CONCLUSION

After analyzing the fundamental issues concerning ‘Saying’ and ‘Showing’ in Wittgenstein’s philosophy we arrive at the following conclusions. The schism between early and later phases of Wittgenstein’s philosophical thought is conspicuous from the writings of Wittgenstein, although one finds language as a common thread that runs through his entire philosophical thought. As discussed in the various chapters, the prime objective of this present project is to show the distinction between saying and showing. Somehow this distinction, by many interpreters of Wittgenstein, is confined to Wittgenstein’s early work *Tractatus Logico-philosophicus*. But it is evident from the contents of the *Tractatus* that Wittgenstein was primarily engaged in what can be said. However, what can be said presupposes what cannot be said but can be shown. The limitations imposed on what can be said result from the limitations of ideal or logically perfect language. It is designed only to capture what can be said alone. In other words, the facts of reality (world) alone can be mirrored in this language. Even the propositions of logic and mathematics do not express anything about the reality (world). This is the reason why Wittgenstein calls them mystical. But, unlike ethics, religion, and aesthetics, these statements have significance although they cannot say anything about the reality (world), but can show the limitations of the reality (world). Thus they are like scaffoldings of the reality.
Wittgenstein’s treatment of solipsism has some implications for what can be shown in the *Tractatus*. He writes: “In fact what solipsism means, is quite correct, only it cannot be said, but it shows itself.”\(^{244}\) Further he holds; “I am my world.”\(^{245}\) As observed by Pete Mandik,\(^{246}\) there is close relationship between solipsism and the picture theory of intentionality. Mandik argues that the distinction between saying and showing can be explained in terms of the notion of picture theory in which ‘aboutness’ is equivalent to ‘resemblance’. This distinction, according to Mandik, can be explained how the facts can manifest intentionality (aboutness) in two different ways. By equating ‘aboutness’ to ‘resemblance’ the exhibition of aboutness by our thought is a normal mundane affair. The bearers of intentional properties are the facts of existence for Wittgenstein. In order to explain the notion of ‘aboutness’, Mandik takes recourse to our day-to-day experiences. A penny resembles moon being round and shiny, but resembles a dime in being to fit into one’s pocket, and so on. Therefore, a particular thing can be about as many things as it resembles. This amounts to saying that resemblance admits degrees, so also aboutness. This resemblance can be talked about and can be expressed. But there is another way of looking at the whole issue. The best resemblance of a fact is itself. In being about itself the fact cannot be false. Therefore, what is shown is shown by itself. What is said is said by something else. This is an important observation by Mandik.

Given this understanding of the distinction between saying and showing, solipsism can be interpreted in the following way, according to Mandik. A world is a

\(^{244}\) Wittgenstein, L. *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, 5.62.

\(^{245}\) Ibid., 5.63.

set of facts. Similarly, mind is a set of ideas. Thus both the world and mind manifest aboutness. Just as the most that facts resemble are themselves, the most that ideas resemble are themselves. This is already argued by Mandik. Against this backdrop we have to interpret solipsism. When Wittgenstein says: “I am my world”, it amounts to saying that these ideas are most about are themselves. In this sense we call mind is its world. But Wittgenstein also held that solipsism coincides with pure realism. Just as my world consists of my own ideas, the physical world consists of its own facts. These facts the most resemble themselves. The totality of facts is the reality (world). The totality of facts is also manifesting aboutness.

There is another interesting observation from Maurice McGinn concerning the distinction between saying and showing in her paper “Saying and Showing and the continuity of Wittgenstein’s Thought.”

McGinn, first of all, takes stock of the views of James Conant and Cora Diamond. She endorses the observations made by the latter that we must find out the way which gives freedom to interpret the text (Tractatus) in an unbiased manner for otherwise it is dominated by metaphysical or theoretical assertion. Their ‘austere conception’ of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, according to Conant and Diamond, makes Tractatus worthy of its content and its statement “My propositions are elucidations in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must, so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed upon, it.”

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The central element in Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus* is that philosophy does not result in philosophical doctrine and this book is ‘not a text book’. But McGinn feels that something important and positive in Wittgenstein’s philosophy is lost when we preoccupy with the distinction between sense and nonsense. Therefore she resorts to less austere interpretation of the work which “sees him doing more than showing that philosophical utterances fail to express determinate thoughts.”

