CHAPTER I

THE CENTRAL DOCTRINES OF THE TRACTATUS

Introduction

Description appears to be the most important problem in philosophy. From an epistemological point of view, it can also be said to be the problem of accurately formulating our experiences about the world. Philosophers are constantly engaged in such an exercise. What is problematic here is how to communicate intelligibly whatever is understood by us. Metaphysically speaking, it is the problem of thought and reality again. If thought has to represent or reflect or mirror reality, how does it do that? It does, but how does it do is the fundamental philosophical issue. Any attempt to formulate this problem cannot really by-pass logic and psychology. The logicists like Frege, Russell, and early Wittgenstein are of the opinion that psychology or psychologism has nothing to do with philosophy. There is a clear demarcation between epistemology and psychology. In the introduction to the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus Russell looks at the entire problem of language or description from four different perspectives. They are: psychological, empirical, epistemological and logical.\(^8\) But our knowledge of history of philosophy reminds us that these four perspectives are the sub-divisions of two broad perspectives, namely, logical and psychological. Unfortunately philosophers in the past did not really make sharp boundaries between these two important perspectives. Symbolism being

the necessary component in these two perspectives both the interpreters and the critics of the *Tractatus* have provided us with different assessments of the contents of the text. Thus *Tractatus* is subjected to many an interpretation. This is a welcome sign. While pursuing research we do not always look for unanimity, rather we are equally interested in the diverse opinions on the same subject. This is how the scope of the subject under discussion is enlarged. In other words, it adds up to the layers of knowledge.

Russell and many of his followers held the view that *Tractatus* is “concerned with the conditions which would have to be fulfilled by a logically perfect language.”9 The objective here is to use appropriate symbolism in which a sentence or a statement means something definite. Therefore it is mainly the question of logic rather than anything else. But the philosophers like Ramsey, Stenius and Weinberg held the view that *Tractatus* is only a metaphysical spelling of the world of facts.10 According to them, Wittgenstein is largely interested in providing a picture of the world of facts or the reality. Wittgenstein himself was aware of the inroads made by psychologism into philosophy. His aversion to psychologism is evident from the letter he addressed to Russell when the latter wanted to know the contents of his thought. For instance, it is written in the *Tractatus* that “we must not say, the complex sign ‘aR b’ says ‘a stands in a certain relation ‘R to b’; but we must say, that ‘a’ stands in certain relation to ‘b’ says that ‘a R b’.”11

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9 Ibid., p. 7.
If what is expressible and what is not expressible is the main concern of Wittgenstein in his *Tractatus*, it is also necessary to know what falls under each of these categories. Early Wittgenstein was of the opinion that philosophy does not consist of any philosophical propositions. In other words, philosophy does not yield any knowledge of reality. Then what is the function of philosophy? It is merely a ‘critique of language’. As a critique of language philosophy is only interested in the logical clarification of our thought. Thus Wittgenstein almost echoes Frege in this respect. By assigning this peculiar task to philosophy Wittgenstein has driven epistemological and psychological elements from the sphere of philosophy. No critique of language (philosophy) could ever be put into words unless one is familiar with the logic of such language. But this logic of language also cannot be expressed in language. Therefore, in a way, philosophy too cannot be expressed in language. It amounts to saying that philosopher must remain silent all through. Wittgenstein wrote in his *Notebooks*: “it is one of the chief skills of the philosopher not to occupy himself with questions which do not concern him.”  

12 Similarly the last proposition of *Tractatus* reads as follows: “What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.”  

13 If there are no philosophical brand of propositions, then it amounts to saying that there is no philosophical brand of knowledge. Knowledge per se belongs to the realm of natural sciences and there are only propositions of natural sciences. Then the only area left for philosophers is engage themselves in speculative thinking.
(metaphysics). But, Like the Buddha, Wittgenstein felt that philosopher should not address the questions concerning metaphysics, for there are no answers for such questions. To quote Wittgenstein’s remarks here: “For an answer which cannot be expressed the question too cannot be expressed. The riddle does not exist. If a question can be put at all, then it can also be answered.”\(^ {14}\) In a way Wittgenstein indirectly suggested that the questions concerning metaphysical matters cannot be answered at all, therefore, the questions concerning metaphysics cannot be expressed at all.

