CHAPTER - III

MUSLIM POLITICS AND LEADERSHIP IN U.P. DURING SWARAJIST ERA
The main protagonists of the Swarajist policy were the young men like Tassaduq Ahmad Khan Sherwani, Abdul Rahman Siddiqui, Chaudhuri Khaliquzzaman, Abdul Aziz Ansari, Khwaja Abdul Majid and Shuaib Qureshi. They supported a policy of council entry. Sherwani and Khaliquzzaman both served as secretaries of the Swaraj party from its inception in January 1923, and as they freed themselves from their panislamic entanglements the others threw their weight behind these two men.

It has been already explained in chapter II that the muslim leaders were divided on the question of the council entry, into two groups. Some where between these two groups but progressively inclining to the second were Hakim Ajmal Khan, Dr. Ansari and Abdul Kalam Azad. The role of Ajmal Khan and Ansari in the khilafat movement had been strictly limited. They were men of caution, opposed to violence, reluctant to participate in mass politics and wary of the extremism of the Ali brothers and the ulama. At the hight of the khilafat movement they remained in the background and when they did emerge again after the imprisonment of the Ali brothers, it was largely as a moderating influence, working hand-in-hand with Gandhi in an endeavour to co-ordinate the two movements under his leadership. After the government's dispatch of Feb. 1922; they continued to follow the same policy, urging both the ulama and the moderates, in the name of Hindu-Muslim unity, not to
make any gesture of conciliation to the government. Over the question of council entry, however, they differed. Both considered a return to civil disobedience the resort of desperate men, but Ansari was more anxious than Ajmal Khan to keep both wings of the movement together. Ajmal Khan came out in favour of council entry in October 1922 but Ansari continued to favour the no-change party and worked to prevent party divisions from becoming deeper.  

After the defeat of council entry at Gaya, these differences increased. Ansari continued to support the no-changers; Ajmal Khan joined the Swarajist party and endeavoured to persuade the ulama, though with little success, to amend the fatwa passed in 1920 on this question. In this he was aided by Kalam Azad, who had resigned from the khilafat committee in January 1923 when he saw that the Swarajist star was in the ascendant. He had been obliged to admit by this stage that his hopes to become Sheikh-ul-Hind would not be fulfilled and he chose a broker's role instead these differences persisted until September, 1923, when the special congress gave the green light to the Swarajists. After that time, Ansari ceased to support the no changers and applied himself instead to the task of healing Hindu-Muslim divisions.

These differences over council entry did not entirely dominate the proceedings of the khilafat committee. Indeed, even after Nov. 1922, it pursued Pan-Islamist policies which were unanimously supported by all factions. Reactions to the abolition of the temporal and spiritual powers of the khilafat
and to Shafi Hussain's bid for election to that office, all fall into this category. Not all Pan-Islamist issue, however can be disintangled from Indian issues, because particularly for the Ali brothers, the pursuit of Pan-Islamist policies was largely dictated by their need to maintain themselves as credible Muslim leaders after the decline of non-co-operation. Their advocacy of Pan-Islamist activities, therefore, did not always meet with widespread support. Indeed it often brought them into conflict with those khilafatists who wished to use the khilafat organization for purely Indian purposes.

In 1923, the main opposition within the khilafat committee to its continuing preoccupations with Pan-Islamic Ventures came from the Muslim Swarajists who had joined Nehru and Das in January. These men had involved themselves in the U.P. Municipal elections in March, and Khaliquzzaman and Khwaza Abdul Mazid had emerged as the Chairman of the Lucknow and Aligarh municipal Boards. This involvement in Swarajist politics made them less sympathetic to Pan-Islamic activities. Their feeling was that the khilafat organisation should be used to strengthen the pro-change party, and this feeling grew stronger as the battle between the no-changers and pro-changers became more acute. One small indication of the emergence of this feeling was provided at the khilafat committee meeting at Muzaffarabad in April 1923, when Khaliquzzaman and Sherwani fought with Ansari over the allocation of 12,000 rupees to Kalam Azad for
propaganda in Persian and Arabic in the khilafat cause.\textsuperscript{5} Matters got worse, however, after the Ali brothers were released from goal, for they proceeded to nail their colours firmly to the khilafat mast and to plan three deputations to the middle east.\textsuperscript{6} This escapist political thinking won them few friends. Among the Swarajists, and at Coconada in December the differences between the two groups came to a head. Khalizuzzaman led the Swarajists in an attack on the Ali brothers' proposals for three deputations, holding that one would be quite sufficient, and when this attack failed, he, Shuib Qureshi and Abdul Aziz Ansari refused to stand for election as secretaries of the organization. By this stage, the political rift between the Ali brothers and their former chelas was virtually complete. But the Ali brothers were not only faced with opposition from their former followers. They also had to face a Muslim community throughout north India which was becoming less interested in the problems of Turkey and more preoccupied with the growth of communal tension in its own back-yard. By June 1923, communal feeling in U.P. was already intense, and on the eve of Mahommed Ali's release from prison, rumours were rife that he would respond to this situation by breaking with the congress and by leading an anti-Shuddhi campaign.\textsuperscript{7} Consequently, when he turned a blind eye to these developments and plunged himself into middle east affairs, there was much disappointment and opinion hardened against him. The Moradabad municipal Board decided in July by the casting vote of the chairman not to present him with an
address, and though the Aligarh and Lucknow Boards did so in September and October to meet with a very poor reception in both places. At Lucknow, where he campaigned for the freedom of the Jazirat-ul-Arab, he only collected fifty rupees for his projected deputations, and at Jhansi, whither he proceeded the following day, he was so chagrined by his reception at the Railway Station 'that friends had some difficulty in persuading him to proceed to the city to receive the address.' By the end of 1923, therefore, it had become clear that the fortunes of the Ali brothers were in decline. The Pan-Islamic question with which they were concerning themselves were only of peripheral appeal to the masses, and it was not to be long before the rise of communal antagonism in the provinces began to erode their control of the khilafat organization.

In 1924 after their success in the elections, the Swarajists took less interest in the affairs of the khilafat committee and the main opposition to the Ali brothers came from the Punjabi khilafatists under the leadership of Dr. Kitchlew. His Amritsar khilafat party had sided with no-changers in debate over council entry, but as communal tension increased, Kitchlew was obliged to become more communal himself. Even in 1923 there had been a split in the Punjab khilafat committee over the 'Suddhi' movement, but at the stage Kitchlew had worked hard to reduce communal tension, and to revive non-co-operation by forming a united front with the Akalis. What he lost by these endeavours,
however, was considerably greater than what he gained. The muslims of Amristar were offended by the introduction of Akalis into their Mosques and in the early months of 1924 in the face of waning support for his policies, Kitchlew was obliged to give up his hopes of an alliance with the Akalis and to concentrate on constructive work amongst his own community.

The plans which he initially put forward were not of a communal character but his ambitions were clearly political and he met with opposition from both the Swarajist and the Pan-Islamists on this score. The Swarajists did not relish the idea of mass mobilization. They were involved in constitutional opposition to the Raj and given the nature of the franchise, they were obliged to take into account the prejudices of the more established sections of the community. When Kitchlew's programme was debated by the central khilafat committee at Delhi in June 1924, Khaliquzzaman emphasized the fact that 'most of the rich men, the landholders and the Shia community will not like to work in any organization founded under the khilafat committee and he suggested that the best plan would be 'the capturing of the muslim league by the khilafatists.' The muslim league had a history behind it and any work done through it would carry more weight. He pointed out, furthermore, that the muslim league had appointed a committee to confer with other nationalist organisations and he said that it would be inadvisable to pre-empt the work of the league before it
had been given a chance to prove itself. This advice was in line with Swarajist policy, and Kitchlew did not take to it. His differences with Ali brothers, however were more fundamental. They were less opposed than the Swarajists to this plan for political mobilization but they reacted strongly against two of his proposals which struck at their chances of political survival, of the two, the proposal to convert the Jamia Millia into a school for propagandists was the less serious because the Delhi and U.P. Swarajists were as opposed to this as the Ali brothers. But his proposal for the transfer of the Khilafat office from Bombay to Delhi met with the support of both these groups and placed the Ali brothers in a very threatened position. It amounted to a vote of censure on Pan-Islamic politics and a demand for a Khilafat organization geared to the North Indian Situation. The Ali brothers resisted it to the hilt, tempers rose on both sides, and they only escaped defeat by much blistering rhetoric and a thinly veiled attack on Ajmal Khan and Ansari which produced a characteristic plea for compromise from these two men. 14

