INTRODUCTION

I

GENERAL SURVEY OF SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

Social philosophy, comparatively in the recent times, has established its separate entity among the subjects of philosophical discipline. It has already acquired pretty definite meaning, and endeavours to traverse, practically, diverse fields of studies in its intellectual journey.

Social philosophy is the attempt by the philosophers to provide guidance and solutions in order to resolve problems about social process and its institutions. "It is a philosophic critique of social process with reference to the principles underlying social structure and functions." As an introductory definition, this statement serves to work out a field of enquiry, though it is admittedly somewhat vague and in need of refinement.

Philosophy is the key word requiring clarification in this definition. The meaning of philosophy is difficult to be conveyed in a brief phrase. It is derived from two Greek words, "philia" (love) and "sophia" (wisdom). Etymologically, it is simply defined as the "love of wisdom". Technically it means the understanding of the "first truths" like real, good, just, even truth itself, and the application of these first truths to the problems of life. Philosophers have been engaged in speculative, phenomenological, normative and analytic activities over the centuries. These four activities in a way describe the main concern of philosophy.
Social philosophy is often regarded to be basically concerning with normative or evaluative aspects of activity as it deals with values which have a close relation to the ideal of social good or of the welfare of humanity. As the philosophical critique of the principles underlying social process, social philosophy seeks to develop the arguments that justify political and social institutions, either as they actually are or as they are imagined to be. If the emphasis of a philosopher is primarily evaluative, social philosophy becomes for him a branch of ethics, which is the enquiry into the good. That is, since ethics or moral philosophy deals with the most general considerations of values, social philosophy is a matter of their application to the moral questions raised by the social order. On the other hand, if the philosopher's interest is in methods of enquiry and analysis of concepts, his social philosophy will be neutral towards value and will be directed rather towards clarification of terms and arguments. More speculative philosophers may try to combine these two apparently different but, in fact, inter-related interests. In any case, these approaches are alike in that they attempt to examine critically the arguments for justification of social institutions. In this sense, social philosophy is concerned with "principles underlying social process, real or ideal."

Again, philosophy, as distinguished from natural or social sciences, is an effort to view particular objects in relation to the whole within which they are included. In its largest aim, philosophy seeks to interpret the particular
facts and truths in the world of our experience as forming parts or aspects of a single universe or Cosmos. It helps us to "see life steadily and see it whole." Social philosophy, keeping in line with this philosophical tradition, ventures to focus its attention on the social unity of mankind and tries to analyse the significance of the special aspects of human life with particular reference to that unity. It takes into account all branches of human knowledge and every domain of man's experience in order to knit a well co-ordinate and co-herent system of social life from out of them. The "inspiration of the artists", the "vision of the mystics", the "social urge of the reformers", the "emotion of the politicians", the "passion of the moralists" the "facts revealed by the social sciences", the "convictions preached by the religions", the "investigations and discoveries made by the natural scientists", the "theoretical generalizations embodied in imaginative works of literature" and the "practical reflections made by the reputed writers, authors and poets" all are grist to the mill of social philosophy in its test of sustaining social strength and nourish social unity of mankind. Social philosophy teaches us to place the various ends of life in their right relations to each other. If educates us to regard the pursuit of wealth, the pursuit of political organization, the pursuit of aesthetic satisfaction, the pursuit of religious truths etc., not as a number of separate ambitions which one may choose and other may neglect, but as all essentially parts
of a single aim which no one can renounce without some degree ceasing to be human. To place all human pursuits in their right relations, to exhibit their significance as important elements in the effort 'to see life steadily and see it whole' is one of the main functions of social philosophy.

This "all-embracing" tendency of social philosophy strikes a departure from the modern trend and practice, current in almost every sphere of human knowledge. Today, we live in an age of specialists, an age in which success, whether in the theoretical or practical sphere, depends on concentration, on narrowing one's range of activities, and on working in lofty isolation being concerned only with a set number of abstractions. Every branch of knowledge therefore takes up for examination a particular class of objects, or a particular aspects of the object. This results in a narrowing down of approach for fuller grasp of some particular province of existence. Now such abstraction as this necessarily brings with it the danger that we may lose sight of the whole from which abstraction has been made. "It often happens in investigations", as Haffding puts it, "as it does to children with their toys. They take them to pieces to see what is hidden in them, and then are unable to put them together". Specialists' attitude is like a searchlight - the narrower and brighter the beam, the clearer it shows the objects on which it is focussed, but more certainly it banishes everything else into darkness. Accordingly we tend to be lop-sided
individuals, over-developed on one side, under-developed on others, our views of life distorted, one-sided, and out of focus. In dealing with complicated and living things, such as human society, the danger arising from the aspect of specialization is even greater and of graver consequences, for several reasons.

In the first place, while some facts can be isolated from their context without any serious distortion, the same cannot be done with facts of social life. The different aspects of a social situation and the different parts of the life of a society are so closely interwoven and interdependent that we cannot single out one factor without affecting others.

In the second place, the results of isolating social facts are liable to be not only false in theory, but mischievous in practice, too. For the social sciences are basically connected with the ways we live, our relations with each other and our behaviour towards one another. And, therefore, the conclusions at which they arrive, and the laws and principles which they formulate are apt to be taken as guide to action, and action if it is to be wise must take account of the total situation in which the action takes place and of the total consequences which flow from it.

In the third place, in a relatively stable society in which the context of a social situation may be taken for granted less harm might be done by not taking account of it, or, at any rate, by not calling attention to it.
But on the contrary we are living in an age of increasingly rapid change. We cannot hope to understand the changes which are taking place in one aspect of our society without taking account of their causes and conditions which may be found in other aspects than in those our science is concerned with, and we cannot guide the change properly without realizing their consequences upon other aspects of the total situation.