In order to debate upon ‘what can be said’ in Wittgenstein early work a survey of the central doctrines of the *Tractatus* needs to be provided. This survey serves as backdrop of the second chapter. It is clear from the preface written to the *Tractatus* the motto of Wittgenstein is to show that reality (world) is mirrored through language. The isomorphic relation between language and reality are represented by logical space and physical space respectively. What is physically existent can be logically expressed through language. On other words, the elements of logical space and the elements of physical space share the same logical form and ontological status. Consequently, the limits of language set limit to the reality (world). The radical shift from the *Tractarian* position did not make Wittgenstein to leave aside language and reality. In fact, language and the reality are looked at from a new perspective altogether. Therefore, the common thread that runs through both his earlier and later phases of his philosophy is his concern for language and reality. As held by Pears: “In both periods his aim was to understand the structure and

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\(^ {14}\) Ibid., 6.5.
limits of thought, and his method was to study the structure and limits of language.”

Once we carefully study the structure of language, we come to know what we can do and what we cannot do with language. The limits of language are set forth by its internal structure. Since the subjects like ethics, religion and aesthetics do not fall within the limits of the language as they do not meet the requirements of what can be said. In other words, just as there are no propositions in philosophy, there are no propositions in ethics, religion and aesthetics. This is because in the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein held that it is the reality (world) that determines the structure of our language, but no the other way round. The view that the structure of reality influences the structure of our language leads us to formalism, foundationalism and essentialism. The entire language becomes formalistic for it has to adhere to the principles of truth-functional logic. It becomes foundational for it is operated on the basis of the given set of rules of formation and transformation. These two components essentially lead to essentialism, for language is governed by a set of calculi that regulates these rules of formation and transformation. The language becomes objective for it is scientific or physicalist in its nature. Let us examine the central doctrine of the *Tractatus*. This is necessary, for the later work of Wittgenstein is understood only in the light of his early work.

**The Project of Tractatus**

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16 Ibid., p. 13.
As Pears observed, the most significant feature in the *Tractatus* is that all language has uniform logical structure. This may not be visible at the surface level, but can be unraveled by pure philosophical analysis.\(^{17}\) Since ordinary language leads to ambiguities, there is every need to employ ideal or logically perfect language to avoid philosophical problems. To quote Wittgenstein’s remarks in this context:

In order to avoid these errors, we must employ a symbolism which excludes them, by not applying the same sign in different symbols and by not applying signs in the same way which signify in different ways. A symbolism, that is to say, which obeys the rules of logical grammar of logical syntax. (The logical symbolism of Frege and Russell is such a language, which, however, does still not exclude all errors).\(^{18}\)

The above statement of Wittgenstein makes it clear that even the language employed by both Frege and Russell has its inherent defects. Perhaps, Wittgenstein thought that he can design still a fool free language than that of Frege and Russell so that it accurately mirrors the reality.

Then what is the job of philosophers? Should they remain idle? Perhaps, Wittgenstein, like his mentor Russell, was of the opinion that philosophers, if they do not have any task before them, at least, they should help others to execute their programmes properly. How does a philosopher help others? While distinguishing philosophy from natural sciences, Wittgenstein held that: “philosophy sets limits to

\(^{17}\) Ibid.

the much disputed sphere of natural science.”\textsuperscript{19} In other words, one should be in a position to identify what is thinkable and what is unthinkable. One knows what is unthinkable only through thinkable. Where one cannot form thought it is the sphere of unthinkable. Wittgenstein held that philosophy belongs to unthinkable. However, Wittgenstein offered a positive function to philosophy in his \textit{Tractatus}. This is evident from the sections 4.1 to 4,116. In support of this view we can quote Max Black. He writes: “It is noteworthy that in this part Wittgenstein allows philosophy a positive function.”\textsuperscript{20} However positive this function may be it is only secondary in nature, for philosophy does not have a subject matter of its own.

Once it is determined that philosophy has only secondary role to play, its existence becomes shadowy existence. Philosophy cannot survive on its own without natural science. Philosopher must take this view of Wittgenstein with a pinch of salt. Ever since the time of the Greeks, philosophy has a reputation of being the queen of all sciences. But it is reduced to the level of a maid servant. Also, it is evident that philosophy does not have a language of its own so that philosophy has no right to talk about the reality (world). A philosopher belongs to no man’s land and he needs to be taught the language of science if he has to perform his job as an apprentice under a matured scientist. Only science is permitted to talk about the reality. It is a scientist who indulges in explaining the fundamental components of the reality. He has absolute freedom to do so. As an assistant to scientist, philosopher passively observes the work of a scientist.

