Land revenue formed the major source of state income under the Mughals. Its size varied according to circumstances such as the yield of particular harvests, fluctuations in prices, and the efficiency of the collection machinery. Luttre observed, "----- there are no fixed limits to the land-revenue or rent, which he (the king) levies from its occupier, save their inability or unwillingness to pay".

We have no information regarding the magnitude of the land-revenue in relation to the produce of the land or in relation to the surplus generated by the peasant. What we get are only the ratios of land-revenue per bigha in rupees. By taking the prices of the agricultural products prevalent in Awadh or in the adjacent territories under the East India Company, one can then perhaps have some idea about the size of the revenue in terms of the grain.

Luttre informs us that, "During that sovereign's (Saadat Ali, 1758-1814) life, the rent of good land varied from one to

1. Luttre, op.cit., p.48. British officials said the land-revenue in the light of rent; and the king was considered to be the actual proprietor of the land; "the sovereign is, according to established Indian rule, the only acknowledged proprietor of the soil". Luttre, (op.cit.). However, I have not found any native statement to this effect from Awadh.
one and half rupees per bigha, now (c.1856) the assessment is 2, 3 or 4 rupees per bigha, and can seldom be fully levied without the ruin, both to rajyal and the zaminār. At another place he praises the good and judicious administration of Saadat Ali and adds, "Since the death of nawab Saadat Ali rent is fixed at such a rate — generally 50% above that of former times". But Heber who toured the kingdom during 1825-27 says: "I asked the umāshāta the rent per bigha of the land. He said, generally 4 rupees, but sometimes 6; and sometimes the peasant had all taken from him." It appears that he had spoken to some one who had exaggerated the matter. The revenue rates prevalent in Tiloin Raj during 1856 indicate the extent of the exaggeration. In the Chattari estate of Tiloin, "the assessment was allowed to remain at the old standard of 2 rupees per bigha of old arable soil and one rupee for newly reclaimed land..."

Butter tells us that revenue rates per bigha in Southern Awadh varied from 2 to 4 rupees; the latter rates, he deems to be rather harsh and difficult of realization without the ruin of the payers. At another place we come across the statement that because

1. Butter, op.cit., p.54
2. Ibid.
4. For a detailed description of the administrative arrangements in Tiloin Raj see Butter, pp.109-114.
5. Ibid., p.54. As far as the size of the bigha is concerned, some local variations are noted by Butter. But it seems that the revenue-rates and the productivity of the soil had been recorded in the standard unit of the pakka bigha (20 lathas x 20 lathas; each latha being of 100 inches). It would be unreasonable to think that the revenue-rate contd....
on the high revenue rates the peasants were left with little for their subsistence. They had not even been left with the resources to carry on cultivation and were forced to borrow seeds from the village bankers. Bishop Heber wondered how under such extremely oppressive conditions the peasants could still carry on cultivation. Thereupon he was told, "what can they (the cultivators) do? --- they must eat; and when they have put the seeds in the ground, they must wait till it comes up, and then take what they can get of it."

Moreover, the peasants were obliged to pay certain other fiscal dues, which in turn formed the amount of recognised perquisites of the zamindars. Thus the faujdar was, "authorised to levy for his own benefit a rupee from every zamindar --- this gratuity is called bhent". The additional fiscal obligations claimed by the superior right holders from the peasant are discussed elsewhere.

Charles Elliott in his Chronicles of Oonao has given figures of land-revenue settled in that district by the 'Native Government' in 1855 and by the British in 1861. The figures suggest that the revenue levied by the Awadh authorities, at least

... or the productivity of the soil was recorded anywhere in kacha bigha, which was only 40% of the former. However the methods by which the revenue officials dealt with the local variation in the unit are not known. Butler, pp. 82-83.

1. Ibid., p. 49
4. See the Chapters on the Nature of the rights of the zamindars and of the 'Revenue grantees'.

...
in the first half of the 19th century, was not by any means more onerous than that levied by the British authorities, particularly since by 1861 the ravages of the mutiny and the subsequent scarcities had taken their toll. Elliott's figures are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parganas</th>
<th>1855</th>
<th>1861</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(i) Bagharmau, etc. 3 parganas</td>
<td>Rs.2,99,240</td>
<td>Rs.2,99,033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) Fatohpur Chaurasi etc. 4 parganas</td>
<td>Rs.2,96,274</td>
<td>Rs.2,77,049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iii) Hurha, etc. 7 parganas</td>
<td>Rs.3,68,416</td>
<td>Rs.4,67,377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>Rs.9,63,930</strong></td>
<td><strong>Rs.10,333,64</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Nawab-vazirs inherited the Mughal system of revenue assessment and collection and this seems to have been largely retained by them till at least 1765. After the battle of Buxar, Jang Bahadur was forced to sign a treaty with the English East India Company at Jajmau near Kanpur. Apart from the political implications of the treaty, the most important financial clauses of the treaty stipulated a drastic reduction in the court's army and the payment of large amounts to the company for keeping its forces in Awadh. In spite of this new

