CHAPTER 5

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The Russian revolution of 1917 was not merely a revolution, which ended the rule of Czar and allowed the revolutionaries to establish Communist Government in Russia but also it paved the way for the future revolution in Bukhara. The impact of February revolution was greatly felt and its influenced could also be noticed in Bukhara. It is evident that the seed of revolution somehow existed in the minds of Bukharan people under the shadow of Jadidism. As the Jadidis were not fully satisfied with the Amir and were disenchanted with the existing administrative and social system of Bukhara, surely they wanted certain changes in the existing structure of the government. The Jadidists, however, in the beginning limited their activities mainly to the cultural and educational spheres as still they had some faith in Amir and his God-fearing Vazirs. Under the influence of February revolution in Russia, the Jadidists who were now being called, as Young Bukharans demanded certain reforms like fixation of taxes and organisation of Majlis (Parliament). The Amir soon realized the gravity of the situation and thought that before it could go out of his hand he had to think of certain concessions as demanded by the Young Bukharans.
A precautionary measure was urgently taken on 7 April, 1917,¹ the Amir issued a mandate called the first manifesto of the Amir, promising certain reforms to appease the Jadidists but could never implement it.

The collapse of autocracy in Russia all of a sudden paved the way for the Bolsheviks to ask for a new type of government. It heralded for Russia a period of great expectations but limited its accomplishments, in the field of imperial policy as elsewhere. Both moderates and radicals were dedicated to the achievement of equal rights for all citizens. By 20 March 1917, the Provisional Government of Russia changed the old regime and henceforth tried for the establishment of new administration. Regarding the policy towards Turkistan, on April 7, Petrograd replaced the military Government General with a civilian Turkistan Committee consisting of nine members five Russians and four natives with one Russian as chairman. The last Russian Governor General Kuropatkin had already been arrested a week earlier. The diplomatic relation of Russia with Bukhara still remained where they were before October revolution. The only change that could be seen was the change of Russian residency in place of Russian political agency in Bukhara. On March 17 at the level of local government, the new Russian regime introduced some significant changes.²
On March 8 Governor General Kuropatkin invited the people of the town to elect municipal Dumas of twelve to fifteen members of whom half were to be the Russians and in turn each Dumas was to elect a three to five member executive committee to look into the local affairs. The four Russian settlements — Charjui, New Bukhara, Karki and Termiz responded very promptly. Surprisingly the Muslim residents of these four settlements no matter if they were Russian nationals were deprived of voting rights. The executive committee took over the civil governors in New Bukhara and from the garrison commandants in the other three towns. Within less than a week of overthrow of Czar Nikolas II from the seat of power the Russian population of Bukhara tried to follow the examples of their 'cousins' at home by forming extra legal soviet of workers and soldiers which were created in Charjui and New Bukhara on March 9 and 10 respectively. Soon after soldiers Soviets were organised in the garrison at Karki within a month and at Termiz by the beginning of May. They were now seen as influential source of pressure for modernisation and new reforms. With the news of collapse of autocracy in Russia, the Bukharan Jadids became more active and came to the forefront. Without wasting time, they contacted N.S. Chkheidze, Chairman of the Petrograd Soviet to pressurise the Amir of Bukhara to
grant the long awaited reforms. Amir Alim Khan at the same time is seen congratulating the head of the new government, greeting and emphasising expressions of loyalty and friendship and above all hoping for the continuity of the existing relationship between Russia and Bukhara.

In response to a congratulating telegram from the Jadids, the Provisional Government was only to happy to sent a dispatch to A.Ia. Miller, the representative of the former Russian government in Bukhara and to Amir Alim Khan urging him to accept the reforms demanded by the Jadids. With the assurances of support from the provisional government, the revolutionaries became assertive in their demands. The clamour for reform was so intense that Miller had to think over it seriously to got it implemented. He persuaded the Amir to issue a liberal manifesto. On April 7, 1917, the much-awaited manifesto was signed by the Amir, which was already drafted by Miller. Some of the important demands of the revolutionaries were — to declare an amnesty; to lessen the criminal punishment; to establish a printing press and to permit the publication of newspapers.