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., 4.113.
If this were the condition of a philosopher, there is no future for philosophy at all. Is Wittgenstein right in holding such a view, which belittles the significance of philosophy? The distinction between science and philosophy is dependent upon their subject matters. Science has its own subject matter, but philosophy does not have one. Philosopher is only a service provider. The view that “Philosophy is not one of natural sciences.”\textsuperscript{21} Certainly does not show any parity between these two disciplines. Wittgenstein provided ample reasons to say so. Once the domain of science is determined, now it is the turn of philosophy to be defined what it really stands for. In fact, the status of natural science determines the status of philosophy. Philosophy is not a theory but an activity by itself. As an activity philosophy serves science to clarify the muddy thoughts of science. To quote Wittgenstein’s remark concerning the activity of philosophy: “Without philosophy thoughts are as it were, cloudy and indistinct.”\textsuperscript{22} Even indistinct or ambiguous thoughts are not allowed in philosophy. A thought represents some aspect of the reality and it is preserved in an unarticulated form. Thought finds its expression only in language (proposition). Thus whatever is thought and articulated belongs to the realm of science. “In other words, philosophy can only set limits to our thought.”\textsuperscript{23} Thus philosophy sets limits to science. The fundamental task of philosopher is to make the boundaries of science more distinct.

As observed by Kenny: “The greater part of the book is concerned with the nature of language and its relation to the world, Wittgenstein’s major concern throughout his

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., 4.112.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., 4.114.
life.” 24 This is true of both the phases of his philosophy. The one to correspondence between language and reality presupposed the mind set of early Wittgenstein. The method of analysis introduced by Wittgenstein analyses the elements of physical space and the elements of logical space in order to arrive at logical atoms corresponding to the physical atoms. If objects are supposed to be the unanalyzable units of the physical space, names are the unanalyzable units of logical space. Just as objects make up states of affairs, names (words) make up of elementary propositions. The totality of states of affairs represents the totality of facts and the totality of facts represents the reality. The totality of elementary propositions gives rise to propositions and the totality of propositions is language. Thus both reality and language are analyzed into simple units. “The ideal or logically perfect language is truth-functional in its nature and it does not leave any scope for ambiguities. The limits of language and the limits of the reality do not merely happen, rather they are well determined.” 25 What can be mirrored in language alone can be expressed. What exists beyond the boundary is not the concern of the Tractatus. In other words, it is the language that determines our conception of the reality. Since what is inexpressible can only be shown, it amounts to saying that what can be shown need not be nonsensical. Here one must be circumspect enough to provide a proper explanation for the expression ‘nonsensical’. What is expressible alone can be put into language, and whatever can be put into language bears sense. And anything that cannot be put into language simply cannot be conveyed through propositions. Since propositions alone are the candidates for expressing the sense, what is

nonsensical does not belong to propositions. But certain personal experiences are inexpressible in language, but they need not be nonsensical. Their sense is manifested in some other form, for other wise there is no scope for us as humans to imbibe non-material values. They may be termed as social objects. Their measurement and assessment require a different yard-stick. Certainly they cannot be treated on par with extended objects in physical space. Although Wittgenstein time again talks about physical space and logical space, he is not unaware of social space. Of course the elements of physical space are represented by the elements of logical space. The natural consequence of such a view is that it is language that determines the scope and limits of the reality. As observed by Pears: “at this point it is important to remember that, when Wittgenstein speaks of the limits of language in the Tractatus he means the limits of factual discourse.”

Our judgments about the values are neither factual nor contingent. Then what is their status? Even tautologies are also not exempted from this dilemma, for they are neither factual nor contingent. Of course, although tautologies do not state anything, Wittgenstein claimed that they are the limitations (scaffoldings) of the reality. Another important question that is often raised is can one reduce the isomorphic relation between language and reality to a logically necessary relation which is exhibited by a tautology? This issue was raised by Pears. “If Wittgenstein needs to be more consistent, he needs to spell out this relationship between language and reality. It appears that the theory of language and the theory of reality are only metaphysical in nature and it is also a metaphysical mistake to say something about what can only be shown.”