1. Elliott, p.104. Jagdish Raj says, "Had this state of affairs continued (the one prevailing under the nawab vazirs) much longer a general desolation of the country must have followed" /JESHO/, 1958, p.1047. This is open to question since he makes no comparisons with the
financial pressure, the traditional financial structure was maintained under Shujauddaulah. But his death in 1775 marks a turning point in the history of Awadh as the British got a fresh opportunity of imposing new demands upon his successor Asafuddaulah. Under these pressures the system of mansab and jair inherited from the Mughal empire was abandoned, and the Awadh government had to make arrangements for direct collection of taxation everywhere.

The system of the assessment was known as tashkhis while its collection from the prayers bore the name tabail. The amount of land revenue was assessed separately for kharif and rabi harvests. The revenue for the autumn crops was divided into five monthly instalments (qist), while for the spring crops the payment was demanded in four. These nine instalments in total were payable at the new moons, between 11th September and 12th June of the succeeding year. This rule was followed very strictly by the officials. In case of the inability of the zamindars to pay the whole amount before the last lunar month (12th June) an invasion of his village was sanctioned by the faujdar and soldiers were sent to attach and sell away the entire property of the defaulting land-

holders and zamindars.

The key point in determining the amount of taxation was that it should be in conformity with the previous year's assessment. The actual settlement with the zamindars took place in the month of December, as by that time the rabi crops were well forward, and an estimate could be made about the quality of the expected harvest. The chakledar ordered the tehsildar to gather the land-owners of his pargana, along with the village accountants and qanoongo by a certain date, when the chakledar encamped on the spot to receive them. The scene in the tent of the chakledar is described in detail by Elliott. First of all the village accountant (patwari) used to give information as to how large an area of land of such and such crop was under cultivation. The qanoongo, by his personal knowledge of the condition of the crops, would confirm the report of patwari. The tehsildar reported on the actual realization made from the village during the previous year. At the same time he gave his opinion as to whether the amount of the land-revenue should be raised this year or not. Most often suggestions of an increase came from the tehsildar out of collusion with some land-holder who might be interested in taking the particulars village on farm. Naturally, such suggestion when made was contested vehemently by the actual

owners of that village who insisted that they were already
ruined men and could not pay as much as had been paid last
year. But in case the original owner wished to return his
village, he had to make some settlement with the
Chahli dar with some enhancement over the last year's figure.
Otherwise the village was 'settled' with the new land-holder
who was a ruse to raising the amount of the tax. The trick
often was that next year the Chahli dar would report that the
village had been very much over assessed, and recommend
that the amount of demand be reduced to the original one, or even
less than the actual realization of the previous year.

But little information as regards the determination
in the nature of the burden placed on the individual peasant.
Since the village was assessed as a unit, there is every reason
to believe that the distribution of taxes among individual
peasants could have been very unequal and unjust. Moreover
the system gave full liberty to the land holders to deal with
the peasantry as they thought fit.

Dutcher informs us that the land-revenue was fixed
on the basis of the actual cultivated area in Aighas. According
to him, the reign of Nawab Sadat Ali (1798-1814) marked the
water shed in the agrarian history of Awadh. With him departed

"the permanent prosperity of the country". This was now
attached to the exigencies of the year, to the spirituality and
extravagance of the ruling powers, and to the savagery of the
temporary local authority. During that sovereign's life,
the rent of house land varied from one to one and half rupee
per annum (1½) the amount is 2, 3, or 4 rupees per
acre. The rents were fully limited, without ruin, both to
revenue and zamindars.

Apart from the relatively low revenue rates then
prevailing, the peasants enjoyed some security of tenures under
Ba'adat Ali Khan. The leases and acceptance were executed to
run from 2 to 5 years. These fiscal documents were signed,
sealed, and verified by the various revenue officials such as
the zamindar, qanungos, diwan, fevadar and chakledar. But
after the death of Ba'adat Ali in 1614 the entire picture
underwent a change, as thereafter, "no lease has been granted
for more than a year and rent is fixed at such a rate generally
4½ times that of former times as to leave the farmer (seasants)
little, if anything, a bare subsistence."

