Chapter IV

Islāmic Resurgence
Anwar al-Sadāt Era
Jamāl ‘Abd al-Nasser died on 28 September 1970 due to heart attack. Anwar al-Sadāt (b.1918) was appointed his successor. He was elected President of the country by the National Assembly of Egypt and was confirmed by the process of referendum on 17 October 1970. Anwar al-Sadāt was one of the members of Revolutionary Command Council of Free Officers and close associate of Jamāl ‘Abd al-Nasser. He had been jailed for his revolutionary activities in his student days. After the ‘Free Officers’ revolution on 23 July 1952, he was then appointed as the editor of Jumhuriya, the voice of the Revolutionary Command Council (R.C.C.). Before becoming Vice-President of Egypt in December 1969, he served as president of the Egyptian National Assembly.

After coming to power, Anwar al-Sadāt ended the state sponsored terrorism and barbaric actions of al-Nasser era. He ended the police rule and gave the superiority to the by-laws of the country. He raised voice against the secret police and burnt all papers and cassettes in the presence of the people, which were made the basis to pursue barbaric actions and attack the honour of those people who were treated as opponents in al-Nasser era. In May 1971, he removed Vice-President, Ali Sabri; War Affairs Minister, Mohammad Fauzi and Home Minister, Sharavi Juma from their portfolios and put them in jail. They were responsible for state sponsored terrorism during al-Nasser era. He also accused this group of plotting to over-throw the regime with the Soviet backing.

So far as the External policy is concerned, in the beginning, he signed a 15 year agreement with Russia in May 1971. Under this agreement, Russia had to provide arms and economic assistance. The agreement could not come to its logical conclusion due to the hypocritical role
played by Russia. The relations between the two countries increasingly became severe due to the earstwhile Soviet Union (now only Russia) support to India during the war for East Pakistan. With the result al-Sadat, made friendship with the U.S.A. In 1972, he ordered 20,000 Soviet military observers and experts to leave the country. After that he paid attention towards Israel. Suez Canal played an important role in the economy of Egypt but it was blocked since 1967. Due to this situation, Egypt was dependant economically upon Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. To solve this tangle, Anwar al-Sadat asked Israel, if they would leave the Eastern Coast of the Suez Canal, the canal would be opened. When he failed in this effort, he made arrangements with Syria and kept the whole operation secret. On 6th October 1973, his troops crossed the Suez Canal and broke through the Bar Lev Line. Consequently the Israeli troops left the Eastern Coast of the Suez Canal. The victory made al-Sadat popular among the Arab leaders. Egypt got back Abu Rudeis oil fields, Mitla and Giddi passes. The war began in the month of Ramadhan under the code name Badr. Al-Sadat proclaimed himself batal al-ubur, hero of the crossing. But before the cease-fire on 24th October 1973, Israel attacked Egypt and captured 300 sq. miles of Egyptian territory in South Western Coast of the Suez Canal. However, in the post war negotiations, al-Sadat worked vigorously for a negotiated settlement of the dispute, and his efforts culminated with his trip to Jerusalem and the signing of an Egyptian – Israeli peace treaty on 26th March, 1979 at Washington, known as ‘Camp David Accord’. According to this agreement Israel returned the Sinai to Egyptian sovereignty as promised in the 1975 agreement. In this way Egypt achieved such type of success against Israel after a long struggle in last
twenty-seven years, and took revenge of 1967 defeat. Anwar al-Sadat announced that 6th October would be celebrated as National Day instead of 23rd July. In 1975 Suez Canal was opened for international shipping and its income enabled Egypt to become independent from the financial dependence of the Arab countries. On the other hand the Arab country especially Syria and Iraq opposed this agreement. Most of the Arab counties such as Syria, Algeria, Yemen and Libya broke away diplomatic ties with Egypt and called back their ambassadors from Cairo. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait stopped financial assistance also.

In 1972, Anwar al-Sadat tried to make federation of Syria and Egypt, but he failed. Then he signed a treaty with president Qadhafi of Libya, to make federation of Libya and Egypt in 1973. But the treaty was cancelled in 1974 because the people of Egypt did not want moral restrictions, which they would have to accept after making confederation with Libya. The people of Egypt became so much westernized that they could not accept any kind of moral restrictions. The relations were so much strained between the two countries, about the issue of Israel, that in July 1977 they used military strength against one another. They destroyed arms and ammunition in the war with one another, which could have been used against their common enemy i.e. the West.

He concentrated his attention on four matters: democratising the political process, Infitah or open door policy, expanding Egypt’s relations with other countries and reforming the military.

He gave more freedom to the press. During al-Nasser era, single-party system prevailed but al-Sadat allowed other political parties too to operate. New constitution was drafted.

172
Religious Policies of Anwar al-Sadāt

When Anwar al-Sadāt came in power, in September 1970, the constitution of 1965 was in practice in Egypt. On 11th of September 1971, permanent constitution was legislated in the country. The name of the country was cancelled and the republic was named as Arab Republic of Egypt. It was ‘United Arab Republic’ earlier. The constitution made Islām the official religion of the country, while the Shariah was declared as a source of legislation. The following words were written in the constitution about Islām and the Shariah:

“Islām is the religion of the state, Arabic is its official language, and the principles of the Islāmic Shariah a principal source of legislation”.

He introduced al-Infitah (the open door policy) in the economic field. According to this policy, there would be no dominance of the public sector and it would cooperate with the private sector. The policy encouraged foreign investments. Al-Sadāt accelerated the construction of commercial industries with the help of financial aid and planning policies of U.S. Aswān Dam was completed which helped in the cultivation of Upper Nile region, projects in the Delta and along the middle Nile. The Suez Canal, which was closed in 1969, was reopened in 1975.

He cut off relations with Soviet Union, ordered the withdrawal of Russian technicians and advisors on 18th July 1972. He invited Europeans and Americans to finance and invest in Egypt. He made friendly ties with Saudi Arabia and other Arab states, and re-established diplomatic relations with Irān. Besides above-mentioned countries, Egypt received loans rom Soviet Union and China also.
He used foreign aid for the strengthening of his army, purchasing of arms, organized training programmes and constructed airfields.

He was struggling to be regarded as a leader in his own right and to enhance his political legitimacy. He appropriated the title 'The Believer President.' His prayers at the mosques and Islamic programmes were covered by the mass media. He increased Islamic programmes and courses in the schools. Besides this he built a number of mosques in the country. He used Quranic references and Islamic symbols in speeches at public gatherings and cast the 1973 Arab-Israeli war as Jihad. He personally attended religious ceremonies such as (Eid-e-Milād). Islamic criminal laws were reinstated, ribā was banned and women were asked to be segregated from men in public transport and in university education and excluded from certain professions. A series of bills were introduced in the parliament on Islamic penalties for usury, apostasy, theft, adultery and drinking. Most of which were withdrawn, after the protests by both-the Copts and liberal Muslims. There is no doubt, however, as to his personal devotion to the cause of Islam. As he himself said:

"After October 6th 1973 a great change was ushered into the Armed forces...there is no question the slogan 'freedom, socialism and unity', is still valid...and it will remain part of our basic principles. However, the slogan Allah-u-Akbar has become our cri de guerre; reflecting the change in the spiritual make up of our troops."

And to, Western audiences, he said:

"Al-Sadat was passionately devoted to science and technology as he was to Islam. He admitted that Egypt is an Islamic country, so it should open up to modern technology as a means of strengthening itself and Islam. Once, when questioned in this regard, al-Sadāt responded
with cool mind. As for our plans in the coming five to six years. You know that we are Muslims, first of all, and we believe in Allah’s will.”