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26 Ibid., p. 52.
27 Ibid., pp. 52-53.
concept of ‘object’ is purely a formal concept, but not a real one. Objects being metaphysical in nature, their existence is noticed through the propositions that depict the various aspects of the reality. In other words, the existence of the objects can only be shown but cannot be asserted. To put it in the words of Pears: the logical relation between the propositions p and not-p cannot properly be asserted by any third proposition. It can be seen in the form of the two propositions themselves or it can be demonstrated by combining them in the tautology ‘p or not-p’. But, as already noticed earlier, a tautology cannot be expressed at all. It can only be shown.

Further, it is debated in the ontology of Wittgenstein whether there exist objects or there must exist objects. There is a fundamental difference between these two. There exist objects is a fact and there must exist objects becomes a necessary truth. If it is a necessary truth, what kind of necessary truth is it? Tautology as a necessary truth is different from the necessary truth of a theory. The necessary truth of a theory need not be logical necessity, but merely an empirical necessity. How does one prove it to be an empirical necessity? If Wittgenstein has taken the existence of objects for granted, the critics of his position may ask on what grounds did he arrive at this supposition? Both Russell and early Wittgenstein followed Moore in accepting that there are certain mind-independent discrete facts which are composed of particular things called objects. This is vindicated from the statement of Wittgenstein that: “An atomic fact is a combination of objects (entities or things).”

Coming back to the expression ‘nonsense’, it cannot be part of the game of description. It is not the imperfect symbolism that is responsible for any nonsense

rather it is the improper use of symbolism that results in nonsense. Language is an important medium, according to Wittgenstein, which portrays and reveals the reality (world) or a set of facts. The symbolic function of language is necessarily the descriptive function. But this description of facts is not a straightforward description of something that is given to our sense-experience. It is the description of a set of facts by means of analysis. Where there is no description through analysis there the language merely appears to be graphic and this in fact explains the nature of tautologies in the *Tractatus*. For instance, the identity of signs is not a definite relation, but only a visible feature. No principle, even Leibniz’s identity of indiscernibles, could explain the notion of identity. Just as identity is not expressible, so also the nature of a tautology cannot be explained. When Hume wanted to catch the ‘idea of necessary connection’ through sense experience he miserably failed in his attempt as the ‘idea of necessary connection’ is a logical one. The logical necessity exhibits through itself. This is a clear case of showing only reason alone can comprehend it as aptly observed by Immanuel Kant in his *Critique of Pure Reason*.

What is expressed by means of language is the thought. It is the thought that finds its expression in language. Thought is invariably related to reality. What kind of relation is that? To show a meaningful relation between thought and reality philosophers have advanced several theories. The limits of the expressible are coterminous with the activity of analysis. What is unanalyzable is left as mystical. There is no alternate model for logical model. What cannot be logically analyzed remains obscure forever. Logic exhausts all our activity. As held by Wittgenstein:
“Nothing in the province of logic can be merely possible.”²⁹ The symbolism of logic takes care of everything that exists in the logical space. The entire architecture of our thought is grasped only through this symbolism. The unit of our thought does not merely represent a word, but a full sentence and what a sentence expresses is a statement. If a statement is either true or false, then it is a proposition. Sentences only picture a situation but not merely a thing or an object. Even a demonstrative sentence is also a sentence that pictures a situation. Therefore, the signs and symbolism have similar status. No sign is simple or complex than the other. The above analysis suggests us that the Tractatus is primarily concerned with thought not as thinking, but thought as a set of sentences.

The mystical focus of the Tractatus leads us to the fundamental distinction between saying and showing. Every expression has a form and thought and in which its content is made intelligible. The form of thought brings out the structure of its description. The distinction between form and structure has been maintained thought the work by Wittgenstein. Form is more general than structure. Structure is specific to a given fact of existence. For instance, ‘x defeated y’ and ‘y is defeated by x’ share the same logical form, but they have different structures. Form determines the logical character of a descriptive discourse, and a form determines the meaning. The form of any description cannot be expressed rather it can only be shown. If a description involves what is indescribable then it says something about what cannot be said. The critics of Wittgenstein attacked this position in Tractatus as something self-refuting. The philosophy is reduced to this nonsense. To put philosophy back on