The *Tractatus* is basically concerned with the problems of philosophy and these problems, by and large, result from our failure to understand the logic of language. This view is also extended to his later phase of philosophical thought. If philosophical questions are illusory, does Wittgenstein himself concern with them? This is an interesting question posed by McGinn. Just because we cannot answer the questions of philosophy does not result in the view that they are trivial or unworthy, according to Mcginn. The problems of philosophy are something ‘deep’. They do not really exhibit at the surface level. The deepest problems are not problems at all, according to Wittgenstein. He continues to hold on to the same position even in his *Philosophical Investigations*. To quote his remarks in this context: “The problems arising through a misinterpretation of our forms of language have the character of depth. They are deep disquietudes, their roots are as deep in us as the forms of our language and their significance is as great as the importance of language.”

McGinn holds that if this statement of Wittgenstein is taken seriously then we not only subscribe to the absence of doctrine and unintelligibility of philosophical questions, but also to his emphasis on the ‘depth’ of philosophical problems. As

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McGinn puts it:” What we want is an understanding that allows Wittgenstein’s remarks to achieve something positive, something that is connected to the depth of the problems with which the work deals and yet that stops short of treating these remarks as putting forward a substantial philosophical theory. This might, I believe, be taken to characterize the central interpretative issue for the whole of Wittgenstein’s philosophy.”251 The self-conscious use of nonsense to expose the illusory nature of philosophical problems cannot be treated as an end to the dispute. There is something more than that. His elucidations in *Tractatus* not only highlight failures of sense but also suggest us how to bring certain order to something, namely, ‘our knowledge of the use of language’. We are aware of this fact. According to McGinn, what is most important is that Wittgenstein engaged in form of reflection that intends to clarify our view of something of which we already have a practical grasp. There is no need to create doctrines or theories to dispel our illusions about the philosophical problems. All that we need to do is to recognize ‘certain order in our knowledge of the use of language, by which we see that the philosophical problem does not arise. On the other hand, it is precisely their connection with this order that gives the philosophical problems their ‘character of depth.”252

One of the most interesting features that we find in McGinn’s treatment of Wittgenstein’s philosophy is that she did not, unlike Conant and Diamond, confine the classic distinction between saying and showing to the *Tractatus* alone. She extends this distinction to Wittgenstein’s later works too. In this context, both Conant and Diamond make a distinction between mere nonsense and substantial

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252 Ibid., p. 27.
nonsense. Mere nonsense is simply unintelligible. But Wittgenstein was more concerned with substantial nonsense, which tries and fails to express a logically incoherent thought. It is the thought that somehow does not fit into the logical coherence of language. The proponent of the distinction between saying and showing accepts the view that there is a something which a speaker tries to put it in the form of language but fails to express it. This is technically known as substantial nonsense. Therefore, the distinction between saying and showing is only a dubious distinction. McGinn does not agree with Conant and Diamond. The distinction, according to her, is something very important and crucial in understanding Wittgenstein’s philosophy. As an alternative model, McGinn suggests that what can be shown but cannot be said can be connected to what is essential to language. In other words, she argues that what can be shown is basically concerned with the sense and limits of sense that are revealed only in our use of language. “it is this essential connection between what is shown and what reveals itself is only in the use or application of language that makes it impossible to say what shows itself, and not that the thought that we are trying to is somehow at odds with logical syntax.”

The point that McGinn tries to drive home is that the very distinction between saying and showing does not necessarily commit ourselves to the view that there are unsayable thoughts that lie beyond the limits of language, but the limit of language is that everything that is essential to use of our language with sense is something on which we need to have practical grasp. It shows itself only in our actual use of the words with sense. That something is unsayable. For instance, when Wittgenstein talks about ‘logical form’ which is shared by the picture (proposition) and what it

253 Ibid., p. 28.
pictures (reality) in order for the picture to be a true picture of what it pictures can only be shown.