Although his fore-most concerns were science and technology, but he was also well aware about the facts that modernity has its own shortcomings. He admitted that due to weak faith in spiritual values the rate of suicide was highest in the ‘Advanced Countries’. He emphasized that our country should not depend only on science, technology and computers but should preserve and revive our traditions and spiritual values. He cited the example of Vietnam and regarded that advanced technology in computer science could not save it. If they had depended upon scientific technology, it would have been impossible for them to win the war of 1973 against Israel. It was not scientific technology, which made us capable to overpower the enemy, but it was faith and inner spiritual strength.

He appeared in public as a devout Muslim. He allowed Islāmic legislation but also stressed democratic ways and the need to avoid fundamentalism. He received al-Azhar’s blessings for his peace initiative and condemned Irān and Libya for distorting Islām and warned al-Ikhwān that it held no monopoly over Islām. Everyone accepted al-Sadāt and his policies as long as he did not make peace with Israel. He was regarded as hero of the second Islāmic conference held in Lahore in 1974 but treated as outcast after signing the peace treaty with Israel. His move was deadly rejected by the Islāmic conferences and excluded from these gatherings since 1979. Moreover peace treaty was condemned in the Ta’-if conference of February 1981 and jihād was announced to get back the occupied lands from Israel. On this issue, a relation was maintained between Islām as an international political force and opposition to al-Sadat. Al-Ikhwān and other Islāmist
groups sought to link up with Iran and Libya, where Islamic norms have taken over most aspects of life, in the domestic matters.

**Islamic resurgence**

Anwar al-Sadat used Islam to strengthen his legitimacy. Death of al-Nasser removed a major obstacle to the full-scale emergence of Islamic fundamentalism. A committed Muslim with a traditional background al-Sadat paid attention to the rising Islamic sentiment both in and outside.

The official policies of al-Sadat's government gave greater recognition to Islamic themes. The recognition was the product of a general resurgence of Muslim consciousness, especially among the educated political elite. Educated youth, students and administrators reaffirmed Islam. They were more regular in their prayers; the Friday prayers were attended by a large number of people. School and university female students adopted Islamic dress. Religious associations found new adherents among the young as well as the old, within the schools, colleges, universities, and government offices and in all walks of life. There was a change in the dress of the people. The men adopted modest dress and gave up wearing open shirts, tight-pants and gold-chains. The women started to wear long gowns with long sleeves and a head veil.

Al-Ikhwan al-Muslinin encouraged new wave of Islamic fundamentalism, which can be demonstrated in the Friday sermons in the mosques, in the press and through the sale of religious works in the street stands. That was the right time for al-Ikhwan to ride high because the movement had a stern demand of refutation of modernization and westernization, which could pave the way for the
implementation of the *Shariah*. In addition to this al-Ikhwān called publicly for the rescue of Palestine from Zionist occupation and the extermination of Israel.

This was the situation, which was deadly going against the steps of peace initiative and modernization programmes of al-Sadāt. He did not at first move decisively against al-Ikhwān and other Islāmist groups. He was unable to follow al Nasser, who had cruelly suppressed al-Ikhwān in 1950s and 1960s. Al-Sadāt's liberal policies allowed Islāmist groups and al-Ikhwān to operate freely, although he was well aware of the negative role played by Shah of Irān to suppress Islāmist and other opposition groups. Another aspect of the government's religious policy was its relaxation on the expression of fundamentalist ideas, controlled by al-Nasser. Suppressed by al-Nasser, al-Ikhwān was allowed to declare its goals publicly and permitted its resurgence in order to search allies against leftist factions. Governor of Asyūt, Mohammad Uthmān Ismail mobilized Islāmic groups to take action against the Nasserist group, which helped small Islāmist groups like al-Jamā‘ah al- Islāmiyyah (Islāmic Community) to gain public recognition.

The Islāmic student movement in Egypt gained influence outside al-Azhar Univeristy from December 1972 formed one pillar of the new definition of the Islāmic republic. The second important pillar consisted of secessionist tendencies, which operate from the provinces of al-Minya and Asyūt.

In almost all the universities of Egypt, the students having Islāmic understanding won the student union elections. Many books were published on 'The Oppression' of Jamāl ‘Abd al-Nasser era and various editions of these books were published which became popular in the public.
The Government showed positive response in this regard but indirectly it was trying to stop these things because religious understanding could have created dangers for it. To suppress the leftist powers and the negative approach of Soviet Union, stopped Anwar al-Sadat to act against the religious minded people. In this way al-Sadāt was compelled by these circumstances, so he made such steps, which were beneficial for the religious minded people.

Al-Sadāt was more conservative than al-Nasser and had more sympathies with Egypt than Arab world. His political career had begun with the milieu of al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn. So after coming to power, he set-free the leaders and members of al-Ikhwān and many others from the jails, treated by al-Nasser as opponents of the government.

Although al-Ikhwān remained illegal, as an organization, its members enjoyed freedom of expression. Publication of its two monthly magazines *al-Dawāh* and *al-E’tisām* was allowed. ‘Al-Dawah started its publication in July 1976.' 28 Fifty thousand copies of it were published and it was so popular that all the copies were distributed in a single day. And it continued publishing the same number of every issue regularly.

Other Islāmist groups active in university campuses were also allowed to participate in student union elections and such groups engaged themselves in many social service activities.

Al-Sadāt was himself a democratic socialist. During al-Nasser era single party system prevailed in the form of Arab Socialist Union (A.S.U.). But, in 1977, al-Sadāt allowed three more socialist parties to establish. In the 1979 elections, al-Sadāt’s Nationalist Democratic Party (NDP) won 330 seats out of 392 and Socialist Labour Party
(SLP) won 29. Al-Ikhwān had not been allowed to operate as a political organization till date.

Egypt was ashamed of the defeat by the Israel in 1967, so the victory in 1973 rose up its prestige and restored its lost dignity to a great extent. But the jubilation did not long last. The Infitah started in 1974, did not produce fruitful results. There was inflation in the country and the prices of food were high, lowering the wages. In 1976-77 students and workers came out on streets in Alexandria, Cairo and other cities and towns, demonstrated against the failure of government policies. There was fighting at some places between the para-military forces and the protestors, which resulted in the arrest of a number of people. The unrest in the students and the workers was the appearance of fundamentalist Islamic groups and a series of bombings and assassinations.

In February 1977, following the directions of International Monetary Fund (IMF) the government-stopped subsidies on wheat and dairy products. Reacting on it, the demonstrators came out on streets in Cairo and Alexandria and attacked the nightclubs, cinemas and banks. They were demanding restoration of subsidies or resignation of al-Sadāt. The incident is known as 'bread riots.' Consequently a gulf was created between the people and al-Sadāt. On the one hand, Western leaders called him as statesman, peacemaker and best-dressed man but on the other hand his people criticized him for the domestic corruption and his inclination towards Israel and the Shah of Iran. He responded well through stressing Islāmic themes in his speeches such as Ḭmān (faith), sulh (toughness), asalah (genuineness), sabr (patience), mahabbah (love) amal (hope), tawfiq (God-given success) and hidayah (God-given...
guidance). The thrust of the propaganda was to convince
the people to accept their lot and hope for a better future.29

During the mid-seventies, he pursued three tier
policies in the Islamic sphere.
(a) To gain the support of Egypt’s Islamic leadership,
centered in the al-Azhar University and large Govt.
supported mosques.
(b) Some concessions to al-Ikhwan to neutralize the
fundamentalist opposition and to utilize it against the
Nasserites;
(c) To suppress the militant fundamentalist groups whose
activities threatened the regime.30

‘Camp David Accord’ between Egypt and Israel in
March 1979 was not acceptable to other Arab countries
because they did not want Israel be recognized by the Arab
countries without solving the problem of Palestinian
autonomy. Al-Sadat’s agreement cast doubts to the leaders
of Arab countries and they ousted Egypt from the Arab
community, suspended financial assistance to Egypt and
transferred the Arab League headquarters from Cairo to
Tunis. The Prime Minister of Egypt, Mohammad Ibrāhīm
Kāmil, who had been present at Camp David, resigned in
protest. Al-Sadāt must have known the attachment of Islām
with Arabism and Jerusalem.

