INTRODUCTION
Right from the early beginning of the History of the Human being, 'Leadership' has played an important role to guide the society. Society without a leader will be a boat without rudder. Leadership is an ability to dominate the stream of thought of society. Either it may be good or bad, society has to bear the results. Leadership also has to bear so. It seems that the games between leaders and supporters are the main job of our world. Teachers, Saints, family heads, and political leaders use their art of leadership to show a better path to society. But in some cases selfishness enters into leadership and tries to take the society towards the hell. Now, in the modern democratic age it is easy to a common man to follow his own leaders, and practice his own reasonable thoughts.

Leadership is a concept applied to the personality, environment relation to describe the situation when a personality is so placed in the environment that his will, feeling and insight directs and controls others in pursuit of common cause. According to Lapiere and Fransworth - Leadership is behaviour that affects the behaviour of other people more than their behaviour affects that of the leader. What is popularly called leadership is more accurately to be discussed in terms of dominance. Leadership is a foundation on which the super-structure of society is based.
After the entry of Islam in India, in 8th century A.D., Muslims have been the prominent figure of Indian political history. The interaction between the Hindustani and Islamic culture also have taken an important place in our history. The revival or changes in the fields of culture, religion, education, economy and even in daily life style, always take place through the movements of the leaders.

How the leadership of the Muslim community has led the society is the question here. Contribution and participation of the Muslim leadership will be very clear after the assessment of the events of our history and the role of Muslim leaders.

A real leader is one, who is able to (i) arrive at a correct diagnosis of the ills of a group, community or people, (ii) make a realistic assessment of their aspirations, (iii) think of effective remedial measures, (iv) frame a workable and practical programme (v) get it wholeheartedly accepted by his followers and (vi) lead them successfully to implement, the programme, remove their difficulties and make them reach the objective. But one may say that unfortunately Indian Muslims have not been able to produce many such eminent leaders, who may have been able to analyse the distress of Muslims and achieve at least some measure of success in removing even part of their difficulties. Mr. Jinnah proved to be a great leader from these criteria, but what he did really aggravated
the plight of muslims, at least of those who remained in India. Most of the muslim leaders who have been religious ones, have tried to increase the gap of differences between the two communities and thereby to add to the plight of muslims.

We may categorise the muslim leadership of the period of study (1906-1937). Muslim leaders, falling under the first category were those, who like Sir Syed Ahmad Khan of Aligarh, realising that the British had come to stay permanently as rulers of India, thought that the best way by which muslims could hope to retain power, assume importance and gain a dominating position in Indian affairs was by imitating the British, acquiring British education and by winning the favour of the British. Most of these leaders who believed in pleasing the British were immigrant muslims and what they did was mainly for the upper strata of muslim families. This did bring some relief to a part of the muslim community, though only partially, since it was not a programme for the muslim masses, nor was it widely accepted, enthusiastically followed or continued for any length of time. This category of Muslim leaders was more or less like many leaders of the Hindu community of that time, who had also favoured imitating following and pleasing the British and thereby winning their goodwill.

The second category of muslim leaders consisted of those, who believed in living amicably with the majority
community and who preached identification of the interests of muslims with those of the main body of Indians. They had faith in territorial nationalism and common citizenship. They were secular, rational and radical in their approaches towards political and economic questions. Dr. Ansari and Maulana Azad represented this section. The total number of leaders falling into this category has been quite large but from this group many had changed sides. They had started as nationalist muslims but many of them had after sometime, abandoned this philosophy and turned anti-hindu. Nationalist muslims had opposed the demand for Pakistan but, as a result, they had been pilloried by fellow muslims and were called stooges of Hindus.

Most muslim leaders belonging to the third category, came into leadership and succeeded in maintaining it, because they mainly fanned the flames of hatred and preached violences against the majority community and thus struck a harmonious chord, which had always existed in the hearts of most muslims. Most of them had openly preached antagonism against Hindus, advocated reparatism from the main stream of national life, encouraged extra territorial loyalties, advised allegiance to outside bodies, invited the attention of the masses to draw inspiration from countries other than India, stressed the point that muslims had very little in common with the rest of India and secretly, at times not so secretly, insinuated disturbances, riots, violence, destruction, rape
and bloodshed. Such leaders hardly did anything to make the life of Indian Muslims any happier.

Commenting upon Muslim leaders, who in the name of Islam, were antagonising against Hindus, Mahatma Gandhi had said, "Religion binds man to God and man to man. Does Islam bind Muslim only to Muslim and antagonises the Hindus? Was the message of the prophet peace only for a between Muslims and war against Hindus or non-Muslims? Are many crores of Muslims to be fed with this which I can only describe as poison? Those who are instilling this poison into the Muslim mind are rendering the greatest disservice to Islam."

Mahatma Gandhi, speaking of Muslim papers stated, "I read as many Muslim papers as I can ... I find them so full of poison and conscious and unconscious untruths..."

According to Inder Malhotra, writing to in the illustrated weekly of India of 22nd April, 1973, "The Tone of many Muslim newspapers and journals and the speeches of the leaders ... are highly inflammatory. Although they claim to be the champions of the rights of the Muslims, they have no programme for the economic betterment of the community. All that they do is to whip up religious sentiments and further isolate the Muslims from the Hindus. Their leaders also want that Muslims should not join any secular organizations. Muslim leaders, who, throughout their life, had supported nationalism, were mostly the immigrant Muslims. They were
not only not supported by any substantial Muslim following but they were boycotted, condemned, classed as stooges of Hindus and quislings although many of them were great scholars and writers on Islam and most ardent Muslims.

Even that section of the elite which advocates secularism and modernization had rather curiously hesitated to draw the attention of the brethren of the community to the problems that are really sapping their vitality and robbing them of the honourable place they can occupy in society.9

As against these, Hindus claim that Hinduism had continued to throw up, throughout these centuries, a number of leaders, big and small, secular and sectarian, political and social, philosophical and religious. Hindus claim that the vitality of Hinduism is evident from the fact that there have been many profound thinkers and well known philosophers, who have come up with different theories claiming to challenge even some of the basic concepts of Hinduism and who have led powerful revolts against the fundamental principles of the Vedas. Rishis like Kapil, Kanad and Gautam had, many centuries ago, challenged some of the basic Vedic and Upanishadic concepts. They had amply shown their independent way of thinking and their theories were seriously studied, thoroughly scrutinized, fully examined and partially or wholly rejected.

Even after the advent of Islam in India, there have been many attempts to reform Hinduism and to place it on a
new footing. Kabir and Nanak are two very good examples of revolts that were organised against traditional Hindu views. This process has continued right through the centuries and even in the last a number of Hindu reformists had introduced far-reaching changes. Ram Mohan Roy, Keshab Chandra Sen, Dayanand, Sahajanand, Aurobindo and last but not the least Mahatma Gandhi, had given many severe jolts to the widely accepted notions and universally followed practices of Hindus.

The muslim community in India has remained backward, dormant, docile, dull, inactive and stagnant in almost all spheres of life. It has not been able to produce leaders, who may have made any appreciable impact on the life of these millions of Muslims, or who may have created even the smallest dent on the body politic of Indian, except perhaps the creation of Pakistan.