After this Kitchlew became progressively more communal. By Sept. 1924 he had offended not only Malviya but also Das and Nehru by his advocacy of Muslim economic independence, 15 and though he still remained a member of the congress he concentrated more on attacking Hindu communalists than on settling Hindu-Muslim differences. By February 1925 he had begun a 'tanzim' tour of Northern Punjab and was reported to be 'on the point of breaking with the congress and joining the ordinary Muslim progressive party in the Punjab.' 16
The plight of the Ali brothers was scarcely enviable. As early as August 1924, in the hope of a financial return from journalism, Mahommed Ali had considered reviving the 'comrade'. But though he received an initial offer of help from Shuaib Qureshi, he was ultimately disappointed and it was not until November, following a donation of 10,000 rupees from Haji Abdullah Haroon, that the project got off the ground. By October 1924, such was the financial plight of the Ali brothers that they were obliged to espouse sectional interests in order to survive: They began supporting Ibn Saud, the Wahabi king of Saudi Arabia, in his ambitions to take over the Hedjar. This provoked a Sunni backlash and ultimately alienated their old colleagues, Hasarat Mohani, Abdul Bari and Mushir Hussain Kidwai, but so long as Ibn Saud and his Indian followers provided them with cash the Ali brothers refused to throw him over. Like Zafar Ali, however, who was also in Ibn Saud's pay, the Ali brothers were placed in a difficult position when his troops desecrated the Prophet's tomb at Madina in August, 1925. Shaukat did his best to play down Wahabi excesses but he met with considerable opposition, not least in Bombay, where Chotani took the opportunity to wreak his revenge on 28 September, on leaving the Juma Musjid, Shaukat was met by Chotani at the head of a hostile mob and was only saved from serious injury by the intervention of the Afghan consul.

This particular reversal of fortune was perhaps the most dramatic from which the Ali brothers suffered, but it was not
untypical, and if they remained Pan-Islamist politicians it was largely because they had nowhere else to go. By May 1925, the comrade had proved a failure and Mahommed Ali had taken to the printing of seditious articles in the hope of a cheap Martyrdom. The chief commissioner of Delhi informed the government of India that Mahommed Ali was 'thoroughly discredited and almost penniless' and refused to prosecute him in order to watch him flounder still further. And flounder he did. He went cap in hand to his former associates and colleagues, and having failed in almost all quarters he finally secured a grant of 6,000 rupees from the deposed Maharaja of Nabha to do propaganda for his restoration. By the end of 1925, the growth of communalism in the provinces had made the Ali brothers look like prehistoric animals unable to adopt to a new environment.

In the field of constitutional politics, the most notable politician to share the predicament of the Ali brothers was Mahommed Ali Jinnah. Jinnah had been a leading member of the nationalist movement before 1920 but he had been disappointed by the reforms. Unlikely his U.P. Colleague in the Muslim League, he had been ambitious for power at the centre, and when dyarchy was only introduced in the provinces he was obliged to reconcile himself to fighting the same old battles all over again in the new legislative assembly.
Jinnah only re-emerged as a significant political force after the 1923 elections. He was returned to the assembly by the muslims of Bombay city and he became the leader of the independent party. In that capacity he co-operated with Nehru's Swarajist party and together the two parties were known as the Nationalist party. None-the-less Jinnah held the upper hand. There were 101 seats in the assembly and the Swarajists had won only fortyone of them. Jinnah with a party of some seventeen members, held the balance between the Swarajists and the government.

From the beginning the two parties were separated by political ideology. Nehru's party was recruited chiefly outside the presidencies, from those areas which had either co-operated wholeheartedly with Gandhi or seen the wisdom of compromising with him. Of its forty-one members, ten came from the united provinces (U.P.) and Delhi seven from Bihar and Orissa, five from the Punjab and the central provinces, and two from Assam. Only twelve came from the presidencies, five from Bengal, where Das had bowed to Gandhi, four from Bombay, and three from Madras. Jinnha's party, on the other hand, was recruited almost entirely from the presidencies, six of its seventeen members coming from Bombay, six from Madras, three from Bengal, and only two from the united provinces. (Madan Mohan Malviya and Mahommed Yakub were from U.P.). Unlike the Swarajists, the independents had mostly opposed non-co-operation and several had
contested the elections 1920. If they could be identified with any political group at all, it was with the school of 'moderate' nationalism which had broken with the congress over the acceptability of the Reforms. Though Jinnah was the president of the muslim league, therefore, the differences between the two parties were political, not communal. Motilal Nehru had more muslim supporters than Jinnah. Of the fortyone Swarajists eight were muslims, whereas of the seventeen independents only three muslims. The outcome of their co-operation, however, was of great importance for communal relations in North India. If Jinnah enabled Nehru to carry the day against the government and to obtain political concessions with which to pay off his supporters, the Swarajist-khilafat alliance would be strengthened, but if Nehru through Jinnah's recalcitrance, failed to carry the day, his opponents were poised and ready to exploit communal differences to destroy him. It was an awesome responsibility but Jinnah was not entirely aware of the burden which he carried. He had his eyes firmly fixed on the central government and he had his own notions of the best methods to achieve the political revision which he sought.

The initial period of co-operation was cordial enough.
The ground was prepared by Das, Jayakar M.R. and Jinnah at Bombay after the Coconada Congress. A National Demand calling for provincial autonomy and responsibility in the central government, was subsequently approved by the Swarajist executive at Lucknow, and the two parties agreed to make this the basis of a joint political programme at Delhi on 3 February. On 18 Feb, Motilal
Nehru moved this Demand as an amendment to Diwan Bahadur Rangachari's resolution calling for the early appointment of the statutory commission. It was supported by virtually all the elected Indian members of the assembly and it was passed by a handsome majority. Even before Nehru moved his amendment, however, the Home Member's reply to Rangachariar's resolution had made it clear that the government of India was in no mood to make concessions. All manner of obstacles to advance were erected, not least. The problem presented by the position of minorities and all that was offered ultimately was a departmental enquiry to remedy justifiable complaints within the terms of the Act itself. The main hopes of the Swarajists, however, rested not with the government of India, but with the new labour government in England. They had friends in the labour party and they continued throughout the summer to expect a summons to a conference.

The first response to the national demand by the new secretary of state, Lord Oliver, however, was distinctly disappointing. In a speech to the house of Lords on 26 February, he made it plain that he was not prepared to go any further than the government of India, and as Nehru was later to remark, this response was 'not only insufficient, but highly unsatisfactory and disappointing.' When it came to pressing home this disappointment, however, the Swarajists and independants were at Loggerheads. Many Swarajists wished to reject the Budget in
its entirely, but the independant were not prepared to resort to such tactics and because their agreement was necessary for any policy to be successful they ultimately won the day. It was agreed that the first four heads should be rejected and that the rest of the Budget should be treated on its merits. This was the first instance of Jinnah using his advantage to modify Swarajist policy, but it was very clear from the statement which he made to the Assembly on 11 March that it was not to be the last. The whole tone of the speech suggests not only a desire to reassure the government as to the reasonableness of the Nationalist position but also in ambition to bring the Swarajists under his own more constitutional umbrella.

He said "... The nationalist party is a party which is formed to work in this assembly and nothing more; and in this assembly we stand to pursue a policy and a programme of a constitutional character. We shall pursue that policy and that programme until the last stage of the constitutional struggle are exhausted. There is no idea in the mind of the nationalist party to resort to civil disobedience. The no idea in the mind of the nationalist party that we want revolution. There is no idea in the mind of the nationalist party that we are going to carry on the campaign of non-payment of taxes."

In readings view, Jinnah was making a bid for leadership and his activities over the next three months do not belie that impression.
He first attempted to achieve this ambition by direct methods. After the assembly session ended, he returned to Bombay and held almost daily conferences with Nehru, Jayakar, Purushotamdas Thakurdas and V. J. Patel with a view to producing a new, inclusive, constitutional party. Gandhi also participated in a number of these discussions, as did Das on his arrival from Bengal. Ultimately, however, Jinnah's efforts foundered on the rock of internal congress differences. Nehru and Das were under pressure from Gandhi and, though they did not bow before him, they were too wary of his anties to ally openly with men who repudiated his creed. It was only after the promulgation of the Bengal ordinance in October 1924, when Gandhi agreed to suspend non-co-operation and to place the Swarajists in charge of the congress organization, that Jinnah's ambition stood any chance of being fulfilled and by then new obstacles had been thrown into his path.