²⁹ Ibid., 2.0121.
the rails, it was Ramsey who held that: “we must then take seriously that it is nonsense, and not pretend, as Wittgenstein does, that it is important nonsense.”30 Since every proposition has a determinate sense there is no scope for meta-linguistic model that can accommodate descriptions of sort. The logic of formal language does not allow any loose play. Max Black in defense of Wittgenstein held that both saying and showing are used in a technical sense but not in the sense that ordinary man understands it. To quote Black here: “Closer attention to the reminder of Wittgenstein’s argument would show that he is using the crucial words “saying” and “showing” in a technical sense which deviates from the sense which would commonly be attributed to them. It is characteristic of Wittgenstein’s sense that the phrase ‘p can be said’ is restricted to the case where p is an empirical proposition....”31 It is evident that language has two components or elements, namely; that which show but do not say and those which say.

**Essentialism**

In *Tractatus* Wittgenstein gave so much importance to essentialism. In other words, language has its own essence. For instance, Wittgenstein held that language consists of names (words), and each name possesses a meaning in so far as it stands for something. The words are merely names, and to know a language is to know what all the words denote. Hence a word that did not denote anything would not be a word. It would be mere sound and it would be meaningless. The words have meaning within themselves. Wittgenstein argued that the language is a picture of

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reality. What kind of language is it? It is the symbolic language like the one that is used in the *Principia Mathematica* of Russell and Whitehead. The form of language must be the same as form of the reality. Reality is that which can be explained by means of language. To quote Wittgenstein’s remarks on language:

> Man posses the capacity of constructing languages, in which every sense can be expressed, without having an idea of how and what each word means—just as one speaks without knowing how the single sounds are produced. Colloquial language is a part of the human organism and is not less complicated than it. From it is humanly impossible to gather immediately the logic of language. Language disguises the thought; so that from the external form of the clothes one cannot infer the form of the thought they clothe, because the external form of the clothes is constructed with quite another object than to let the form of the body be recognized. The silent adjustments to understand colloquial language are enormously complicated.\(^{32}\)

The crux of this argument is that ordinary language often disguises our thought, therefore, it is in need of analysis. As Gilbert Ryle puts it, there are certain expressions in language which systematically mislead us. They are in need of analysis. As a matter of fact, early Wittgenstein treats ordinary language as a mask. It obscures the real nature of the reality.

Although Wittgenstein did not elaborate the salient features of his ideal language in his *Tractatus*, in the introduction of the text Russell highlights the nature of such a language in the following manner:

The essential business of language is to assert or deny facts. Given the syntax of a language, the meaning of a sentence is determinate as soon as the meaning of the component words is known. In order that a certain sentence should assert certain fact there must, however the language may be constructed, be something common between the structure of the sentence and the structure of the fact. This is perhaps the most fundamental thesis of Mr. Wittgenstein’s theory.\(^{33}\)

Perhaps Wittgenstein does not deny the ambit of his project highlighted by Russell and the nature of ideal language. Language, according to early Wittgenstein, has only one function. It is the logical clarification of thought. From a logical point of view, all languages are one, with respect to the logical conditions they are to satisfy. It is only possible to formulate meaningful statements in the form of language in accordance with the structure of reality. In his entire work, Wittgenstein sets out seven propositions. Each proposition, except the last, is followed by various comments. The first proposition reads “The world is all that is the case.”\(^{34}\) The world is with full of facts. “The world is the totality of facts not of things.”\(^{35}\) There is difference between a thing (and an object) and a fact. A thing is bound up with the notion of a fact but it is not itself a fact. For example ‘A watch is a thing and the table

\(^{33}\) Ibid., Introduction, p. x.
\(^{34}\) Ibid., 1.
\(^{35}\) Ibid., 1.1.
is a thing, whereas it is a fact that a watch is lying on the table. In other words, fact is the essence of the reality (world).

In his second proposition, Wittgenstein says “what is the case-a fact- is the existence of status of affairs.”\textsuperscript{36} A ‘state of affairs’ is a fact that in itself does not consist of facts. A state of affairs is a combination of possible facts. State of affairs is made up of objects. According to Wittgenstein, “language is a picture of model of facts.”\textsuperscript{37} Language is not a picture of objects but of the combination of object that constitute a fact. An object can be named, but to name is not to picture. Suppose there is an object “chair”. A description might state that it is brown. But that chair is brown is a fact. More precisely, “Objects must be named for the fact to be pictured.”\textsuperscript{38} Wittgenstein considered the substance, as essential and in all respects the simple objects of the world.