The manifesto promised removal of abuses and irregularities in the Bukharan government and its reform on the basis of Sharia and in the light of progressive and useful knowledge. The document emphatically promised judicial and
tax reforms, promotion of education and economic development. The manifesto further promised salary for the civil servants and to ensure prohibition of government officials taking bribe. The manifesto also gave assurances for self-government fore the capital city and separation of state treasury from the Amir's private wealth. A government budget was also promised and finally government allowed the printing office to produce publication of social utility and last but not the least general amnesty was also granted. Before the draft manifesto reached the Provisional Government for its approval the situation in Bukhara was becoming day by day tense. The clergy began to express their concern for the faith and the established order, which was yielding place to new. This fear was further strengthened when on the advice of Miller; Alim Khan replaced Burhanuddin, the ultra-conservative Qazi Kalan of Bukhara with man more acceptable to the Jadids and who was also sympathetic to the cause of moderate reforms.  

The manifesto did not satisfy the line of Jadids. Meanwhile in the afternoon of April 7, the Jadids met to discuss their future course of action in the light of Amir's apparent acceptance of all their demands. But with regard to the course of action, there arose a rift between the two groups of Jadids, the moderates and the radicals. The moderates were
not in favour of the public demonstration for which the radicals gave a call on the next day. Despite Miller's sharp warning, the radicals though in minority took the help from Samarqand Soviets and persuaded the Jadids to except the hardcore moderates to go for demonstration. On April 8 they demonstrated in the capital and soon they faced a group of counter demonstrators who were larger in number. To avoid the clash, the Jadids decided to dispatch a delegation of three men before the Qushbegi. These members were soon arrested. One of the leaders Mirza Nasrullah was ordered to be whipped 150 lashes, as a result of which Mirza Nasrullah died of the next day.⁹

The arrest of Jadids and death of Nasrullah infuriated the rank and file of the Jadids. Chaos ensued in capital and engulfed the capital on April 8 and 9. With the intervention of Miller the situation came under control on April 8 and any further demonstration was banned. The moderates now elected a Central Committee with Muhiddin Mansur as its head.¹⁰ They blamed the radicals for the April 8 fiasco and tried to negotiate with the Amir to obtain an amnesty for themselves and asked for the legalisation of political activities in the Khanate. The Qushbegi was persuaded to take advantage of the situation, for the peace overture and appeals to the conservatives for accepting Amir's will on the
question of reform. On April 14, the Russian authorities were present to witness the Amir's sincerity. The clergy however, disrupted the proceedings expressing their apprehension of the Manifesto of April 7. Alim Khan was obliged to leave the audience chamber. Though the meeting ended without any conclusive decision on the issue the two hostile groups were pacified with a troop support from New Bukhara. Thus the efforts of rapprochement between moderate Jadids and Amir's government terribly failed. Being convinced of the role of Qushbegi for 14 April episode and the suspected involvement with the opponents of reforms, his replacement was demanded by the residency. He was relieved of his duty on April 15 and was thereafter dismissed a week later. On 22 April Nizamuddin Urganji was appointed as the new Qushbegi.

Nizamuddin had an attitude of sympathy towards the conservative zealots. After being installed on the post of Qushbegi he continued to protest against the policies of Jadids, and allegedly distributed funds from the state treasury to support the reactionaries. Having enjoyed government support and full encouragement from Muslim clergy, the Bukharan mullahs became more aggressive and bold. In April they agitated against Young Bukharans and their allies. Again on June 7, they destroyed the newly installed printing
office. Having tasted the new incumbent's bitter attitude, in July, they demanded and campaigned for the restoration of former Qazi Kalan, Burhanuddin.

Being caught in a difficult situation the Amir wanted to come out of the situation successfully and to remain away from the scene. On the one hand he had apprehended full pressure from Russia for some more reforms as he had earlier complied with some of their demands to some degree, on the other hand religious zealots who were helplessly watching the predicament of Alim Khan without appreciating it now vehemently demanded Amir Alim's replacement. An awfully worried Amir was frantically looking from opportunity to leave Bukhara on health ground. While the clergy was totally unhappy with the ruler and denied to him his privilege and position as Amir the same position was not guaranteed by the Russian authorities. The Amir was left in the lurch and decided to leave for Karmine. Now Chirkin, the new Resident forced him to abandon his ideas, as the new replacement could even be worse.