Regarding the achievement of Indian Muslims in carving out a separate and independent state of Pakistan, not only most Hindus but many others also think that it was the outcome of the deep hatred mutually felt between Hindus and Muslims. The lot of Muslims in India has hardly improved as a result of the creation of Pakistan and so far the poor performance of Pakistan in almost all spheres is a positives proof that those leader who had agitated for and achieved Pakistan had not been able to do any real good to the Muslim masses.
Prof. A.A.A. Fyzee, former Indian Ambassador to the United Arab Republic, writing in the Times of India of the 21st January 1973, stated about leaders of his own Muslim community, "The leaders of the Muslims have never really gone down to the masses, and have never been able to get rid of the budgbears of religion and law. The rank and file likewise have always been manipulated by political leaders for their own selfish ends."

Even when Indian Muslims have been in this obviously unfortunate position of living amidst hostility and hatred, no movement has been started by any muslim leaders or any muslim organisation to preach the advantage of harmony, good neighbourliness and a programme of promoting friendliness with Hindus. Nor have Hindus led any movement to absorb Muslims into the main stream of Indian life.

In the independent India Muslims enjoy the same freedom, rights and authority as is done by Hindus. Indeed, in fact, muslims, in certain respects, enjoy special additional rights and advantages as members of a minority community and are permitted some unique privileges under their special personal laws. More than one Muslim have occupied the highest posts of governors in many states in India, including some of the biggest states. Zakir Hussain was the Chief Justice of India and officiated as president of India. The number of Muslim ministers in the Indian states has been
large. Besides, many muslims have adorned many high civil, military, diplomatic, academic and scientific posts in Indian government, universities, public undertakings, financial and other corporations.

Many Indian muslims had followed Mahatma Gandhi in many matters, but they did not accept his principle of non-violence, and did not give up eating meat, most probably because non-violence, was originally a Hindu principle. Here it would be better to mention that many Hindus, who followed Mahatma Gandhi in many other matters, also did not accept his views on non-violence and continued to eat meat.

Legally and constitutionally muslims have all the rights just equal to Hindus, but in practice, socially, economically and honourwise they remain completely discriminated against. The fear of Hindu domination keeps muslims so frightend that even the most enlightened, highly educated and scholarly among them cannot argue rationally or maintain intellectual honesty in many matters concerning their own community or India or about Indianness.

Even the most nationalist muslim leaders have to stand apart from the mainstream of the life of the Indian people. Many such leaders have of course denied that Hindus and Muslims constituted two separate nations in India. They have said that India was one nation but the Indian nation of
their concept probably had two parallel ways of life and two different streams of Indian cultures. In this connection it may be of some interest to see what Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, perhaps the greatest and the most consistent of nationalist Indian muslims has to say. In his presidential address at the annual session of the Indian national congress held at Ramgarh in 1942, the Maulana said, "I am a muslim and this thought fills me with pride. The traditions of Islam during its career of thirteen centuries go to my heritage. I am not willing to give up an Iota of this portion, Islamic education, Islamic history, Islamic arts, Islamic sciences and cultures constitute the elements of my wealth, and as a muslim it is my duty to preserve it. Being a muslim, I have a special position in cultural and religious circles and I cannot bear it that anyone should interfere in this inner sanctum of my soul. We brought with us a great treasure... We entrusted our wealth to this country. We gave to this country the most precious of our possessions and one which was greatly needed by it. We gave to it the message of democracy and equality."

This is not much different from the claim made by the protogonists of the two nation theory. What the Maulana here claims is that as a muslim he is different from other Indians and his culture is different from that of the majority community and he cannot give up any part of it. The only difference between Maulana and Mr. Jinnah would appear to be that the
former did not use the term different nations but said different history and different arts. The meaning of both may perhaps be the same. What the Maulana had said did in essence mean that Indian Muslims were different from other Indians and that they should remain so. The Maulana asserts that his heritage, his education, history, arts, culture and even his sciences are those that had their origin in the thirteenth century, that is, from the time of the birth of Islam. It has, therefore, to be different from that of other Indians, who claim a much older heritage, culture, education and arts and a much older history. Mr. Jinnah had said, "The Hindus and the Muslims have two different ... philosophies ... customs ... based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions." Even Mahatma Gandhi said, "Though the majority of Musalmans of India and the Hindus belong to the same 'stock', the religious environment has made them different."

Most of Hindus and Muslims are almost unanimous in thinking that for the sake of unity with one another, neither Hindus nor Muslims have been able to adopt the ways of life of the other. It cannot be said whether east and west shall ever meet, but it can certainly be said that a hindu and a muslim has not merged with one another.

Muslims have a history of over a thousand years in this country as traders, conquerors, missionaries, rulers,
British subjects and finally as free citizens of secular India. Mainly three factors account for their presence here. They are: conquest, immigration and conversion.

Immigrant muslims came from central Asia, Afghanistan, Iran, West Asia and coast of Africa. There were immigrants also from the tribal territory of the north-west frontier. Muslims did not colonise, India en masse, they infiltrated slowly in small groups in successive waves, and this went on for centuries.

The main source that accounts for an overwhelming number of muslims in India is conversion that went on through centuries. Persuasion proved to be the more effective weapon, though force or threat of force, allurement of office and prospect of social nobility played an important part. Most of the recruits came from the intermediate and the lower level of Hindu society. To the socially oppressed Hindus specially, Islam with its egalitarian zeal must have seemed a religion of hope and in many cases their power of resistance was not much. These conversions were accomplished mainly through the agency of mystics and Sufi saints who were supposed to be possessed of miraculous powers. Often the change of faith took place in groups and at a times whole communities accepted the new faith. The Bohras, Khojas and Memons are examples of such mass conversion.
Most of these converts carried their caste and prejudices over to their new faith, which means that while the conversion from Hinduism to Islam may have been a matter of moments, the Islamization of the converts was a gradual process spreading over centuries. It was during this interregnum that Hindus and Muslims influenced each other up to some extent.

Reffering to the coming of muslims and this interaction, Maulana Azad said in his presidential address at the Rampur congress in March 1940:

"This vast and fertile land (India) gave welcome to all and took them to her bosom. One of the last of these carvans ... was that of the followers of Islam. This came here and settled here for good. This led to a meeting of the culture-currents of two different races. Like the Ganga and the Yamuna they followed for a while through separate course, but nature's immutable law brought them together, and joined them in a Sangum. This fusion was a notable event in History."15

"Islam" as Azad said later on in the same address, "has now as great claim on the soil of India as Hinduism. Now it need hardly be said that there has been a great deal of interaction between the two cultures that shows itself up in the spheres of art, architecture, customs, language and religion. Islam's influence on reformers like Kabir and Nanak is well known. The evolution of a common language, Urdu and the
achievements of the Indo-Sarcenic arts are direct consequences of this co-existence. And there are other influence too."¹⁶

But it is a moot point whether the two communities have achieved the kind of Sangum or fusion that Azad spoke so confidently of. M.R.A. Baig in the "Muslim dilemma in India" contests Azad's thesis of assimilation and says that the Creation of Pakistan, the culmination of Hindu-Muslim political rivalry from the eighth century A.D. is proof enough that no synthesis between Hindus and Muslims took place.¹⁷ A.A.A. Fyzee also quotes "The apparent unity must not make us blind to differences in religion, in morals, in language, in food, in dress, in spirit and in mode of thoughts.

Now it is quite easy to overemphasise the role of divisive powers at the cost of those that held the two communities together. It would be wrong to assume, for instance, that Hindus and Muslims were in a state of perpetual conflict or that Muslims interest were always different from those of Hindus or that Muslims interests were the same in different regions of the country.

