CHAPTER II

MUSLIM LEADERSHIP IN U.P. DURING KHILAFAT AND NON CO-OPERATION MOVEMENT
Political action up to 1916 had been determined increasingly by the prospect of further reform of the legislative councils. In August 1917, the Secretary of State, Montagu, declared that the British government had decided to take 'substantial steps' in the direction of the 'progressive realisation of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British empire.' In April 1918, together with the viceroy, he published a report which recommended the devolution of considerable power to Indians in the provinces. These two events, which assured many Indian politicians that power was not very far from their grasp, had an important effect on political alignments.

Two main groups among Muslim politicians in the U.P. had begun to emerge in the decade after Syed Ahmad's death. The "young gentlemen of progressive tendencies" and the men of property and influence. After 1909, government frequently employed these categories in surveying the political scene and the Muslims used them too, often describing them as the young party and the old party.

After 1914 'The old party' became unimportant. In future the province was going to be governed by those who could command a majority in the provincial council. It was clear that the policy of relying on government to protect
muslim interests, for which the 'old party' stood, was unlikel
ty to be effective. Nevertheless, 'old party' men did not
allow reform to go through without a fight. When the govern-
ment called for memorials on reforms, two leaders of the U.P.
muslim league, Ibni Ahmad and Syed Abdur Rauf of Allahabad,
and the large muslim landlords of Aligarh, led by Muzamilullah
Khan of Bhikampur, organised with government encouragement a
'U.P. muslim defence association.' The Association's address
presented to montegu and chemsford declared that any large
measure of self-government which might curtail the moderating
and adjusting influence of the British government would be
nothing short of a cataclysm,' and demanded that, if devolu-
tion took place, muslims should have fifty percent represen-
tation. This line was supported by other muslim groups also.
They were -- the muslim association for the protection of the
Mohemdans of Gorakhpur, the Anjuman-i-Islamia of Saharanpur
and the Mohammadan of Rohilkhand. But British influence was
being curtailed and there was no chance of muslims being given
equal representation. The lack of reality in the defence
Association's policy, even as a bargaining position, indicates
that the old party had reached the end of the road. Members
of the 'Old Party' now began to leave the main stream of the
muslim politics. Aftab Ahmad Khan joined the Secretary of
State's Council, Syed Abdur Rauf became a judge of the Punjab
Chief Court, and Ibni Ahmad disappeared from view.
Several young party leaders also left the mainstream of Muslim politics. Wazir Hassan's (1874-1947) aim was to ensure that political reforms were carried out. This required a tight hold upon Muslim league. Yet in 1917 it was coming increasingly under attack. He had to face a direct assault on his control of the league from Lucknow itself. Raja Ghulam Husain, Mahomed Ali's follower, was its organiser, his newspaper, The new Era, the Vehicle. In a series of articles entitled 'Reconstruction', he launched a campaign for the transformation of the league into an 'efficient vehicle for the expression of the will of the Muslim community'. He did not deny Hassan's liberal policies, but the Secretary had placed a dead weight on the development of Muslim politics - 'New era' states:--

"The All-India Moslem League in its framework and organisation has inevitably led to the growth of political despotism - an exclusive ring of a few favoured personalities, who have coalesced into a form of dictatorship and have suppressed, however unconsciously, all healthy development of political thought in the democracy of Islamic India. The result is that Muslim politics is split into 'warring cliques' revolving around masterful and self-seeking personalities."

There were to be no more Wazir Hassans. In his blueprint for the new league, Hussain recommended that the same man
should be eligible for the post of secretary only every other year. 15

Wazir Hassan warded off these attacks, but they did not diminish. When the montagu-chesham report was published in April 1918, "young party" opposition to Hassan crystallised around it. Most thought they had little chance of winning seats or ministries in the new councils. Moreover they were concerned by the Report's hostility to separate representation, and were being increasingly alarmed by the fate of Turkey in the war. With nothing to gain from supporting reform, they joined the congress in condemning them. Their alliance was commented by a new and real participation in congress affairs. T.A.K. Sherwani (D. 1935) and Manzar Ali Sokhta became prominent in provincial congress activities, Ansari, Asaf Ali and Hakim Ajmal Khan gained leading positions in the Delhi congress committee, while Khawza Abdul Mazid and Syed Hyder Mehdi were elected to All-India Congress Committee. 18

Wazir Hassan had to tread warily to keep the league on the side of the reform. In May 1918, it looks as if congress and league were about to hold a special session to discuss the montagu-chesham report. Wazir Hassan was not heartily prepared for a special session, because of his weak position of secretaryship of the league. 'We do not think', he told the congress secretary, 'that we should hold a special meeting of the All-India Moslem League but we would call a meeting of the council of the All-India Moslem League to confer with the
Hassan had preferred Bombay as a suitable place for the session. He won over this point but had to accept a full session. The congress leaders were in hurry but told to the congress secretary that, if they wanted the support of the Raja of Mahmudabad (President of the League) and himself, the earliest they could have a joint session was the first week in September. They wanted time 'to gauge fully the public opinions as well as the views of the press.' In the meantime, Harcourt Butler, recently installed as lieutenant governor of the U.P. is said to have made Mahmudabad's support for the reforms certain by promising him, if he behaved himself, the Home membership in the first government formed under the new dispensation. Whether true or not, the Raja behaved himself, and the special sessions of the league over which he presided in September refused to join the congress in condemning the reforms report. As a result attack on Hassan and now the Raja intensified. They came to a head at the Delhi Muslim League session in December 1918. In the subjects committee, Hassan, with the help of Nabiullah and Jinnah, bravely defended his policy against the assaults of Hakim Ajmal Khan and Ansari urging that 'nothing which might injure their interests in India or which might compromise their national position should be done....' In the league council, Hassan still had enough influence to get the Raja and himself re-elected as president and secretary, and to defeat an attempt to change the constitution. But in the league sessions, he
and his patron came in for such a drubbing that Mahmudabad, having received treatment ill-befitting a taluqdar and a nobleman, 'left Delhi in disgust.' They resigned from the league, they could no longer reconcile the growing hostility to government and to themselves of many league members with their own hopes of receiving the rewards of collaboration, and their own views of what was best for the Muslims.

As the old leaders left the league at Delhi, new supporters arrived, the Ulama. The odd alims had attended the sessions before, for instance, Shibli had come to press the Waqf question, but never before had session been graced by so many of the religious leaders. They had been invited by Ansari in order to add their weight to his protests regarding the Khilafat. In the sessions they were feted, being given a paean of praise in welcome and a prominent place on the platform. One of them, Maulvi Ghulam Mohiuddin of Kasur replied saying that 'up to this time the Ulamas had considered the religion and politics of Musalmans were in different things but in fact they were one and the same in Islam. Their politics was their religion.' Ansari and Hakim Azamal Khan took up this theme by trying, without success, to alter the aims of the league from protecting the rights of Indian Muslims to protecting the religious as well as the political rights of Muslims both outside and inside India. Not all 'young party' men, however approved of this attempt to connect religion with
politics. Khaliquzzaman told an intelligence agent "that they were playing with fire in uniting with the Ulamas. They would either be swept off their legs or carry the whole of Muslim India with them. Khaliquzzaman's warning was not wrong. Over the next four years, the Ulama were to be a powerful force in both Muslim and Indian politics.

But who were the Ulama? How they became a distinct group? The following assessment is useful:

"They were not a hierarchy or an order; if they were professional body, they were without, so to speak, a registration council or a court of discipline. They were a class by their education, ... they did not possess equal qualifications or individual parity of esteem. Not much more than pretension united the product of one of the great teaching centres, say the Firangi Mahal in Lucknow, and the village mulla who, though he could recite the Quran in Arabic, could hardly understand who he was reciting ... As long as a man followed a traditional syllabus of study and accepted the ijma of his learned predecessors, he would be accepted as an Alim.

The Ulama, therefore, were those who followed the traditional education of Islam.

Most Ulama depended on religion to make their living. A few eked out an existence in Industry or trade; early in its history the Deobandi School suspecting that it would be
hard to find work for its graduates, opened a department teaching small handicraft industries. Some had alternative means of support. Shibli inherited wealth from his father and received a grant from the Nizam, Nasarat Husain, one of Mahmud-ul-Hasan's companions during his Malta internment, owned 'a comfortable little estate in Fatehpur district,' Salamalullah of Firangimahal owned property in Lucknow and Abdul Bari held a small zamindari. But most derived all their religion. Some were journalist and writers, like Maulvi Habibur Rahman of Deoband, but the great majority were missionaries or teachers.

The Ulama looked to no governing body or hierarchical chief for guidance. Nevertheless, they were not without organisation. They had all been taken through the Dars-i-Nizamia at one of the schools, and the particular training they received imposed something of a pattern upon their thinking and action. Ulama organisation, therefore, tended to be derived from the schools. In the U.P. there were three schools of primary importance: Maulana Ahmad Reza Khan's school at Bareilly, Fingi Mahal tucked away in an alley of the Chowk at Lucknow, and the Dar-ul-Ulum at Deoband.

The elements of organisation among Ulama were also sources of division. Apart from a natural rivalry, religious schools were at loggerheads with each other over
education and doctrine. Deoband concentrated on the traditions, textual commentary and disputation, Firangi Mahal on Islamic law, and its methodology. Deoband accepted the old Islamic order in principle and tried to revive and purify it; the school rejected any interpretation of the canon law (Ijlihad). Firangi Mahal on the other hand attempted to compromise with modern developments: it permitted reinterpretation. Deoband and Bareilly were forever locked in the most bitter doctrinal battles. Although, Bareilly like Deoband, was of the Hanafi school of jurisprudence and rejected reinterpretation, its support of worship and intercession at tombs and its belief in the miraculous powers of saints were naturally anathema to the Puritanical Deobandis. The Ulama of Firangi Mahal also objected to the Bareilly dogma. The Sunni school of ulama were prepared to ally only in doing down their hated sectarian rivals, the Shia mujtahids. Much more 'Fatwa-power' was expended in trying to get the better of rival schools than in tackling the implications of British rule for the faithful. A united platform of ulamas was immensely difficult to achieve.