In view of these over-riding considerations, social philosophy makes a conscious effort, on its part, to go against the spirit of the modern age, and wages a war on intellectual front, by fighting the tendency of the specialists who are in the habit of partitioning the life of human society into many watertight compartments. But it does not mean that social philosophy, by adopting such an attitude, totally negates the utility of specialization. It, of course, suggests that it is essential for each branch of science to concentrate its attention and confine its activities to a limited sphere. Such concentration is a necessary condition for progress in their inquiries, and it is needed more, not less, provided that it does not isolate the particular aspect on which it concentrates from its context. We do not expect from such inquiries more than they can give us, or regard their conclusions without supplement or re-interpretation as a full and final account of the objects. We need all the facts that we can have related to every aspect of society, but side by side we are also in need of the facts about the functional
correction between its different aspects in order to establish their relative value in the harmonious functioning of our society. This task in our intellectual pursuits is performed by social philosophy. To break down the tendency of abstract isolations, to bring to light the unity in diversities, to try to see life as a whole and to make explicit the principles on which its broken fragments can be united and the differences can be reconciled, is the business of social philosophy. It insists that there are no purely economic, or purely legal, or purely psychological, or purely religious situations or activities. There are just ordinary human beings who enter upon such relations and engage themselves in such activities, human beings who are aware of themselves as being the persons involved in various relations and activities, and who, if they are to find peace of mind, have somehow to reconcile the requirements of the different spheres.

"The isolated sciences", says Mackenzie, "go, on the whole, straightforward, like conquering armies, in their intellectual battle; while social philosophy remains behind to take the bearing of the territories that have been won, and to bury the dead." It assumes the role of a kind of "Platonic Justice" among various sciences dealing with the abstract aspects of human society, setting each in its proper sphere, and teaching it to recognize what it can really accomplish and what lies beyond its limits.
As "a philosophic critique of social process", social philosophy attempts, as has been hinted above, to examine critically the arguments for justification of social institutions. This justification is, among other things, a recourse to principles that consistently support and illustrate the conclusions that are drawn or arrived at. Philosophers sometimes seek these principles in their theories of value, sometimes in methods of analytical clarification, and sometimes in both ethics and analysis. A really sound social philosophy, in fact, obtains justification of social process as well as of the principles underlying social structure and functions with reference to norms and values, critical appraisal and fair analysis.

Social philosophy, therefore, confines itself not merely to the analysis of facts but extends its range of activities to the study of ends, ideals, values, which society is trying to realize and ought to embody in its way of life. Social scientists, usually, hold the viewpoint that their main concern is with facts and truths, not with the human purposes and motives, while social philosophy aims at a highly balanced appraisal of all the facts and tendencies prevalent in the society in the light of a system of values. It seems to support the premise that purposes and ideals are operative factors in human individual conduct as well as in social organizations. Hence they cannot be brushed aside easily but deserve to be studied with equal importance. Society and institutions
have come into existence and continue to exist because men cherish certain ends and ideals, and therefore they cannot be explained without reference to these modes of existence. If we have to conceive or achieve a coherent and desirable way of life we must take account of both facts and values. We cannot reduce one to the other or dispense with either. Our most difficult problems are concerned with matters in which both are involved and our main difficulties today seem to arise from discrepancies in our values rather than from the ignorance of facts. Social philosophy, therefore, in dealing with various aspects of social life, considers facts about every phase of human society, and pays due attention to the study of the ends, ideals and values. Nothing, short of this, can provide the necessary corrective to the abstractions of the social sciences, or can provide a guide to social decisions whether they are to be taken by the ordinary man, the administrator or the Statesman.

"Professor Gainsberg has said that it is a sure sign of the immaturity of the social sciences that they can be used by rival politicians in defence of contradictory policies. It seems to me that however mature they become, as long as they continue to deal with abstract aspects of society and concern themselves only with facts they can continue to be so used."

Practical significance:

The importance of social philosophy with reference to our social life is more than merely theoretical. It
performs the function of co-ordination not only among the matters of theoretical interest but equally proves to be a reliable guide to our social activities by establishing a living synthesis of the different trends and tendencies which have practical impact upon the activities of the peoples of society. A synthesis of this kind, between thought and action, becomes more indispensable in our modern society which attaches a great importance to specialization and division of labour, an emphasis greater than ever before in the human history. We may describe the general condition of our modern society as one of tumultuous progress in every walk of life. On the one side, our industrial and technological researches have made enormous advances; on the other, our view of the world has broadened and deepened through our scientific progress. The result of all this growth has been in the main a marked improvement in the condition of nearly all groups of people and a very great improvement in our general outlook. But, at the same time, it has resulted in breaking a large number of traditional relationships which had been established among mankind. It has overthrown customs, and authorities and broken bonds of union. Society has passed from that state in which men stood in a fixed relation to one another, governed by authority and custom, to that in which ever changing relationships and ties come into being which are governed by the economic and other industrial factors. It has made life in many directions more chaotic and uncertain. It has
made men less dependent on narrow but definitely ascertainable and intelligible connections, and has made them more dependent on broad principles which are very difficult to be understood, thus difficult to be obeyed. It has replaced all the little unities of our former mode of life and has knit everything into a single whole, with a great deal of disorder and confusion resulting in the process. What is wanted, accordingly, is some principle which will enable us to bring about a more perfect and stable connection between the different organs of our society, to form new links and ties, so that man may no longer be slave of mechanical laws over which he has no control. "We have', says Mackenzie, 'to overcome individualism, on the one hand, and the growth of material condition, on the other."28

