CHAPTER - IV

MUSLIMS ATTITUDE AND LEADERSHIP IN U.P.
BETWEEN 1930 - 1937
Muslim Politics in U.P. During Civil Disobedience and Round Table Conferences:

The history of the three round table conferences may conveniently be taken from the date of the decision to form the Simon commission. Ramsay Macdonald, the then prime minister (Britain) delivering his speech at the final plenary session of the conference, made this point absolutely clear. He said: "When that commission was appointed, we all leaders of the three political parties were agreed that when the British government came to consider the report, it came to give it a legal and constitutional value at some time or other, and somehow a consultation would have to take place between the representative of the British parliament and the representatives of Indian opinion; and that is why you are here." It had been announced that after the examination of the Simon report, his majesty's government would be duty bound to present proposals to parliament. But it is not the intention of his majesty's government to ask parliament to adopt these proposals without first giving a full opportunity for Indian opinion of different schools to contribute its view upon them."

It was, indeed, the British anxiety to placate all shades of political opinions in India that the round table conference were called and, with that end in view, nothing was more reasonable than to contemplate the possibility of a thorough discussion with the representatives of Indian opinion. On this basis alone, any constitutional structure could have the possibility
of endurance for some time. But the announcement of the viceroy (Lord Irwin) made on 31 October, 1929 giving British intention a definite shape, was more precise and exact. Its main promise was that "the British Government would invite representatives of different parties and interests in British India and Indian states to meet in a round table conference for discussion of the Indian problem."

Behind all these promises, however, there was the national movement in the country. The situation became menacing for the government of India. The non-co-operation movement had ended in failure for all outward purposes, but it had left a permanent impress. It had developed national courage and provided training in organising agitation throughout the country. It kept alive the fire of national enthusiasm which found expression in the boycott of the Simon commission and the preparation of a Swaraj constitution. All this must have served as an eye-opener to British diplomats and the aforesaid announcement of the viceroy was in the nature of things. "The Calcutta congress in December, 1928, had resolved that in case the British government did not accept the Nehru report, which provided that the India should have the status of a Dominion within a year by 31 December, 1929, the congress would give up the report and insist on complete independence."

The period of this ultimatum was fast approaching completion. In view of the past experience of agitation in India,
nothing was more diplomatic than to avert the catastrophe by a bold pronouncement of a conference in London. The viceroy referred to Sir John Simon's letter to the Premier in which the proposal for such a conference was embodied. The expected happen at first and within twenty-four hours of the announcement leading personalities (like Madan Mohan Malviya, T.B. Sapru and Mrs. Besant) assembled at Delhi and after deep consideration, the mixed gathering came to conclusions which were embodied in a manifesto in which the signatories "expressed their appreciation of the sincerity underlying the declaration as also the desire of the British government to placate Indian opinion." This move on the part of British statesmanship was certainly a bait thrown to nationalist aspirations and the subsequent history of the Indian constitutional developments bears testimony of the illusory character of the pronouncement.

In the December session of 1929 held at Lahore, the most important problem for the congress was to arrive at a decision for political action. It was rightly observed that "the one topic on which the constitution laboured for over two full days was Mr. Gandhi's resolution recommending the rejection of the offer of the Round table conference, the definition of Swaraj as complete independence, the boycott of councils, and the launching of a civil disobedience campaign." The opposition to this was really very vehement and disruption of the congress was expected at every moment. But the subjects committee, after a prolonged discussion and heated debate, passed (by 187 votes 77) Gandhi's main resolution on independence and council boycott.
Jawaharlal Nehru's presidential address at the Lahore congress of 1929 was an intense plea for complete independence. He rightly argued that in view of the non-fulfilment of the condition of the Calcutta resolution, the Nehru report (which aimed only at Dominion status and not complete independence) should be scrapped. It was true that Mahatma Gandhi's resolution of boycott of the Round table conference and the assertion to complete independence did not have an immediate result. But its final adoption indicated a healthy attitude of the national mind. The congress therefore, not only did not have to do anything with the round table conference, but also busied itself with the civil disobedience movement. The independence resolution of the working committee was read over in public meetings all over the country on 26 January, 1930, the 'Purna Swaraj day'.

The Mahatma Gandhi started his famous March for manufacturing salt in violation of salt laws, reaching Dandi for the purpose on 5 April, 1930. Salt was actually prepared on 6th April and it was that then the civil disobedience movement began in full swing. Under the circumstances, the congress attitude to the round table conference can better be imagined. The congress delegates to this conference were conspicuous by their absence in plenary session. The British Premier Said: "I regret profoundly that important sections of the Indian political activity are not here too." 7

The muslim attitude to the round table conference may at once be described as one of co-operation. The muslim split of
1927 was not bridged even by 1929. It is true that twelve months later, a special gathering of Indian Muhammadans, known as the All-Muslim parties conference, assembled in Delhi and passed series of very important resolutions. But at the same time, it must also be accepted that "it left no permanent organisation behind it and by the winter of 1929, the two wings of the original Muslim league had not recombined. The result was that "no really representative Muslim gathering took place.

But for this reason, it would be wrong to assert that the Muslim outlook on the proposed conference cannot be gauged. Jinnah, for example, welcomed the viceregal announcement and suggested that the invitation to the round table conference "should be responded to without any condition."\(^8\) The Delhi conference of prominent politicians, held immediately after the viceregal statement, desired amnesty to political prisoners and a truly representative and national character of the personnel of the round table conference along with its appreciation of the proposal. But Jinnah's was an unqualified support to it, irrespective of the fulfilment of any conditions whatsoever. Saiyid Matlub Hasan, the biographer of Jinnah, observes: "Mohammad Ali Jinnah had seen the absurdity of such an attitude from the very beginning and wrote to Motilal Nehru that the principle of the Round Table Conference should be accepted and details outlined in the Delhi manifesto could be adjusted later, particularly in view of the bitter criticism by the House of Lords of the progressive policy of Labour government regarding India."\(^9\)
Nor was Jinnah alone in the field to support the round table conference, the All India Khilafat conference which commenced its sitting on 31 December, 1929 under the Presidentship of Nawab Ismail Khan also welcomed it.' The president was happy that the announcement regarding the round table conference and trusted that the Musalmans would avail themselves of the opportunity of stressing their view point. It is significant that, besides the Ali brothers and Abdul Qadir among the prominent presentees, there was also Muhammad Shafi (The Punjab Muslim Leaguer) who had set up an independent league in his province in protest against Jinnah's dictatorial conduct. The Ulama meeting in conference at Kanpur on 23 December, 1929 under the presidency of Maulana Muhammad Ali condemned the Nehru report and gave adherence to the proposal of the Round Table Conference. But a condition was attached to their support. The conference of the Ulama expressed its faith in the proposed round table conference only if such muslims were selected to represent their community as were really worshippers of the Shariat and interpreters of their own community's right and interests.10 The all-India Muslim conference meeting at Lahore on December 30, and 31, 1929 also welcomed the viceregal announcement of the Round table conference. But it was made plain that the muslim representation should be by men "who truly represent the community, respect the inviolability of the Islamic law, possess the confidence of their co-religionists and give true expression to their views and sentiments.
Thus it is clear that whereas the Lahore session of congress (December 1929) was marked by the decision to obtain from participation in the round table conference, all important muslim leaders and organisations declared themselves in favour of complete co-operation with the project. In consequence, all important muslim leaders composed the muslim personnel of delegates to the round table conference as H.H. the Aga Khan, Maulana Muhammad Ali, M.A. Jinnah and Muhammad Shafi being specially noteworthy as representatives of the view point of important muslim organisation.