In much the same way within individual schools ulama were divided over doctrinal issues, and their differences were sharpened by bitter personal rivalry. The Nadwa-ul-Ulama of Lucknow was for many years rent by struggles between orthodox and reformist parties, and in 1913 Shibli almost destroyed the institution in a petty attempt to score off a doctrinal rival. Deoband was divided over the question of its curriculum, and also by a straight forward struggle for power between rival
'Ubaid Ullah and his friends,' wrote Mahmud-ul-Hasan, principal from 1890 to 1914, 'wished to teach Arabic history, not Indian.' I did not approve of it. I thought it would have a bad effect. It (The Deoband School) was founded to promote piety and religion and bringing in a secular subject like history would injure it in the minds of its supporters. I told Ubaid Ullah and his friends they had no money. The school which was for "Namaz Rauza," would become an ordinary school. Having failed to achieve reform from within, Obeid Ullah left the college and attacked it from without. He formed the jamiat-ul-ansar 'to improve the management of the college...'. This meant cutting down the powers of the superintendent, Hafiz Mohamed Ahmad, who naturally resented this and issued a fatwa declaring obeidullah a Kafir. The college divided into factions and remained divided against itself throughout the period.

Firangi Mahal split irreparably over the question of what its attitude to government should be. Two parties developed when the Balkan wars broke out, their positions hardend during the first world war and were maintained during the Khilafat movement. The first known as the 'madarassa party', consisted of Abdul Bari, his disciples, relations and pupils of the madarassa Nizamia. The second known as the 'Bahr-ul-ulum party', consisted of the two brothers, Maulvi Abdul Mazid and Abdul Hamid, and their followers. Abdul Majid and his party strongly objected to the extreme line taken by Abdul Bari over the Balkan wars and resined from the madarassa Nizamia. Abdul Mazid was not the supporter of the war. The rivalry between
the two groups, rapidly became imbued with them. The bad blood it created lay behind many of the conspiracies among Lucknow Ulama. In 1916, for example, government requested the Raja of Jahangirabad to dismiss Mohamed Bashir, a follower of Abdul Bari. Bashir, the Maulvi in charge of a Mosque under the Raja's control, had encouraged by Abdul Bari, permitted fanatical divine to include the Sultan of Turky in the friday Sermon (Khutba). Raja of Jahangirabad found himself caught in the horns of dilemma. Directives from his zenana, where Abdul Bari was much admired, instructed him to do nothing. The government considered it intolerable eventually Raja had to take action. The 'Madrassa Party' were furious at 'what they regard as a victory for Abdul Hamid and Abdul Majeed... They attempted to revenge themselves by drawing public attention through the columns of the Indian Daily telegraph, to the 'Scandalous' condition of the Lucknow Idgah, of which Abdul Mazid was the prayer leader. In 1919, they appear to have had a hand in the internment for the dissemination of seditious pamphlets of Barkatulah Raza, a member of the staff of the Firangi Mahal Khilafatist paper, 'Akhuwat'. For every fatwa Abdul Bari produced in favour of the Khilafat movement, non-cooperation and Hindu-Muslim unity, they fired off one in opposition. The Lucknow battle of Fatwas achieved All-India importance when the 'Bahr-ul-Ulum party' furnished the major government fatwa refuting 'the religious fatwa of the ulamas of All India', which made non-co-operation mandatory on all muslims. For their activities the brothers, Abdul Hamid and Abdul Mazid, were all rewarded by the government. Medals denoting the title of Shams-ul-Ulama dangled from their turbans,
while for his anti Khilafat work Abdul Majid was one of the most rewarded men in the province. At a provincial-Durbar in 1922, he received from Harcourt butter both a robe and a sword of honour.

Ulama were incapable of working together. It was difficult for Ulama to take a united stand over large issues; they could not even present a united front to the secularising processes introduced by British rule. For every alim who issued a fatwa that India was dar-ul-herb there would be one who declared that it was dar-ul-Islam. For every alim who opposed the government there would be one who declared his loyal support. When the Ulama entered the politics of Muslim League, it could not be all Ulama, only particular factions. Nevertheless, their entry was received with considerable forboding: even factions of Ulama had influence which secular politicians feared. Islam was stock in their trade. All Muslims came within their ken, political or non political, literate or illiterate, male or female.

Evidently the alliance of a group of Ulama with some of the leading Muslim League politicians, which was heralded at Delhi in 1918, was likely to extend greatly the Depths of Muslim society which political agitators could plumb.

There were excellent reasons for Ulama to be discontented with British rule. Theoretically every Muslim activity was subject to their approval, yet the whole tendency of government
was to interfere with their authority and steadily to reduce their influence in Muslim society. The immense growth of administrative activity both encroached on those aspects of government over which they had power and created new areas over which they had none. Ulama preserves - Mosques, Shrines, religious, practice and susceptibility - were all beginning to come within the purview of local bureaucracy. Moreover this bureaucracy, though the increasing association of local interests with local government by means of elections, was coming under the control of Muslims who had secular training, and of Hindus. Government was also interfering with Muslim personal law. Indeed, by legislating against the Muslim right to make waqfs, it limited an important source of Ulama income. But by far the most important encroachment was the establishment of a government educational system which taught mainly secular subjects. These subjects became essential for most forms of employment, and so Muslim boys were steadily enticed away from the religious education of Islam.

Ulama attacked most bitterly the protagonists of English education and secular values, Syed Ahmad Khan and the Aligarh School. At the same time they tried to reinforce Islamic education against the new influences. Their endeavours took two forms: a puritanical assertion of the traditional forms of education and an attempt to come to terms with western learning. Deoband represented the first response. Soon after the mutiny, a group of Ulama from Shamli in Muzaffar Nagar, who had fought against the British, decided that now the important
victories were going to be won not on the battle field but in the classroom.\textsuperscript{83} To revive and strengthen the Islamic Sciences, the Shamli group, founded in 1867, the dar-ul-ulum at Deoband. They establish a syllabus which contained only traditional Islamic learning though they were not entirely opposed to modern knowledge and tried to set up branch institutions elsewhere in the province\textsuperscript{84}. The dar-ul-ulum of the Nadwat-ul-ulema, founded in Lucknow about thirty years later, represented the second response.\textsuperscript{85} Shibli, the major force in the institution, insisted on the learning of English.\textsuperscript{86} He believed that a knowledge of English was vital to maintain their proper role in modern Muslim society.

Traditional Islamic education was found eventually to be overwhelmed by the new western learning. But the Ulama resisted the process with some success. The top institution of traditional learning became more popular.\textsuperscript{87} In 1908, Abul Bari set up the Madrassa Nizamia at Firangi Mahal, up to this point the Lucknow school had played little part in the educational effort. Between 1907 and 1912 enrolment at Deoband leapt from 267 to 600 and the Dar-ul-ulum buildings were extended.\textsuperscript{88} At the same time Nadwa authorities pressed vigorously for expansion,\textsuperscript{89} and on 1st December, 1908 the foundation of an ambitious building was laid.\textsuperscript{90}

The reforms of Morley Minto and the great outburst of political activity, brought forth another Ulama organisation,
the Majlish Muid-ul-Islam. It was entirely on Firangi Mahal. Its constitution stated that it was an Islamic association which seeks to promote the way of the Sharī'at for the benefit of the Muslim. By means of this organisation, the ulama of Firangi Mahal can join with other ulama of their persuasion to work among the Islamic people. Its aim were declared to be:

(a) To try to work for the religious progress of the Islamic community within the laws of the current government, and to help the Islamic community.

(b) To help the Muslims attain progress in worldly matters, while keeping in mind the injunctions of the Sharī'at.

(c) To propagate the injunctions of the Sharī'at among the Islamic community and to overcome opposition to it.

The Majlis was to meet once a month, not necessarily in Lucknow, and the remarkable provision was made that the occasion could take the form of a general meeting open to non-members, both Muslim and non-Muslim. Abdul Bari was appointed president and Salamatullan, secretary. The Majlis was important because, for the first time, a formal organisation was imposed over the connections and allegiance of an ulama school.

The attempts to organise in order to meet the threats which modern education and politics presented to priestly
authority were the work of the leading ulama from the great schools of the province. But not Ulama were affiliated to the great schools and not all who were affiliated were moved by their initiatives. Many, in fact, had to live and get on in local society, on which they often depended for their income, and could not afford the luxury, however much they regretted it, of preaching rigid adherence to orthodox Islam. The Saijada-Nashins (siterson the carpet or head Ulama) of the Diara Shah Hajtullah at Allahabad, Mohamad Husain and his son Wilayat Husain who succeeded him, are a case in point. Far from attacking Aligarh and all its works, Mahomed Husain appears to have been influenced by it. The activities of the Sajjada-Nashins of owed more to the political needs of the minority community they led in Allahabad than any general perception what Ulama should do.

The considerable development of communal awareness from 1810, derived mainly from the morley-minto reforms and to a lesser extent from the growth of Pan-Islamism, helped to bridge the gaps between the Ulama of the leading schools and other groups in muslim society. Contacts between leading and local Ulama became more frequent. Groups in Firangi Mahal and Deoband began to organise political support.

No less significant of the future of muslim politics was the development of connections between the leading Ulama schools
and the young western-educated muslims. Remarkably the first attempts at rapprochment appear to have been made between those deadly enemies, Aligarh and Deoband. Mohsain-ul-Mulk set up an Arabic department and made overtures to the Ulama, Abdul Bari, his biographer, praised him highly for his diplomacy. Vikar-ul-Mulk increased in the religious content of the Aligarh syllabus. Students had to pass a paper on 'Islamic Religion', and if they played truant from daily prayers they were threatened with expulsion. But after all these enthusiastic steps proved not so successful.