According to McGinn, “that the order that Wittgenstein brings to our knowledge of the use of language is thus one that turns on the distinction between what is shown and what is said in language, between what is grasped practically and what is known theoretically to be true.”\textsuperscript{254} This is an interesting observation. All our theoretical constructions about the workings of language can be expressed clearly; hence they fall under the category of what can be said. But the actual workings of language can only grasped. This is practical; hence it can only be shown. Further McGinn argues that there is no doubt that the distinction between saying and showing is central to Wittgenstein’s \textit{Tractatus}, but this distinction is equally present in his later thought too. According to her, Wittgenstein in his \textit{On Certainty} makes a distinction between a priori or what is shown in the language and a posteriori, or what is said in language. This distinction appears to be vital in identifying the cause of philosophical skepticism and its dogmatic alternative. Wittgenstein’s objection to Moore’s commonsense rejection of skepticism is that the latter identified the question related to sense (use) of words with the question concerning a matter of fact. According to Wittgenstein, all our language is rooted in certain foundational beliefs. They are a priori. We do not question them. When these foundational beliefs are used in any language-game they become essence of that language-game. What McGinn tries to establish here is that Wittgenstein tries to draw our attention to the distinction between the determination of sense and the

\textsuperscript{254} Ibid., p. 32.
employment of sense. Once we realize this fact we are bound to accept that his work mainly consists of elucidations but not propositions.255

Von Wright 16 feels that the idea of bipolarity which runs through the Tractatus can also be found in On Certainty although in a different form. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein drew a clear line between what can be said and what cannot be said but only shown. In his On Certainty he makes a distinction between what is grounded and the ground itself. His comparison of a world-picture to the hinges on which a door turns is very apt. If the door is to turn, hinges must stay put. If inquiry is to proceed, then the very framework of inquiry cannot be brought under the domain of the inquiry itself.

This is precisely what we aim at to show in the present work. The supposed distinction between saying and showing is not merely confined to Wittgenstein’s earlier work but also present in his later work. As a matter of fact, under the influence of Frege and Russell, early Wittgenstein was only concerned with what can be said. For him, what can be said belongs to the realm of natural sciences, hence constitutes knowledge of those sciences. However he realized that there is something which cannot be said, but can only be shown due to the limitations of his ideal or logically perfect language. It can be argued that later Wittgenstein was more concerned with what can be shown. His concern for the social functions of language brings out this fact. His shift from logically perfect language to ordinary language is a vindication of this fact. The notion of ‘language-game’ is a novel mechanism through which he explained the workings of language. Perhaps, later Wittgenstein

255 Ibid., p. 35.
realized that what can be shown is more important for a society of individuals rather than what can merely be said. In a way both his early and later phases of his philosophy represent two sides of the same coin. One side of the coin (early philosophy) is more concerned with what can be said (theory) and the other side of the coin (later philosophy) is more concerned with what can be shown (practice). We cannot exclude one from the other. This is the most obvious reason why Wittgenstein wanted to publish them together.

One of the significant features of his early philosophy is his attempt to show isomorphic relation between language and reality. In a way Wittgenstein is right that reality gets exposed through language, for otherwise it loses its identity in the midst of our day-to-day life activities. Had there been no language there would not have been any talk about reality. However, he narrowed down the conception of reality by reducing to the level of physical reality. The influence of physical sciences and logic is visible in his treatment of reality. His analysis of the reality (world) in terms of facts is another significant move. Instead of saying that the reality is a sum total of things, he makes it a totality of facts. His preference for the expression ‘fact’ to the expression ‘thing’ is worth consideration. The reality not only consists of the entities like chairs, table, mountains and rivers, but also the natural processes and relations existing among various phenomena. The expression ‘fact’ takes care of everything. A relation or a process is a fact in as much as a chair is fact. Therefore, Wittgenstein’s move in this direction is a significant one.

Wittgenstein’s transition from early phase of philosophical thought to later phase can be seen as a sign of maturity. Although there is no radical shift in his
focus on language and reality, there is a shift in his attitude towards language and reality. This transition bridges the gap between his earlier and later thought. The dissolution of the notion of ‘meaning’ and his emphasis on use is considered to be a big leap in his philosophical journey. Similarly, Wittgenstein’s rejection of private language argument and understanding as a mental process is a unique work of a skilled philosopher. He started believing that philosophy is a matter of skill. Our competence and ability to perform certain acts is only shown but cannot be said. Speaking language, understanding language are skills. They require rigorous practice and ability to master the required technique. This skill of Wittgenstein requires a different sort of thinking altogether. It cannot be simply acquired. A scientific or logical way of thinking can be acquired with proper training. The skills to be acquired by the philosopher are embedded in our social practice. This is clear from his views on rule-following as a custom or social practice. Whether one has mastered the required skill is only exhibited though his performance of certain actions, but cannot be theorized. With respect to certain practices, Wittgenstein asks us to look and see what people do in the course of their day-to-day life. They are shown in the social behavior of the individuals. As regards rule-following as a social practice, in support of Wittgenstein Norman Malcolm writes as follows:

To speak of language is to participate in a way of living in which many people are engaged. The language that I speak gets its meaning from the common ways of acting and responding to many people. I take part in a language in the sense in which I
take part in a game ----which is surely one reason why

Wittgenstein compares language to games.256

A rule, according to Malcolm, is something public. It cannot be practiced privately. We come to know whether one is obeying a rule or not is exhibited through his actions. Therefore, there is some kind of transparency.