There were three sessions of the Indian round table conference held in London, First, from 12 Nov. 1930 to 19 Jan. 1931. Second, from 7 Sept. 1931 to 1 Dec. 1931. Third, 17 Nov. 1932 to 24 Dec. 1932. To discuss the problems nine sub committees had been set up under these heads:- Federal structure, provincial constitution, minorities, Burma, North-West frontier provinces, Franchise, Defence services and Sind.

The proposals of communal safeguards was the main point from the muslim leaders, inspite of the fact that a committee was specially entrusted with the work of examining the minority question were communal vituperations could best be expressed. Muhammad Shafi observed, "unfortunately that hope, has not been realised and therefore it has become absolutely essential for me to make declaration that in the words of the resolution adopted by the All-India-Muslim conference held at Delhi on 31 December, 1927 and 1 January, 1928, 'no constitution by whomsoever devised, shall be accepted by the Indian musalmans unless their interest are adequately safeguarded in the constitution."
Jinnah was no less emphatic when he said: "I maintain that the Hindu-Muhammedan settlement is a condition precedent ... before any constitution can be completed for the government of India, and I maintain that unless you provide safeguards for the musalmans that will give them a complete sense of security and a feeling of confidence in the future constitution of the government of India and unless you secure their co-operation and will consent, no constitution that you frame for India will work for 24 hours." As a sequel to muslim activities and utterances, the Round table conference at the final plenary session held on 19 Jan., 1931 unanimously adopted a resolution admitting, iter alia, muslim claims of 'adequate safeguards' to be incorporated into the future constitution of India.

Even the second session (Sept. 7 - Dec. 1, 1931) of the round table conference attended by Mahatma Gandhi in consequence of a true (between Lord Irwin for the government of India and Mahatma Gandhi on behalf of the congress) did not improve the communal or federal position in any way. The chief work was transacted by two sub committees - federal structure and minorities which scrutinised and 'amplified the reports presented by the corresponding sub-committees at the first session.' Mahatma Gandhi was a members of both these sub-committees and much was expected towards easing the situation. But the expected did not materialise and the communal question remained as puzzling as before. Ramsay MacDonald, the chairman of the minorities (second session) remarked in his opening speech in the committee:
"when we met last, the problem of minorities, I candidly confess, and I am sure those of you who were with me then must also candidly confess, baffled us. We could not come to a solution of the difficulties." A week adjournment was asked for with a view to arrive at an amicable settlement of the communal problem by a process of free and hearty consultation between the leaders of the various committees.

At the end of the week (8 Oct. 1931), Mahatma Gandhi announced his failure in the matter. He said: "Prime Minister and friends, it is with deep sorrow and deeper humiliation that I have to announce utter failure on my part to secure an agreed solution of the communal question through informal conversations among and with the representatives of different groups. I apologise to you, Mr. Prime Minister, and the other colleagues for the waste of a precious week." Mahatma Gandhi, however, presented before the sub-committee the congress solution of the communal problem and emphasised the congress claim 'to represent the whole nation.' According to the congress scheme, safeguards for minorities would be incorporated into the fundamental rights of the future constitution of India. There would be provision for the protection of their culture, languages, scripts education, profession and practice of religion and religious endowments etc., and franchise would also be extended to all adult men and women.

While speaking in the minorities committee, Gandhi assured the reservation of the seats for the Hindus in Sind, for the muslims in Assam and for the Sikhs in the Punjab and north-west
frontier provinces, and for Hindus and Muslims in any province where they were less than 25 percent of the population. It would be done on the basis of population with the right to contest 'additional seats.' The condition of the untouchables, he promised, would be bettered by the most drastic legislation. He openly said: "Thank God, the conscience of Hindu has been stirred, and untouchability will soon be a relic of our sinful past."  

He also examined the causes of failure of communal settlement and rightly ascribed it to 'the composition of the Indian delegation.' He observed: "We are almost all not elected representatives of the parties or groups whom we are presumed to represent. We are here by nomination of the government.

Muhammad Shafi attempted to refute Mahatma Gandhi's contention of the non-representative character of the delegates at the second Round Table conference. Regarding the congress scheme of the future constitution of India, he observed that it had met its fate along with the Nehru report and it was 'no use referring to that resolution here.

Speaking in the tenth meeting of the minorities committee held on 13 November, 1931, Gandhi reminded the prime minister of the assurance given to the Indians before the round table conference and said: "I am quite certain that you did not convene this Round Table Conference and bring us all six thousand miles away from our homes and occupations to settle the communal
question, but you convened us, you made deliberate declarations that we were invited to come here, to share the process of constitution building... Now at the present moment, we are face to face with a wholly different situation, namely, that because there is no communal settlement agreed to by us, there is no building of the constitution..."\(^{16}\) The second report of the minorities committee, however, referred to the various suggestions that the British government should settle the dispute on its own authority. After all, British Government assumed this authority and made provision for minorities safeguards in the constitution of 1935 which was super imposed on us by an imperialist power.

The Government of India Act 1935 and Muslim Leadership in U.P. :

The government of India act 1935 was the result of brisk political activities expanded over a long span of time. It was the product of long discussion and ultimately of compromise between contending ideologies of British imperialism on the one hand and Indian nationalism on the other. "The Simon Commission report of 1930, the Indian round table conferences held in London between 1930-1932, the white paper on proposals for Indian constitutional reforms, 1933, the joint select committee report on the white paper proposals, 1934 - these served as the basis for determining the new constitution of India."\(^{17}\)

Three important principles in the act of 1935 comprised 'All India federation, provincial Autonomy and responsibilities
with safeguards.' Now our main point is communal safeguards. The Act of 1935 represented the most interesting features in so far as it was influenced by the muslim league politics. In order fully to understand this contention, it is desirable to go little back in history. The communal policy of aloofness from the Hindus had been marring Hindu-Muslim relations from 1857 onward. The period of the khilafat movement certainly constituted an exceptional stage of Hindu-Muslim unity and, when it ended in a failure, there was once again reversion to the old policy of isolation and even antagonism. A basic reso­lution was, therefore, carried on January 1 1929, in the inaugural meeting of the All-India Muslim Conference under the leadership of His Highness the Aga Khan, which contended that the muslim community would not accept any constitutional frame work, if its demands were left unconceded.