In the 1976 elections, al Ikhwān joined other political
groups to elect the pro-government majority in the Peoples,
Assembly, which placed al-Ikhwān in an awkward position
during the riots of Jan. 1977. In these riots nightclubs, bars
and prostitution centers were destroyed by Islamicist
elements.31 In 1977 al-Ikhwān criticized the Egypt Israel
peace Treaty, the Infitah and al-Sadāt’s pro-Western
outlook particularly regarding women. The former also
accused al-Sadāt of favouring Christian minority in the
Muslim-Coptic riots. Islamic revolution of 1979 in Iran gave encouragement to al-Ikhwan in pursuing its goal of establishing an Islamic order in Egypt.

Little by little Islamic organizations began to show opposition to the Westernizing currents that swept the country after 1977. Now the Muslim groups formed the considerable opposition. They were not against the modernizing policies of al-Sadat but expressing their rejection of Westernization, the consequences of *al-Infitaḥ* and peace with Israel, and increasing of corruption. They were showing disaffection with the consequences of ‘Camp David Accord’, which provided Israel a full opportunity to blow up the nuclear reactor in Iraq, the series of bombing raids over Lebanon, oppression of Palestinians and increased settlements on the West Bank. These groups viewed such actions as a punishment of making relations with the Western countries. They were of the strong opinion that only and only the return of Islam, religious traditions, and religious and moral values could restore Egypt’s glory.

Some of these religious groups were content to perform religious duties. But some of them opted militant approach to overthrow government, seize power and establish Islamic form of government in the country. The militant groups believed that those who did not join them should not be treated as Muslims but should be killed.

During the late 1970s al-Ikhwan and al-Jamā‘ah al-Islāmiyyah criticized al-Sadat government. It was the tragedy with the Egypt that its rulers always, before and after the 1952 revolution, treated Islāmists as their opponents. They used their full strength to minimise their impact. God has provided Egypt with the wealth of knowledge; cultural, intellectual and military capability;
self-confidence, leadership and so many things. But unfortunately this wealth is being ruined in mutual struggle. So it is obvious that the Islāmist and Islāmic minded people would rebel against the cruel rulers.

Militant underground groups such as Shabāb Mohammad (Mohammad’s Youth) al-Takfīr wa al-Hijrah (al-Jamā’at al-Muslimīn) and al-Jihād wanted to overthrow al-Sadāt regime and to implement Islāmic government therein. They began their guerilla war against government officials, minorities and other Muslims, whom they treated as infidels.

In 1977, al-Takfīr wa al-Hijrah unveiled the un-Islāmic policies of al-Sadāt and his subordinates. They abducted and then killed Dr. Hussayn al-Dahabi, Religious and Endowments Minister. Through the mass media al-Sadāt openly launched campaign against the activities of Islāmist militants. He disgraced learned men and religious books. In this way it was unveiled that al-Sadāt had that conception of Islām, of which the Western philosophers are preachers i.e. limited prayer and total segregation from daily life and politics.

In February 1979, he called for the separation of the religion and politics, a position seen as un-Islāmic by Muslim organizations calling for an Islāmic state and the implementation of Islāmic law. He banned Islāmist student groups in the universities and extended state control to private mosques. In April 1980, he made amendment in the constitution declaring that, Islām is the religion of the state and Shariah the main source of legislation. Actually he failed to implement Islāmic laws and his pro-western policies, which brought him death penalty.
Many Egyptians did not regard al-Sadat as their father and resented being called, his children, due to his economic and foreign policies. Al-Ikhwan and other Islamist groups gained control in the student unions in the universities, bureaucracy and to some extent in the army. During the Muslim-Christian communal riots in September 1981, he arrested 1500 people including Islamists, lawyers, doctors, journalists, university professors, political opponents, ex-ministers and religious scholars and warned that he would arrest 5000 more unless the dissidents did not behave well. He also took direct control of the mosques. The situation worsened due to the foreign policy of al-Sadat because he had failed to solve Palestinian issue and U.S. president Ronald Reagan could not help him in this situation. Finally on 6th October 1981, he was killed by his own soldiers passing in front of the reviewing stand at a military parade celebrating the anniversary of the victory of 1973 war. The group was led by Khalid al-Islambuli of al-Jihad group. Al-Sadat was a Nobel Prize winner with Israel’s P. M. Menachem Begin (1913-92) for ‘Camp David Accord’.

Moderate policy of Anwar al-Sadat provided a chance to Islamic organizations to pursue their goals. Al-Sadat showed a much greater tolerance to Islamist groups in the beginning, which resulted in increasing power of these groups. Although he encouraged governmental and religious cooperation to moderates, he also attacked militants. He was against the critical revolution in Iran and was willing to provide political asylum to Shah of Iran deposed in 1980.

The Islamist militant organizations had deep roots during the period of Anwar al-Sadat. Before 1970’s al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun was a dominant organization. During
the 1970s a large number of groups emerged in Egypt, shared a common spirit with al-Ikhwan, but the latter no longer offered them a political forum. During the period of al-Sadat, al-Ikhwan played a moderate role in Egypt. In April 1974, a year after the death of its leader al-Hudaibi, it published a declaration calling upon its members to support al-Sadat's al-Infitah policy and to side with the state to fight the isolationists. On the other hand, the militant groups, who showed their allegiance to al-Ikhwan, were thinking totally different from al-Ikhwan in terms of methods of working. In most of the programmes e.g., the creation of an Islamic state and the enforcement of Islamic law, they were similar to the programmes of Hasan al-Bannā. Egyptian fundamentalism is more traditional than militant and it does not differ from the basic fundamentalist ideology of the past decades. Most of the groups opposed the policies and programmes of al-Sadat in particular the negotiations and peace treaty with Israel, close ties with United Sates and the sympathy with the Shah of Iran.

The fundamentalist groups were purely local, organized around private mosques. They performed a variety of welfare activities, which include establishment of co-operative food stores, sewing rooms for the poor women and many other aiding programmes for the students. The operating centers of these organizations were university campuses, encouraged by al-Sadat regime to counter the influence of the leftists among students. In a short span of time, they became independent and reflected the Islamic resurgence. The largest group Al-Jamā‘ah al-Islāmiyyah won student union elections almost in every Egyptian university in 1977-78. It follows the track of al-Ikhwān al-Muslimun. It provides students with textbooks,
tutorials, Islamic clothing to women and other social services.

