as well as natural necessity is the true creator of society, social organizations and state. 14

In Plato's ideal society or state there is hierarchy of ranks and positions among its citizens. On the analogy
of the tripartite division of the soul, society is divided into three classes, the "guardians", the "soldiers", and the "artisans", each class having its own specific virtue. The guardians are endowed with the virtue of wisdom, the soldiers with valour, and the artisans with self-restraint and willing obedience. To keep people contented in their respective classes the state would have to propagate "a royal lie" that God has created human beings of three kinds: the best are made of gold, the second best made of silver, and the common herd of brass or iron. The first are fit to be guardians or administrators, the second warriors, and the rest manual workers — a myth which would become a common in about two generations. The function of the guardians is to mould the state in the likeness of the State "of which the pattern is laid up in heaven"; in the realm of ideas. They are destined to rule the state in aristocratic fashion. That is, they are not required to enquire of the citizens the kind of administration they would like to see in operation in the state, for the same reason that a physician does not ask the patient the kind of medicine which he wants. The business of the soldiers is to help the rulers by military service and protect the state in times of war or revolt. The duty of the artisans is to carry on trade, manual labour and craftsmanship.

The end of Plato's ideal State is the promotion of virtue and happiness (not pleasure) of the citizens. And since this is possible only through a rational organization, the State is to be founded upon reason, like the rational
The founding of the State upon reason is the key-note of Plato's socio-political philosophy. The laws of the State, says Plato, must be rational; and since rational laws can be made only by rational men, i.e., philosophers, the rulers of the State must be philosophers. Moreover, since it is only the philosopher who has true knowledge of reality, he alone deserves to be a King. And since the philosophers are few, we must have an aristocracy, not of birth, or of wealth, but of intellect.

There are three operative principles that run the State administration. The first is reason, the second is force, and the third is labour. These three operative principles are carried out by the philosopher-kings, the soldiers and the common herd of people, i.e., artisans respectively. Corresponding to these three operative principles, there come into being three cardinal virtues; wisdom, courage and temperance which are manifested, as has been indicated above, by the philosopher-kings, the soldiers and the artisans respectively. The harmonious co-operation of all these three classes and the happy blend of all these three cardinal virtues produce the fourth cardinal virtue, i.e., justice, which is technically called "political justice" or "social righteousness". It is constituted by each class sticking to its own duty, minding its own business, doing what it is assigned to do, and not meddling with the work of others and desisting from aspiring to take on the job of others.

The ranks and designations of the citizens as "guardians", "soldiers", and "artisans" are to be determined
neither by birth nor by personal choice. This will be determined by the rulers and the officers of the State who will base their decision upon the natural dispositions and capabilities of the individuals.

As selfishness is the root of all social evil, the guardians, i.e., rulers as well as soldiers or warriors, are to live a common life with a common mess as one family without any private property, wives, or children.\textsuperscript{20} Men between 25 and 55 and women between 20 and 40 (i.e., when they are in the prime of life) are to be brought together on ceremonial occasions specially arranged for intercourse, in numbers suitable for the required population.\textsuperscript{21} The paring on these occasions is to be determined apparently by lots, but actually by secret manipulation in such a way that the braver get the fairer. As in a society of communism of property, wives, and children, no child would know his parents and no parents their children. All those belonging to an older generation would be called fathers and mothers by the younger generation and all those belonging to a younger generation would be addressed as sons and daughters by those of the older generation. Those children who were begotten at the time when their fathers and mothers came together will be called by one another \textit{brothers and sisters}.\textsuperscript{22} The children thus born will be brought up by nurses in quarters specially provided for them. They should get only the necessities of life, and be so brought up as to be
able to bear the roughness and hardships of life. The
State on the whole should not be allowed to become too
rich or too poor, for both riches and poverty lead to
evils. Nor is the State to be allowed to be too large
or too small. Its size "shall not be larger or smaller
than is consistent with its unity" which indeed is its
greatest good. Women are to take equal part in education
and State services as administrators or warriors.23

Plato is of the opinion that the State should manage
to impart education freely to all its citizens. Education,
he says, shall be universal, but not compulsory; that is,
all shall be taught, but none will be compelled to learn.
The fundamental aim in education shall be to secure a
healthy change in the attitudes of the people. Such
changes are more important than modification in external
matters. A well trained and well-educated individual is
a replica of a just society.24

According to Plato, there are five types of politi-
cal organizations: aristocracy, the rule of best; timocracy,
in which the rulers are motivated by honour; oligarchy, in
which the rulers seek wealth; democracy, the rule of the
masses; and tyranny, the rule of one man advancing solely
his own selfish interests. Aristocracy is, in his opinion,
the best possible form of political organization. In the
Republic he gives an outline of a socio-political organi-
ization which may rightly be regarded as intellectual
aristocracy.25
This is a brief description of Plato's Ideal State in the Republic. But he himself acknowledges that his aristocratic-cum-socialistic system of socio-political organization is not fully realizable. Therefore, in a later work, the laws, he modifies it in several important ways and gives a more practical plan of what he regards as the second best State. In this State he places freedom and friendship side by side with reason. All citizens should be free and given a share in government. Of course, slaves who should be only foreigners are not counted among the citizens. The administration he now recommends is a mixture of aristocracy and democracy. Women are now included in the community meals of the guardians. Marriage is also permitted and family life and private property restored. The greater part of the Laws is devoted to enumerating the rules and regulations of which Plato approves and feels that God approves. In this Dialogue he assigns more importance to law and gives a lesser emphasis to any particular kind of socio-political constitution. The greater thing is that divine commandments should be enforced, for God is the head and the foundation of the State. It is the theocratic and puritanical tone that mostly characterizes the Dialogue. Towards the end of the Dialogue he does, however, revert to the "philosopher-king" of his Republic, and suggests that the duty of preserving the constitution and keeping the laws intact shall be entrusted to a "nocturnal council" composed of ten elderly people of wide experience, and ten young men chosen by them, all of whom shall have received a special education in right action, correct theology, and the mathematical
exactitude of thought inculcated by astronomy. But this is something of an afterthought.

We turn now to Plato's pupil, Aristotle, who ranks with his master as one of the greatest and most influential philosophers of all times.

ARISTOTLE

Although Aristotle did not make, like his master, Plato, a unified and systematic contribution to social philosophy, yet he, developed many significant social ideals in his celebrated Philosophical writings, viz., the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics. Unlike Plato, Aristotle was a pragmatist, a thorough-going practical philosopher. He introduced the systematic empirical method of studying social phenomena, while Plato had almost relied entirely upon the speculative approach. Aristotle was, in other words, observational and "inductive", Plato was, on the contrary, primarily imaginative and "deductive". Aristotle, in consequence, sacrificed unity, i.e., universals for the examination of particulars. He did not look for "ideals" or "universals" separate from, but in particulars. His primary attention was focussed on "what is", rather on "what ought to be". His eyes were directed to the parts then to the whole. In his examination he found that the parts are related and, further, they hold a developmental relation. He demonstrated the relative value of institution showing that those which are best for one age
of society will be worthless for a later period. The comparative method of studying human institutions led Aristotle to consider the process of becoming, instead of Plato’s perfection. In order to meet changing social needs and conditions, institutions must change. There is a fundamental evolution in social changes.

In spite of this distinct contrast as regards the method of approach, Aristotle developed a philosophy of social organization which strikingly resembled with that of his teacher in many respects. He held that man is by nature a social animal and, as such, can realize his true self only in society and among his fellow-beings. Aristotle agreed with Plato that the object of the state is the promotion of virtue and happiness of the citizens, which is possible only in an organized society or state. It means that the state is the end of the individual, and that the activity in the State is the part of man’s essential function. The state is, in fact, the form, the individual, the matter. The state provides both, an opportunity of training in virtue and the necessary provision for sustaining temporal existence.

Aristotle in his book, Politics, which is a compilation of different treatises, offers an originally searching analysis of many phases of associative life. The first natural community for him is the family, which when complete, consists of father, wife, children, and slaves. It also includes, inter alia, property and personal possession
within its fold. The family is based, in his opinion, on two relations, the relation between man and woman and that between master and slave, both of which are considered to be natural. To all members of the family the father is an absolute ruler, but he should rule the slaves with mildness, the wife as a free member of the community, and children by right of affection and seniority. Aristotle is credited to have touched the question of eugenics to ensure a healthy generation of citizens. In order that children are physically, as sound as possible, legislators should give, he suggests, special attention to the institution of marriage. Early marriages are to be condemned because the children that may be born of such marital unions will be wanting in respect for their parents. Late marriages will be unsatisfactory because there will be too great differences between the ages of the parents and their children. The marriage of a man and a woman whose ages are widely disproportionate will lead to misunderstandings and quarrels. According to the rigorous dictum of Aristotle, no deformed child should be permitted to survive. In the marital relation there is always inequality. The man is by nature better suited to command than the woman. The Chief characteristics, of a good wife is obedience to her husband - a doctrine which is basically patriarchal. Unfaithfulness of either sex in marriage is disgraceful.

The second natural community for Aristotle is the village. It comes into existence when several families unite for a more complete type of association than that
which aims merely at supplying everyday needs. The village, as he conceives it, is, in its most natural form, purely a genetic aggregation — a "colony" from the family. 32

The last and the most comprehensive human society is the State. It comes into being when several villages are united into a single community in order to ensure common good. The State, is not an artificial creation, but fundamentally the natural outgrowth of man's inherent tendencies of sociability or fellow-feelings. "Since the earlier forms of society, viz., family and village communities, are natural, it is evident, declares Aristotle, "that the State is a creation of nature and that man is by nature a political animal." Although the individual citizen, is prior to the State in point of time, the State is prior to the individual in significance, for the whole is prior to its parts. As man is a social animal, the natural aim of the individual is to lead an associative life in society. The rational aim of society is, as has been indicated above, the happiness of man. So in a rational society the interests of the individual and the State are harmonized. 34 The aim of the State is to produce good citizens, individuals living a virtuous and happy life. As the highest virtues are intellectual, it is the duty of the State not to create warriors, but men capable of making the right use of peace which is conducive to intellectual activity. Yet the State should be strong enough to protect itself. The State is, by no means, a mere mechanical aggregate of families and village communities, formed for the sake of mutual protection and
benefit, nor is it a mechanical sum-total of individuals. The State, on the contrary, is a real organism, and the connection between its component parts is not mechanical, but organic one. In Book VIII and IX of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle finds the subjective basis of the State and Society in friendship. This is, however, merely an elaboration of the principle laid down in the beginning of the Politics, that man is by nature a social being.