As secular leaders attempted to give effect in the Aligarh curriculum to their rapprochement with the Ulama, some Ulama attempted to give it tangible from within the orthodox system. Under the patronage of Hakim Ajmal Khan and Vikar-ul-Mulk, Obeidullah Sindhi, who had been asked to leave Deoband for his unorthodox ideas on the curriculum, set up the Nazarul-ul-Maarif-ul-Qurania (Academy of Koranic Learning) in the Fatehpuri Masque at Delhi. He aimed to redress the balance of secular education by teaching the Koran to English-educated muslims, and hoped to establish his system on an all-India basis.

Deoband and Aligarh, however were too far apart in aims as well as in geography for these tentative approaches to result in united political action. The effective rapprochment between secular and religious leaders occurred in Lucknow, between young party men and the Ulama of Firangi Mahal. It is probable that there has always been connections between the
leading ulama of Firangi Mahal and the prominent men of the Nawabi city. Important 'young party' men certainly had associations with the school. The Raja of Muhamadabad was a distant relative of Abdul bari and, of course, helped to finance its political activities. Mushir Husain Kidwai regarded Abdul Bari as a pir and his brothers, Eshanur and Saidur Rahman, were to work for the Maulana Mohammad Ali during the Khilafat movement.

During world war I the 'young party' leaders maintained their close associations with the firangi mahal ulama. At the outbreak of the war, Deoband and the Nadwa passed fervent resolution of loyalty, and maintained this stand throughout the war. But Abdul Bari and Firangi Mahal, again under the influence of the 'young party' were more diffident. In September, 1914, the Maulana and Raja of Mahmudabad sent telegrams to Sultan begging him to remain neutral or join British. The Sultan was not impressed. When Turkey actually entered the war, Abdul Bari played the daivous games as the 'young party'. At the beginning of 1915, Abdul Bari allowed the Ali brothers to write a series of letters in the 'Hamdard' under his signature, refuting Abdul Haq of Calcutta's fatwa which had laid down that Turkey's war was political, and therefore did not concern good muslims. When the Sherif of Mecca revolted the Maulana, despite considerable private reservations, fully supported the muslim league's resolution of condemnation, and tried to wheel Deoband behind him. For his pains he was
snubbed with the suggestion that he was 'a busy body who could not read his Karan rightly.' Whenever there was a crisis, whenever the voice of orthodox was needed to add weight to the politics of protest, Abdul Bari could be relied upon to play his part, it was an alliance without precedent. Aligarh's brightest sons and Lucknow's most learned divines stood shoulder to shoulder on the issues of the day. Syed Ahmad Khan must have turned in his grave. There were to most remarkable developments in U.P. muslim politics during the world war I - alliance between the young party leaders and the congress and the increasing involvement of the Ulama in the politics of the muslim league. Lucknow pact of 1916 was led by the first and the second led to the attendance of the Ulama at the 1918 League session. The two years that followed the war were to bring changes that were no less notable. Ulama became much more than useful agitational tools to be deployed by western-educated politicians, indeed from time to time they took the lead in muslim politics. The muslim League disappeared from the view completely, being overwhelmed by the new all-India Khilafat organisation. Hindus began to play a much bigger part in muslim affairs. Arya samajists such as Swami Shraddhanand and pandit Neki Ram were to be found addressing muslim meetings. Muslims, on the other hand, began to play a greater part in the congress. Indeed, so great did their influence become in the organisation that they were mainly
responsible both for the powerful position that Gandhi attained in Indian politics by September 1920 and for the congress's decision to boycott the new reformed councils.

At the beginning of 1919 such extra-ordinary developments seemed unlikely. The major issue in Muslim politics was the Khilafat. In October 1918 Turkey was overcome by Allenby's armies. Soon after Constantinople was occupied by the Allies, the British Prime Minister, hotly supported by the Archbishop of Canterbury, began to use the language of the crusades, and in August, 1920 by the Treaty signed at Sevres, the Sultan was reduced to the status of a British puppet.

The agitation to preserve the Khilafat and the holy places of Islam from their fate initiated the last climatic phase of Indian Pan-Islamism. It revealed more clearly than
any other agitation those who supported Pan-Islamism and the reasons why they found it attractive. Most Muslims were to some extent moved by the demise of the last great Muslim power, even though the Khalifa was no more than a name in many Mosques in the U.P. He was not even mentioned in the Khutba. But their willingness to agitate for the Khilafat was directly related to their political position in India. 'Old party' men, who expected to gain power under the empty expressions of concern. 'No one can deny that every Muslim is concerned about the future of Turkey ...', Ibn Ahmad told Ansari in December 1919; 'We differ only on one point, i.e., how to convey our feelings to the authorities.' The young party leaders who left the Muslim League at Delhi in 1918, and those who followed them over the next two years, took up much the same position on the issue as 'old party' men. Raja of Mahmudabad led a moderate party over the Khilafat movement question. Those who agitated vigorously were 'young party' men and the Ulama. Most 'young party' men had no chance of influence in the new councils. They needed the weight of the Muslim identity in order to compensate for their weakness. Their object in agitating over the Khilafat was to ensure that the Muslim identity remained the powerful to adopt in Indian politics that it had been. "The important consideration Muhammad Ali insisted," is the temporal power of the Khalif, as one of his chief functions is to defend the
faith and to put into jeopardy the strength of those who put us into jeopardy. Ulama of course were, not interested in power in India as a whole. They just wanted to control Indian Muslims. Those who agitated did so for religious reasons, though some found that agitation could improve their personal positions and many came to hope that through it they would be able to restore their influence in the community generally.

Despite the essential differences in aim between the Ulama and 'young party' men, their alliance was the key to the extraordinary vigour of the Khilafat agitation. 'Young party' men provided a guiding hand, but the Ulama were the driving force behind the agitation and its ever more radical development. The Khilafat campaign was in effect launched by Dr. Ansari and Hakim Ajmal Khan who, in their speeches to the 1918 League and congress sessions respectively, voiced the concern about Turkey which had grown amongst the muslim during the year.

Words, however, were translated into deeds by Abdul Bari. As soon as the Delhi conferences had finished, he went into action trying to draw as many Indian Ulama as possible behind him. In January, he issued a questionnaire designed to obtain opinions on the Khilafat. Ansari helped to distribute it, using his influence to make sure the Deoband is received a copy. Those who signed were largely of the Firangi Mahal connection. The most radical opinion, part of which argued that if there is any danger of infidels gaining possession of the holy places, all Muhammadans must fight. Jehad is as
imperative as praying and washing,' came from eleven Firangi Mahal Ulama either related to or closely associated with Abdul Bari. Abdul Bari was opposed by some Ulama of Allahabad, Kanpur and Delhi and as usual by Ahmad Reza Khan of Bareilly, Maulvi Abdul Hamid and Abdul Majid of Firangi Mahal and all the Ulama of Deoband.

After issuing his fatwa, which enjoined the faithful to perform jehad there was any danger of the infidel controlling the Khalifa or the holy places, Abdul Bari tried to arrange a meeting of Ulama of different schools. He was supported by Ansari and Hakim Ajmal Khan, and some Delhi Ulama, but opposed by Deoband, and the meeting did not immediately materialised. Meanwhile he tried to organise a village campaign in the U.P. and with the help of a professional editor founded a radical journal, the 'Akhuwat.' In April 1919, the Maulana Muhamad Ali was spilling ideas all over the place: an Indian Muslim mission to Islamic countries, a deputation to the viceroy and an all-India conference of Muslim to meet in Lucknow to discuss the Khilafat problem. His own paper (Hamdard) became increasingly anti-Christian and anti-government, and from time hinted at jehad. Even the ever-confident Harcourt Butler (lieutenant governor) began to be concerned about the way the Maulana was using his influence. He wrote to the viceroy.
"I am trying to influence him through the people on whom he relies financially. My problem is to keep the Musalman women right. If they get a handle, as they did over the Cawnpore masque incident, they will force their husbands and male relations to do something for Islam. No government in the East can control a combination of priests and women. Hence the importance of not making a martyr of Abdul Bari."\(^{133}\)

The editor of Akhuwat made a mistake at this point. He tried attacking the Shias instead of the government. This gave the administration an excuse to act. It moved rapidly, invoked the press act and locked away some of the miow's in the Abdul Bari'gang.'\(^{139}\) A month later, it managed to intern Barkatullah Raza of Firangi Mahal who was suspected of being the author of leaflets encouraging jehad.\(^{135}\) The government need not have concerned itself about Abdul Bari's capacity for martyrdom. The sight of the C.I.D. poking around Firangi Mahal unerved him. He rushed up to Nainital to see Butler, professed his innocence, protested his loyalty, and at the end of the interview broke down completely.

While Abdul Bari and his followers had already pressed far enough ahead to get entangled with the law, others were beginning to move. In March a Khilafat committee had been founded in Bombay city under the presidency of M.M. Chotani, one of Abdul Bari's disciples, and most of the committee, including the president were drawn from the rich muslim
merchants of the city. The committee conducted meetings and organised a deputation to the governor. Even the All-India Muslim League after a long time, began to act. It supported the deputations, commanded its branches to do so, and taking up Abdul Bari's idea, organised an all-India conference at Lucknow on 21st September 1919 to demonstrate... the true depth and intensity of Muslim feeling for the Sultan of Turkey and his empire.\(^{136}\)

The conference of Lucknow was a remarkable occasion. Never had so many Muslims from outside the province and so many Ulama attended a meeting under the auspices of the Muslim League. Indeed the occasion seems to have been dominated by Ulama. Apart from those actually working in the Firangi Mahal seminary, leading divines such as Khwaja Hassan Nizami of Delhi, Mahomed Fakir of Allahabad, Abdul Mazid sharer of Madras, Mahomed Sajjad of Bihar and Abdul Mazid of Budaun were there.\(^{137}\) Maulvi Sanaullah of Amritshar introduced the Chief resolution 'that the spiritual position of the Sultan as Khalifa was indissolubly bound up with his temporal power and that the creation of small states out of the component parts of the Turkish empire, with non-Muslim powers as mandatories, was an intolerable interference with the Khilafat.\(^{138}\) Firangi Mahal Ulama passed a resolution to fix 17 October as Khilafat day and establish an All-India central Khilafat Committee in Bombay with branches throughout India. The Firangi Mahal's, with Khaliguzzaman's help, drew up the committee's constitution.\(^{139}\)
The conference made clear that Ulama had become influential in Muslim politics. In December 1918, Ansari and Ajamal Khan had introduced Abdul Bari and his followers in order to make political capital out of them, but in doing so they had unleashed the forces which overwhelmed them. By September 1919, the Ulema were beginning to take the lead in Muslim politics, and the creation of the central Khilafat Committee at the Lucknow conference gave them the means by which they might well take control of them.