The Government officials most often made the revenue-
settlements with the local Chieftains and the community brother-

1. Mobar, cit., pp. 102-3
2. Attor, cit., p. 94
3. Iqbal, p. 49.
4. Mobar, pp. 100-1
The local magnates remitted a fixed sum to the treasury, while it was left to them to assess and collect the amount from the other members of the communities. The most notable example of this class has been provided by Butter in connection with the family of the Chattari Rajputs established at Tiloin in chakla Salon. The head of the brotherhood was Shankar Singh, styled raja. He had to pay Rs. 7,50,000 as land-revenue on behalf of the whole brotherhood. Each member of the fraternity paid his share of the land-revenue to him. The chakledar received this amount without any difficulty. The peasants of the Tiloin estate were assessed very lightly, i.e. the rate of the arable land was 2/- per bigha, while one rupee was charged for newly reclaimed land. As a matter of fact it seems that since such estates had some hereditary interests, a fairly good and judicious system of revenue administration here prevailed.

Butter describes Tiloin as, "one pleasing oasis amidst this wide spread social waste." Probably because of the existence of such estates "the district of Salon has long enjoyed a degree of tranquility unknown to any other part of Oudh." 2

When the na'ab-wazirs made arrangements for direct revenue collection through their own officials, he appointed the 'umia, nazima, chakludars and tehsildars. These officials were directed to remit to the treasury whatever amount they

2. Ibid.
The various small estates ('bhils') were assisted in their work by the hereditary village officials such as the chaudhari, on the 'panchayat'. In case a higher amount of the land-revenue was in their hands by them, the share of the individual village or of the panchayat was determined by these officials. These officials, as a part of their duty, looked after the land and crops of the area. In case of any difficulty, they could call military help from the 'rajgarh'.

In contrast to this, under the 'amnee' system were almost no constraints on paying the specified sum in the public treasury. They could often enrich themselves at the expenses of both the farming classes and the land-holders. The only thing these officials used to do was to pay large bribes to the court officials so as to secure that their accounts would be dealt with leniently. However, in history of Oudh, under the 'amnee' system, to quote an iron official, was, "an disgraceful tale of the shameless extortion of the amnee by all classes, from the minister, who stood behind the throne, to the lowest peon who served a process on the amnee." The system was so designed as to succeed only if the various officials worked honestly and were vigilantly

1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
...by the minister in charge of the revenue department. In actual fact, the minister, or any minister who tried to know anything, could get no information as to the, "new writers are in the villages under their own servants." The

situation was given up in despair, so it impoverished the kingdom so substantially increased the wealth of the revenue collectors. An idea could be gathered from the fact that a testimony of an English official, Maduock, "the rupees collected by one minister (Khan Mohammad Daulah) amounting to more than 17 lacs of rupees"; and he estimated that the "mills were among them nearly 50 lacs of rupees yearly." This state of affairs continued for long, and Lalji, protests at the unrighteous, inhuman, and the ineptitude of the high officials to cope with them. "The mills of different areas and (mills) lacs of rupees are under heads of various amounts and improper items of expenditure, while the authorities of the revenue department (in collusion with their accountants and improper items of expenditure, while their accountants rob the amount (as irrecoverable)." Thus the kingdom of Awadh was robbed of its resources by its own officials.

The visit of the chakledar in any area for the purpose of revenue collection was most dreaded by the zamindars as well as the peasants. For with him, "the work of plunder and devastation commences with the uprooting of the neighbouring villages.

2. Ibid., p.387.
3. Lalji, Mirakul Aude
to put up temporary huts for his troops." When the chakiladar
contemplated any move to raise the amount of land-revenue, it
was usually resisted by the land-holders, "the zamindars
and their immediate adherents at the same time" took flight
to the jungle forests and mud forts," surrounded by a ditch and
enclosure of living bamboo, through which cannon shot cannot
penetrate. Sutter cites the example of the zamindar of rain in
marcha vallon. The zamindar Isri Singh punctually remitted
a sum of 1 loc as the land-revenue, still he thought it fit
to maintain 2,010 men for collecting the land-revenue and fighting
by which reason the necessity arose. The peasants were
lightly over-seas and held extensive farms varying from 20 to 100
w,heas. In 1877, the chakiladar kunnalal enhanced the demand to
ten thousand rupees. Isri Singh, not agreeing to pay the enhanced
rates, mustered his troops and held the village against the
chakiladar, until the approach of newly raised brigade of colonel
kenns. The zamindars was now forced to retire to the neigh-
bouring vallon, and his house was burnt down by the chakiladar.
On occasion the refugees zamindars were forced to remain in
villages for year.

1. 2nd, p. 51-52
2. 1st, p. 257.
3. 3rd, p. 257.
The military element in the process of the revenue collection has always been very important. Regular forces had to be maintained to ensure the realization of the stipulated amount, these forces being known as the mut'āiyānah. In case these forces were thought insufficient at the time of the harvesting season, additional troops were recruited to assist the revenue collectors and revenue farmers. The additional troops were called sehbandi. The sehbandi troops were employed as the 'āmil as well as the agents of the jāigar in the earlier period, at the approach of every harvesting season. A jābūliyat executed by the jāigar for a jāigar in Surkhnawāran in 1116/1708, excludes the cost of maintaining the sehbandi troops from the total amount to be paid to the jāigar. In a document of Asafudaulah's reign, we find an officer saying that, "the rabi harvest is reaching, and the number of the sehbandi troops in not sufficient; so it is requested that one tāman (contingent) be sent with an adh sehnun for the necessary work; when the sehbandi troops are recruited, the said tāman will be returned.”