As mentioned earlier, we are not opposed to the classification of Wittgenstein’s philosophical work in to early and later phases. Under the influence of Frege and Russell, Wittgenstein constructed a formal system of philosophy called logical atomism. He provided us with an impressive systematic account of logical atomism in his Tractatus. This work of Wittgenstein primary subscribes to formalism and essentialism. According to formalistic interpretation, language is governed by certain formal rules, namely, the rules of truth functional logic. Not only that, the ideal or logically perfect language has really only one function, namely, the logical clarification of thought. The obvious set-backs of this doctrine are- 1. Language mirrors the reality. This position puts both language and reality on the same ontological level. In other words, the existence of the reality is only known through language. 2. The language that is supposed to mirror the reality is not ordinary language, but is logically or technically perfect language. In other words, both language and reality share the same logical form. 3. The only function of language is to picture the facts of the reality. The method of analysis is proposed by Wittgenstein in his earlier work suggests that names (words) are the unanalyzable units of the language. These names (words) have definite meaning. Therefore, the sentential

meaning is depending upon the names (words). In other words, the sentences derive their meaning form the words with which their composed of. In fact what a sentence express is a proposition. Thus what can be said is rooted in the doctrines of formalism and essentialism. In a way Wittgenstein typically followed the deterministic approach of natural science. Everything in this approach is formally fixed and rigid. Thus one can notice the primacy of what can be said over what can be shown.

Wittgenstein’s new approach to language and reality is seen his later writings. He came out of the shackles of both formalism and essentialism. He recognizes that language has got many functions apart from merely picturing facts of existence. Language always function is a context and there are many contexts in which it is used. The function of words in language is as diverse as the tools in a tool box. Wittgenstein holds that our intelligence is bewitched through language. The incorrect picture of language is produced by grammatical illusions. When Wittgenstein talks of grammar what he means by the term is the ability to use the language in different contexts. There are several language-games. If anyone tries to find a common element in all language-games then he finds none. We have to look for it. Wittgenstein tries to convince the reader that language does not contain one pattern. Its patterns vary from context to context. This clearly indicates that Wittgenstein repudiates the notion of essentialism. According to him, to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life. He asserts that analysis as a method should not aim at defining language or its meanings rather it must help us in describing the various uses of language. He further comments that confusion arise
because of muddled thinking. It is largely the product of the misuse of language. The anti-essentialist views of Wittgenstein are conformed from his analysis of the notions of ‘understanding’ ‘rule-following’, and ‘private language argument’. The anti-essentialist position of Wittgenstein rejects the metaphysical use of the words. He holds that what one has to do is to bring back the words from their metaphysical use to their everyday usage. Since all the philosophical problems grow out of language it is necessary to have basic familiarity with the uses of language. Wittgenstein suggests that the work of a philosopher consists in assembling remainders for a particular purpose. The use of language primarily expresses our ordinary experiences. Thus it has pragmatic purport.

One of the characteristics of an original philosopher is that he throws new light on old problems, and sees difficulties where one would see none. Wittgenstein is no exception to this rule. Whatever concept he touches, he forces us to think deeply about it. In his On Certainty we have seen how he reacts to the skeptics and to Moore’s solution to skepticism. His discussions on this topic make us consider epistemological issues concerning knowledge and doubt in a new light altogether. The crucial point made by Wittgenstein is that cognitive acts like doubting, giving reasons, justifying, arguing presuppose a bulk of knowledge that is taken for granted, namely, a world-picture. The propositions constituting a world-picture are not deliberate assumptions. They are explications of our form of life which can be made conscious. It is a mistake to claim that we know such propositions to be true with certainty for they are beyond truth and falsity. They provide the framework, the standards by which we can test the truth or falsity of empirical propositions.
It would be of some interest to compare the views of Quine on the analytic-synthetic distinction with some ideas of Wittgenstein expressed in his *On Certainty*. The main point behind Quine’s essay, ―Two Dogmas of Empiricism‖ is that the analytic-synthetic distinction is logically ill-founded. Quine compares our total knowledge at any time to a sphere whose inner core consists of propositions that are relatively less open to revision (the so called analytic propositions) and the surface to the empirical propositions which are constantly bombarded by our experiences and which are more likely to be revised. In the process, claims Quine, even the inner core of propositions can be affected. For example, some believe that the law of the excluded middle may have to be revised in the light of facts revealed by quantum mechanics, for atoms exhibit both wave and particle natures. This is an interesting observation.