By deciding to hold Khilafat Day, the Lucknow conference brought Gandhi to a prominent position in Muslim politics. Just a week before, Gandhi had displayed his willingness to exert himself for the Khilafat. At a Muslim mass meeting in Bombay he had berated his audience for being so lackadaisical. Moreover his interest was soon felt in more than words. The idea of holding a Khilafat Day on which 'all Muslims should fast and pray and suspend all their business and close their shops .... and hold monster meetings and pass resolutions of protest against the contemplated betrayal of Turkey, was most probably his. In the event, the 'Day' was not a great success, but nevertheless it heralded a degree of organisation in the Khilafat Movement of a new order.

In the weeks following the first Khilafat Day, the U.P. Khilafatists became increasingly dissatisfied with the limited vigour with which the Bombay leaders of the Khilafat organisation prosecuted the agitation. They decided to snatch the
initiative themselves and, early in November 1919, the Delhi Khilafat Committee announced that they would hold an All India Khilafat Conference at Delhi on 23 November to determine how Muslims should protest against the dismemberment of Turkey. This was to be followed on 24 November by a joint Hindu-Muslim conference. Gandhi was the only Hindu invited to both conferences. His invitation informed him that not only the Khilafat question but the question of cow protection as well would be discussed at the conference, and it would, therefore afford a golden opportunity for a settlement of the cow question. The intention of the Delhi Muslims was obvious. They hoped to do a deal with Hindu leaders on cow questions in order to win their support for their new Khilafat agitation plans and Gandhi was to help them do this.

Majority of those who attended the conference of 23 November were U.P. Muslims. Resolution, passed in this conference were to send a deputation immediately to England to make their case regarding the Khilafat and Turkey one last time; to boycott the peace celebrations planned by Government for 13 December; progressively to boycott British goods; and 'in the event of a satisfactory settlement of the Turkish question not taking place; withhold all cooperation from the British Government. Two committees were appointed to make suggestions to the next Khilafat conference about the practical working of the last two resolutions their composition illustrates the prominence of the Ulama and U.P. men generally. The boycott of British goods committee consisted of Syed Zahur Ahmad, Hasrat
Mohani, Zafar-ul-mulk Alvi, Maulvi Akram Khan, Maulvi Munirazamman, Seth Abdullah Hasmi, Haji Ahmad Khattri, Maulana Sanaullah, Agha M. Safdar, Maulana Arif Hansi, Tajuddin and Maulvi Mahomed Sijjad, of whom at least three were from the U.P. and five were Ulama. The non-cooperation committee consisted of Maulanas Abdul Bari, Abdul Majid, Sanaullah and Wilayat Husain, plus Hakim Ajmal Khan, Syed Hussain, Riza Ali, Hasarat Mohani, Kamalluddin Jafari, Mumtaz Husain, Fazlulhaq and Seth Abdullah Hasmi of whom four ulama, six were young party men and nine came from U.P.145

Gandhi supported the decision to boycott the peace celebrations.146 He also supported the resolution to withhold cooperation from the Government. But as far as progressive boycott of British goods was concerned, Gandhi was not prepared to follow. Over three quarters of Bombay muslims merchants many of whom financed the Khilafat agitation did business in British goods. Boycott would ruin them. Gandhi was not prepared to help the Khilafat agitators commit suicide.147

On 23 November the U.P. Khilafatists won Gandhi's approval for part of their programme. But on 24 November he was very cautious about the kind of Hindu-Muslim action he was prepared to support. For a start he would be a party to no communal bargain. He rejected the offer, made by Abdul Bari, Asaf Ali and others, to stop cow-slaughter in return for Hindu support for the Khilafat. The Muslims, he argued, should only stop cow-slaughter of their own free will just as Hindus
should only join the Khilafat protest of their own free will. When they (Khalafatists) threatened to decide the matter by a majority vote, Gandhi warned them that, if they did not accept his decision, he would have nothing more to do with the agitation.\textsuperscript{148} As far as joint action was concerned Gandhi was prepared to support only one item in the Muslim programs resolved upon the day before. Boycott of British goods he pilloried as 'ridiculous'. Non-cooperation he hailed as a 'sublime decision', but would go no further. Only boycott of the peace celebrations gained his un-qualified approval.\textsuperscript{149} Resolutions on this and thanking the Hindus were the only ones passed by this joint conference. Gandhi had his own way. The 'independent' called it 'Gandhi's day',\textsuperscript{150} and the Muslims discovered that the Mahatma was no easy tool to manipulate.

So much for the U.P. Khalafatists first attempt to capture the Khilafat organisation, rally the Hindus behind them and drive the Khilafat protest into a higher gear. Hindu support for their boycott the peace celebrations, which did admittedly cause 'a serious curtailment of the programme of celebrations and gave great prominence to the Khilafat question throughout India', was all they gained. At the end of 1919, the Council reforms became law and the Khalafatists did not have to be very perceptive to see that most Hindu politicians like many Muslim politicians, were much more interested in these than the Khilafat. In addition the resolutions of the Delhi Conference regarding the boycott of British goods and non-cooperation came to nought. The Bombay dominated Central
Khilafat Committee opposed them and told the Chairman of the next All-India Khilafat conference, to be held at Amritsar in Congress week, that it should reach no decision on the matter and that the non-cooperation sub-committee should be charged to include representatives of Muslim commercial interests. Muslim merchants from Bombay, notably the Central Khilafat Committee president Chotani, financed the agitation both in north India and in England. The U.P. Khilafatists, with as yet few alternative resources, were powerless to resist. Moreover, they had to stand by silent as the Bombay hold over the Khilafat organisation was confirmed. In the constitution adopted in February 1920, Bombay held over one-quarter of the seats on the Central Khilafat Committee and every seat on the working committee bar one.

At the Amritsar Khilafat conference it was resolved to send a deputation to the Viceroy to place before him their three-fold demand regarding the Khilafat and holy places, and to obtain permission for deputations to go to England and America. Permission was granted. But the Khilafat, Chemsford told the Muslims, was their own affair. Moreover, he did not encouraged them in their hopes for the Holy places. He could not. The demands that Turkey should preserve the sovereignty and dominions which she possessed before the war was one, he declared 'we can not reasonably hope will be recognised by the Allied power in conference.'

Tied by the financial strings of the Central Khilafat Committee, given not a spark of hope by the Viceroy, the Muslims
of Upper India were not daunted. If the Government would not take notice, it had to be forced to take notice. In January and February 1920 they passed forward the agitation with renewed vigour. In doing so they were assisted by two developments. The first was the creation of the basis of better Ulama organisation. Two days after the Delhi Khilafat conference, the Ulama delegates had met to discuss ways of overcoming their ineffectiveness. They were ineffective, they decided, because they were divided. Ulama of different schools, they felt, should make another attempt to unite and so they voted to form the Jamait-ul-ulama-i-Hind (the Society of Indian Theologians). 155 Abdul Bari was the President of its first conference at Amritsar in the last week of 1919.

The second development was the Release, as a result the amnesty which accompanied the Royal proclamation of the montegeu-Chelmsford reforms of those Muslims interned during the first World War. The release of Abdul Kalam Azad, Shibli's most prized pupil, brought to Muslim politics in alim, who, though less influential than Abdul Bari, was intellectually his superior and capable to a far greater extent than any other alim of appreciating both the religious and the political sides of a problem. The release of the Ali brothers brought those masters of Muslim agitational politics to the head of the Khilafat campaign.

In early 1920, therefore the Khilafat agitation reached a new level of intensity. Leaders went on a series of agitational tours throughout northern India, a whole rash of provincial
Khilafat conferences were held and the Ali brothers' purse fund was launched - the first of many appeals for money which were to help to reduce the extremists dependence on Bombay financial support. The U.P. Khilafatists methods of making the Government take notice remained the same as those they had advocated at Delhi in 1919. They wished to force the Khilafat organisation into adopting non-cooperation and to persuade, with Gandhi's aid if possible. Hindu politicians to follow them. In speeches on tour and at conferences, Shaukat Ali, Abdul Bari, Azad and others stressed the importance of fostering Hindu support. Gandhi joined in and he was no less strong in advocating Hindu support for the Khilafat, though he maintained his line of refusing to endorse any bargain over religious practice.

The main effort however, was devoted to persuading the Khilafat organisation to adopt measures of non-cooperation. A strong attack was launched during the third All-India Khilafat conference held at Bombay on 15, 16 and 17 of February. Twice in the month before it was held, Shaukat Ali and Abdul Bari toured the backward Muslim province of Sind, and with fanatical Sindhi pirs and Mullahs at their backs they descended upon the conference. Fourteen resolutions were passed, among them the adoption of the Central Khilafat Committee's constitution, an appeal for thirty lakhs of rupees for the committee's fund and a manifesto, said to have been drawn up by Gandhi, which stated the Khilafat claim and threatened Government that, if it was not met, 'it is futile to expect peace in India....' But the committee still would not accept a measure of non-cooperation.
The decisive action came into the subjects committee where the following questions were considered:—The proposed boycott of English goods combined with a withdrawal from cooperation with Government; whether or not it was 'Haram' (Forbidden) for a Muslim to serve in the Indian army; and the evacuation of the Jarirat-ul-Arab. The delegates from outside Bombay demanded an extreme course of action, those from within, moderation. When the temper of the conference was tested with a resolution on the third subject, it was discovered to lean towards the extremists. The resolution was passed. The moderates tried to wriggle out the situation by submitting the question of army service to the Ulama. This was a bad move. The ulama session was chaired by Azad Sobhani, and immediately, under the inspiration of Abdul Bari, it was decided that, as there was no guarantee that the army would not be used against Muslim forces, it was haram for Muslims to belong to it. Notices were issued to those present asking for the circulation of Fatwas among the troops. When some objected, they were told that in this matter the Sharia should prevail. Nevertheless it was clear to the extremists that they were not going to be able to carry the Bombay moderates with them, and, as they could not afford to do without them, they had no alternative at the end of the conference but to accept and compromise with moderates that the question of the army, boycott and non-cooperation should be left until it was seen what success Mohamed Ali's deputation achieved in England.156

A few days later a speech by the Archbishop of Canterbury denouncing Turkey with crusading zeal was reported in India.
Bombay financiers notwithstanding, the U.P. Khilafatists were no longer prepared to wait for the results of Mahomed Ali's deputation. At the Bengal Provincial Khilafat conference in Calcutta, Abdul Bari wanted nothing less than an eye for an eye from the Anglican primate. He told his audience:— "They could sacrifice every Christian's life and property; they could burn them, and even if they stole their property he would give them a fatwa in justification.... He declared that had cannon and guns been at his disposal he would have declared war and would have burnt the Christians after saturating them with kerosine oil...."