Meanwhile, the effectiveness of the residency as a vehicle of influence over the Bukharan government continued to diminish. Chirkin continued along the course marked out by Miller. The Russian authorities recognized that fundamental reform would be prolonged and gradual process.
They did not want to tackle the situation with Russian troops at a time when Russian armies were engaged in German and Austrian fronts. Further they did not want the conservative elements to be alarmed by Russian forces that might lead Afghan threat on Russian Central Asia. State of confusion continued. Chirkin asked for the dispatch of new Resident. On the other hand Provisional Government was not in a position to take a clear-cut decision regarding Bukhara. The position of status quo somehow or the other remained unchanged.

On September 30, V.S. Elpatievski was sent to Bukhara as Resident. By this time due to hesitant attitude of Provisional Government, Alim was bold enough to request that the implementation of the promised reforms be put off indefinitely. This time, too, the new Resident sensed the future threat to the Amir and hence to Russia, and decided not to do anything which provoked clerical zealots. Once more Russian position in Bukhara was identified with stability of the Amir's throne. Therefore no steps were taken against the authority of the Amir and dethronement was averted for the time being. It would be wrong presume that before the seizure of power in Russia Bukhara was not having much attraction for Bolsheviks. There is no denying the fact that Central Asia had all along excited the cupidity of Russia.
Earlier Lenin many a times compared the Khantes of Bukhara and Khiva to Manchuria and Korea and France's Colonies. Point lying within the statement was that these Khantes too, should have been liberated from the capitalist exploitation that is from the clutches of respective rulers of the states. Thus, these two Khanates should have the same freedom and be separated from Russian influence as were Turkestan, the Ukraine, Poland or Finland.\textsuperscript{12} In June 1917 at the First All Russian Congress of Soviets, Lenin's insistence was that Bukhara and Khiva must not forcibly be retained as quasi colonies.