Aristotle, like Plato, seems to have given license to his imagination in construction of an ideal commonwealth, which permeates with the then Greek ideals of "exclusiveness", "provincialism" and "localism". Its size should, he says, neither be too large nor too small, for its existence is an articulate whole. Its whole territory should be surveyable from a hill-top (which is, of course, possible only in a City-State). The State should be self-sufficient and yet have import and export trade — an apparent inconsistency. Citizenship will be denied to merchants and tradesmen, "since their life is ignoble and inimical to virtues", and to husbandsmen, because they lack the leisure "that is necessary both for the development of virtue and for the attainment of political excellence." As far as possible these functions will be performed by slaves. The citizens should own land, but the tilling of it should be left to the slaves for it leaves no leisure and the citizens need leisure for their development. The slaves are to be trained in all useful arts such as cooking, washing, farming etc.
Aristotle does not at all seem interested in any particular structure of social organization. What alone interests his mind is the kind of social constitution which is to be executed successfully in the state in accordance with the needs and requirements of the hour. Unlike Plato, he avoided a dogmatic choice of any particular kind of social constitution as the only ideal form suited to all times and circumstances. A good social organization must, however, recognize the natural inequalities of the individuals and confer rights accordingly. It should take into consideration the differences of capability, property, birth and freedom, while determining the kind of treatment to be given to citizens. In so far as all citizens are equal, it must confer equal rights on them, but in so far as they are naturally unequal, it must confer on them unequal privileges. That is, equals should be treated as equals and unequals as unequals. This is possible, believes Aristotle, only in a constitutional form of government where, whatsoever it may be, law must be supreme. There are two fundamentals in a good government, first, a true compliance with the laws of the land by the citizens; second, the social goodness of the laws. The spirit of obedience to laws, he emphasizes, must be inculcated in the citizens. Any apparently slight neglect or disregard of laws is insidious; transgression commonly creeps un-noticed. Hence, there should be at all times strict adherence to the laws of the State.
The major chord in Aristotle's ideal society is the social mean. He believes that an ideal society is to be founded upon social mean. The existence of two classes only, the very rich and the very poor, will bring disaster to the State. The very wealthy consider themselves above all social authority; the very poor are too degraded to understand the necessity and the reason for authority. He believes that the poor are as egoistic as the rich and that the poor are incapable of being trained to the levels of virtuous citizenship. A society is safest from all social ills, when the people belonging to the "middle class" are in control of the State administration. Salvation from all social injustices lies, in his opinion, in giving due recognition to the middle class people. Poverty is, he maintains, a dominant cause of committing crimes and wrong-doings. But it is not poverty only that always motivates the people to commit crimes. Richness, too, often leads to wrong-doings. The greatest offences are not, in fact, occasioned by sheer necessity of wealth but by its excess. A social organization headed by the people belonging to the middle class will ensure freedom from the ills of poverty as well as of wealth.

Aristotle considers education, like Plato, to be a dominant social force that greatly helps eliminate or minimize the frequent recurrence of evils. The aim of education is the promotion of virtue, not utility. Aristotle is vehemently opposed to the concept of "utilitarian education". Education should be provided to free children,
but not, of course, in any professional skill that might enable them to earn money or give them technical efficiency or deform their bodies, for citizens should neither lead the life of mechanics or tradesmen, which is "ignoble and inimical to virtue", nor the life of professional athletes, which is detrimental to health. The slaves are to be trained for all these useful purposes. The citizens should be, however, made to learn drawing so as to be able to appreciate the beauty of form and of painting and sculpture expressing moral truth. They should also be made to learn music no more than just enough for critical enjoyment.

The real worth of the individual citizens depends on the kind of government under which they are brought up. Governments are good or bad accordingly as they seek the interest of all or only their own interests. Judged by this criterion, there are three forms of good government: monarchy, aristocracy, and polity; and three forms of bad government: tyranny, oligarchy and democracy, accordingly as the rule is of one man, of few, or of many in both the cases. The best form of Government is, in Aristotle's opinion, a monarchy in which the ruler is a man of intellectual eminence and moral worth. Next best is aristocracy in which there are a few persons possessed of such qualities. Aristocracy is better than polity in which the citizens are politically, intellectually, and morally nearly equal. The worst form of government is tyranny, for the corruption of the best is worst; next is
oligarchy which is the rule of the rich few. Democracy is the least bad of all bad governments. 48

After the time of Aristotle, Hellenic life degenerated, political corruption, military intrigue, and intellectual scepticism vitiated the Hellenic morality that was greatly based on custom and tradition. Post-Aristotelian period bears striking testimony of the degeneration of Hellenic social life. The ideal, held by Plato and Aristotle, of man as an integral part of a constructive social order was supplanted by a philosophy of pure individualism which appeared in two diametrically opposed systems of thought, namely "Stoicism" initiated by Zeno (c. 350-260 B.C.), in the later half of the fourth century B.C., and "Epicurianism" founded by Epicurus (342-270 B.C.) almost during the same period.

The fundamentals of Hellenic Social thought were, later on, preserved by the Romans, and were transmitted in course of time, to the Arab world through the Hebrew or Syrian translations of Greek masters. But the Greek philosophy reached the Muslim philosophers not in its original shape, but in almost transformed form, full of inconsistencies and contradictions. Rationalism of the Greeks was transmitted into intuitionalism. Neo-Platonism, a movement which aimed at seeking a reconciliation between the two philosophies, namely, Platonist and Aristotelian, presented Greek philosophers as great saints and mystics, and Greek Philosophy as the truth compatible with the Christian dogmas.
Plotinus (204–270 A.D.) and other protagonists of this School with their renunciation of the world of senses, their tendencies towards unlimited credulity, and their hostility to rationalism or scepticism, militated strongly against any movement toward a scientific conception of social processes and social institutions. Neo-Platonism, the conception of a former golden age, and the eschatological view of society, which was drawn as much from Persian religions and the pagan mysteries as from Christian text, all combined to make up the other worldly and anti-rational intellectual environment in which Christian theology and social philosophy flourished.

Muslim philosophers, having embarked on task of imbibing the Greek knowledge, took a long time to free the Greek philosophy from accretions and inconsistencies that had crept into its body and spirit. We, therefore, now turn to a brief exposition of the contribution made by the Muslim philosophers in the realm of social philosophy with special reference to al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, Miskawaih and Naṣīruddīn Ṭūsī who had greatly helped our philosopher, al-Dawwānī, in framing his system of social thought.
Socio-political philosophy of the Muslim Scholars, like that of the Greek philosophers, is an integral part of their general philosophy, but at the same time largely conditioned by their recognition of the authority of the Shari'ah, the divinely revealed law of Islam. "The Salasifa (i.e., the Muslim philosopher), with the exception of Avempace (i.e., Ibn Bajja), are strongly remarks Bosental, 'under the influence of the Shari'ah but also under that of Plato and Aristotle.'

Plato and Aristotle were deeply, as we have seen in the previous section, interested in society and its problems. Man according to them was thoroughly social being and his social nature dominates his individuality. They were basically concerned with the rule of law and justice. They hold the conviction that without law there can be no stable society and welfare state and that unlawful behaviour is damaging and injurious to humanity. Every departure from law is bound to have serious consequences for public safety as well as for morality, right beliefs and convictions. Sincere adherence to the sacred law of the state (i.e., nomos) leads to the realisation of the aims and objectives of the Ideal State.

Greek ethics was fundamentally social in character. Greek philosophers, especially, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle
were concerned with individual as well as social good. It was always, according to them, some form of happiness, the realisation of which primarily depended upon the cultivation of moral virtues. The virtuous character that leads to happiness was identified with the perfection of reason. Reason was the distinctive characteristic of man. True humanity was identical with leading life in accordance with the dictates of reason. The life of reason, therefore, was the true objective of humanity. Reason was practical as well as theoretical. But theoretical reason always ranked higher and practical life was considered subservient to theoretical pursuits. Metaphysics was the highest form of knowledge and its attainment, the most exalted element of the human aspiration. Virtues were graded on a scale in which intellectual virtues occupied the paramount place.

Such are the main ideals of the Greek philosophy that have exercised a tremendous influence on the Muslim scholars. They, too, consider man as naturally a social being. He, must, therefore, live in a socio-political association which guarantees his life and makes possible his perfection in accordance with his natural disposition. He is a part of the state and this is the true essence of his humanity. If he separates himself from the society, he forfeits his right to and his chance of perfection. It is binding on him to refrain from unlawful activities and endeavour always to follow the just and rational course.

It is the concern for the rule of law, justice and reason that, in fact, constitutes the common ground between the Muslim scholars and the Greek philosophers. The emphasis
on law, justice and reason occupies a central place in the socio-political thought of Plato and Aristotle as well as in that of the Muslim philosophers. "As far as the life in the state is concerned," says Rosenthal, "they found in the Republic and the Laws of Plato and in Aristotle's Nocomachean Ethics a kindred concept in the rule of law as the guarantor of human welfare." The study of these Greek masterpieces enabled the Muslim Philosophers to apply the socio-political ideals of Plato and Aristotle to the Muslim State of their own time and to underline more fully the socio-religious character implied in the Shari'ah with its unquestioned opportunity of securing for the Muslim what philosophy was to obtain for the Greek: the highest good, Summum Bonum of human life. Hence the revelation is for them not simply a direct communication between God and man, not only a transmission of right beliefs and convictions, a dialogue between a personal God of love, of justice and of mercy and man whom He has created in His image; it is also and above all a valid binding code for man, who must live in society and be politically organised in a state in order to fulfill his destiny. It provides for man's welfare in this world and prepares him for the hereafter, and thus alone guarantees his perfection and happiness as a religious being.

Although the Muslim philosophers have seemingly or superficially realised close parallel between the Nomos of Plato, the best law reason can devise, and the Shari'ah of Islam as regards man's ultimate goal and means to attain
that end, yet they maintain the fundamental difference between the divinely revealed code of conduct and philosophical human law. The state based on the Shari'ah is for them the Ideal state of Islam as the Republic was for Plato the ideal state of the philosopher. At the same time the Prophet is certainly superior to the philosopher at least for Ibn Sina and Ibn Rushd, known to the Western world as Avicenna and Averroes respectively. Further, they have certainly gone beyond the Homos, the man -- made law of the Greek philosophy, which knows of no twofold happiness, though it was equally designed to enable man to reach his goal -- intellectual perfection.

It does not, however, disprove the impact of Greek Philosophy on the Muslim social thought. The Greek philosophers have, indeed, greatly influenced the Muslim thinkers. They helped them to evolve certain synthetic social ideals and provided ready made tools and concepts for their formulation and understanding. The present section is planned to study in detail the social ideals of some of the noted Muslim philosophers, with special reference to those who have directly or indirectly influenced the thinking of our philosopher, al-Dawwani. It will help in understanding the growth of the Muslim social thought in general, and the extent of its indebtedness to the Greek philosophy in particular. It will also help promote a better understanding of the significance of al-Dawwani's social philosophy. We propose to begin this section with Al-Farabi, then take up Ibn Sina and Ibn Miskawaih and finally discuss Nasir al-Din Tusi at some considerable length.
Preceded by Ya‘qūb Ishaq al-Kindi, the first Arab philosopher, al-Fārābī is, undoubtedly, the first Muslim Scholar who took up important problems of social philosophy in his famous political writings. In his celebrated works he showed the way, and gave an authoritative beginning, to the integration of Greek-Hellenistic philosophy in all its branches with Islamic tenets. C'Leary in his book, 'Arabic Thought and its place in History', has rightly commented that al-Fārābī, in the truest sense, "was the parent of all subsequent Muslim philosophers".

al-Fārābī, like Plato and Aristotle, took it for granted that by nature man is a social animal. He has been created to live together because he cannot lead his life alone, he cannot provide himself with the necessities of life. Man requires to form association with his fellows not simply because he has to satisfy his physical or biological needs, but also for his moral perfection. In his book, Tehsīl-al-Sa‘ādah, while expressing the necessity of society, al-Fārābī has argued that man must form a social or political association with his fellow-beings because he cannot attain his goal of perfection in isolation. He is, therefore, called Ḥayawan-i insi or Ḥayawan-i 'adāni.