**Militant Groups**

Besides al-Jamā’ah al-Islāmiyyah, al-Ilkhwān and other social service organizations, three main militant organizations emerged on the scene. Political life was shaken by these organizations during al-Sadāt era. The first is Munazzamāh al-Tahrīr al-Islāmi (Islamic Liberation Organization) known in the Arab mass media as Jamā’at al-Fanniyya al-Askariyya (the Technical Military Academy Group). It is also known as Shabāb Mohammad (Mohammad’s Youth). Although there have been other fundamentalist organizations under this name. The second is Jamā’at al-Muslimīn (The Society of Muslims) known in the Arab mass media as al-Takfīr wa al-Hijrah (Repentance and Holy Flight). The Third militant organization is al-Jihād (the Holy Struggle), which is also know as, ‘New Jihād’ or ‘Islamic Jihād. All these three organizations were formed after 1967 war.

Several years after Sayyid Qutb’s death, a number of underground neo-activist Islamic groups arose within Egypt. Sayyid Qutb’s influence before 1970’s on al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn was also seen on the new militant organizations during 1970’s. He was a role model of these organizations. Three things are worth mentioning here in this respect. Firstly, as a theoretician, he played a key role in regenerating and redirecting Islamic ideology. Secondly, as a member of al-Ikhwān, he provided organizational continuity between the organization and its offshoots. Thirdly as an activist, his death provided the younger militants with a model of martyrdom to emulate.

It was Sayyid Qutb, who played a pivotal role in the re-emergence of al-Ikhwān as a force in the early stage of 1960’s. The 1966 suppression of al-Ikhwān by al-Nasser
changed the ideology and action of fundamentalism. The ideological influence of Sayyid Qutb in prison shaped the Islamist movement of the 1970's. It was his writings in and outside the prison, which influenced the young militants.

He followed the path of Ibn Hazm, Ibn Taymiyyah and his disciples. He was also influenced by the ideas and philosophy of Hasan al-Banna and Maulāna Abul Ala Mawdūdī. Sayyid Qutb derived the idea of *al-hakīmmiyah* from the larger notion of *ulūhiyyah* meaning divine power or sovereignty, and from *rububiyyah* and *rabbaniyyah*—meaning divinity or Lordship. In this way Qutb was trying to revive the fundamentalist theology of Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyyah and Ibn Taymiyyah. Qutb’s main aim was to wake up the Muslims for the establishment of *al-hakimiyah* (God’s authority on earth). To achieve this goal it would be necessary to form a group of dedicated Muslims (*Mujahideen*) prepared to wage *jihād* against the sinful society. Both Qutb and Mawdūdī’s writings favoured the legitimacy (*walayah*) of those who joined the *hijrah* (Holy flight). He emphasized that the Muslims should follow the Prophet’s (S.A.W.) path of *hijrah* by separating themselves from the sinful society and establishes a strong group of pious Muslims to fight against the *jāhili* (ignorant) society for the establishment of God’s authority on earth. Now I feel it necessary to furnish a detailed report of these organizations—their ideology, membership and their activities.

**Munazzamāh al-Tahrīr al-Islāmi**  
*(Islamic Liberation Organization)*

It is also known as Shabāb Mohammad (Mohammad’s Youth). In the Arab mass media, it is called Jamā’at Fanniyya al-Askariyya (the Technical Military Academy).
It was founded by al-Nabhāni after 1967, which died in 1973. The organization followed the fundamentalist ideals of al-Bannā and Sayyid Qutb. It advocated strict obligation of five pillars of Islām. The organization regarded Egyptian ruling order as being corrupt and humbled by the West, Israel and the Soviet Union. They regarded government as their main enemy and centered their attack on it. It believed that *al-adl asas al-hukm* (Justice is the foundation of rule). Rulers should be faithful, pious, rational and obeying *Shariah*. It is the duty of the Shūra (elected body) to make the rulers answerable and accountable before the people. In case the latter fail in delivering the goods rightly, the ‘Shura’ should remove them. They adopted modern techniques to achieve their goals.

Basically al-Hizb al-Tahrīr (Islāmic Liberation Party) was founded in Saʿūdi Arabia and Jordan in 1953 by diaspora Palestinias led by Shaykh Taqiuddīn al-Nabhāni Filastyni (the Palestinian). A graduate from Al-Azhar University Cairo, al-Nabhāni was a schoolteacher and a local Islāmic judge before he was forced to leave Palestine to make way for the new country of Israel. He settled in Jordan in 1953, and there set up the movement. He wrote many books and leaflets during his lifetime, which form the core belief of al-Tahrīr after 1967, he founded Munazzamāh al-Tahrīr al-Islāmi in Egypt. He died in 1973.

After his death, Dr. Salih Abdullah Siriyya took the leadership responsibility on his shoulders. Dr. Salih Abdullah Siriyya was born in 1933 in Haifa in Palestine, but got the citizenship of Irāq. In his mid-thirties he became the member of Muslim Brotherhood branch in Jordan known as Islāmic Liberation Party (Hizb al-Tahrīr al-Islāmi). So Islāmic Liberation Oreganization (I.L.O.) is said to be an offshoot of al-Ikhwān. After the Arab
defeat of 1967, he joined various Palestinian groups and got involved with the revolutionary Libyan and Iraqi regimes and was jailed for a short period. He had come to Egypt via Jordan and Iraq in 1971 and worked for the Arab League. Then he formed underground cells (*usār*) in Cairo and Alexandria.

Dr. Salih Siriyya was a modern educated man with Ph.D in Science. He was fearless and pious Muslim having great religious knowledge. His followers and friends loved him. He was the head of twelve-member executive council, which was making all discussions through consensus (*ijma*). After the expression of views, discussion was followed by and final decision was to be taken by the leader. His power of persuasion was often decisive in steering the views of the majority in one direction. But he was commanding his followers with love and affection. Only at one occasion he was not able to do so because he was not in favour of challenging al-Sadāt regime during latter’s period of popularity following the October 1973 war. But rest of the members was in favour of taking over the power from the regime by force. He stated a number of reasons in favour of his views that the regime was gaining popularity after 1973 war, the time was not ripe, the organization was not so strong to overpower the regime and in case of success, the organization had not prepared the plan of action for running the state administration. He forecasted only 30% chances of success. But unfortunately only one member was favouring his views at that very occasion and the rest were seeing otherwise. And they argued, even if success was not assured, their action would be an ‘outrage for God’ (*ghadhbah lil-Allah*) propaganda by deed. Their justification in favour of the immediate action was the saying of the Prophet Muhammad (S.A.W.),
Any of you who sees a repugnance (*munkar*) ought to remove it with hands; if unable, then by his tongue; and unable, then by his heart, and that is the least, a pious can do.\(^50\) The political justification provided by his followers was that al-Sadāt regime was learning towards the West and Israel, both enemies of Islām and Muslims. At last the majority view prevailed and the leader had to bend before the *Shūra*. They divided the plan of attack into two stages. In the first stage the Technical Military Academy in Cairo would be attacked and arms and ammunition would be seized. In the second stage the group would move towards the headquarters of the Arab Socialist Union, where President al-Sadāt and other Egyptian leaders would be assembled.

They prepared themselves for the showdown, took the training of the use of various arms, infiltration of the army and the police, daily routines of the president and other top leaders, map construction and map reading of all key points in the capital and communiqués to be aired on radio and television. A number of rehearsals were done. Technical Military Academy was successfully attacked on 18 April 1974 but the second show was foiled by the govt. troops\(^51\).

Over the failure of their plan, there were two opinions of the members, one group accepted that their failure was due to tactical reasons and they would do it again. They claimed that one member of the attacking group informed the security forces about the intended plan to overthrow the regime.\(^52\) They also claimed that they were successful to implement the first part of the plan because at the initial stage the informant was not taken seriously. But when they moved to the Arab Socialist Union building, where Anwar al-Sadāt was present, to attack the president and his
ministers, the security forces had acted on the information, ambushed the attackers and foiled the attempt.

