The imperial grant of Chauth and Sardeshmukhi was a great triumph for Balaji Vishvanath. It was a formal recognition of Raja Shahu's claims to leadership against his rival, Sambhaji II, who had recently sustained defeat at Warāna near Wadgaon in 1719. It raised his status and established his position in Maharashtra. The Peshwa had by his diplomatic skill, integrity and courage, secured for Shahu the alliance of two powerful ministers (the Saiyids brothers) at the imperial court, the cooperation of several Maratha chiefs, the financial help of bankers and the service of a strong army. "He succeeded in cutting a new path out of a vicious circle of civil war and stagnation."

But the circumstances under which the Emperor had been forced to issue the Farman to this effect had changed. Nizamul Mulk was most hostile to the Marathas, and after the fall of the Saiyid brothers, resolved to nullify the grants which had been obtained under duress, and therefore had no legal validity. The grants were moreover a direct challenge to his authority in the Deccan and their mutual and family struggle were a source of constant threat to the peace of the land.

Baji Rao, who succeeded his father as Peshwa on 17th April, 1720, was, on the otherhand, determined not only to weaken the power of Nizamul Mulk but bring Gujarat and Malwa under his sway. Ambitious and shrewd, Baji Rao "united the

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enterprise, vigor and hardihood of a Maratha chief with the polished manners, the sagacity and address which frequently distinguished the Brahmins of the Concon." He well realised that Mughal power was slowly crumbling away and if he could strike against it he would have the support of the people, and the internal troubles would be terminated by diverting the attention of local army leaders and leading them on the path of glory.

According to Dr. Raghubir Singh, the main cause of Maratha invasion of Malwa was economic. "The Peshwa was deep in debt, and he wanted money to pay it off. It was not possible for him to realise huge sums at home or in the Deccan, because the Nizam would not allow further encroachments on his own territories. Thus, the province of the Mughal Empire appeared to be the only places whence money could be forthcoming. Gujrat and Malwa were nearest to the Deccan, but the former had been dominated by the Maratha general, Debhade, which left Malwa alone to the Peshwa." The Peshwa had put this policy in very clear terms. He wrote to Chimaji when he left Poona to invade Malwa, "The sum and substance of the whole thing is to follow a policy by which debts may end, and permanent arrangements be made for the future." After Chimaji's success against Girdhar Bahadur, Baji Rao wrote to his brother, "Go roaming about wherever you like, but bring money somehow or the other."

2. Malwa in Transition, P. 188.
Even after establishing their hold in Malwa, the Peshwa was not keen to keep it under his control and administer it directly. Thus economic pressure and domestic troubles made the Maratha leader to look elsewhere for the solution of problems with which the Poona State was now confronted. "Such a policy could not be consistent with the idea of establishing Hindu-Pad-Padshahi, nor could it be expected of men leading a holy war against the Muslim powers." The later conflict of the Marathas with the Rajputs, their raids against non-muslim population, the devastation and massacre accompanying them, militate against such an ideal.

Gujarat.

This province had long been subject to the ravages of Maratha military adventurers. The deadly civil contests between Hamid Ali Khan and Shujaat Ali Khan had resulted in the armed intervention of the Marathas who spread over the land and perpetrated wanton cruelties. Towns and villages were harried and burnt, their inhabitants slain or driven away. The Emperor appointed Sarbuland Khan as the new governor of Gujrat and declared that he would himself march against the enemies. One Karor of rupees as subsidy was granted and the Rajput chiefs and the Saiyids of Barha were ordered to assist the governor in the forthcoming campaign. But neither the Emperor came out, nor was the money paid in full as had been promised.

3. Mirat-ul-Haqaiq, f. 333. (a)
Sarbuland Khan received only fifty lakhs, and waited to get the balance for 8 or 9 months in the neighbourhood of Delhi. With army of 15 thousand horse, 15 thousand foot, he, however, started from Delhi and reached Ahmedabad on the 16th December, 1725.

Raja Shahu, in pursuance of the expansionist policy, had divided the spheres of influence among his principal officers. Malwa was assigned to Peshwa Baji Roa and Gujrat to Senapati Debhade. But the Peshwa, jealous of the growing power of the Senapati, his rival, attempted to execute an arduous undertaking of establishing his foothold in Gujrat. Their mutual dissensions culminated in armed struggle which dragged on for four years, 1726-30. Each of them strove to oust the other from the province and at the sametime secure the right of collecting dues from the governor. After 1726 their invasions were aimed not so much against the governor as against each other; their clashes with Sarbuland Khan were intended to compel him to pay Chauth. If one succeeded in receiving grants of Chauth and Sardeshmukhi, the other would invade the province, spread destruction in every direction, and ultimately force the governor to yield to his demands. The confused state of affairs continued till the Senapati was crushed by the Peshwa.

Sarbuland Khan had neither the firmness of mind nor the diplomatic skill to play off the Maratha chiefs against each other. Inspite of his resources in men and money, his operations were ineffective against the guerilla tactics of the Marathas. In the cold weather of 1727-28 he was visited by

1. Mirat-ul-Haqaiq. f. 333(a); f. 349(a)
the Senapati's agents and the disputes connected with the Chauth were settled. About the same time the province was invaded by the Peshwa himself. Again, in 1729 the province was invaded by Chimaji Appa with a picked force on behalf of Peshwa. The governor in his eagerness to save the imperial authority from total collapse and establish a stable peace in Gujrat, agreed to conclude peace with the agents of the Peshwa on 23rd March, 1730. These terms were as follows:

1. Sardeshmukhi or ten percent of the whole revenue both from land and customs dues with the exception of the fort of Surat and the district around it, and the Chauth or one fourth of the whole collections on the land and customs, excepting Surat and five percent on the revenue of the city of Ahmedabad, were granted to the Peshwa.

