CHAPTER II

ISLAM IN THE CONTEMPORARY SOUTHEAST ASIA

Introduction

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Introduction

The Southeast Asian region has been influenced by different external forces in the course of its long history. In the first centuries of the Christian era, the sprawl of the Indian and Chinese civilizations stretched in the region. Subsequently, the Arabs and Europeans entered the area. The arrival of various external groups contributed to the growth of heterogeneity in the region's societies. Southeast Asia's initial contact with Islam is undoubtedly a byproduct of Arab trade in the region. Arab traders are believed to have brought the religion to the regions as early as the eighth century.

Islam became identified with state power in Southeast Asia from the fifteenth century shortly after the foundation of the trading empire of Malacca based on the west coast of the Malay Peninsula. But after the fall of Malacca to the Portuguese in the early sixteenth century, Muslims dispersed to other parts of the Indonesian Archipelago where Islam became most deeply accepted among coastal trading communities. In Java, Islam was later adopted by local princes to underpin and support their mythical power but primarily as a cultural veneer on entrenched animist and Hindu-Buddhist beliefs whose syncretic legacy is to be found in eastern and central parts of the island. The Islamic faith was also employed to mobilize opposition to Dutch colonial control. Within Southeast Asia, the most significant Islamic communities are to be found in Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei.1
In contrast to the Middle East, Islam in Southeast Asia is far more multi-religious and multi-cultural. This diversity is exemplified in Muslim majority countries such as Brunei, and in Indonesia and Malaysia with their significant non-Muslim minorities as well as the Muslim minorities' communities of Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Myanmar. In Indonesia, Islam has become more visible in the political and institutional landscape, from the government to NGOs. Multiple and diverse voices discuss and debate the status and role of Islam in Indonesian society. Muslim scholars and professionals in Indonesia are producing some of the most creative thinking on religious and social reform, democratization, pluralism, and women's rights in the Muslim world.²

This chapter emphasizes on the current situation of Muslims in the countries wherein Islam is dominant and a growing factor in mainstream political life and in the countries which the religion of Islam is in minority.

2.1 Islam in Indonesia

Some 90 percent of Indonesia's 190 million inhabitants are Sunni Muslims, the largest population of Muslims in any country in the world today. The remainder of the population are Christians, Hindus, animists, or followers of varying Confucian and Buddhist beliefs. From the beginning, state and popular Islam continued to be imbued with a Hindu culture reframed within local traditions.
Early Islam in Indonesia was also greatly influenced by Sufi views. By the sixteenth century many of the Archipelago’s best-known Muslim scholars were from the Sufi orders. In the years that followed, Sufi orders such as the Qadiriyyah and Naqshbandiyah attracted many Indonesians into their ranks, and branches were formed in many parts of the islands.

Until the nineteenth century, contact with the rest of the Muslim world was relatively intermittent compared with the burgeoning interaction which was to follow. Muslim scholars from the Middle East and the Indian subcontinent continued to be the transmission channels for Islamic ideas, and a small but important group of Indonesians traveled to centres of the Islamic learning in the Arab world. Arabs and Turks were also political and religious advisers in local sultanates. The nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw a significant increase in Indonesia’s involvement with the rest of the Islamic world. There was also a significant rise in the number of Indonesian scholars going to the Arab countries for religious studies. And those who returned from these Arab countries became the backbone of religious education in the regions, along with the immigrants from the Arab states who taught religion and Arabic in the pesantren and madrasahs. This was also a period in which new religious ideas, and particularly modernism (kaum muda), made strong inroads into the religious thinking of the islanders. The reformers were particularly critical of the syncretic, “non-Islamic” accretions. They also argued in support of ijtihad (independent judgment) and rejected taqlid.
(adherence to tradition). The most important modernist organization, *Muhammadiyah*, was founded in 1911. Its founder Ahmad Dahlan and other key members were studied in Cairo by the followers of Muhammad Abduh. It became heavily involved in education and social change.⁶

Religious thought in Indonesia can be characterized by a burgeoning indigenous literature on Islam and the large scale importation and translation of works by Islamic writers such as Hamka, as well as those considered more recent. Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid, became well recognized interpreters of Islamic thought in the islands. Among foreign Muslim writers, those most widely published in Indonesian have been Ali Shari’ati, Sayyid Qutb, Abu al-A’la Mawdudi, al-Ghazali, Hasan al-Banna, and Muhammad Iqbal.

Muslims in Indonesia have been described as divided between those “nominal” Muslims who have been more deeply influenced by non-Muslim traditions and those more “orthodox” ones who follow a more universalistic pattern of belief and practice. The former, usually referred to as *abangan*⁷ have been described as imbued with Hindu and animist elements reinforced by Sufism to create forms of rituals and mysticism peculiar to Indonesia and especially to Java. Within this culture, ritual feasts (*slametan*), spirit beliefs, traditional medical practices, and Hindu art and ceremonial forms intertwine with Muslim precepts. The latter group, termed *santri*,⁸ have perceived themselves as followers of a “purer” Islam, adhering more rigidly to rituals.
The Indonesian government over the past several decades has been more closely attuned to mystical sufism, while many orthodox Muslims have attacked what they considered to be un-Islamic tendencies within the national political leadership.

However, greater contact with the rest of the Muslim world and the teaching of Islam to Indonesia’s growing school population has provided a stronger foundation for a more universalistic interpretation of the religion. The teaching of religion in the schools is now compulsory. There has also been a greater interest in the hajj, and even more on wearing of Islamic dress by women, and concern over halal\textsuperscript{10} products.

Part of the social change in Indonesia is the result of missionary (\textit{da’wah}) activities by organizations seeking to “make Muslims better Muslims” or to “Islamize Muslims.” The postwar era has seen a proliferation of Islamic organizations, tracts, magazines, stuffy groups, and lectures seeking to bring to the Indonesians a better understanding of Islam. An Indonesian Islamic Da’wah Council was formed in 1967, led by former Masjumi leader Mohammad Natsir,\textsuperscript{11} and there has been considerable recent cooperation among individual Muslims from disparate organizations such as the Muhammadiyah and Nahdatul Ulama.\textsuperscript{12}

\textbf{-Islam and Politics}

Islam has played an important role in twentieth century Indonesian politics. The first mass nationalist organization was Sarekat Islam, formed in
1912 and the dominant political organization of the colony for more than a
decade. Given a great ethnic and linguistic diversity across the Archipelago. It
differentiated the Indonesians from the Christian colonizers and gave them a
sense of identity with universality. Sarekat Islam had an economic agenda that
reinforced its religious platform. From the beginning it criticized un-Islamic
(particularly Chinese) economic power in the islands and later attacked Dutch
capitalism. The Sarekat Islam also aimed to oppose the proselytizing efforts
of the Christian missionaries. Thus, the Dutch colonial administration tended
to see Islam as a danger to domestic peace and order and expressed suspicion
of returning pilgrims and students who had studied in foreign Muslim
educational institutions.\(^1\) In 1922 Sarekat Islam broke into two parties, a left
wing and an Islamic wing. The left wing became the nucleus of Indonesia's
first political party, the *Partai Komunis Indonesia* (Indonesian Communist
Party, PKI), and the Islamic wing became the first Islamic political party,
albeit a minor one, *Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesian,* (Indonesian Islamic
Federation Party, PSII).\(^2\) Later, the Sarekat Islam prohibited its members
from joining any other political organization, the Communists were expelled
from the Sarekat.

In the decades preceding World War II and during the Japanese
occupation, Islam's role in domestic politics was weakened. Through these
years Islamic political power was further fractured by religious differences
among Muslims who formed competing parties. In 1926 Nahdatul Ulama was
founded as a traditionalist counter to the reformist aspects of *Sunnah Islam* and to what its founders saw as an undermining of the "*ulama".\(^{15}\)

The postwar era saw the rise of three political faces of Islam. At the party level, two major political organizations sought to dominate the Muslim majority in the new republic, both groups reflected the historic division among Muslims. Nahdatul Ulama supported more traditional non-modernist views, and Masjumi was formed as a modernist Islamic socialist party. They vied to lead Indonesians who were interested in a government based on Muslim values and expressed strong opposition to secular and particularly communist influences. In the country’s first election in 1955 the Masjumi and Nahdatul Ulama each received approximately twenty percent of the national vote, and other Muslim parties obtained only a small percentage, the remainder went to primarily secular parties. The Masjumi became increasingly frustrated with its inability to influence the growing secularism of Indonesian politics, and in 1960 the party was outlawed for supporting dissident elements fighting the central government. This left the more traditional Nahdatul Ulama and small splinter parties to act as the legal voices of Islam at the national level.\(^{16}\)

During this period Muslim political leaders tried to impose the *Shari’ah* law in the Indonesian constitution. However, a compromise altered the charter to reflect a more secular and pluralist view of the role of religion in the state. A new national ideology, the *Pancasila* (Five Principles),
proclaimed as one of its five principles “belief in God” but did not describe this within a Muslim context, allowing Indonesians freely to choose their own religious expression. President Sukarno’s statement,

“The principle of Belief in God! Not only should the Indonesian people believe in God, but every Indonesian should believe in his own God. The Christian should worship God according to the teachings of Jesus Christ, Moslems according to the teachings of the Prophet Mohammad. Buddhists should perform their religious ceremonies in accordance with the books they have. But let us all believe in God. The Indonesian State shall be a state where every person can worship his God as he likes. The whole of the people should worship God in a cultured way, that is, without religious egoism.”