Azad, the conference president, concentrated on more practical means of revenge and in his address raised plain non-cooperation into the Islamic doctrine Tark-i-Malavat, surrounding it with wreaths of quotations from the Koran. Then the conference resolved to boycott British piece goods immediately, to withdraw cooperation from Government if the Khilafat decision was unfavourable, and to observe Friday 19 March as a Khilafat day with a Hartal.

The Calcutta resolutions become the instrument of an extremist coup within the Khilafat organisation. The Bengal Khilafat conference was a mere provincial affair, and had no right to declare for the whole of India a hartal, boycott of British goods and non-cooperation. The extremists were offering Khilafatists the alternative of other joining them or opposing them. Their seizure of the initiative was very successful.
Gandhi was forced to follow them. The Mahatma had attended the Bengal conference. He had witnessed Abdul Bari's fury. He had been unable to prevent the boycott resolution – indeed he had to swallow the fact that, despite his known disapproval, it had been implemented straightway in Calcutta. He had heard the great chorus of approbation of the resolutions that had been voiced in north India. He knew that if he was to continue to influence the Khilafatists, he must go with them. A week after the conference, he issued a manifesto on Khilafat agitation. He stressed that there should be no violence, no boycott of British goods and no confusion of the Khilafat with other questions. He supported the Hartal of 19 March, declared that if Muslim demands were not granted 'non-cooperation is ... the only remedy left upon to us', and hazarded a few suggestions as to its form. All these things he had said before. They were unimportant. What mattered was that he had shown his willingness to keep up with the extremists. But there was a greater success than this. The Central Khilafat Committee also, very reluctantly, fell into line.

On 7 March 1920, the Central Khilafat Committee, with a few dissentients, approved of the 19 March hartal. On 14 March, the Central Khilafat Committee actually endorsed non-cooperation. It agreed that, when action next became necessary, non-cooperation should be begun and that, according to a plan drawn up by a committee of which Gandhi was a member, it should take effect in three stages: first, return of titles and honours;
second, resignation of council seats and withdrawal from private and public service; third, non-payment of taxes.\textsuperscript{163}

On 22 March at Delhi, fifteen Muslim and Gandhi discussed this non-cooperation plan with nine Hindu leaders, among them Lajpat Rai, Madan Mohan Malviya and Bal Gangadhar Tilak, with the aim of gaining their support. The Hindu politicians were not impressed. Malviya doubted that many Muslims would implement the policy; Lajpat Rai was more interested in Swadeshi; Tilak thought it was all nonsense. Even some of the Muslims were not entirely in favour of the Central Khilafat committee's plan. Abdul Bari jibbed at the restriction of non-violence; Hakim Ajmal Khan was diffident non-cooperation but an end to his hopes of a Government grant for his beloved Tibbia (medical) college.\textsuperscript{165} Nevertheless a committee composed of Gandhi, Lajpat Rai, Ajmal Khan, Shaukat Ali and Azad examined the Central Khilafat Committee's programme, and two days later at a Khilafat conference at Meerut, Gandhi announced a non-cooperation programme to be implemented if the Turkish peace terms were not favourable, which was substantially the same as that of the Central Khilafat Committee.\textsuperscript{166}

Once non-cooperation was agreed upon, the U.P.Khilafatists set about preparing to put it into action. They were determined that Government should realise that Gandhi's Meerut announcement was no idle threat. At the Meerut Khilafat Conference it was proposed to form committees of Ulama to organise agitation.\textsuperscript{167} Ten days later a conference of U.P.Ulama, under Abdul Bari, set up a Central Coordinating body for these
committees at Budaun under Abdul Bari's disciple Abdul Mazid Budauni. Two weeks afterwards, a Khilafat workers conference, attended by delegates from all over India, was held at Delhi to decide upon ways and means of putting the non-cooperation programme into effect. U.P. leaders helped to stiffen morale elsewhere in India. Azad Sobhani and Abdul Mazid attempted to stir up the Bihar Ulama. Shaukat Ali, with Abdul Bari in attendance, presided over the Madras Khilafat conference, and ten days later made the major speech at the Bihar Khilafat Conference. But there was a price to pay for all this activity and preparation. Muslim feelings became increasingly strong. The resolutions of the Ulama conference went beyond the content and the spirit of the programme of non-violent non-cooperation, approving of Abdul Bari's Calcutta speech. The Khilafat workers conference went further. It advocated 'hijrat' and many were disappointed. That preparations for Jihad were not to commence at once, 'with few exceptions, it was noted, 'the delegates were determined not to follow Mr. Gandhi's peaceful instructions.' The Bombay moderates were attacked mercilessly and even Abdul Bari came in for a share of abuse. Matters were getting out of hand. By early May, Muslims in several U.P. district had begun to noncooperate of their own accord.

Just as it was difficult for U.P. leaders to prevent local agitation from getting out of hand. So they had problems in preventing the Central Khilafat Committee from wriggling out of its commitment to non-cooperation. Understandably, the
moderate men of Bombay were alarmed by the increasing fanaticism of the agitation in northern India. They showed their displeasures by refusing to affiliate to the Khilafat organisation. The Khilafat workers League and the U.P. provincial Khilafat Committee. Then, encouraged by declarations from the Aga Khan and Raja of Mahmudabad, they suggested that the non-cooperation programme ought to be reconsidered. It seemed in late April that the U.P. Khilafatists' victory of March was about to be reversed. They reacted sharply. 'I want Hakim Shahab and Maulana Majid to be here', Shaukat Ali told Asaf Ali, so 'that we could thoroughly work up the Bombay Muslims'. The Committee was bombarded with letters of objection from Sind, Madras, U.P. and Bengal. Ultimately on 12 May the Central Khilafat Committee decided to adhere to its non-cooperation programme with the change that it should be implemented in four stages instead of three, and appointed a sub-committee consisting of Chotani, Shaukat Ali, A.K. Azad and Hajji Ahmad Khatri to work out in detail a plan for starting it. Consequently several leading Bombay moderates, Badruddin Abdullah Koor, Fazlbhoy Currimbhoy and Rahmatulla Chinoy, resigned. Gandhi was elected to the committee in Chinoy's place.

The terms of the proposed treaty between Turkey and the Allies were published in India on 14 May 1920. The Allies conditions were tough. Apart from the Jazirat-ul-Arab, which was left in Muslim hands, the demands of the Indian Muslims were ignored. The frontiers of the once great ottoman empire were cut back to constantinople and predominantly Turkish areas
of Asia Minor; the Holy places of Islam were removed from the Khalifa's custody; and the power with which he was supposed to depend the faith and the faithful was reduced to visible proportions — 50,000 policemen, seven sloops and six torpedo boats. The Firangi mahal Ulama condemned these terms straightforwardly and demanded that non-cooperation should be implemented at once. But two days later their political sense got the better of them and they modified their stand. Abdul Bari and Kidwai sent a telegram to the press declaring, 'Turkish peace terms outrageous situation desperate Muslims should be patient till Ulama and Central Khilafat committee decides actions!' Gandhi described the terms as 'a staggering blow to the Indian Muslims.. non-cooperation', he declared, 'is the only effective remedy', and hoped that the Central Khilafat Committee would call a joint conference of Hindus and Muslims to consider what ought to be done. Shaukat Ali in a press communiqué supported Gandhi, though he was not prepared to admit that non-cooperation was the only remedy and recommended that the next Khilafat Committee meeting to consider policy should be held in northern India. When on 24 May this body's working committee considered Shaukat Ali's suggestion, there was strong opposition from the Bombay moderates to this over attempt to force their hand. Nevertheless, it was agreed that the Central Khilafat Committee would meet at Allahabad from 1 to 3 June, which was immediately after the All India Congress Committee meeting at Benares. Moreover Hindu leaders of all shades of opinion were to be invited to join in the deliberations in order to hear the Muslim case and to give advice.
At the Hindu-Muslim conference in June, Khilafat leaders were going to try and win Hindu support for the non-cooperation programme. They realised that non-cooperation was less likely to be a success without it. However important it might be to press forward the Khilafat protest, few were likely to resign honours and jobs if they saw that these were immediately snapped up by Hindus. Equally they felt that their action would make little impact on the Government if it was restricted to the Muslim minority. So Khilafat leaders laid heavy stress on the need for Hindu-Muslim unity; Kidwai's presidential speech to the Oudh Khilafat conference concentrated on this point, and Shaukat Ali did not appear to consider starting non-cooperation without our 'Hindu brethren'. 182

Soft words from the Khilafatists carried little weight with Hindu politicians. Any real hope they had of gaining Hindu support lay with Gandhi. By June 1920, the Mahatma, who had skirted around the edge of Indian politics for the past five years, was coming to be a leading politician. In his own right, he had developed strong associations with Hindu revivalism in north India. He had special relationship with trading groups such as the marwaris and Bombay Muslims. He had cultivated pockets of support in the areas where he had championed causes, Champaran in Bihar, and Khaira and Ahmadabad in Gujrat. He was beginning to assert himself in congress affairs.