After emphasizing its due importance al-Fārābī proceeds to classify human society, into: (1) perfect society, and (2) Imperfect Society. The degree of perfection of a society is based on its size. Accordingly al-Fārābī divides perfect
society into three categories: (i) 'Uzma, the largest of all the perfect societies which he calls "ma'mira" that covers the entire inhabited earth under cultivation; (ii) Musata, the middle sized society which he calls "ummat" or "millat" (nation) that resides in one particular part of the earth; and (iii) Sughra, the smallest perfect society which al-Farabi calls "Madina" (city or town) that resides within a particular territory occupied by "ummat" or "millat" (nation). The imperfect society is that of the people of village (al-qarriyah), a locality (al-mo'alla), a lane (al-sikka), or a house (al-manzil), the last being the smallest. These perfect and imperfect societies are interrelated and render services to each other, as the house (manzil) happens to be a part of the lane (sikkat), the lane a part of the locality (mo'alla), the locality a part of the city (madINA), the city a part of the nation (ummat), and the nation, lastly, a part of mankind (m'amura).57

Every society must be backed up by some authority, for a society without any authority can never exist. If accidentally it exists, it cannot survive for a long time. Man by nature, no doubt, is a social animal, but he is not always a well-behaved animal. He erects many artificial barriers along with natural ones in the way of his harmonious development. That is why humanity, in spite of being in great need of co-operation, integration and harmony, is divided into different hostile blocks. This division, in the opinion of al-Farabi, arises primarily on account of the relation of the planet earth to the heavenly bodies, i.e.,
due to some geographical factors especially climate and the nature of the soil. These geographical factors play a vital role in forming the habits and customs of a particular nation, bringing discords and differences among the peoples and leading humanity to divide into different apartments on the basis of caste, colour and creed. The most powerful artificial barrier that comes in the harmonious progress of man is the difference of language. This language difference obstructs the smooth communication between the nations. Due to these natural and artificial barriers the peaceful co-existence, which is most vital for social life, becomes difficult. Therefore to maintain peace and harmony in the society, authority is indispensable. Al-Farabi distinguishes two kinds of authority: (i) the real authority (al-qaḍiyya) through which true happiness is attained, and (ii) imagined or unreal authority (al-mutakhyilla) under which assumed happiness is attained. The first kind of authority is obeyed in the ideal state (madinat al-Fāqīla), whereas the second kind is obeyed in non-ideal or ignorant state (madinat al-Jāhilīyah). The organization entrusted to enforce authority and exercise legal power is called by al-Farabi, the state. Though he does not make very sharp distinction between society and state, he always stresses the need of attaching to the concept of society, the corollary concept of state which was regarded as an essential pre-requisite for society. Not that state precedes society, but the existence of society depends on the existence of state.
al-Farabi explains the formation of state with the help of a mutual contract of submission to a powerful ruler who would help the convenants to attain to peace, progress and prosperity. The society is composed of men of different physical and mental characteristics. Some are cruel, strong and aggressive, others are meek, weak and subdued. Society in the midst of these discrepancies can never run harmoniously. Therefore, the isolated individuals organize themselves into an integrated institution and elect, through a mutual contract, a powerful leader of their own. They, with their own will, submit themselves to that leader so that he may help them in controlling their animal propensities such as aggression and passion. They also mutually renounce their powers and impose condition on themselves that they would maintain law and order and foster the spirit of peaceful co-existence within their organization, i.e., State. 63

If, inspite of this contract, a person or some people violate law and order and try to tyrannise others, the rest of the citizens join hands in overpowering the anti-social elements and thus by mutual help they retain their liberty. 64

al-Farabi classifies states into two distinct categories: (i) the Ideal or Model State (madinat-al-fadilah), and (ii) the non-ideal or imperfect state (madinat-al-Jahiliya). In his classification of states al-Farabi strictly follows qualitative criterion instead of quantitative one. "Perfect" or "Ideal" in size is, however, not the same as "perfect" or "ideal" in quality. "The ideal
al-Farābī, defines al-Farābī, as one whose citizens help each other to obtain the things by means of which true happiness is gained. This true happiness is a state of soul, in which it exists free from matter and tends towards pure substances entirely free from corporeality. It stands in opposition to supposed or assumed happiness which consists in wealth, honour, power or material gains.

Keeping in consonance with the Islamic faith and practice, al-Farābī believes that the real sovereignty in the state, so defined vests exclusively in God (Allāh), the First, Final, and Efficient Cause of all phenomenal as well as noumenal existence, and the ultimate source of all temporal as well as spiritual inspirations. The authority and the code of conduct to be enforced within the territory of state is called Shari'ah which God revealed to mankind through the Prophet Muḥammad (peace on him). The prophet is not only a man of vision, but is also a lawgiver (wādi' al-nawāmis), whose proper function is to maintain law and justice in society and show the mankind the path of happiness in this world and the world hereafter.

According to al-Farābī, "Divine Law" is superior in all respects to the law formulated by finite mortal beings. Divine law is an exoteric representation of the certain esoteric truth that remain hidden from the masses (jama'ūr) but accessible to the philosophers — (ahl-al-burhān). Divine laws and principles are expressed in terms of actions which are grasped by everybody and are equally binding upon all men, masses as well as on intellectuals, or philosophers. Divine law, therefore, is the condition of a uniformity of
sentiment and social stability.

Though God is the real sovereign, He does not however, exercise His authority directly in the socio-political matters of man. He, obviously, delegates His power to His Vicegerents, whom al-Farabi prefers to call "Imams". An Imam must combine in his personality the philosophical insight and the prophetic vision. He calls such an Imam as the "Rais al-Awwal" (the first chief or ruler) who would rule the city, the state and the whole inhabited globe. He is the only competent authority to help man in achieving his destiny, i.e., the enjoyment of the vision of God by means of moral and intellectual perfection through obeying the Shari'ah. The people ruled by the prophet-cum-philosopher Imam are the "excellent, best and happy citizens." The Rais al-Awwal of the politico-religious community occupies in the philosophy of al-Farabi the same position that the "philosophy-King" occupies in Plato's political philosophy. al-Farabi follows, of course, Plato's description of the philosopher-king, but he, for his Imam, makes "wahy" (the prophetic vision) an indispensable condition. al-Farabi further lays down that Imam must be an ardent believer in religion both theoretically and practically. al-Farabi treats philosophy simply as the best guide to the understanding of the proper meaning of the Shari'ah.

It is evident that every man cannot be the "Imam". People differ in their intellectual capacity, in physical strength, in the exercise of virtuous deeds, and in the acquisition of excellent habits of thinking, feeling, willing
and doing. In every department of life the strongest person of excellent accomplishments is the chief of that department, the rest being the subjects. The chief is either one of the first rank who is not subservient to any one, or he is of the second rank, dominating some, and being dominated by some others. The Rais-al-Awwal of al-Farabi's ideal state in general is he who needs no help from any one; he requires no guidance from any person in any respect. He is the Chief of the ideal nation, and for the matter of that, of the whole inhabited part of the earth. This position is only attained by a man who naturally possesses the following twelve characteristics as his second nature: (i) Sound health and perfect physique; (ii) intelligence and sagacity; (iii) Good memory; (iv) prudence and talent; (v) Eloquence; (vi) Devotion to education and learning; (vii) No greed for food, drink and sex; (viii) Friendliness towards truth and truthful persons; (ix) Dignity of heart, loving nobility, and natural magnanimity; (x) Indifference to all forms of wealth; (xi) Devotion by nature to justice and just people; and (xii) Strong resolution, courage, and promptitude without any sign of fear or psychological weakness.

Fully aware of the near impossibility of finding such fine qualities in one single human being, al-Farabi has suggested certain alternatives to be followed one after another. In case these desired qualities are not found in one person, al-Farabi is satisfied if the ruler has six or even five of the following qualities.
(i) He must be a philosopher. He should know and keep the laws and ordinance of the Rais-al-Awwal and observe them all in his own actions as an obligation on himself and an example to others; (ii) He must be able to decide points of law in a novel situation on the examples set by the previous Imāms; (iii) He must have insight and knowledge to tackle the problems unforeseen by the previous ideal rulers; (iv) In their solution he must be guided by the best interests of the state; (v) He must be able to make deductions from the laws laid down by the first Imāms and guide and direct his people in their just application; and (vi) He must have the mastery over the principal and subordinate techniques of war.

If the above-mentioned qualities of the second best chief of the ideal state are not found in one person, al-Fārābī will suggest that a person who has been brought up under a leader having these qualities should be the head of the state. In case even if such a person is not available, it is preferred to have a Council of two-to-five or six members possessing an aggregate of these qualities, but one of them must be a "ḥakīm" (i.e., wise-man) al-Fārābī defines ḥakīm as one who is able to know the wants of the people and visualise the needs of the State as a whole. This ḥakīm having philosophic insight is to al-Fārābī a desideratum for every kind of government, and if such a person is not procurable then the State is bound to be shattered into pieces.

al-Fārābī suggests not only the appointment of the
best man or the formation of a Committee of the most efficient men available to head the state administrative machinery, but also stresses the need for a sound internal organization. He says that the dignities of the citizens in state employment or services depend on their natural disposition and training. It is, therefore necessary that the Rais-al-Awwal should train employees of the state in the fittest manner. A state is said to be properly organized if the employments are given strictly on the merit basis. The "Rais-al-Awwal" should take inspiration in this connection from the Divine Organization where everything has the due place according to its worth and ability, otherwise there would have been crisis and chaos.

al-Farabi, further, explains it with the analogy of the human body. As in human body the chief organ, i.e., heart, should be the most perfect, so the "Rais" or head of the State should be as perfect as humanly possible. It is the heart which determines the soundness of the various organs of the body, and it is through it that the different organs co-operate with one another. In the same manner the "Rais-al-Awwal" should determine the status of the various rungs of society. He should collect, arrange, and organize the meritorious people in the most appropriate fashion. The organs of the body which are near to heart are greater in importance, exactly in the same way the value of the different functionaries in a well organised Commonwealth increases or decreases according to the distance from the "Rais-al-Awwal", the supreme head of the State. By this biological
analogy, al-Fārābī intends to illustrate the real purpose and the harmonious functioning of his "Madinat al Faḍīlah", the ideal state. Just as all the organs of the body are united in serving the purpose of the heart, similarly, all the organisations of the state should be united to fulfil the ideal of Raīs al-ʿAwwal, the Supreme Head of the State. al-Fārābī's ideal state consists of five kinds of people; (i) the excellent, (ii) the linguists, (iii) the secluded, (iv) the struggling, and (v) the steady. The excellent people are the philosophers (i.e., ḥakīms), the intellectuals, and the "People of Opinions" in great affairs. As for linguists, they are the orators, speakers, poets, musicians, writers, and the like. The secluded people are the mathematicians, statisticians, physicians, astronomers, and the like. The struggling people are the fighters, the defenders, and all those who take their place. The steady are those who earn money in the city, for example cultivators, traders, and those engaged in other pursuits.

Although, al-Fārābī had access to the translation of Plato's Republic and maintained that the citizens of the "Madinat al-Fāḍīlah" have things in common among themselves, he did not fall into the Platonic abyss of making everything, even women, the common property of the male citizens. He makes it clear that apart from the common property to which every one would have equal right of possession, each man and each class would also be allowed to have individual property, individual knowledge and scope for individual action.
The excellent or the ideal state as explained above is the social organisation administered by the best and most talented who aim at prosperity and happiness for all and sundry. If constitution fails to provide the people with prosperity and happiness, and the rulers do not possess the qualities of ideal rulers, then the state ceases to be excellent, and is transformed into many imperfect associations which are collectively called "madinat al-jāhiliyah", i.e., "non-real" or ignorant state. They are considered "ignorant" not in the quantitative but in the qualitative sense. They lack certain essential features of the ideal state and show some traits due to which it is not possible to attain the "highest good" of life. The inhabitants of madinah-al-Jāhiliyah (the ignorant state) do not know happiness as it is understood in Madinat al-Faḍilah. Their aim in life, individual or social, is materialism which consists in such things as wealth, health, pleasure of the senses, earthly powers and honour etc.