In November 1917 in all the Russian settlements in Bukhara — New Bukhara, Charjui, Karki and Termiz powers came into the hands of Soviets.\textsuperscript{13} In December 1917 Soviet government sent a diplomatic mission to Bukhara to make all possible efforts for the establishment of normal relation with the Amir. But the Amir did not receive the mission. On 6 December a delegation of Young Bukharans came to Tashqand and informed the Soviet authorities all about the preparation going on in Bukhara for the fast approaching revolution.\textsuperscript{14} Further they also informed that about 30,000 armed people were expected to participate in the revolution, which was not based on fact.\textsuperscript{15} Misled by this exaggerated account of revolutionaries in Bukhara, the Council of Peoples
Commissars of Turkistan made a wrong decision to support the people of Bukhara. On 28 February 1918 Kolesov, the Chairman of the Council of Peoples Commissars of Turkistan failed to estimate Amir's strength. They proceeded to Bukhara with a small army consisting of 500-600 men along with the support of some three hundred of Young Bukharans. He and Faizullah Khojaev, Chairman of executive committee of Young Bukharans issued an ultimatum to the Amir and demanded the recognition of Soviet power and Russian settlements. Another demand was to introduce immediate reform to be enforced by an elected body from the Central Committee of the Young Bukharans headed by the Amir himself. Further, they asked the Amir for removal of his ministers and disarmament of troops. If the demands were not accepted the Young Bukharans and Kolesov had to attack the capital. Under such condition the Amir had no choice left except to fight. To accept the demands of the Young Bukharans meant to invite a civil war in the Khanate in which majority of his subject were likely to follow the frenzied religious groups. At this juncture the Amir also had the risk of a rival candidature for the throne. This time Alim was not fortunate like his grandfather in 1868 in securing Russian help. Thus he had to rely on his own force and to fan the religious feelings against the Young
Bukharans and their 'infidel' supporters. Taking this decision the Amir wanted to delay for sometimes in order to gather his forces. He, therefore, wanted to buy time and showed hesitation in accepting all the demands in one go instead he wanted to take them up slowly and gradually. As a token of compromise he replaced 'notorious' Qushbegi, Nizamuddin with Usman Beg, a man equally reactionary but less well known. Neither Khojaev, nor Kolesov was pacified with Amir's decision. On the next morning, they began their advance on Old Bukhara and reached up to one mile away from the city wall. Kolesov had under his command some 2000 men at the moment. The Amir having failed in delaying tactics adopted another trick, asking for a truce and declared his readiness to accept all demands. On this occasion the Amir issued a second manifesto,\(^{17}\) which was more radical than the first one. In this proclamation the Amir was ready to give the chance of equality and liberty to all. He felt badly the need of reforms in maladministration, which was the main cause of the backwardness and ignorance of the people. In his long list of reforms, the Amir promised freedom, tax reforms, the abolition of corporal and capital punishment. Moreover he promised a democratic government. Regarding the above-mentioned items he explicitly affirmed his firm decision to implement the Manifesto.
Meanwhile, Kolesov asked for immediate disarmament of Amir's force but the Amir requested to give him three days to comply with the order. But Kolesov reduced the duration for just twenty-four hours. As per the plan the revolutionaries were to send a committee to supervise the disarmament process, as just after that the Young Bukharans were to occupy the city. Subsequently the Amir was succeeded in cutting the railway line from Smarqand and at the same time he declared a holy war (Jihad) against Kolesov. During the night a five men delegation with a cavalry escort of twenty-five was sent to Bukharan capital to see the disarmament process. During the night the delegation was trapped assaulted and finally killed but two of the cavalry escorts however escaped to report the fate of their fellowmen to Kolesov. Finding themselves cut off from all assistance in New Bukhara, as expected, the Russians on March 16 ordered for shelling of the city. The cannonade, which lasted thirty-six hours, brought no result at all. The ammunitions were exhausted. Soon Kolesov ordered his men to retreat towards Katta Qurghan. Owing to the fear of native government's atrocities, several thousand Russians and Young Bukharan revolutionary committee joined the retreating Soviet troops. On 19 March Kolesov stationed at Qizil Teppe completely stranded and finding no way for safe departure.
He was however, saved from being annihilated by timely reinforcement from Turkistan. Kolesov's luck was favourable as he overcame from the disaster. Fearing a massive Russian attack, the Amir sued for peace, which proved to be too heavy for him ultimately.

The Amir anyhow, signed an agreement on 25 March 1918 after two days of negotiation. The clauses of the treaty had completely demobilize his army and disarm his subjects; to expel all counter Russian revolutionaries from the territory of Bukhara; to compensate Russia for the damage of railway line, pay for its reconstruction; to exchange prisoners of war with Russia; to receive Soviet Russia's representatives and to protect all Russian citizens in the Khanate; to preserve strict neutrality in any hostility between Russia and her enemies. Thus was thwarted the first attempt of Young Bukharans to overthrow Amir's rule. The main reason behind this failure was non-participation of masses along with the Young Bukharans who did not take part in this unsuccessful attempt of dethroning Amir. There were still large number of people under the influence of clergy who also had faith in Amir's good administration. Another cause of failure is said to be awfully inadequate number of forces allotted to the campaign.
The Qizil Teppe Agreement, however, did not give Turkistan the necessary security as after the March event the Amir was drawn more closer to the British. In return the British promised to help the Amir in tackling the Soviet backed Young Bukharan threats to the Amir's rule. Meanwhile in April and May 1919 several hundred camels loaded with British arm reached Bukhara through Afghanistan. Again in April, the same year Amir received twenty thousand rifles and in May soldiers reaching up to eight thousand more arrived. The Amir got British help in the form of her troops and instructors. The number of British instructors in the Amir's army reached six hundred by the spring of 1919. In the summer of 1919 the Amir with the support of Transcaspian White Guards and with the direct participation of British, sent an armed expedition against Karki. By July with the aid of English, Soviet power in Afghanistan was overthrown. Also it is said that on 15 July 1918 nine Bolshevik leaders were executed there. Amir Alim Khan was emboldened during these months due to the arrival of British mission, which consisted of Major L.V.S. Blacker, Colonel P. T. Etherton with Lt. Colonel F.M. Bailey as its head. The mission left India on April 20 and reached Kashgar on July 24. In October 1919 Colonel Bailey reached Bukhara from Tashqand and tried to prepare an action plan.
against the Soviet Turkistan. By the middle of September the mission left for India, and succeeded in further ties with counter revolutionaries.