As recent sociological research has shown, Muslims are far from being a homogeneous community. Language, caste and economic standing worked together to divide Muslim from Muslim no less than Hindu from Hindu.¹⁸ There is the familiar distinction of Sayyids, Shaikhs, Mughals and Pathans, according to extraction. And as pointed out earlier the
converts took their social system to the new faith. Indian Muslims have modified and weakened system of caste of their own, which they acquired from the Hindus.

The invaders themselves belonged to different stocks. There are doctrinal differences between the Sunnis, who are in a majority and the minority sects like the Shias, Bohras and others.

Till recently, Meos of Haryana, for instance, had purely Hindu names or tagged on Khan to a Hindu name. And they celebrated not only Divali and Deshahara but Janmastami also. Mujeeb M. refers to a newspaper report in the statesman of 11 March 1959 saying that 'a Hindu temple near Suralgarh in Rajasthan has Muslim priests who perform the worship of the idol and receive offerings from devotees.

There were furthermore divisions at a social level town dwellers and rural dwellers, landlords and tenants. The interest of a Muslim landlord tallied more with those of his Hindu counterpart than with those of his poor co-religionist who tilled the soil. Another factor that contributed to these differences was the uneven distribution of Muslims in different parts of the country.

What held this heterogeneous community together was the sentiment of a common allegiance to Islam and its symbols—Mosques, Sufi Shrines and Hajj. This sentiment has been
a great cohesive force among muslims cutting across doctrinal and other differences within the community and giving them a very strong sense of religious identity. But this religious cohesiveness did not mean that their social, economic and political interests were the same, and what affected the muslims of one area or class did not necessarily affect those of other areas or classes. In fact, it has been argued the muslim response to political questions often rested on local, special or temporary interests.\textsuperscript{21} This sentiment can remain latent or dormant for generations, but it can also be roused to fever pitch within an incredibly short time.\textsuperscript{22}

The potency of this sentiment to override all differences and to unite muslims was demonstrated several times in recent Indian history. For example, the Kanpur masque incident, the Khilafat issue, the controversial Sarda marriage bill, and the biggest of all, the demand for a separate homeland for muslims. On the last occasion, Jinnah and his muslim league were able to orchestrate through their promise of Pakistan the disparate interests of all sections of the community and achieve their objective. Their battle cry was 'Islam in danger.' These facts of divisions and differences within the muslims and of the great unifying force of Islam will be kept in mind during the analysis of muslim politics after 1857.

But temporarily unifying forces between Hindus and Muslims are rare too, in our Indian history. Hindu-Muslim
I've read the document and extracted the following natural text:

strife and coldness, is an ancient tale that began in 712 A.D. when Muhammad Bin Quasim, son-in-law of the Governor of Iraq, conquered Sind and declared it a muslim state. In Quasim's Sind Hindus were inferior in status to muslims and had to pay the jizia, a poll-tax not levied on muslims. Between the years 1000 and 1026 Sultan Mahmud of Gazani in what is now Afghanistan raided India seventeen times, broke idols in Hindu temples, took away a store of riches and annexed an area around Lahore. A scholar in Mahmud's court who accompanied him to India, Al-Beruni, noted that because of the ruination at Mahmud's hands the Hindus "cherished the most inveterate aversion towards all muslims." 23

Al-Beruni also saw that while apparently resigned to their humiliation, the Hindus looked upon the invaders as outcastes and "recoiled from the touch of the impure barbarian muslims." 24 Muhammad Ghori (1174-1206) extended muslim rule eastward, from his days until 1857 there was always a muslim king on the throne of Delhi. But a hundred years after Ghori the muslim traveller Ibn-Battutah observed that Hindus in Malabar ensured that "no muslim should enter their house or use their utensils for eating purposes" and that if a muslim is fed out of their vessels the Hindus either break the vessels or give them away to the mussulmans. 25

The Pakistani historian Ishtiaq Hussain Qureshi, has given his terse view of the distance between Hindus and
muslims down the ages:

"They have lived with minimum contacts. There has been little intermarriage, because Islam forbids it with the Hindus and the Hindus are bound by their rules of caste. Except in a small sector of the highly westernized class, interdining has been unthinkable. The festivals provide no social occasion for coming together, instead they have often given a pretext for rioting. The communities have remained different not only in religion but in everything, culture, outlook on life, dress, cookery, furniture and domestic utensils. There has been no sense of common history. The heroes of the muslim conquest and the rebels against muslim domination inspire contradictory feelings among muslims and Hindus. Common bondage to the British did not always inspire the same feelings at all time." 26

Although India had succeeded in integrating foreign elements that had entered India before the muslims (Greeks, Sythians, Kushans, etc.), but she could not 'Indianise' the Muslims. Unlike the previous invaders the muslims did not merge themselves with the Hindus and thus for the first time the population of India was divided into two separate units with marked distinctions. This was the historic beginning of the Hindu-Muslim problem that led after more than six hundreds years to the creation of Pakistan. 27 The pattern of relations...
between Hindus and Muslims since the early days of Muslim rule was essentially that of conflict. But in spite of these all, not that all Muslims lost their belief in the possibility of Hindu-Muslim unity. One who did not was Khaliquzzaman, who headed the Muslim League in U.P. and later in Pakistan. While not regretting his espousal of Pakistan, he held that the Muslim presence in India had led to 'the evolution of a common culture and a common social life.' That "the Muslims were forced by circumstances to seek the partition of the country" was, in his view, more "a great irony" than an outcome of incompatibility.

It was an irony because says Khaliquzzaman, "the Muslims had endeavored for centuries to unite India." Though this endeavour was linked to Muslim rule, which meant minority rule. Many Muslims found Pakistan a thrill but partition sad; they had been heirs, some of them at any rate, to a tradition of a composite Indian or Hindustani culture. This culture had influenced Delhi and areas near it ever since the reign of Akbar (1556-1605), a Hindu wife of whom gave birth to his son and successor Jahangir. Jahangir's Hindu wife was in turn the mother of emperor Shahjahan; and even Aurangjeb the devout married a Hindu noblewomen. The Mother of the last Mughal, Bahadur Shah II (1837-57) was a Hindu too, called Lalbai. These Hindu wives were all
converted to Islam, only exception in case of Akbar. Hindu wives during the reign of Akbar were allowed to practise their own religious rites inside the palace. They may be considered as vehicles for an infusion of Hindu culture into the red fort. Culture also flowed the other way. Many Hindu men took to the Muslim 'achkan' and 'pajama' and Hindus of both sexes sought favours from the tombs of Muslim saints.

It was common for the Muslim rulers to celebrate: Holi, Rakhi, Dussehra and Diwali and to fete Hindus and Muslims together. But the most significant fusion was over language. The court, Hindu and Muslim subjects and Muslim and Hindu poets increasingly used a new language that was evolving, Urdu, which had strong Persian and Arabic flavours but was, in Hali's words, "based on Hindi." "All its verbs, prepositions, conjunctions and the greater part of its nouns," added Hali, "are derived from Hindi." In Khaliquzzaman's estimate, "Urdu contained about seventyfive percent words of Hindi and Sanskrit origin."