Jinnah's other plan, the revival of the Muslim League, had more ominous consequences. When Jinnah called the council of the league at Delhi on 16 March and persuaded his colleagues to agree to a session at Lahore, he was undoubtedly motivated by a desire to strengthen the chances of a government response to the National Demand. The choice of Lahore was not fortuitous. The Punjab was the only province where the Muslims were working the reforms for their own advantage. Fazli Hussain was keen on provincial autonomy, but he was wary of selling his support too cheaply and he made sure that he was in a position of overwhelming strength at the League meeting. This preparation paid
dividends; and when the main resolution defining the Muslim position emerged from the subjects committee it was an almost entirely Punjabi affair. It looked forward to a Federal government at the centre, 'The functions of the central government being confined to such matters as are of general or common concern.' It demanded that very small minorities should be given representation in excess of their numerical proportion in those cases in which they would remain entirely unrepresented in the absence of such exceptional treatment, subject, however, to the essential provision that no majority should be reduced to a minority or even to an equality. 31

This demand was a direct product of the Punjabi situation, the stress on 'very small minorities' being calculated to exclude the Hindus and the Sikhs, and the province itself to improve the position of the Muslims at their expense. As such it was resented by the minority-province Muslims, and particularly by those working the reforms, and an amendment eliminating the reference to 'very small minorities' and replacing it with a demand for 'adequate and effective representation for minorities in every province' was moved by Dr. Ziauddin Ahmad and carried by one hundred and twenty-six votes to eighty three. This amendment was supported by the Punjab agriculturists, suggesting that their original resolution had reflected parochialism but not prejudice, but it was vociferously opposed by the khilafatists and notably by Ghazi Abdur Rahman of Lyalpur, Chaudhuri
Khaliquzzaman and Mahommad Ali. These were the men who had worked closest with the congress and they saw that these terms would not be accepted by that body. It had become clear when Dr. Ansari and Lala Lajpat Rai tried to formulate their national pact that even separate electorates had ceased to be universally accepted, and a communal majority by separate electorates had already been rejected by the congress at Coconada. If the league were to demand this concession again without giving any compensation in the minority provinces, the result would be a foregone conclusion. Nonetheless by the passage of the amendment, the league did demand just that, and Jinnah emerged from the Lahore session, not only armed with a declaration in favour of a complete overhaul of the government of India Act, but committed to securing an improvement on the Lucknow pact as a precondition for united action. He did not shirk this responsibility proved insufficient.

Within a week of Lahore session, Nehru and Jinnah were invited to sit as non-official members on the reform Enquiry Committee, an extended version of the departmental inquiry promised by Hailey in February. Nehru would have liked to accept this invitation but opposition from the Swarajist executive obliged him to turn it down. Jinnah being less subject to external pressure, accepted with alacrity. It gave him an ideal opportunity to pursue his ambitions for reform, to explore the views of others, and where necessary to convert them to his
point of view. His questions to witnesses suggest three main pre-occupations. He seeks firstly to show that Dyarchy has failed and that the constitution needs overhauling, secondly to encounter the argument that communal tension in an obstacle to advances, and thirdly, to discover terms on which a new Lucknow pact might be devised. His path was not smooth, however, for he met with considerable opposition from the chairman. Sir Alexander Muddiman, who was also the Home member, and from Sir Mahommed Safi, the law member, who had been put on the committee to represent the communal point of view.33

As at Lahore, Jinnah obtained the greater co-operation from the Punjabi Muslims. They were anxious for reforms and willing to minimize the significance of communal tension in order to achieve it. Furthermore they had already come to an understanding with Jinnah and based their position on the resolution passed by the League.34

Jinnah, also received support from three U.P. Muslims, Maulvi Mahommed Yakub, a member of his own party, Syed Raza Ali, a member of the council of state, and professor Shafaat Ahmad, a member of the U.P. Legislative council. Mahommed Yakub was the most outspoken. He held it 'a malicious subversion of facts to say that the musalmans are not in favour of responsible government' and he opposed the argument that communal discord was an obstacle to political advance. He admitted, however, that
he was 'more keen for an extension of democratic powers in the central government than in the provinces.' As an All-India politician he wished for responsibility at the centre, but as a muslim from a minority province he had his scruples about provincial autonomy. The same dichotomy was also noticeable in the evidence of Raza Ali. He was less bold than Mahommad Yakub with regard to the central government, holding that Dyarchy, though unpopular, would be a more sensible beginning than complete responsibility, but more special about provincial autonomy, declaring quite openly that communal tension was an obstacle to further devolution. Shaafat Ahmad's were less precise. On the one hand, he held that full advantage had not been taken of the opportunities afforded by the act; on the other, that it would be possible even within terms of the Act to abolish dyarchy and to introduce responsibility at the centre. Did he wish for the overhaul of the Act? It is not clear. He did demand, however, that muslim representation should be increased both in the provinces and at the centre, and as this appeared to be an escalation of the league demand made at Lahore, Jinnah was anxious to clarify the position. Shaafat agreed almost immediately, however, that the minority province muslims were satisfied with the Lucknow pact, and Jinnah proceeded further.

When the work of the reforms enquiry committee was completed, Jinnah, Sapru, Sivaswamy Iyer and Paranjpye refused to sign the majority report and produced a minority report instead.
In that report, they condemned Dyarchy unequivocally and they demanded the introduction of provincial autonomy and responsibility in the central government they used the evidence of Barakat Ali to show that communal tension was a phenomenon of restricted importance; they quoted the Muslim league resolution to prove that the Muslims were not opposed to advance. They involved the spectre of centrifugalism as an argument for simultaneous advance.

"... with provisional governments fully responsible to their legislatures and the central government irresponsible in the last resort, the control of various kinds which it is desired to be continued in the central government will be more difficult to enforce and the centrifugal tendency observed in many federal states and especially marked in the history of India will manifest itself more and more making stable government unworkable."³⁷

This was perhaps the first time that partition had been foreshadowed in constitutional terms and it provides a very significant marker on the road to that destination.

On 3 Dec., 1924, when the reforms enquiry committee report was signed, Jinnah’s ambition looked of fulfilment. Gandhi, by his suspension of non-co-operation, had paved the way for a new accession of strength to the congress; and already, on 21 Nov., an all-parties conference had met at Bombay and set up a representative committee to devise a united front against the government.
None-the-less, Jinnah was wary of taking part in unity discussions on other people's terms. Strictly speaking, the suspension of non-co-operation enabled him to rejoin the congress. But when he considered attending the Belgaum session he found himself in two minds. "He is apparently of the view," Venkatapatiraju wrote to Purushotamdas Thakurdas, 'that we need not bother ourselves outside the Assembly. My point is that to carry any influence in the assembly we should have public support.' This was a crucial difference not only between Venkatapatiraju and Jinnah but more importantly between Jinnah and Swarajists. Jinnah wanted the Swarajists to adopt purely constitutional methods but he had no desire to fight their battles for them. His own position, both as leader of the independents and as president of the Muslim League, was already secure, and he did not wish to compromise his chances of negotiating with the congress as an equal by becoming a party to its decisions. The same considerations also affected his participation in the all-parties conference. He only agreed to sit on Gandhi's unity committee providing its decisions were not taken by vote. Decisions by majority implied differences of opinion and he was only prepared to subscribe to an agreement which was voluntarily adopted by all parties.

Jinnah saving himself for negotiations with the congress. But Mohammad Ali, as congress president, had already put a number of spoker in his wheel. Jinnah's self-importance, his fine
clothes and his precise manner of speech had long been a
subject for Mahommed Ali's satire, but by the middle of 1924,
with Pan-Islamist enthusiasm at low ebb, Jinnah was no longer
just good material for the gossip column of the 'Comrade'. If
Mahommed Ali had any chance of re-establishing himself as a
political leader it was a purveyor of Hindu-Muslim unity, and
Jinnah's efforts to revive the League and to renegotiate the
Lucknow pact provoked a jealous response for that reason.
Mahommed Ali opposed the revival of the League; he attended it
only to object to the resolution on communal safeguards; and
when the session was over, he turned with a new zeal to the
promotion of communal harmony. Jinnah was not unduly pertur-
bed so long as Mahommed Ali confined himself to pouring oil on
troubled waters. Within the League his opposition was managea-
ble and the reduction of communal tension was a desirable and in
itself. But he was considerably inconvenienced when Mahommed
Ali stopped playing peacemaker and started playing politician.