2. It was stipulated in the deeds that for these cessians the Peshwa was to maintain 2,500 horse for keeping peace in the province.

3. No more than two or three persons were to be placed in each district to collect the Maratha dues.

4. No extra demands whatever were to be made from the ryots, and every assistance was to be given to maintain Imperial authority. The Peshwa was bound on the part of Shahu Raja to prevent Maratha subjects from siding with or in any way supporting disaffected zamindars or other disturbers of public peace in the Mughal dominion.

The treaty of March 1730 was a heavy blow to the prestige

   S.P.D. XXX, pp. 295-96.
3. S.P.D. XV. pp. 82-84, 86.
and fortune of Trimbak Rao Dabhade who had succeeded his father in the office of Senapati in January, 1730, on his death in September, 1729. The young commander of the Raja's forces first appealed to the Raja to redress his grievances. Seeing no hope from this quarter he took recourse to the sword, but was killed in battle on 1st April, 1731. With his fall, the Peshwa became dominant in the affairs of Gujrat.

From the very outset Sarbuland Khan was anxious to secure money by all means. Despite the monetary help given by the centre he was in desperate need of money. He led punitive expeditions from time to time into Wadhwa, Islamnagar, Mandu and even into Kutch. Even individuals were forced to pay money under threats of being insulted in public. The bankers and gold merchants of Ahmedabad paid him five lakhs of rupees. He imposed taxes on the trading community of Bohras, who were driven by his measures into an abortive revolt. They had risen to a man to oppose his orders, but the governor was able with the help of the army to impose a fine. The revenues from Bharoch amounting to fifty thousand of rupees were seized. He had occupied and turned to his own use, all the parganas assigned in Jagir to nobles and Courtiers at Delhi. When complaints were made to the Emperor, he deprived him of his Jagirs

1. The zamindar of Wadnagar paid him three lakhs of rupees as a fine for his resistance, and again in 1721 one lakh more besides the fixed dues. The Jam of Islamnagar gave him three lakhs of rupees. Lal, a zamindar of Mandu paid him 20 lakhs of rupees, and he secured from Puhandar and Chhaya 125,000 rupees. Mirat-ul-Ahmedi, pp. 94,98,99,111-112.

2. Khushal Chand, a rich merchant and Nagar Seth, was replaced by Ganga Das, and imprisoned. Under threat that he would be paraded through the streets of the town with ignominy, 60 thousand of rupees were taken from him. Mirat-ul-Ahmedi, p. 92. M.H.f.449(a)

3. Mirat-ul-Haqaiq, f. 374(b)

in the Punjab and parcelled the same amongst those who had
suffered at his hands. Inspite of all this vast sum of money
he had thus accumulated, his army was ever discontented due
to the non-payment of their salaries. One day, Khwaja Hashim,
a Jamadar, came to him with a drawn sword with the intention
of killing him, but Sarbuland Khan also took up his spear and
confronted him. His guards, however, softened his anger and
took him away from the presence of the governor who also
retired. Saiyed Jamal Ali Khan and Saiyed Ali and other officers also pressed the governor for the money. The following
verse was on their lips:

( The soldier of Sarbuland is far off from his home; Alive, he
has no bread, dead, he is without a winding sheet). His army
was composed of heterogenous elements - Gujratis, Saiyids, Arabs,
Mughals and Rajputs - who were always at dagger's drawn, and
opposed the people. Added to all these difficulties, the Kolis
were creating disturbances. Such was the fear of their night
attacks that orders were issued in Surat that no one should go
outside the city after sunset.

Muhammad Shah now dismissed him, and on the suggestion of
Khan-i-Dauran, Raja Abhay Singh of Jodhpur was appointed
governor of Gujrat in 1730. He was granted Rs 18 lakhs and given
50 canon of various sizes, together with a robe of honour and
gifts. At the head of 25 thousand soldiers, well trained and

1. Mirat-ul-Haqaiq, p. 464(b)
2. Mirat-ul-Haqaiq,ff.458(a),464(a)
well-equipped, the Maharaj marched from Jodhpur to Ahmedabad. Reaching there he found the dismissed governor fully armed to resist his peaceful entry into the city. A fierce battle followed, in which the two forces suffered heavy losses. Sarbuland Khan, however, left the city, after accepting one lakh of rupees.

The first thing the Raja did was to accept terms of peace offered by the Peshwa. He agreed to pay Rs 13 lakhs in lieu of Chauth, Rs 6 lakhs were paid by the governor at once and the rest was promised to be paid in parts. Nevertheless, he could not get peace out of this agreement. Ahmedabad was invaded and besieged by the Marathas, and he was so much harassed and put to hardships, that he in the end, agreed to pay Rs 80,000 from the revenues of the city in addition to the Chauth and sardeshmukhi of the province. Raja Abhay Singh, finding any further resistance against Marathas futile, left the province, making Ratan Singh Bhandari as his deputy.

In 1737 Abhay Singh was replaced by Momin Khan as governor of Gujrat. Momin Khan met the same difficulty in taking charge of the provincial government as his two predecessors, Sarbuland Khan and Abhay Singh had faced. Ratan Singh Bhandari refused

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   Reu. pp. 136-143. (Abhay Singh's letter dealing with his war against Sarbuland Khan). According to it the Raja had received 15 lakhs cash, 40 guns, 200 maunds of gunpowder and 100 maunds of lead.
to leave the province without fighting, and the new governor had to call Damaji for aid against him. Momin Khan agreed to cede half of the revenues of the whole province to the Maratha chief as the price of his support. The allied troops laid siege to Ahmadabad and though Bhandari resisted for six months, the capital was occupied by the victors on 26th May, 1737. After that Gujrat remained under the control of the Maratha, and last vestiges of the Mughal rule disappeared with the capture of Ahmadabad in 1753.