Gandhi was very willing to play the Khilafatist's game. Indeed, he had been playing it for some time, though of course it did also suit his own idealistic ends. In April and May 1920,
he urged closer Hindu co-operation with the khilafat movement. Soon after he joined the All-India Home rule league, he declared that he wished to engage every member... in khilafat work. Three days later he hinted that Hindus should join Muslims in non-co-operation. When the Turkish peace terms were announced he declared that 'the Hindus are bound to join in non-co-operation. But when he tried to bind the nationalist leaders to non-co-operation, he found them unwilling.

The central khilafat committee's sessions at Allahabad were dominated in spirit though not in number by the extremists of upper India and their followers. Abdul Bari had spent the previous days whistling up as many of his Ulama contacts as possible. Two fifth of those who attended the first meeting in Sheikh Zahur Ahmad's house on 1 June were from the U.P. Many were very bitter when they heard that the congress would not support them straightway in non-co-operation: Abdul Bari accused the Hindus of 'playing' with the Muslims and 'excitedly held Gandhi to his pledge of support.' If the Khilafatists had any doubt about the congress decision on non-co-operation these were removed by the meetings held with the Hindus in the Railway theatre. Only twentyfive Hindus bothered to attend, and important congress leaders such as Tilak and C.R. Das did not come at all. Most of those that did attend supported Motilal Nehru and Madan Mohan Malviya when they made it quite clear that they were not convinced of the practicability of non-co-operation, or of the need for the whole of Gandhi's
programme, and that they wanted to consider the question much more fully. At the second joint meeting on 2 June, the extremist muslims really ran wild. Hasrat Mohani promised to join any Afghan army which might invade India to drive out the British. Then Hindus promptly demanded an explanation, whereupon Shaukat Ali jumped up and in an aggressive tone said that their holy places had already been snatched away, that attempts were being made to obliterate Islam and there was nothing left.

If any moslem invader came for support of the khilafat cause and punish the British, the muslims would join hands with them. The British he said, deserved such punishment for their injustice and high handedness towards Islam. So saying he dropped into his seat and tears began to flow. 189

Azad Soughani and Zafar Ali Khan strongly supported this stand. But speeches such as these were not likely to encourage the Hindus to ally themselves with the muslims. Lajpat Rai wanted them that, at the first sign of the muslims pursuing the course set out by Shaukat Ali, the Hindus would oppose them. 190 The muslims did not win Hindu support for non-co-operation.

It was clear to the khilafatists that, if they were going to non-co-operate, they would have to do so by themselves. The thought must have deterred many, because, when the central khilafat committee met on 3 June, only forty attended. 191 After the resolution to implement non-co-operation had been proposed,
Gandhi was asked to explain his programme and the terms on which he would assist. According to an intelligence report:

He said that if he were allowed to lead the mohammadans who would then form a small committee of such whole-hearted workers who would have to leave themselves at his mercy and who would have to behave in any manner he directed them to do. He would not limit the number but those who joined him whether few or many should be such people who would sacrifice their very lives if he asked for them. He would then get through all the stages in four or five months one by one. He would himself be sort of a director. The committee would work in the cause of the khilafat but would not be dependent to any other committee. Even the central khilafat committee would not be allowed to guide this committee.

Shaukat Ali declared that the muslims were ready to submit to Gandhi's dictatorship. 'There was a dead silence and people did not dare to speak one way or the other as they did not approve of placing themselves blindly under Gandhi.' Eventually Riza Ali, supported by Bombay moderates and some up 'young party' men who together amounted to a majority of those present, put forward an amendment which would have limited non-co-operation to the first stage. But Shaukat Ali and Abdul Bari with their customary vigour and religious fanaticism quashed all dissent. Consequently, Gandhi was made chairman of a committee composed of A.K. Azad, Ahmad Hasan of Bihar, Mahomad Ali of Dharavi, H.S. Khatri, Shaukat Ali, Saluuddin Kitchlew and
Hasrat Mohani, which was answerable to no one, not even the central khilafat committee, and was to have complete charge of putting non-co-operation into practice 'without further delay.'

'Take great care', the independent of Allahabad warned its readers on the morning of 3 June, 'that the control of khilafat movement does not fall entirely into hands of theologians and divines, without any appreciation of the great national and international issues involved in it.' Yet this was the very thing that most of the 'young party' muslims and the Bombay moderates, by permitting themselves to be bullied into questions by Abdul Bari and Shaikhat Ali, allowed to happen. In getting the upper hand the U.P. extremists were helped by men from the Punjab, Sindh and Madras. But this had happened before, what was important on this occasion was that the khilafat organisation had become less dependent on Bombay financially. By June 1920 it was tapping funds from all over India, and any way Chotani, the major financial backer, though reluctant, still provided support, probably as a result of Abdul Bari's spiritual guidance. Thus the U.P. extremists were able to shake off the leading rains of the Bombay moderates, ignore the opposition of the less advanced khilafatists of their own province, and commit the khilafat organisation to putting non-co-operation into practice. Their failure, as yet, to win substantial Hindu support was a great disappointment.
But they had done enough to persuade Gandhi to commit himself to cause and to lead them.

The leaders of the khilafat movement now submitted themselves completely to Gandhi's control. At his dictation they appealed to their rulers (British) once more. On 22 June they addressed a memorial to the viceroy asking him either to get the Turkish peace terms revised or to resign. They give him till 1 August to take action, failing which they would commence progressive non-co-operation. Non-co-operation was launched on 1 August.

The impact of the introduction of non-co-operation was not startling either in the U.P. or in India as a whole. A few lawyers resigned their practice and a few title holders returned their honours. The commencement of the programme at this stage was partly a stop to the extremists, but mainly a tactical expedient. Between June and September, 1920, the basic aim of Gandhi and the khilafatist was to line up enough support to persuade the Calcutta special congress to support their non-co-operation plans. Gandhi was the architect of the campaign. In June he began to persuade congress men to join the non-co-operation camp.

Gandhi and the khilafat leaders made a direct bid to persuade their supporters to go to Calcutta and vote for non-co-operation.
Gandhi courted his Gujrat supporters with a hurriedly held Gujrat political conference just before the special congress. He told his audience that he was 'going to Calcutta to get non-co-operation accepted by it.' He wooed his Marwari followers by emphasising the concern of leading khilafatists for cow-protection. To make the point Abdul Bari, Hakim Ajmal Khan, Azad and the central khilafat committee all issued statements enjoining muslims to abstain from cow-slaughter on the Bakar-ID, which fell a few days before the congress. Their real search for support, however, was directed towards the muslims. In July Gandhi and Shaukat Ali toured the muslim areas of Punjab and Sindh, in August those of Bombay and Madras. They spoke mainly to the muslims, explaining non-co-operation and emphasising that it was the only answer to the khilafat problem. The pursuit of votes also went on elsewhere. In Bengal, the khilafat committee asked muslims to go to Calcutta in large numbers and offered free board and lodging to encourage them. In Bihar, Mazrul Haq and Nurul Hasan helped to push the provincial conference into approving the non-co-operation programme. In the U.P. leading Ulama formed a Propaganda subcommittee of the provincial khilafat organisation and toured the province. A free trip was offered to all Ulama who wished to attend the special congress.

All these representations bore fruits at Calcutta. The real fight over the central khilafat committee subcommittee's
non-co-operation programme took place in the subjects committee. Once the decision was reached here, victory in the full congress was a foregone conclusion, three hundred members of the subject committee were crammed into the Indian Association's rooms in Bow Bazar. In the discussions three groups emerged. Gandhi, Shaukat Ali, Yakub Hasan, Saifuddin Kitchlew and Jintendralal Banerjee, who were out and out supporters of non-co-operation, C.R. Das, B.C. Pal and Madan Mohan Malviya, who were only partial supporters, Jinnah Mrs. Besant and Jamanadas Dwarka Das who were strongly hostile. The real struggle was between Das and Gandhi. The Mahatma presented the following plan of non-co-operation: (a) Surrender of titles and honorary posts; (b) Refusal to attend levees and durbars; (c) Withdrawal of children from government school; (d) Boycott of British courts by lawyers and litigants; (e) Refusal to serve in Mesopotamia (Iran); (f) Withdrawal from council elections; (g) Boycott of foreign goods. Refusal to participate in government loans and interference in recruitment for the army and police, which had been included in the programme announced on 7 July, were omitted.

Das and party were prepared to adopt the programme with the exception of (c), (d) and (f), which reduced it to little more than an endorsement of the principle of non-co-operation. Gandhi stood firm against all attempts to whittle down his programme. For three days in stifling heat the argument raged
back and forth. A session of the congress had to be postpone. The only concession that Gandhi was prepared to make was the substitution of 'gradual' for 'immediate' in section (c) and (d). More than once, when the drift of the debate seemed to be going against him, Gandhi stopped his opponents in their tracks by declaring that, whatever they did, he would put non-co-operation into effect. Shaukat Ali was Gandhi's staunchest supporter. He blasted Fazlul Haq off the fence into the non-co-operation camp with a valley of abuse, and was only narrowly prevented from forcing non-violent non-co-operation on Jinnah with his first. When on 7 September the vote was finally taken, Gandhi's resolution passed by the narrow margin of 148 to 133. With the meeting still in session, Shaukat Ali leapt to a window and announced the result to the crowds outside to a swelling cry of 'Gandhi ki jai.' That evening the congress voted. The resolution passed by 1885 to 883 votes.201

Only one leading congressman, Motilal Nehru, supported Gandhi, it was an amazing victory. Its explanation lies in part in the membership of the subjects committee. No list of members appears to exist, but nevertheless some important facts about its composition can be ascertained. It was elected by the delegates from the various provinces and these contained a remarkable number of non-co-operation sympathisers. There were personal supporters of Gandhi: Khaddar Clad Punjabis from Ludhiana, Bhatias from Gujarat and Madras, Marwaris from Calcutta was upper India.202 But the major groups were muslims. Mazharul Haq led a personal following of fifty muslims from
Bihar, Chotani, a similar number from Bombay, while 'khilafat specials' from Bombay and Madras brought hundreds of muslims to Calcutta. The 'Leader' reckoned that over 2000 of the 5500 delegates were muslims. Never had so many muslims attended a congress. These newcomers did their utmost to ensure that only supporters of the non-co-operation programme were elected. In the Bengal camp, advantage was taken of the claim for special representation for muslims and Marwaris to introduce a large number of non-co-operation supporters.