Nā'il Ṣahib passed through the district of Sandilīkh in the course of his tour, and found the 'āmil of the district in a considerable force. The district was put under the charge by the and the 'āmil Huṣain Ṭakhsī had three regiments of nūrān and twelve guns. The soldiers of these battalions,

3. Inshmūlah Ṣāhib, Nuṣaf-i Ṣaf, Ms. Abdul Salām Collection, Maulana Azad Library, NLU, ff. 72a-b.
say, 'the worst that the country suffers under. Although the soldiers were always expected to accompany the 'amils, and there was hardly any occasion when their services were not needed in collection of the revenue, yet the troops and artillery were never but in a working condition. The bullocks employed to carry the amils carriages were utterly useless, so much so that even amils passed from the district, the amil had to hire a few plough bullocks from the cultivators to draw out the guns to my camp to fire the salute. With the help of such unauthorised force, the revenue was collected with the utmost harshness, and in doing so all the limits were crossed.

Revenue collection, it was said, "resembles rather the levying of tribute in a hostile country, than the enforcement of the claims of a lawful sovereign upon his own subjects."

During the mid 19th century, Broom as well as Lalji are unequivocal in declaring the 'amils and other revenue collection to be responsible for increase in banditry. The reasons for the ravages and the depredation of the country, says Lalji, "are that the settlement of the revenue upon those who pay it, is not made in accordance with their portions and shares in this country -- the 'amils and the revenue contractors never.

1. Broom, op. cit., p. 182
2. Broom, op. cit.,
3. Edward Thornton, A Description of the Territories under the Government of the East India Company and the Native States on the Continent of India.
respected the agreement and having the intention to raise the amount, they never allowed the duty here to the landholder." At another place Lawi says that this could have prevailed, "if the 'amal had given half to the local..." Slemman too cited an instance from the district of Muhammad, where the 'amal Khanjo Muhammad nawaz a minor of the government demand on the rent was refused - but they (the owners) refused to pay while neither inhabitants of the locality agreed to pay the income for the revenue; and this led to the accretion and impotency of the area. In followers of one land-holder attacked, burned, and went down the village and killed his (the owner's) brother with his two sons."

The revenue collectors have been held responsible on a number of occasions for their negligence in performing the duties, and giving a free hand to oppressors, and highway robbers. Slemman indeed charges the 'amal of our good Benjamin Singh for his, "notoriously conniving at th. crimes (shop-robbery) from a consciousness of utter impotency to contend with the land-holders who commit them". At the same time, we are informed that he had a big force at his disposal, "sufficient to keep in order a district five times or forty." His forces

1. The third section of the chapter two of Nuzhat-ul-Mushtari is entitled, "A collection of the occurrences of depredations and murder as a result of the arbitrary manner of the 'amal and revenue collectors" ff. 112-223.
2. Ibid., f. 190
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., pp. 3-4.
6. Ibid.
includes one jähnigür battalion, jähnigür battalion, and the jähnigür battalion. Nine guns and a squadron of horses were also kept by him.

The fact was that the 'ämils and our revenue officials were often in collusion with the leaders of the ramgar-gangs. In the course of his tour of inspection, he would visit:

"suffices residing in the camps of the 'ämils. Even if the 'ämils were not in league with such elements, they 'but their creators?', did in punishing defaulters or the unarmed cultivators among the land-holders." The court extorted, by means of the 'ämils, helped the latter to realize that much with little difficulty; and in return of this, he would pay to their activities. The 'ämil of Burcoropad Raja Girnarra Singh, says Sleeman, "acquiesces in all the atrocities committed by these 'ämils, and is in consequence, able to collect his revenues and secure the favours of the court."

The revenue collectors use to make conciliatory gestures towards the big land-holders so as to make them agree to pay the land-revenue. They even went to the length of giving an absolute increase in their share of the hānkār, which was quite contrary to the royal order. They bribed the high and influential officials at the court to get a notion for the increased share of the hānkār. In any it was not sanctioned, the offering

1. Ibid
2. Ibid
3. Ibid
4. Ibid
of the military force by the viceroy could be an occurrence. Thenceforward, the viceroy could be attacked by the Mamelukes in large numbers. Indeed, it was very difficult in quelling the Mamelukes, the viceroy would be at liberty to ask the consent of the English rulers for, "sending him the aid of two stations and heavy military." The English civil and military officers were advised to exercise the utmost caution before they committed "with the requisition of the Mamelukes."