Malwa.

The early Maratha incursions during the closing years of Alamgir's reign (1699-1707) were intended to obstruct the free passage of Mughal armies, treasures, and provisions through the province of Malwa. Tarabai, after the death of Raja Ram, in March, 1700, as a regent of her minor son, Shivaji, took vigorous measures for ravaging the imperial territories and sent armies to plunder towns and villages not only in the Deccan but in Malwa as well. But the Marathas, because of the Emperor's vigilance, could not penetrate into the province and gain a footing there. Though Tarabai failed to execute her scheme of expansion, her activities directly contributed to the increase of Maratha raids into Malwa. The Marathas, unmindful of past disappointments, and undaunted by future fears, continued ravaging the province and gathering spoils from towns and villages. The imperialists, however, kept the Marathas at bay, and successfully stopped their expansion northward. Further, Husain Ali Khan's alliance with Raja Shahu saved Malwa from being ruined by their destructive armies.

for sometime.

But the instability of the imperial government and palace revolutions encouraged the Marathas to once again extend their incursions northwards. The Peshwa had assigned to himself Malwa, prosperous in agriculture, and rich in industry, and a link between the north and the south. If this province was annexed, it would be easier to strike at Ahmedabad in the south, and pierce the heart of the Empire in the north. As it was a paying possession too, enormous collection of dues would flow to the relife of Raja Shabu who was in financial troubles at that time. Baji Rao parcelled out the province among his own confidents and issued orders to generals of Poona to assist them in the collection of dues. The generals marched into Malwa in 1726, and employed themselves in the work of securing money. But they were opposed by Daya Bahadur, governor of Malwa, who ousted them empty handed. Raja Shabu had requested the governor not to interfere in their activities. But the governor did not yield either to pursuasion or the display of force, and when they came next year, they fared no better than previously.

Now the Peshwa resolved to take a more vigorous action against the governor of the province. Early in 1728, a formidable army was equipped by Baji Rao for the invasion of Malwa, and its supreme command was assigned to Chimaji Appa. On 25th November they crossed Narmada and passing through Mandu Ghat

2. S.P.D.XXX, p.269.
5. S.P.D.XIII, 6-9, Ajaib, No.180. ff.66(b), 67(a)
reached Nalch on 27th of November. Girdhar Bahadur who first lay encamped near Amjhara set out on November 29, for Dhar suspecting that they might have ascended the hills near Mandu. But before he could reach the place he was overtaken by the Marathas rendering him unable to arrange his forces in battle order. A battle was fought between the two armies, in which both Girdhar Bahadur and Daya Bahadur lost their lives. The Mughal army fled pellmell leaving their whole baggage to be pillaged by the victors. "The effect of this victory was great. The Mughal offensive ended and the Marathas found Malwa totally defenceless. The moral effect of this defeat was disastrous and the local princes, zamindars and others felt the utter weakness of Mughal rule."

Chimaji, the hero of Amjhara, after three days of battle moved from the place and reached Ujjain in December 19, and tried to capture it by storm. But it was defended by Bhawani Ram, the son of the late governor, who had raised new forces, and gathered sufficient provisions. After a siege of one month and five days, Chimaji, after gaining nothing left the place and halted at Kaliyadab. He had been advised by his brother, Baji Rao, to devote himself to the business of collections in Ujjain and the rest of the province, and confiscate all jagirs

1. S.P.D.XXX, 55.
   Ajaib, Nos. 182, 201, ff.3(a), 69(a), 79(b).
   Ajaib, Nos. 182, 184, 189, ff.6, 70, 71.
of Girdhar Bahadur. According to the instructions, dues were 
collected and he returned to Poona on 4th May, 1729.

Bhawani Ram faced numerous difficulties. He had no money 
to pay the salaries of his fresh recruits, and without having considerable army, protection of the province was not possible. The sum of two lakhs of rupees given by the Emperor had been run out. His father's jagirs as promised by the government had not been restored, nor the money was coming from the land, as the zamindars were doubtful of his position. As a result the army mutinued and attacked him when he was at Kaliyadab, but he succeeded in routing the rebels. Najmuddin Ali Khan, who had been recalled from Gurjat and sent to Malwa to support Bhawani Ram by the government, could not pull on with the governor and attempted to oust him, though he failed in his aim. Under these conditions the work of defence could not be executed properly. On charges of inefficiency, Muhammad Shah dismissed him, and appointed Raja Jai Singh as the new governor in November, 1729. Raj Jai Singh was given Rs 13 lakhs for the maintenance of his army.

Just after his arrival in Malwa, he had to fight the Marathas who had captured Mandu in the last week of November, 1729. But peace was made and Mandu was handed back to the Raja. The Emperor now thought of making peace with the Marathas, and instructed Raja Jai Singh to open negotiation. The Raja sent

Dip Singh as his envoy to the Court of Raja Shahu to discuss the terms. Dipt Singh promised a subsidy of Rs 11 laksh a year for Malwa if Narmada was not crossed by the Marathas. But before the agreement could be ratified, Raja Jai Singh was replaced by Muhammad Khan Bangash in September, 1730.