Language consists of propositions and propositions picturing a state of affairs are elementary propositions. Propositions are the combinations of words and every word has a meaning. An elementary proposition is a model or picture of states of affairs. Thus every proposition becomes a proposition. A state of affairs exists in an elementary sentence. An elementary proposition is true, if a state of affairs exists, the proposition is false, if the corresponding state of affairs does not exist.

In fact, to hold the view that language consists of propositions is to put a radical limitation on what language can do; in his later work Wittgenstein rejects this limitation. He says that “the simplest kind of proposition, an elementary

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., 2.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., 2.12.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., 2.1., 2.12.
proposition, asserts the existence of a state of affairs.”

And again “the sense of a proposition is its agreement and disagreement with possibilities of existence and non-existence of states of affairs.”

“One elementary proposition cannot contradict another elementary proposition.”

A tautology is a proposition that cannot be other than true, example ‘it is either snowing or not snowing’. According to Wittgenstein, there is no actual example of an elementary proposition. A fact is based on experience, but not on logical necessity. Wittgenstein holds that “the constituent elements of the world, what he calls ‘states of affairs’ are logically independent of one another.”

Again, “From the existence or non-existence of one state of affairs, it is impossible to infer the existence or non-existence of another.”

The corresponding true elementary propositions are also logically independent of one another. Wittgenstein pointed out that a proposition that denies an elementary proposition is not itself an elementary proposition. Ordinarily, when we speak of a picture we mean something, which has some resemblance to what it depicts. A painting resembles the person it is supposed to depict. A fact has no appearance.

A state of affair is a combination of objects. The picture of a state of affair is a combination of names. Every object has a corresponding name and every name has a corresponding object, which it designates. Names are nothing but words. There is an essential ingredient that runs though entire language. Essentially they have something in it. Anything simple cannot be analyzed. So, language possesses intersubjectivity. What is essence of language? Meaning is the essence of language.

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39 Ibid., 4.21.
40 Ibid., 4.2.
41 Ibid., 4. 211.
42 Ibid., 2. 061.
43 Ibid., 2. 062.
Language is the product of thinking. “The fact that the elements of a picture are related to one another in a determinate way represents that things are related to one another in the same way.” 44 The fact is characterized by the objects being combined in a certain manner, and a proposition is characterized by the names of the objects being combined in a certain manner. “The combination of names in a proposition which makes it a picture (either true or false) of the fact is called the logical form of the sentence. “The logical form is “the form of reality.” 45 The statement and the fact are identical. Compare it with: paper, pen, written notes, and reading, all stand to one another and they have an internal relation that holds between language and the world. Different kinds of facts are made possible by different kinds of objects. “The nature of objects governs the state of affairs in which it may be found.” 46

Wittgenstein writes that, “The nature of object, or what Wittgenstein also calls the form of the object only tells what is possible, it tells nothing about what is actually true.” 47 In other words, a picture is still a picture whether it depicts a truly existing fact or only a possible fact. It is for instance a fact that cats have four legs. It is ‘possible’ that a deformed cat may have five legs. The word ‘possible’ means that, although there have never been a case of cat with five legs, the possibility is not ruled out that such a cat exists.

Wittgenstein says that whether facts are possible depends on the nature of the objects. “If I am to know an object, though I need not know its external properties, I

44 Ibid., 2. 15.
45 Ibid., 2. 18.
46 Ibid., 2. 0123.
47 Ibid., 2. 224.
must know all its internal properties.” 48 Further he holds that, “A property is internal if it is unthinkable that its objects should not possess it.” 49 For example, the dimensions of the pencil on the table, I cannot be told that it has no dimensions. The property of dimensions is a necessary one: Thus elementary sentences which say something about the dimensions of the pencil are pictures, although only one of those pictures would be the true picture, namely, that which expressed the correct dimensions of the pencil. If the objects are totally different, then their internal properties will also different. Thus Wittgenstein calls everyday language is clothed in such a way that its logical form is not immediately apparent.