A peep into demands of the muslim community bears testi­mony to the intense feeling of separatism and it is essential to reproduce them here in the words of Shafat Ahmad Khan. "These demands included a majority for the muslim community in the Punjab and Bengal, separation of sind from Bombay the introduc­tion of genuine provincial autonomy, introduction of equality of status for the north-west frontier province, weightage for muslims in the legislatures of all provinces where they are in a minority, fundamental safeguards for the protection of their religion, culture and civil rights, representation of the
community by separate electorates, adequate representation in
the public services, and residuary powers to be vested in the
provinces."¹⁸ The Delhi resolution of the All-Indian muslim
conference brought about unity in all sections of the Indian
muslims and put them on a single platform.

The result of the muslim demands was that the minorities
problem proved insoluble. In consequence the communal award
was issued by His Majesty's government on August 4, 1932. The
basis of this award was laid down in these words: "I will be
recalled that owing to the failure of various communities to
reach any agreement on the subject, principally because of a
radical divergence of opinion on the vital question of separate
electorates and the distribution of communal seats. His majes­
ty's government themselves reluctantly undertook the task of
devising a scheme for the composition of the new legislatures."¹⁹

The communal award was highly detested in India. Rabind-
ranath Tagore, the great poet, could not restrain his feeling
and sent a telegram to Madan Mohan Malviya. "You all know that
I have always disapproved of the communal award. I hope our
leaders will join their forces to save from its paralysing
grip the political integrity of the nation."²⁰

It is interesting to note that the communal award was
said to be the result of the activities of the Aga Khan. The
editor of a leading monthly paper commented: "From private
advice received from London, we are in a position to state
that H.H. The Aga Khan has a great deal to do with it." The Aga Khan kept M.A. Ansari informed of all developments and this accounts for the latter's changed attitude of neutrality from one of complete opposition to the Award. It was further stated: "The London correspondent of the 'Daily Sun' wired to that paper on 6 August 16, that frequent references between the Aga Khan and Mr. Jinnah, who is in Europe, were taking place."22

Under the circumstances, it does not require any special logic to conclude that the government of India Act 1935 was considerably influenced by the muslim community and its activities. The All-India Muslim League and the All-India-Muslim conference supported the white paper and the communal award. It is futile to argue, as the editor of the 'modern review' did in his enthusiasm, that these two muslim organisations commanded insignificant influence because the muslim masses, easily influenced by catchwords, followed their lead. The subsequent history of the league itself clearly indicated its light grip over the community. It was in response to the muslim demands expressed on many occasions that the separate electorate system was not only retained but also made firm. Safeguards of a similar nature were introduced for other minority communities. The language of the act leaves no doubt as to the provision for communal disharmony. For example, it was laid down: "No person shall be included in the electoral role for a Sikh constituency, a Muhammadan constituency, an Anglo-Indian constituency, a European Constituency, or an Indian
christian constituency unless he is a Sikh, a Muslim, an Anglo-Indian, a European or an Indian Christian, as the case may be."

Weightage and reservation of seats provided in the Act also reflect on the British policy of winning good will of the Muslim community in India. In accordance with the government of India Act, (resolution of 4 July 1934) 25 percent of the vacancies were reserved for Muslims and 8.5 percent for other minorities. In the absence of suitable candidates from the later, all residuary vacancies of this category would also be reserved for the Muslims. A comment on this arrangement. "In all civilised countries the rule is recruit the ablest men for the public services, irrespective of creed. In India, government has encouraged the notion that it is not ability that counts but the government jobs must be given by preference to Europeans, Anglo Indians and Muslims Indians according to certain fixed minimum percentage in addition to what they can get by completion. For the Muslims a minimum of 25 percent has been fixed. But they now want 33.5 percent..."

With these provisions, the British intention to appease the minorities in general and Muslims in particular was calculated, inter alia, to widen the breach between the two communities. Small wonder therefore, that the constitution of 1935 failed to win the approbation of nationalist India. It was observed. "To call the new constitution 'an edifice of popular self government' is a flagrant misuse of words." Reffering to an American view on the subject, it was commented: "It has been admitted even in
Britain by members of the Tory government also that the new constitution, which is going to be imposed on India, has been generally disliked and condemned by the Indians and that even the Muhammadans, who among Indian communities have been favoured most, have not bestowed unmixed praise upon it."

The congress-league conflict of ideas at this stage was best reflected in the league's attitude towards the Act of 1935. The basic demands of the muslim community were well high satisfied through it. Separate electorate, reservation of seats and weightage were admitted as powerful safeguards for the muslims and they were provided in the Act. In the acceptance of the communal award lay the germs of narrow communalism. In the central legislative assembly. Which started its session on January 21, 1935, Jinnah's resolution was carried to the effect that the communal Award should be accepted 'until a substitute is agreed upon by the various communities concerned.' Inspite of this, the league also vigorously condemned the Act of 1935. But it was in other directions that it did so. An important difference between the ideas of these organisations league is thus represented: "The congress had rejected the whole of the Act. The league, which denouncing the 'safeguards' as making responsible government 'nugatory', recommended that having, regarded to the conditions prevailing at present in the country, the provincial scheme of the constitution be utilised for what it is worth.
This difference is well expressed in the proceedings of the Lucknow congress held on April 12, 1936 and those of the All-India-Muslim League which met at Bombay for its 24th session on April 11, 1936. In his presidential address Jawahar Lal said: "Our attitude towards the new India Act can only be one of uncompromising hostility and a constant endeavour to end it."27

The league's session presided over by Sayyid Wazir Hasan was characterised by a spirit of opposition to certain parts of the Act. The president remarked: "A constitution is literally being forced on us by the British parliament which nobody likes, which no one approves of. After several years of commissions, reports, conferences and committees, a monstrosity has been invented and is being presented to India in the garb of this constitution Act."28 In his resolution on the constitution, Jinnah condemned the All-India Federal scheme of the central government as most reactionary, retrograde, injurious and fatal to the vital interests of British India. While moving his resolution, he made it also plain that the new constitution embodied only 2 percent responsibility and 98 percent safeguards.' But with all his criticism, he specifically said in his resolution: "The league considers that, having regard to the conditions prevailing in the country, the provincial scheme of the constitution be utilised for what it is worth inspite of the most objectionable features contained therein which render real control, responsibility of the ministry and the legislature over the entire field of government and administrative nugatory."29
Apart from these cleavage of thought and attitude towards the act of 1935, a reference to the ever-recurring malady of communal riots should also be made, as it clearly indicates the nature of the relationship between the two communities. Karachi witnessed a serious incident on March 19, 1935, when disturbances occurred over the procession taking dead body of Abdul Qaiyum, who was sentenced to death for murdering a Hindu alleged to have insulted Islam. And serious trouble arose in Lahore on 29 June as a result of a dispute between Muslims and Sikhs about a Mosque situated within the precincts of a Sikh temple known as Shahidganj Gurdwara.