Other members of I.L.O. considered themselves responsible for the repercussions because they had not listened to their leader and dragged him out into the action, which claimed the life of their top leaders and other members.

Whatever the cause may be, the Egyptian security forces arrested many members of I.L.O. Dr. Salih Siriyya was executed on 9\textsuperscript{th} Nov. 1976 along with Karem al-Anadoli. Tallal al-Ansaris death sentence was changed into life imprisonment. Ninety two members of the organization were tried twenty-nine were found guilty, 8 were sentenced to life imprisonment, seven to 15 years, 8 to 10 years and six to 4 years.\textsuperscript{53}

I.L.O. recruited young worshipers from mosques, students from universities and colleges mostly belonging to Cairo, Alexandria and the Delta. It relied on friendship and worship. The senior members of the organization found so many young people in the colleges and neighbourhood mosques. The young religious persons especially observing dawn prayer approached to attend religious discussions after regular prayers. They were recruited in the organization after their calibre was discovered in the discussions. During the recruitment, the social and educational background was kept in mind. No information is available regarding the recruitment of female members.

The ideology of I.L.O. was dominantly influenced by the writings of Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, Abul ala Mawdūdi and Ali Shariati.\textsuperscript{54} There are five main aspects of this ideology:

1. Islam is the only proper and right path to be followed by man in every field of life. There is no God but
Allah. Like other militant organizations, I.L.O. also would not tolerate Judaism and Christianity (the people of the book).

(2) Both the individual and the society should possess righteousness. And the Shariah should rule the society.

(3) Islamic societies e.g. Egypt, Jordan etc. are weak before the external enemies such as Christian West, Jewish Zionism and atheistic Communism, because they do not follow and implement the Shariah. I.L.O. condemn the political system of Egypt as its leaders are 'God-fearless.' One of the surviving leaders of the attack on Technical Military Academy stated: "We believe that the Egyptians are basically the most religious of all Islamic peoples. They were so before Islam, from the time of the pharaohs. They have continued to be very religious. Egypt would therefore be a good base to start the world Muslim resurgence. All that the religious Egyptians need is a sincere Muslim leadership".\(^5\) This conviction had a decisive impact on shaping the strategy of the I.L.O.

(4) Ulama are not sincere and God-fearing. They are delivering the sermons like propagandists of the Govt. In this way they are corrupting Islam. They described 'ulama as babaghawat al-manāber (pulpit parrots), whom pity rather anger should be felt.

(5) I.L.O. engaged itself in jihād for the re-Islāmisation of the society. One, who shows dedication to this cause, will achieve martyrdom, the reward for which is paradise.

Consequently I.L.O. rejected Western thinking and non-Islāmic institutions and advocated the re-organization of the society on the basis of Shariah. I.L.O. also
advocated transformation from Godless and corrupt state and victimized society by the political system with the result they attacked Technical Military Academy in 1974 to seize the power and establish Islāmic political systems, but failed in the second stage. 

**Jamāʿat al-Muslimīn**

The second Islāmic revolutionary militant organization, active during the period of Anwar al-Sadāt, was Jamāʿat al-Muslimīn. It was called by the Arab mass media and the government as al-Takfīr wa al-Hijrah (Repentence and Holy Flight). Shukri Mustafā founded it in the early 1970s who defected from al-Ikhwān on the basis of tactics but was very much influenced by their ideology.

The ideas of this organization became perfect in Egyptian jails, where state-sponsored oppression continued on these prisoners and there was no hope of its end. No one was raising voice for justice in favour of these prisoners. It seemed that the people have forgotten them and the angel of death was also delaying. In these hopeless and helpless dark circumstances, they defected from al-Ikhwān on the basis of tactics although they had faith in their ideology. They had no faith in unconscious society, so they treated others as infidels excluding themselves. When their ideas spread outside jails, their supporters stopped offering prayers (*Salah*) behind the financed *lmāms*. They treated it ill to take up service in infidel-army, ex-communicated from the society, married among themselves and gradually went to big cities and far-flung areas to live a separate religious life.

It is an interesting thing that Egyptian secret services used the youths of this organization to crush other Islāmist organizations. According to the viewpoint of this
organization, all other Islamists were apostates and deserving death because they were demanding the implementation of Islamic jurisprudence, which was already reputed by this organization. In this way Egyptian government was able to kill the Islamic leaders and youths with the help of this organization.

They threatened their members with death, who wanted to leave the group or refused to become its members.\(^{57}\) such defectors became easy prey for agents of Egyptian secret services. That is why this organization could not long last.

They called Jamāl ‘Abd al-Nasser (1918-1970) and Anwar al-Sadāt (1918-1981) as modern pharaohs because they introduced non-Islamic political, judicial and socio-economic institutions.

The organization utilized a ‘dedicated cadre’ of followers- that is the group demanded full time activism and total obedience, thus creating a situation wherein members were heavily dependent upon it. Deviation from duty or group doctrine could lead to expulsion, physical punishment and even assassination. It was the Jamā’at’s punishment of deviant members in 1976-77 that alerted the Egyptian authorities to its activities.

In 1977, when the group was at its peak, it had two to three thousand active members and sympathizers throughout Egypt. The group ran business operations including bakeries, bookshops, candy-making and vegetable production. It had financial assets worth £E 50,000 throughout the country.\(^{58}\) There are some evidences of having sympathizers in other Arab countries. Following the arrest of its members in July 1977, a threat to bomb Egyptian Embassy in Kuwait was reported.\(^{59}\)
Jamā‘at Muslimīn discussed about several places to start its new community of believers. Outside Egypt, they included Yemen, Libya, and the Sūdān. Inside the country they debated several sites but two of them were actually used – al-Minya governorate in Upper Egypt and a desert strip between Ma‘āsarrah and Hulwān, South of Cairo. But the group never stayed permanently to either side.60

The working strategy was a patient and long run one. Besides political regime, they treated other social institutions also corrupt. Not only the rulers were Godless and sinful but also other members of the society as well. They wanted to establish a society of ‘Community of Believers’, who would act out the true life of Islām. This was the first step of Jamā‘at al-Muslimīn. The second step was, growth in number and spiritual and material strength of this ‘Community of Believers.’ At a certain stage, this ‘Community’ would march onward to bring down the already corrupt and sinful social order of Egypt.

They justified this strategy by providing the example of the period of Prophet Mohammad (S.A.W.) and his followers. Prophet Mohammad (S.A.W.), when harassed by the ‘Pagan Makkans’, migrated to Madīnah along with handful followers (Mu‘minīn) and established there the first community of true Muslims on 13th of September 622 A.D. The flight (hijrah) from Makkah to Madinah is the first day of the first year of the Islāmic calendar.61 As the community gained strength, it engaged the infidels of Makkah in a series of battles (ghazwāt) and finally conquered Makkah itself in 8 A.H. corresponding to 630 A.D. 62

The group suffered serious arrests in May 1975, August and November 1976, and in January 1977.
Members of this organization claimed that it was the suppression and the detention without trial of several group members by the government, which provoked the members to act violently against the regime in July 1977. Whereas others claimed that violent acts of the group themselves clarify their designs regarding the regime and Islamic militant organizations.