Khaliquzzaman recalls a personal experience as he had had of Hindu-Muslim friendship. "I had now been the chairman of the Lucknow municipal Board for seven years. The Hindu members of the board continued to support me loyally. Now that I am at the fag end of my life I have to thank them. Pandit Rasbihari Tiwari, who was the president of the Lucknow Hindu Mahasabha and had always opposed my election as Chairman, asked me to see him in hospital. I found him very
weak, suffering from consumption. He took my hands in his, with tears in his eyes, and asked his son, Birgudat Tiwari, to touch my feet and treat me as his father after he had gone. On the way back to my house I felt very miserable. I was meeting nothing but affection from my Hindu friends personally but in matters of public policies I had failed to convince them.34

Indian muslim was afraid of the future. He was not less keen for India's political progress, for independence from white rule, than the Hindu. Perhaps he was keener, for his elders were always reminding him that the English had toppled a mughal from the Delhi throne that muslims had occupied for 650 years. But probably he was afraid of the other prominent claimers of the Indian rulership.

As for Hindu rule, the muslim saw risk in it. Only a section of Hindus had subscribed to the composite culture. Wouldn't the rest, a majority, yield to urging to recall the past? Might they not see muslims as aliens, indeed as aliens tarred with the anti-Hindu excesses of men like mahmud of Ghazni and desire revenge in estimating their prospects under majority rule. India's muslims were influenced by their reading of history.

It is a fact that many muslim ruler levied the Jizia (though several did not) and at least one (Firoz Shah Tughlak)
(1351-1358) fostered conversions by offering to withdraw it. Most muslim rulers had to call Islam the official religion; without such an affirmation they would have alienated the ulama, the body of Islamic scholars and interpreters, which was seldom without influence, and also strengthened the hands of their muslim rivals and challengers.

Hindu temples were defaced by muslim rulers — and also preserved by them. If some rulers permitted the sacrifice of Cows, others, out of an understanding of Hindu sentiment, discouraged cow killing. The Hindu assumption that muslims were outcastes was not always concealed but the muslim rulers chose not to react angrily to it; they just ignored it. And though some conversions, frequently short-lived, were obtained at swordpoint, and others through the cure of honours, decorations and money.

Akbar's bid for Hindu-Muslim unity was bold, too bold in fact. Not only did he abolish the jizia and create, by appointing Hindus to vital posts in the empire, a mixed governing class, he also allowed his enemies to charge that the emperor sought to dilute Islam out of recognition. His great grandson Dara Sikoh, the eldest son of emperor Shahjahan and the apple of his father's eyes, believed in what he called "The mingling of the two oceans," translated
portions of the Upanishads and declared that the latter were of divine origin. But in the battle for succession the broad-minded but weak and moody Dara lost out to his self controlled and puritanical younger brother, Aurangjeb.

Aurangjeb reimposed the hated jizia. His regime saw the destruction of many a Hindu temples (Viswanath Temple in Varanasi, etc.), the execution of Hindus and Sikhs, including the ninth sikh teacher, Guru Tej Bahadur, and two sons of the tenth Guru, and humiliation of many of his non-muslim subjects. His clashes, offensive or defensive with the Rajputs, Sikhs and marathas and with muslim Chieftains in the south ate the life out of the mughal empire, and his policies induced hate in Hindus and Sikhs. That he realized what had happened, and also sensed his personal responsibility, is indicated in the letter he wrote in his last days to his favourite son Kam Baksh:

'Son of my soul... now I am going alone. I grieve for your helplessness. But what is the use? I have greatly sinned, and I know not what torment awaits me ... Let not muslims be slain and reproach fall on my useless head. I commit you and your sons to God's care. I am sure troubled.'

If we except Aurangjeb and his unfortunate excess of zeal, we can agree with Mujeeb that the mughal state "was
Islamic only in the sense that the ruler was a muslim and 
the ruling party mainly muslim. No doubt the government 
promoted the interest of the ruling class, and that class 
happened to be mainly muslims, but the state was not a 
theocracy.

If Islam rode across India with the sword and spoke 
from the throne, it also walked with the Sufi and spoke in 
gentler cadences from the hut. The Sufis, Muslim mystics, 
talked of the love of God and the brotherhood of man, of the 
shortness of life and the length of eternity. Their 
thoughts took root; their language did not seem alien. 
Numerous Hindu admirers and disciples were drawn to them and, 
after their death to their tombs. Likewise many muslims 
felt attracted to the Bhakti saints.

The Sufi's and the Bhakti poets brought Hindus and 
Muslims closer at the grassroots. Affirming often in memor-
able verse, that there was no difference between Hindus and 
Muslims, or between Ram and Rahim or between Hinduism and 
Islam, some of these mystics refused to accept either the 
Hindu or the Muslim label for themselves. The best known 
among them is, of course, the fifteenth century saint poet, 
Kabir. The orthodox in both communities warned the faithful 
against persons who denied the existence of differences and 
questioned the value of externals. That inward belief was 
not possible without outward observance was the position of
Shaikh Ahmad of Sirhind, the brilliant purist (1562-1624) who reacted against Akber's heterodoxy. But the Sufis did not fall in line. Despite orthodox warning the message of the muslim sufies and the Hindu Bhakti school reached and uplifted large sections of the common folk, muslim and Hindu, and tended to unite them.

After the decline of the great mughals, and domination many markable changes came in muslim politics of Britishers over Indian sub-continent of India. The downgoing mughal aristocracy saw that they had shared power to their increasing dis-advantage with plebians-marathas, jats and indeed Afghan adventurers. Why should they not accomodate the British -- who ranked some where between banias and marathas ? The British themselves in 1803 were rather awed by their own success and respectful towards mughal mughal culture. Perhaps the British were prepared to accept the Indian political world of the mediatised prince and the nominal supremacy of mughal emperor Shah Alam. Shah Alam thought that the dream of restoration of empire would be easy through the help of Britishers. But it was a dream only. The British acted upon their thesis that Shah Alam was a crowned pensionary by settling upon him eleven and a half lakh of rupees, drawn from the land revenue of areas west of the Jamuna, and allowing him to retain ruling powers within the area of the Red-fort. In the time of Shah Alam's son and successor, Akbar II (1806-37). The British reinforced
their pensionary thesis by refusing to recognise, his right to nominate his successor and by Lord Hastings (1754-1826) refusing when governor general to stand in Akbar's presence.\textsuperscript{40} In the eighteen forties the British began to omit those courtesies due to a king which they had formerly shown.

In 1844 Lord Ellenborough (179 -1871) abolished the presentation of nazrs, dishonestly concealing the fact that the directors of the East India Company had decided to continue them for the lifetime of the then King, Bahadur Shah. Eventually, in 1851, Bahadur Shah received the monthly Sum of 833 rupees in lieu of his nazrs. In 1849 Dalhousie (1812-60) agreed to recognise Mirza Fakhrul-din as heir-apparent on condition that at Bahadur Shah's death the royal family move out of the Red fort. In 1856, however, Mirza Fakhrul-din died and the new governor general coming would only recognises Mirza Muhammad Kalash as Shahzada or prince of the house of Timur.\textsuperscript{41}

The British in India had by 1857 persuaded themselves without difficulty that the mughals in Delhi were an anomaly and their existence a matter of indifference even to the muslim population of the East India company's territories. The East India Company felt satisfied with her success and followed a more fearless policy towards Indian subjects.\textsuperscript{42}
For the muslim elite in northern India, muslim conquest meant the destruction of the way of life more than livelihood. Bishop Heber, writing in 1824 while passing through Rohilkhand, provides the occasional observation. "The musliman chiefs, who are numerous, are very angry at being without employment under government, or hope of rising in the state or Army, and are continually breaking out into acts of insubordination and violence. The Rohilkhand is burdened with a crows lazy, profligate self-called Suwars who, though many of them are not worth a rupee, conceive it derogatory to their gentility and Patan blood to apply themselves to any honest industry, and obtain for the most part a precarious livelihood by sponging on the industrious tradesman and farmers, on whom they levy a sort of blackmail, or as hangers-on to the few noble and wealthy families yet remaining in the province, of these men, who have no visible means of maintenance at all and no visible occupation except that of lounging up and down with their swords and shields like the ancient Highlanders, whom in many respects they much resemble, the number is rated at perhaps, taking all Rohilkhand together, not lower than 100,000, all these men have everything to gain from a change of government."