But whatever the degree of antagonism between the two major communities, the provincial part of the scheme under the government of India Act 1935, was soon to be brought into force. The year 1936 was the year of preparation for elections to provincial legislatures. The Lucknow session of the congress (12 April 1936) decided in favour of contesting elections, though the question of office acceptance was, after heated discussion, postponed through a resolution moved to that effect by Dr. Rejendra Prasad. It was also resolved that the functions of the parliamentary Board be discharged in future by the working committee of the All-India-Congress committee which was entrusted with the work of placing the election manifesto before the country.

Though several other parties also contested the election, the activities of the league deserve special attention in context
with our subject point. Muhammad Ali Jinnah was authorised to constitute a central election board of 35 members with power to form and affiliate provincial boards for the purpose of fighting elections. A resolution to that effect was moved by Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan in the Bombay session of the League (April 11, 1936) and it was carried. The Muslim League then met at Lahore on 10 June, 1936 and expressed confidence in the Muslim parliamentary Board and the Muslim League election manifesto was issued on June 12, 1936. The task before the league was how to organise the Muslims of India with a view to ensure the success in the election and this war, indeed a difficult job.

The Muslims of the country followed different paths and it was stated: "In the Punjab Mian Sir Fazli Husain had built up a unionist party, in Bengal a Krishak Pooja party functioned under Maulvi Fazlul Haq. In U.P. the Nationalist Agriculturist party was a creation of the leadership of Nawab of Chhatari. In Sind Sir Abdullah Haroon refused to join hands with the league. In Bihar Sayyid Abdul Aziz followed suit. In the North-west frontier province the congress forces under Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his celebrated brother were let loose." But Jinnha, in his extraordinary determination and devotion to the task, "proceeded to supervise the work of the board and constitute the provincial branches and he accomplished a great deal more than could be expected from him under the circumstances."
Addressing a meeting of U.P. Muslims on August 15, 1936, Jinnah stressed the need of communal and inter-communal unity. He explained, in the course of an address to the Muslim students of Calcutta, that the aim of the Muslims was to attain solidarity. Speaking at Nagpur on January 2, 1937, he again voiced the same feelings.

Muslim League manifesto (for election) had been adopted on 11 June, 1936 under the presidency of Jinnah. It was stressed in it: "To all appearance the social policy it advocated was much the same as the Congress policy. Industrial development, the upliftment of the rural population, the relief of agricultural indebtedness all this was common ground. Nor was there much difference on political issue." 32

In fact, the window-dressing of the league manifesto was complete. It sketched, in brief, the history of the Muslim league with special stress on its feeling of Hindu-Muslim unity. It stated that the league had always been working in co-operation with all nationalistic views and that its objective was the attainment of full responsible government. For example it was emphasised in the manifesto: "In the various steps that followed the deliberations and collaborations that took place, the league has always stood for full responsible government for India and unflinchingly stands for the same ideal." 33

Behind all this glittering exterior, the manifesto was not an attempt at representing the national viewpoint. The
communal poison prevailing for so long was surfacing in the country and the manifesto was a powerful addition to the already surcharged atmosphere. Even in this document meant for wide circulation among the public, the propaganda for muslim safeguards could not be kept concealed and it was openly stated that, as minority, their position was required to be protected 'in any future political structure.' The problem, it was said, was not merely to educate the middle class muslim, but was also to bring about 'the entire social regeneration of the seventy millions of muslims.' The muslims were asked to unite as musalmans and there was clear insinuation of their exploitation by others. It was stated without reservation: "The League appeal to musalmans that they should not permit themselves to be exploited on economic or any other grounds which will break up the solidarity of the community."\(^34\)

Infact the propaganda was that the muslims should unite under the league for all eventualities and for the attainment of their communal demands. The programme part of the manifesto embodied the claim to protect and promote the Urdu language and script. It was, for all intents and purposes, a communal manifesto which promised general improvement of the country and special attention to the uplift of muslims and promotion of their religion, language and cultural interests. The burden of the league's propaganda was to prove that it had been, and was at the time, a patriotic organisation and that the need for
muslim solidarity was necessary for furthering the special interests of the community. The status of the muslims could only be raised by a recognition of their claims and their religious, economic, social and cultural interests could be safeguarded only by a continued attempt at common unity.

In addition to this, Jinnah in his election speeches charged the congress and the Hindus with attempts to divide muslim forces. Speaking at a meeting in Calcutta on 3 January, he warned congress "not to interfere in muslim affairs." He regarded the muslim community as an exclusive sphere for his and the league's propaganda and was jealous of other organisations making an appeal, however reasoned, to it.

This propaganda had its effect and the clue was taken up by other muslim leader and organisations. Even a man of his-highness the Aga Khan's calibre and intellectual grasp seized the opportunity of extending a concealed threat of muslims renouncing the ideal of independence in India when in his presidential speech at the All-India muslim conference he claimed communal credit in these words: "Though the attitude of their powerful sister community has been cold and distant, their patriotism and their sense of self respect and honour did not permit their going back on their ideal of self-government for their country." In the course of his presidential address delivered on 4 January, 1936, Khawaja Habib Ullah (Nawab Rahadur of Dacca) said: "The fundamental political objective of the Indian muslims is a self-governing India in the political polity of which Islam must have a place as a free community of culture."
This was an outspoken expression of what was to follow in the demand for Pakistan, shorn of all its diplomatic polish. The best criticism of this type of Muslim propaganda sponsored and generated by the Muslim League was embodied in these words: "When Jinnah speaks of measure for the protection of 'the integrity of Islam' in India and another leading Muslim of 'a self-governing India in the political polity of which Islam must have a place as a free community of culture,' a conflict ensues between medieval and modern developments that can be resolved only by Muslim thought-leaders themselves: any help offered by outsiders cannot have any chance of acceptance, and will be rejected as impertinence." 38

The Muslim League now released ideas that laid the foundation of Pakistan and made division of the country an evil necessity of paramount importance. Under the circumstances, an attempt to draw a parallel, as R. Coupland does, between the Congress manifesto and that of the League would not only be futile but would also be missing the real issues and betraying ignorance, real or pretended, of the situation as it existed in India of the time. The results of elections fully conformed to the political situation in India. The Congress was highly popular and it achieved unprecedented success in the elections. The League succeeded in appealing to the sentiments of the Muslims and, to that extent, its victory was only limited. The elections were almost over by the end of February, 1937, and the results were soon announced. They indicated the relative strength of political parties in different provinces.
The results of the elections indicated that whereas the congress gained a position of superiority in Madras, Bombay, U.P., Bihar, C.P. and Orrissa and whereas it gained a commanding position as a single political party in Bengal, Assam and N.W.F. P., the League's condition betrayed lack of hold over the muslim masses everywhere. Jinnah's claim of muslim being the sphere only of the muslim activities was believed. Under the circumstances, R. Coupland's observation that the results in Punjab and Sind alone "were enough to show that the congress could not truly claim to be the only valid champion of Indian political aspiration," can only be received with a sufficient allowance for his imperialist bias and pro-muslim inclinations. Such a view wholly ignores congress influence in a larger part of India and makes absolutely no margin for exceptions and unusual circumstances. The total muslim seats for all the eleven legislative assemblies were 482. "Out of this number the congress contested only 58 and won 26, that is 45% of the seats contested."