Before going into a detailed description of different forms of ignorant or imperfect state we must take into account the motives due to which such states come into existence. According to al-Fārābī, force, either physical or moral, is the first incentive which compels men to gather round the powerful person. The second possible motive consists in blood-relation which in modern terminology may be called Patriarchal theory. Members belonging to the same family and dynasty gather together to form a separate community. The third motive is the material bond existing
between two groups which leads them to establish some kind of Ignorant State. A fourth **inventive** is provided by language and custom which constitute a strong **bond** for the groupings of men. The last one is the geographical factor, i.e., men residing in the same region are attracted to come together in a state. Al-Farabi having enumerated the possible motives for the origin of the ignorant state, now classifies it into following categories:

(i) The "state of necessity" (madīnah al-jarūriyyah) endeavours to earn what is evidently necessary for the constitution and the upkeep of the body such as food, drink, clothing, shelter and carnal gratification. (ii) The state of the vile or contemptible (madīnah al-‘addalah) is the one which tries to achieve wealth in abundance; the money which its citizens hoard due to love of wealth and niggardliness is spent only for the needs of the body. (iii) The "base" or "despicable state" (madīnah al-Khissah-wal-Shaqwah) broods over sensuous pleasures and achieves the best means for the sake of pleasure only. (iv) The state of the "noble," i.e., "monarchy" (madīnah al-‘arāmah) is the organization of the profusely generous in which the individuals help one another to reach nobility in express and action. The people of this state are called generous either by themselves or by the people of other states. This is precisely an honour loving state. This is in the opinion of al-Farabi, the best state among all the states of the ignorant. (v) The state of the dominant people or the
imperialistic state (madinat al-taghib) tries to overpower others in power and wealth; they shed blood, subjugate innocents, and indulge in all sorts of pleasures. The state of the dominant excels the state of the generous in showing power. As for the state of masses, i.e., democracy (madinat al-jumhūr), everybody is free in it to do whatever he likes, and believes that no man has any superiority over the others by any means. But independence often leads to extremes, and, therefore, there arise in this state different rites and rituals, customs and manners; and people are misled by evil propensities. Thus, this state splits into different groups and parties. The governor in a democratic state, however, governs with the explicit consent of the governed. In all these above-mentioned states there is always unrest prevailing among the people, as everybody tries to become the chief and, by virtue of his wits, to lead the state to prosperity and happiness. To these six states al-Fārābī adds three more imperfect states, namely the "evil-doing state" (al-madinat al-fāsiqah), the "ignorant state" (al-madinat al-jāhilah) and the "astray-going state" (al-madinat al-ğallah). People in the evil-doing state are like weeds in a field. They are no better than savages and can have no organization worthy of a state. As for the people of the ignorant state, they possess their own constitution and culture. But their civic organizations are found at variance. They look after the necessities of life in a necessary state, organize the society of the contemptible in the contemptible state, the society of the vile in the vile state, society of the extravagant in the extravagant state, the society of the dominant in dominant state,
The astray-going states are those whose people suffer from some delusion. They adopt such principles, actions, and deeds as appear to them to be those of the ideal state, but in fact are not. The same is true of their goal of happiness and prosperity which they conceive to be so but which actually is not so.

The evil-doing, the ignorant and the astray-going states differ from the states mentioned above (viz., the necessary, the vile, the base, the timocracy, the dominant and the democracy) in so far as the people of these state believe in the principles held and the forms of happiness conceived by the people of the ideal state, and also invite others to do the same, but they themselves do nothing to achieve their object, not do they try by action to attain the happiness they believe in. On the contrary, they incline to their own whims and propensities, that is to say, they like to enjoy power, nobility and dominion, and direct their actions towards their achievement. In activities these states are like the states of the ignorant. In manners their peoples resemble the people of the said states. The peoples of these two sets of states differ only in belief. None of these states ever achieve happiness and prosperity.

The offsprings of the societies which develop in these states are of various types and all of them aim at personal gain and victory and not at real happiness and true prosperity.

The best among the heads of madinat al-Jahiliyyaha is one, says al-Hrabi, who safeguards the freedoms of
of its citizens and in whose regime the subjects are contented and have plenty of wealth. Such ruler does not hanker after wealth but is pleased with the praise of his words and deeds, thought and action.\footnote{96}

al-Fārābī's genius has also hinted at the concept and the principles of colonization. The citizens of a state, either due to fear of the enemy, or the havoc of epidemics or economic necessity, may be forced to scatter about in the different parts of the globe where they may establish their separate colonies. There are two alternatives, however, open to the colonists; (i) either they would form a united single commonwealth, or (ii) they would divide themselves into different political units. In any case these colonists would form communities depending on uniformity in their character, methods and purpose. They would be at liberty to formulate any laws according to their needs provided there is an agreement for such a change or modification.\footnote{97} It may, however, come to happen that a large number of these colonists may have the opinion that it is not necessary to change the laws which they have brought from their mother country; they would then simply codify existing laws and begin to live according to them.\footnote{98}

To purge the society from ills and evils, al-Fārābī recommends that "Tālim" (education) and "Tādīb" (training) should be imparted to its members.\footnote{99} It would be too far if we were to summarize here al-Fārābī's theory of education. Suffice it to say that proper education (tālim) helps the people to attain to theoretical or speculative virtues,
while adequate training (tādīb) leads a race or nation to acquire perfection in practical arts and crafts. The philosophers (ahl al-burhān) gain knowledge through their insight and by means of demonstration and teach their followers by the same methods. All others or common men are taught by allegories and examples. Education and training, says al-Farābī, facilitate smooth functioning of social life and glorify society and state.

**I B N SĪNĀ**

Ibn Sīnā, known to the Western world as Avicenna, however, did not write any treatise, devoting to the study of socio-political problems, of the kind we have just discussed while surveying al-Farābī's social thought. His philosophical writings and theological discourses are, nevertheless, deeply embedded with the analysis of socio-political ideals of the day. He is basically concerned in his works with human happiness and perfection, the highest stage of which, in his opinion, consists in contemplation of God and in mystical union with Him. It is in this context that man as a socio-political being is considered. This gives Ibn Sīnā's philosophy a definite socio-political orientation, and we find many important discourses on socio-political problems in his principal philosophical writings. His Kitāb al-shifāʾ, especially the last two parts of its final section, deals with the formation (i.e., 'aqd) of the city-state and the administration of household affairs together with the marriage and the general laws for living a collective life in the family. It also deals with politics,
ethics and social relations. In Kitāb al-Majāt Ibn Sīnā confines himself to a general exposition of political organization based on the divinely-revealed constitution, and discusses the institutions of the Caliphate and the imamate as well as the obligation of obedience to both these socio-political institutions of the day. His Kitāb al-Siyāsah is mostly devoted to ethics and to economics, i.e., "the regime of the household" which generally includes the head of the family, his wife, children and servants. In his last work Kitāb al-Ishārāt-wa-al-Tanbihāt, commonly called 'Ishārāt', which is mystical in character, Ibn Sīnā emphasizes the need for law and justice in men's life and advocates that it is possible only by means of mutual assistance in a well organized society.

The attainment of man's temporal as well as spiritual perfection is possible, says Ibn Sīnā, only in an organized society where mutual co-operation, assistance and understanding for the fulfilment of the necessities of life are easily rendered possible. Such a society must be based not on particular laws (that is, on laws laid down by human authority to secure only material well-being), but on a comprehensive general laws which take an equal account of man's spirituality as well as his corporeality. Only the society, whose socio-political organization is run through a comprehensive code of conduct, can provide the real basis for the attainment of man's highest and ultimate good, i.e., the knowledge and the love of God. Such laws, believes Ibn Sīnā, are the divine laws (i.e., the Shari'ah) which are the revelations of God to His apostle, Prophet Muḥammad.
The Almighty God created mankind and wished it to survive. Hence He sent down His laws through His prophets to ensure justice in man's social as well as personal life which is basically attained through mutual assistance and cooperation. The divinely revealed laws are not only indispensable in safeguarding and strengthening social relation of mankind; they contain also the truth about God, His Universe, His angels, the life hereafter, reward and punishment and the divine providence. The "Zähid" the "'abid" and the "'arif" must, therefore, live in society whose socio-political organization is run by the Shari'ah (the divinely revealed laws); if they aspire for the attainment of their ultimate perfection, the highest good, the knowledge and the love of God.

As regards the socio-political organization and structure of the state there seemingly exists a striking affinity between the views of Ibn Sīnā and those of Plato. Ibn Sīnā in his politics appears to be interested in all aspects of Plato's Republic, including the transformation from one constitution to another. In addition he draws a distinction between "secular Kingship" (mulk) which forms the subject matter of Plato's Republic as well as of Aristotle's Politics, and another kind of socio-political administration, i.e., non-secular or theocratic, based on the Shari'ah, which is similar to the subject of Plato's Laws. Ibn Sīnā identifies, like al-Fārābī, his model state which he calls "madinat al-ḥasanah", with the ideal state of
Plato's philosopher-king. But he does not proceed to identify the prophet, the ideal head of the Islamic state, with the philosopher-king, the "imam" and the first ruler (Rais al-Awwal) as al-Fārābī is alleged to have done in his political system. The prophet is distinguished from all other men, including the philosopher-king as well as the 'ārif' (Gnostic) by his specially gifted divine revelations. Moreover, he can perform, believes Ibn Sīnā, miracles and is capable of doing no fault. He experiences immediate and spontaneous perceptions (i.e., wahy) in order to deal with the socio-political affairs of mankind. This calls for no special training or education like that of the philosopher-kings who attain to the knowledge of this intelligible world by means of reason and experience, i.e., through syllogistic discipline and demonstrative argumentation. The prophet, thus, is superior to all categories of mankind. He always sails the ship of state towards right direction according to the divinely revealed injunctions and guidance. "This man (i.e., the Prophet) is richly endowed', says Ibn Sīnā, 'with the intuitive knowledge to administer the affairs of mankind in such a way that the livelihood of all human beings is provided and their future life well ordered." This appears to be in marked contrast to al-Fārābī who had required of the prophet to possess skill in philosophy through study and training in the use of demonstrative arguments. This is due to his staunch belief in Islamic ideology which made him to concentrate on the true spirit of the Shari'ah.
Ibn Sīnā speaks of his model state (madinat al-ḥasan) in the last part of his al-Diyāyat, i.e., metaphysics. The man who administers the affairs of the model state after the prophet is called al-ḥalīfa, the prophet's vicegerent or Ta'mūn, the spiritual and temporal leader of the Muslim Community. Ibn Sīnā assigns to ḥalīfa (the Prophet's vicegerent) the primary task of ordering the life of society organized in the state by dividing the citizens (as Plato is attributed to have done) into three categories: (i) the rulers (ii) the artisans and (iii) the guardians. Each group is administered by a strong head (Ra'īs), who, in turn, appoints heads of lesser authority over smaller social units.