In the early years, the activities of Muslim militant group *Darul Islam,* originally formed in West Java in 1948. In part, *Darul Islam* rationalized its war against the Indonesian Republic on the grounds that secularist forces had rejected Islam as the basis of the state. *Darul Islam* spread its influence into East Indonesia, and it was not until 1959 that negotiations largely brought an end to this period of conflict.

Following an attempted coup in 1965 in which the Indonesian Communist Party became involved, communists were considered enemies of Islam because of their perceived atheistic views and, to a lesser degree, because many landowners were members of religiously powerful families.
These events led to the fall of Sukarno regime, the military-dominated government of General, later President, Suharto held power in Indonesia. It was initially hoped that the military would work closely with Muslim political organizations. However, in the ensuing years important cleavages have developed between elements of the Muslim community and the Suharto regime. While the factors responsible for these differences are complex, they have centered upon three core issues, government efforts to establish secular bases for centrally important areas of interest to Muslims, such as education and marriage, attempts to emasculate Muslim political power, and the reimplementation of the Pancasila as the national ideology.18

During the late 1970s and the 1980s, small elements in the Muslim community turned to violence to express their opposition to what they perceived to be an un-Islamic government, they demanded the formation of an Islamic state. An organization called Komando Jihad was accused of conspiring to overthrow the government, and other Islamic Youth Movements allegedly attacked shopping centres in the name of Islam and the Indonesian Islamic Revolution Board was charged with seeking Iranian support to eliminate Suharto’s regime. The government forcefully repressed these activities and used the incidents as further proof of the need to take religion out of politics. This move to de-emphasize Islam in politics reached its zenith with the demand by the Suharto government that all mass organizations affirm that the Pancasila was their one ideology. Finally, Muslim
organizations have expressed increasing antagonism over what they see as the growing power of Christianity in the islands.¹⁹

Leading intellectuals such as Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid advocated focusing on a “cultural” Islam as opposed to a “political” Islam. The goal was Muslim renewal, spiritual and economic. This led to a strong revival of Islam in Indonesia during the 1980s, and then Suharto realized that Islam was becoming a force to reckon with. Non Muslims started to worry when in 1990 the government established the Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals* Association (ICMI) to promote Islamization of state and society.²⁰

NU is the umbrella for Muslims tolerant of local culture that does not interfere with Islamic teachings. They stress the study of fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) because it espouses the views of generations of scholars starting from the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). They only exercise ijtihad in the context of Islamic teachings, preferring taqlid, following traditional opinions. The political aspirations of the Ulama were presented by the NU party until the Suharto government forced all Islamic parties to unite into one government-supervised Islamic party, the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party, PPP), NU dropped its political aspirations and focused on religious, social, and economic development instead. This shift away from politics resulted in increased piety among Indonesian Muslims and a steady strengthening of a democratic-minded civil society. After Suharto
stepped down in 1998, the structure that repressed religion and society collapsed. Political parties representing Muslims to various affiliations were setup, religious organizations were free to have Islam as their sole constitution, and Muslims began to be fully represented in the democratically elected parliament. Freedom of religion also led to the emergence of groups such as Lashkar Jihad in 2000 that called for holy war against the Christian populated Malaccan islands.\textsuperscript{21}

Although Suharto has resigned, his family and supporters still wield great power. This tension will animate Indonesian politics for years to come. In the post Suharto era, Indonesia is unlikely to see a single, dominant Islamic grouping any time soon, it is even less likely to see a clear Muslim consensus on the role of Islam in the state.

The depression into which Indonesia is now sinking will worsen the ethno-religious imbalance between Chinese and indigenous (\textit{pribumi}) Indonesians. Since the early 1980s, the ultraconservative wing of the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII) has been un stinting in its critiques of the “Christianization” of Indonesian society. Thus, the political future of Indonesian Islam remains clouded. The economic crisis will worsen the plight of the urban under classes, the overwhelming majority of whom are Muslim.\textsuperscript{22}

\subsection*{2.2 Islam in Malaysia}

The Malay Peninsula, before the imposition of British rule in the late nineteenth century, was made up of traditional Malay states under the control
of hereditary Malay sultans. In these states Islam, which spread to this part of world during the twelfth to fourteenth centuries, was already strongly established at all levels of society. In some states, such as Johore-Riau, Malacca, Kelantan, and Trengganu, certain rulers were well known for their patronage of Islamic religious learning and scholarship.

What formal education existed during the early part of the nineteenth century for the Malay community was purely Islamic religious education revolving around the reading and memorizing of the Qur'an and the learning of basic religious teachings. The mosque was the only site of such education until the emergence of the pondok (as in Indonesian is Pesantren) in the late nineteenth century and the madrasah (school) in the beginning of the twentieth century. Islam was already strongly established during this period. Aspects of Islamic law were observed to varying degrees, although elements of pre-Islamic culture were still prevalent among the people as a whole. Among the sacral powers of the Malay rulers was responsibility for the defence and good governance of Islam as the state religion.

The beginning of the twentieth century saw the emergence of an Islamic reformist movement that began to criticize the socio-economic backwardness and religious conservatism of traditional Malay society of the time. This new socio-religious activism began when several religious scholars studying in the Middle East came under the powerful influence of the revivalist and reformist ideas of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad
Abduh at the close of the nineteenth century. The leader of the Malay reformist movement, Sheikh Tahir Jalal al-Din (1869-1957), a student of Abduh, founded *Al-Imam* in 1906, the first periodical to spread the message of Islamic reformism in the Malay-Indonesian Archipelago.

The Japanese interference during World War II did not seriously alter the position of Islam among the Malays. The Islamic reformist spirit was suppressed while Malay nationalist sentiments were gathering momentum. Post war Malay nationalism of a conservative orientation saw the foundation of the United Malay Nationalist Organization (UMNO) in 1946. The British formed the Federation of Malaya in 1948 but was rejected by the Malays. The Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (*Partai Islam Se-Malaysia*, known as PAS) originally developed from the defection of the *Ulama* faction in UMNO in 1951 and became a registered political party in 1955. Its emergence marked another turning point in the development of Islamic thought in the Malay states. The British granted independence to the Federation of Malaya in 1957 and in 1963 Malaysia came into being.

Although the position of Islam as the official religion of post-independence Malaysia, with the Malay rulers of each state serving as the guardians of the religion of Islam and Malay custom, was guaranteed in the constitution, only some aspects of the life of the Muslim community and the nation were influenced by Islamic values and norms. The government under the leadership of Tunku Abdul Rahman with the support of the British was
committed to a secularistic vision of the new nation and vigorously opposed the Islamic political struggle and ideals. As such, it came under strong attack from the PAS and Islamically oriented Malay organizations. Five years after the 1969 racial riots, the PAS joined the coalition government of the National Front (Barisan Nasional). As a result, the government under the second prime minister of Malaysia, Tun Abdul Razak, established the Islamic Centre, which formed an important part of the Islamic Religious Affairs. Tun Abdul Razak’s government gave increased attention to the educational, social, and economic development of the Malay Muslims to accommodate the demands coming from PAS.

The assertive, and generally, anti-establishment da’wah (Islamic proselytization) movement emerged in the 1970s through the activities of youth organizations in secular educational institutions, including PKPIM and ABIM (the Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia, established in 1971). It represented a new phase in Islamic thought and action, but its vision of Islam as a complete and holistic way of life was in fact a continuation and elaboration of earlier reformist and revivalist movements in the Middle East and Pakistan.

The government under Tun Hussein Onn at first viewed the new phenomenon negatively and was extremely wary of the political effect of assertive, Malay-dominated da’wah on the multiracial notion and its own political strength. It reached a high point around 1979-1982 with the victory
of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. The demand for the establishment of more Islamic institutions in the country was raised by several organizations in national seminars and international conferences held in Malaysia. The government under Tun Hussein Onn’s premiership made some concessions and decided to conduct a feasibility study for the establishment of an Islamic bank in Malaysia, when Dr. Mahathir Mohamed became Prime Minister in 1981, this was one of the projects that received his immediate attention.\(^{25}\)

Under Mahathir’s leadership the government took a more conciliatory and positive approach towards the demands of the \textit{da’wah} movement. PAS had been forced to leave the National Front coalition government in 1977 and had continued its struggle for complete implementation of the \textit{shari’ah}\(^{26}\) and the establishment of an Islamic state in Malaysia as an opposition party. It regarded Mahathir’s Islamic initiatives and efforts as “cosmetic islamization” aimed at undermining the influence of the Islamic party. Anwar Ibrahim, the charismatic leader of ABIM and an articulate spokesman of nonpartisan \textit{da’wah} in the 1970s, decided to support Mahathir by joining his government in 1982 in order to achieve his Islamic objectives from within the administration. Anwar’s support gave a new lease of life to Mahathir’s Islamic initiatives. The creation of the Islamic Bank and the establishment of the International Islamic University in 1983, followed by the establishment of International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization in 1987, were the
immediate results of Anwar’s direct involvement in Mahathir’s administration.