During the Lahore League, a committee had been appointed
to formulate a constitution in consultation with other organizat-
ions. This was Jinnah's brainchilded and he had great hopes of
it. When it made overtures to the congress, however it was
unceremoniously snubbed. This was the first instance of Mahom-
med Ali's activities influencing the relations between the two
organizations and it prevented the holding of a joint session at
Belgaum.
Though relations between the League and the congress had become testy, both Jinnah and the Swarajists remained anxious for a settlement. When Motilal learned that the League had decided to hold its session at Bombay, he urged Jinnah to change the venue to Belgaum, and Jinnah though he claimed it was too late to do so, did postpone the meeting for several days to allow for congress attendance. At the League itself, the president, Syed Raza Ali, warned his audience against a Merger with the congress. But Jinnah, whilst acknowledging the differences which had emerged over separate electorates, renewed his plea for an attempt at a settlement. Nor was he successful. The constitution committee appointed at Lahore was refashioned to accommodate a significantly larger congress muslim element, and presumably as a result of Gandhi's intervention, this new committee was subsequently co-opted bodily on to the unity committee of the all-parties conference. All this shows that hope was not yet dead. The main obstacles came from U.P. and Punjab. Malviya and Chintamani, who had already begun to break Nehru's alliance with U.P. Muslims in the municipalities, were the main leaders who protested. Hindu Mahashabha's activities took a distinctly political turn. A committee was appointed to formulate Hindu opinion on the communal question, and its composition was ominous for the future. Amongst others, it consisted of Lajpat Rai, Raja Narendra Nath, Chintamani, Raja Sir Rampal Singh, Jairamdas Daulat Ram of Sindh and, most
ominously of all, Nehru's Swarajist allies from the central provinces, B.S. Moonji and N.C. Kelkar. It was these mahasabhitites who frustrated the chances of a new Lucknow pact when the all-parties conference reconvened at Delhi on 23 January 1925. During the preliminary consultations, when Jinnah urged the committee to attend first to Hindu Muslim differences, the Mahashabhitites did not actually oppose a new settlement. They feigned ignorance of Muslim demands and having first preempted Jinnah's position by condemning both communal representation. Jinnah's speech demanding recognition for Muslim majorities in Bengal and the Punjab was followed by an uncompromising harangue from Lajpat Rai and there was some danger of the committee being disrupted. This danger was averted by the acceptance of Mrs. Besant's proposal for the establishment of two committees, one to formulate a scheme for Swaraj and other to solve the communal question, but no sooner had the second committee started work than Chintamani announced that its decisions would not be acceptable to the Hindu until they had been endorsed by the Mahashabha. Both Jinnah and Nehru objected to this condition and it was eventually withdrawn at Gandhi's insistence, but the relations between Hindus and Muslims within the committee became steadily worse and on 26 January Hakim Ajmal Khan had to propose an adjournment to allow for the removal of misunderstanding. These misunderstandings, however, were too substantial to be removed and after
a further five minute session on 28 January the committee was adjourned for a month that in effect marked the end of it.

After the failure of the all-parties conference, the division between Nehru and Jinnah definitely widened. In the spring of 1925 the two men began to disagree publically, and the united front against the government collapsed.

On 7 July 1925, in the House of Lords, Lord Birkenhead put paid to hopes of immediate reform. He did not entirely rule out the possibility of an early statutory commission but he made it plain that no concession could be expected until Indian leaders had co-operated in the working of the reforms. This speech was a turning point for the politics of confrontation. Until that time, Nehru's leadership and Swarajists tactics had been unchallenged and a victory at the all-India level seemed possible. Afterwards both were rejected, and many provincial battalions withdrew from the battle and made overtures to the enemy. Consequently, Nehru was obliged to wase front line operations and to take up the task of quelling rebellion amongst his own forces. To do that successfully, however, he eventually had to quit the legislature and to resume non-co-operation.

After Birkenhead's announcement, the confrontation with the Raj ceased to hold the centre of the stage and its plade was taken by a conflict between Nehru and his opponents. Opposition to Nehru came from the main sources; firstly from his
own allies in the central provinces and Bombay, and Tilakite congress organization in Maharastra and Berar. And secondarily from the Hindus of Punjab and U.P. the main point at issue was office acceptance Nehru had built his all-India organization on the rejection of the reforms and a Demand that the constitution be completely overhauled. Yet having failed to budge the British, he had to face a demand that the reforms be worked for what they were worth.

At the same time, in north India, Malaviya's attitude had become more overtly political. In August, the working committee of the Mahashabha decided to set up candidates for the forthcoming elections if other candidates were initial to Hindu interests, and in September, Malviya began to give all-India importance to the issue of music before Masques. On 5 Sept., his relative Pandit Rama Kant Malaviya, told a joint Hindu-Muslim meeting at the collector's house at Allahabad that local Hindu could not agree to stop music before Masques until there was an all-India settlement.

Both, Malviya group and Maharastrian group clashed jointly with Nehru at the Kanpur Congress. Nehru proposed a resolution reaffirming the faith of the congress in civil disobedience, insisting on non-acceptance of office as the party programme for the 1926 elections, and calling for a withdrawal of Swarajists from the legislature if the National Demand had not been met by Feb. 1926. Malviya proposed an amendment urging the congress
to work the reforms to the best possible advantage, replacing the National Demand of February 1924 with the less extreme demand of Sept. 1925, and declaring all reference to civil disobedience and resignation. Malviya was supported by Jayker, Kalkar Aney (Party leader in Berar) and Moonji, but Nehru ultimately carried the day. Nonetheless the scene was set for a substantial political battle in the crucial months before the 1926 elections.

In U.P. Malviya was supporting office acceptance, maximizing his contacts with Hindu landlords and using a communal platform as a means of rallying support. He had already defeated Nehru's Swarajists alliance in the 1925 municipal elections, and from the Spring of 1926. He began to use the same methods for provincial ends. Nehru did not want an outright battle with Malviya. Nonetheless, though he wanted a compromise, he was not prepared to compromise on Malviya's terms, and after all outright battle took place. In the battle, Malviya used every communal device available. Nehru was accused of being a befeatherer; the congress was stigmatized as a prostitute of muslim India; and such was the communal hatred aroused that Nehru afterwards considered retiring from public life in disgust.

An indication of the depth of communal tension and its political implications is provided by a letter from the secretary of the Delhi pcc to the congress president Sarojini Naidu.
"You know that Delhi the one place in the whole of India where we have get joint electorates, and during coming elections the question of having joint electorate all round in future will be put to the test here. The muslim and hindu votes are in ratio of 1 to 2 and the pcc Delhi has put up Mr. Asaf Ali, bar at law, as their candidate for the Assembly.... it is a matter of shame that the Hindus of Delhi do not realise the importance of Delhi.

Though Nehru made considerable concessions to communal feeling, the election result were disartrous for his party. the U.P. from thirty one members in 1923, they were reduced to sixteen members in 1926.

In U.P. where eleven muslims had been nominated and four returned in 1923, only six were nominated and only one returned in 1926. Of the original eleven only one was renominated, Maulvi Zahuruddin, the member for Bareilly and Shahjahanpur cum Moradabad, and he was the only one returned. Not only had muslim vote decreased. There has been a virtually complete change of personnel. Indeed the indications are that Nehru concentrated on supporting independent candidates in the hope they would join the party one elected.

Ultimately fourteen Swarajist muslims stood for eighteen seats and six were returned. These were almost the only muslims returned to provincial councils on the congress ticket throughout North India.
In the central assembly, of the eight Swarajist muslims returned in 1923, only three were returned in 1926.

The only new blood came from Bihar and U.P. from U.P. were Tassaduq Sherwani and Rafi Ahmad Kidwai. Khaliguzzaman who stood for the U.P. council from the Lucknow, Unao, and Hardoi constituency, was soundly defeated by the Raja of Salempur. 55

When Nehru contemplated these results he was profoundly discouraged. He wrote to Jawahar Lal: - "The Malviya - Lala gang aided by Birla's money are making frantic efforts to capture the congress. They will probably succeed as no counter effort is possible from our side. I shall probably make a public declaration after the Guahati congress and with it resign my seat in the assembly though I am still acclained as the leader of the strongest party in the country. We can do no possible good in the Assembly or the councils with our present numbers and the kind of men we have. 56

Nehru Report and Muslim Leadership:

The Nehru report was first published on 21 August 1928. It immediately aroused tremendous interest. The constitution which the report put forward was the most coherent and radical ever framed by group of Indian politicians, and though its communal provisions have since received most attention, its political provisions were equally controversial and undoubtedly
contributed to were of communal dissention in which it was soon submerged. All Departments of the central government, including defence, finance and relations with the states, were to be transferred to the control of a responsible Indian legislature, and though Dominion status was the goal, it was demanded at the next immediate step in India's political evolution. The central government was to consist of a governor general appointed by the king, a prime minister appointed by the governor general, and six ministers, appointed by the governor general on the advice of prime minister. The appointment of a provincial government was to follow a similar pattern. In both cases, cabinets were to be jointly responsible to their respective legislature, and the power of both governor-general and governor reduced to a bare minimum. The lower house of the central legislature and all provincial legislature were to be elected on an adult Franchise. There was also to be a supreme court, a committee for Defence, and a public service commission. Relations between the central government and the provincial governments were not discussed in detail. But it is clear from the schedules of subjects under their charge that the national government was to be of a unitary rather than a federal type, with residuary power in the hands of the central government. This was subsequently to be a bone of contention with many opponents of the congress point of view. In the communal sphere, the report recommended the abolition of separate electorates and of weightage for minorities, and it also rejected the muslim demand for reservation for majorities and for thirty three per cent at the centre.
The all party conference to consider the report was convened at Lucknow on 28 August. The Raja of Mahmudabad, Sarojini Naidu and Dr. Ansari, all urged the Nehrus to postpone it so that Jinnah could attend, but though they secured a token postponement of one day, the indications are that the Nehrus were not anxious to be conciliatory. All religious bodies, including two influential Sikh organisations, the Akali Dal and the Siromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee were excluded, and the attendance was kept down to about a hundred people. The meeting produced a happy result. On 30 August it was unanimously agreed.