The Soviets were seen caught in the cobweb of exigencies during these days. That is why the Fifth Turkistan Congress was called at the beginning of May to organise the former Government General into an autonomous Soviet republic within the Russian Soviet republic and subsequently formally recognised the independence of Bukhara as a sign of Bukhara's restored sovereignty. It abolished the Russian customs frontier on the Bukhara Afghan border. Being hard pressed on all sides and due to insufficient military forces to deal with Khanate, Tashqand was in continuous state of alarm over the report of Bukhara's ongoing dealing with Afghanistan, Britain, and various white elements all the way from Ashqabad and Farghana to the Ukraine and Siberia.

After Kolesov's retreat the attitude of Amir became more hostile towards the opponents within the Khanate. The Young Bukharans, their sympathisers, and modern educated people who were advocates of reforms became the target of both administrative machinery and religious zealots. It is said that fifteen to twenty prominent advocates of reform were given death sentences. It is also reported that seventy persons were hanged in the beglik of Charjui after the treaty of Qizil
Tepe. The Russians, who remained in Old Bukhara after Kolesov's withdrawal too, were killed by angry mobs.\textsuperscript{25}

The economic scene during this period was also not profitable for the Khanate. Almost nine tenth Bukharan foreign trades were hampered during the summer of 1918 to the fall of 1919.\textsuperscript{26} Even after the restoration of communication, consumption of Bukharan cotton, qaraqul, wool, supply of cotton textiles and other manufactured goods did not return to its previous position. Bukhara lost a major market in the form of Russia. Although Bukhara once again improved her trade relations with the neighbouring countries like Persia and Afghanistan, it could not compensate the amount from which they have been deprived of from Russian trade. With a near disappearance of its sole market now cotton was no more a cash crop. This resulted in economic hardships and social unrest, which became the burden of ever increasing Bukharan army to cope with.

Due to economic crunch more taxes were levied on the peasants to feed the increasing army. Naturally it was a burden on the poor peasant masses. There were more or less fifty-five different taxes on peasants.\textsuperscript{27} Writing about the heavy taxation a modern author comments that only 'air was untaxed' in the Khanate.\textsuperscript{28} Owing to these heavy taxes ill-organized uprisings were seen in the Zarafshan and Kashka
Darya oases from the end of 1918 to the whole next year. In this burning situation of discontent, the revolutionaries and reformers got fertile atmosphere to alienate the masses from the old regime. This is the matter of debate as to how much the reformers were successful in their effort. In this context one thing is clear that the Amir lost sympathy of the people in the coming months.

Alim Khan despite his hostility towards Bolsheviks was in no hurry to provoke them, which could invite them to attack from Tashqand merely for the sake of Ashqabad cause. The Amir's conduct during these days (1918-1919) indicates that he adopted wait and watch policy. He probably hoped and in fact made up his mind that he could be dealing with the victorious party in Russia. The Bukharan's neutrality in July 1918 event did not pacify the anxiety of Aashqand Bolsheviks, who were under constant fears in case the Soviet troops in Transcaspia suffered defeat, Bukhara was to definitely attack. Moreover, the Soviet plan of advancement towards Ashqabad was halted at the end of August by the Anglo Indian troops from Persia which came in the middle of the month at the invitation of Ashqabd. It is evident that Ashqabad was primarily concerned with the threat from the Soviet Turkestan. Surely, the British attention was focused on Trans Caucasia and the Caspian Sea. As a result of the end
of World War and with the German and Turkish occupation of Trans Caucasia the British found themselves in awkward position. Now the British seem to be hesitant in involving themselves deeply into the affairs, as now owing to the fears from opponent's side the situation was serious. Also it is obvious that without British assistance the Whites were unable to advance further. Thus the front remained static until May 1919.\(^{30}\)