The British resident at the court of Aqush, lord Chelmsford informed the viceroy in 1871 that, "he sanctioned it (use of British troops) after a careful and minute investigation of the case and very well." Yet British arms and troops were employed indiscriminately by the Mamelukes in punishing the "pretenders to sole" and representing the country that it was subdued by them in 1859; that such assistance be discontinued altogether.

An off-shoot of the Mameluke system was the yahz system. The Mamelukes used to assign a portion of the land from his estate

1. I'id.
2. Foreign Secret Consultations, iii, 8th Jan., 1776 A.H.
3. I'id.
4. I'id.
5. I'id.
to the commandant of the troops in order to collect the revenue due to soldiers to his troops. Since the soldiers knew it to be their only means of livelihood, they used to bear the amount with the utmost harshness. All men concurred, in coutil, the Lakulme jabz (ulooj) to collect and pay a certain sum, for which the state is held liable the Persian term s not presumably lād-kullām (lower) and the wusili jabz
(post) to pay the collector of troops a sum which the commandant may be able to collect. In the second method the work of
the collection was carried out by the commandant and his soldiers.
Al-'amir observes, "If they can't collect it from the sale of
all the crops of the season, they seize and sell the stock
and the quantity of all kinds to be found on the estate; and if
this will not suffice, they will not scruple to seize and sell
the women and children." Still quite strangely this system
was thought to be less oppressive to the peasantry than the actual
collection of the revenue by the nāzīm or that area himself.
Lately calling, the actual mechanism of the jabz system:

"If any officers fixed, of the military forces posted in the
area. If any had amounts outstanding for payment of the
salaries of the troops, he could submit the jabz for one lac of
rupees, before the 'āmil." 3

1. Al-'amir, op.cit., pp. 140-1
2. Al-'amir, op.cit., pp. 140-1
3. Al-'amir, op.cit., pp. 143-1
Liljé says that if an officer of the artillery had
11,000 rupees, he would make a claim
in the control of an area with their
11,000 rupees, he would command as head of one
area, and no hilt would be diminished from them. They
were also enlisted in various ways, a number
of them being enlisted under various
names, such as,,!, paju, aliggi, tila, and
Muhä. The officer alone were the beneficiaries of these
orders. If, says Liljé, the troops were to remain satisfied
with their pay, and that two or three occasions remained unpaid for
a year the nazim might, some times the entire amount was best
left, but certainly, no he soldiers got nothing.

1 Liljé, Dj.Cit., ff. 459a-46b.
It would not be accurate to this was a solitary instance; such or more were a common phenomenon among the

They borrowed large sums on the basis of the revenue of the ensuing year. The work of revenue-collection was entrusted to the troops whose pay claims had fallen into the arrears. It was common for these troops either to overlay the crops or to extract the double amount from the peasants. This practice was said to be "the source of much evil."

The system was introduced only when the mustajirs were unable to enforce payment in any way. The amount of the troops, when taking possession of their assignment, appropriated the whole produce for themselves. They had little regard for the rights of the zamindars or the peasants. As the direct-officer of the system, the troops were rendered unfit for any sort of military service as all their time was consumed in making arrangements in their respective 'estates'. The soldiers as well as the officers were converted into "manorial tenants on the worst possible description." They used to

2. Ibid., Vol.I, p.86
It is said that the entire system of such irregularities was to be put into effect everywhere. The experiment made by Mr. Jinnah at the Agency, to implement this

in its entirety with success, at least for a
time, must have been to change the mis-management of the kingdom. Herein,

Muhammad Ali Khan, the prime minister, submitted

a list of the assignment of an area and

the area were to be informed thereof. He agreed to the proposal

on the condition, that in it should be no interference from any

other. Absolutely, he was instructed the village of Biyana.

All about one lac of rupees, its

villagers were ruined through oppression, and the total

revenue from the area never exceeded Rs.50,000/. Mr. Hasan

Hussain of the area, contrary to the practice of

1. [Iliz, vol.I, 6456.]
The territory, which had been ruled by the court favorites, was turned into agreements with mir haseen. It stable in such a judicious system of their revenue collection in the way that the zaminadar used to send in revenue to the treasury without any demand or talqin being put on them. It was of the year Mir Haseen was able to dispose of 70,000/= on the Nawab's treasury after turning all the revenues incurred in the administrative arrangements. The result of the territory was quite prosperous and acts of malversation and bribe were much fewer. The outstanding, great pinstripe which had been taken as a challenge to the authority of the officials and the court favorites. Hence, the court favorites, his abdication and new officials were installed in his place. Under the new officials, the territory returned to the situation in which Mir Haseen had found it.