Such is the practical problem with which we find ourselves confronted at the present moment. And this is the central problem round which social philosophy revolves with all its logical vigour and rational vitality. A living contact between reason and faith, knowledge and devotion, science and religion, materialism and idealism, is to be worked out in the practical scheme of social philosophy in order to achieve in our social life a balanced integrity. It attempts to lead the world from war to peace, from strife to love, from the chaos of nationalism to the ideal of internationalism, all this by tempering down the purely scientific or materialistic outlook with the mixture of wisdom, compassion and oriental spirit of calm contemplation. What has been said, till now, may be summarized in these
words of Hobshouse "The function of social philosophy consists in setting before ourselves a conception of harmonious fulfilment of all human capacity as the substance of happy life and in inquiring into the conditions of its realization." 30

The Problems of Social Philosophy:

The basic theme of the social philosophy is the study of man. This study leads us to the conclusion that man, by his very nature, is a "social animal" partly of course, for the same reason that makes animals gregarious which is the simple instinct of preservation of life itself; but chiefly, because man is a progressive being, struggling always ahead to a higher life than the lower one. He cannot attain his ideal of a nobler life outside the society. The society with its multiple organizations creates opportunities for the individual to realise his objective or a higher and nobler existence.

Social philosophy, therefore, after analysis of the human nature, directs its course of discussion towards the exposition and interpretation of the terms like society, community, organization, and association. Dealing with these primary notions, it seems to concentrate its attention, in the main, on the question, in what sense and to what extent, can these modes of human relation be properly described as natural? If it is purely arbitrary or conventional, its study can be little more than an attempt to trace the external, variable, and, in a sense, accidental
circumstances by which its forms have been, from time to
time, determined. If, on the other hand, it is in its
essence natural, social philosophy tries to explain in
what sense it is natural, and what are the particular forms
to which its fundamental nature gives rise. Along with the
analysis of the natural basis of society, its conventional
aspects, and various other conceptions, basically attached
to it, such as the conception of a social contract, the
organic unity, the general will, common good, spiritual
unity and social differentiation, are also considered
closely by a student of social philosophy.

After the due consideration of these concepts, social
philosophy proceeds to discuss the various modes of social
association or different forms of social unity. Among them,
family, institution of marriage, educational institutions,
industrial institutions, economic institutions, cultural
institutions, nation, state, forms of government and other
governmental institutions hold the most prominent place.
In its study of state, social philosophy considers the
conceptions of justice, reward and punishment, and the
various ideals of social organization, such as liberty,
equality and fraternity.

Thus having examined these different forms of social
organizations in national, social philosophy extends its
field of study to the international problems, such as,
international relations, the problems of international
morality, practical significance of the international law,
fundamentals of international trade and the possibility of
promoting the good-will and co-existence among the nations of the world for creating an atmosphere of international peace, progress and prosperity.\textsuperscript{36}

The study of religion is also not neglected by social philosophy. In its treatment of religion, it analyses the practical utility of religious beliefs, and the significant role, played by great world religions towards the establishment of world peace and prosperity, and asks us to adopt a dynamic conception of religion which must be free from the elements of rigid dogmatism and baseless superstitions. It goes further, in its treatment of religion, to expound the ideal of international religion which may truly help in resolving all the petty differences and in realizing the ultimate good, the \textit{sumnum Bonum} of the entire human race.\textsuperscript{37}

The terms, culture and civilization, too, occupy their due place in social philosophy. It endeavours to make explicit the true significance of these widely spoken terms, points out the natural and conventional aspects that a culture tries to foster within its limits, and throws light upon the social significance that any culture assumes in society.\textsuperscript{36}

These topics, however, are, by no means, the exclusive domain of social philosophy. Various other fields of studies, such as politics, education, economics, law and sociology, too, are equally competent branches of inquiry to include these topics into their discussion. But the approach adopted
by these sciences, is quite different from that adopted by social philosophy. These sciences deal with the facts pertaining to these topics as they are, and adopt somewhat direct method, in the sense that the discussion in these realms of human inquiry is not conditioned by some pre-conceived notions. Social philosophy, on the contrary, not only imparts the norm of "ought", but also allows its discourse to be conditioned by certain primary, pre-conceived conceptions, ascertainable by philosophical analysis, especially by ontological and epistemological considerations. A social theory propounded by a thinker, who believes in the authenticity of "materialism" as the only valid explanation of the ultimate reality and who dogmatically affirms "empiricism as the only proper means of attaining true knowledge, would be totally different from that which has been propagated by a philosopher who is a staunch supporter of "Idealism" and "Rationalism". An existentialist approach to social philosophy, likewise, may not be similar in many respects to that of a pragmatic one. Again a logical positivist, evolving a philosophy of society, may be led to arrive at certain conclusions which might lack recognition from other champions of the same school of thought. Thus it is but obvious that epistemological as well as ontological considerations of a thinker have direct bearing upon his social thought.

This implies, logically, that any social philosophy which can be formulated at any given time is bound to be incomplete and thus lacks finality. Moreover, it can never
be applicable to all societies — the primitive tribe, the
city-state, the mediaeval community and the modern urban
industrial society. It, indeed, lacks finality and remains
incomplete, but it is, by no mean, fragmentary. It is not
the whole, yet the idea of whole always shines through it.
Each philosopher seeks, to some extent, to form a system
or to evolve a social theory, but the important thing about
the work of each philosopher is not the particular system
or theory which he formulates, but the way in which he
deepens our insight into conceptions, by bringing them into
relation with one another within his particular system.
What is important in the philosophy is their grasp of the
ideal unity of all social phenomena, and their effort to
interpret the various particular ideas with reference to it.
Social philosophy, in spite of all the fact that it lacks
finality and remains incomplete, helps understand the
nature of associative life or collective living, facilitates
apprehension of socio-political values, outlines the problem
of power and authority of the state, furnishes knowledge of
the agents of social control, i.e., law and rights, brings
out the characteristic features of socio-political obligation
and directs our attention toward fundamental understanding
of the inclusive ideal for society and its institutions
whose traditional name is justice. These are, in short,
the basic concerns of the social philosophy.