We are reminded of al-Fārābī's division of the people, based on Aristotle, into rulers and ruled in hierarchical order, from the first ruler over secondary rulers who partly rule and are partly ruled, down to those who only accept rule, i.e., the masses. Ibn Sīnā strongly recommends that every citizen must sincerely execute his allotted task, so that there is not even a single person who fails to benefit the state by his naturally gifted capacities and abilities. Idleness is not to be tolerated. If it is due to illness, the sick person must be exempted from the duties; otherwise no one should be allowed to lead an idle and lazy life. Laziness must be eradicated from the society. One who is addicted to the habit of laziness without any rational justification, ought to be punished. Ibn Sīnā is of the opinion that the state should assume the responsibility of providing medical assistance and facilities to those who are subject
to physical or mental infirmities, and cannot earn their sustenance and livelihood by themselves. Here we mark a very glaring contrast between the position of Ibn Sinā and the teaching of Plato. Plato recommends that the persons who are either physically infirm or mentally abnormal, destined to live without being cured and helpless to contribute anything to the maintenance of the state, ought to be put to death. While Ibn Sinā calls ignominious (qaṣīḥ) the killing of those persons who can no longer fulfil their civic duties through no fault of their own.

The care of the sick and infirm together with the explicit provision for those who become impoverished and are incidentally rendered incapable of earning their own living, can certainly be attributed to Ibn Sinā's faith in the ethical ideals of Islam and to his activity as a physician.

The Khalīfah, the head of the model state, must possess a thorough knowledge and a deep insight into the Shari'ah. He should be capable of utilizing his ability of "qiyās" (speculation and insight) in such cases which are not traceable in the laws of the Shari'ah. New situations are bound to arise as the result of change in time and social circumstances. It is the duty of the Khalīfah to issue orders and regulations (ahlākām), based on qiyās to meet any contingency that may arise in course of running the administration of the state. He is, however, entitled to good advice from the learned counsellors (ahl al-masāwirān), but the decisions in the form of regulations is his prerogative and special duty.
The Caliph, in the opinion of Ibn Sīnā, must be a man of sound character. He must possess noble virtues like courage, temperance and other good behaviour (ḥush tadbir). These character traits and virtuous habits must lead to justice (adālah) which is "Mustā", the golden mean. The virtue of justice is needed to overcome the lower desires and tendencies and helps in elevating the soul and liberating from corporeality. The satisfaction of the physical desires is quite necessary for the preservation of the body. The courage is needed to defend and protect the interests of the state. Justice includes equity and balance. It is concerned with the individual and social welfare and aims at avoidance of excess as well as deficiency (i.e., injustice). The virtue of justice, in the opinion of Ibn Sīnā, is the sum total (majmu’) of three others, wisdom, courage and temperance.

In addition to these qualities Ibn Sīnā assigns to the Khalīfa another virtue of a highly developed intelligence that will enable him to acquire the theoretical wisdom (ḥikmat al-nazariyyah) on the one hand and practical wisdom (ḥikmat-al-'amaliyyah) on the other. The former finds its highest expression in the true knowledge of God, while the latter happens to be concerned with actions and activities of this mundane world. The man who combines the theoretical and practical wisdom in his personality is crowned with the achievement of the prophetic and intuitive insight which accords him the utmost happiness. The person who possesses the prophetic insight is capable to becoming the leader of the
mankind (rabb-i Insānī) and he is the ruler (Sultan) of the terrestrial world (i.e., 'ālam-i ardī) and the Vicar of God (Khulifat al-Allāh). He must be obeyed after Allah and the Prophet Muḥammad.

The election of the Caliph must proceed on the pattern prescribed by the tradition that had been practically outlined in the selection of the first four successors of the prophet, who are generally called "Right-Guided Caliphs" (Khulfa-i Rāshidīn). The election of the Caliph is of great social importance. Hence it should take place, precisely speaking, by "ba'ya'" (investiture with electors' oath of loyalty) and is to be followed by ba'ya' in public, expressing the ijma', i.e., the consensus opinion of the millat (nation). Ibn Sīnā holds the opinion that the electors who wrongly elect their Caliph violate the commandment of God, nay they become "unbelievers" if they are guilty of a wrong choice. He condemns usurpation and recommends the capital punishment for a tyrant (mutaghallib) as well as severe retribution for those who fail to carry out such a tyrannicide if they have the means to do it. Ibn Sīnā goes so far as to claim that tyrannicide is more pleasing to God; it draws man near to Him.

If the lawfully elected caliph is unworthy to hold office and is challenged by a worthy revolutionary (ahwārji), the citizens are advised to recognise the claimant, if he is intellectually and physically fit to hold the office of a Caliph, even if he lacks some virtues. The Caliph occupies an eminent place and has to play a leading role in the social life of the state. He is the defender of faith, the dispenser
of justice, the "Imām" in prayer as well as the commander in war. He is bound to discharge these duties effectively and obediently, either in person or by delegating his authority to his appointed officials, chief among them are the "Vizir" and the "Qādi" (i.e., Judge). It is the task of Caliph to integrate the political, social, and economic life of communities, living in the theocratic state of Islam, into a harmonious whole. It is to be noted that Ibn Sīnā emphasizes the paramount need for the law as the regulator of earthly life in the state. He explicitly remarks that not everybody is concerned with the life hereafter. Therefore, it is but necessary for the Caliph to enact the laws mostly directed against the actions which go counter to the "sunnah" and are apt to corrupt order or bring disharmony in the state. Individuals may suffer in the process of law's enforcement, but this is quite inevitable to ensure the general interests and the common well-being of the citizens of the state. Ibn Sīnā recommends the deterrent theory of punishment.

Ibn Sīnā classifies man's activities into two broad categories, namely "'Ībadat" and "Mu'āmalāt". 'Ībadat' comprise, defines Ibn Sīnā, man's duties to God, his Creator, Benefactor and sustainer. 'Ībadat seek practical manifestation in the daily prayers, at least, five times in a day, the collective Friday prayer once in a week, the festival prayer, twice in a year, the fasting in the month of Ramajān, the annual holy tax and the pilgrimage to Mecca, at least, once in one's life. These religious observations foster an
atmosphere of social integration, emotional harmony and human brotherhood in the society. "They bind those who fulfill closely together, strengthen their desire for the defence of their state by imbuing them with courage and devotion and finally lead them to acquire virtues. Collective prayer calls down God's blessings upon the affairs of the state and the citizens. The regulations pertaining to the observance of the religious obligations must be neither too dogmatic and rigid nor too liberal and flexible. Ibn Sīnā often stresses the need of golden mean (musṭā) in all facets of life -- social, political, economic and private.

By the term "Mu'amalat", Ibn Sīnā means commercial transactions and social relations which cover the whole range of man's obligations towards his fellow-beings. These inter-human relations, too, must be the concern of the Caliph, or the "Imām". He must manage to regulate them in such a way that they promote the construction of the two pillars of the state, namely family life (munākahat) and the generality of things men share in common (mushārahkāt). He must promulgate laws concerning mutual help and the protection of the property and of personal life. To supplement the positive duties of co-operation in defence of life and property, Ibn Sīnā advocates waging war against the people or sections of the people who pose threats for the social stability and aim at demolishing communal harmony in the state. To perform "jihād" (holy war) against the opponents of the sunnah within and enemies of the sharī'ah without is
one of the principal duties of the caliph and one of the cardinal virtues of every Muslim. He must confiscate through war or otherwise their properties and administer them in the interest of the common weal. The shari'ah, the most perfect and excellent is to be promulgated over the whole inhabited earth. If the model state (madinat al-ṣasanah) considers that the affairs of the corrupt states (madun-al-fāsidah) can be reformed and restored to a good and just order (ṣālah), it may impose on them its own constitution. If there is opposition and refusal on the part of the corrupt states, they must be punished for that.114

Ibn Sīnā's account of marriage and family life is based on the provisions of the shari'ah. Marriage, according to him, guarantees the propagation and perpetuation of human race. The family is the foundation upon which the state is built; it establishes a bond between parents and children which should serve as a pattern for social life. He strongly emphasizes the purity of married life and deals with the measures to safeguard the health of the family. He adds a long statement about divorce (Ṭalaq) which he allows as a last resort, if all attempts of reconciliation between the couples prove futile, in spite of the danger to the children if the tie is broken. In this, as in the matter of the status of women and in the case of children, he is in full accord with the relevant injunctions and regulations of the shari'ah especially with the law of inheritance.115

Ibn Sīnā has also dealt with public finance. Like al-Fārābī, he stresses the need for capital, and the public
funds in order to guarantee the general welfare of the citizens. It is to be made up of taxes, fines and legal booty (fay'). This last, a concept peculiar to the Islamic state, is to be used equitably in the general interest (masalih-i-mushtarakah). The Caliph must forbid games of chance, for the gain must be the result of work, which is also of advantage to others. Theft, robbery, and usury are also forbidden, since they are detrimental to society.

This, is, in short, the summary of Ibn Sīnā's social thought. In a highly sparkling style Ibn Sīnā represented his social norms which matched the profundity of his religious insight and philosophical understanding. Steeped in the study of Muslim Jurisprudence at an early age, Ibn Sīnā's socio-political thought is centred round the practicability of the law, by which he clearly means shari'ah. The shari'ah is the nucleus of his social thinking. There is no rival claim, in his opinion, between the divine law and the law of the state because Islam knows only one code of conduct, the shari'ah, which holds sway over political life no less than over social, economic and cultural life. Human life is always one and indivisible, religion pervades and determines all its aspects. The whole of life is ordered by the shari'ah, all-embracing divine constitution. It does not differentiate between authority and power. The shari'ah knows only one supreme authority, that is of God, His Prophet and after him his vice-gerent, khilaf or imām, who sincerely obeys the commandments of God and follows the example set by the Prophet in dealing
with socio-political matters of the state and ethico-religious affairs of the citizens.

**MISKAWAIH**

Though as a philosopher Miskawaih was not of the calibre of his predecessors: al-Kindi and al-Farabi, or even of his contemporary Ibn Sina, yet in giving lucid and systematic exposition of the science of ethics he undoubtedly surpassed them all. His *al-Fihrist al-* and *Tadhrib al-Muhtasar wa-Talad al-`Arafi*, commonly called as "*Tadhrib al-`Arafa*", are eloquent testimony of this fact. His *Tadhrib al-`Arafa* is the first attempt of its kind, embodying the ethical views and opinions of both, the Greeks and the Muslims.

Miskawaih did not exclusively write any separate treatise on social problems. He is essentially concerned with man's happiness (Sa'adah) and perfection, which is attainable only in a human society. It is in this context that man as a social being or as a citizen of a State is considered. He has made many important pronouncements as regards society, its origin and function; the state, its government and duties; in his principal ethico-philosophical works referred to above.

His social system draws its ideals from the social nature of his moral philosophy which maintains that perfection is possible only in an organized society, that virtues cannot be cultivated in seclusion, that social co-operation is essential to common happiness of man. Morality in its
nature is social, and, therefore, cannot be confined within the bounds of individual life. Individual perfection is bound up with, and ultimately leads to the perfection of the family and the society at large. Keeping in view these ethical considerations Miskawaih ventures to analyse social process and institutions.

Man, the noblest of all creations, is born naked and ignorant, says Miskawaih. Neither physically nor mentally he is in a position to provide himself with the necessities of life which are numerous and almost without limit. He, therefore, needs the co-operation of his fellow-beings to fulfil his requirements. Society is, therefore, indispensable, believes Miskawaih, for bare survival of humanity.

Man must live in a community or in a city. This kind of collective living is known as "Civic life" (tamaddun), no matter whether people live in tents, in houses made of clay or mud, or in buildings. Whatever may be the particular state of their civilization, the very fact of mutual cooperation which brings them to live together is called "tamaddun" and the place where they live is called "madinah" (city or town).\(^{18}\) Besides this collective living, man also needs to acquire education and training in order to dispel the darkness of his born ignorance.