During 1999, however, he appeared to tone down his rhetoric in the face of significant challenges to his political future resulting from the decline in the Malaysian economy and the trial of Anwar Ibrahim on charges of corruption.27

All of the major Islamic movements in addition to PAS, ABIM, worked for the Islamization of the individual, family, community, and state. Darul al-Argam supported workshops, clinics, and schools and stressed economic independence and Qur’anic social values and also supported segregation of the sexes. The Tabligh emphasized preaching and appealed to the educated segments of the society.28

PAS, as an opposition party, and some Islamic factions, continued to dwell on the ideal of an Islamic state, the abolition of secularism, and the complete implementation of the Shari’ah, including that of capital punishment (hudud) in the state of Kelantan. Currently, the state of Kelantan is governed by PAS which is a conservative Islamic political party, with a proclaimed goal of establishing an Islamic state. To counter Islamic fundamentalism as supported by PAS, the head of the Barisan Nasional, Datuk Seri Abdullah Badawi, has proposed “Islam Hadhari”.29

Although the constitution declares Malaysia to be a secular state, there is much confusion on this subject. Several Muslims have argued, especially
after former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad’s declaration that Malaysia is an Islamic state, that Malaysia is in fact an Islamic state. One Member of Parliament (MP), Badruddin bin Amiruldin, has stated in the Dewan Rakyat House of Parliament that "Malaysia ini negara Islam" ("Malaysia is an Islamic state") and that "you tidak suka, you keluar dari Malaysia!" ("You don't like it, you get out of Malaysia!") Badruddin refused to take back his statement, and a motion to refer him to the House Committee of Privileges was rejected by a voice vote. However, the first Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, contradicted this stance in the 1980s, saying, "All talk on Islamic States is just an empty dream. No man in his right sense would accept a nation which bases its political administration on religion, and in a country like Malaysia with its multi-racial and multi-religious people, there is no room for an Islamic State".30

-Islam and Politics

As defined by the constitution of Malaysia, Malays must be Muslims, regardless of their ethnic heritage; otherwise, legally, they are not Malay. Consequently, apostate Malays will have to forfeit all their constitutional privileges, including their Bumiputra status, which entitles them to affirmative action policies in university admissions, discounts on purchases of vehicles or real estate, etc. It is legally possible to become a Malay (legally) if a non-Malay citizen with a Malaysian parent converts to Islam and thus claims all the Bumiputra privileges granted by Article 153 of the Constitution.
and the New Economic Policy (NEP), etc. However, the convert must "habitually speak the Malay language" and adhere to Malay culture. A textbook for tertiary Malaysian studies following the government-approved syllabus states: "This explains the fact that when a non-Malay embraces Islam, he is said to Masuk Melayu (become a Malay). That person is automatically assumed to be fluent in the Malay language and to be living like Malay as a result of his close association with the Malays."

Parallel to the civil courts, there are Shari'ah courts which conduct legal matters related to religious (Islamic) and family (Muslim) issues. Legal issues like Muslim divorce and Muslim apostasy are conducted in Shari'ah Court. Non-Muslims are not affected by this.

Nine of the Malaysian states, namely Kelantan, Terengganu, Pahang, Kedah, Perak, Perlis, Selangor, Johor and Negeri Sembilan have Sultans. These Malay sultans still maintain authority over religious affairs in states. The states of Penang, Malacca, Sarawak and Sabah do not have any sultan but the nominal kings (Yang Di-Pertuan) are still head of religion of Islam.

As the religion embraced by the most populous ethnics of Malaysia, Islam plays an important part in Malaysian politics. Islam is seen by the Malay as a subject which could not be challenged conventionally or constitutionally.

The newest format of the Malaysian Identity Card (MyKad) divides Malaysians into various religious groups, i.e. Muslim, Christian, Hindu, and
Buddhist. The introduction of this caused an uproar in Malaysian politics and is deemed discriminative by non-Muslims. This issue has, however, since receded and been accepted non-willingly by non-Muslims.

Currently, one of Malaysia's states, Kelantan, is governed by PAS which is a conservative Islamic political party, with a proclaimed goal of establishing an Islamic state. Terengganu was briefly ruled by PAS from 1999 to 2004, but the ruling Barisan Nasional Coalition has since won back the state. To counter Islamic fundamentalism as supported by PAS, the head of the Barisan Nasional, Datuk Seri Abdullah Badawi, has proposed Islam Hadhari.

There is also an Islamic University in Malaysia called the International Islamic University Malaysia, and a government institution in charge of organizing pilgrimages to Mecca called Tabung Haji (Pilgrim Fund Board of Malaysia). In addition to this, the government also funds the construction of mosques.31

2.3 Islam in Brunei

Islam is the national religion of the tiny, oil-rich sultanate of Brunei on the northwest coast of Borneo. An estimated two-third of Brunei’s population of 350,000 are Muslims. Many Chinese immigrants, who make up about 15 percent of the population, and small people indigenous tribes have converted to Islam.32
Brunei adopted Islam during the fifteenth century, or possibly as early as the fourteenth, after one of their rulers was installed as Sultan by the Sultan of the Malaysian state of Johore. As head of the faith, the Sultan has always been responsible for upholding the Islamic way of life, but he has traditionally delegated this responsibility to appoint non-noble officials. Islam provided a unifying theocratic and political base that allowed Brunei, a trading centre for jungle produce, to attain the status of empire during the sixteenth century. However, internal dissensions and European encroachment led to its disintegration, and Brunei probably would have disappeared entirely had not the British taken it on as a protectorate in 1888. In 1906 Brunei yielded control of internal affairs to a British Resident, with the Sultan retaining responsibility only for matters related to Islam.33

During the nineteenth century and through the mid-twentieth, the status and institutions of Islam continued to reflect traditions broadly shared with the sultanates of the Malay Peninsula. Brunei was truly a backwater, untouched by the religious controversies that occasionally feared elsewhere in the region. The British accepted Islam as the established way of life, while most Bruneians respected the British as akin to saviours of their country.

The situation began to change after World War II. The British promoted experimentation with democracy even as control of internal affairs was returned to the Sultan with the adoption of the constitution of 1959. The socialist Brunei People’s Party (BPP) emerged dominant by playing on the
disaffections of commoners over the hereditary privileges of the nobility and by proposing Brunei as the power centre of a new Pan-Islamic state that would recover territories in Borneo lost to private British interests during the nineteenth century. Revenues from oil exports, which began during the 1930s, were fortuitously climbing, allowing the late Sultan Sir Omar Ali Saifuddin to address the disaffection of his poorer subjects through an extensive social welfare system and the promotion of Islam. He built one of Asia’s largest mosques, greatly expanded the Department of Religious Affairs established in 1954, and subsidized performance of the hajj to make it the norm rather than the exception for Brunei Malays. Sultan Omar abdicated in favour of his eldest son Hasanal Bolkiah (the twenty-ninth Sultan) in 1967, but he remained the power behind the throne until his son began asserting himself in the early 1980s. The resulting power struggle between them was often played out along religious lines, reflecting a rift within the royal family and the government between what have been called “ideologues” who want a theocratic Islamic state and “pragmatists” who are secularly oriented and open to Western values.

Sir Omar, who died in 1986, was allied with the ideologues, many of whom attended Cairo’s al-Azhar University and hold top positions in the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Ministry of Education (a ministerial form of government was introduced at full independence from Britain in 1984). Sultan and Prime Minister Hassanal, who often warns of the dangers of
religious extremism, is considered a pragmatist. Yet, to the dismay of many pragmatists, he has promulgated the concept of Malay Islamic monarchy as a national ideology that would entrench what the pragmatists see as an anachronistic system of governance. Some believe the Islamic monarchy is meant to preclude demands for an Islamic theocracy by mollifying the ideologues and keeping the general populace focused on religion rather than politics.\(^{34}\)

Brunei’s leaders are concerned that increasing integration into the world economy may undermine the country’s internal social order. Today there is a rift between those who want an Islamic state and those who are more open to Western values. The role of Islam in Brunei government will continue to be examined and contested.\(^{35}\)

2.4 Islam in Singapore

The geographical position of Singapore defines the history and contemporary position of its Muslim community. Singapore is the northernmost island in the Riau archipelago, which links the east coast of Sumatra with peninsular Malaysia. This territory is the traditional home of the Malay people. Malay history is intimately linked with Islam, and the first Malay-Muslim trading city, Melaka (Malacca), flourished in the fifteenth century. The sacking of Melaka by the Portuguese in 1511 marked the beginning of an era of intrusions by various colonial powers interested in the strategic sea lanes through the Straits of Melaka.
In 1819 Sir Stamford Raffles founded the British colony of Singapore, which quickly flourished as an *entrepot* trading centre for the region. Singapore remained a British colony until it was granted self-government in 1959. In 1963 it became a state within the Federation of Malaysia, and in 1965 it separated from the Federation to become the independent Republic of Singapore.