Regarding the July 1977 action by the group, they demanded the release of their members but the government ignored their pleas. In retaliation they kidnapped the former minister of \textit{waqf} (Religions Endowments) Shaykh Mohammad Hussain Dhahabi, a noted scholar and strong opponent of religious extremism, on 3rd July 1977 and kept him as a hostage. On 4th July, at about 11 o’clock, the telephone bell rang in certain people’s rooms, a young man was repeatedly calling on the other end of the line:

“We are the group that the atheists call al-Takfir wa al-Hijrah. We have kidnapped Dr. Hussain al-Dhahabi, who published an article against us on 30th May in the blasphemous newspaper al-Akbār.”

Anwar al-Sadat president of Egypt was not at home. He was in Morocco. Prime Minister and the former police officer, Mamduh Salem ordered the security forces to search for the kidnapped Shaykh and his kidnappers. On the other hand, the kidnappers demanded a huge cash of £E 200,000, the release of sixty prisoners of the organization and an aircraft in exchange for al-Dhahabi’s release. Prime Minister failed to show positive response and a manhunt against the kidnappers was launched, but the security forces failed to trace the kidnappers and the kidnapped Shaykh. When the demand of the kidnappers was not met with, they killed al-Dhahabi on 6th July 1977. The group carried out a number of bombings over the next few days.
Egyptian forces also came in action and there was a heavy exchange of fire between the two sides resulting in the death and injury to many members and 400 members of the Jamā'at were arrested including their leader Shukri Mustafā. 198 of them were tried in courts and only 36 were found guilty. Shukri Mustafā along with Maher Abakri Zanati, Ahmad Tariq Abd al-Alim, Anwar Mamun Saqr and Mustafā A. Ghāzi were hanged to death on 29th March, 1978. Twelve of them were sentenced life imprisonment, six got ten years imprisonment with hard labour and thirteen were sentenced five to 25 years imprisonment. At the time of his death, Mustafā was 37. The loss of Mustafā was a heavy blow to Jamā'at al-Muslimīn because most of the members left the group either joined other Islāmic organizations or left the Islāmic movement altogether. In this way the group collapsed after the death of its leader, Mustafā, but some of them joined another militant and anti-regime group, al-Jihād, which became very much active after 1977. Some of them emigrated to Yemen for the establishment of another Islāmic society. A dedicated group under the leadership of Mohammad Amīn ‘Abd al-Fattah established a new Islāmic society outside Egypt. A nine member advisory council was formed in Egypt to implement the guidelines of this organization headed by external leadership. Its membership reached 150 in Egypt and a somewhat large number outside the country. It is also reported that the group aligns its policy with that of the Islāmic Liberation Party.

Al-Takfīr wa al-Hijrah, the name which was given by the government and mass-media to the group suggests its tactics. Takfīr means ‘to excommunicate the infidels from the society’ while hijrah means flight, they accused nominal Muslim society as ‘the Society of unbelief’ (takfīr).
and urged true Muslims 'to emigrate' \((hijrah)\) from the paganism of modern society. They declared that true Muslims must emigrate to Muslim-controlled political communities. They regarded people, who do not live according to the Qur'ān, as unbelievers and themselves as the real and true Muslims. This group separated themselves from Egyptian society, because they treat it as un-Islāmic society. They did so giving the logic that Prophet Mohammad (S.A.W.) also migrated from Makkah to Madīnah to abandon the immoral society in order to establish a faithful society. They cramped their flats in Cairo\(^{71}\) and started living in caves in Upper Egypt. During the transformation, some members of the organization left the group and joined other Islāmist organizations. Mustafā ordered his members to punish the dissidents by death as he regarded quitting his organization as quitting Islām. In 1976 the group lead raids and used violence against such people and confrontation started with the regime.\(^{72}\) the police also lead raids on the group and arrested many of them but Mustafā escaped.

The group was very active in universities of Cairo, Alexandria, ‘Ain Shams and al-Mansūrah. Some members of the organization, who were at the same time students of the Faculty of Commerce at the University of Cairo, participated in the religious programmes of the television. Some of the members permanently lived in the mosques of Cairo, Guizeh, Ābidīn and in the al-Qulāli quarter. The group was also active in al-Minya, Asyūt and Giza villages of Upper Egypt. They had their training camps there and lived there alongwith their wives, who were simple, dressed.

Killing of al-Dhahabi was the first political assassination in Egyptian history for the last thirty years.
Important al-Azhar personalities denounced the militants of Jamā’at al-Muslimīn for the act. The leader of the Mohamadiyyah fraternity stated that members of al-Jamā’at were suffering from psychological complexe’.73

The president of Shabāb Mohammad said, “The principles of al-Takfīr wa al-Hijrah are against the teachings of Islām.” The president of the Association for the Upholding of the Qurān stated, “Islām does not recognize these terrorist barbarians who threaten the safety of society,” The then Mufti of Egypt, Shaykh Hassanain Makhfūl, said that this group was like ‘criminals with no scruples, spreading corruption (fasād) through the land.’ Mohammad Sallam Makdūr, the then head of the Shariah section of the Cairo Faculty of law, saw them as ignituous men. Ahmad Shalabi, the then Director of the History of Islām Section at the Dār al-‘Ulūm Institute, declared that such an event was unique in the history of Islām.74

Egyptian people also enquired about the incident because they did not know what was the controversy between the Shaykh and al-Jamā’at. They even knew that he had not done anything wrong with Islām. Although he had written that “this group aspired to live the religious life at the most sublime level and free from all aspects of immorality”. These words are taken from a book written by Shaykh al-Dhahabi, while he was Minister of Property in Mortmain in 1976.75 He had also written in a research paper, ‘The effects of the restriction of the communities on social stability’ presented to the Muslim Fiqh Congress at the Mohammad Ibn Saʿūd University at Riyādḥ: ‘Muslim societies are now experiencing a rebirth of hope; the return of Muslims to Divine law, the return of blind who miraculously regain their sight, the return of the dead resurrected by Divine Grace”.76 This was the clear cut
support in favour of the transformation of Egypt constitutionally and socially into an Islamic society.

Some intellectuals openly opposed the official point of view. Among them was Sayyid al-Tawīl, Professor at the Faculty of Islamic Studies. He wrote regarding the name of the organization:

‘May our revered mullah be careful in making judgments against this group in the name of Islām. They must consider the members objectively in the light of Islām. These young people did not give themselves the name al-Takfīr wa al-Hijrah. The name was given to them in the security publications. The name that they chose for themselves is, ‘The call to Islām Group’.”

Shukri Mustafā grants himself the title ‘Amīr of Believers’, ‘Amīr of End of time and their to land’ in his booklet al-Tawāssumāt (Searching books). His followers secretly circulated the booklet, which was in the form of a manuscript to avoid the blasphemy of printing. Shukri says in this booklet (Manuscript):

“But it is not possible to establish this state without treading the path traced out by the Prophet of Islām because neither state nor Islām can be established before this emigration. Death of the atheists and the destruction of their state cannot be achieved while the faithful are still living among them. Furthermore, the Prophet (S.A.W.) requires Muslims to leave the blasphemous land; it is then that the retribution of God will fall upon the infidels.”

He divided the jihād into three phases: “First, the faithful must escape the pitfall of the Shirk of ascribing another divinity to God. He must avoid being tortured by the infidels. He must spread ‘the knowledge’ throughout the land. Finally, the Holy war must be fought to establish the Islamic state.”