The principle of give-and-take, or love and friendship, based on mutual cooperation is necessary condition for maintaining the civic life and society. It is the law of life.\(^ {119}\) The roots of human existence lie in natural affection (uns) because man is affectionate and sympathetic,
not unsocial or unfriendly by his nature. The word "insān" (man) is a derivative of "Uns" (natural affection) and not of "nisyān" (forgetfulness) as it is erroneously supposed.

This instinct of natural affection in man can properly be developed only through co-operation with his fellow-beings. All the groups and sections of society must be governed by the principle of mutual co-operation. If the police or the army protects our life and property from enemies, both external and internal, it is incumbent on the rich and well-to-do citizens of the state to make provisions for the fulfilment of their needs, so that they may freely serve the country with all their vigour and vitality. It is the demand of justice that we must provide assistance to our fellow-men as they do give assistance to us.

As a natural corollary of the law of co-operation the ascetics and the saints who neither earn their own living nor co-operate with others in any way are, in fact, oppressors (zālim). They have deviated from the path of justice, since they live on the fruits of society but render no service in return which is incumbent on them. They may plead in their defence that as their needs are very few, their shortcomings, therefore, should be condoned. But this argument, says Miskawiah, is not convincing or tenable. No matter whatsoever little their wants may be, they must render some service. On no account can they be permitted to sit idle. One must strive to earn according to one's natural abilities. Everybody must necessarily try to achieve the good of the world for the sake of, and never at the cost of, the well-being of his soul. This is best done by following the Shari'ah, the revealed law of God.
In his book, *ATHUTH-AL-AXLAQ*, Miskawaih clearly indicates that man by his very nature and necessity is in need of forming society in order to develop his personality and reach his Sa'idan. Man has to behave fairly, says Miskawaih, with his fellow-men and has to extend the hands of love or friendship towards them because they co-operate in contributing to his perfection and the full fruition of his humanity. An ascetic who retires to a cave or monastery, or roams from place to place cannot achieve virtues. One who does not lead a social life cannot attain noble ideals of life such as temperance, vigour, generosity, courage, justice etc. He only destroys, through disuse, his own faculties and dispositions. If any one does not use his abilities and powers and leaves them to rust and wither away, he is no better than a dead matter, may he be even worse than that. He may flatter himself that he is "pure, sacred, just and endowed with every conceivable virtue". But, in fact, he is neither pure, nor just, nor has he cultivated any real virtue. People consider him virtuous because apparently they see no vice in him, as if virtues were something negative ('adam). On the contrary, they are positive activities and as such they appear only when we mix with people and live with them. Virtues are realized only in social behaviour and group activities. Miskawaih calls society an "organism, the well-being of which depends on the co-operation of all organs, and in this co-operation lies their own perfection too." He brings this analogy only to emphasize the interdependence of individuals in a society and the unity of
the social organism.

This long discourse leads us to conclude that society owes its origin to man's need of bare survival. Its expansion occurs with the increased or multiplying requirements of human beings. This gives rise to the most vital law of society, namely the law of co-operation, which is at the same time the condition for the survival and for the provision of the higher goods of soul. A social life, which comes into existence by the joint forces of necessary co-operation and natural love, is indispensable condition for self-perfection, i.e., the perfection of true humanity. This rational co-operation as we call it, is the end of society and the "raison d'etre" of its being.

A society, which earnestly adheres to the ideals of co-operation, love and friendship, is bound, by the very logic of its existence, to develop into a state. The highest end of moral and intellectual perfection cannot be fully realized unless there is a recognized political authority to enforce those conditions which are necessary and indispensable for such realization. Social-co-operation is, after all, an activity in which individuals are at liberty to participate. Their liberty may even hamper the process of co-operation. It is more likely that uncontrolled and unregulated social co-operation may thwart the realization of Saladin rather than facilitate it. The necessity of a political authority is, therefore, obvious in order to enforce certain conditions for a healthy social co-operation.
Those conditions are:

(i) Every member in the society must work rightly and rationally; (ii) He must have correct knowledge of the needs of Society; (iii) He should make his contribution to that field in which he can serve the society in the best possible way; (iv) Equity and justice must be observed in the exchange of service; and finally, the material goods necessary for physical and moral needs must be adequately provided.

If any society fails to achieve these norms, it cannot be successful in achieving the highest end of life. These norms can never be found in an uncontrolled society. In an controlled society, the "social justice" will be always undermined and the moral activities will be seriously impaired both by the internal forces of disruption and by external enemies. To save society from falling an easy prey to such elements, it is necessary to have political authority. The state, which provides such sanction, is therefore a moral necessity, and indispensable agency for ensuring social justice.

Miskawain maintains that Shari'ah, the divinely revealed law of Islam, is the real basis of imposing legal authority within the territory of a state. He believes that the Shari'ah which consists of the holy Qur'an and the Hadith, i.e., the words and deeds of the Holy Prophet, Muhammad (be peace on him,) brings men nearer and closer to one another, strengthens the bonds of natural affection, and widens the range of love and co-operation. The prayers for five times a day, the Juma' Congregations in a central
mosque, once in a week, the two huge congregation on the
occasion of 'Id every year, and finally the Hajj (the world
wide meeting of the Muslims at the Holy Ka'bah) at
least once in one's life are the gradual steps for the
realization of the unity, integration and love of mankind.

The observance of the laws of Shari'ah is essential
not only for this social unity and love, but also for the
virtuous life of the individuals. By elevating the soul of
man through the love of God the Shari'ah makes the cultivation
of virtue and the attainment of perfection easier. Since
the love of God is not subject to change and dissolution, it
serves as permanent and unexhaustible source of inspiration
for higher ideals. Miskawaih even goes on to say that the
attainment of a virtuous life, of social unity and sincere love
of mankind, is not possible without the observances of the
rulers of Shari'ah. For, one can achieve these ends only
after attaining true knowledge, right discipline and firm
beliefs, and these are possible only in a Divinely revealed
religion.

The agency to administer the authority of the
Shari'ah in the state is called Government. The function
of the government, therefore, is to implement the laws of
Shari'ah. In course of implementing the laws of the Shari'ah
the government should not enforce any particular way of
Sa'adah that one has to follow. The individual himself
should make his choice and regulate his life. The state and
the government should provide assistance to the individual
for the attainment of Sa'adah, but leave them free to
choose their ways. It should interfere only when social
justice and co-operation are jeopardized. The government
has to perform the function of educating the people to think and act rightly. It should also look after the productive activities and other creative occupations of the citizens. Along with education and training it must provide the people with the necessities of life, amenities of better living, shelter and protection.

Besides these basic duties, the government should look after the moral life of its people. But it should not play the role of a schoolmaster in enforcing moral discipline. It should strive for the cause of unity, true beliefs, firm convictions and correct opinions.

Miskawaih finds such government existing in the early days of Islam. The Government run by the Holy Prophet and his immediate successors (Khulafā'-i Rāshidīn) is an ideal for him. Miskawaih further says that such government is the only lawful Government. Firstly because no other Government except this can enforce the Shari'ah; and secondly the real sovereignty in this Government essentially belongs to God and nobody else. The ruler is only the protector of the Shari'ah; his authority is the subject to authority of God.133

The Shari'ah, as it has been mentioned above, is an integral part of the divine religion. Consequently obedience to the Government, maintains Miskawaih, is a religious duty. He who violates the laws of the Government commits crime not only against the Government but also against God. The duty of the ruler is to provide opportunities for the spiritual perfection.134 The relation between
the ruler and the ruled should be on 'familial' lines. The ruler should behave like a father and the ruled like his issues. The people should treat themselves as brother to each other.\textsuperscript{135}

Miskawaih is not an advocate of the passive acceptance of evil. He emphasizes the need for political reform and social action for restoring conditions that are indispensable for the attainment of Sa'adah. When a condition of political decadence sets in, people indulge in sensuous acts, the laws of the Shari'ah are violated, and it becomes progressively difficult to distinguish between right and wrong. In short, when the order that the prophet sought to establish through divine regulations gets weakened or upset, then it is high time for reviving the religious spirit, for imparting the knowledge of truth, and for establishing a new and just government. This is called "Tajdid" (revival or renovation) in the religious terminology.\textsuperscript{136}

Miskawaih in his celebrated writings has laid a good deal of emphasis on "Social Justice" which we have referred to in the foregoing here and there. Let us now examine it in the detail.

Miskawaih defines justice as the "virtue of the Soul obtained as a result of the combination of the three cardinal virtues, i.e., it is the joint result of courage, temperance and wisdom". "It occurs", he explains, "when the different faculties of the soul perform their own functions with
moderation and work together in harmony, surrendering power of willingly to the discrimination without encroaching upon one another by pursuing ends contrary to their respective natures.¹³⁷

In continuation of the above mentioned definition of justice Miskawaih goes on to say that "as a result of natural dispositions one chooses in the first instance to be fair or just to oneself in all private matters, and then observes fairness in those matters which are between himself and others.¹³⁸ What is fairness or what is the criterion of fairness, is certainly a difficult question. In matters of simple exchange fairness, however, is defined by Miskawaih as "equality" (Musāwat). In relations other than exchange, fairness or justice lies in "giving what is due, to whom it is due, and in way it is due."¹³⁹ This, in short, constitutes the essence of social justice, which seeks, equality in relation to the members of the society.

Social justice is divided by Miskawaih primarily into two kinds: (i) Distributive Justice, which includes (a) the distribution of any public fund or stock of wealth, honour or whatever else may be allocated among the members of a community by a social agency, and (b) Justice in contracts, in the exchange of commodities, and in kinds of transactions carried out by individuals or groups.¹⁴⁰ (ii) Reparative Justice, which is realized in the exaction from a wrong-doer for the benefit of the persons wronged, of damages just equivalent to the loss suffered by the latter.¹⁴¹
The purpose of this reparative justice is to bring back the relative position which obtained before the wrong was done. The duty of the judge is to restore the original position, either by punishing the wrong-doer or giving redress to the person wronged.\textsuperscript{142}

There are three fundamental agencies, through which social justice is obtained in the society: (i) the Shari'ah (ii) a just governor or an authority based on the Shari'ah, and (iii) dinār, i.e., money. Dinār (money) is the value-measuring device (muqawim). It is through money that in trades and commerce justice can be achieved. Dinār is the silent agency employed to regulate transactions and exchanges according to the rules of justice. But it is not necessary that money should always perform this justice-administering function.\textsuperscript{143} In case money fails in this function, the authority of the Government should be involved to restore just and fair dealings. The duty of the Government here is to assist and supplement the function of money and set it right whenever it fails to fulfil its functions.\textsuperscript{144} A just Governor (al-Imām-al-Ādil) has to look after both kinds of justice, distributive and reparative. Every problem that has any bearing on the maintenance of social justice should be the concern of the Government.

When social justice is established through these agencies, society and its cultural pattern will remain intact, otherwise they will be destroyed. "The greatest tyrant is one who does not recognise and submit to the
authority of the Shari'ah. Next is one who does not obey the laws of the Government in all his dealings and relations. Last of all comes the man who does not earn, but appropriates the property of others. Social justice gives no encouragement to such unhealthy elements in Society and demands that such things should be looked into and dealt with properly.