Regarding the difference between ordinary empirical propositions and the propositions constituting the world-picture, Wittgenstein says that there is no permanent dividing line between the two. He says: “The same proposition may get treated at one time as something to test by experience, at another as a rule of testing.” Wittgenstein gives the analogy of a river-bed. The base on which the river flows is the channel for the movement of water. Part of the flowing materials may get fossilized. On the other hand, parts of the bee see may get eroded and start flowing. Here the world-picture is the river-bed of thoughts and the empirical propositions, the flowing waters. For example, at one time the theory of evolution was rivaled by empirical hypothesis in biological circles. Now it is accepted as a paradigm for explain biological facts by most of the scientists.
One point of concern can be found in what Wittgenstein had to say about the clash of world-pictures. We have seen that such a fundamental difference of opinion cannot be settled by appealing to higher standards for the very standards of adjudication are being questioned. At this point one can convince the other not by justification but by persuasion. But that does not mean that the one who was convinced in the process to adopt a different world-picture is wrong. ‘Right and wrong’, ‘true or false’ are terms not applicable to a world picture.

We should understand that language-game, form of life, family resemblance are only Wittgenstein’s philosophical tools to understand the varieties of ordinary language and people’s practices. But, there are certain things, which cannot be explained by his philosophy of forms of life, language-game, etc. That is, they are beyond the realm of philosophical speculation and justification. This is the reason why often Wittgenstein suffered from disquietudes, which forced him to be silent on these issues. These issues include religion, culture and value. As mentioned, Wittgenstein believed that religious, culture and value, have got two dimensions; the external dimension and the internal dimension, though there was no explicit mention. In the case of values, he spoke about relative and absolute values, which we equate with those with extrinsic worth and those with intrinsic worth respectively. Similarly, there are also external dimension and internal dimensions of culture. These dimensions are visible in one's practices. The external dimension that which contains the elements of what can be said, but the internal dimension contains the elements that can be shown. But personally for Wittgenstein, the notion of the ‘will of God’ is crucial. For him, the world, even to some extent the forms of life are
not our making. The world is ‘given’. And for the ‘given world man cannot be a measure of things. There is some absolute standard. These absolute values belong to the realm of divine will. No absolute value is reducible to facts. They are transcendent. Similar is the case with religion and culture. So, what is accounted for in his later approach through language-game and other techniques is the external dimension of the issues concerned. The internal dimension is again beyond the human grasp.

To conclude, for Wittgenstein, the ‘picture theory’ did not give any scope for both the external dimension and internal dimension of religion, culture and value. They both are relegated to the realm of mystical. As a matter of fact, there is no question of external dimension and internal dimension of religion, culture and value, for ‘ideal language’ is suited to bring out neither of these dimensions. For him, in his earlier approach, it was precisely that about which he was silent, was important in his life. In his later approach, the ‘ordinary’ language could able to accommodate these issues, but I believe, only the external dimension of religion, culture and value. And hence, we can say that it was precisely the later part about which he was silent, was important in his life.

Let us now evaluate his contribution as a whole. First of all, there is no doubt that Wittgenstein is an original thinker. His originality, as he puts it, does not lie in the seed, but in the soil in which the seed is sown. His concepts are novel in the sense that they provided us with new insights into the very conception of the art of philosophizing. Wittgenstein’s ingenuity lies in the way in which he tried to understand the age-old philosophical issues. This is left to the individuals to judge
whether his views are acceptable or not, but the fact remains that his views are genuine. In a sense, Wittgenstein’s art of philosophizing is a blend of personal experience and intellectual maturity. This is the reason why his approach to any philosophical issues is radically different from the earlier approaches.