To come back to the distinction between ‘what can be said and what can be shown’, a proposition asserts that a state of affairs exists and it must have the same logical form as the facts. In other words, every proposition must have a certain logical form as the facts. To identify whether a proposition is true or false and to find whether it corresponds to reality. For this identification understanding is essential. Hence Wittgenstein says that “Every proposition, in so far as it is a genuine proposition, already has a sense, already means something.” 50 Thus a proposition cannot state its own sense; it cannot say anything about its logical form. “What can be shown cannot be said.” 51 Here Wittgenstein claims not only a proposition (p) cannot say anything about its own form; but also that no proposition whatever can say anything about the form of ‘p’. A proposition cannot represent the logical form; the logical form can only be shown. i.e., it is mirrored in them. The Tractatus itself is

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48 Ibid., 2. 01231.
49 Ibid., 4. 123.
50 Ibid., 4. 064.
51 Ibid., 4. 1212.
a book that deals mainly with the logical form of propositions. Russell writes in his introduction to the *Tractatus*, “What causes hesitation is the fact that Mr. Wittgenstein manages to say a great deal about what cannot be said, thus suggesting to skeptical reader that possibly there may be some loophole through a hierarchy of language or some other exist.”\(^{52}\) Wittgenstein himself admits that his book says what cannot be said, but he thinks the book has a purpose even so, to be used and discarded. “It is like a ladder; when he has used them as steps-to-climb up beyond them.”\(^{53}\) If Wittgenstein persists in the belief that the logical form of language can only be shown. For example, a fever chart shows the temperature curve of the patient. This can be explained orally or in writing, but it cannot be shown on any cure. Wittgenstein’s proposition is like the oral or written instructions, which explain how a map depicts a landscape, or a chart depicts a fever.

Another problem arises that Wittgenstein believes that while the so-called logical unit of language is the elementary proposition which depicts a state of affairs, most of the proposition that are uttered in language are not elementary propositions, but combinations of elementary propositions. These combinations are depending upon their truth value—that is, whether they are true or false-depends entirely on the truth-value of the elementary propositions of which they are made. The proposition is also have the "truth functions’ i.e., proposition whose truth-value depends on, the truth-values of elementary propositions. Suppose I speak of the class of all snow I may say: ‘All snow melts at 0º centigrade’, or rather elaborately, ‘snow melts at 0º centigrade’. I could invent the proposition: ‘This snow melts 0.0

\(^{52}\) Ibid., Introduction, p. xxi.
\(^{53}\) Ibid., 6. 64.
centigrade’. There is no means to cover all snow, for this proposition refers not only to all snow that has hitherto been observed, but to all snow whenever or wherever it may be observed. The proposition ‘all snow melts at 0° centigrade’ is a truth function. A truth function is to indicate its truth-values will depend on the truth-value of the propositions. ‘This is snow’ and it will melt at 0° centigrade.

Wittgenstein claims that “there can be no advance knowledge of whether a certain elementary proposition is true or false. This must be determined in each case by comparing the proposition with reality.”54 In other words, all truth-functions are composed of elementary propositions and the truth of these is empirically determined. Thus the truth-value of truth-functions is determined empirically. Wittgenstein says that propositions about reality, his ‘pictures of facts,’ are not necessarily true or false, while propositions, which are necessarily true or false are not statement about the reality. It is not always the case, if we consider a truth-function ‘Either it is raining or it is not raining’. This proposition is always true no matter what the state of the weather may be. Wittgenstein calls such truth-functions that cannot posses the truth-value ‘false tautologies’. The truth-value of a tautology is not determined empirically because it does not deal with anything empirical and also no reality at all.

According to Wittgenstein, all propositions in logic are tautologies. “Tautologies and contradictions are not pictures of reality. They do not represent any possible situations.”55 When one proposition is held to be a logical consequence

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54 Ibid., 2. 223.
55 Ibid., 4. 462.
of another is a form of tautology. The proposition is able to depict the fact because it shares its logical structure of reality. Language is characterized by its logical form: and in so far as proposition depict reality, the logical form of language is governed that of reality. Language is capable only of taking about describing, expressing, characterizing- what is real, what is factually and logically possible. A logical picture of facts is thought. The totality of true thought is a picture of the world. The proposition can be more or less concealed by the grammatical form of sentence. A proposition is something linguistic and non-linguistic. A proposition is something that is articulated. What a sentence expresses is a proposition. A proposition expresses thought. The logical picture of a fact is thought. So, the identification of a proposition with a thought is not absurd. ‘Thought’ must be understood correctly. ‘Thought’ is a complex of psychological factors, a phenomenon of consciousness. Wittgenstein made an argument that a logical picture of a fact is a thought which is unexceptionable, it is agreed with that of ‘a logical picture of a fact’ is a proposition. Everything that can be thought can be given a linguistic expression. The investigation of the logical structure of thought and knowledge becomes an investigation of the logical structure of language. Wittgenstein claims that the logical limits of language and of the world coincide the logical limits of language are the limits both of what can be said and what can be thought and therefore all that can be said to exist.