N A S Ī R A L-DĪN TŪSĪ

Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī (1201-74), an important Shi'ite philosopher and theologian, born in the year 1201 A.D./597 A.H. in Ṭūs, the native place of al-Ghazālī and of many other Arabo-Persian scholars of medieval times was, apart from being an excellent exponent of the Shi'ite doctrine of the Imām, a well-known critic of Ibn Sīnā. Of the hundred or more works (most of them in Arabic) traditionally ascribed to him, not more than fifteen or so are considered to have survived in substantial form, Akhlāq-i Naṣīrī being
the most outstanding of them. 146

Akhlaq-i Nāṣirī published in 1235 A.D./633 A.H. is a well-written treatise in Persian language on Social Philosophy, usually called then the Practical Philosophy. It is a kind of work, written by a scholar thoroughly at home in the sciences of his time, deeply immersed in the ideas of the earlier Muslim Socio-Political theoreticians, namely, al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā and Miskawaih, but with powerful solvent genius and personality of his own. Tūsī appears to have made a conscious endeavour on his part to integrate in this treatise the socio-political thought of these great Muslim philosophers. Moreover, it has been extensively used by our philosopher, Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawwānī, in his most scholarly written book, Akhlaq-i Jalālī. A summary description of the contents of Akhlaq-i Nāṣirī is, therefore needed

contd.....
to give a comprehensive shape to this historical background of al-Dawānī's social thought.

Ṭūsī initiates the discussion by giving first an exposition and the meaning of the term Practical Philosophy (ḥikmat-i 'amali) and its division into its various components, so as to make clear the scope of this treatise. Practical philosophy signifies knowledge of the good of the voluntary actions of the human beings in a way that it may conduce to the ordering of the states of man's life, here and hereafter, and be helpful in realising his perfection and happiness. Ṭūsī divides practical philosophy into two: (1) that which is concerned with the individuals and (2) which relates to the society. The second is again subdivided into (1) that which refers to the family and (ii) that which concerns the city life. The connotation of the city life is not limited to the confines of a city alone, but is extended to a province, a country and the whole world. Practical philosophy thus has three branches: the first is called ETHICS which is basically concerned with the discipline of the conduct and character of the individuals (tahdīb al-‘akhlaq), the second "Domestics" which provides the regulations for the household affairs and the management of the family (tadbīr-i manzil) and the third, "Politics" which is mostly related to the government of the cities (siyāsat-i mudun).

Ṭūsī's Akhlāq-i Našīrī consists of three discourses, each discourse comprising one of the divisions of practical
philosophy. Tusi is primarily concerned in all these discourses with the criteria of human conduct that are required for attaining the end of happiness or blessedness (sáádat) in this world and the world hereafter. Blessedness is of three kinds: (i) Spiritual Blessedness or Blessedness relating to soul (sáádat-i nafsání); (ii) Physical Blessedness relating to body (sáádat-i badání); and (iii) Civic Blessedness or Blessedness related to civic life (sáádat-i madání'). All these kinds of blessedness are to be attained in order to enjoy the Eternal and the Ever-lasting Bliss (sáádat-i abadí) in the life hereafter.

The first discourse which is related to the discipline of the conduct and character lays down criteria for the evaluation of human dispositions purely at individual level. It consists of two broad divisions. One deals with the principles (Mabādī), and the other with the aims and objectives (maqāṣid) of Ethics. The part pertaining to the Principles is composed of seven sections which have been set up to enumerate the faculties of the human soul, to explain the superiority of mankind over the whole creation, to point out the excellence and maladies of the human soul and to lay down the means that may lead to the realisation of the ultimate good of human life. The next part, dealing with the aims and objectives of Ethics, consists of ten sections which are mostly devoted to the study of virtues, pseudo-virtues and vices. Tusi has tried to show in this part that the culture of conduct and character (tahdhib al-Akhlaq) is the noblest of all disciplines, and essentially
lies in the acquisition of noble virtues. The "First Tutor" (muaddib-i awwal) that teaches the whole society the proper course of setting right the dispositions is the Divine Law (Nâmûs-i Illâhî). The "Second Tutor" (Muaddib-i Thânî) is philosophy (ḥikmat) which teaches only the men of distinguished learning and wisdom. Accordingly it is incumbent on parents, says Ṭūsî, to bring their children first of all into the bondage of the Divine Injunctions and to reform their manners and habits through the various methods of education, training and discipline, so that they may become men of distinction and learning, and be able to prove themselves good citizens of the State. The last two sections of this portion are devoted to an enumeration of the importance of maintaining the mental health and the necessity of treating the sicknesses of the soul. The maintenance of mental health lies mainly in the preservation of the state of equipoise by the adaptation of virtues and the eradication of vices. The preservation of mental health is a matter of utmost significance for everybody, so that life in society may progress smoothly in a healthy fashion. It is quite indispensable for the maintenance of peace and progress in the society.

The second Discourse, which consists of five sections, deals with the family and the domestic affairs. It has been pointed out in this discourse that how a man, as a member of the family and other small social units, should behave with wife, children and servants; how he should administer the property and provision and how he should look after the
various other matters of the household. It also contains a supplementary section regarding the observance of parental rights and discharge of filial obligations.

The management of the family is the central theme of this entire discourse. A family comes into existence when a sacred bond of union between a man and woman gets established. It also includes child, servant and means of sustenance. Thus a family is generally said to have consisted of (i) Father, (ii) Mother, (iii) Child, (iv) Servant and (v) Provision of livelihood.

The object of marriage, says Tusi, should be two-fold: (i) the preservation of property at home, and (ii) the quest of progeny. It must not be at the instigation of appetite or for any other purpose. A worthy wife, in his opinion, should take on the role of a "mother", "friend" and "mistress", while a bad or unworthy wife would adopt those of "despot", "enemy" and "thief". The prudent course for a husband, unfortunately afflicted with an unworthy wife, is to seek release (khalas) from her in the form of divorce; for the proximity of an unworthy wife, he says, "is worse than that of wild beasts and serpents."

Those who are incapable of maintaining the sanctity of home and the family life, have been advised by Tusi, to
this world, should be blessed with a suitable name. A nurse, who should be neither stupid nor diseased, ought to be employed, if possible, for his tender care and adequate protection. When he completes the prescribed period of suckling, the discipline and training of his character must be undertaken with utmost care on the line of certain established principles. The first principle of discipline is to keep him away from the company of the "contrary-minded persons". The next is to teach him the beliefs, traditions and votaries of the religion. In addition to these, he should be instructed to learn by heart the stories and poems, embued with noble sentiments and ideas, so that he may become firmly convinced of virtues and values of moral life. He should first, be introduced to the kind of poetry, called the "rajaz" and then to the "qasida"; but he must be kept away from frivolous poetry, such as the poems of Imr al-qais, Abu Nuwas and the like.

If a child displays aptitude towards learning, he should be provided with the proper opportunities of further education. Firstly, he should be taught the science of ethics (ilm-i akhlāq) and after he should be directed to learn the theoretical sciences (ulūm-i ḥikmat-i nazari), such as, metaphysics (ilm-i tabā'ī). If he lacks natural aptitude for learning, he should be engaged in arts and crafts or trades so that he may earn his livelihood immediately after his primary education.

In case of daughters, one must employ, says Tūsī, whatever is appropriate and befitting to them. They should
be brought up to keep close to the house and live in veil (hijab), cultivating gravity, continence, modesty and the like virtues that would qualify them to become a worthy wife. "They should not be allowed to learn reading and writing, but should acquire such qualities which are essentially needed for being a commendable woman". In attaining maturity "they should be married to suitable matches." 157

Sons and daughters, in the course of training be taught the manners of conversation, movement, rest, dining and the like matters that are of great social importance. They should be instructed to observe the duties towards their parents. A sincere observance of the rights of parents, in the opinion of Tusi, lies in three things: (i) The children should have sincere love for their parents in their heart and they should please them with utmost respect, obedience, service, softness of speech, humility, and all such things which do not come in conflict with the commandments and prohibitions of God. However, if there may arise any kind of conflict, that should be dealt with on the basis of human considerations and not as an opponent or a litigant. (ii) They should meet their requirements without their demands. (iii) They should display a benevolent attitude towards them, both privately and publicly and should carefully guard their injunctions according to their volitions both in their life and after their death.

Filial disobedience (‘qūq), which is opposed to the sincere discharge of duties towards parents is also
of three kinds. First is to hurt the parents by one's insincere behaviour. Second is to quarrel and to make litigation regarding money matters and the means of livelihood. Third is to display an attitude of disrespect and hatred towards them, either in public or private, as well as in their life or after their death. It also includes disregard for their injunctions and will.

Ṭūsī compares the attendants, servants and slaves to the organs of the human body in relation to the management of the household affairs. They occupy in the family life the same status as hands, feet and other organs possess in relation to body. Existence of such people is indispensable for the harmonious discharge of many important functions of the family. The impelling force in utilizing the service of servants should be love (muhabbat) rather than sheer necessity or hope or fear. No disparity of any kind whatsoever should be maintained as regards the servants' livelihood, whether in matters of food or dress or in any other things.

Regarding the financial status of the family, Ṭūsī emphasises the need for acquiring wealth, money and property by fair and just means. The sources of income, in his opinion, collectively fall under two broad categories: (1) Crafts and Commercial enterprises; (ii) Inheritance, gifts and State employments. He lays down three guiding principles for seekers after worldly fortunes. One must avoid (i) tyranny, (jaur), (ii) disgrace ('ar), and (iii) meanness (danā'at) in his pursuits of wealth, property
and money. Tyranny generally results in when one obtains things by embezzlement and domination (taghallub), or by discrepancy in weights and measures, or by deceit and theft. Disgrace comes into eminence when one acquires things by stooping to impudence, to-mfoolery and abasement of soul. Meanness finds its way when benefits and gains are acquired by base crafts, knowingly setting aside the noble ones.

In the expenditure and disbursement of wealth one should guard himself, says Tusi, against four things: (i) meanness and cheeseparing or miserliness which imply strict restraint on one's expenditures and those of one's family, and also abstention from giving freely for a good cause; (ii) extravagence and dissipation which involve spending lavishly on redundant purposes, such as the gratification of appetities and lower pleasures. It also includes spending immoderately on obligatory ends; (iii) affection and vainglory or mockery which mean spending wealth for sheer pride, show and boasting; and finally comes the bad management, i.e., to spend more when one should spend less and vice versa.

The lawful expenditure of money and wealth can be analysed into three categories: (i) expenditure in the way of God, such as giving alms (ṣadaqāt) and paying the holy-tax (zakāt); (ii) expenditure for the sake of generosity, favour and good cause, such as gifts, presents, pious offerings and donations; (iii) expenditure for the quest
of necessities, congenial objects and for compensation of loss. The quest for congenial objects refers to the expenditure made to fulfil genuine needs which include such things as food, drink, cloth and the similar requirements of the family; compensation for harm comprises giving to the unjust (zallāmah) and the ingenious (sufahā) so as to keep one's soul, one's property and one's good repute intact from them. In conclusion Tusi says that expenditure should be comparatively lesser than income, and that there should be no expenditure on any unproductive head such as over a land that cannot be cultivated or on a jewel which is rarely desired.

The third and final discourse of the book, Akhlāq-i Nāsīrī, deals with politics. Tusi in this discourse is concerned with the criteria of man's political activities. He considers human being as an organic member of the city community, of state and even of an empire in this final discourse.

The whole discourse is divided into eight sections dealing with an explanation of the administration of cities (Siyāsat-i mudun), the need for civilised life (tammaddun), the virtues of love and friendship and the manner of dealing with friends (mu'āsharat-bi-aṣdīqā). It also enumerates the manners to be observed before king and his companions, and the mode of transaction among the different classes of mankind (aṣnāf-i khalq). The discourse concludes on the wise utterances of Plato, that are supposed to have
been delivered by him to his pupil, Aristotle. It would not
be out of place to present a brief summary of this whole dis-
course, for it would enable us to have a better understanding
of Tusi's socio-political thought.