In judicial and revenue employ, muslims held their own until the middle of nineteenth century. But now they held their posts at the pleasure of alien and infidel masters and, after the abolition of Persian as the language of the courts
in 1837, in increasing composition with Hindus who had learnt English. On revenue administration, as money was the company's principal concern, European control was established. In 1772 European collectors were appointed to the Districts of Bengal. Although they were withdrawn in 1774 they were finally reinstated in 1785. The consequence of anglicisation of the revenue system for the muslims in Bengal was not that they lost employment but that they lost income. Hindus had dominated revenue employment under the mughals in Bengal. In Chittagong district in 1777 there were only five muslims to fortytwo Hindu employees in the revenue offices. 

Lord Cornwallis's (1738-1805) reorganisation of the company's government in Bengal starkly revealed that muslims would not be subordinate partners but merely subordinates. In 1790 cornwallis abolished the office of na'ib nizam. muslim judges were dismissed and European judges were appointed, who were also given charge of the police as magistrates. The career prospect of muslims were limited to appointments as native commissioners (amins, salis or munsifs) in minor civil suits as advisory quazis. 

In the north western provinces, composed of the territories coded by the nawab of Awadh in 1801 and those obtained by the defeat of the marathas subordinate judicial officials. In 1850 they held 72% of the judicial posts open to Indians, that is, up to the post of Sadar Amin and including almost all the appointments in the latter part. They were equally
dominant in the subordinate revenue service. In 1853 Banda, Gorakhpur, Muradabad, Azamgarh, Gurgaon, Ghazipur and Bharathana are named as having muslim deputy collectors.\(^{48}\) and in 1856 Farrukhabad, Ghazipur, Jalaon, Meerut, Mutta, Aligarh, Mainpuri, Etawa, Gorakhpur and Sahjahanpur.\(^{49}\) Muslims were very numerous too among the tahsildars, or Indian collectors of revenue, at the tehsil level. Majority of inspectors of police in northern India were muslims as were a majority of the rank and file.\(^{50}\)

British rule profoundly changed the relationship of the landed classes to the land in India. In some provinces muslims proved specially vulnerable to British-induced change, in others less so or not at all, as British agrarian policy varied from province to province. Much depended on how far muslims in the eighteenth century had transformed themselves into zamindars and on whether they enjoyed incomes from jagirs or from grants of revenue free land. In Bengal Muslim did not become as significant a proportion of the new landlord class as their numbers among the population might suggest, in the North-West provinces a muslim landlord class excercised an influence and power which persisted into the twentieth century.\(^{51}\)

A class of muslim landholder commonly believed to have suffered greatly from British rule was the holder of revenue free land or the recipient of land revenue from the cultivators of a specified area. Such grants were made on a considerable
scale by muslim rulers. In order to receipts from lands revenue, the East India Company issued, from 1793 onwards, regulations for the investigation and resumption of those holdings which did not possess unimpeachable title deeds properly registered with the collector. Muslims in Bengal were worse hit than others by resumption proceedings.\footnote{52}

In the upper provinces, Muslim grantees were certainly not destroyed as a class before 1857. The revenue proceedings for 1859, recording confiscations of holdings for rebellion in 1857, mention, for example 255 muslim Muafidars in Shahjahanpur district and 109 in Shikarpur paragana.\footnote{53} In Meerut district, there were 350 muslim and 21 Hindu Muafidars mentioned in a return of 22 Nov. 1858.\footnote{54}

The Britishers desired a land system which would case the task of collecting the state's traditional share of the gross produce of the soil, and create a loyal class of landholders. To fulfill this requirement a permanent settlement with Zamindars were made in 1793 during the reign of Cornwallish. The long term effect of the permanent settlement was to depress the status of the cultivator whether Hindu or Muslim. No proper attempts were made by cornwallis to ascertain the extent of the lands,\footnote{55} to which zamindars were given proprietary titles, and this enabled the zamindars to deprive cultivators of their customary rights to graze the pasture land and to use the waste land.
Probably the muslims were better able to bear the introduction of landed proprietorship, (permanent settlement) in north western provinces than in Bengal. Muslims were to be found alongside Hindus as tenants, occupancy cultivators, village zamindars, revenue farmers, revenue officials and accountants. Benares provides a classic illustration of the interpretation of Hindus and muslim in rural society. The Raja of Benares was a Hindu Chief, obliged to furnish troops and money for his muslim overlord, the Nawab of Awadh. He employed both Hindu and Muslim mill to collect revenue.56 In Ghazipur in 1989 jonathan Duncan (1756-1811) made settlements with both Hindu and Muslim tribes.57 In a revenue settlement in Rohilkhand in 1802, eleven of the revenue engagers were muslim and eight Hindu.

In brief, we may say that establishment of British rule in India affected different classes of muslims in different ways. For a minority it destroyed not a livelihood, but a way of life, and damaged not so much their pockets as their pride. For the mughal court at Delhi and the muslim aristocracy attached to it, life under British patronage was probably materially no worse than life under maratha patronage—but the patronage was made more galling by a generation of British functionaries who put a low price upon the mughal past and the mughal present in the market of utility, who scorned gentility and poetry and those who did not live laborious lives.
After all we may say that by 1800 an irreversible changes took place in temporal setting of Islamic rule in India. Marathas, Sikhs and English East India Company had overborne Mughal Military power and become the effective rulers, even in the territory of Delhi itself. Muslim ruling elites were neither rudely supplanted nor did they all immediately suffer hardship; indeed some of their members quickly made themselves, with personal profit, indispensable to the new masters. By 1803 the East India Company had occupied Delhi and Agra, the historical centres of Mughal imperial power, and had begun to control the application of Islamic law to Muslim society. In their savage repression of mutiny and rebellion in 1857-1858, the British demonstrated that any future Muslim success and prosperity must be on terms laid down by British rulers. Moreover, Muslims were obliged to live under censorious rulers who made it possible for Christian missionaries publicaly to attack their religion and for any one to allege that Muslims were behind in the race of progress because they were Muslim. Infidels had conquered Muslims before but had often surrendered to Islam later. Now western imperialism intellectual and moral as well as political, seemed to proclaim that either God was not omnipotent or that he was punishing his would-be servants for failing to be true and faithful servants. 59
But some Muslims were prepared to object publicly to the way history was going in early nineteenth-century India. They were those who as Muslim scholars did not care to see the express commands of God openly disregarded, those upon whom British rule was quicker to take effect and those who had no expectations, as the former ruling elite of the upper provinces had, that the British would recognise their merits.

Muslim scholars (Ulama) had been slow to react publicly to British rule, perhaps because the East India Company had only very gradually departed from the medieval modus vivendi between the religious and the political establishment. Until 1790, penal justice in Bengal continued to be dispensed according to the revived sharia norms of Aurangzeb's time and regulation II of 1772 had provided that in all suits regarding inheritance, succession, marriage and caste and other usages and institutions, the law of the Quran with respect to Muhammadans... shall be invariably adhered to. But in the last decade of eighteenth century and in the first decade of the nineteenth, the East India Company began by legislation to substitute its own rules of evidence, definitions of offences and penalties for those of the sharia. The leading Delhi scholar, Shah Abdul Aziz (1746-1824), son of Shah Wali-Allah, protested at this formal interference with the substantiate content of the Islamic holy law, by declaring those areas of northern India under British supremacy to be Dar-Al-Herb (the abode of war). But this was an academic ruling by an academician to ease the conscience.
of those obliged to live under non-muslim laws administered by non-muslims.