In terms of ethnic percentages, Singapore's population has remained relatively stable since the mid-nineteenth century. The major demographic change occurred early in the nineteenth century, when the Chinese gradually overtook the originally predominant Malays. By 1891 Chinese numbered 67.1 percent of the population, Malays 19.7 percent, Indians 8.8 percent, and others (including Europeans) 4.3 percent. A century later in 1990, the resident Singapore population was 2.7 million, with Chinese forming the majority (77.7 percent), followed by Malays (14.1 percent), Indians (7.1 percent).36

The nineteenth-century Singapore Muslim community was divided into two broad categories: Muslims indigenous to the region (mostly Malays) who formed the majority, and a minority of wealthy and better-educated Indian Muslims, Arabs, and Jawi Peranakans (indigenized Indian Muslims), who formed the social and economic elite. This elite spearheaded the flowering of Singapore as a Muslim publishing and educational *centre* for the region. From the middle of the nineteenth century, the Dutch took repressive measures to prevent Muslims in the Dutch East Indies from performing the
pilgrimage, and so Singapore increasingly became a focal point for such departures. The British reluctantly realized the need to intervene in the affairs of the Muslim community, beginning with quarantine controls on departing and arriving pilgrims. In 1880 the British government passed the Islamic Marriage Ordinance; in 1905 the Muslim and Hindu Endowment Board was set up to regulate trusts and in 1915 the Islamic Advisory Board was constituted to advise the government on matters pertaining to the Muslim community.

In August 1966, a year after Singapore’s independence, the Singapore parliament passed the Administration of Muslim Law Act (AMLA), ushering in a new phase in the legal and administrative history of Islam in the country. The Singapore Muslim Religious Council (Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura or MUIS) was constituted under the Act and inaugurated in 1968. MUIS is the supreme Islamic religious authority in Singapore and advises the government on matters relating to Islam. MUIS administers the mosque-building program, manages mosques and endowment properties, and coordinates the annual pilgrimage to Mecca.

The Shari’ah Court and Registry of Muslim Marriage was set up in 1958. In addition to hearing divorce petitions, the Shari’ah Court also considers applications for inheritance certificates relating to Muslim estates. All appeals to either the Registry or the Shari’ah Court are channelled to an appeals board formed by MUIS. MUIS, the Shari’ah Court, and the Registry
of Muslim Marriages are administered within the Ministry of Community Development. There is also a Minister in charge of Muslim Affairs who acts as a liaison between the Muslim community and the political leadership.

In short, Singapore is Chinese-majority, secular state located in the Malay-Muslim world of Southeast Asia. The Singapore Malay-Muslim community is cognizant of its position as a national minority that is also part of a larger regional Muslim majority.\textsuperscript{37}

\section*{2.5 Islam in Philippines}

In 1990 the Muslim population of the Philippines comprised between five and six million, or about 8.5 percent of the country’s sixty-six million inhabitants.\textsuperscript{38} The Mindanao region in the Philippines, once an independent kingdom, consisted of indigenous tribes. Islam came to this kingdom at the same time that it appeared in Siam. Arab traders preached Islam in this land but established their permanent settlements only at the end of the 13\textsuperscript{th} century. Over the next century, the Muslims established their sultanate, and by the end of the 14\textsuperscript{th} century the Islamization process had reached the point where being a Muslim became an acceptable passport into the community. In 1565 the Spanish arrived and initiated a series of attacks on the Muslim sultanates in the southern Philippine islands of Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago. These attacks continued for the next 350 years. Although the Spanish failed to occupy the region, they did establish a few garrisons in the area. Moreover,
the rest of the Philippines came under their control and they were successful in converting the local people to Catholicism.

Once direct rule had been imposed on Moro, the colonial government adopted a "policy of attraction" in the area to "develop, to civilize and to educate" the public. This policy had disastrous consequences. The government introduced a secular system of education and non-Muslim teachers were appointed to the Moro schools. This was seen as a direct blow to the authority of the traditional religious teachers. Muslims generally refused to send their children to secular schools, leading to significant illiteracy. To integrate the province into the larger framework of the Philippines, the U.S. colonial government encouraged non-Muslims from other parts of the Philippines to settle in Moro Province. The government provided loans to those settlers who lacked funds, and between 1903 and 1906 increased the number of acres of land given to settlers from 40-200. In 1902, a Land Registration Act was passed to determine the extent of private landholdings in the country. This was followed by Public Lands Acts of 1905, 1913, 1914, and 1919. These gradually claimed all lands in the Philippines as state property, though individuals could apply for private ownership. The Moros lost ownership of their ancestral lands. According to the Act of 1919, a Christian Filipino could apply for private ownership of up to 24 hectares of land while a non-Christian could request only 10.39 This led to the beginning of "legalized land grabbing" in Mindanao. Finally, the government
encouraged foreign corporations to operate in Mindanao, which resulted in an upsurge in agro-businesses owned and managed by transnational corporations.

All these programs created a deep sense of frustration in the minds of Muslims in the Mindanao and Sulu region. Immediately before Independence in 1946, the Moro leaders submitted a memorandum to the U.S. government stating "we do not want to be included in the Philippines Independence. For, once independence is launched, there will be trouble between us and the Christian Filipinos because from time immemorial these two peoples have not lived harmoniously...It is not proper (for two antagonistic) peoples to live together under one flag". The U.S. did not accept the proposal. Thus, in 1946 the newly independent Philippines had two major religious communities in the Sulu-Mindanao region, the Muslims and the Catholics.

However, the Moros continued their struggle for an independent Mindanao in the post-Independence Philippines. Rather than accommodating the demands of the Moros, the new Philippine government continued with the colonial policy and adopted further repressive measures. It encouraged the further migration of Christian population into Mindanao. By the 1960s, the influx of settlers from northern and central Philippines made the Moros a virtual minority. A substantial inflow of domestic and foreign investment led to the transfer of wealth from Mindanao to other parts of the country. The Filipino government, like the colonial administration before it, passed a series
of laws to legitimize its expropriation of lands traditionally owned by the Muslim population for resettlement projects and plantation. Many lost their lands to Catholic settlers. Violent clashes between Catholics and local Muslims became a regular occurrence. Riots broke out in various parts of the region. Although the Moro elites were co-opted by the state, the gradual deterioration of the condition of the Muslims together with the 1968 Jabaidah massacre led to the formation of the Muslims (Mindanao) Independence Movement (MIM) in 1968, and this group declared Mindanao’s independence.41

In response to the MIM declaration, the Catholics launched the anti-Moro Ilaga Movement, a group whose activities culminated in the June 19, 1971, massacre of some 70 Muslims in a mosque at Bario Manili, North Cotabato. The government tried to co-opt MIM's top leaders by providing them with high positions in the administration. This disappointed many young MIM cadres who abandoned the organization and, led by a university graduate, Nur Misuari, went on to form the militant Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). The organization's main objective was the complete liberation of the Moros' homeland. The MNLF attracted the support of large numbers of Filipino Muslims who considered the movement to be spearheading a jihad against the Marcos regime. The MNLF opened an armed wing, the Bangso Moro Army (BMA), consisting of militant Muslim youths and they engaged in guerrilla warfare against the Philippines Army. The MNLF also sought the
support of the overseas Muslims and reported their grievances to the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). When President Marcos declared martial law in 1972, the MNLF continued its activities underground. Thousands of people lost their lives and properly in the armed struggle in Mindanao.