But, as the various agreements were reached, the only murmur of dissent came from Shaukat Ali, who fell out with the Punjabi khilafatists over the abolition of reservation for minorities, stating that the central khilafat committee still stood by its original resolution on this question. The secession of the Punjabi and Bengali khilafatist was a bitter blow for Ali brothers (Saukat Ali) and Mahommad Ali). Even by 1925, their standing with their own community had been very much in decline and if Congress now struck bargains independently with different khilafat factions, their only remaining political assets, controls of the All-India organisation, would also be in jeopardy. Following the Lucknow conference, therefore, Shaukat girded up his lions for action. He broke with Motilal Nehru, denouncing him for making concessions to the Mahashabha (Hindu), and he also broke with the Muslims who supported Motilal, Chief among whom was Ansari, denouncing them as Congress stooges.
Shaukat Ali's repudiation of the Nehru report was a considerable embarrassment to Congress. But a more serious challenge to the report came from those provincial forces on whom the government had relied from the beginning. Those (provinces) who found themselves in the separatist lobby could look to leadership chiefly from two sources, the Punjab and the U.P. In the Punjab, it was Fazli Husain's unionist party which gave the lead, and in the U.P. a group of Muslim members of the legislative council, chiefly from the western division of the province, who were co-ordinated by Professor Shafaaat Ahmad Khan of Allahabad University and financed by Sir Mahommed Yusuf, the minister of local self-government the views of the first group are most succinctly expressed in the majority report of the Punjab legislative council co-operating committee set up in May 1928 under the chairmanship of Sikunder Hayat Khan, and those of the second in 'Representation of the Muslims of the united provinces to the Indian statutory commission.

In many respects, the views of these two groups were diametrically opposed to each other. The unionist party in Punjab was confident that any further devolution of power at the provincial level would be to its advantage, the U.P. Muslims on the other hand, fearing that in the prevailing communal atmosphere of their province a further devolution of power would mere usher in 'a Brahmin or a Kayastha domination, declared
their opposition to all forms of provincial advance if their position was not safeguarded. They favoured a continuation of Dyarchy, with law and order and revenue remaining reserved subjects. They were opposed to the abolition of the nominated element and special constituencies. They demanded a second chamber and they required that thirty three percent of all cabinet posts should be allocated to their community. These U.P. Muslims demands were, in fact, the most far-reaching ever put forward by a minority community. They also demanded separate electorates with weightage at every level of government, effective representation on all autonomous institutions created by the legislatures, safeguards for Urdu, adequate safeguards for the exercise of Muslim religious rights, due allocation of grants in aid by government and local bodies, and a share of the services according to their representative proportion in any given body.

Outside the sphere of provincial devolution, however, the U.P. Muslims were agree with Punjab group. Not only did they both support the separation of Sind, reforms for the frontier and Baluchistan, a thirty three percent Muslim share in the central legislature and the continuation of separate electorates; they also showed a common opposition to control of the central government by the majority community, though for different reasons in each case. The unionist of Punjab were not opposed in principle to full responsible government at the centre.
The U.P. Muslims adopted a very different attitude. They were not in favour of a full responsible government at the centre. In their view, the existence of communal mistrust was a sufficient reason for the maintenance of the status quo:

"We are of the opinion that the relationship between the governor general and his executive council which now subsists be maintained... We feel that a strong central government, which is able and willing to pursue a policy that is not coloured by communal, racial, local, provincial or economic prejudices is necessary at the present juncture, and is essential in a country where conflict of interest necessitates absolute impartiality and prompt action.

The U.P. Muslims wanted a strong central government—and this involved vesting residuary powers at the centre—because they envisaged the continuance of British control. In the words of Masud-ul-Hassan, they wanted 'Fundamental safeguards which nobody in India can touch,' and this was only possible if the British parliament retained the right to interfere in the provinces on behalf of the minorities. We are strongly opposed: wrote Shafaat Ahmad, to vesting the central government with the power of amending any constitution that is granted to it by the British parliament. In their different ways, therefore, both the unionists and the U.P. Muslims were opposed to what
Jinnah and the congress were campaigning for. Neither wanted to be subjected to a national government at the centre.

Among the muslims of these two groups, the publication of the Nehru report did not produce any major changes of political orientation. Most of them had always believed that they would get a better hearing from the government than from congress, and before the report was published, most of them had already decided to co-operate with the Simon commission.

For both the U.P. and Punjab Muslims, the report posed the question: 'what is your attitude to the prospect of an effective British withdrawal from the central government.

In the U.P. where muslim demands for all manner of separate representation had met with a hammer blow from Nehru and his colleagues, those who had been responsible for the statutory commission. Memorandum convened an all-parties muslim conference at Kanpur on 4 November. Hafiz Hidayat Hussain, Masud-ul-Hassan and Saikh Zahur Ahmad, all three of them important contributors to the memorandum, now figured prominently on the platform and reiterated the demands which they had earlier submitted to the commission. By November 1928, however, one additional and more extreme demand had emerged for a fifty percent share in the provincial government. This demand, which appears initially to be just another indication of muslim nervousness, may well have been the result of a change of attitude towards the
prospect of a national government at the centre. Hafiz Hidayat Hussain, the chairman of the reception committee, told his audience that the Nehru report's greatest drawback was that it concentrated power in the central government where Muslims would always remain in a minority. The solution he said, was a federal system of government which would provide for provinces where the Muslims majority could retaliate the treatment method out to their community in the Hindu provinces. This statement reflects a considerable change in perspective since the submission of U.P. Muslim memorandum to Simon, and it suggests that Nehru's recommendations had forced Hidayat Hussain and his friends to face the question: How are we to protest ourselves if we cannot rely on the Raj? It suggests, moreover, that their answer to this question was to put their faith in a system of 'retaliation,' which depended for its effectiveness on a maximum degree of provincial autonomy for the majority province Muslims. By November, therefore, the political future of the U.P. Muslims was seen to be far more interlocked with that of their Punjabi co-religionists.

The Kanpur conference was also significant because it witnessed an important accession of strength to the minority-province separatists from those nationalist Muslims who had been alienated by the Nehru report. The president of the session was no less a person than Shaukat Ali, who now established himself in the separatist camp. In the future he was to make occasional forays into 'nationalist' politics, drawn by his personal
indications and his lengthy acquaintance with congress leaders. Yet just as the constraints of the system had forced him into the separatist camp, so they continued to keep him there. The same was also true for his brother, Mahommed, who following his return from Europe in October, took up an identical position. Not only did he support the demands of the U.P. muslims for safeguards: he also campaigned for a loose federation with maximum provincial autonomy. At the Bihar all-parties muslim conference early in December, he condemned the Nehru report for favouring the Hindu Mahashabha. Even in the provinces where muslims had a majority, he said, 'the Nehru report was so planned as to counter the influence of that muslim majority by having too dominate a central government at Delhi.  

The most important personality in Motilal's calculation, however, was Mohammad Ali Jinnah, who returned to India some months later than expected as a result of his wife's illness in Peris. If Jinnah could be won over, the Nehru report would aquir added prestige, and Motilal therefore deputed Purushotamdas Thakurdas to 'rope in Jinnah' before Shaukat Ali got to him. He wrote "so much depends on Jinnah that I have a mind to go to Bombay to receive him. If I have the necessary funds within the next few days I hope to create a strong opinion amongst the Mussalmans to great Jinnah on his arrival. Therefore please lose no time to raise as much money as you can for this great enterprise."
When Jinnah arrived however, he did not immediately proclaim his support for Nehru's recommendations but characteristically chose to sound out Muslim opinion first. Nehru who wrote to him from Ahmedabad the day after he arrived, urged him to attend the all parties committee meeting at Delhi on 5 November, assuring him that members of the committee were not representatives of the organisations to which they belonged and that his presence would not commit the Muslim League to any decision reached. All such decisions, he said, would be open to alteration at the all-parties convention at Calcutta on 17 December. But Jinnah was too experienced a politician to put his head in such a noose. He was not prepared to attend any all parties conference until he knew his brief, and though sent Nehru a letter to be read out at the Delhi meeting, he waited to see what would happen at the Muslim League council meeting which he had called at Lucknow on 11 November.