After the general survey of social philosophy, we
now revert to the main subject in our present study, "A
critical study of Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī's contribution
to social philosophy. We propose to initiate the study with a brief biography of al-Dawwani, his works and the sources of his social thought along with an account of its metaphysical foundations. The subsequent chapters, preceded by a brief historical survey of the social thought before al-Dawwani, will be devoted to the proper themes of his social philosophy, viz., virtues, pseudo-virtues and vices, maintenance of mental health, family and State. The study will conclude on a critical note on al-Dawwani's social philosophy.

II

AL-DAWWANI: HIS LIFE AND WORKS

Muhammad bin As'ad Jalāl al-Dīn, a celebrated Persian jurist, commentator, theologian and scholar, was born at the village of Dawwān (from which he derives his relation, i.e., 'nisbah', and hence is commonly known as 'Allāmah al-Dawwānī) near Kazarun, a district some fifty miles west of Shīrāz, the capital of the province of Fars, in 830/1427. He belonged to a well-off family. His father was a judge (Qādī) of Kazarun district and claimed to be a descendant of the first Caliph, Abū Bakr. Very little is known about his early life. Having received early education from his learned father and then from Mahjwī and Ḥassān bin B-aqqāl, he proceeded to study theology and religious education under the guidance of the two foremost scholars of that time, i.e., Mohyī al-Dīn Anṣārī and Ḥammām al-Dīn al-Shirāzī, where he ultimately
became professor at the "Orphans' College" (i.e., Madrasah al-aitām). In a very short span of time he became famous for his knowledge and learning, attracting students from far and wide. Ibn al-'Imād, a historian of that time, states that the students visited him from as far as Transoxiana and Turkey, and this, in fact, was not surprising; for his commentaries on the Arab philosophers and theologians exhibit a rare gift of clear exposition. It was in recognition of his literary and academic fame that he got admission into the Court of Hassan Beg Khan Bahadur, commonly known as Uzun Hassan (d. 1478), the then Turkish ruler of Mesopotamia and Persia. Sultan Uzun Hassan, the most eminent ruler of the "White Sheep" dynasty (Aq-oğulunlu) in Western Persia, is noted to have extended a generous patronage to the distinguished men of letters and scholarship. It was under the generous patronage of this Sultan that al-Dawwānī wrote his literary and philosophical works. He ultimately rose to the eminent position of the Qādi of the Court, which he retained under Sultan Ya'qub, the son of Uzun Hassan as well. He died in 907/1501 or 908/1502, and was buried in his native village, Dawwan. Ibn al-'Imād inexplicably puts the year of his death in the year 1522 A.D. but none of the distinguished scholars of Muslim philosophy and literature seems to have accepted it as historically true.

The age of al-Dawwānī was the critical phase of Iranian Civilization. The second half of the 15th Century in which he lived, was one of those chaotic and anarchical periods in Persian history, in which the death of one great
conqueror and empire builder was followed by another. It includes the rise of the Uzbek power in Transoxiana; the gradual decay and disruption of the vast empire built by Timur at such a huge cost of blood and suffering; the successive domination of two Turkman dynasties known as the "Black Sheep" and "White Sheep" (Qara-quoyunlu and Aq-quoyunlu); and the appearance and triumph of the Safavids, the greatest of modern Persian dynasties, who may be regarded in a sense of the builder or the restorer of the recent Persian national sentiment.

After the collapse of Timurid dynasty, the city of Shiraz, fell a prey to the ambitions of neighbouring powers and knew little peace. Further, the Safawids presented a continued threat. Their power, organized by Shâh Ismâ'il, whose adventures of empire building were carried out with great ruthlessness and cruelty, succeeded finally in the complete overthrow of the rule of princes, especially that of the 'Black' and 'white' sheep', dynasties. This led to the establishment of the succeeding Safavid dynasty. In this period of political chaos, when the princes and rulers were waging wars against each other for establishing their supremacy being quite oblivious of their subjects' interests and welfare, there arose a man of great eminence and distinction. This was no other person than Uzun Hassan of the "White Sheep" dynasty in whose royal court al-Dawwâni got admission by virtue of his rare scholarship. Under the patronage of this prince who was the lover of Scholarships and Arts, he tried to revive the tradition of philosophical disciplines during
the chaotic and anarchical Ottoman period of the Iranian civilization. He is known to have reoriented the study of Shihâb al-Dîn Maqtûl, the most noted Sufi philosopher of his time, by writing a commentary on his remarkable book, Hiyâkal-i-Nur, and elaborating his illuminative philosophy (Hikmat-i-ishrâq) in his philosophical writings.