In spite of the Marcos regime's tactics, the consequences of the armed struggle aroused the concern of the OIC countries over the conditions of Muslims in the Philippines. A delegation of four foreign ministers from Libya, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, and Somalia visited the Philippines to discuss the situation of the Muslims there with the Marcos government. The involvement of the Muslim states eventually culminated in the signing of the Tripoli Agreement on December 23, 1976, in Tripoli, Libya. This agreement provided for the creation of an autonomous region in Mindanao consisting of 13 provinces and nine cities. In return, the MNLF was forced to reduce its demand for complete independence to autonomy, settling for a peace that would keep the Bangsamoro homeland part of the Republic of the Philippines. However, after returning home the Marcos government interpreted "autonomy" as an internal matter that should be solved within the framework of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Philippines. Marcos insisted that the attainment of autonomy was subject to the Philippine constitutional process. This required that a referendum be held
to determine which among the provinces and cities claimed in the Tripoli Agreement should be included in the autonomous region.42

The breakdown of the Tripoli Agreement undermined the credibility of the MNLF leadership. Misuari was challenged by the chairman of MNLF’s Foreign Affairs Bureau, Hashim Salamat. He accused Misuari of being a failure, corrupt, and a communist sympathizer.43 Shortly thereafter, he broke away from the mainstream MNLF and established the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Salamat claimed, "We want an Islamic political system and way of life and can be achieved through effective Da’wah, Tarbiyyah, and Jihad."44 The MNLF and MILF conducted simultaneous guerrilla warfare campaigns against the Marcos regime. In the 1980s, both provided strong support to Corazon Aquino when she led the mass upheavals for democratic government. In return, Aquino promised to grant autonomy to the Mindanao region if elected. After assuming office in 1986, President Aquino offered a new Constitution and declared the establishment of the Autonomous Regions in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The MNLF was dissatisfied with this, however, as it granted autonomy to only four provinces, not 13 provinces and nine cities indicated in the Tripoli Agreement. Misuari called on the MNLF’s various factions to unite and renew their armed struggle for a sovereign Bangsamoro Republic.45

The ascendance of Fidel Ramos to the presidency of the Philippines in 1992 gave Misuari renewed hope to recoup his shattered prestige. President
Ramos opened negotiations with the MNLF, and in 1996 an agreement was signed making the MNLF the overseer of economic development projects in all provinces in Mindanao for three years. The Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD) was established with Misuari as the region's governor directly under President Ramos. The Ramos-MNLF agreement appears to have brought peace in the Philippines by ending the armed struggle in Mindanao. Many of Southeast Asia's leaders felt great relief, such as, Indonesian President Suharto who commented that:

"The peaceful solution to the conflict in the Southern Philippines could serve to prove before the international community that conflicts within the region could by solved by the region or the community of nations concerned using their own resources, their creativity and their determination to achieve peace. In fact, I would not be surprised if analysts of international politics would see in the peace process in the southern Philippines valuable lessons with possibly some applications elsewhere."46

Despite the appearance that the Philippines's Moro problem was under control, MNLF leader Hashim Salamat declared in 1996 that while autonomy in the Bangsomoro region was a feasible first step to independence, its effectiveness would depend upon the type of autonomy and the personalities of those involved in running the region. Salamat believed that the only viable solution to the plight of the Moros was complete independence and the establishment of an Islamic state. Thus, despite the MNLF's seeming break
through, the MILF remained engaged in armed struggle and so President Ramos opened negotiations with the group. In his sixth State of the Nation Address given on July 28, 1997, he stated that steps had been taken toward opening peace talks with the MILF. The government promised that "all legislative measures aiming to promote economic and social conditions of the Muslim indigenous cultural group in the country will be given priority. These include measures to recognize the ancestral domain of Muslim and cultural minorities." President Ramos hoped that peace agreement would be signed in the near future and ends Mindanao's decade-old social unrest. Both the government and MILF pledged in late 1997 that the peace agreement would be signed before January 30, 1998, declaring, "We are one final step away from an agreement that would guarantee an enduring peace in Mindanao".

-Muslim Autonomy and Independence Movement

In the Philippines, the minority Muslims have been deprived in many respects for a long period of time. However, the degree of deprivation is much lower than Muslim minority in the southern Thailand, and the sense of deprivation is correspondingly much deeper among the Moros than among the Malay Muslims in Thailand. This result has resulted in making the Moros more aggressive in their struggle. In fact, the level of social, economic, and political subjugation is much lower in Patani than Mindanao. In Patani, the Thai government is interested mainly in political domination and not in religious conversion, i.e. "Buddhification" of Patani society by transferring
Buddhists there from other parts of Thailand. In Mindanao, governments since the Spanish colonial period have been interested in both political domination and religious conversion. The domination continued after Independence as thousands of Catholics migrated to Mindanao at the government's will. The Moros now constitute only 22% of the population in their own homeland. Today much of the wealth in Mindanao belongs either to Catholics or foreign investors.  

On the other hand, the Moro liberation movement has always been led by strong organizations. Datu Untog Matalim, a member of a traditional aristocrat family who had run for governor of Cotabato Province in 1967 and lost, founded MIM with other Muslim elites in the wake of the Jabaidah massacre to mobilize Muslim support and articulate calls for Muslim unity and autonomy for Mindanao. Initially, the MIM was a haven for the traditional Moro power elite who attempted to regain their lost political prestige and power. The rise of the MNLF was a challenge to both the traditional local elites as well as the Philippine government. There is no doubt that the MNLF was a very strong organization. it survived until it achieved its goal in 1996. Its leadership came from educated youth who understood political tactics and strategy. It is true that the MNLF was divided later and that this resulted in the formation of the MILF. However, there is no record of fighting between the two. Both focused their efforts against the government forces. It is also true that the MILF remains unhappy with mere autonomy. It
century. Active assimilationist policies have resulted largely in irredentist and separatist ethnic and religious movements among the Malay Muslims of Thailand.

The Thai Muslim population is a much more heterogeneous group than the Malay Muslim populace of Thailand. The Thai Muslims include descendants of Iranians, Chams, Indians, Pakistanis, and Chinese, who reside in the predominantly Thai Buddhist regions of central and northern Thailand. The vast majority of these Muslims speak Thai and have assimilated into the mainstream of Thai society. Most of the descendants of Iranians, Chams, Indonesians, Indians, and Pakistanis reside in Bangkok and the surrounding communities of central Thailand. Smaller communities of Chinese, Indian, and Pakistani Muslims reside in the northern provinces of Chiangmai, Chaingrai, and Lamphun.

Traditionally Islamic thought, beliefs, and practices in both the Malay Muslim and Thai Muslim communities of Thailand were suffused with Hindu-Buddhist and folk-animistic accretions. Patani, south of Thailand, had been an independent kingdom. Originally known as the ancient kingdom of Langkasuka, its name was changed to the kingdom of Patani at some point in the 14th century. It was an important commercial centre for Asian and European traders. Hinduism and Buddhism seem to have been practiced until the adoption of Islam as the state religion in the 15th century. Arab merchants had spread the religion
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throughout the area between the 12th and 15th centuries side by side with their trade, and a large number of people were converted. However, the most significant development in its spread occurred when the king of Patani himself embraced Islam and declared his kingdom to be an Islamic state in 1457. The Islamization of Patani replaced many elements of the Hindu-Buddhist culture and its institutions. The Muslim religious elites (ulama) came to dominate the kingdom's socio-political system. The Muslim dynasty was abolished in 1786 when Patani was conquered by the king of Siam. The Siamese government divided Patani into seven provinces both for administrative purposes as well as to weaken the Muslim power. The provinces were governed by appointed bureaucrats under a centralized administrative structure. There were sporadic rebellions in protest of the administrative reforms, but the Siamese government forces were strong enough to suppress them.53

Nonetheless, such rebellious activity and later external pressure from the British in Burma did make the Siamese government control over Patani uncertain through the end of the 19th century. Control was finally consolidated with the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909.54 The British renounced the extra territoriality rights it had claimed previously and recognized Siam's governance of the province, though this came at the cost of conceding control of four other Malay states to the European power. The firm guarantee of Siamese control over Patani allowed the government to take various measures
aimed at weakening the Islamic identity of the people in Patani in order to develop.\textsuperscript{55} The government first replaced the Islamic \textit{Shari'ah} and \textit{adat} laws with Siamese law. Second, an act was passed in 1921 that required all children to attend Siamese primary schools, institutions designed to offer a secular education where the medium of instruction was the Thai language. Thus, the local \textit{pondoks} (Islamic schools) were closed, an action that "undermined the very roots of the \textit{ulama}'s power."\textsuperscript{56} Third, administration was further centralized by recognizing the seven provinces into three. Patani, Yala, and Narathiwat (now four, including Satun), and replacing the local rulers with Thai governors. This change led to the loss of political power of the traditional aristocrats. Fourth, during the Second World War, the Phibun regime issued the Thai Customs Decree prohibiting the "wearing of sarongs, the use of Malay Muslim names and the Malay language," which angered the common people. At the end of the war, Patani's districts and local governments were brought under the direct control of Bangkok.

All these measures were attempts to integrate Patani Muslim into the larger framework of Thailand, and they created serious resentment among them. The traditional elite and \textit{pondok} religious teachers were very unhappy and objected to the introduction of secular education and the Thai language in schools. Haji Sulong, president of the Islamic Religious Council, submitted a seven-point demand to the Thai government. It called for (i) the "appointment of a single individual with full powers to govern the four Patani
provinces...this individual to be local-born in one of the four provinces...and to be elected by the people", (ii) 80% of government servants in those provinces to profess the Muslim religion, (iii) Malay and Siamese to be the official languages, (iv) Malay to be the medium of instruction in the primary schools, (v) Islamic law to be recognized and enforced in a separate Muslim court other than the civil court, (vi) any revenue and income derived from the four provinces to be utilized within them, and (iiv) the formation of a Muslim Board. As a consequence of making this demand, Haji Sulong and his associates were arrested and charged with treason. At the end of the Second World War, the Patani separatist movement was brought under control by the Thai state through military intervention.