Saiyid Ahmad of Rai Bareilly (1786-1831) made a more active call to Muslims to stand up for Islam as a public way of life, but even he did not openly resist the East India Company in its territories.  

Saiyid Ahmad was born into an obscure family, possibly in minor official service. Tradition has it that he found reading and writing difficult, but that in 1807 he had been accepted as a pupil by Shah Abd-ul-Aziz and initiated into the Naqshbandi, Qadiri and Chisti orders. From about 1809 to 1818 he was a trooper under the pindari chieftain, Amir Khan, later the nawab of Tonk; probably there was nothing to distinguish him outwardly from other pindari freebooter. The later story that he tried to influence Amir Khan against making peace with the British is apocryphal. After the suppression of the pindaris, Saiyid Ahmad returned to Delhi where he attached himself to Shah Abdul-Aziz. He formed ties with Shah Ismail (1781-1831) and Maulwi Abd-ul-Haiy, nephew and son-in-law respectively of Shah Abdul-Aziz. Between the middle of 1819 and July 1821 he stayed in Rai Bareilly and began preaching during this period.

Saiyid Ahmad started the journey to Mecca, in July 1821, to perform Hajj. He returned to India in November 1823. The
next two years were spent in teaching, organising his followers and collecting funds in the upper provinces. In January 1826, however, he left Rai Bareilly and after a circuitous journey of nearly three thousand miles through Rajputana, Sind, Baluchistan and Afghanistan with his followers he reached Gharsadda in the Hastnagar district. From there he declared a jihad against the Sikh ruler of the Punjab, Ranjit Singh. In a night attack upon Sikhs near Naushera the Mujahidin were successful and Saiyid Ahmad was joined by neighbouring Pathan Chiefs, including the Sardars of Peshawar.66

Saiyid Ahmad was declared Imam in January 1827. It was difficult to impose unity upon the Pathan tribesman and after a betrayal by one of the Peshawar Sardars, Yar Muhammad Khan the Mujahidin were defeated at Shahidu near Akora in March 1827. Saiyid Ahmad now toured the Pathan tribal areas gathering recruits and moved his headquarters to Panjtar. He defeated Yar Muhammad Khan and was able to establish himself at Peshwar in 1830. The local Pathan resented control by outsiders, even in the name of Islam, and rose against Saiyid Ahmad's tax collectors, murdering many and forcing him to return to Panjtar. In May 1831 at Balakot on the Kaghan river, in an area where he was trying to enlist the local chiefs against the Sikhs in Hazara and Kashmir, he, Shah Ismail and nearly six hundred of his followers were killed.67
Saiyid Ahmad described his path as the Tariqa-i-Muhammadi, the Muhammadan mystical path. Although he proclaimed the love of a prophet for God to be superior to that of mystic, because a prophet is concerned to create the good society on earth whereas the mystic is concerned only with his own soul's welfare, the path of sainthood and the path of prophethood are complementary. Saiyid Ahmad and Shah Ismail condemned pilgrimage to Hindu holy places, participation in Hindu festivals, consulting Brahmins and resorting to astrologers and fortune tellers. He tried to weaken the Indo-Muslim prejudice against widow-remarriage. But he did not set up as a faqih or canon lawyer.

Saiyid Ahmad left behind him among Indian Muslims what the prophet had left behind him in Arabia. From February 1829 the Holy law governed, or so it was recorded, the community of mujahidin. As the prophet, according to Muslim traditions wrote letters to the great powers of his day calling upon them to accept his prophethood, so Saiyid Ahmad, according to reformist tradition, wrote letters to Muslim rulers in central Asia under the title of Amir-al-muminin, calling upon them to recognise his Khilafat. He described how Hindustan had fallen under the rule of Christians and how he would strive to free it and to establish the supremacy of the Shariat over it.

The surviving Mujahidin after the field of Balakot eventually found a refuge in remote Sittana where they
continued to obey the mandates of the Sharia, collecting the Ushr or Tithe for benevolent purposes and levying fines for non-attendance at prayer. Before his death Saiyid Ahmad had sent a number of deputies, including two brothers, Maulwi Wilayat Ali (1791-1853) and Inayat Ali (1794-1858) of Patna, to organise the indispensable tail of the army of the faithful on the frontier. They in turn sent missionaries on mission to tour India both to preach and to organise 'fiscal circles' under collectors to collect funds which would eventually be forwarded to the Muzahidin on the frontier.

The British were early apprised of Saiyid Ahmad's campaigns against the Sikhs, through their political agents in Sikh territory. After his death they correctly gauged that his followers intended the eventual overthrow of British rule, but recognising the reformist religious aims as not necessarily identical with the longterm political aims, they thought prosecution would be savour of persecution. 72

Contemporary with Saiyid Ahmad, there arose in Bengal another religious movement. It was Faraizi movement founded by Hajji Shariat Allah (1781-1840). 73 Hajji Ahmad had earlier lived in the Hejaz for about eighteen years. He sought to teach Bengali, Muslims to observe the obligatory duties of Islam, to abandon reverence for pirs, and to for shake 'Hinduized' life ceremonies. On the ground that there were no properly constituted Muslim rulers and quzis in nineteenth century India, the Farazis abandoned Friday
and Id prayers. Under Hajji Shariat Allah's son Dudu Miyan (1819-1862) violence broke out between the movements largely peasants following and the landlords.

Throughout the nineteenth century a variety of Sunni scholars and teachers, including Maulana Karamat Jaunpuri (D. 1873), a follower of Saiyid Ahmad Barelwi willing to accept British rule, devoted themselves to rid Islam in Bengal of Polytheistic attitudes and practices, while disagreeing among themselves about the acceptability of Tasawwuf, or about which school of jurisprudence should be followed.

In the far south among the Moplas, Ulma such as Saiyid Alawi (D. 1843) and his son Sayyid Fadl (D. 1900), through creating no formal organisation, perpetuated local muslim tradition of Jihad and martyrdom so that the violent Mopla agrarian opposition to Hindu landlords, and to the British, which continued throughout nineteenth century and during the Mopla rebellion of 1921, was expressed in the idiom of a return to the earliest days of Islam.74