Strangely enough, al-Dawwânî is sometimes alleged to have been converted to Imamite Shi'ite. But so far as the history of the beginning of his academic pursuits goes, he certainly started his career of scholarship, remarked M.M. Watt, in his recent book, Islamic Surveys I, devoting especially to the study of Islamic Philosophy and theology, as an earnest Asharite Thinker. His writings are free from Shi'ite dogmas. Moreover, his famous treatise namely, Tarh 'Aqâ'id-i-'Ajudiyyah bears testimony to the fact that he was never in sympathy with Shi'ite doctrines. It is a commentary on the Creed of Al-Ijî, explicitly supporting the imamate of Abu Bakr, from whose family his father, as we know, claimed himself to have descended. Akhlâq-i-Jalâlî, the source book of his social philosophy, is absolutely free from the slightest taint of Shi'ite faith. He did use the words "Imâm" or "imamate", in this book as well as in his other philosophical writings, but never in the same sense in which it is understood by an Imamite Shi'ite. He made use of the terms 'imâm' or 'imamate' simply to designate a rightful King who happened to be the true Viceregent of God on this earth, or a righteous government which precisely stood for a theocratic state administered
by a rightful Imam in accordance with the Shari'ah of Islam respectively.

al-Dawwānī, says, A.J. Arberry, "is one of the most productive authors Jumāt aever produced". Numerous works by him are extant on philosophical, theological and mystical subjects, including commentaries on some of the famous works of his time. Brockelmann has enumerated seventy of his extant works, of which the important ones are listed below.

1. Sharh 'Aqā'id 'Aqūdīyyah - an article on the imamate of the Second Caliph of Islam, ʿUmar. The article has been published in 1817 at Istanbul.


3. al-Zaufa' Cairo, 1326/1908 - a metaphysical treatise, which contains a critical evaluation of Kalam and of the teachings of the spiritual leaders, the philosophers, and the mystic from the illuminative (Iṣḥāqī) point of view.

4. Risālah fi ithbāt al-wājib al-qa-dimah wa-al-Jaḏīdīan -- a treatise, as it is obvious from its title, on metaphysical considerations as regards the problems of the existence of God.

5. Risālah fi Tahqīq Nafs al-amr-- a dissertation on the problems of soul, as the command of God.

8. Risālah fi al-ḥikmah — a treatise on philosophical wisdom and problems of philosophical implication.
9. Sharh al-Ḥayākal — a philosophical commentary on Shihāb al-Ḥāfażī's treatise namely, Ḥiyakal-i-
Nūr, which earned him a good name and reputation as a faithful suharewādi.
10. Muntahaj al-‘Ulūm — a work on the benefits, categories and characteristic of sciences.
11. Masa’il al-'Iṣr fi al-Kalām — treatise on the philosophical problems of that time.
12. Aklāq-i-Jalālī, properly entitled, "Iyāmī. I-Iṣārāt fi Makārim -i-Aklāq — an ethical digest composed between A.D. 1467 and 1477, and dedicated to Sulṭān Uzun 'Hassan of the 'Aqqāmil" or the "White sheep" dynasty, who provided all opportunities to the author to bring out his rare scholarship in the form of this remarkable book.

Among his philosophical writings, Aklāq-i-Jalālī deserves special consideration and offers an important and fruitful field for research. It is, of course, one of the best known ethical digests to be composed in Persia, if not in medieval Islam. However, eminent and sublime may have been the reputation of his tradition and academic accomplishments, he is certainly known to posterity by virtue of this book alone. It is unanimously acknowledged as the masterpiece.
of al-Dawwānī's scholarship. It has undoubtedly imparted immortality to him as an outstanding thinker of his time.

Akhlaq-i Jalālī is the principal source of al-Dawwānī's social philosophy. This marvellous book stands as a significant contribution to the growth and development of Social thought in Islam. This outstanding book which has earned its author a good deal of name and reputation is not, however, the original production of his mind nor is it claimed to be such by him. The foundation of al-Dawwānī's social system appears to be greatly borrowed from his predecessors, such as al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, Miskawāh and Tūsī, the great social political thinkers of Islam. Moreover, the design of the superstructure of the book, Akhlaq-i Jalālī is particularly more or less the same as that of his immediate predecessor's book, Akhlaq-i Naṣīrī of Naṣīruddīn Tūsī. It seems, therefore, necessary to keep in mind the growth and development of social thought in Islam made before al-Dawwānī in order to have a clear insight into the sources of his social philosophy.

al-Fārābī is the pioneer thinker in Islam who included social problems into his philosophical discourses. He, for the first time, touched upon socio-political matters with authority and wrote several treatises, devoted exclusively to some of the genuine problems of social philosophy. He laid the foundation of social criticism and the majority of the subsequent Muslim thinkers appear to have been greatly influenced by his social thought. Ibn Miskawāh, the successor of al-Fārābī, mainly pre-occupied with moral thought, has incorporated some of the social ideals of al-Fārābī into his
ethical system. In his monumental book, known as "Tahdhib-al-Akhlaq", Miskawaih has discussed various social problems at length which form essential ingredients of his ethical philosophy. The later eminent Muslim philosophers, especially, Ibn Sīnā, (Avicenna), Ibn Bajjā (Avempace) and Ibn Rushd (Averroes) discussed socio-political problems, raised by al-Fārābī, not separately, but only as parts of their general philosophy. It was, however, Naṣiruddin Tūsī (1201-1274 A.D.) who achieved the distinction of producing a separate work on moral, intellectual and social themes in Persian in the year 633 A.H/1235 A.D. Inspired by the philosophical achievements of the early Muslim thinkers, particularly, al-Fārābī, Miskawaih and Ibn Sīnā, Tūsī wrote the book, 'Akhlaq-i-Nāsiri' which, in fact, is very close to the aims and objectives of social philosophy. The book is basically concerned with the study of human behaviour at the individual or personal, the domestic or economic, and the political or social levels. He has studied in the book all these aspects of human behaviour in a systematically integrated and a highly co-ordinated fashion, always preserving its organic unity.