The Lucknow Muslim League council meeting was less conclusive than Jinnah would have liked. Three different schools were present (The Independents, the Congress Muslims and the U.P. separatists) and no decision was reached by a substantial majority. A resolution thanking the Nehru committee for its report (but not committing the League to accepting its provisions) was carried by only four votes, and the Raja of Mahmudabad was elected president of the annual session by a majority of two. From Jinnah's point of view, this absence of unanimity made it impolitic for him to open negotiations with the Congress. He
ensured that the two organizations met in the same city but he was not prepared to attend the all-parties convention until a full session of the league had met. This attitude forced him into disagreement with Motilal who wished the league to meet after the convention so that it could ratify its decisions. Jinnah was adamant, however, that authorization to attend the convention could not come from the council alone; and he also held that subsequent ratification by the league, would not be necessary if adequate authorization was forthcoming in the first place. This difference of opinion caused some ill-feeling between the two men and the air was only cleared when Sir Ali Imam helped them to come to a compromise. The all parties convention was to begin on 22 December, as Nehru had planned, but its open session was to be held on 27 and 28 December, to allow the league to send accredited representatives. The open session of the congress was to start on the 29th.66

Before the league met at Calcutta, a powerful section of support had seceded from it. This was the khilafat section which had repudiated the Nehru report - Shaukat Ali, Mahommad Ali, Shafi Daud, Hasarat Mohani, Azad Shobhani and a section of the Jumait-ul-Ulama-i-hind under the leadership of Mufti Kifayatullah. The confrontation between these men and the 'nationalist' khilafatists, which had been on the cards since the Lucknow session of the all-parties conference, came to a head during the christmass week. By that stage, Punjabi and Bengali opposition had convinced the Ali brothers that bold tactics were necessary
to retain control of the organization. Muhammad Ali and H.S. Suhrrawardy, the Calcutta khilafat leader, broke up the Bengal provincial khilafat committee meeting and overruled the election of delegates from the districts to the annual session. Instead, quite unconstitutionally, they enrolled their own delegates from Calcutta itself. The Ali brothers also succeeded in banning the attendance of North West frontier delegates elected by the Punjab khilafat committee, and they ousted the Bihar delegation. These tactics gave them a majority in the annual session but only at the cost of a split in the party. Dr. Ansari and his followers broke with the Ali brothers and called their bluff by electing their own delegation to the all parties convention. The Ali brothers responded by withdrawing from the convention entirely.

The Muslim league meeting at Calcutta was attended by Jinnah, the Raja of Mahmudabad and Sir Ali Imam, the old independent trio, and by Ansari's khilafatists. The session began with a note of warning from the chairman of the reception committee, Maulvi Abdul Karim, who argued that some form of special representation was essential for the protection of Muslim interests, and it continued with a plea for 'sweet reasonableness' by the Raja, who made a strong case for Dominion status rather than independence and urged his audience to elect a delegation to the all-parties convention to settle outstanding communal issues on that basis in the spirit of broad mindedness. On the second day, following a meeting of the subjects committee on the previous afternoon, Mr. M.C. Chagla, Jinnah's
disciple an friend, proposed a delegation to the all-parties convention consisting of twenty persons, ten of whom had seceded from the khilafat committee with Dr. Ansari. Haji Abdullah Haroon, the Karachi businessman, objected that the delegation only consisted of members of one party but he was called 'today' by Zafar Ali and no major changes were made. Two additional delegates were added, however to give representation to the frontier and Assam.

The same afternoon, these Muslim League and khilafat delegates met a sub-committee of the all-parties convention. The demands which they put forward had not been discussed at the open session of either organization. They were put forward jointly by Jinnah and T.A.K. Sherwani. The demands were as follows:

1. That one-third of the elected representatives of both the House of the Central Legislature should be Mussalmans.

2. That in the Punjab and Bengal, in the event of adult suffrage not being established, there should be reservation of seats for the Musalmans on the population basis for ten years subject to a re-examination after that period, but they shall have no right to contest additional seats.

3a. That residuary powers should be left to the provinces and should not rest with the central legislature.

b. That clause 13A embodied in the supplementary report be deleted.
c. That the division of subjects in the schedule I and II be revised.

(4) That the constitution shall not be amended or altered unless the amendment or alteration is passed first by both the houses of parliament separately by a majority of four-fifths of those present and then by both the houses in a joint sitting by a majority of four-fifths.

(5) Article V—communal representation ... delete the words 'simultaneously with the establishment of government under this constitution.

(6) Embbody the pact regarding communal representation in Punjab in full in the Nehru report.

In all probability, Jinnah was responsible for the demand for thirty three percent at the centre. This had been one of his four proposals in March 1927 and he had every reason to stick to it rigorously, because his muslim followers in the central assembly, and particularly those from the minority provinces, had been very critical of the Nehru report on precisely this point. Jinnah's insistence, in defence of this demand, that the extra seats should be distributed to give weightage to the minority provinces, is probably a reflection of his awareness of this situation.

At least three of the demands, however, appear to have come from the Punjab khilafatists. This group had clearly been put out when the Nehru committee supplementary report made no
reference to adult suffrage as a precondition for the introduction of joint electorates in their province. This had been agreed at Lucknow and they wanted that agreement to be incorporated into the Nehru report in full. The demand that the reservation of seats should be on a population basis if adult suffrage was not introduced also seems likely to have come from them, though Jinnah may have prompted them to be realistic. Finally, the demand that residuary powers should rest in the provinces certainly did come from them, as it was put forward first in a letter from Ansari's khilafat faction to the all parties convention. Jinnah for his part, supported this demand, but more out of necessity than of choice. Being intent on ministerial power at the centre, he did not wish the centre's powers to be eroded before he could enjoy them, and he only bowed to the Punjabi khilafatists, as they had bowed before public opinion in their own province, because he had no alternative.

The reception given to these demands by the all-parties convention sub-committee could have been safely predicted after a perusal of its personal of its thirty-seven members, eleven were Hindus, Sikhs and Christians of the Punjab, one was a leading opponent of the separation of Sind, and Six were leading lights of the Hindu Mahashabha. The demand for thirty-three percent at the centre was supported by Gandhi and Sapru, but opposed by the Hindu Mahashabha and the Sikhs. The demand that
residuary powers should rest with the provinces was opposed by both the Mahasabha and the liberal federation, though both Sapru and Chintamani were prepared to re-examine the schedules of subjects. Neither Gandhi nor Motilal intervened during the discussion of this most important point. The demand for reservation on a population basis in Bengal and Punjab if adult suffrage was not adopted was skirted by means of the formula, "We do not contemplate any such contingency.' The demand regarding Sind was rejected on the grounds that it involved altering the agreement reached at Lucknow. In the open session, Jinnah tried to change the verdict of the committee. He told his audience that the modifications required were fair and reasonable; that no country had succeeded in establishing its independence without making provision for its minorities; and that a Hindu-Muslim settlement was essential for the political progress of the country. Yet though he was supported by Dr. Sapru, he met with a highly reasoned opposition from Jayakar, who told the convention that Jinnah only represented a small minority of muslims and that it was not worth-while making concessions because it would make no difference to the muslim community as a whole. Besides he said, Jinnah was on their side anyway, and would do his best to bring the Muslim League with him. Jinnah's reply shows how clearly he realized the isolation of his position:

"It is essential that you must get not only the muslim league but the musalmans of India and here I am not speaking
as a musalman but as an Indian. And it is my desire to see that we get seven crores of musalmans to March along with us in the struggle for freedom. Would you be content if I were to say, I am with you? Do you want or do you not want muslim India to go along with you? 73

It was a good question. But Jayakar had already answered it. The convention rejected Jinnah's offer and brought him to 'the parting of the ways.'

The circumstances responsible for forcing Jinnah into the wilderness were extremely complex. They went far beyond the individual attitudes of Mahasabha politicians. They reflected the working of the political system itself. In the early 1920s, though the forces of provincialism did occasionally impinge on the all-India scene, the real conflict of interest between the 'nationalist' politician and the provincial politician working the reforms was obscured by the absence of points of friction. Only when the Montegu-Chelmsford reforms come under the hammer does this conflict of interest become explicit.

Jinnah's main difficulty was that he had no solid political base. He was a consultative politician in an age of political responsibility. Consequently, however sincere his 'nationalism', he could only survive by acting as a broker between muslim politicians in the provinces and his congress colleagues at the centre. He was not himself engaged in provincial politics. He merely attempted to fashion the provincial clay at his disposal into a shape suited to his all-India, purpose. His task, however,
was like that of a sculptor required to work in materials which constantly change their texture. As the provinces threw up new provincial demands, so, ineluctably, Jinnah was obliged to change his political objectives. In 1927, he put forward four proposals; in 1928, they became six, and in 1929, fourteen.

Ultimately, negotiation between Jinnah and the congress was no longer productive. Jinnah was looking over his shoulder at the provinces so much that he was no longer actively engaged in the same battle as the congress. He was not prepared to accede to the congress programme merely as an individual. He wanted to take a large body of Muslims with him, yet those Muslims whose activities forced Jinnah to alter his all-India negotiating position were the provincial opponents of the very men who swelled the ranks of the congress. Here was the heart of Jinnah's dilemma. It had ceased to be possible to occupy a central position in Indian politics. One either had to be in the congress camp or the Muslim camp. It was this logic which ultimately turned Jinnah into the Quaid-i-Azam of Pakistan. But Jinnah's discomfiture at Calcutta was not the end of the story. Just as the rise of provincial Muslim separatism had cut the ground from under the feet of the 'all-India politician, so was the Calcutta convention followed by the emergence of the All-India Muslim conference. Just as those congressmen favouring 'independence' and non-co-operation were beginning to replace the Nehru's and Saprus so the Muslims of the various legislatures gathered at Delhi to declare their allegiance to the
king emperor and their respect for constitutional norms. The Indian body politic was being divided, government and muslims on one side, Hindus on the other.