199
According to this group the war would start from Egypt and would spread to the every part of the world, till the establishment of rule of God in the whole world. Their ideology states:

“God be praised. He will prepare the land for the group of the just by provoking a war between the two great powers, Russia and America. Each one is trying to extend its domination all over the world. The war is inevitable; they will destroy each other. God will thus have prepared the land for the Islāmic state and the society that follows the right path. Following the destruction of the two great powers in the third world war, the forces of the Muslim nations will be about equal in number to those of its their enemies. It is then the true jihād will start.”°⁰

This ideology given by Shukri does not seem new as it was already told by founder of al-Ikhwān, Hasan al-Bannā to his followers sixty years ago. He addressed his followers with these words:

“Muslim Brothers, when the time comes that among you are three hundred companies, spiritually strengthened by the faith and by the doctrine, and physically exercised, you will ask me to invade Heaven and Earth with you and to conquer the most violent of the infidels and I will do it by the will of God.⁸¹ [or again] You will be a formidable enemy of those in power and of those not in power.”⁸²

Shukri Mustafā, disciple of Hasan al-Bannā, represents the ideas of his guide in the purest form. Al-Ikhwān endorsed that Islām is a religion, a state, a country and a nationality. It is not only the religion of God but also His state in the world.

Shukri Mustafā, leader of Jamā‘at al-Muslimīn, was influenced by the writings of the Khawarijites, Ibn Taymiyyah, Mohammad Ibn, ‘Abd al-Wahhāb, Jamāl al-dīn al-Afghāni, Hasan al-Bannā, Sayyid Qutb, Abul Ala
Mawdūdi and Ali Shariati. This group had not endorsed the works of some Modern Egyptian writers like Mohammad Abduh, ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Rāziq, Rifa’ah Al-Tahtawi and Tahā Hussain. The particular reason for that seems to be the association of them with secularist trends that opted for separation of religion and state. ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Rāziq wrote a book *al-Islām wa usūl al-Hukm* (Islām and foundations of Governance), in which he gave a statement regarding the concept of a secular state. In 1977, Shukri Mustafā gave a statement regarding the ideology of his organization, before a military tribunal. The main principles of the ideology are as under:

1. All existing societies are pagan.
2. The only true Islām is the Islām of the Prophet Mohammad (S.A.W.), his companions and the salf (the first three generations of Muslims).
3. Interpretation of the Qur’ān – *qiyaṣ, ijmā* and *ijtihād* - are rejected.
4. Membership in the Jamā’at al-Muslimīn is the right path to be a good Muslim.
5. Not everyone who claims to be a Muslim is one. Only those who accept and live by the tenets of al-Jamā’at al-Muslimīn are good Muslims. Others are infidels.

The group made no distinction between state and society. Both were Godless and corrupt and interrelated. They stated that there is no difference between contemporary Egypt and *jāhiliyyah* (ignorant) period of pre-Islāmic Arabia. Following the example set forth by the Prophet Mohammad (S.A.W.) in his flight from Makkah to Madinah and the conquest of Arabia. To achieve such type of goal, the group established a community of believers, which would form a base, where from the re-Islāmicfication
of Egyptian society could take place. Mission of the group al-Khilāfah (establishment of Islamic rule) categorized into three stages, beginning with communications (balāgh), followed by organization, emergence (tabaw), and migration; and culminating in Holy war and its strategy. Shukri Mustafā claimed that there was no salvation for the Muslims unless they joined his group in order to separate themselves from the jāhiliyyah society.

Al-Jamā’at drew this type of ideological inspiration from the thinking of ‘Ali ‘Abduh Ismail, a graduate of al-Azhar University, who sought to pattern al-Jamā’at’s beliefs and activities according to the Prophet Mohammad’s (S.A.W.) tactics adopted during the early Makkah period, when the community was weak and the circumstances were not favourable, the Prophet (S.A.W.) stressed and worked for the strengthening and expanding of his ‘Ummah through spiritual and physical separation from the jāhiliyyah society. During this period, he had refrained from jihād. Muslims are advised by Shaykh Ismail to practise spiritual separation (mufasilah al-Shiriyyah) to strengthen their allegiance (wala) to Islām through al-Jamā’at organization, and advised the group not to wage jihād, as it had not achieved strength then. They should not make efforts for the seizure of power, which was also impossible then.

The group denounced usury, extravagance, excessive wealth and property, called for state collection of the zakat and regulation of the economy in the interest of justice and welfare. They accepted private property, inheritance, profit and social distinctions, provided they resulted solely from the expenditure of labour.

Shukri Mustafā leader of Jamā’at al-Muslimīn was born in Asyūt province in Upper Egypt. He was a student of Faculty of Agriculture in Asyūt University, where he joined
al-Ikhwān and was arrested by al-Nasser regime in 1965 on the charges of distributing the pamphlet of al-Ikhwān. He was first kept in Tura prison and then shifted to Abū Zabal concentration camp in 1967. When al-Sadāt came in power in 1970, he released many Islāmists and political prisoners from various jails. Shukri Mustafa was also released from jail in 1971. Jamā‘at al-Muslimīn had already recruited members, while Mustafā was still in prison.\(^\text{87}\) After his release, he went straight to Asyūt University and completed his B.Sc. Agriculture, preached throughout Asyūt and recruited members for Jamā‘at al-Muslimīn and moved to Cairo. He was very much influenced by Sayyid Qutb’s book ‘Ma‘ālim fi al-Tariq (The Milestones), in which the author declared the Egyptian society unfaithful to Allah and Mohammad’s (S.A.W) Teachings. So Jamā‘at al-Muslimīn separated itself from the Egyptian society and began to live in caves in Upper Egypt.

He was condemned in the 1972 hearing and arrest warrant was issued against him, but was not apprehended because he several times left the country and took shelter in Yemen.\(^\text{88}\)

He declared all Muslim societies as un-Islāmic societies and only the ‘Society of Muslims’ (Jamā‘at al-Muslimīn) is true Muslims. He declared that whole Islāmic jurisprudence is rejectable because it is not the word of God but work of men. He also refuted the collection and compilation of the Hadīth. He was in favour of the destruction of the classical literature and books written on women.\(^\text{89}\) Shukri stated that:

“We do not accept the words ascribed to the Prophet’s (S.A.W) contemporaries, or the opinions of those verses in Islāmic law, the fuqahā. We do not accept the opinion of the early jurists, or their consensus (ijma), or the
other idols \((asn\text{ā}m)\) like analogy \((qiy\text{ā}s)\). How can words of mere humans be a source of divine guidance?\(^9\)

They wanted to put the power of the omnipotent modern state into the hands of the best possible Muslims. They challenged the authority of the Govt. and demanded the establishment of nonsecular Islāmic state. This direct confrontation with the government makes them dangerous in the eyes of the authorities.

Mustafā exercised final judgment on all matters as the \textit{Amīr} of Jamā'at al-Muslimīn (commander of the Faithful).\(^9\) His followers were obedient to him and respected him. He elicited sometimes awe (fear) while commanding his followers. They considered him and the group had been ordained by God to restore Islām. He encouraged discussion and dialogue; the final word was always that of the \textit{Amīr}. He made final judgment on individual (e.g., marriage and divorce), inter-group and international issues. His followers regarded him as an authority on matters of doctrinal theology, Islāmic jurisprudence, worship and Islāmic social transaction. He was an omnipotent figure in the group. His followers would not believe that the Govt. could hang him to death. His followers refused to believe the news of his hanging, because they believed that he would not die before completing his mission i.e. the restoration of Islām.\(^9\)

Jamā'at al-Muslimīn relied on kinship and friendship. Shukri Mustafā began recruiting his close friends and relatives like his brother and a nephew, from prison days. These in turn enlisted their close friends and relatives as members to the group. Mustafa operated from Asyūt, his hometown in Upper Egypt and later moved to Cairo. So he first recruited the members in the organization from Asyūt.
and then members from major cities like Cairo, who had recently arrived to these cities.