He was promised an advance of Rs 60 lakhs, and an army of 8,200 horse and 2,500 foot was placed at his disposal. On January 15, 1731, Muhammad Khan reached the neighbourhood of Sarangpur, fifty two miles north-east of Ujjain, but before the imperial forces could enter the town, they were overtaken by Malhar Rao Holkar and Anand Rao Pawar. The Marathas, nevertheless, soon fled like crows on seeing a bow. In October, 1731, huge herdes of Marathas aggregating to one lakh horse, under Chimaji and Holkar invaded Malwa. The governor, finding himself in a perilous position, made peace with the invaders by sending presents to their leaders. The Marathas returned to the south. From the very outset Muhammad Khan had to face a difficult situation. He had exhausted all his means to meet the requirements of the campaign against the Marathas and local zamindars. Unrest had arisen in the army due to the non-payment of the salaries. Inspite of his repeated requests to the Court, no assistance was given to him. What he got at last was a letter of dismissal. There were three distinct causes of his disgrace. First, 

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2. Ibid. Letter to Samsanud Daulah - Letter No.1,f.40(a)
4. Ibid. f.41(a)
of the jagirdars in Malwa, persons who were influential in
the palace, secondly, the attack on Chattar Singh of Narwar
who was the protege of the enpich Khidmatgar Khan and others,
and thirdly, the friendship which had sprung up between the
governor and Nizamul Mulk."

On September 28, 1732, the Emperor appointed Swai Jai
Singh as the governor of Malwa. He started from Jaipur on
October 20, and reached Ujjain in December. When he was at
Mandsaur in February, 1733, Holkar and Sindhia surrounded
him, and intercepted all supplies of food, fodder and water.
Having neither the will nor the strength to fight, the Raja
sued for peace and offered 6 lakhs of rupees, but Holkar
demanded more. As a result, a severe engagement ensued in
which both suffered losses, but in the end Jai Singh was
forced to make peace with the raiders. He promised to pay
Rs 6 lakhs in cash, and to cede 28 parganas in lieu of Chauth.
After this defeat he left for Jaipur, and never took serious
notice of the coming doom of the province.

Raja Jai Singh had assumed cold neutrality and insti-
gated the Marathas to invade Malwa. Muhammad Shah could not
dismiss him lest he might incur the displeasure of Khan-i-
Dauran, his foremost friend at the Court. Recently the
corrupt clique of Kokiji, after holding mastery over the
Emperor's mind and thereby controlling the affairs of the
Government for thirteen years, had been extirpated due to their

1. Irvine - p. 255 (Vol II).
2. Khajist-i-Klam - Letter to Qaim Khan, f. 53(a).
own folly and sordidness. Samsa-ud-Daulah had now become the Emperor's evil genius. As a leader of Indian party, opposed to that of the Turanis, Samsa-ud-Daulah sought alliance with Raja Jai Singh, who was trying to carve out an independent kingdom for himself. The shrewd Raja found in the Amirul Umra a fit person to push his interest at the Court, while at the same time, he befriended the Marathas. He thought that on account of his alliance with Baji Rao, the Marathas would not disturb him in the execution of his grand scheme. He convinced Khan-i-Dauran that the Maratha aggression could not be resisted by force, it would be better to buy them off and leave the work of restoring peace and order in Agra and Malwa into his hands. The Amirul-Umra desired friendship of Raja Jai Singh, the most influential and powerful of the Rajput chiefs to counterpoise against the Mughals, and prevent the Emperor from inclining towards them for consultation and support. Destitute in quantities of statesmanship and military ardour, organisation and resourcefulness, he began to play into the hands of the Raja, who secured through him high offices and enormous riches, which he spend in bribing the Marathas and increase his strength. On the suggestion of the Raja, Samsam-ud-Daulah advocated policy of friendship with the aggressors. This desire for a policy of conciliation was not inspired by national interest, but was due to his ease-loving and slothful nature and jealousy of other Mughal officers who might overshadow his influence. "It was Raja Jai Singh who had persuaded Baji Rao to attack Girdhar Bahadur and

1. Ashob. p. 137.
when the faithful governor died fighting in the Emperor's service, he wrote to Nand Lal Mandoli who "had rendered hearty assistance" to Chimaji, "You have defended our religion in Malwa, and crushed the Muslinsans, establishing Dharma. You have fulfilled my desire." The contemporary writers have severely condemned the disloyalty of these officers. Warid bitterly wrote that in the past one hundred Hindustani soldiers were sufficient to beat two thousand Marathas. Their women and children, fearing of the Indian army, did not pass one night at one place, always wandering from one place to the other in dismay. But now the tide has turned and things have changed. The Emperor confined himself in the fort which he thought to be a safe refuge from all dangers. Whenever reports of Maratha incursions in Malwa and Gujrat were communicated to the Emperor, he would forthwith visit the gardens or go out hunting inorder to forget the paralysing fear. The only Turani leader of some influence was Qamaruddin Khan Itmadu-u-Daulah, the Wazir, and the son of the late Muhammad Amin Khan. He was, however, steeped in debauch. He loved peaceful life and shunned all serious business. He

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2. Shah-Namah-i-Deccan.

Warid gives the following account of Raja Jai Singh's inacti­vity and negligence." For 12 years he had been governor of Agra, and for 4 or 5 years governor of Malwa. From the gates of Delhi to the banks of Narmada he was in supreme authority. But inspite of all the disorder around him, the Raja supported by the court influence of Samsam-ud-Daulah, sat calmly and did nothing, though he possessed an army of 30,000 horses, and a still larger number of matchlockmen. Several times in previous years the Raja had received from Muhammad Shah large sums, as much as thirty lakhs or twenty lakhs, it is said, for payment to the Marathas. Half would be paid to them and half retained by the Raja; the Marathas then went home and Jai Singh returned to his own state. After two or three years of this procedure, the Marathas began to expect their 'breakfast' and every time grew more speedier and avaricious." Warid pp.680-81. (Irvine p.278 Vol.II.)
never exerted himself, never thought of improving the condition of the government, nor, like his intriguing father, did he form cliques to dominate others, although he favoured and supported the Mughals.