al-Dawwānī, with whom the proposed study is concerned, appears to have been greatly influenced by Naṣiruddin Tūsī's philosophical accomplishment. The former seems to have constructed his social thought upon the thought-process of the latter. al-Dawwānī's Akhlāq-i-Jalālī bears very striking resemblance to that of Tūsī's Akhlāq-i-Nāsiri, both
in structure and content, form and matter, letters and spirits. But it would be, however, highly misleading to conclude that al-Dawwānī has merely reproduced Tūsī's views in a copy-book-fashion. Akhlāq-i-Jalālī can by no means, be regarded as simply the "edition" of Tūsī's Akhlāq-ı-Nāṣīri. al-Dawwānī, in composing Akhlāq-i-Jalālī, has skilfully analysed the treatise of Tūsī, who has liberally assimilated Platonic and Aristotelian ideas. After its proper analysis he, with remarkable success, summarized Tusi's treatise, and, in doing so, very intelligently re-moulded it in the pattern of traditional Islam in his capacity as a theologian and jurist. "al-Dawwānī", says Rosenthal, 'separated from Tusi by two centuries and great changes in the political and spiritual climate of the Muslim world, writes as an eclectic harmonizer in a fluent, easy style and succeeds in making philosophy respectable and presentable as part of a pleasant, interesting mixture of traditional beliefs and convictions, with appropriate quotations from Qurān and Ḥadīth and suitable sayings from Plato and Aristotle.'

al-Dawwānī's approach in propounding his social convictions and norms is highly synthetic in spirit. His originality lies in making an intelligent application of the existing social ideals of the day by incorporating them into his own system as well as in integrating apparently different attitudes and opinions, theses and their antitheses, into a constructive synthesis. He makes a conscious endeavour on his part to bring an effective synthesis of
Greek ideas as interpreted by early Muslim philosophers, especially, al-Fārābī, Miskawalh, Ibn Sīnā and Ṭūsī, and of the traditional Islamic thought illustrated in Qurān and Ḥadīth. He has, in fact, achieved in his most celebrated book, Akhlāq-i-Jalālī, a harmonious blending of philosophy and tradition, and has succeeded in affecting a sound integration of the Hellenic ideals together with purely Islamic doctrines. Akhlāq-i-Jalālī, seen in this perspective, comes as a significant modification of Ṭūsī's thought and is a definite advance over it. It certainly accords him, at any rate, a right claim to be considered as occupying a highly distinguished position in the study of social thought in Islam.

al-Dawwānī's social thought, in its completely worked-out form, is a study of human life as a whole. He is primarily concerned in his work, "Akhlāq-i-Jalālī", with the criteria of human behaviour first at individual or personal level where man is seen as an integral part of the creation being responsible to the creator; secondly at the domestic or family level, where he operates as an active member of the family and of other sub-political as well as economic units; and finally at the political or social level, where he becomes, individually and by way of the higher groupings, an organic member of the city-community, of a State and even of an empire. "The object of this book", says al-Dawwānī, is to ascertain the principle of practical philosophy, which means the knowledge
of the nature of human mind in so far as it may give rise to good or bad actions by way of voluntary process. On account of that knowledge one may purge himself of vices and equip his personality with virtues to arrive at the perfection sought for. The book, in other words, contains practical instructions for the human being for his individual, domestic and political aspects of life. But— in keeping with medieval attitudes in general, which is not acceptable to the modern mind— he does not treat these different aspects of human experience individually, i.e., in broken fragments or from a purely pragmatic standpoint. He admits no disparity between the rules laid down for the guidance of man's conduct, and the rules guiding the course of planets, and the laws of mathematics: all are interdependent, absolute, real and right. Similarly, he believes that theory must always precede practice, otherwise harmony and unity between thought and action is liable to be demolished. A profound thought must effectively be translated into practice, this is the central theme of al-Dawwānī's social philosophy. He reviews the whole process of life and thought in an authentic "ledger-book" summation. He is not inhuman and fanatic who would sacrifice all men to a system, emphasizing only certain aspects of their total nature. He focuses his attention on the "social unity of mankind and tries to analyse the significance of the special aspects of human life with particular reference to that unity." In his remarkable work, Akhlāq-i-Jalālī, al-Dawwānī makes a conscious effort to place the
various ends of human life in their right relations to each other. He teaches therein to regard "the pursuit of wealth, the pursuit of virtue, the pursuit of knowledge and wisdom, the pursuit of culture, the pursuit of political organization, the pursuit of aesthetic satisfaction, the pursuit of religious truths, not as separate ambitions which one may choose and other may neglect, but as all essentially parts of a single aim, which no one can renounce without ceasing to be human in some degree".

Unfortunately no systematic attempt has been made so far to introduce him to the modern world. No critical and thorough analytical work exists on al-Dawwānī's social philosophy, particularly for English-speaking readers. An attempt was made by W.F. Thompson in 1839 to translate Akhlaq-i-Jalālī of al-Dawwānī into English entitled "Practical Philosophy of Muhammadan People". But this translation is not a complete one. After the comparison of the translation with the original, it becomes clear that the translator often paraphrased and left out the long passages.

A thorough philosophical assessment of his work with special emphasis on his social ideas is, therefore, highly desirable.

The present study is an attempt to fulfil this need. It is planned to make a critical exposition of al-Dawwani's social philosophy. It further attempts to trace the origin of his various concepts and make explicit
the reorientation that he has given to them. Finally, it wants to bring out into limelight those advancements which have been made by al-Dawwānī over his predecessors' social thought. Thus the present proposed study will not only bring about the contribution of a great Muslim social thinker of the medieval Islam, but also will help in understanding the course of development of Muslim social thought and its philosophical accomplishments.