The success of the revenue system was directly connected by the high authorities of the Nawab. The 'umalquzaras were little trouble and no consent of these people. They were allowed to collect the revenue as per village and, in the end of the year whatever collection was

1. Iqig, f*, 16b-19a.
could be made was remitted to the treasury of the nawab. If any amount was left to be realized, it was debited to the account of these malguzars. Apart from collecting of the revenue, they were expected to make customary gifts to the 'amils and his establishment.

During the later period of the Awadh administration the amannee system of became subject to as many evils as the ijara system. When the authorities used to assign an area to the 'amil under this system, they used to take an iqrarnama from him, just as the mustajirs used to give qubuliyat. The 'amil's iqrarnama was the effect that a stipulated amount of jama would be paid to the treasury at the end of the year and in case of his failure to discharge the obligation, he was to be held responsible for the default. The nawabi establishment attached to the amani district had little say in the affairs of the 'amil. The 'amil used to realise large amount of customary gifts which were above to the amount stated in iqrarnama. Thus large fortunes might be made by 'amils from such extra levies. After the appointment of the 'amil to an amani district, he would show large amounts of deductions on account of the expeditions sent against the t'aalugadaras; similarly a number of fictitious accounts were submitted to the court. On occasion the stackness of the statis supervision over the activities of these 'amils, enboldened them so much that they realised the revenues of an ilaga, but did not pay anything into the nawab's treasury. Indeed Lalji laments
that the rajas suffer more hardship in the hands of these
Ramil, than by the revenue collectors of the mustajirs."

often revenue arrangements were made with large
community-brotherhoods in the areas where caste ties were
strong. Their chiefs, styles rajas, in their turn made
agreements with the heads of their minor branches. Areas,
where such arrangements existed, were free from the interference
of the chareids and Ramil, that the peasants enjoyed
some security of tenures. The rate of assessment, too,
remained as we have already seen in one case, "at the old
standard of 2 Rs. per bigha of old arable soil and 1 Rs. per
bigha for newly reclaimed land; generally, the rates in such
areas was about two-thirds of what prevailed elsewhere.

Francis Buchanan in his survey of the mughal sarkar of Jorakhpur
found that the hereditary chiefs the revenues to the treasury
or the Ramil as the case might be, while they "managed their
estates by letting each mauza or gan to a birtia or dikmi."n
These birtias were the hereditary chiefs of their brotherhoods,
and the arrangement was made with the brotherhoods rather than
with the individual chiefs, as the eldest member of the brother
hood was chosen by the members themselves to represent their
interest with the raja. In case of his discharging the duties
dishonestly, his dismissal could be procured by other members
of the brotherhood. In case the raja was dissatisfied with

1. Ibid., ff. 220-258.
2. dutton, p. 109-114
3. martin, c. cit., p. 546
the conduct of the birtia, he would appoint a māntu from the same clan to perform duties in place of the dismissed birtia. In such arrangements the proprietary rights of the peasants were not protected as they could be evicted at the will of the raja, and the gubūliyats, if made, ran for a short period. Still since most of the cultivators were the members of the same brotherhood, and the rāja had to depend upon their support at times of emergency, oppression of the peasants in respect of tenure and assessment was often avoided. In course of time, due to the internal conflicts and laxity of caste-ties and the effects of indebtedness, the power of the local chiefs (rājas) faded away. This process, in turn, offered an opportunity to the nawāb-wazīr to assert their authority over the Chieftains demanding regular payment of the revenues. The situation was supposedly tolerable under Shuja'uddaula, but Asafuddaulah formed out the entire region to one Col. Hanny, on the recommendation of the Governor General. This gentleman adapted such "violent measures in the collection, as to depopulate the country". The traces of such destruction of the country's agriculture were to be perceived even after a number of years.

The system of making arrangements with the local chieftains seems to have continued in the southern districts of Awadh during the first half of the 19th c. Butter, while

describing the unique administration of the Tiloin estate in Salon district, says that the chief of the Chatteri family, Shankar Singh, who was styled Raja of Tiloin. He used to pay Rs. 7,50,000 for the whole Tiloin zamindari to the chakledar. The payment was made regularly without giving any pretence to the chakledar for making any attempt at undue exaction. The five brothers of Shankar Singh were also courteously styled rajas, while his nephews were called Thakur they remitted the specified revenues of their share to Shankar Singh punctually. In case the sub-zamindars showed any defiance, he was, "left to be dealt with by the chakledar, who puts him in fetters, and levies the rent from the raiyats." The zamindar was not released, "untill he (gave) security for the future regular payment". Apart from the such occasions, the chakledar could never make any undue demand from the zamindars. This being known to the neighbouring zamindar as well, "they sometimes make successful appeals at Lucknow, against the chakledars' exactions."