The first major shock the Amir received was in June 1919 when he learnt that England was withdrawing her forces from Transcaspia and leaving just a small detachment at Krasnovodsk. The evacuation of British troops had totally changed the balance of military power in Transcaspia in favour of Bolsheviks. Finding a good opportunity they began their final gradual advance towards the Caspian Sea and were successful in recapturing Marv on 23 May. By the end of 1919, the messages received from various anti-soviet fronts were increasingly alarming. On 13 September Red forces of Turkistan started moving under M.V. Frunze and demolished all except Dutov by the Aral Sea railroad station.\(^{31}\) He was driven into Semirechye, the Red Army of Turkistan joined at last Red army of the Centre. Subsequently on January 6, 1920 the Bolsheviks captured Krasnovodsk, which was the last hold of anti-soviet forces. From Khivan side too, Amir Alim
Khan had not received any good news. Here Junaid Khan, a serious threat to Bolsheviks was overthrown. Junaid Khan with all his men fled to Persia. Just after his flight, the Young Khivans organised a revolutionary government.

While Russia succeeded in suppressing the revolt in Amu Darya Delta and in solving Khivan problem and being victorious wars on Transcaspia, Semirechye fronts in February and March 1920 the Russo-Bukharan relation continued to be somewhat suspicious and hostile. The events of Khiva frightened Alim Khan and now he seemed to give a number of minor concessions like giving permission to the Russian citizens of free entry to Old Bukhara and banning the import of British goods via Afghanistan. On March 30 Frunze made an agreement with the Amir to exchange diplomatic representatives and settle all outstanding questions. As a result of which Tashqand later was turned to Bukhara. There were six cannons captured by Kolesov two years before. However, despite these gestures and several visits of Frunze and other members of Turkistan Commission, the influence of clergy could not be eliminated and was still strongly dominating over the Bukharan people. The first and foremost concern of the Amir was to expel Young Bukharan agitators from the Russian settlements and in fact he had less interest in introducing political and social reforms in Bukhara. It
seems that Bukhara had no intention of establishing a normal trade relation with Turkistan.

Amir Alim Khan on the one hand was showing little interest in maintaining good relation with Soviet Turkistan while on the other he tried to make a bond of friendship with the new ruler of Afghanistan, Amanullah Khan. In July 1919 Alim had requested for material support from Amanullah Khan who in response sent in October sixty military instructors, six experts in arms production and six cannons and also probably four or five war elephants. In January 1920 Afghanistan established a permanent embassy in Alim's capital and simultaneously Bukhara opened a consulate in Mazar-i-Sharif. By April it was reported in Tashqand that Alim Khan had mustered 1500 Afghans with a purpose of war preparation in future against Russia. After realizing future danger Frunze warned Lenin and explained him all about the activity of the Amir and told him that the Amir was in league with Afghanistan. By the end of June however Frunze was all set to take steps against Bukhara. On 24 June he ordered the defences of Karki and Termiz and side-by-side moved one regiment by river and another by rail to Qarshi. The apparent purpose of these measures was to guard New Bukhara, Qarshi, Karki railroad but actual one was a preparation for the Amir's eviction. In the report to Turkistan Commission on
June 30 and to supreme headquarters in Moscow on July 12, it was urged by Frunze for the "immediate integration of Bukhara into the Soviet system". The possibility of giving an autonomous status and to let the Amir rule independently was considered a direct military threat to Russia and it was sure to encourage the counter revolutionaries.

Frunze was of the opinion that the Amir should be overthrown by internal revolt led by Bukharan Revolutionary council and supported by armed units of Bukharan emigres. But he openly asserted that decisive factor would be played by the Red Army. On August 1, 1920 Frunze sent a telegram to Lenin seeking a directive on Bukharan question and problems. He proposed only two courses of action; one was to hope for the development of an internal revolutionary process and second was to wait for it or to organize revolution with outside support. To his mind the first course was very slow and so he favoured that the second one for which he had already made all possible efforts should be followed. After discussing the telegram the Political Bureau recommended the following course of action, "to take all measures essential for the protection of Russian people within Bukhara and on the borders of Bukhara; never to take initiative in attacking Bukharan territory and Bukharan armed forces; to conduct a wide agitation among Muslims against
the counter revolutionaries work of Bukhara in alliance with British agent and Russian counter revolutionaries; to create in the process of such an agitation a native army, Bukharan communists also join it; and to convert these defensive measures into an offensive only if popular revolutionary centre exists in Bukhara and asks for help.”