Muhammad Shah now decided to send another expedition against the Marathas. It was proposed that the Wazir, Saadat Khan and Muhammad Khan Bangash should march into Malwa against the Marathas. Muhammad Khan Bangash exerted himself in the province but was forced to sue for peace. The Wazir who had gone to Bundelkhand fought on February 3, 1736, a pitched battle with the Marathas and defeated them. Khan-i-Dauran and Raja Jai Singh again showed criminal negligence in facing the Marathas. They entrenched themselves at the Toda Tank and suffered a blockade by Holkar and other Maratha leaders.

On the invitation of Raja Jai Singh, the Peshwa left Deccan in October, 1735. Passing through Malwa and subduing several places, he reached Udaipur, where the Rana received him with great ceremony. He promised to pay a tribute of one and a half lakh of rupees, but refused to cede any part of his country. Meanwhile the Raja of Jaipur, had sent his Diwan, Ayamal, with cash, jewellery, horses and one elephant valued at five lakhs of rupees, and invited the Peshwa to come to Jaipur. On 4th March, the Peshwa met Raja Jai Singh, and discussed terms of peace with Wijahat Ali Khan, sent by Khan-i-Dauran for this purpose. Raja Jai Singh proposed a grant of 20 lakhs in cash,

2. S.P.D.XXIX, 39.
3. S.P.D.XIV, 42.
and a jagir of 40 lakhs in Malwa, which might be assigned on the principality of Dost Muhammad Khan.

The Peshwa offered to the Raja his own terms:

1. "The grants of the Subedari of Malwa and that of its entire territories, excluding the parts held directly by the Emperor, the lands of jagirs and grants of rent free lands and daily allowances.

2. A cash payment of Rs 13 lakhs for his expenses of war to be paid in three instalments. Rs 5 lakhs when Pilaji goes to the Court to settle the peace treaty; Rs 5 lakhs after the autumn harvest; Rs 4 lakhs after the spring harvest.

3. The Nagar of 6 lakhs of rupees to the Emperor in return for the grant of Sardeshpandai rights in the 6 Subahs, to be paid only after the country is brought under control."

These terms were presented by Wijahat Ali Khan and Yadgar Kashmiri before the Emperor, who granted them, and appointed Baji Rao the deputy governor of Malwa on May 1736. The Peshwa who was waiting the result of the negotiations at Sironj left Malwa for the South. On September 29, 1736, Muhammad Shah issued an imperial Farman by which Baji Rao was honoured with a Jagir, a mansab of 7 thousand, the Mahals of his Waton and right to perquisites, robes of honour and jewellery, while his brother Chimaji was made a Mansabdar of 5 thousand. He was asked to come to Delhi and take his Rs 15 lakhs.

This supine policy exposed the Emperor's weakness and
enhanced the presumptuousness of Baji Rao. He came to Malwa during the rains of 1736, and sent a new list of his demands. He claimed:

1. "That the governorship of the Province of Malwa, with all the states connected with it, to be given as jagir to the Peshwa.

2. Expulsion of Yar Muhammad Khan and Izzat Khan from their estate with the aid of the Imperial forces and the grant of their principalities to Baji Rao.

3. A jagir of 50 lakhs a year in the six Deccan subahs to the Peshwa. These subahs should be transferred in the name of the Emperor's son and Baji Rao be asked to act for the absentee governor. Half of the dues collected by Baji Rao in the Deccan, for the Emperor, to be granted to Baji Rao.

4. The kingdom of Tanjori be given to Raja Shahu.

5. Grant of for$t$ of Mandu, Dhar and Raisin in Malwa to Peshwa for keeping his family in them.

6. All the territories of the Chambal to be given to the Peshwa in jagir on the explicit term that various rules of the various states within that area would not be harassed, if they submitted and paid their tributes.

7. A sum of ₹ 15 lakhs to be paid immediately from the Bengal treasury to help the Peshwa to pay off some of his huge debts.

8. The holy places of Prayag, Benares, Gaya and Mathura to be given in jagir to the Peshwa.

9. All the arrangements in the Deccan to be made through the Peshwa.

10. Baji Rao agreed to go to Agra, whence he should be con-
conducted by Jai Singh and Munir Khan and presented to the Emperor during a ride. Soon after he should be given leave to return home.

These extraordinary demands were refused by the Emperor who again decided to renew hostilities. When the demands of the Peshwa were rejected by the Emperor, another formidable attack on northern India was planned by the Poona Court. Raja Jai Singh informed the Peshwa that without some extreme action the Imperial Court would not accept his new demands. Baji Rao, fearing no resistance in Malwa and Bundelkhand, and realizing utter unfitness of the Imperial forces and their generals, resolved to invade the heart of the Empire with his huge armies. At the head of fifty thousand horse, he left Poona on 12th November, 1736, crossed Narmada, penetrating through Malwa, descended on Bhopal and received five lakhs of rupees from Yar Muhammad Khan. Thence he boldly marched into Bundelkhand, and reduced the zamindars of that region.

The Emperor directed the Wazir and Mir Bakshi to march against the enemy. Raja Jai Singh and Raja Abhay Singh in response to the Emperor’s orders, marched out from their respective headquarters, and Saadat Khan also hastened towards Agra inorder to effect junction with them. The Peshwa remained calm and inorder to prevent this junction of Imperial forces, he sent his principal officers to range the land across the Jumna.