Besides the above revenue arrangements, the chief method employed under the nawab-wazirs for the purpose of revenue collection was the ijara or contract system. By employing this method, the nawabi Government ensured a fixed amount for the treasury establishment. Under this system the muta'iynah and the

1. Dutt, pp. 109-114
2. Ibio., pp.:..
114

sehbandi troops were maintained and paid for by the revenue farmers themselves. Even the hereditary officers serving in the jāyā villages were also paid their salaries by the revenue-contractors. The system had become so popular that the land-grantees (alimcādares) started making farming arrangements with the mustājīrs in the villages of their grants. The jāyās had of course, no salary or land grant in view of the services performed by him but as Bitter put it, "the difference between the sum, which he has for the year engaged to pay into the public treasury," and the amount which, with the military power of the state at his command he can levy from the zamindār, constituted his income. In case of the natural calamities the jāyā could be provided some relief by allowing a deduction, and by not insisting for the full amount for which the contract had been made.

In theory the contractors could have an interest in improving the lot of the peasantry and raising the productivity of the soil, thus to generate a larger peasant's surplus. The

1. A qubuliya'd deed executed in 1116f/1708, by one Dilār Khan for a jāyā in pargana Sandila, stipulates a payment of 22000/- to the jāyār. This excluded the cost of maintaining seh-bandi troops and peshkash to faujdar, jil-1467 (1116/1708).

2. jil-1257 (1254/1838). This pargana was issued to the chaklekar of Sandila to enquire the complaint of a village mustājir regarding his pay claims against the mustājir.

3. F.I.-64 (4th R.Y. of Firrukhshiyar). The village in question belonged to Mulla Niramuddin and was situated in sarkar Sarraich, while the grantee's headquarters happened to be at Lucknow. (Firunyi Mahal papers are preserved in the Department of History, WRU, Aligarh).

tenure of the contract was for a number of years and the
waving an increase in capacity of the peasants would have
benefited the contractors themselves. But this was not so in
practice. Najid Ali, the nazim of Farragharh, under whose
ilāra lay the to'ālluga of Huncune in pargana Rivajganj,
designedly discouraged the cultivation of the district in the
hope that none else should venture to form the revenues of the
district with such a scanty tillage and so he would go on
retaining the contract on more favourable terms. The treasury
incurred heavy losses on account of the oppressions of these
contractors, but the high officials of the state too were a
party in such designs. Najid Ali, the nazim, had a balance
of r.12 lacs, when he was replaced by another nazim; but says
Sleeman, he would get the balance written-off from his name
by paying Rs.2 lacs in bribe to the minister and other influen-
tial persons at the court, and just paying Rs. one lac to the
treasury. Ironically there was no bar imposed upon his getting
a contract for some other district subsequently.

During the last quarter of the 18th century about 85% of
the total jama' of the kingdom of Awadh was formed out to the
revenue contractors. About 1780 there were 18 big and small
contractors, but the bulk of the territory was in the hands of
4 revenue farmers controlling 65% of the total jama. These were

1. Sleeman, op. 114-5.
2. Ibid.
Almas Ali Khan, 'Ainuddin Khan, Bhawani Singh and Ghulam Husain Khan. The table prepared by R.B.Burnett is reproduced here to show the relative position of the contractors and the deductions claimed by these revenue farmers c. 1780. Since most of the columns are self-explanatory, they need no comments. However, it should not be assumed that the cost of the collection 25.2% of the total jama' collected) and the deductions (12.9% of the total jama' collected) claimed by the contractor had in any way increased during this period. There exists a qubuliyat deed executed in 1116F/1708 by one Dilawar for a jagir in parjana Sandilah, having a jama' of 41 lacs dama. (=Rs. 1,02,500).

In all, excluding the cost of maintaining the sehbandi troops and peshkash to faujdar, Rs. 22001/- were to be paid to the jagirdar in two instalments - here, therefore, the 'military' expenses amounted to well above 20%.

Buchanan in his survey of varakhur points out that the 'amils appointed by the nawab's government generally took the revenues on farm from the government. They then made their own settlements with the landholders for the period of their tenure. But these agreements were hardly ever respected as the intentions of the contracting parties were contradictory; the 'amils wanted to establish their authority over the chieftains by

1. R.B. Burnett, pp. 181-191
2. NAI, 1487.
pretending a settlement, while the land-holders sought to procure the help of the āmil against their adversaries. Although the āmils dealt with these chiefs quite firmly, they did not wish generally as to lower their prestige and status. Such a policy on part of the āmils had created such conditions that the actual amount of the revenue was quite unconnected with the settlement." Often it was that "some governors (āmils) were unable to collect as much revenue as much they paid to the nawab." But generally, the āmils used to accumulate a great deal of wealth and power during the tenure of their contract of which they were often deprived of all on their return to the capital.