-Muslim Separatist Movement

In the initial post-war period, the Thai government adopted a policy of accommodation towards the Muslims. However, the state penetration in pre-war years into the civil society of Patani Muslims, together with the absence of political participation of Patani elites and especially the arrest of Haji Sulong in the late 1940s, contributed to the Dusun Nyiur incident, a violent clash between the Thai police and the Patani Muslims on 28 April 1948.58

The Thai government was able to suppress the revolt but the political situation in Patani remained very tense in the 1950s. In 1948, the government declared a state of emergency, an act that reinforced the Patani Muslim perception of the Thai nation as an "alien state." Once the emergency ended,
Tengku Abdul Jalal, a follower of Haji Sulong, in 1959 formed an underground organization, *Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani* (BNPP, or Patani National Liberation Front), that drew support from traditional aristocrats as well as the religious elite. The organization's objective was complete independence and the establishment of an Islamic state. It adopted a strategy of armed guerrilla warfare and, consequently, intermittent violent clashes occurred between government forces and BNPP cadres throughout the 1960s.

A fall in rubber prices led to a decline in the Patani economy in the late 1960s. This led to a fall in the region's per capita income compared to that of the rest of Thailand. Muslims believed that "the central government thinks in terms of taxes and duties which can be extracted from the region rather than in terms of investment and technical support, and the region's tin and rubber resources are siphoned off by Thai Buddhists and the Thai Chinese."^60^ Concurrently, many Patani youth who had been educated in Egypt, Pakistan and India now found on their return that the government was reluctant to employ them. These factors combined to make them politically active separatists. They differed in their orientation from the traditional aristocrats and were also divided among themselves between Islamists and secularists. The Islamists founded an organization, *Barisan Revolusi Nasional* (BRN, or National Revolutionary Front), whose aim was to establish the Islamic Republic of Patani. The BRN's base of support lay mainly in the
pondoks. The secularists formed the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO), which claimed that it had an "invisible government" whose tactic was to work by ambush.\textsuperscript{61}

In response to the Patani separatist movement, Thai government launched a series of military operations against the guerrillas while adopting a policy of accommodating certain demands. In 1961, the government repealed the Thai Customs Decree and allowed pondok schools to continue provided they offered both secular and Islamic education. The Patani Muslims were also allowed to keep their names. In the 1970s, the government offered some special privileges to Muslims. These included quotas for admissions of Muslims to the universities and government bureaucracy, the establishment of National and Provincial Councils for Islamic Affairs, and the creation of the position of Chularajmontri, or state councillor for Islamic Affairs. Finally, the government initiated massive economic projects to construct roads, schools, colleges, and universities in the Muslim majority provinces. With respect to agriculture, the rubber plantation owners were given incentives to replace old trees with a high-yield variety. An irrigation system and flood control projects were started in the region. Not all of these government programs have been viewed positively by Muslims. Instead, many perceive such measures as tricks of the Thai government to penetrate Patani culture, economy, and society. Guerrilla activities continue. An aspiring elite still seeks the complete independence of Patani and the creation of a \textit{dar al-Islam}. 
The opposition movement has remained factionalized. In late 1997, activists across the political spectrum joined to form an underground organization called the Council of the Muslim People of Patani (MPRMP). Taking inspiration from the Moros' success, they sought to pressure the Thai government to come to an understanding with the Patani Muslims.  

The strategy remains the same, i.e., guerrilla attacks on police stations and government offices. Since the Council is quite new, it is difficult to predict the success of the organization.

-Degree of Deprivation

In both Thailand and the Philippines, the minority Muslims have been deprived in many respects for a long period of time. However, the degree of deprivation is much lower in Thailand than in the Philippines, and the sense of deprivation is correspondingly much deeper among the Moros than among their Patani counterparts. This fact has resulted in making the Moros more aggressive in their struggle. In fact, the level of social, economic, and political subjugation is much lower in Patani than Mindanao. In Patani, the Thai government is interested mainly in political domination and not in religious conversions, i.e. "Buddhification" of Patani society by transferring Buddhists there from other parts of Thailand. In Mindanao, governments since the Spanish colonial period have been interested in both political domination and religious conversions. The domination continued after Independence as thousands of Catholics migrated to Mindanao at the
government's urging. The Moros now constitute only 22% of the population in their own homeland. Today much of the wealth in Mindanao belongs either to Catholics or foreign investors. In contrast no such land grabs took place in Patani and so the Malay Muslims' armed struggle lacked the communal aspect present in Mindanao.  

Economically, Patani has encountered less exploitation than Mindanao. Patani is rich in rubber plantations and other natural resources, and the government initiated several projects to improve the socio-economic conditions of the people and enhance the loyalty of the Muslims toward the Thai government.

Politically speaking, while the Thai government took many steps to earn the loyalty of the Muslims in Patani, the Philippine government adopted repressive measures in Mindanao. From the beginning, the government adopted integrative and assimilationist policies through a "control model". A commission for national integration was established in 1957, but rather than earning the loyalty of the Moros, its activities only deepened their sense of deprivation. There was a continuous denial of participation to the newly educated elites. The Muslims had neither the chance to become part of the ruling political elite in their region nor were any administrative jobs open to them in the 1980's, T.J.S. George wrote, "Two decades after the Philippines became independent, Muslims in Mindanao were a devitalized people, their economic conditions stagnant, their social conditions in jeopardy, their laws
and customs in danger of disintegrating.\textsuperscript{65} The Moros had no choice but to resort to violence and a war of attrition. In contrast, the Patani Muslims resorted to only a low level of violence. The Thai government's policy of integration was moderated by effective socio-economic and political moves that have lessened the movement toward a more violent response.

2.7 Islam in Myanmar

The Union of Myanmar, also known as Burma, is a country in Southeast Asia. The country has been ruled by a military government since a coup in 1988. The country is becoming an underdeveloped country. It has a population of approximately 54 million.\textsuperscript{66} The Muslim population of Myanmar consists of two ethnic groups and counted for only 3.9 percent of the country’s population. The first are those who consisted of Indo-Pakistani origin and have strong links with the Indian sub-continent and speak Urdu and Tamil fluently.\textsuperscript{67} And the others are of Burmese origin, the longest-established Muslim community can trace its origins back to the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.

The most recently established section of the Muslim community arrived following the colonization of Myanmar by the British in the nineteenth century. By making British Burma a province of India until 1937, the colonial government encouraged significant numbers of the immigrants and casual labourers, as well as traders and civil servants, to settle mainly in and around Yangon, the colonial capital and entrepot. These Indian Muslims,
who by the 1930s accounted for more than a third of those who followed Islam, maintained strong links with the religious and cultural practices of their home-lands. This often brought them into conflict with the Buddhist majority and the Burmese Muslims over matters of marriage and property law as well as the role of Islam in Myanmar’s political life. Another Muslim community is settled in the Myanmar state of Arakan or Rahkine, which borders Bangladesh. The largest proportion of Muslims in Burma are of Bengali descent, and the majority of these reside in Rahkine State.

Indian immigration and the rise of nationalism generated significant tensions among the three Muslim communities in Burma, as well as between them and the Buddhist majority. While many of the Indian Muslims became involved in organizations and societies with their origins in the Indian subcontinent, the long-established Burmese Muslim population tended to identify with the Buddhist majority and supported the Burmese nationalist movement. The Rahkine Muslims remained detached from both and have continued to develop their own history separate from the other communities. After the independence of Myanmar in 1948 the roles of the Muslim communities continued to be divided. The Burmese Muslims found places in the government of the devout Buddhist Prime Minister U Nu, and many continued to serve in the military and socialist governments of General Ne Win after the coup of 1962. The more outward-looking and commercially oriented Indian Muslims found life more difficult after independence and
sought political alliances with Burmese politicians or returned to India and Pakistan. Following the wholesale nationalization of the economy by Ne Win’s Revolutionary Council government in 1963, several hundred thousand South Asians, including many Muslims, returned to the countries of their ancestors. A significant Muslim community, however, remains in Yangon (Rangoon) and other cities in southern Myanmar.68

2.8 Islam in Cambodia

Islam is the religion of a majority of the Cham (also called Khmer Islam) and Malay minorities in Cambodia. There were 150,000 to 200,000 Muslims in Cambodia as late as 1975. Persecution under the Khmer Rouge69 eroded their numbers, however, and by the late 1980s they probably had not regained their former strength. All of the Cham Muslims are Sunnis of the Shafi’i school.70

The Muslim community of Cambodia prior to the victory of the Khmer Rouge in 1975 was essentially composed of Cams (or Chams) from the former kingdom of Campa (Champa). These people had been converted by Arab and Indian merchants and artisans. Large numbers of Cams emigrated to Cambodia in the fifteenth century. Also included in the Muslim community were Malays from present-day Malaysia and Indonesia, who also began to arrive in the fifteenth century, as well as Arabs, emigrants from the Indian subcontinent, and some indigenous converts. Cambodian Muslims have primarily been Sunni with practices and beliefs similar to other orthodox
Southeast Asian Muslims. They have tended to follow religious practices more regularly than their Vietnamese counterparts. In 1975 there were between 113 and 120 mosques with some three hundred religious teachers and three hundred preachers. A great many of these teachers had studied in Kelantan, Malaysia, and at Islamic universities in Cairo, India, or Medina. The years from independence to 1975 also saw the formation of Islamic organizations, for examples, the Islamic Association in Phnom Penh, which attempted to coordinate all cultural and religious activities, and an Islamic youth group that sought to encourage young people to study at the university.  