III

Metaphysical Foundations of al-Dawwānī's Social Philosophy

al-Dawwānī's social philosophy is deeply rooted in his metaphysics. Many of his ethico-social ideals are simple deductions from his standpoint regarding God, Soul Universe and Man. His Akhlāq-i-Jalālī opens with a discussion on the nature and function of the soul that provides the psychological basis for an elaborate treatment of character, virtue and happiness, individual as well as social. Besides, some of the ideas underlying his metaphysics, and notions implicit in his theory of knowledge assume, however, no less effective role in the exposition of his social philosophy. We propose, therefore, to outline in this section a brief sketch of the metaphysical foundations of al-Dawwānī's social philosophy.

G O D

God, in the opinion of al-Dawwānī is the first Being. He is the self-caused, and everything else is
Caused by Him. He is the creator of all the exists. He is the sustainer and mover and the ultimate Cause of all life and motion. His, causality, however, should not be understood in a purely mechanical way. He ordains the affairs of the Universe according to His absolutely free will, desire and knowledge. Although the act of God, the absolute bestower (jawwād-i-muṭlaq) and the true creator (fā'al-i-barḥaq), is not actuated by any end or design, yet it is not devoid of purpose and ends. All goodness flows from Him; He is the source not only of all existence but of all goodness also. Everything comes from Him and returns to Him. He regulates the affairs of the Universe in the best possible ways according to His own will, which is nothing but a pure and absolute good.

al-Dawānī lays great stress on the unity of God. God is, in his opinion, simple, indivisible and indeterminate, since every determination would be contrary to His absolute Unity. He is to be understood as the sole-existent, the ultimate ground of all being, and the only self-sustaining reality. Yet He possesses the fullness of beings; all the attributes mentioned in the Quran inhere in Him, only the modality of this inherence is rationally unknowable. We, should, however, understand that all His attributes are spiritual in nature. He is perfect goodness and perfect beauty, the supreme object of love. He is the light of lights, the eternal wisdom, the creative truth, but above all He is the eternal will.
al-Dawwānī also emphasizes the transcendent aspect of God. He is exalted beyond the limitations of space and time, for He is the creator of space and time. He was before time and space were. But He is also immanent in this spatio-temporal order. His eternal wisdom and supreme beauty manifest themselves through the wonders and glory of His creation. His eternal will is in action throughout the universe, it is in the swing of the sun and the moon and in the alteration of day and night. Everywhere around is the touch and working of God. al-Dawwānī's God is not strictly the absolute of the philosophers who is bleak and cold, but a personal God, a living God. He desires intercourse with His creatures and makes it possible for them to enter into fellowship with Himself through prayer and contemplation, and above all, through the gift of mystical gnosis. 65

al-Dawwānī's metaphysical treatise is a critical evaluation of Kalām and of the teachings of the spiritual leaders, the philosophers, and the mystics, from the illuminative (ishrāqī) point of view. He fully appreciates the utility and importance of the first three disciplines (i.e., Kalām, the teaching of the spiritual leaders and the philosophers) but takes a serious notice of the inconsistency with Islam of some of the issues raised by them. He believes that philosophy and mysticism both ultimately lead to the same goal, yet he cannot shut his eyes to the eminence and superiority of the latter over the former. Mysticism, in his view, is free from doubt and uncertainty
because it is due to divine grace and is, therefore, nearer to prophethood.

**Cosmology:**

Universe, according to al-Dawwānī, is the creation of God. Everything, he maintains, is the creation of the Absolute Maker, (Ṣānī), the intelligence or the soul being no exceptions. He further believes that creation is "ex-nihilo". Whether the world is eternal (qadīm) or was created by God out of nothing, i.e., ex nihilo (ḥādīth), is one of the most vexing problems of Muslim philosophy. Aristotle advocated the eternity of the world, attributing the motion to the creation of God, the Prime Mover. Ibn Miskawaih agreed with Aristotle in regarding God as the creator of motion but, unlike him, reasoned out that the world, both in its form and matter, was created by God ex nihilo. al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā did not deny that God is an eternal creator of the Universe, but as true Aristotelians, believed that God's activity consists merely in bringing forth in the state of actuality the virtual possibilities inherent in the prime matter which is considered to be co-eternal with Him. This was in conformity with the Aristotelian notion of change not as a passage from non-being into being, which would make it unintelligible, but as a process by which what is merely "potential being" passes over, through "form" into "actual being." So God as eternal creator constantly combines matter with new forms. He did not create the Universe out of sheer
nothingness at a definite time in the past. As a corollary they believed in the infinity of time as well. Tūsī tried to affect a half-hearted reconciliation between Aristotle's doctrine of the eternity of the world and the doctrine of creation of the world by God ex nihilo. He initiated the process of reconciliation by criticising the doctrine of "creatio ex nihilo". The view that there was a time when the world did not exist and then God created before the creation of the world means that His creative power was still a potentiality which was actualised later, and this was a downright denial of his eternal creativity. Logically, therefore, God was always a creator which implied the existence of creation or world with Him. The world, in other words, is co-eternal with God. Here Tūsī closed the discussion abruptly with the remark that the world is eternal by the power of God who perfects it, but in its own right and power, it was created (muhdath). In a later work, Fusul, Tūsī altogether abandoned the above partially reconciled position and supported the orthodox doctrine of creatio ex nihilo without any reservation. al-Ghazālī, charging the philosophers with infidelity on three special Counts, viz., (i) eternity of the world; (ii) denial of God's knowledge of the particulars, and (iii) denial of bodily resurrection, firmly held the position that the world was created by God out of absolute nothingness at a certain moment in the past which is at a finite interval
from the present. He created not only forms but also
matter and time along-with them which had a definite
beginning and hence are finite.\textsuperscript{72}