Being affected by the events of Turkistan and Khiva, the masses in Bukhara became more sensitive to revolutionary propaganda. Now the anti Amir movement started growing. By August 1920, for the revolutionaries the conditions were favourable for a second advance against the Amir. During August 16 to 19 the Bukharan Communist Party held its fourth congress at Charjui, where they reluctantly confirmed the alliance with the Young Bukharan and discussed plan for the earliest overthrow of the Amir. In anticipation Tashqand sent two hundred rifles to the Bukharan Communist Party Congress to help the rebels. On 23 August the new members of Turkistan Committee who were entitled either to approve or alter the plans for the Bukharan campaign reached Talshqand and unanimously endorsed the decision already taken by Frunze. On the same day the Turcomans revolted at Charjui beglik in accordance with their plan. On 25 August Frunze ordered his troops to march on the night of August 28. They were asked to attack
the western part of the Khanate from their bases at Charjui, New Bukhara, Katta Qurghan and Samarqand. As per the plan all exit points were to be sealed so that the Amir and his men might not escape. Military activities were to be started at dawn at four O'clock sharp. All the plans were kept in strict secrecy.

In accordance with the plan the fight started early in the morning at 4 O'clock with the burst of first cannon. On the night of 28 August, the Beg of Charjui was compelled to step down from the post in which Bukharan Revolutionary Committee played vital role. The said committee very soon invited the people to take part in their struggle against the Amir and simultaneously sought the help of the Red Army. The capital was attacked by troops of different begliks. Guzar was occupied on August 31. After a desperate struggle the Red Army managed to capture Old Bukhara on September 2. The anti-Bolshevik leaders Burhanuddin and Usman Beg were arrested and put to trial, and sentenced to death in the end of the year. The three sons of amir were also arrested and sent as hostages to Moscow. The Amir left the palace after having disguised himself as a carter as reported by a revolutionary to Colonel Etherton. The Amir left the city with a group of loyal troops for Central Bukhara. From there
he fled to Afghanistan finally, where he took asylum and where he is reported to have lived till his death in 1946.\textsuperscript{41}

The victorious Revolutionaries formed a new Bukharan government on the very same day of the flight of the Amir. A Revolutionary Committee and Council of Peoples Nazirs were formed. The Revolutionary Committee and Council of People's Nazir had nine members. Almost the entire government official structure comprised only natives. Faizullah Khojaev who was most capable and prominent among the native revolutionaries was appointed chairman of the council. A full merger of Young Bukharans with the Bukharan Communist Party was announced on September 11.\textsuperscript{42} On October 6, the First All-Bukharan Kuriltai of Soviets abolished the existing Khanate. The Bukharan people's Soviet Republic was established and the Soviet Government recognised the Republic of Bukhara on November 6, 1920. The Governments of Bokhara Republic and the Russian Soviet Federation of socialist Republic (RSFSR) entered into economic, political and military agreement on 4 March 1921.\textsuperscript{43} The RSFSR granted a five billion rouble non-payable loan to the Republic of Bukhara. Thus ended the story of the centuries old Khanate.
References

1. J. Kunitz, p.47.
3. Ibid. p.240.
4. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid. p.243.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid. p.262.
14. Ibid.
15. Becker, p.266.
18. Ibid. p.81; Becker, p.266.
20. Khatira, p.35

25. Becker, p.281

26. Ibid, p.282


29. Becker, p.275


32. Becker, p.290

33. Kunitz, p.112


35. Becker, p. 293.


37. Ibid.

38. Kunitz, p.112.


43. R. Rahul, *Bukhara the Emirate*, p.32.