His philosophical tools are mainly intended to bring out the unseen dimensions of the various philosophical issues. This is his sole aim. Of course, one may or may not agree with Wittgenstein’s way of looking at things. His intention is to dissolve the philosophical problems by rehabilitating them in their appropriate contexts. But it does not mean that his philosophical findings are dictatorial or final. For that matter, every philosopher aims at setting the earlier disputes with his own approach. And only because of this, every philosopher stands on the shoulders of the philosopher(s). Wittgenstein was not an exception to this rule. Many a time he was influenced by the views of the great philosophers like Schopenhauer, Frege, Russell, and Moore. Apart from philosophers, there were so many eminent thinkers, who influenced Wittgenstein to a greater extent. Similarly, Wittgenstein too rendered his shoulders for the then future thinkers like Kripke, Rorty, Derrida, Habermas and many other philosophers, theologians, and literary critics. This clearly shows that Wittgenstein’s analysis of the various philosophical issues did not lead to a dead end. For example, Wittgenstein’s transcendentalism can be compared with that of Vedanta, a popular philosophical tradition in India. The philosophical ‘I’ which Wittgenstein talked about is akin to the philosophical ‘I’ in Advaita Vedanta. The philosophical ‘I’ is subject of all experiences, it is not part of those experiences.
The positive features of any philosopher presuppose the negative features too. It is not that Wittgenstein’s views are not open to criticism at all. Von Wright in his “Biographical Sketch’ highlights that there is a possibility that Wittgenstein’s thought may degenerate into a jargon. The simplicity and naturalness with which Wittgenstein tried to approach the problems of philosophy are not easy to grasp. There is a danger that his followers may make a caricature of his philosophical thought through their poor mimicking.257

It can also be pointed out that the album of Wittgenstein represents a history of philosophy. But what benefit does an ordinary man get by looking into this album? Wittgenstein’s answer to this question is that what an ordinary man knows is perfect. He needs no therapy. As aptly remarked by Stroll, Wittgenstein’s advice, as it appears from his later writings, is only for the tiny coterie of intellectuals.258 They mislead us and see to that we are trapped in the fly-bottles. Constructive thinking is that which holds fast to the ground. There is no destructive element in Wittgenstein’s philosophy. His criticism is constructive and positive.259 It is difficult to uproot it.

Further it can be noted that according to McDonough there is no one particular way of showing, but there are several ways of showing. To quote his remarks: “Wittgenstein distinguishes between that which is shown and by symbols or a symbolic system and that which shows itself...without any connection with

symbols." According to him, the mystical elements belong to the latter. What is mystical can be shown without any reference to facts. Also, it implies that propositions just who what they say. They belong to the category of symbolism. Similarly, Donald Harward held that Wittgenstein’s distinction between saying and showing can be classified into reflexive and demonstrative categories. These categories can help us the contradictions involved in the *Tractatus*. For instance, Wittgenstein held that logic is mystical in as much as religion and ethics are. But it is difficult to put them in the same category. One can conveniently claim that religion and ethics belong to the reflexive category and logic belongs to demonstrative category.\textsuperscript{261} There is another interesting observation as regards the distinction between saying and showing. This is from Philip Shields. He does not completely disagree with Harward. However, he modifies this distinction between reflexive and demonstrative ways of showing to represent the external and internal relations of the propositions. The external relations are the sense of a proposition and the internal relations are the structure of a proposition. The former can be treated as saying and the latter the sowing. The apparent contradiction between saying and showing can be resolved by noticing “the explicit asymmetry between saying and showing.”\textsuperscript{262}

In fact, saying and showing are not isolated from each other. They are dependent on each other. As aptly held by Martin Pulido,\textsuperscript{263} the distinction between


\textsuperscript{261} Harward, Donald, D. *Wittgenstein’s Saying and Showing Themes*, Bonn: Bouvier, 1976, pp. 5-15.


\textsuperscript{263} Pulido, Martin, “The Place of Saying and Showing in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and Some Later
saying and showing goes beyond \textit{Tractatus} and is also present in the later writings of Wittgenstein. For example, Wittgenstein’s views on mathematics do not drastically change in his earlier and later works. Mathematics is an assortment of methods and their employment in their proper manner. The results of mathematics are exhibited or shown through their applications. The use of rules clearly shows the way in which the rules of mathematics are employed. To conclude, Wittgenstein’s distinction between saying and showing is something unique in the sense that takes care of both the physical and social aspects of reality. Both saying and showing are the two sides of the same coin.