But renewal of Islam, by attempts to revive the believed patterns of a model era, occurred mainly as a peaceful process of education by the 'Ulama'. They progressively took over the religious leadership of muslims in India under non-muslim rule. Shah Abd-al-Aziz had begun to assert that leadership
by delivering rulings (Fatwah) to the many Muslims seeking assurance in a period of rapid change. The position of 'Ulama' was strengthened in the course of Sunni Shia controversy - Shah Abd-al-Aziz's Tulfat-al-Ithna 'Ashariyah (A offering to the twelvers) was of major significance -- and in public debate with Christian missionaries. After 1857, the Ulama at Deoband proved adept at using the post, telegraph, railways, and the press to communicate their teachings to the Urdu knowing Muslim public. Their leaders, Maulana Muhammad Qasim Nanawatwi (1832-1880) and Rashid Ahmad Gangohi (1828-1905) stood for the Hanafi school, subjecting local custom to a careful critique in the light of the model practice of the prophet and seeking always to ensure that believers kept the divine tawhid (unity) before them. The Deobandi leaders assumed the status of Sufi Saikhs and initiated disciples. But the special efficacies (Karamat) that were attributed to them were depicted as being exercised to influence people to follow the Sunnah. The Deobandis were opposed to treating the tombs of Saikhs as centres of worship or intercession. Since some leading Deobandis claimed initiation into all the main Sufi orders in South Asia, Deoband encouraged comprehensiveness and consolidation of intellectual and experimental traditions. Although they accepted the British as rulers, the Deobandi weighed their culture and usually found it wanting. Muslims were not to accept their contemporary world on its own terms. 75
The Ahl-i-Hadith (people of Hadith) were another group of 'Ulama' aiming to reform custom and to purify convictions soiled by customs. Led by Siddiq Hasan Khan (1832-1890) and Saiyid Nadir Hussayn (D. 1902) they derided the authority of the four schools of Islamic jurisprudence in favour of a literal interpretation of Quran and Hadith. At the same time they opposed the Sufism of the shrines. However, the Ahl-i-Hadith's treatment of the prophet Muhammad's hadith as an implicit revelation which elaborated authoritatively the explicit revelation of the Quran exposed them to the charge of introducing a dualism into God's communication with human. 76

Titu mirled a movement named 'Lollard'. It was the most violent movement of Bengali Muslims at required British Military action for suppression. Born in 1782 in Chandpur in the twenty-four paragana, Titu mir was described as a wrestler and as leading in the Calcutta district until about 1815 the life of 'a bad and desperate character.' 77 Apparently he acted as a 'strong arm-man' for some Hindu Zamindars at Nadia and was imprisoned for an affracy. 78 But by 1827 he was campaigning in favour of a purified Islam in a idiom similar to that of Saiyid Ahmad Barelwi and Hajji Shari-al-Allah. His sphere of operation was mainly in West Bengal. He directed his follower to grow beards and to tie their dhotis in a distinctive fashion. 79
The reform movement of Saiyid Ahmad Barelwi and of the farazis contributed to the gradual transformation of the Indian muslim community from an aggregate of believers into a political association with a will for joint action. Their reformist movements of the nineteenth century enlisted muslims outside the former ruling circles of whom Saiyid Ahmad was openly critical for their willingness to act as collaborators of the British — in effect trying to achieve a juster and more God-fearing society by popular co-operation.

The muslim reform movements of the nineteenth century helped to transform muslim attitude towards Hindus. They were essentially rejections of medieval Islam in India in favour of early Islam in Arabia. They were not only movements confined to the library and to the study, their exponents did not merely formulate intellectual positions against monism, but went out and preached against the customs which so many muslims shared with the Hindus—intercession at the tombs of saints, consultation of Brahmins, even vegetarianism and aversion to the remarriage of widows. Muslims in India were to be made aware of what they did not share with their non-muslim neighbours. India could be made by the reformers to feel not like a home, but like a habitat. The religious and social activism of Dudu Miyan and Titu Mir in Bengal could result in a social and economic conflict assuming a communal guise.
The militancy of Saiyid Ahmad and Dudu Miyan's followers was to have profound long-term effects on British political strategy in India. It helped to reinforce the British belief after 1857, that Muslims were by nature fanatical and irreconcilable and could not be kept quiet by a judicious mixture of buffets and boons, not necessarily, however, to be administered to the same Muslims. For the reformist movements, with their attacks on landlords and their disrespect for family and position, alarmed the 'better class' Muslim. The British saw this and by offering favours to those Muslims with something to lose were able to isolate and contain the activity disaffected.

Because in thinking about Muslims after 1857, the so-called Wahabis were for the British the great unthinkable that was always thought, the British were usually ready to meet the demands of 'respectable' Muslims more than half way. But it took the trauma of the mutiny and Rebellion of 1857-58 to open up these political perspectives. Before 1857 British policies were generally speaking 'community-blind', Muslims were members of 'a fallen race' or in George Campbell's words the most gentlemanly and well-mannered of those seeking employment under the company. By 1888, however, for the then viceroy, Lord Dufferin, they had become 'one of the two mighty political communities of our Indian "Cosmos."'

A most important and changing point comes to the Indian history. It was the great rebellion of 1857. It was a
trauma for the both — muslims of northern India and British. The savage British suppression of the mutiny resulted in destruction of Delhi as a centre of muslim culture. The descendents of great mughals were dispersed by execution and exile. At last the educated muslims realised that the British were not only in India to stay but also they intended to stay on their own terms. The last illusions that Britishers were the mayors of the mughal palace were dissipated, the illusion that an education in persian and Urdu and in the muslim religious sciences would serve both a muslim's eternal and his worldly welfare were torn away. Most of the Britishers observed the muslims as a rebel in 1857. Dr. Metcalf has summed up the typical British attitude.  

"The first spark of disaffection it was generally agreed, were kindled among the hindu sepoys who feared an attack upon their caste. But the muslims then fanned the flames of discontent and placed themselves at the head of the movement, for they saw in these religious grievances the stepping stone to political power. In the British view it was muslim intrigue and muslim leadership that converted a sepoy mutiny into a political conspiracy, aimed at the extinction of the British Raj."  

Sir William Mular Writes: "the musalmans, while they thought their cause had a fair chance of final success have frequently compromised themselves by flaggantly traitorous
acts. At Aligarh, for instance, the muslims were for a considerable time dominant; they forcibly converted many Hindus; they defied our government in the most insolent manner, all the ancient feelings of warring for the faith, reminding one of the days of the first Khalifas, were resuscitated.87

John Lawrence (1811-79) on 14 June 1857, wrote to the governor general, Lord Canning (1812-62), "The Mohommendans of the regular cavalry when they have broken out have displayed a more active, vindictive and fenatic spirit than the Hindoos - but these traits are characteristic of the race."88

Charles Raikes (1812-85) collector at Agra, writing while passions were still ranging, saw the muslims as innately hostile to the British. "The green flag of Mahomed too had been unfurled, the mass of the followers of the false prophet rejoicing to believe that under the auspices of the Great Mughal of Delhi their lost ascendancy was to be recovered, their deep hatred to the christian got vent, and they rushed forth to kill and destroy."89

Muslims participated warmly in the revolt of 1857. It was they who rode off from Meerut to Delhi to set up Bahadur Shah at the head of the rebellion. Bahadur Shah also had no objection, but it was very natural for him because there was no reason to love Europeans, who were going to reduce his family after his death to a house near Qutub Minar. By nightfall on 11 May 1857, the day after the mutiny at Meerut,
a salvo of twenty-one guns at Delhi announced that Bahadur Shah had assumed the Mantle of Akbar, Shahjahan and Aurangjeb. within Delhi itself seemed almost as if the great days of the mughals had come again. A proclamation was issued in the mughal name calling upon all who wished to save their religion to join the troops and not to leave their religion to join the troops and not to leave any unbelievers alive.90

Events in Awadh, too, seemed to confirm the muslim character of the rising. There the sepoys rallied under the standard of Birjis Qadir, a minor son of the exiled king of Awadh (Wajid Ali Shah, 1847-56) and his mother Hazarat Mahal (D. 1879), who was one of the Indian heroes of 1857. The chief commissioner of Agra, colonel H. Fraser (D. 1858), advised against abandoning Lucknow after the British storm of Delhi in September, as it would be 'reoccupied as the Head of the Mahomedan rebellion'. The famous 'Times' correspondent, William HowardRussel (1820-1907), spoke of Begum Hazrat Mahal as existing all Awadh to take up the interests of her son and as declaring undying war against the British.91