Now the muslims were the core of Gandhi's party, but his victory was narrow enough to make every source of support important. Here the council boycott element of the non-co-operation programme played an important part. Whatever the provincial congress committees may have determined before hand, congress politicians at Calcutta decided whether or not to support non-co-operation according to their estimate of the congress's chances of winning a majority at the elections in their province. Thus congressmen from Maharastra, C.P. and Bengal, who fancied their chances, were most strongly opposed to non-co-operation. But these from Madras, where Rajagopala-chariar's Brahmin faction feared defeat, from Bihar, where they knew they would be squashed by the landed interests, and from U.P., where a similar result was anticipated, supported it. Crucial probably, in swinging the U.P. delegation behind the programme was the defection during the discussions of Motilal Nehru. Das thought so, Gandhi certainly thought so; it was for him he made his one concession.
This was a great victory for Gandhi. By persuading the congress to join the central khilafat committee in non-co-operation he had gone some way towards achieving his ambitions of Hindu-Muslim unity and proving the efficacy of Satyagraha as a means of obtaining justice. But Gandhi, for all his political streudness, was an idealist. In crude political terms, this was a much greater victory for the khilafatists. For months they had been trying to win Hindu support. For months the congress chiefs had resisted them. No they had with Gandhi's aid tossed them to one side, and as Lajpat Rai put it 'tacked' the congress on to the khilafat committee.

This khilafatist victory was primarily the work of the 'young party' men and ulama of the U.P. They had led the movement and led it into ever more radical paths. But not all had worked equal enthusiasm. Many 'young party' politicians were wary of association in politics with fanatical ulama. Moreover, their wariness grew as non-co-operation became increasingly the favoured tactic of the khilafat leaders: they like many of their congress contemporaries, did not want to relinquish their legal practices, however small they might be, their chances of winning a council seat or their hopes of government patronage. So, as the steady revelation of the reform assured them that the muslim claims of separate representation and 'political importance' were not in danger and as the influence of the ulama in politics increased and non-co-operation seemed a likely form of protest,
many 'young party' men became more circumspect in their agitation for the khilafat. Ajmal Khan and Ansari who had launched the agitation at Delhi in 1918, refused to assist either the Delhi khilafat conference of November, 1919 or the extreme khilafat workers conference of April 1920.207 After the draft rules of the new up council were published in May 1920, several 'young party' men fancied their chances of getting a seat, among them Ansari, Kamaluddin Ahmad Jafri, Riza Ali, Ali Nabi, Haji Musa Khan, Hyder Mehdi, Sheikh Zahur Ahmad and Syed Zahur Ahmad.208

Attitudes to the khilafat agitation became influenced by the council entry question. For electoral reasons 'young party' politicians had to appear to support the khilafat agitation whole-heartedly but, when at the Allahabad conference Riza Ali gave them a chance to limit non-co-operation to harmless items, several of them seized it. Right up to the Calcutta congress they kept their options open. When they were forced to choose, those who know they could win council seats, like Riza Ali and Ali Nabi, abandoned the khilafat agitation; most of those who knew they could not made the best of a bad job and support non-co-operation. These were not the men to force to non-co-operation programme through the Calcutta congress.

The only 'young party' men wholly behind the khilafatist drive to implement non-co-operation were the Pan-Islamist rump of Mahomed Ali's pre-war following. They were few in number: Hasrat Mohani, Mushir Husain Kidwai, plus one or two new recruits
such as Syed Mahomad Husain and Ismail Khan who helped to run the U.P. khilafat committee, and they joined hands in other provinces with Kitchlew, Zafal Ali Khan, Mzharul Haq and Yakub Hasan. Their doyen was Shaukat Ali, tireless agitational terror, bombastic orator and committee lion, with the useful Knack of being able to bludgeon opponents into submission.

The muslims, however, who made the khilafatist victory were the ulama. They tried to push the movement in a radical direction faster than the 'young party' politicians wished to go. They for instance, founded the Delhi khilafat workers association in order to force the hands of Ansari and Ajmal Khan. They originated the idea of non-co-operation and put constant pressure on the central khilafat committee to adopt it and put it into practice. The extent of their involvement is indicated by the closeness with which the non-co-operation programme had by 7 July, been tailored to fit their interests; they hoped to replace legislative councils with committees of ulama, courts of infidel law with bodies that would interpret the Sharia and government schools with muslim Madarassas. What could have appealed more to a band of private school-masters, who were fast losing business to state schools, than smashing the rival system, winning back their pupils and reviving their trade. The ulama had most to gain from driving the khilafat agitation more extreme. It was not surprising that they lay at the heart of its organisation. They dominated the U.P. provincial khilafat committee: Azad Sobhani was president and
Abdul Majid and Nazir Ahmad ran its propaganda. They presided over district, provincial and all-India conferences and their followers were usually a large part of the audience. Nor were they any less prominent in other provinces. Maulvis Akram Khan and Ghiasuddin ran the Bengal khilafat committee, Mahomed Sajjad was the leading worker in Bihar and Abdul Majid Sharar the organiser in Madras. 209

These ulama who dominated the early stages of the khilafat agitation both in the U.P. and in India as a whole, were mainly followers of Abdul Bari. 210 The Lucknow Maulana's influence, not only as head of the school which most ulama politicians followed but also as the pir of most leading lay khilafatists, was immense. He organised the first great fatwa on the khilafat question as well as those which reinforced the various developments in the agitation. These fatwa moved muslims all over India, and their practical power was considerable. Abdul Bari led most of the ulama who attended such important occasions as the Delhi khilafat conference of November 1919 or the Allahabad meetings of June 1920. His followers were mainly responsible for the large muslim attendance at the Calcutta congress in September, which transformed non-co-operation from a dream into a practical political proposition.

But Afterall, the publication of the government despatch on the Turkish question in March 1922 was a watershed for the
khilafatists. The movement had derived much of its impetus from the fact the British government was opposing the Turks at the peace conference and once it became clear that the government of India was representing the Indian Muslim opposition, non-co-operation seemed less justifiable. At the time, therefore, two of the main groups involved in the movement, the Bombay moderate and the ulama of North India, showed signs of a change of policy.

The moderate had been eclipsed politically as early as May 1920, and from that time forward, though they continued to render the movement invaluable financial assistance, political control had rested in the hands of the North Indian politicians and ulama. After March 1922, however, the dissociation of the congress working committee at Ahmadabad on 17 and 18 March, 1922, Mohammad Chotani, the president of the central khilafat committee and the leader of the Bombay group, broke with the politicians over the attitude to be adopted to Montague resignation and drew upon himself the enmity of the North India faction. Chotani however, was not alone. Many of the most influential ulama were similarly affected by the same development. After the government's dispatch was published, Abdul Bari and Hasarat Mohani and many leading U.P. khilafatists issued a manifesto urging Muslims to cease hostilities against the government, and Abdul Bari, in a letter intended for the viceroy's eye, declared that his opposition to the government had been solely
with a view to preserving the khilafat and that the government's changed attitude towards a similar change on the part of the Muslims. Most spectacular of all, however, was Hasarat Mohani's reaction. He had been the most virulent protagonist of independence for India and his activities had been curbed with difficulty by Gandhi at Ahmadabad in December 1921, but by March 1922 he showed himself prepared to drop non-cooperation altogether. By March 1922, therefore, those ulama who did remain politically active were not those who had led the movement from the beginning but the secondary leaders, men like Abdul Badauni, whose antipathy towards the Raj went deeper than their aversion to particular politics.

After March 1922, the movement began a rapid decline. Most of the leading politicians were in gaol, subscriptions began to fall off, and though the government continued to be wary of any developments in Europe which might spark off a resumption of civil disobedience, it was gratified by the enhanced esteem in which it was held. The major revival of Muslim feeling took place in September and October when the British opposed the retaking of Smyrna and Eastern Thrace. At the time, a clash between British and Turkish forces seemed imminent and the Khilafatists organised a body of semi-military volunteers called the Angora Legion. But this organisation also could not bring any positive result.

By the beginning of 1923, khilafat activity had virtually come to an end. The masses had lost interest, with few
exceptions the ulama had dissociated themselves from the work
of the khilafat committee, and the politicians, finding them-
selves to be leaders without a following, sharpened their knives
for internecine war. The north Indian faction made public
Chotani's embezzlement of 18 lakhs of khilafat funds and
preoccupied themselves with retrieving the money by the liqui-
dation of his assets, while Chotani's colleague, Khatri,
the treasurer of the khilafat committee, gave plentiful evidence
to the khilafat Accounts Enquiry Committee of the parasitical
activities of the Ali Brothers and Dr. Mahmud. Neither
of these disclosures improved the public image of the leader-
ship, and future efforts to raise funds were treated with
justifiable cynicism. Yet though the khilafatists were leaders
without a following, they found themselves in an identical
dilemma to that faced by their congress counterparts. Were
they to follow Gandhi and his lieutenants in the continued
pursuit of non-co-operation outside the legislatures or were
they to join the congress-Swaraj khilafat party, under the
leadership of C.R. Das and Motilal Nehru, in order to contest
with election and made the reforms unworkable? Like the
congress, the khilafat committee was deeply divided over this
issue and this added to its ineffectiveness.