al-Dawwānī’s views as regards the creation of the
Universe are quite akin to those of al-Ghazālī. He con­
siders the eternity of the Universe to be the most per­
nicious thesis of the philosophers. He does not agree
with the philosopher’s contention of the eternity of the
world, for with him there is nothing eternal but God, all
else is created (ḥādīth). To make anything co-eternal with
God is to violate, in his opinion, the strict principle
of monotheism, for that infringes upon the absoluteness
and infinity of God and reduces Him to the position of an
artificer: a Demiurge. Virtually, the doctrine leads one
to the materialists’ position that the world is an indepen­
dent universe, a self-subsistent system, which develops
by itself, and can be understood by itself. All this was
hard to be digested by al-Dawwānī who was engaged in out­
lining a social system based on purely Qurānic ideals.
Like al-Ghazālī, he believes that this Universe is the
creation of God, who has created it absolutely out of
nothing, creatio ex nihilo, at a particular time. Classi­
fying Being into the necessary and the possible, he argues
that the possible depends for its existence on the necessary,
and since it exists by other than itself, it cannot be
assumed to be in a state of existence, for the creation of
the already existent is logically absurd and impossible.
And that which is not in existence is non-existent, and so
the necessary Being creates the possible absolutely out of nothing, such a process is called creation, and the existent, the created (muhâdath). Again, in al-Zawâ, al-Dawwânî blows up the theory of Creation out of necessity, and believes that the phenomenon of creation is, indeed, the free act of God. 73

al-Dawwânî's cosmology consists of the gradual creation of ten intellects, nine spheres, four elements, and three kingdoms of nature. The active intellect, the intellect of the sphere of the moon, bridges the gap between the heaven and the earth. Like Ibn Sînâ and others, he fully adheres to the Neo-Platonic principle that from one nothing can proceed except one, i.e., from one only one can proceed. Following this principle he ventures to explain the order of the creation of being -- the intelligence, the soul, the spheres and the world -- that proceeds from the Necessary Being, purely after the familiar fashion of the Neoplatonic theory of Emanation.

The intelligence is the first creation of God, everything else is created through its agency.

From thinking by first intelligence of God flows another intelligence. By virtue of thinking of itself as possible in itself flow the matter and the form of the "first heaven or sphere", because every sphere has its specific form which is its soul. In this way, the chain of creation goes on so as to complete the ten intelligences and nine spheres and their respective nine souls. The tenth and last intelligence, or agent intellect, is that which
governs the sublunary world. From this intelligence flows the human souls and the four elements which are fundamental constituents of this world.  

Quoting the Prophets' saying that intellect is the noblest of all created phenomena, al-Dawwānī identifies the first intellect (‘aql-i awwal) with the original essence of Muhammad. Aql-i awwal conceives the idea of all things past, present and future just as seed potentially contains roots, branches, leaves and fruits. The spheres which are stationary in nature, but changeable in qualities, control the destiny of the material world. Fresh situations came into being through the revolutions of the spheres, and every moment the active intellect causes a new form into existence to reflect itself in the mirror of elemental matter. Passing through the mineral, vegetative, and animal statues, the first intellect finally appears in the form of acquired intellect (‘aql-i mustafād) in man, and thus the highest point having coalesced with the lowest, the circle of being is completed by the two arches of ascent and descent.

The first intellect is like seed which, having sprouted into twigs, branches, and fruit, reverts to its original form of unity possessing collective potentiality. This circular process takes the form of motion (ḥarkat-i waḍaʿī) in growing bodies, of increasing or decreasing their magnitude, and in the rational soul that of the movement of thought. All these motions are, in fact, Shadows of the divine motion proceeding from God's love for self-expression, which in mystic terminology is called the flashing of self upon self.
It need not be emphasized further that the entire Universe is the creation of God. To Him is due the primal origin of everything that exists in the Universe. The universe, therefore, is an organic unity, i.e., from inanimate bodies to higher spiritual beings, from the strata of earth to the topmost surface of the nine heavens or spheres, all is one whole, like an organism composed of different parts. It may, however, be broadly divided into two wholes. One is the world of becoming and corruption in which we live; the other is that which is almost free from degeneration and change, like the Universe of heavens and planets.

The world of becoming, the material world which is the abode of human beings, is composed of four primary elements, air, water, fire and earth. These primary elements receive forms from the Universal soul in order to shape themselves into bodies. They form the first stage or the first point from which the circle of beings in this world starts. It consists in the appearance of new forms which flow from the Universal soul and distinguishes itself into the kingdoms of being mineral, vegetative and animal. The vegetative state is decidedly superior to the mineral state, it consists in displaying new powers of assimilation, growth, expansion in space, excretion of waste material and reproduction. In the appearance of animal state nature takes another great step forward in the evolution of life. Animals first develop their power of appetitie, then their
power of anger and lastly their power of sensation. The next most significant appearance is man, and the phenomenon that distinguishes him from other animals consists in the power of discrimination and reason.

In fact the whole process is the progressive realization of reason. The active form behind the process is the soul or the first intelligence. In non-human beings it is unconscious and sleeping, in man and super-human beings it is conscious, that is, rational.

This assertion has a great significance, for al-Dawwānī's ethico-social system. The most distinctive feature of man is his reason; which forms his essence. All other powers of man assume, indeed, quite important position in the development of his personality, but they are excluded from his real essence. They may be a condition of, or serve as a means for, the realization of his true essence, but they cannot constitute a part of his true good. Even the empirical knowledge that is gained through the senses - a phenomenon common to animals - cannot strictly be an essential element of the real human felicity (Sa'ādah).

The second important point is that though the end of man is the realization of his reason, yet he cannot attain to it except through progressive discipline of his appetites, anger and senses. He cannot succeed in seeking realization of his reason without at first cultivating moral excellences, for the discipline of the body precedes the enlightenment or illumination of the soul. The third point is that it provides us with a scale of values. Although the ultimate