The idea of a conference of muslim legislators was first mooted by the Aga Khan in December 1927. But it was not taken enthusiastically until after the publication of the Nehru report, at which stage certain of Jinnah's colleagues in the central assembly, notably Sir Mahommed Yakub and Mr. Fazl Rahimtoolah, brought the scheme to fruition. They invited members of the legislatures and other prominent men to a conference at Delhi on 31 December and they persuaded the Aga Khan to deliver the presidential address. The Nehru report had made it clear that muslims in the central assembly could no longer maintain an 'independent' position. By advocating joint electorates and abolishing weightage it had reduced muslim representation in the minority provinces and made it almost certain that minority province muslim representation in the central assembly would also be reduced. These were sufficient reasons for such men to want to make common cause with their provincial colleagues. Those who respond most readily to their invitation, however, were either those who were highly organised already, the Punjab unionists under the leadership of Firoz Khan Noon and the U.P. Muslims under Shafaat Ahmad Khan and Hafiz Hidayat Hussain, or those who had become disillusioned with the politics of confrontation once it became clear that Jinnah's negotiations with the
congress would be fruitless the frontiersmen, the Punjabi and Bengali urban constitutionalists, the minority province khilafatists and Sindhi's. The appearance of all these different schools on the same platform was the most remarkable feature of the first meeting of the conference. That Mahommed Ali should sit beside Sir Mahommed Shafi, whom he had so often derided as a government stooge, and that the Aga Khan should be cheered by Azad Shobhani, whose vitriolic speeches at Kanpur in 1913 had forced him to wash his hands of the muslim league, were amongst the most delicious ironies of the Montegu-Chemlsford reforms.

The terms put forward by the All-India muslim conference were a combination of unionist and U.P. Muslims demands:

(1) Federal system with complete autonomy and residuary powers vested in the constituent states.

(2) No bill to be passed if 3/4 of the affected community is against it.

(3) Separate electorates to be retained until muslims decide to give them up.

(4) Fair muslim share in the cabinets of provinces and the centre.

(5) Where muslims constitute a majority of the population, their ascendancy may not be undermined by electoral reorganisation.
Where Muslims were in a minority, they shall have no less representation than they do at present.

33% (Thirty-three percent) representation in the central legislature.

Separation of Sind.

Reforms in the North-West Frontier province and Baluchistan.

Same safeguards for Hindu minorities in Muslim provinces as for Muslim minorities in Hindu majority ones.

Adequate share for Muslims in the services.

Safeguards for the protection of Muslim culture and education, language, religion and personal law.

No change in the constitution except with the assent of the federal legislatures.

Of these demands 1 and 5 clearly came from the unionists, whereas 2, 4, 6, 11, 12 & 13 came from the U.P. Muslims. 3, 7, 8 and 9 were commonly demanded by both groups, 7 gaining added urgency as a result of the presence of several 'All-India groups. It is significant that the U.P. Muslim demands, though covering the same ground as those put forward at Kanpur, were shorn of the hysterical percentages which were a feature of that occasion and given a more balanced and deliberate look.
Attitude of Muslim Leadership in U.P. to Simon Commission:

After 1925 begins the new phase - The phase of confrontation. The Muslim league, though ridden with factional politics until Jinnah assumed its leadership in 1937, preferred to stick to the course of open and unabashed criticism of the congress policies and programmes for no other reason than to register its opposition for the sake of opposition. What the congress did, the league did its opposite. When the congress decided to boycott the Simon commission, a powerful section of the league welcomed it. More than this, the league now came forward with certain fantastic demands of its own so as to beat the forces of nationalism with its stick of communalism. The most agonising feature of the league politics now was that it went to the extent of fighting for its communal demands in the galleries of the British parliament without paying heed to the old maximum that mutual problems should not be discussed in the enemy's home.

The Indian statutory commission presided over by Sir John Simon was constituted under a Royal warrant dated 26 Nov, 1927. It was composed of seven trusted, well placed and experienced Englishmen - The chairman himself, Harry Lawson Webster, Donald Sterling Palmer, Edward Cecil George Cadagon, Stephen Walsh, George Richard Lane Fox, and Clement Richard Attlee. Its basis of appointment lay in section 84A of the government of India act, 1919, which provided that 'within' ten years after
its passage, 'The Secretary of state with the concurrence of both house of parliament shall submit for the approval of his majesty the names of persons to act as a commission' which after approval would inquire into 'the working of the system of government, the growth of education and the development of representative institutions in British India and matters connected there with, and the commission, shall report as to whether and to what extent it is desirable to establish the principle of responsible government... then existing therein including the question whether the establishment of second chambers of the local legislatures is or is not desirable.'

The Indian statutory commission paid two visits to India, the first one lasting from 3 February, 1928 to 31 March, 1928 and the second one from 11 October, 1928 to 13 April, 1929. The first act that the chairman of the commission performed on arrival in India was to write a letter on Feb. 6, 1928 to his exelency the viceroy and there in he unfold the scheme of a 'joint free conference.' This proposal was based on the statement of his majesty's Government that the task of the commission in taking evidence would be greatly facilitated, if it were to invite the central legislature to appoint a joint select committee chosen from its elected and nominated unofficial members.
This committee was merely to be a consultative body. The plan chalked out in the Chairman's letter to the viceroy was that the two houses of the central legislature of India should constitute a joint committee consisting conveniently of seven members and each local legislative council should be asked to constitute a similar body. These committees of the Indian Legislature were to provide assistance to the Indian statutory commission. This step was represented to have been taken in the true interests of India and great Britain alike. It was specifically mentioned that the joint conferences were to commence their work only on the second visit of the Simon Commission.

By the time the commission arrived again, committees, on the lines indicated, had already been formed in all provinces except Burma and C.P. The co-operation of the central legislature was, however, not unreserved, the legislative assembly deciding to withhold support. But the viceroy shortly before the return of the commission had formed an Indian central committee composed of the three elected members of the council of state, one more member of the same body and five members of the legislative assembly. The procedure adopted in each governor's province was one of registering evidence and hearing witnesses by the joint conference, comprising the statutory commission, the Indian central committee, and the provincial committee. Witnesses were examined and evidence was taken in the presence of the press. The members and the ministers of provincial governments were also associated with the joint conference.
Since evidence taken at Delhi concerned only the central matters, the joint conference was composed of the statutory commission and the Indian Central Committee. The work performed was tremendous and a number of places were visited. "Evidence was taken," wrote the commissioner, "on 75 days in all, at the following places—Poona, Lahore, Karachi, Peshawar, Delhi, Lucknow, Patna, Shillong, Calcutta, Rangoon, Mandalay, Madras and Nagpur. We have also visited many other areas besides these principal towns and have done our utmost to make ourselves more familiar with various parts of British India." 81

Shortly before their final departure, the commissioners held a three days conference at Delhi and on this occasion all the eight committees of provinces, the Indian central committee and the statutory commission sat together. Even when the commission returned home, its work was not suspended and the Indian central committee was called to England where officials of the India office members of the secretary of state's council, the high commissioner for India and a representative of the war office consulted. The Chairman of the Indian statutory commission sought permission of the prime minister for investigating and reporting on Indian states because the constitutional development of India presupposed considerations of relations subsisting between British India and Indian states and J. Ramsay Macdonald accorded this permission on October 25, 1929. 82

Above description should give an erroneous impression that the commission had a plain sailing throughout its course
of investigation of conditions and examination of evidence. So great was the agitation over their arrival that even the commissioners were constrained to accept that "the purely British composition of our own body roused resentment in many quarters in India...."\(^\text{83}\) Regarding the arrangement of their report and the data they examined, the commissioners observed: "we have examined many schemes and suggestions. The material is abundant, while it is true that we were denied the direct testimony of some important bodies of Indian opinion, we have had the fullest opportunity of studying the report of the committee appointed by the All-parties conference,\(^\text{84}\) 1928, and have not failed to give due attention to its contents, and to other still more recent expositions of contemporary Indian opinion."\(^\text{85}\) The lack of contact with representative bodies, including the Indian National Congress, not only handicapped the statutory commission in its grasp of political feelings in India, but also demonstrated the degree of boycott the commissioners experienced in this country.

Delivering his presidential address at the Madras congress of 1927, M.A. Ansari voiced the feelings of the people when he referred to the statutory commission in these words: "Keen disappointment and surprise have been expressed at the exclusion of India from its personnel... No sane or self respecting Indian can ever admit the claim of great Britain to be the sole judge of the measure and time of India's political advance. We alone know our needs and requirements best and our's must be the
decisive voice in the determination of our future." Motilal Nehru, the president of the Calcutta congress of 1928, observed: "The Solemn promise of responsible government have found fulfilment in that colossal fraud, the statutory commission which is now careering along our streets leaving bleeding heads and broken bones behind." Answering the viceroy's characterisation of demonstrations after the return of the statutory commission to India as 'unmannerly and offensive,' he said that such demonstrations "must in their very nature be offensive to those against whom they are made, and it is hardly reasonable to expect drawing room manners from a hostile crowd."