2. S.P.D.XXX, 192, XV, 93.
3. S.P.D.XV, 47.
The Marathas swooped down on Shikohabad, exacted 1,50,000 rupees as tribute from Lal Jiu Khatri and reduced Firozabad and Itamadpur. Their progress was, however, arrested by Burhan-ul-Mulk and his nephew Mansur Ali Khan, who had reached there with a force of fifty thousand horse. On 23rd March, 1737, they routed and inflicted on Marathas heavy loss of life. Saadat Khan resumed his march westward to join Samsam-ud-Daulah who had arrived at Mathura with 25,000 horsemen, artillery and numerous elephants. Muhammad Khan Bangash, was also there with a contingent of about 12 thousand men. Saadat Khan celebrated his recent triumph there and was complemented by the Emperor. Baji Rao in order to revive the morale of his army decided in his own words "to teach the Emperor a wholesome lesson by letting him know that Holkar and (Vithoji) Bule were still alive. Two ways "wrote he" were open to me, to attack Saadat Khan and destroy him; or fall upon Delhi itself and burn its outlying parts. But Saadat Khan would not venture out from Agra. So I took the latter course. Sending his heavy baggage into Bundelkhand and avoiding the Delhi Agra road, where he feared he would be overtaken by the imperial forces, passed through the unfamiliar country of the Jats and the Mewatis, and covering ten days journey in two days and nights, he appeared at the gates of Delhi on 28th March, 1737. The imperial troops, under Mir Hasan, advanced against the enemy and defeated them. When the Mughals pursued the Marathas, their leaders Hokdar and Jadhav encircled the pursuers and routed them with heavy loss of life. The Peshwa hearing the approach of Qamruddin Khan left the

1. Tarikh-i-Hind, p. 538.
2. B.S.C. letter No. 27.
left the city at midnight. At Badshapur he, however, had to face the Wazir's force. In an indecisive encounter the Marathas were defeated and put to flight but they were not pursued.

After that no effort was made to drive out the Marathas from Malwa. It was only in the year 1737, that Nizamul Mulk, after joining the central service, launched an offensive against the enemy. He was given one Karor of rupees for the army. About the middle of December, Nizamul Mulk, with 70 thousand horse, 180 cannon drawn by elephants, and 3,000 camels carrying rockets and other equipment arrived near Bhopal. The Peshwa also reached there with 80,000 horsemen, while Chimaji Appa took up a position on the Tapti with ten thousand horse.

The Nawab, instead of attacking the Marathas, entrenched himself in the neighbourhood of the fort with a tank in his rear and a rivulet in his front and prepared to defend himself against the Marathas. This was a tactical mistake; the Marathas assumed the offensive. The Marathas surrounded the imperial camp, stopped all supplies of food and fodder coming in and reduced the imperialists to great straits. Nizamul Mulk, opened negotiations through his agent Anand Rao Sumant with the Peshwa on December 24, 1737. While discussions were going on between the representatives of two parties, Nizamul Mulk moved out and with his artillery he succeeded in entering the fort of Bhopal only to be besieged again by them. The condition of the garrison

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2. S.P.D. XV, 56-57.
grew desperate as time passed on. Neither Muhammad Shah answered his appeals for help, nor did Nasir Jung come out. Nizamul Mulk sent Ayamal of Jaipur, Said Lashkar Khan and Anwarullah Khan to the Maratha camp and on January 6, 1738, Nizamul Mulk accepted the following terms:-

1. "Grant of the whole of Malwa to the Peshwa.
2. Grant of complete sovereignty of the territories between the Narmada and the Chambal.
3. A promise by the Nizam to obtain confirmation of this peace from the Emperor.
4. A promise to use his best endeavour to get a sum of 50 lakhs from the Emperor to pay for Baji Rao's expenses.  

Nizamul Mulk reached Delhi ingloriously in April, 1737.  

"The victory of Bhopal marks the zenith of the Peshwa's career. He accomplished the conquest of Malwa..., and announced the birth of the new imperial power."

Chattar Sal, son of Champat, was a soldier of fortune. Following the example of his father and inspired by Shivaji, he raised the standard of revolt in the reign of Alamgir, and persisted in that rebellious conduct up to his death. He defeated several government officials sent against him. Alamgir's long absence in the south weakened the royal authority in the north providing opportunities to local chiefs to increase their power. In the 40th year of his reign he joined the imperial service, but after four years abandoned it and left Deccan for his home. In the next year (1707) Nawab Firoz Jung obtained his reinstatement with the rank of 4,000. He returned home

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1. S.P.D.XV, 66.
2. Digha, p. 149.
and on the accession of Bahadur Shah sent his sons to wait on
the Emperor when he was marching to Deccan against Khan Baksh.
Throughout his reign he remained loyal to Bahadur Shah. During
the reign of Farrukh-Siyar he was raised to high favours. He
defeated the Marathas in cooperation with Raja Jai Singh. On
the 21st June, 1714, he secured the mansab of 6,000 zat (4,000
horse) and on the 3rd May, 1718, three of his sons and several
grandsons attended the court and received rewards.

During the early years of Muhammad Shah's reign, Chhatar
Sal remained quiet. Later he was driven into revolt by the
encroachments of Muhammad Khan Gangash on his territories. The
Afghan chief had been appointed governor of Allahabad on 25th
December, 1720. His jagirs lay in Bundelkhand. Personal
interests as well as imperial interests required the reduction
of areas now under the possession of the Bundela leader. Chhatar
Sal refused to surrender the hard won gains, and hostilities
ensued.