Countryside events also pointed out to the Muslim character of the rising. 'The Mahomedan villages in the Doab and the people in the neighbouring of Aligarh were by far the worst in the district. They seemed to have risen as if by singfiil. In Aligarh 'The fanatical lower mussalmans, jooluhas raised' the cry of "Deen Deen".92 One Ghiyath Muhammad Khan
proclaimed himself at Aligarh as subadar on behalf of Bahadur Shah II. The muslim population of Rohilkhand, composed of the district of Bareilly, Muradabad, Shahjahapur, Badaun and Bijnor, had strongly resented British rule since company annexation in 1801. They had rioted against taxation in 1816 and troops had to be called in. Khan Bahadur Khan (1790-1859), grandson of Hafiz Rahmat Khan (1708-74), the last independent muslim ruler of Rohilkhand, assumed the title of Nawab-Nazim on behalf of Bahadur Shah II and appointed a pathan chief, Mubarak Shah, as governor of Badaun. At Allahabad, the old capital of a principal mughal province, after the mutiny of the 6th native infantry stationed there, the discontentented muslim aristocracy and the muslim city population joined hands and soon the green flag of Islam was waving over the Kotwali.

Members of the muslim religious classes were prominent in revolt. 'The Maulvi of Faizabad' Ahmad-Allah Shah (D.1858) a natural leader of men, harassed Sir Colin Campbell's (1792-1863) forces during the hot season's campaign in 1858 for the conquest of Awadh, although he was without any formal military training. One Maulana Rahmat-Allah assumed leadership of the revolt in Muzaffarnagar. 93

Sir George campbell describes the bitter British feelings towards muslims which he encountered in the north western provinces as follows.
"It was at Meerut that I first realised the strong feelings against the muhamdans which had grown up in the north-western provinces. We thought that the mohamadans had no excuse from the caste grievance which was the immediate occasion of the mutiny and were disappointed when the mohomadan Sepoys in the regular regiments went with the rest. Then we thought that the irregular cavalry, a superior class and largely Mohomedan, would have stood by us and when a good many of them went too we felt aggrieved. When our power was completely upset in the N.W.P. and all signs of our rule had disappeared, it was not unnatural that in some places the Mohomedan whom we had succeeded within the memory of man should try to set up in our stead, the more as the Sepoy rule was nominally that of the old emperor of Delhi. We were very bitter against those Mohomedan pretenders.  

Nevertheless appearances were deceptive and were recognised such by Lord Camning, and others in high places, with profound consequences for the future of muslims in India. The civil risings in Awadh, Bihar and central India were mostly Hindu-led. The majority of the rebellions tallugdars of Awadh were Hindu. The Rani of Jhansi (D. 1858) tatya tope (D.1859-59) and Nana Saheb (1820-59) were all Hindus. In the Gorakhpur region the commissioner, C. Wingfield (1820-92), noted that it was certain tribes of the higher castes of Rajputs who displayed the most marked hostility.
Muslims themselves were as divided by personal, ethnic, class and regional affiliations as were Hindus. Among Muslim princes and aristocrats, Nawab of Rampur, Karnal, Muradabad and Dacca remained loyal, while the Nawab of Farrukhabad and Danda turned 'rebel.' Some Muslim officials went one way, some the other. In the Aligarh and Rohilkhand areas they mostly joined the rebels, on the other hand, the district of Mathura, a predominantly Hindu area, was held for the British by a Muslim deputy collector and the loyalty of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan as Sadar Amin at Bijnor, in trying to hold the district for the British assisted by a Muslim Tehsildar, became part of the Saga of the 'Loyal Muhammadans' of India.

Here, a balanced observation of Sir George Campbell, written in July and August 1859, will help in making opinion about the participation and policies of Muslims in the revolt of 1857.

"The Pathans and Rajputs and Boondelas whose countries has been acquired within the last fifty years have made a considerable, but I believe it will be found not a really formidable figure; while the Mohomedans and zamindars of Bihar and part of Benares whose subjection to us is of a date twenty years earlier, have generally not joined in the rebellion at all."

A formal assessment made for canning early in 1859 under the title 'Note by L. Bowring (1824-1910) on the causes..."
of the mutiny and on the part taken in it by the Mahomendans held to the same judgement.

Inspite of the real fact and contradictory observations, the main point was the result and British policies towards Mahomodans. While the rising was at its height, George campbeel expressed the fear that the British might degrade muslims as a class. William Howard Russel recorded in 1858 that, 'The Mahomodan element in India is that which causes as most trouble and provokes the largest share of our hostility.... our antagonism to the followers of Islam is far stronger than that between us and the worshipers of Lord Shiva and Vishnu. They are unquestionably more dangerous to our rule.' After the capture of Delhi in September 1857 a dire vengeance befell the muslims there. As the famous Urdu poet Ghalib (1797-1869) wrote, 'Here there is a vast ocean of blood before me, God alone knows what more I shall have to behold.' Bahadur Shah was tried and exiled to Rangoon. Lieutinent Hodson (1821-58) summarily shot three mughal princes and later twenty four Shahzadas were tried and executed. Zahir Dihalwi (1835-1911) wrote in his Dastan-i-Ghadar, 'The English soldiers began to shoot whom-so-ever they met upon the way ... Miyan Muhammad Amin Panjakush, an excellent writer, Maulvi Imam Baksh Sabhai along with his two sons ... were arrested and taken to Raj ghat gate. They were shot dead and their dead bodies were thrown into the Yamuna.'
The prime minister Palmerston (1784-1865) wrote to Canning that every civil building connected with Mohommedan tradition should be levelled to the ground without regard to antiquarian veneration or artistic predilection.  

But we see, on the other hand that Britishers not only followed the policy of discrimination but a balanced policy also. Muslim pension-holders were particularly vulnerable to British wrath. Yet in January 1859 the Governor-General sanctioned the continuance of a large number of pensions of the royal family of Awadh. A large number of muslim pensions were forfeited, but then so were many Hindus. In Gorakhpur, for example, one proceeding records the loss of pensions by twenty three Hindus as against six muslims. In Jalon district all the pensions listed as forfeited in one proceeding had been received by Hindus. In Bareilly district, however, a consolidated return of forfeitures gives ninety-five muslim forfeitures to two Hindus. In Aligarh district forfeitures of or confirmations of pension were more nearly balanced between Hindus and Muslims.  

Jagirdars received similar treatment. The Nawab of Dadri's jagir was declared forfeit to the Raja of Jhund, on the ground that the Nawab set cavelry to assist the rebels at Delhi. But as the Nawab was old and feeble and had perhaps been coerced, Canning himself decided to award him a monthly
pension of one thousand rupees. The jagirs of Saiyid Atta-Allah Khan in Allahabad and Saharanpur districts were continued until his death, but they were then to be resumed, as his son had helped the rebels.

Thus we see that any absolute conclusion about the British attitude towards muslims will be wrong. The co-relation between direct consequences and policies may be the exact conclusion. After all, we see that criterias to decide the policies of Britishers after 1857, lie in the event of 1857, And on some extent in the political awaking among Hindus.

NOTES

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92. Intelligence record, Muir, Vol. II, p. 6, P. Hardy, p. 91.

93. Ibid., p. 66.

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98. Ibid.


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102. Canning Papers, No. 362, Miscellaneous subjects.


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