During the first half of the 19th century, the nazims and chakledārs generally held entire districts on contract, all the big and small estates of the district falling under their jurisdictions. These officers enjoyed practically unlimited powers in their dealings with the ta'allugādārs. Indeed the visit of the chakledār to a village of the landholders was thought to be a natural calamity, and the zamindārs used often to prepare for battle at the news of the approach of an oppressive chakledār. Generally, the zamindār retired the neighbouring jungal with his family and immediate retainers

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
after making a summary levy of the revenues from the cultivators. But on such occasions the chakledar too used to realize the government dues from the very same poor peasants, who had already paid the levy to the zamindar.\footnote{Lutter, pp. 50-1.}


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sl. No.</th>
<th>Farmer's name</th>
<th>Jara</th>
<th>Gross Jama</th>
<th>Per cent of the total Jama</th>
<th>Deductions in 1779-80</th>
<th>Per cent of Jama</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Almas 'Ali Khan</td>
<td>Kala Dara</td>
<td>64,60,031</td>
<td>23.2%</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>'Ainuddin Khan</td>
<td>Bareili</td>
<td>60,00,000</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
<td>575,000</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Bhawani Singh</td>
<td>Deonsara</td>
<td>38,78,748</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>301,000</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Muhammad Husain Khan</td>
<td>Gorakhpur/Bahraich</td>
<td>21,82,904</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td>616,504</td>
<td>37.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Mirza Ali Raza</td>
<td>Khairabad</td>
<td>10,50,371</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>106,317</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Naiku Singh</td>
<td>Dalmau, Bareili</td>
<td>8,34,891</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>129,151</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Isma'il Qek Khan</td>
<td>Allahabad</td>
<td>7,66,000</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>52,000</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Mirza Nur Beg</td>
<td>Azangarh/Kahaul</td>
<td>6,64,864</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>139,065</td>
<td>20.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Mirza Mehdi</td>
<td>Sanoila/Haliabad</td>
<td>5,17,161</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>156,701</td>
<td>30.6%</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Nawab Muzaffar Jang</td>
<td>Farrukhabad</td>
<td>4,50,000</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Jhau Lal</td>
<td>Sansi</td>
<td>3,67,800</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>67,800</td>
<td>16.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Amber Ali Khan</td>
<td>Anhuna/Sandila</td>
<td>3,28,280</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Mir Nahim Khan</td>
<td>Kursi</td>
<td>3,24,326</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>146,821</td>
<td>45.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Kambah Khan</td>
<td>Pali</td>
<td>2,25,776</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Chait Singh</td>
<td>Khairagarh</td>
<td>2,00,000</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Isma'il Beg Khan</td>
<td>Mahmudda</td>
<td>1,50,000</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Kewal Ram</td>
<td>Manalari</td>
<td>1,20,000</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>36,895</td>
<td>32.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Mir Ali Khan</td>
<td>Mahaur</td>
<td>49,578</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>---</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total:** 2,35,11,565 84.3% 30,26,396 12.9%
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3 Reserved Asaf's account</th>
<th>4 Reserved, Company's account</th>
<th>5 Mural charges, transport, crosse etc.</th>
<th>Percent of jama</th>
<th>Per cent of jama or actually collected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7,00,000</td>
<td>20,00,000</td>
<td>15,69,669</td>
<td>30.9 %</td>
<td>61.3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>25,00,000</td>
<td>6,37,141</td>
<td>12.7 %</td>
<td>75.8 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8,74,004</td>
<td>13,00,000</td>
<td>11,16,393</td>
<td>28.7 %</td>
<td>63.6 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>10,00,000</td>
<td>4,76,553</td>
<td>21.8 %</td>
<td>40.1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>3,32,000</td>
<td>5,85,170</td>
<td>55.7 %</td>
<td>34.7 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,04,796</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,54,695</td>
<td>30.5 %</td>
<td>54.0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>3,50,000</td>
<td>1,61,313</td>
<td>22.8 %</td>
<td>68.8 %</td>
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<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,50,000</td>
<td>3,92,285</td>
<td>59.0 %</td>
<td>20.1 %</td>
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<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,00,000</td>
<td>1,46,016</td>
<td>28.2 %</td>
<td>41.2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>5,50,000</td>
<td>61,276</td>
<td>13.6 %</td>
<td>86.4 %</td>
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<tr>
<td>1,69,355</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,04,860</td>
<td>27.9 %</td>
<td>63.7 %</td>
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<tr>
<td>2,55,357</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>69,712</td>
<td>21.2 %</td>
<td>78.8 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66,048</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>None ❍*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>54.7 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,75,776 ❍*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>None ❍+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,00,000</td>
<td>4,890</td>
<td>2.4 %</td>
<td>96.9 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,50,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>None ❍+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
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<td>81,105</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>None ❍+</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6,196</td>
<td>12.5 %</td>
<td>87.3 %</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

| 29,76,620               | 1,06,62,000                   | Rs.59,30,274                           | 25.2 %         | 61.9 %                               |

(10.7% of the total jama | (45.4% of all forms)