Muhammad Khan Bangash appointed Dilair Khan to establish
the imperial authority in the land. The Bundelas rose to a man

2. As a reward of his distinguished services in the battle of
Hasanpur, Muhammad Khan received a Khilat, 7 lakhs of rupees
in cash, the title of Ghanzafar Jung, and two parganas of
Bhojpur and Shamshabad, along with the Subedari of Allahabad.
Tarikh-i-Farrukhabad.p.34.
3. Dilair Khan was the adopted son and chela of Muhammad Khan.
He had fought for him in many campaigns and had impressed
him by his loyalty and valour. In this contest he fought with
only one thousand against an army of forty thousand. Though
he perished in the end, his enemies admired his courage and
gallantry. He was styled for his bravery as Surma "Brave."
Tarikh-i-Farrukhabad.p.34. Tarikh-i-Lauh. (F.30(a).
to resist him; and they ousted the Afghans from Kalpi and Jalalpur. Dair Khan with five hundred of his soldiers was killed in a severe battle fought on 25th May, 1721. After sometime, Muhammad Khan Bangash set himself to restore order in the disturbed area and within a period of one year and four months, he brought the Bundela chief to his knees, although he had to fight against heavy odds. After the capture of Ijoli in pargana Moheba, Chatter Sal fled away, his troops were scattered, and he himself took shelter in the fort of Moheba itself. But in the next round Moheba was also reduced, and at last in June 1728 the Bangash chief laid siege to Jaitpur, the last stronghold of the Bundelas. Throughout the rainy season the investment continued with relentless pressure. Chatter Sal sent appeals for help in vain, and in the end (December, 1728) he surrendered the place to the enemy. Chatter Sal surrendered himself and his family into the hands of the Mughal Subedar, who detained him in his camp for three or four months waiting for instructions from the court; where officers hostile to Muhammad Khan secretly advised the rebels to continue struggle and in desperation the Bundela chief applied to the Marathas for assistance.

The Peshwa readily agreed to support the Bundelas with his army. Taking leave of Raja Shahu on 27th November Baji Rao, at the head of 25,000 horse, advanced through Berar and reached Moheba, where he was received on 10th March by Bharti

1. Ibid.
2. Tarikh-i-Farrukhabad. @ pp.37-38.

Khajista-i-Kalam - Arzdashat No.2 ---- 3 ff(5-8)
Singh, the son of Chattar Sal. His arrival infused a new spirit of confidence among other Bundela chiefs, who joined his standard. On March 19, the allied troops of the Bundelas and the Marathas, marched to Jaitpur, where Muhammad Khan with only 15,000 men lay encamped. When the enemy was sighted at a distance of 20 miles, he atonce started preparations for defence and letters were sent to Delhi for reinforcement.

The enemy blockaded the Afghan camp. All supplies of food and fodder were completely cut off and the Afghans began to experience the hardships of starvation. On 25th March, Muhammad Khan issued forth, but was compelled by the besiegers to fall back. His son, Qaim Khan, who was at Tarabwan, hearing his father's difficulties, marched up to Supa, 12 miles north-east of Jaitpur, but was repulsed by the Marathas, all his baggage and supplies fell into their hands. Availing of this diversion, Muhammad Khan escaped into the fort of Jaitpur which was surrounded by the Marathas. From the fort, Muhammad Khan sent appeals to the court for immediate succour. The Emperor ordered Khan-i-Dauran to march to the assistance of the beleagured governor. "Full of intrigue, and deceipt and excuses, he every evening put off his start to the morning, and every morning put it off until the evening." As a result no reinforcement reached Muhammad Khan. Luckily for Muhammad Khan with the rainy season an epidemic broke out in the Maratha camp. Baji Rao atonce raised the seige, left Jaitpur on 23rd May and reached Poona on 16th July. The seige, however, continued for another three

months. Reduced to extremities, Muhammad Khan agreed "not to attack the Bundelas again and content himself with the tribute they formerly paid."

Thus the imperial cause in Bundelkhand was lost by the inactivity of the monarch and the factions of the nobles. The Marathas gained a footing in the land of the Bundelas by timely assistance to them in the hour of danger. Chattar Sal rendered his grateful thanks to Baji Rao by giving him a jagir worth of Rs 2,25000, and a fort in the neighbourhood of Jhansi, and adopted him as his son, and when he died on 14th December, 1731, one third of his territories were added to his former acquisitions.

"From Bundelkhand it was easy to exercise a check upon the Rajputs in the west, to descend in a moment into the Duab and Oudh to the north and advance to Benaras, Patna and even Bengal to the east." After one year of Chattar Sal's death, the Peshwa sent his brother to collect tribute from the chiefs of Orcha, Datia, Narwar and Bhadawar with a view of consolidating Maratha hold in Bundelkhand. In October, 1732, Chimaji reached Bundel-Khan, obtained the money equalent to the revenues (two lakhs and twenty five thousand) of jagir bestowed by the deceased Raja; his sons Jagat Raj and Hirdesa submitted to the Maratha power and handed over the charge of the fort of Rajgarh, and promised to assist them against the imperial forces. This opened the way to the north to the Marathas.

Irvine, p 240.
Dighe, p. 108.
2. Grant Duff, p. 421.
Maratha Incursions on the Eastern Provinces.