Human species, which is the noblest of all existent
beings in this universe, "needs the assistance of other
species and the co-operation of its own kind to ensure the
survival of the individuals as well as that of the race." But
such cooperation or assistance, which ensures the existence
of human race, is rendered possible only when people, living
within a particular locality are combined together. "Co-
operation without combination (ijtema'), says Tusi, 'is a
logical absurdity (muhmal)". The type combination, estab-
lished to secure co-operation, is called "civilized life"
(tamuddun). Man, being essentially a "city-dweller" (madani)
has been gifted with a natural yearning for synthesis (talif)
or combination (ijtema') which helps to evolve civilization
and culture (tahdhib-u-tamaddun). The natural yearning for
synthesis (talif) has been called by Tusi as "Love" (muhabbat)
which causes affection and fellow-beings and helps in resol-
vving the conflicts that are likely to tarnish the image of
co-operation and harmony in life. The blessed and felicitous
man (sa'eed) in his opinion, is one who spares no pains to win
the affection, love and sympathy of his fellows who are needed
in all circumstances: in prosperity as well as in adversity, for
company and assistance as well as consolation and sincere ad-
vice. To lag behind in winning friendship is to fall short
in the acquisition of blessing and felicity (sa'adah).
The farthest of men from virtues is one who passes his life away from civilized society in solitude and isolation. He remains devoid of virtuous accomplishments which can only be gained through the co-operation and assistance of fellow individuals in a civilized society. It is sheer tyranny (jaur) and injustice to turn aloof from leading a social life. To live in society is the natural urge of humanity. To forsake this natural yearning, therefore, is the greatest of all social evils.

Association is of different kinds. The first and simplest kind of association is that of the family (manzil). The second kind is that of the people living together in a particular locality (muḥallah). This is followed by the association of the inhabitants of a city. Next comes the association of big communities (umam-i-kabīr). And finally comes into existence the international association. For the normal functioning of all these kinds of association the help of an efficient agency is required. Such an agency is technically named as "government" (siyāsat). Every government should administer and manage the affairs of the state by the help of three agencies: (i) the Law (nāmūs), (ii) the Governor (ḥākim) and (iii) The Money (dīnār). Tusi divides government into two broad kinds, each having a purpose and a necessary consequences of its own. The first is called "accomplished government", also known as "Imamate"; its purpose is the perfection of man and its consequence the attainment of blessedness (saʿādah). The
second is called "un-accomplished government" which is also known as "domination" (taghallub); its purpose is to enslave the mankind, and its consequence to bring hardship and misery to the people. The governor (ra'īs) of the former kind of government holds fast to justice ('adālat), treats the people as friends, generates good values, such as, security, tranquillity, mutual affection, equity, continuence, graciousness and loyalty and the like, and tires his best to control his personal appetities, passions and desires. The governor of the latter kind of government, on the contrary, holds fast to tyranny (jaur) treats his subjects as slaves and servants ('ābid-u-khawāl), creates evils, such as, fear, disturbance, strife, inequity, dread, severity, deceit, treachery, tomfoolery and detraction and the like, and is overpowered by his lower desires and appetites. 167

Ṭūsī appears to have favoured a kingling type of government to administer the affairs of the state. He has, however, prescribed seven qualities for an ideal king whom he prefers to call "Imām". These are: (i) good descent; (ii) high ideals; (iii) sound and strong opinion; (iv) firm determination; (v) endurance of sufferings and adversities together with persistence in quest without getting languished; (vi) affluence; and finally the uprightness in choosing assistants. The King or Imām, adorned fully with these qualities is obliged to deal with his subjects affectionately and to devote himself to the maintenance of the rule
of law and justice in the state. The people should obey, Tusi advises, the commandments and prohibitions of such kings whole heartedly and should willingly as well as cheerfully discharge the duties assigned to them. They should observe allegiance to the Imam or the king both in times of war as well as in peace.

Like the division of government, Tusi classifies states broadly into two categories: The first is called the "accomplished state" (madinat-i fādilah) and the second the "un-accomplished state" (madinat-i ghair-i fādilah).

The accomplished state signifies an association of people who collectively aspire and make an effort towards the attainment of virtues and eradication of evils. In the midst of accomplished state many un-accomplished ones crop up which hold a status parralel to the weeds (nawabit) in the field.

The highest authority (riyāsat-i-ʿuzmā) in an accomplished state must be vested in a person who is endowed with the qualities of wisdom (ḥikmat), sound intellect (taʿaqqul-i tāmm), excellent powers of persuasion and imagination (jaudat-i iqna-wa-takhayyul) and the capacity of waging the holy war (quwat-i jihād). Such an authority is called the authority of Wisdom (riyāsat-i-ḥikmat). If a person endowed with the aforesaid qualities is not available, the authority should go to a committee or council consisting of four persons who should collectively possess the required qualities of a worthy head of an accomplished state. This
is called the authority of the erudites or the virtuous ones (riyāsat-i afāḍil). Thirdly, if the above two kinds of authority may not be available, the accomplished state should be administered by a person familiar with the "tradition" (Sunan) of the former heads of the States adorned with the above-mentioned qualities. This authority is called "the authority of the traditions (riyāsat-i-sunan). Finally, if the condition of being familiar with the traditions of the former rulers is not fulfilled by one person, the authority should be vested in a council or committee consisting of four persons at the most. This is called "the authority of the men of tradition", (siyāsat-i aṣḥāb-i sunnat). 171

The un-accomplished state (madinat-i ghair-ifadila) is of three types: (i) The "Ignorant state" (madinat-i-Jāhila), wherein the inhabitants, being devoid of their rational faculty are made to lead a civilized life on some other considerations; (ii) "The Impious state" (madinat-i fāsiqa) wherein the rational faculty of the citizens is not, however, set aside, but, somehow, rendered subservient to other faculties which stimulate men to lead a civilized life; (iii) "Errant state" (madinat-i ḍalla), the citizens of such state, because of their deficiency in the "reflective faculty" (quwat-i fikri), conceive laws suiting their own fancy, call it virtue, and base the civilized life upon such self-made injunction.172

After discussing the different kinds of un-accomplished association and state purely on Farabian pattern, Tūsī comes
to the analysis of the significance of "Imām". Imām, in his opinion, is the most perfect leader of humanity, and the "imāmate" the best possible institution to be brought in existence in every civilized society, for its welfare and well-being. Tūsī, being an exponent of the extreme Shi'ite faith, shows adherence to the greatest esoterics in the tradition of Islam, and accordingly, is believed to be a "heterodox Muslim" by some of his noted commentators. He sees revelation and legislation as necessary and even valid, but the choicest spirits (i.e., "imāms") are able to approach the Divine direct, through philosophy (ḥikmat) and ultimately through mystical institution. The diverse truths, he maintains, do not conflict because of being of common origin but they are hierarchically graded; and all creation is called to ascend the grades within the limitations of capacity. This ascent is the end of all existence and it is by reference to Man's potentially supreme elevation that his behaviour is to be determined. Tūsī has discussed in great details here and there in this discourse on the central problems of all religiously based societies. He analyses, precisely speaking, the relationship of revelation to the continuing and developing need for legislation and authority. He also offers a definition of, what is called in modern terminology, de jure, and emphasizes the practical necessity to harmonize de jure and de facto. These problems were assuredly of the greatest practical and personal concern to him, so as to make his theory of leadership (imāmate) quite explicit and rationally justified.
Towards the end of this discourse Tūsī reflects upon the mode of social intercourse among the different classes of mankind (aṣnāfī-khalq). All strata of human societies, whether, superior, or of equal status or inferior, should have intercourse, in short, on the basis of generosity, urbanity, and good faith, so that all men may have an increased desire for one another's friendship. Even enemies, whether near or distant, are to be accorded the courteous treatment (murawat) warm affection and politeness because such treatment removes or at least reduces the enmity and generates love and affection. It is, indeed, the best contrivance (tadbīr) to be employed in our practical life. Abuse, curse and disgrace against the enemies are extremely reprehensible acts and totally devoid of rational approach.¹⁷⁴

Similarly, the envious man (ḥāṣid), the clever persons (Sufahā) and the arrogant people (ahl-i takabbur) are to be accorded restrained, humble and courteous treatment. The weak should be given, says Tusi, a helping hand and mercy is to be bestowed upon them. The oppressed (muzlimān) should be given all possible aid and assistance to heal up their personal injuries. One should mingle, suggests Tūsī, "with men of virtues with the intention of drawing benefit from them". With bad neighbours and incompatible kinsmen one must display forebearance and employ tact and politeness.¹⁷⁵

The discourse concludes on such utterances, which are deemed to be precious gems for social dealings; some of them are as follows:
"Be not arrogant about your stock of things lying outside your possession. In doing good to the deserving, do not wait to be asked for, but take the initiative before the request. Do not take such person as wise who rejoices at any of the world's pleasures, or grieves at any of the world's misfortunes. Always be mindful of your death. Do not think ill of others; the moment one thinks ill of others, he adopts the evil path. Think thrice before you do anything. Love the humanity and control your anger."

"Be not conceited in your wealth, and do not expose yourself to the misfortunes of defeat and abasement. Deal with your friends in such a way that you may not be in need of any arbitrator (ḥākim); but in dealing with an enemy you should aim at success in arbitration. Do not blame your brother for your fault. Rejoin not in sloth, nor rely on fortune, nor regret good deeds. Jest with none. Be ever attentive and follow the course of justice and rectitude, adhering to good things so that you may attain fortune by the grace of God."

Analysing the present treatise of Tūsī in its historical perspective, it becomes clear that Tūsī was strongly influenced by the earlier Muslim scholars on ethics, economics and politics. The first discourse of this treatise, for instance, is mostly based on Miskawaih's Tahdhib al-Akhlāq, as he himself has clearly stated in the Preamble of this book alluding the special circumstances of its composition. The second discourse is his version of Ibn
Sīnā's Kitāb-al Siyāsat, which is devoted to ethics and economics, i.e., the regimen of the household. Tūsī himself has clearly indicated his indebtedness to Ibn Sīnā in the earlier part of this discourse. The last section which deals with the socio-political matters, similarly, appears to be profoundly influenced by al-Fārābī's "Madinat al-Fādila", "Kitāb-al-Siyāsat al-Madaniyah" and "al-Fūṣūl". His division of societies, classification of governments, and the kind of administration he visualizes for the State, all these show striking similarities to those of al-Fārābī. "The greater part of the present discourse', as Tūsī has himself acknowledged, 'is derived from the dicta and aphorisms of the second Philosophers, Abu Nasr Farabi.'

But Tūsī, in spite of being greatly indebted to these thinkers, was not, simply a translator from Arabic to Persian. He was well-versed in Plato's Republic and Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. Moreover, he is, undoubtedly, wider in scope and more rounded and coherent in arrangement, and his treatment of individual topics is both more developed and systematic. Tūsī, pointing out the worth of his book in its Preamble, says: "It is justified to note that my aim in writing this book is not only to present the translation of Miskawaih and other eminent philosophers but also to present my own original thought related to the topics dealt in this book."

Tūsī, on the side of the Mongol prince, Hulagu, crossed the greatest psychological watershed in Islamic civilization, playing a leading part in the Capture of
Baghdād and the extinction of the institution of Caliphate there. The work, seen in this particular historical perspective, has a special significance of its own and deserves to be studied on its own account. Further it is the work of Ṭūsī that in fact, motivated al-Dawwānī to compose his master piece work, Akhālāq-i Jalālī, which provides the basic material for the present thesis.