The main protagonists of the 'no-change' party were the
Ali brothers, Dr. Kitchlew of Amritsar and Dr. Mahmud of Patna.
For the Ali brothers, the obstacles to a policy of council entry were the same as the obstacles to their participation in constitutional politics in the years before 1920. As individuals, they might have secured election to either the U.P. council or the central assembly yet they were too committed to non-constitutional activity to change their policy overnight, and to accustomed to straddling the sub-continent to confine themselves to being small in a constitutional machine. For Dr. Kitchlew, the existence of a Zamindari party in the Punjab which despised his Kasmiri origins as much as he despised its consistent loyalism left him no alternative but to continue as a political activist, and for Dr. Mahmud, habitual vacillation and an emotional attachment to Jawaharlal Nehru, himself a fervent no changer, provided on this occasion, as on many others, a stumbling block to rational action. Lastly, in early 1923, when the Swaraj party was found, all these men were in gaol and incapable for that reason of participating in the new political initiative which were being taken.

NOTES

4. Ibid., p. 176.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Montegu Papers (35) IOl, Address of the U.P. Muslim defence association GAD 1917, 553, UPS.
9. GAD, 1917, 553, UPS.
11. Ibid.
12. Published from Lucknow, first issue in April, 1917, GAD, 1917, 140, UPS.
13. 'New Era' (Lucknow) 16 June, 1917.
15. Clause 10 of a draft constitution for the All-India Muslim League, Published in 'New Era' (Lucknow). 16 June, 1917.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Wazir Hasan to Ramaswami Aiyer, 9 July, 1918 Aleep, 1918, 2, Part II, NMM
23. So went the story told by Raja's son Quoted by F. Robinson, p. 260.
25. WRDCI, 9 Nov. 1918, Home Poll. B, Dec. 1918, 158-9 NAI.
30. Home Poll. A. March, 1919, 251-9, NAI.
33. F. Robinson, p. 262.
35. F. Robinson, p. 264.
36. Hundred years of Darulullom Deoband, Pamphlet prepared by the department of Tanzeem Abnae Qadeem Darululoom, Deoband, 1967.
38. 'History Sheet of Shibli Nomani Shams-ul-Ulama' GAD, 1914, 55, UPS.
40. Interview with Mufti Reza Apsari of Firangi Mahal, 29 May, 1968, Quoted by F. Robinson, p. 265.
41. A leading Maulvi of Dar-ul-Ulum, Deoband, who edited two Urdu Monthlies, 'Al-Qasim' and 'Al-Rashid.'
42. F. Robinson, p. 265.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. Firangi Mahal was the oldest of the heading schools in the U.P. It was founded in the house of a French Merchant in Lucknow with a grant given by Aurangjeb. The mughal emperor, it is said had taken pity on the relatives of an eminent aalim, Mulla Qutubudin, who had been killed by jealous rivals. The fame of the institution developed with the teaching of Qutubudin's son, Mulla Nizamuddin. He was the creator of the Dars-i-Nizamia, the curriculum employed in one form or the other in most of the Madrassas of India. Firangi Mahal was never a school in the sense that Deoband was apart from the years 1908-26 when Abdul Bari's Madarassa Nizamia flourished, but merely the Quarters in which the descendants of Mulla Qutubuddin, most of whom were Mauluvis, lived. Source - F. Robinson, p. 266.

47. Deoband was founded in 1867, when a small 'Arabi Maktab' was raised to the status of a dar-ul-ulum. The Maktab had been started shortly after 1857 in the Jama Masjid of Deoband by Hafiz Syed Abib Husain. Its leading lights are said to have been survivors from the battlefields of the mutiny. Next to Azhar of Cairo, it is the most important and respected theological seminary of the Muslim World. Source - Farueqi the Deoband School, op. 22-24; W.C. Smith, Modern Islam, pp. 335-6, Wuoyrf by F. Robinson, p. 266.

49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
52. Ibid., pp. 336-7.
53. The Ulama in British India, P. Hardy, p. 9.
56. Ibid.
57. At the height of Muslim disturbances over the Balkan wars, when Shibli was pouring poems instinct with hostility to the British Government into the Pan-Islamic press, a teacher at the Nadwa, Maulvi Abdul Karim Khan, published a virulent article on jehad in the College paper, An Nadwa, Shibli took the remarkable course of bringing the piece the notice of the Deputy Commissioner and inducing the board of the Nadwa to suspend Abdul Karim Khan. His action was not the result of a sudden feeling of loyalty, nor even an attempt to wheedle a bigger grant for the school, but merely an
attempt to score off an old theological opponent. The
veemacular press had no illusions about Shibli's motives.
Source:—Note by Meston, 22 April, 1915, GAD, 1314, 55,
UPS.

58. Ibid.

59. Statement of Maulana - Muhammad-ul-Hassan 11 Dec., 1917,
Home Poll. B, July 1918, 92-101, NAI.

60. Statement of Nasarat Hussain, 14 Dec. 1917, Home Poll B
July, 1918, 92-101, NAI

61. Ibid.

62. F. Robinson, p. 270.

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid.

65. Secretariat Note, 4 April, 1917, GAD, 1916, 436, UPS.

66. F. Robinson, p. 270.

67. Ibid.

68. A Note by jopling, Deputy Commissioner of Lucknow,
7 August, 1916, GAD 1914, 718, UPS.

69. Ibid.

70. Abdul Bari papers, File 1, FM Lucknow.

71. Ibid.

72. Home Poll. 192, 137, 1922, 699, NAI.

73. Ibid.

74. 'Grants of awards in connection with meritorious public
service,' GAD, 1921, 347, UPS.

75. F. Robinson, p. 272.

76. Ibid.

77. Ibid.

78. Ibid.

79. Ibid.
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid.
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid., p. 273, 276.
84. Ibid.
85. Ibid.
86. Ibid.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid.
89. Ibid.
90. Ibid.
91. Ibid.
92. 'The constitution of the Majlis Muid-ul-Islam,' FM, 1328 AH (1912) Article I Urdu leaflet in the private library of Mufti Raja Ansari of FM.
93. Ibid.
94. Ibid.
95. Ibid.
96. Ibid.
98. F. Robinson, p. 280.
99. Ibid.
100. Ibid.
101. Ibid.
102. Modern Muslim India, S.M. Ikram, p. 85.
103. Ibid.
104. The Deoband School, Farugi, p. 58.
105. The rules of the Nazarat-ul-Maarif-ul-Qorania, Published in Mashriq (Gorakhpur) 1 July, 1913, UP NNR, 1913.

106. F. Robinson, p. 281.

107. Ibid.

108. Ibid.

109. Ibid.


111. Ibid.

112. Hardinge Papers, Meston to Hardinge. 25 March 1915, CUL, WRDCI.

113. WRDCI, 8 July 1916, Hom Poll, B. July 1916-441-5 NAI.

114. FR (U.P.) Home Poll D. September 1916, 17, NAI.


117. Mohammad Ali Papers. Ibni Ahmad to Ansari, 20 Dec. 1919, JMI.

118. 'Independent.' (Allahabad) 8, May, 1920.


120. Home Poll. A. August, 1919, 415-16, NAI.

121. WRDCI, 10 March, 1919. Home Poll. B. April 1919, 148-52, NAI.

122. FR (U.P.) Home Poll. D. April, 1919, 48, NAI.

123. FR (U.P.) Home Poll. D. March, 1919, 16, NAI.


126. FR (U.P.) Home Poll. D. March, 1919, 17, NAI.

127. FR (U.P.) Home Poll. D. April, 1919, 48, NAI.

128. WRDCI. 18 March, 1919, Home Poll. April 1919, 148-52, NAI.
129. 'Akhuwat' (Lucknow) I April, 1919, UP, NNR, 1919.
130. Ibid.
131. FR (U.P.) Home Poll. D. July, 1919, 47, NAI.
132. WRDCI 19, May, 1919, Home Poll. B. June 1919, 494-7, NAI.
133. Harcourt Butler to Chemsford, 20 April 1919, Chemsford Papers (22) IOL.
135. Ibid. August 1919, 51, NAI.
136. 'The Independent' (Allahabad), 7 Sept. 1919.
137. Ibid. 25 Sept. 1919.
139. The Leader (Allahabad) 25 Sept. 1919.
143. 'Leader' (Allahabad) 27 Nov. 1919.
144. 'Independent' (Allah.) 28 Nov. 1919.
145. Leader, 28 Nov. 1919.
146. Ibid., 3 Nov. 1919.
148. Ibid.
151. FR (Bombay) Home Poll. D. Jan. 1920, 5, 45, NAI.
152. Ibid.
153. Ibid. July 1920, 89, NAI.

156. FR (Bombay) Home Poll. D. July, 1920, 89, NAI.


159. Ibid., 12 March, 1920.

160. 'Medina' (Bijnor) 17 March, 1920.


162. FR (Bombay) Home Poll. D. July, 1920, 90, NAI.


165. Ibid.

166. 'Independent.' 27 March, 1920.


168. Ibid.

169. FR (Bihar) Home Poll. D. July 1920, 95, NAI.


171. Ibid., 9 April, 1920.


175. Mahomed Ali Papers, Shaukat Ali to Asaf Ali 22, April, 1920, JMI.


186. Abdul Bari Papers File of Telegrams. FM.
188. Ibid.
190. Ibid.
191. Ibid.
192. 'Independent', 8 June, 1920.
193. Ibid., 3 June, 1920.
195. Chemsford papers (24) IOL.
197. Young India, 4 August, 1920.
201. Amrit Bazar Patrika, 6, 7, 8 Sept., 1920.
202. Ibid. 4, 6, Sept. 1920.
203. 'Leader' 1 Sept. 1920.
204. Hindu (Madars) 6 Sept. 1920.


207. FR (Delhi) Home Poll. D. Jan. 1920, 5; 67, NAI.


209. F. Robinson, p. 325.


211. GI Home Poll. 501/1922.

212. Ibid.

213. Ibid.

214. GI Home Poll. 461/1921.


216. GI Home Poll. 741/1922.

217. Reading Papers. Reading to Peel. 8 June 1922.

218. GI Home Poll. 968/11/1922.

219. GI Home Poll. 25/1923.

220. GI Home Poll. 15/II and 15/v/1923.