The limits of language mean the limits of world. The reality (world is the totality of facts. Thought cannot be about such a thought is to wish to think what can be thought and to know what cannot be known. Thus Wittgenstein concludes that
the metaphysician’s aspiration to know the universe as a whole is doomed to disappointment.

According to the principle of verification, one understands the meaning of a proposition if one knows what is required for it to be true. A proposition without truth condition is without meaning. Wittgenstein says that “a proposition must be determined by comparing it with reality.”\textsuperscript{56} Wittgenstein seems to identify “A logical picture of the facts is a thought.”\textsuperscript{57} And again “A thought is a proposition with a sense.”\textsuperscript{58} Wittgenstein calls language a picture of facts and it depicts the logical structure of facts. A language that does not depict facts is not language at all. Wittgenstein writes that “general proposition form is the essence of propositions.”\textsuperscript{59} and that to ‘give the essence of proposition is to give ... essence of the world.’\textsuperscript{60}

The language or language used by all these transcendental speakers was primarily linked to the objects and situations in their common world, and their public reactions to these. In so far as private aspects were present in their performances, these were essentially linked, whether by words or other forms of correlation, with what was public and common. Thinking, describing, imagining, etc. are expressed by language performances. Propositions are the only unity of distinct constituents that there are or can be, and that unity is always a proposition, even if an unasserted one. Every proposition must consist of simple constituents. “The Tractatus analyses all ordinary statements in terms of facts linking wholly

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., 2. 223
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., 3.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., 4.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., 5. 471.
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., 5. 4711.
unanalysable objects with one another. Ordinary language is all right, and corresponds with fact and reality, but what fact and reality ultimately consist in, is nothing stable is ordinary language, but only in a completely analyzed language that is not at our command. What have, in fact, only arguments which guide us towards such a language, and to the facts and objects to which it corresponds.”

For Wittgenstein, the world is made up of both existent and possible facts. In the *Tractatus*, there is a stress on the role of logically independent elementary propositions, each of which depicts some particular possible states of affairs. “When we understand the ‘objects’ in a set of wholly simply entities; wholly without internal structure, since, if they had such structure.” The totally of true thoughts can therefore be said to be a picture of the world. If we combined elements in a thought in a manner in which the corresponding objects cannot be combined, then that thought would not be a proper logical picture of that fact. A self-contradictory statement is not true, however, it is recognized as an an essential part of our language.

Wittgenstein’s proposition is not accompanied by all the fully envisaged correlation’s which would tie its elements to ultimate objects, but it is essential to its being a proposition that we must view it’s as a capable of being so tied, and so as having a definite sense, though we need not consider, and cannot know, that sense. “The proposition is itself a fact, a combination of its elements, and it stands for some immensely complex range of alternative combinations among ultimate

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62 Ibid., p. 80.
Wittgenstein is interested in the conditions for a logically perfect language and at 4.0031 Wittgenstein says that ‘all philosophy is a critique of language’. In 4.03, A proposition communicates a situation to us, and so it must be essentially connected with the situation. Wittgenstein is clearly saying at least that “what the proposition means in particular must be essential to it, since he holds that the structure of the propositional symbol perfectly coincides with the structure of the relevant state of affairs.” Wittgenstein holds that we can say genuine propositions, that they can be put into words. There is actual relationship between Wittgenstein’s earlier and later writings, to state precisely the extent of the similarity and differences between the two philosophies.

What is inferred from his approach to language and reality is that the early Wittgenstein is an essentialist. Both language and reality are constituted by certain essential elements. For instance, reality is analyzed into facts, facts into states of affairs, and states of affairs into objects. Similarly, language is analyzed into propositions, elementary propositions and names. These elements constitute the essential aspects of reality and language respectively. In his Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein deviated from this approach. In the following chapter a detailed account of what can be said is discussed. In the process there is bound to be some overlapping between what is discussed in the first and second chapters. This is inevitable for there is a correlation between the structure and the content of the Tractatus.

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