This was by all means a brilliant record and it was only perverted logic to argue that most of these 26 seats were won in the N.W.F.P. where the congress held a 'peculiar position.' The 'peculiar position' could not be self-begotten, it was the result of the congress ideology of independence which appealed to the people of that province. The league strictly speaking, could gain 108 seats in all the provinces and this was constituted only 22 percent of the total muslim seats in the country as a whole. This result was a fair comment on the league's inability to win the support of the muslim masses and its later strength
was surely the product of a vigorous propaganda carried on by its protagonists. Even the limited success of the league in these provincial elections was due to its propaganda of protecting the exclusive interests of the Muslim community though, at this stage, it did not assume a dreadful character. But, all the same, this meagre success was a stepping-stone for its future glory. Moreover, considering the league's age of 30 years, full of activities of a diverse nature, the success achieved in these elections was not unencouraging.

With the completion of elections and the Marvellous success of the congress, the question of accepting office could not long be differed. There was a growing desire for the congress to accept ministerial responsibilities. As early as 21 Feb. 1937, the Lucknow district congress committee voted in favour of this course. On Feb. 27, 1937, the all-India congress committee met at Wardha to settle this question, but it was reserved for its meeting at Delhi (March 18, 1937) to pass a resolution that in pursuance of the basic congress policy towards the new constitution of India 'permission should be given for congressmen to accept office in the provinces where the congress party was satisfied and could state publically that the government would not use his special powers of interference or set aside the advice of ministers in regard to their constitutional activities.
The Governors of Madras, Bombay, U.P., Bihar, C.P. and Orissa invited congress parliamentary leaders in these provinces to constitute ministries, but they expressed their inability to promise not to use their special powers provided in the constitution. Under the circumstances, the leaders declined to form ministries. This constitutional deadlock made Sardar Patel, president of the congress parliamentary sub-committee, remark: "The repeated professions of the British statesmen have been put to test by the congress and once again they have been as usual found to be false. The Mockery of the newly created democracy stands thoroughly exposed."

The statement of Lord Zetland (the Secretary of state for India) and of R.A. Butler, (under secretary of state for India) about the constitutional deadlock were deemed inadequate to meet the requirements of the congress according to a congress working committee resolution adopted at Allahabad on April 30, 1937. But in view of the subsequently modified official pronouncements, including the statement of the viceroy and the premier on the subject, the congress working committee which met at Wardha under the guidance of Mahatma Gandhi felt "that the situation created as a result of the circumstances and events, that have since occurred, warrants the belief that it will not be easy for the Governors to use their special powers."

Then on July 7, 1937, the CWC unanimously adopted the resolution of office acceptance. It was done with the
important stipulation that the congress election manifesto would be worked out and the congress policy of combating the new Act on the one hand and of prosecuting the constructive programme on the other would be furthered.\(^49\) The conditions binding on the congress legislators had already been broadly impressed in the Oath of allegiance to congress ideology administered by Jawaharlal Nehru after his presidential address in the national convention which opened its session at Delhi on March 19, 1937.\(^50\)

Immediately after the Wardha decision of 7 July, 1937, brisk activities for the formation of ministeries commenced. A congress ministry was formed in the united provinces by Govind Vallabh Pant. The congress thus, accepted office in July, 1937 and continued to function until October, 1939.\(^51\) The period of congress ministeries was, therefore, brief to judge the merit of their achievements and even during this short time they were confronted with difficulties of a great magnitude and an awful character.

In the first place, there was the congress inexperience of ruling vast provinces. Pattabhi Sitaramayya writes: "Congress-men had doubtless administrative experience of various types and varying measures of importance. But the ruler-ship of provinces which were as big and populous as Britain was new to them. Many of them were men of outstanding ability and strength of character. But they were utterly lacking in practical experience of ruling extensive and populous provinces."\(^52\) Coupland with this, was
the unfavourable attitude of the permanent secretaries and departmental heads—mostly members of the I.C.S. it was, therefore, most appropriately stated that the ministers "were rather like the daughter-in-law of the Hindu home that goes to the father-in-law's house where she has to serve a period of apprenticeship in which she has to deal not merely with her spouse but his parents and his sisters and brothers as well." 53

Added to this was the high expectations of the public from the popular government. The Harijans, the poor, the labourers, the down-trodden and the peasants hoped for immediate regeneration at the hands of national leaders. Moreover, socialists and communists, specially in South India, assisted the agrarian revolts. "The accelerated pace of popular expectations in the way of progress of ideas and events—especially in the spheres of labour and machinery—was the cause of strikes here and there and elsewhere which under the very congress ministeries, witnessed instance after instance of firing by the police and military." 54 Besides, the greatest difficulty arose out of the desire to bring about co-ordination between the activities of the various provinces and it was with this end in view that the congress working committee had to install its parliamentary sub-committee or directly had to undertake the task of co-ordination. 55 The sub-committee consisted of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, Dr. Rajendra Prasad and Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad and different provinces were assigned to each one of them.
'to advise them in all their activities and to take necessary action in any case of emergency.'

The release of political prisoners was a very important item in the congress programme and by virtue of its election manifesto, the congress was pledge to their release. A great enthusiasm was displayed in this connection. By the middle of February 1938, most of the political prisoners were released in the different congress provinces. But in the U.P. and Bihar some were still behind the bars and when the two premiers passed orders for their release, the Governors refused to endorse them. The Governor-General, making misuse of section 126(5) of the government of India Act 1935 also 'prevented the execution of the order.'

This precipitated a crisis and the congress cabinets of U.P. and Bihar tendered their resignation on Feb. 16, 1938. But better sense soon prevailed and the viceroy realising his mistake, issued a statement on February 22. "He argued that the action taken was designed to safeguard the peace and tranquillity of India. He stated, however, that it was still open to the Ministers in consultation with the Governors to pursue a policy of the released of prisoners and that there should be no difficulty in securing the ready co-operation of the governors." In consequence, negotiations were opened and they materialised into an agreement between the governors and the premiers. The congress stand was accepted and the ministries of U.P. and Bihar were reinstated. It was a great victory for the congress.
Civil liberties were well protected. Freedom of speech and writing was conceded to as never before under the British regime. A bill was passed by the Bombay legislature "authorising the government to re-purchase lands confiscated during the civil disobedience movement and return the same to the original owners." In Bihar, ban on 92 books was lifted and freedom of the press was ensured.

A wide latitude of speech and writing was conceded by the congress government in the N.W.F.P. Similar features characterised activities and associations and funds and property confiscated of these associations during the civil disobedience campaign was restored.