1. Aliwardi Khan, deputy governor of Bihar, a man of daring enterprise, valour, inordinately ambitious and unfaithful, overthrew Sarfraz Khan (Ala-ud-Daulah Haider Jung), the governor of Bengal in the battle of Ghari (10th April, 1740) and became the master of three provinces, after obtaining royal recognition by bribing the Emperor profusely. But he was not destined to enjoy power and peace for he had soon to face the Marathas. Raguji Bhonsle, was approached by the relations of the deceased Nawab Sarfraz Khan, who had taken refuge in the south after the latter's downfall. The former sent his prime minister Bhaskar Ram at the head of 20000 cavalry, commanded by 23 generals, to overrun the territories. Bhaskar, penetrating through Orissa reached Bardwan, and inflicted heavy losses of life and property on Ali Wardi Khan. He then sacked Murshidabad and occupied Houghli fort without much opposition. As a result, the whole of western Bengal passed into the hands of the enemy who established their headquarters at Katwa and from there Maratha detachments were

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1. His original name was Mirza Mohd. Ali and was the grandson of one of Aurangzeb's foster brothers. His father Mirza Mohd was a petty servant in the establishment of Azam Shah. He came to Bengal in 1720, and got an employment of one hundred rupees as monthly salary under Shujauddin, the Deputy-governor of Orissa. It was through his efforts and those of his brother Haji Ahmad that Shujauddin obtained the subedari of Bengal, though his father-in-law Murshid Quli Jafar Khan did not wish it. He was appointed as Faujdar of Rajmahal. When after the dismissal of Fakhru Daulah, the governor of Bihar, he was as deputy-governor. His efficient administration brought for him more revenues, enabling him to strengthen his position. See for details "Aliwardi and his Times." By Dr. K. Datta. (Chapter I. pp.2-25).

down and kicked with their shoes. They constantly shouted, "Give us rupees, give us rupees, give us rupees". When they got no rupee, they filled their victims nostrils with water or drowned them in tanks. Some were put to death by suffocation. Those who had none, had to give up their lives. It was only after crossing the Bhagirathi that people found safety."

The Emperor ordered Safdar Jung to march into Bihar but he was recalled by Muhammad Shah on the representation of Aliwardi Khan. The Emperor, as usual, yielded to the enemy's demand. He promised a Chauth of these provinces to Raja Shahu, who on his part, assigned the work of collection to Raghuji Bhonsle. In 1743, Raghuji set out for Katwa. Balaji Vishava Nath also came to Bengal by way of Bihar and met Aliwardi Khan on 31st March, 1743, at a place called Lauda, 7 miles south of Burhanpur near Murshidabad. The Nawab agreed in this meeting to pay Chauth to Raja Shahu, and 22 lakhs to Balaji, on his promise of driving Raghuji out of Bengal. The Peshwa did his duty well, and pursuing him through Orissa, he went back to Deccan.

Raja Shahu by the settlement of 31st August, 1743, granted the Chauth from the four subas of Malwa, Agra, Ajmer as well as the two estates of Tikari and Bojpur (inclusive of Daudanagar) in Subah Bihar, yeilding 12 lakhs a year to the

Riyaz p. 351.
Yusuf f. 44.
Datta p. 86.
Peshwa while Raghuji was to enjoy the Chauth from the two Subahs of Bengal and Bihar except the Mahals yielding 12 lakhs reserve for the Peshwa.

After the conclusion of this treaty Bhaskar again marched on Bengal through Orissa at the beginning of March 1744. "As soon as Bhaskar arrived again, he summoned all his captains and ordered them, "Draw your swords and kill every man and woman that you see." When the commander spoke thus, they plundered and slew on every side with shouts of kill! kill! Brahmins, Vaishnavas, Sanyasis, women and cows were slaughtered by the hundred." Sarkar gives Aliwardi Khan's reaction in these words; "The Nawab found that in return for all his expenditure he had now got not an assured protector, but only two-blood suckers instead of one. The Peshwa's breach of his promise and callous desertion of the Nawab's cause threw Aliwardi into an agony of despair and rage. Smarting under the 'Punic bad faith,' of the Maratha race, he decided to use the same weapon to free his people from their intolerable tyranny." The Nawab conspired with his general Mustafa Khan to destroy the aggressor by a stratagem. They succeeded in getting Bhaskar and his 21 generals murdered when the party entered the camp erected for their welcome and peace talks, on the plain of Manakara on 31st March, 1744. Raghuji Gaikwad was the only survivor who fled away with his troops to Nagpur. For fifteen months Bengal enjoyed peace, and the province was cleared out of the Marathas.

2. Siyar, pp. 528-531.
Datta p. 91.
But there arose hard difficulties which rendered his position untenable. The province suffered further from rivalries of the governor and Mustafa Khan. Early in November, 1746, the Nawab was asked by the Emperor to send Rs 25 lakhs as Chauth of Bengal and Rs 10 lakhs that of Bihar to the royal treasury so that the money could be sent to Raja Shahu. Aliwardi Khan made complaints against the pact formed between the Emperor and Raja Shahu. He regarded all the three provinces as one administrative unit and was not prepared to make a separate agreement for the Bihar Chauth with the Peshwa when there was no guarantee for the defence of Bengal. He said to Raghunath Jaya Ram, a Maratha agent at Murshidabad. "Patna is mine, Bengal too is mine, I ought to act treating both provinces as one. The Chauth for the two is inseperable. In his reply to Muhammad Shah, the Nawab argued that when a settlement had been struck with Raja Shahu, why did Raghuji Bhonsle march towards Bengal, and why did not the Peshwa take the responsibility of preventing him. The question of payment did not arise as there was no guarantee of immunity from further raids and also because of his own poor finances. In the beginning of the year 1751, both the Nawab and the Marathas had realised the futility of war and entered into a treaty with them in March 1751, which secured some respite to the Nawab.

1. Sarkar, p. 72.
2. S.P.D., II. 4.10.

Sarkar, p. 92.