There were good relations between the Muslims and the majority Buddhist communities. During the pre-French period, Muslims played important military and political roles under the kings and held high titles through the centuries. Many Muslims acted as merchants who were also translators for the monarchs in their dealings with Europeans. During the French colonial period Muslims were completely removed from national decision making.

However, with the return of independence in 1953 Muslims again were placed on significant posts, including high ranks in the Cambodian military. The mass murder inflicted on the Cambodian population by the Khmer Rouge after 1975 severely decimated the Muslim population. An untold numbers were killed, and some twelve to fifteen thousand left the country for nearby
refugee camps or settlement overseas. Nearly half of the refugees went to Muslim-ruled Malaysia, while others settled in France, Australia, and the United States. Muslims also became part of anticommunist military units based on the Thai-Cambodian border. In 1980, of almost six hundred preachers and religious teachers who had resided in Cambodia in 1975, fewer than forty remained. Of the nearly 700,000 Muslims prior to 1975, only 150,000 to 190,000 remained. Cambodia’s elite were especially targeted by the Khmer Rouge, and this was also true for the Muslim leadership. For example, only one of the country’s nine graduates of al-Azhar University survived. During this period most of Cambodia’s mosques and Muslim religious books were also destroyed. The new government allowed the return of religious freedom, and many Muslims moved into important government posts.

Although the Muslim communities of Cambodia suffered from a real genocide during the period from 1975 to January 1979, now the members of the communities freely practice their religious obligations, and the current Government is making serious attempts to give them representations at all levels.73

2.9 Islam in Vietnam

A sizeable Muslim community lives in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. They are settled in three different regions: in the centre-east in Ho-
Chi-Minh city, in the south-west at Tay Ninh, and on the frontier with Cambodia at An Giang.\textsuperscript{74}

The exact date of Islam's spread in Indo-China is not known for certain. However, generally speaking, Islam arrived in Indo-China before it reached China during the Tang Dynasty (618-907). It was introduced by merchants from the Muslim world who sailed along the coastal cities. What is known for sure is that by the 11th century, Islam was already in Vietnam as evident from the recent discovery of two gravestones belonging to the Champa Muslims, dating the early 11th century.\textsuperscript{75}

The oldest of these communities is on the coastal planes of central Vietnam, in the former Annam, in the region of Thun Hai, This region is more than 300 km. North-east of Ho-Chi-Minh city, formerly Saigon. The members of this community also belong to the Cham ethnic group. It was this ethnic group which created the kingdom of Champa, a kingdom which reached its zenith during the 6\textsuperscript{th} and the 13\textsuperscript{th} centuries, before being destroyed by the Vietnamese in 1470. According to Phan Duc Duong, Deputy Director of the Ethnographic Institute of Hanoi, and Phuan Mewyen Long, specialists in the study of minorities and particularly the Cham, the Cham in this region are either Brahmins or Muslims, the latter represented a third of the population of 40,000 according to the 1964 census, the figures today are not precisely known. A large number of Muslim community lives in the major city of South Vietnam. Members of the community come from different
origins. Along with the Cham there are a sizable number of Indonesians, Malays, Indo-Pakistanis, Yemenis, Omanis, and North Africans. Before the re-unification of Viet Nam in 1975 there were in all more than 60,000 Muslims. The greater part, however, fled. Today, it is estimated that about 10,000 remain, all of them Vietnamese citizens.

2.10 East Timor

The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste or East Timor is the newest independent country in the world, located in south eastern Asia. It consists of the eastern half of the island of Timor, the nearby islands of Atauro and Jaco, and Oecussi-Ambeno, an exclave of East Timor situated on the north western side of the island, surrounded by Indonesian West Timor. The small country is located about 400 miles northwest of Darwin, Australia.

The name Timor is derived from timur the Malay word for 'east', which became Timor in Portuguese. The Portuguese name Timor-Leste and Tetum name Timor Lorosa'e are sometimes used in English. Lorosa'e means 'rising sun' in Tetum. East Timor has the lowest per capita GDP (Purchasing Power Parity adjusted) in the world of only $400 (which corresponds to the 192nd, and last, position). However, regarding HDI, it is in 140th place among the world's nations, which corresponds to medium human development.

Colonized by Portugal in the 16th century, East Timor was known as Portuguese Timor for centuries. It was invaded by Indonesia in 1975, which occupied it until 1999. Following the UN-sponsored act of self-determination
that year, Indonesia relinquished control of the territory, which achieved full independence on May 20, 2002. With the Philippines, East Timor is one of only two majority Roman Catholic countries in Asia.

The population is predominantly Roman Catholic (90%), with sizable Muslim (5%) and Protestant (3%) minorities. Smaller Hindu, Buddhist and animist minorities make up the remainder.

Islam has taken root within Southeast Asia since the fourteenth century, when port cities began to adopt the Sunni faith of Arab and Indian maritime traders. This conversion extended northwards through the Malay peninsular into southern Thailand and south and east through the northern coasts of the Indonesian Archipelago and then northwards from Borneo to the island of Luzon in the Philippines. In the case of Myanmar (Burma), Islam spread to the Arakan region overland from India. Islam became identified with state power in Southeast Asia from the fifteenth century shortly after the foundation of the trading empire of Malacca based on the west coast of the Malay Peninsula. But after the fall of Malacca to the Portuguese in the early sixteenth century, its adherents dispersed to other parts of the Indonesian Archipelago where their faith became most deeply accepted among coastal trading communities. In Java, Islam was later adopted by local princes to underpin their mystical power but primarily as a cultural veneer on entrenched animist and Hindu-Buddhist beliefs whose syncretic legacy is to
be found in eastern and central parts of the island. The Islamic faith was also employed to mobilize opposition to Dutch colonial control.

Islam is in a minority position in Cambodia, Myanmar (Burma), the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. With the exceptions of Cambodia and Singapore, heightened ethno-religious identity in the face of discrimination by the dominant culture has led to abortive separatist violence which has been met with repressive reaction. The Cham Islamic minority in Cambodia are the displaced survivors of the Kingdom of Champa (once located in central Vietnam), which was extinguished by the drive southwards of the Vietnamese in the fifteenth century. They enjoyed a tolerated existence after independence until they became victims of civil war and the bestiality of the Khmer Rouge during the 1970s. A significant number escaped as refugees to Malaysia, since the downfall of the Khmer Rouge regime in 1979, the Cambodian Cham have virtually disappeared as a separate community.
Notes and References


3. Qadiriyyah, Qadiri brotherhood is one of the oldest Sufi orders, taking its name from Persian theologian Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani (1078-1166). An expert in Hanbali law, Abd al-Qadir embraced Sufism late in his life. His preaching inspired disciples from all over the Islamic world, including Christians and Jews. Abd al-Qadir’s teachings reconciled mysticism with the teachings of Islamic law. He believed Muslims should embark on a personal Jihad to conquer their desires and submit to the will of God. After Abd al-Qadir’s death, his followers created legends about him, some of which earned him the wrath of his colleagues. According to oral tradition, Abd al-Qadir’s grandson brought the movement to Spain. Christian persecution, however, forced the Qadiriyyah to flee to North Africa in the 1400s. The order gained strength in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and the Sudan. By the 1800s, it had reached Nigeria, Mali, Guinea, and Senegal. Several offshoot movements formed in Africa. The Qadiriyyah movement remains strong today, with a following in India, Pakistan, Turkey, and the Middle East. In addition, the Qadiri’s have formed communities in China, Indonesia, Central Asia, southern Europe, Somalia, and the East African coast.