It can reasonably be remarked that no sphere of reform worth undertaking in a brief span of two years and a few months was left untouched. Useful measures were adopted for the improvement of education, the introduction of prohibition, the betterment of medical relief, radical liberalisation of local self-governments, the improvement of the lot of peasants and agrarian conditions, the advancement of industries and for the betterment of the condition of labour. The work of rural reconstruction was taken up in right earnest. Nor was the work of Harijan uplift and social regeneration ignored, reforms in prisons were also begun.

Considering the difficulties under which they had to function, the work of congress ministeries must be pronounced commendable. Their work was not directed to benefit any single
party of community. "These benefits were not confined to any particular community but were for the general mass of the people.

The success was undoubtedly limited, but it could not be otherwise because of the very nature of the government set up under the government of India Act 1935. Rajani Palme Dutt's allegation is hardly convincing that congress ministeries in the provinces "were, not in any modern parliamentary sense governments" and their "reforms did not and could not touch the main basis of imperialist power and exploitation or the main causes of the poverty of the masses."

The ministers, inspite of the assurance given by the British government befor acceptance of office, had only a precarious hold over events. Mahatma Gandhi in an article in the Harijan in August, 1938, made clear the extreme limitations of their powers. Said he: "The ministers are mere puppets so far as the real control is concerned. The collectors and police may at a mere command from the Governors unset the ministers, arrest them and put them in a lock-up."

It is now in the fitness of things to examine the league's role in the provincial legislative assemblies. It had its prelude in the important decision taken by the congress not to have coalition governments in the congress-majority provinces. The muslim league was 'willing to co-operate' and Jinnah had given this indication both in private and in public.
muslim league leaders could be admitted to the ministry of the U.P. on condition of ceasing to function as a separate group and of dissolving the muslim league parliamentary Board. Other conditions were also appended and Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad was appointed to negotiate teams of agreement so far as the U.P. was concerned. The league did not agree to the congress demands and it accused the latter of its alleged Hindu affiliations and inclinations. Delivering his presidential address at the 25th session of the All-India muslim league (Lucknow 15 to 18 Oct. 1937), M.A. Jinnah said: "Wherever they (congressmen) are in majority and wherever it suited them. They refused to co-operate with the muslim league parties and demanded unconditional surrender and signing of their pledges."

The indictment that 'the congress leaders became obsessed with the idea that they could ignore the league altogether and arrogate power for the Hindu Majority' had no foundation infact. On the other hand, the congress was ready to sacrifice the interests of the majority in its desire to woo the muslim minority. But the impossible could not be achieved. The congress did include muslim figures in the provincial cabinets, but they were congress muslims or converts to congress ideology. Had the congress adopted a different course, it would have been guilty of lack of proper comprehension of parliamentary form of government. The principle of joint responsibility of the ministers presupposed systematic exclusion of any discordant element. Moreover, the congress was pledged to carry out the
promises of its election manifesto and for the realisation of this purpose had only the weapon of tendering resignations to deter the executive from unnecessary interference in its national projects.

Under these circumstances, it would have been mere folly on the part of the congress to join with the league and invite unnecessary trouble at every step. The congress alliance with league at this stage, without purging it of all its communal poison, would have meant an alliance with the forces of sectarianism. Expectations of fidelity in the hour of necessity from the members of an organisation, not in sympathy with the congress aims and methods, was an impossibility. In addition to these considerations, it would have been injustice to the congress muslims in the legislatures to have ignored their claims to the posts of ministers and in stead to have included league muslims in the cabinets of the provinces.65

Another pre-requisite of understanding the league's role in the provincial assemblies is its decisions at its Lucknow session (15 to 18 Oct. 1937). The very resolutions adopted there indicated the spirit of antagonism to the congress. Defeated in the elections by the congress, it registered its sense of indignation and posed as victors on its own platform. The following resolution, among others, is significant. "The All-India muslim league deprecates and protests against the formation of ministeries in certain provinces by congress parties in flagrant violation of the letter and spirit of the government of India Act, 1935, and the instrument of instructions and condemns
the governors for their failure to enforce the special powers entrusted to them to safeguard the interest of the musalmans and other important minorities.

It was in this session that Ismail Chundriger condemned federation 'as a retrograde measure'. He stated that by joining it, the muslims would only be strengthening the hands of the Hindus and a resolution to the effect was passed. Muninullah attacked joint electorates in local bodies and alleged that in his province (Bihar), 'The purity of the urdu language was being attacked.' The Raja of Mahmudabad moving a resolution on Urdu said 'that if musalmans wanted, they could have imposed the Arabic language on Hindus when they ruled in India.'

Qutubuddin Abdul Wali charged congress 'as an irreligious body.' No greater distortion of facts could be coined than the one by Aziz Lalji who levelled the allegation that the congress "was spreading communalism and socialism only to bring the Hindu Raj." In contrast to the fact that congress measures resulted in common benefit or harm to Indians as a whole, Chaudhury Kaliquzzaman asked: "Have any of the programme of the congress cared for muslimartisans?"  

These proceedings of the league's session furnish sufficient indication of the communal behaviour of its members in the provincial legislatures. Small wonder, therefore that I.H. Siddiq moved a resolution in the Bombay Assembly on 28 January, 1938 asking the government that the teachings of Koran
and Sunna should be made compulsory for muslim boys and girls in schools and colleges in the presidency. 68

On Feb. 2, 1938, in the U.P. Assembly, Farooq objected to the chief secretary's circular issued to district Magistrates to seek help from the congress organisations. He contended that this was calculated to create 'a privileged position for congressmen.' It was also urged that it had discriminated against the liberal federation and the muslim league. 69 Though the circular only imposed a duty on the congress organisations, favouritism was alleged by these critics of the step taken by the chief secretary.

On 7 March, 1938, general discussion on the budget commenced and while the congress party members generally praised the budget, the members of the muslim league party strongly criticised the rural development scheme. Zahiruddin Faruqi said that the agency for working the scheme did not inspire universal confidence and the entire scheme was meant to strengthen the congress organisation, district committees being packed. 70 Even the U.P. Tenancy Bill did not fail to evoke a desire for ridiculous amendments by the muslim league party and on Nov. 16, 1938, K.N. Katju (minister of justice) had to criticise vehemently the muslim league demand for the application of muslim personal law in the tenancy Bill. He quoted from the books that personal law did not apply to Mustafa Kemal Pasha's Turkey of which the muslims were so proud. 71
Besides, an adjournment motion was moved in order to discuss the government policy of repression towards the Khaksars who had proved a menace to the peace and tranquility of the province. Advocating their cause, Zahirul Husain Lari said on Oct. 3, 1939: "Apart from the effect of it there is one thing and it is of curtailing civil rights of a certain section of the public who go by the name of Khaksars. So the government by their policy have infringed the right of free association." Fine conception of the right of civil liberty and free association! on Oct 5, 1939, Quazi Muhammad Adil Abbasi demanded a list of muslims selected for different posts by the public service commission since its existence. He also inquired about the number of the muslims and Harijan teachers employed by the government through education expansion department. He further demanded the number of Urdu and Hindi books purchased for rural libraries and their total costs. All this, indeed, constituted evidence of fidelity to muslim league ideology, but hardly touched the solution of problem from the national point of view.