This national viewpoint gives sufficient indication of the nature and degree of agitation that resulted from the visits of the statutory commission. In pursuance of the resolution of boycott, non-co-operation and demonstrations passed in the forty second session of the Indian National Congress held at Madras on 26 December 1927, an all-India hartal was observed on February 3, 1928. As a mark of protest against the Simon commission Bombay were a deserted appearance when the commission landed. Commission was greeted with black flags and the slogan of "Simon go back." Wherever the commission went it was accorded a warm reception by the public. 'A monster meeting of 50,000 in Bombay attended by the moderate leaders solemnly resolved to boycott the commission in any shape or at any stage' and in Madras the demonstration was marked by disorderly scenes in different parts of the city forcing the police to open fire.
Now the attitude of the Muslim League towards Simon commission and emergence of Jinnah's leadership: - The Muslim league was at this time seriously threatened with a rift. Muhammad Shafi, a very influential Muslim leader of Punjab, who had also acted as a member of the viceroy's executive council, was chosen to preside over the nineteenth session of the All-India-Muslim League scheduled to be held in December, 1927. Muhammad Shafi desired the session to take place at Lahore as decided by the executive of the league, but Jinnah and his friends were determined to hold it anywhere except at Lahore. A small majority in a special meeting of the council of the All-India Muslim League at Delhi decided that it should take place at Calcutta and, in the upshot, two separate sessions were held, one at Lahore under the presidency of Muhammad Shafi, and the other at Calcutta under the presidency of Muhammad Yakoob, Deputy president of the legislative assembly.

The points of difference between Safi and Jinnah were, however, far-reaching. The former was in favour of supporting the Simon commission, whereas the latter had declared its boycott. But even this does not explain the whole situation. The crux of the matter lay in the fact that it was Jinnah who received the league in December, 1924 after a period of quiescence and he continued to be one of its dominating personalities. It was inevitable, therefore, that there should be a clash of some sort between him and Shafi.
Under the circumstances, the attitude of the two leaguers was pre-determined and could easily be predicted. At the Calcutta session of the league on the motion of Ali Imam and after the speeches of Yakub Hasan, Mrs. Besant and Muhammad Ali, the following resolution was unanimously carried: "The All-India-Muslim League emphatically declares that the statutory commission and the procedure as announced are unacceptable to the people of India. It therefore, resolves that the Musalmans throughout the country should have nothing to do with the commission at any stage and in any form."

The Lahore session of the League repudiated the decision of non-co-operation with the commission taken by the Madras congress and a definite resolution to that effect was carried. This dual policy adopted by the muslim community at the early stage of the Simon commission, however, betrayed a lack of concerted action. It was true that one section of the divided muslim league, Jamiat-ul-Ulema, All-India khilafat committee, and most of the muslim leaders (like M.A. Jinnah, Sir Ali Imam, Sayyid Hasan Imam, the Hon'ble Maharaja of Mahmudabad, Shaheb-jada Afatab Ahmad Khan, Maulana Mohammad Ali, Shaukat Ali, Abul Kalam Azad and others) arrayed themselves in the opposition to the commission.

But the view of Maulvi Muhammad Yakub that it "appears that propaganda for co-operation with the Simon commission in its present constitution is gaining more favour with the musalmans
than with the Hindus" can hardly be disputed. The partial boycott of the commission by the muslims did not involve surrender of their basic demand and even the Jinnah faction of the League at Calcutta on January 1, 1928 worded its resolution thus: "That in the present circumstances the representation of muslims in the different legislatures of the country through separate muslim electorates is inevitable and that the muslims will not accept any scheme involving the surrender of this valued right unless and until Sind is actually separated, etc.

With this outlook, the muslim support to nationalist aspirations could not but be stinted, though it cannot be denied that the boycott of the statutory commission by a section of the faction-ridden muslim was supported.

Now the analysis by C.F. Andrews about the causes of boycott by the Indians: He pointed out that lord Birkenhead, the Secretary of State, "instead of appointing a mixed commission on which Indian and British should serve jointly under a British member of parliament as chairman, nominated a commission of seven members drawn solely from the British race." Apart from the political annoyance of this course, it was regarded as a racial insult to have ignored Indian representation on a commission that was to decide the future constitution of India. It happened that just at the time of the appointment of the Simon commission race feeling was running very high in the East. To ride-rough-shod over national sentiment and appoint a purely British commission on a subjects so vitally and intimately affecting India was surely asking for trouble."
It was, however, on the side of recommendations that the report was most disappointing. It fell far short of the country's needs and expectations. It betrayed lack of understanding the young India which was rising up in a national upheaval. Inspite of the failure of non-co-operation movement, its effect was a very powerful political awakening leading to a longing for Swaraj.

Though the commissioners professed to have come in contact with the nationalist point of view and though the Indian central committee also laid special claims of getting "ample opportunities of acquainting themselves with the sentiments of the group," the fact remains that the real India was left unrevealed to them and, hence their recommendations fell considerably short of the real aspiration of the public. To choose only one example, the proposal of federal structure for India was not in consonance with the national desire of the time. The language of the report could be interpreted as calculated towards the vivisection of the country. For example, it was laid down in the report: "It might be possible to visualise the future of federation in India as the bringing into relationship of two separate federations, one composed of the elements which make up British India, the other of the Indian states." However, the chief flaw of the statutory commission report was best represented by Prof. Herald Laski. He stated: "As a piece of analysis, its finely meshed structure could hardly be bettered... Everything is there save an understanding of the Indian mind... Gandhi, who has set half India a flame with new dreams, is dismissed as an administrative incident of which the significance is never seen. You cannot deal with the hopes of a people as though they were studies in logic."
NOTES


2. AIICC Papers. 8/1922, pp. 57, 91.


8. Ibid., U.P. FR ii July 1923.


14. GI Home Poll. 167/1924, Ibid.

15. GI Home Poll. 25/1924, Punjab FR. I Sept. 1924.


18. GI Home Poll. 1924, Bombay FR II, Sept. 1924.


25. AICC Papers, 8/1924 and 31/1924.
27. Ibid., 11 March, 1924, pp. 1443-4.
28. Reading Papers, 7: Reading to Oliver, 13 March, 1924.
30. Fazli Hussain Papers, Fazli Hussain to Amir Din, 24 Nov. 1932.
32. IOR/1/PO/278 Tgm. Viceroy (Home) to Secretary of State 3 June, 1924.
33. Ibid., Tgm. Viceroy (Home) to Secretary of State, 26 May, 1924.
35. Ibid., pp. 270-3.
37. Ibid., p. 172.
38. Purushatamdas Thakurdas Papers, 40: Venkatpatiraju to Thakurdas, 12 Nov. 1924.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
44. Indian Quarterly Register, 1924, Vol. ii, p. 481.
46. Prelude to Pakistan, p. 122.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
50. AICC Papers, G 47/1926, Pandit D.R. Sharma to M.L. Nehru, 29 April, 1926.
51. GJPGAD 687/1925, Note by Crosthwait, Collector of Allahabad, 7 Sept. 1925.
53. GI Home Poll. 112/N/1926, U.P. FR I June 1926.
54. AICC Papers, G 52(I)/1926, Shankarlal to Sarojini Naidu, 22 August, 1926.
57. Prelude to partition, p. 174.
58. Ibid., p. 176.
64. Ibid. Motilal to Jinnah, 28 Oct. 1928.
66. AICC Papers, AP 35/1928.
70. Proceeding of the All parties national convention, p. 76-8.
71. Ibid., p. 78-82.
72. Ibid., pp. 86-92.
73. Ibid., p. 93.
74. Struggle for Pakistan, Lal Bahadur, Delhi, 1988, p. 140.
75. Popularly known as "Simon Commission."
76. The constitutional history of India, A.C. Benerjee, Delhi, 1978, p. 70.
77. Ibid.
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid., p. 72.
80. Ibid.
83. Ibid., p. 4.
84. It was Nehru report.
86. Congress presidential address, second series. Published by Noteson & Co. Madras, p. 841.
87. Ibid., p. 856-57.
88. Ibid.
89. The Indian review, 1928, Jan. p. 51.
90. The Indian Quarterly Register, Jan. June 1928, p. 2.
91. Ibid, p. 3.
92. 'India' in 1927-28, p. 61-62.
93. The Indian review, January, 1928, p. 56.
94. It was moved by Yamin Khan.
95. The Indian review, Jan. 1928, p. 56.
96. Ibid., March, 1928, p. 164.
102. India and the Simon report, p. 188, Appendix VI from daily herald, 19 July, 1930.