4. Naqshbandiyah, refers to one of the most widespread and active orders within Sufism. Naqshbandi groups exist in most Islamic regions of Asia, but until recently they have not been common among Arabs. Naqshbandis are found in Turkey, Bosnia and some states of the former Soviet Union, and much of Southeast Asia, especially in Indonesia. The order is characterized by strict observance of traditional Islamic law, avoidance of music and dance, and a preference for silent dhikr (Sufi chant for the remembrance of God). The order has tended to be politically active. The Naqshbandiyah originated in the late 1300s in Bukhara, a city in present-day Uzbekistan, a republic in the former

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Soviet Union. Within 100 years, the order spread to adjacent areas of the Muslim world. A branch of the order, called the *Mujaddidi*, became especially popular. It was founded by Sheikh Ahmad Sirhindi, who was known as the first *mujaddid*, or “renewer”, of Islam. In the early 1800s, India emerged as an important *centre* of the *Naqshbandi* order, largely because of a teacher named Ghulam Ali. Attracting followers from India, Central Asia, and the Middle East, his students continued to spread his teachings throughout the Muslim world. One of Ghulam Ali’s students, Mawlana Khalid, began another branch of *Naqshbandiyah*, called *Khalidiyah*. Maulana Khalid is sometimes considered to be the second “renewer” of Islam. He tried to centralize the *Khalidiyah*, making it a disciplined order focused on himself. In other ways, the *Khalidiyah* resembled the *Mujaddidi* branch. *Khalidiyah* spread quickly, reaching Southeast Asia within a few decades. In recent years, *Naqshbandi* teachers have become more prominent in the Eastern Arab world and in North America.

*Madrasahs* play a major role in Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. The *madrasahs* in these nations exist within an educational system called *pondok* in Malay archipelagoes and *pesantren* in Indonesian islands. Derived from the terms for “inn” and “religious students”, *pesantren* are boarding schools that teach various aspects of theology. In Indonesia, some 40,000 *pesantren* teach about 8 million students, mostly in rural areas. Most *pesantren* admit male students, where they live together, cook their own meals and wash their own clothes. A few admit women, and others have separate dormitories for men and women. Students travel among the *pesantren* to study different subjects, earning a certificate from each teacher. Each *pesantren* is headed by a teacher-leader (*kiyayi*), who serves as the driving force behind the school, and most *pesantren* decline following the death or departure of the *Kiyayi*. The *pesantren* operate solely through personal donations. The Indonesian government, however, sponsors state-run *madrasahs* that prepare students for higher religious education after they have learned secular subjects. These *madrasahs* operate at
the elementary, middle, and high school levels. Since the 1970s, the government has added secular subjects to the elementary school madrasahs. Around 70 percent of the instruction in these schools and 30 percent of the instruction in the high schools resolves around nonreligious subject matter. Singapore claims nearly 40 madrasahs, each offering either elementary or secondary education. In the 1970s, secular subjects were added to the curricula of these schools. Madrasah students can take the same examinations as students from secular schools. Those who wish to travel to the Middle East for higher education must complete a year at Madrasah al-Juneid al-Islamiyah, the only one of Singapore’s madrasahs from which al-Azhar accepts certificates. Because Thailand has a tiny Muslim population, Muslim schools encourage students to spread Islam by preaching in remote areas. In the 1960s, Thai government worked to standardize madrasahs. It converted all of the country’s pondoks into private schools, helping to set their courses of study. It has also developed programs to send students to Middle Eastern universities.


The Abangan are the population of Javanese Muslims who practice a less orthodox version of Islam than the traditionalist Santri. Abangan are more inclined to follow a local system of beliefs called adat than pure Sharia (Islamic law). Their belief system integrates Hinduism, Buddhism and Animist traditions.

*Slametan*, feast festival which is originally derived from Hindu's ritual.

*Santri*, is an Indonesian term deriving from pesantren, which is the name for a village religious school. It has come to be implied, primarily in Java, to distinguish Indonesian Muslims of a strict orthodoxy from the Abangan whose Islam is a synthesis comprising in part animist and Hindu-Buddhist beliefs with a mystical content. Since independence, *Santri* have been identified with political parties such as Masjumi and Nahdutul Ulama and since the merger of all Islamic parties in 1973 with the United Development Party (Partai
The term is a convenient category for foreign scholars rather than a precise basis for common identity on the part of devout Muslims.

**Halal**, permissible products which are allowed according to the *Shari'ah* or Islamic law.


Fred R. Von Der Mehden, *op.cit.* p. 198.


Fred R. Von Der Mehden, *op. cit.*, p. 199


Ibid., p. 200.


The **May 13 Incident** is a term for the Chinese-Malay race riots in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, on May 13, 1969. The riots continued for a substantial period of time, and the government declared a state of national emergency, suspending Parliament until 1971. Officially, 196 people were killed as a result of the riots between May 13 and July 31, although journalists and other observers gave much higher figures. The government cited the riot as the main
cause of its more aggressive affirmative action policies, such as the New Economic Policy (NEP), after 1969.

M. Kamal Hasan, op. cit., p. 37.

Shari'ah (Arabic: شريعة; also Shari'ah, Shari'a, Shariah or Syariah) is the Arabic word for Islamic law. In the Islamic state sharia governs both public and private lives of those living within the state. Sharia governs many aspects of day-to-day life; politics, economics, banking, business law, contract law, and social issues. The term Sharia refers to the body of Islamic law. Some accept Sharia as the body of precedent and legal theory before the 19th century, while other scholars view Sharia as a changing body, and include reform Islamic legal theory from the contemporary period.

http://www.jcpa.org/jl/jl436.htm


Islam Hadhari (الإسلام الحضاري) or "Civilizational Islam" is a theory of government based on the principles of Islam as derived from the Qur'an. It was originally founded by Tunku Abdul Rahman in 1957 (but under a different name), and is now being promoted by the current Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi.

It consists of 10 fundamental principles:

- Faith and piety in Allah
- Just and trustworthy government
- Freedom and independence to the people
- Mastery of knowledge
- Balance and comprehensive economic development
- Good quality of life for all
- Protection of the rights of minority groups and women
- Cultural and moral integrity
- Protection of the environment
- A strong defence policy

At that time, the Filipino Army was allegedly putting a group of Muslims through secret commando-style training called "jahaidah." Their mission would be to agitate among the people of Sabah and North Borneo to demand annexation by the Philippines. When the Moros refused to undertake the mission, they were summarily shot for mutiny.

The 13 provinces included the five (Maguindano, Lanao, Del Sur, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi) with absolute Muslim majorities. The total population of the Sulu and Mindanao regions had a large Catholic majority. There are now 14 provinces.


John L. Esposito, (ed.), *op. cit.*, V.4, p. 212.


The **Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909** or **Bangkok Treaty of 1909** was a treaty between the United Kingdom and Siam signed on March 10, 1909 in Bangkok. The agreement, in which the Malays were not represented, effectively dissected the northern Malay states into two parts. The area around modern Pattani, Narathiwat (Menara), Songkhla (Singgora), Satun (Setul) and Yala (Jala) remained under Siam, while Siam relinquished its claims to sovereignty over Kedah, Kelantan, Perlis, and Terengganu to the United Kingdom. Originally, Setul and Perlis were part of Kedah. These four states, along with Johor later became known as the Unfederated Malay States. The British logic for sanctioning the continued Siamese occupation of the remaining northern half of the Malaya was the perceived value of Siam as a friendly buffer against the French in Indo-china. Previously in 1826, both signees of the 1909 treaty agreed to the Burney Treaty. The Burney Treaty stated that Kedah, Kelantan, Perlis and Terengganu were Siamese provinces while Penang and Province Wellesly belonged to the British while Siam would not interfere with British
trade in Kelantan and Terengganu. This agreement as a long lasting effect on both Thailand and Federation of Malaysia. The border of these two countries is mainly drawn by this treaty. Moreover, to some extent, Patani separatist movement is due to Patani’s refusal to recognize Siam’s domination over it and ultimately the deal made between the United Kingdom and Siam.


Ibid.


David Brown, op. cit., p. 66


Lukman Thaib, op. cit., p. 108.

The author had interviewed Dr. Ahmad Omar Chapakia, Vice Rector of Yala Islamic College, while he was in India for academic purpose in February, 2006.


W.K. Che Man, op. cit., p. 165.

T.J.S. George, Revolt in Mindanao: The Rise of Islam in Philippine Politics, (New York, 1980), p. 120.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Myanmar


Khmer Rouge. The pejorative term Khmer Rouge (Red Cambodians) was originally applied to the country’s Communist movement in the 1960s by the head of the state, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, to differentiate them from the right-wing Khmer Bleu. That movement had by then become dominated by an
indigenous intellectual leadership which had been converted to Marxism while students together in Paris. By the late 1960s, it had mounted an insurgency which exploited rural discontent. In March 1970 Prince Sihanouk was overthrown by a right-wing coup while out of the country. In exile in the People’s Republic of China, he joined a united front with his Communist adversaries against the government in Phnom Penh headed by General Lon Nol. The term Khmer Rouge stuck, nonetheless. Its revolutionary army, initially spearheaded by Vietnamese intervention, achieved military victory in April 1975. A reign of collectivist terror was then launched under the leadership of party leader Pol Pot in an attempt to create an ideal socialist society, which led to up to 1 million deaths.


74 http://www.angelfire.com/vt/vietnamesemuslims/hstry.html
75 Seddik Taouti, op. cit., pp. 197-199.
76 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/East_Timor