The league was eager for the recognition of its exclusive claim as the only organisation to represent the muslim community. The result of elections to the various assemblies showed that this was not the time, yet it objected when its status as the sole representative of muslim masses was not recognised. It was perhaps, under a sense of frustration that it began to
behave awkwardly at this stage. In the year 1938, Jawaharlal made efforts to remove the grievances of the Muslim League and tough he exchanged correspondence with Jinnah, it did not result in any substantial improvement of relations. Later, at the suggestion of the league leader, Gandhiji initiated personal contact with him.

The position, all the same, remained where it was. Then, Subhas Chandra Bose took his chance. But the Muslim League leader insisted both in his talks with the congress president and in the subsequent correspondence that an essential precondition of any agreement between the congress and the Muslim league on the Hindu-Muslim question was the recognition by the congress that the Muslim league was "the sole authoritative representative political organisation of the Muslims of India." The league further insisted that "in any negotiation between itself and the congress, the later should not appoint any congress Muslim to carry on its behest." This recognition of the league's status meant, by implication, the recognition of the congress as a Hindu organisation which it certainly was not. The question of the Muslim league's status never came to the fore in negotiations between the league and the congress.

Another principle which guided the league in its action and which constituted a departure from its earlier attitude was the enunciation of a dogma that Muslim masses should be approached only through its own leaders. The congress 'mass contact movement' was decided as an attempt to win over the Muslims to the congress ideology and programme. Delivering his presidential
address at the All-India national convention which opened its session at Delhi on March 19, 1937, Jawaharlal Nehru attributed, the failure of the congress to capture muslim seats to neglect of work among the muslim masses and said that it was time to welcome the muslim masses and intelligencia to the great organisation. 77

This proposal had its immediate reaction and in a strictly confidential letter written by the muslim poet, Muhammad Iqbal (on March 20, 1937, from Lahore) to Jinnah it was stated:

"I suppose you have read Jawaharlal Nehru's address to the All-India National convention and that you fully realise the policy underlying it in so far as Indian Muslims are concerned... I therefore, suggest that an effective reply should be given to the All-India National convention ... to this convention you must restate as clearly and as strongly as possible the political objective of the Indian Muslims as a distinct political unit in the country." 78 At the Lucknow session of the League held in October, 1937, Jinnah echoed Iqbal's views when he said: "I want the musalmans to ponder over the situation and decide their own fate by having one single, definite, uniform policy which should be loyally followed throughout India." 79

It was now felt necessary to debar from the membership those members of the league who were also members of the congress. Even disciplinary action was taken against them, though till then there was no bar to such a course. Important men
like Wazir Hasan and Yakub Khan were thus sacrificed and the council took disciplinary action against a Muslim member of the C.P. government. The militant character of the Muslim league was taking shape and efficiency and party discipline were greatly stressed even at the cost of losing important personalities. The league was becoming aggressive in its attitude against the Congress and its own renegades.

The next important notable step in the Muslim league programme to disrupt the country was its indictment of the Congress ministries. They were openly charged with working against the Muslims and furthering the exclusive Hindu interest. Full play was given to the League's imagination and the charges were couched in provocative terms. These are grouped by Humayun Kabir under the following heads: "(a) interference with religious rights, (b) Tampering with cultural traditions, (c) attempts to curtail share in service and representation, and (d) social snobbery." Kabir, however, felt convinced to some extent of the existence of real grievances in the Muslim community. He observed: "The agitation in the minority provinces could not continue unless there was real discontent or sense of injury behind. The ground may have been imaginary but the discontent was real."

Humayun Kabir giving an example, adds that whereas there was use of the criminal law for the prevention of 'cow slaughter,' there was none in the case of music before the Mosques. He assigned the most unreasonable Muslim opposition to the Wardha scheme of education and to the 'confusion between renaissance and revivalism' which was rampant in the Indian
mind. The question of common language, he argued, still further marred Hindu-Muslim relations, Jinnah was the author of these charges. Jinnah first of all alleged that all kinds of malicious propaganda was being carried out in order to discredit the Muslim league. In his presidential address at the special session of the league (Held on the 17 and 18 April, 1938) he objected to the use of the Bande Matram song in the legislatures. Then, referring to the congress governments, he said: "They are pursuing a policy of making Hindi a compulsory language, which must... destroy the spread of the development of Urdu and what is worse still is that Hindi with its Hindu Sanskritious literature and philosophy and ideals will and must necessarily be forced upon the Muslim children and students." He added that serious difficulties were placed in the way of Muslims enjoying religious freedom. He was surely obsessed with the idea of Hindu Raj and he challenged that all notions and dreams of such a Raj "Must be abandoned."  

Speaking as the president of the All-India Muslim League (which held its session at Patna from the 26th to 29th of December, 1938), Jinnah condemned the Wardha Education Scheme and the Vidya Mandir Scheme and poured open contempt upon Mahatma Gandhi as being their author. He said, "The congress is fighting for domination over the Muslims. It is rank madness, but that has seized the congress and it is against that design— that mad ideal — that I have rebelled."
The Muslim League was not satisfied with this sort of condemnation. It insisted upon the last pound of flesh and appointed an inquiry committee to find out the grievances of the Muslims in Congress provinces. The report was published towards the end of 1938 and was known as 'Pirpur report' after the name of its chairman Raja Sayyid Muhammad Mehdi of Pirpur. Among other things, the report attacked the so-called 'closer door' policy of the Congress and declared that parliamentary government was unworkable in this country. It alleged that in the Muslim share of public appointments, due regard was not paid to the size and importance of the Muslim community. Besides, the flag, the anthem, the reverence paid to Mr. Gandhi, the emphasis laid by the Mahatma himself on 'cow protection,' all these are evidence of a deliberate and far-reaching attack on the civic and cultural rights of the Muslim community, but "its most insidious feature is the attempt to extend the use of Hindi at the expense of Urdu." 87

The Bihar working committee of the provincial Muslim league appointed an Enquiry Committee the report of which is known as the 'Shareef Report' after the name of its draftsman (S.M. Shareef). This committee was consisted to enquire into the grievances of the Bihar Muslims and its report also embodied allegations of a serious character. About this report it was rightly said: "A casual reader of the pamphlet might be forgiven for supposing that something like a reign of terror had been established in Bihar." 88
When the congress governments resigned, Fazl-ul-Haq of Bengal issued a statement to the press and it was later embodied in a pamphlet entitled 'Muslim suffering under congress rule.' A sample of this writing will reveal the nature and style of its author. For example, it incorporated the statements: "Mother cow must be protected... muslims must not be allowed to beef. The religion of muslims must be humbled because is not this the land of the Hindus?"89 A league publication of 1946 -- it shall never happen again-covering articles from Dawn described in detail the alleged sufferings of the muslims in the congress-governed provinces. Refering to communal riots, it says: "in all these riots and outbreaks, muslims were admittedly the principal sufferers. This was not merely a chance coincidence but the result of deliberate policy."90

Those who have been in touch with the events cannot help saying that no better brazen-faced lie could be coined by anyone to paint the congress in worse colours. All sorts of cock and bull stories were narrated in these volumes. For example, describing the attack on Tirth Bazar, Sitapur, it stated: "On February 12, about 400 Hindus armed with Lathis, swords, spears and other deadly weapons appeared on the scene with cries of 'Gandhi Mahatma ki Jai' and suddenly attacked the muslim shop-keepers and looted and plundered their goods. The prominent congress leaders of the place were taking leading part in the loot and plunder."91 Describing the happenings in Benares,
the publication mentioned that congressmen including the secretary, city congress committee, the president congress committee and two central MLA's in combination with other congressmen divided themselves into groups and each group sat at a police station. "Whenever a muslim happened to come with a report of some injury done to him or to some other muslim, these congressmen would laugh his complaint to scorn, and send him away without allowing the police to record it." An illustration taken from the events of Lalpura village in the district of Patna mentions that in the name of village uplift congress preachers incited Hindus against muslims. The result was that hundreds of Hindus of Lalpura and other places caused a serious riot in which a muslim almost lost his life.  

The culmination of these charges is traceable in an article written by Jinnah himself, the crue of which was that democracy was unsuited for India. In this article he reco nv ented the alleged tale of congress atrocities and charged the congress with power intoxication. "The congress working committee," the article, added, "arrogated to itself the position of a parallel central government to whom the provincial governments were responsible." Reffering Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Rajendra Prasad and Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, to whom different provinces were assigned in order to bring about administration co-ordination, he laid down: "Regional dictators were appointed and the ministers were entirely subject to their orders generally and no provincial legislation could be enacted without their
approval." Mentioning Bande Matram, the congress flag and Hindi, he observed: "In the six Hindu provinces a Kulturkampf (cultural war) was inaugurated."  

As against all these allegations, Dr. Rajendra Prasad's observations may be noted. According to him, the league adopted Hitler's tactics of inventing false charges and of exaggerating small ones into Himalayan blunders and by repeated preachings, made lies appear as truth. However much Humayun Kabir might represent the existence of real grievances, the fact remains that they were entirely baseless. In fact, he failed to take cognisance of the value of propaganda in public life. How could the discontent be real when the ground was imaginary? Humayun Kabir did not advance evidence in support of his contention. Besides, the allegations of M.A. Jinnah and those embodied in the Shareef and the Pirpur reports etc., were meant to carryout baseless propaganda against the congress with the sole purpose of discrediting it and feeding its ancient grudge, as the league's demand of coalition with the congress had been turned down.

It is also not without significance to note that all efforts of the league to get its status of being the sole muslim representative recognised, signally failed in the attainment of their purpose, because the congress was adament on protecting its lifelong traditions of national character and any acceptance of the League's demand in this connection would have proved ruinous to the congress. Sitaramayya is right in his statement
"The open antagonism to the congress and the practical steps it had been taking from time to time in pursuit of its avowed object and within the limits of the means set forth in the creed, had not commended themselves to the muslim league despite the fact that the league too had not commended themselves to the muslim league despite the fact that the league too had adopted independence as its creed."96

There can be no better proof that the league's allegations had no substance and were no more than false propaganda to deceive the ignorant muslims masses, and the world outside, than the fact that Jinnah unceremoniously rejected Dr. Rajendra Prasad's offer that the congress was willing to have them investigated through Sir M. Gwyer, chief justice of the federal court or some other person of similar status. His only reply was that the viceroy was asked to consider the whole question which meant that the door to an inquiry with the common concurrence of the congress and the league was closed.97 The congress had already instituted an official inquiry and found the charges groundless.

The allegation of congress totalitarianism on the basis of control by parliamentary sub-committee and the occasional interference of its working committee requires explanation. Anybody familiar with parliamentary procedure can easily understand that, without leadership, unanimity of action is unthinkable. Moreover the congress had not reached its goal of achieving complete independence. The office-acceptance in 1937-1939 was only an interlude in its long struggle for freedom. It could not afford
to follow different policies in different provinces. That course would have surely defamed the organisation and tied its hands in many spheres. In the absence of a federal scheme at the centre, some co-ordinating agency was needed for a common policy. It would, therefore, be a perversion of facts to describe the congress party control over provincial governments as dictatorship.

NOTES

3. India divided, Rajendra Prasad, p. 133.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., p. 132-33.
6. The Indian Review, Jan. 1931, p. 27.
10. The Indian Review, Jan. 1930, p. 36.
12. Ibid., p. 596.
16. Ibid., p. 1381, 82.
18. The Indian federation. Shaffadt Ahmad Khan, p. 324.
19. The constitutional history of India, A.C. Bhenerjee, p. 139.
21. Ibid., p. 359.
22. Ibid., p. 351.
27. The Indian review, May, 1936, p. 306. (Dairy of the Month).
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
31. Ibid., p. 556.
34. Ibid., p. 301.
37. Ibid., p. 305.
41. The Indian Review, March, 1967, p. 176 (Diary of Month).
42. Ibid. April, 1937, p. 240.
43. Ibid. August, 1937, p. 468.
44. Ibid. May, 1937, p. 277.
45. Ibid., pp. 280-280(a).
46. Ibid. p. 280 (d).
47. Ibid., July, 1937, p. 450.
49. Ibid., p. 468.
50. Ibid. April, 1937, p. 233.
51. Indian Politics, 1936-42, p. 164.
53. Ibid., p. 54.
54. Ibid., p. 62.
55. Ibid., p. 57.
56. Indian Politics, 1936-42, p. 164.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid., p. 5.
59. Ibid., March, 1938- Feb. 1939, p. 43.
60. Ibid., p. 81-84.
67. Ibid., p. 409.
68. Ibid., Vol. I, Jan-June, 1938, p. 133, (Procs. of the Assembly).
69. Ibid., p. 184.
70. Ibid., p. 186.
71. Ibid., p. 134.
73. Ibid., p. 303.
74. Ibid., p. 304.
76. Ibid., p. 16.
77. The Indian Review, April, 1937, p. 233.
78. Letters of Iqbal to Jinnah, Published by M. Ashraf, Lahore, 1943.
80. The Indian Review, Nov. 1937, p. 682.
82. Ibid., p. 15.
84. Ibid., p. 384.
86. Ibid., p. 358.
88. Ibid.
89. Ibid., p. 187.
90. 'It shall never happen again', Deptt. of Publicity and information, All-India Muslim League, Printed and Published by S. Shamsul Hasan at the Muslim League printing press. Daryaganj, Delhi, p. 1.
91. Ibid., p. 11.
92. Ibid., p. 27.
93. Ibid., p. 130.
94. The Indian Annual Register, Vol. I, Jan-June, 1940, p. 304.