Jamā'at also recruited female members in their organization. Some eighty women were arrested along with several hundred male members during crackdown on the group. Analysis showed that the women arrested were mostly relatives or wives of male members.

The members belonged to middle and lower middle class background. On the average they were well educated, particularly in technical and scientific fields having good qualities like deep conviction, sense of mission and eagerness of martyrdom. Jama'at provided a good environment to its enterprises. Membership was made dependent on the group in each and every aspect of life. Defectors would face serious action including excommunication and physical punishment. Excommunicated or defected members were considered as infidels (kufār) because existed no pure society outside the group, they were even sentenced death penalty.

Some Common features

Some similarities have been viewed in I.L.O. and in al-Jamā'at although the tactics were different. The similarities can be given separately in different fields as under:

(1) Leadership:

Both the leaders, Dr. Siriyya and Shukri Mustafā had been members of al-Ikhwān. Both had prison experience, a disposition towards secret organizing and were hanged to death by Anwar al-Sadāt regime for anti-state activities. The followers of these two
leaders tremendously respected their leaders and considered them true Muslims (*Mu'minin*).

Dr. Siriyya commanded his followers with love whereas Mustafā used *awe* at certain occasions, while commanding his followers. But in both the cases, none of the members of the two groups had anything negative to say about their fallen leaders. Both were perceived as virtuous, courageous, fearless of death, and even eager for martyrdom (*Istishahād*).

(2) Recruitment: -

(a) Age: - It ranged from seventeen to twenty-six at the time of recruitment in the organization. The medium age for Jamā'at al-Muslimīn was twenty-four and that for I.L.O. were twenty-two years. Mustafā, leader of al-Jamā'at was sixteen years older than the average age of his followers, whereas Dr. Sirriya, leader of I.L.O. was fourteen years older than that of the average age of his followers. In both the cases, the followers were younger than their leaders.

(b) Geographical background

Two third of members of both the organizations were born either in villages or in towns. They had recently come to big cities at the time of joining these organizations. After completing secondary education, they had come to big cities e.g., Cario, Alexandria or Asyūt for further studies. Fifty percent lived in these cities without parents; fifteen percent with their government employed fathers and thirty five percent born in urban centers had lived in smaller communities during their teen age.
(c) Social background

With regard to occupation, there was no difference between the members of the two organizations. About sixty two percent were the children of government employees, mostly in middle grades of the civil service; 11.5 percent were, those whose fathers held high level professional occupations and same percentage were, those whose fathers were small merchants; nine percent were small farmers having six to eleven acres of land; and same percentage was from the working class. With regard to the education, fifty six percent fathers had intermediate education, twenty percent had university education, fifteen percent had below intermediate education and nine percent were illiterate. Sixty two percent occupational and fifty-six percent educational attainment of the parents show that affiliation of most of the members of these militant Islāmic groups in middle and lower middle class.⁹⁵

(d) Educational and occupational background of the members

Eighty five percent of the members were graduates or undergraduates. Occupationally, forty seven percent were government employees or self employed and the rest were students.⁹⁶ Student members of the two militant Islāmic groups were decidedly high in both motivation and achievement.

(3) Discipline

Both the organizations demanded discipline and total commitment from their members. Orders of the leadership, either semi-democratic in the case of I.L.O. or autocratic in
the case of al-Jamā’at, were to be carried out with joy and zeal in the unshakeable belief that they were serving the cause of Islām. The Jamā’at engaged its members in group related activities — worshipping, studying, proselytizing, exercising etc. It also engaged them in its enterprises—bakeries, bookshops, candy-making and vegetable gardening. These types of engagements made them quite dependent on the group to satisfy their spiritual, social and economic needs. Sometimes the members were ordered to resign from their jobs in the society.

Both I.L.O. and al-Jamā’at were mentally prepared for the maximum sacrifice of worldly possession as well as life itself. According to them, adherence to Islām provides a complete and righteous vision for a healthy society on earth and provides for a healthy hereafter. That is why the physical and mental torture made by the enemies of Islām was bearable to them.

Another factor, which bond a member with the organization, was the threat of being excommunicated from the group. Al-Jamā’at many times even did physical punishment to the expelled members.97

The most important controlling factor is the socialization of the members of these two organizations. Every member was provided the opportunity to engage in a serious transformation of his own behaviour, attitudes and relationships along with the adherence to the ideas and principles of the group. Both the organizations aim at fundamental and simultaneous development of the individual as well as the society on the Islāmic path. Besides these bindings and restrictions, the members feel great joy by living in this environment for the cause of the motherland in general and for the Islām in particular. Since then they have heard the stories of torture on al-Ikhwān

208
members in 1966 and desired for the same. But now they are dreaming that the saints, prophets and martyrs to the 'Garden of Eden', while tortured severely in jails, welcome them. They were ready to bear every kind of cruelty for the establishment of Islāmic society in Egypt.98

(4) Ideological Similarities

Both I.L.O. and al-Jamā'at were of the opinion that the man was created for a great purpose. So he should lead a pious and righteous life and follow the right path (al-Sirat al-Mustaqim). The guidelines, for leading the way of life, are given in detail in the Qur'ān and in the Sunnah. It is the duty of every righteous Muslim to strictly follow the five pillars of Islām. He cannot live individually but he must build a righteous community of the faithful. In this way it is a duty of every Muslim to struggle for this purpose.

The ideology of these two organizations was based on this last component. They believe that this was their religious duty to establish a truly Muslim social order on the earth. This belief strikes their minds to work in the form of an organization, which will raise the collective voice against the ruling class. Such an Islāmic Ideology challenged the rulers; either conforms to the percepts and edicts of Islām or face the confrontation.

Both the organizations feel that internal a political system of the country was corrupt and silly, which could be proved with a lot of evidences. Externally defeated by the enemies of Islām: the Christian West, Jewish Zionism and atheist Communism, due to the concessions made by the regime to these external forces on the basis of so-called modernization, peace and friendship. With the result these forces made intrigues to attack Dār al-Islām and the rulers
could not repel due to the deviation from the right path. Instead of implementing Islāmic legal code, they adopt Western imported man-made legal codes, which could no way solve our problems e.g., moral decay, poverty, diseases, illiteracy and the spread of vices (Radhīla). The final solution to such issues exists in Islām; consequently Islāmic Shariāh should be implemented in Egypt and other Muslim countries, to get rid of these problems.

Both the groups had same viewpoint regarding the status of women in the Shariāh. They admit that women have equal rights and obligations in the society. Men have neglected women’s rights due to the corrupt and irreligious social system of the states. They can receive highest level of education for the socialization of true Muslim children, but home is their rightful place. After fulfilling the primary obligations and in the interest of the community (maslahāt al-‘Ummah), they could work outside the home. Both groups insisted on the imperative of modesty, the protection of women from temptation (al-fitna, al-ghiwaya), and separation of sexes in public places. They believe that the application of Hudūd (Islāmic legal codes) with regard to sexual offences is both necessary and sufficient to ensure these ends. They perceive the family as being the basic unit of Muslim society. Its soundness derives from strict observance of Shariāh values and regulation. Authority and protection flow from the male head of a household down to females and the young - respect and obedience; complementary, protection, and respect - not around equality competition and self-reliance.

On economic issues, say that if the faithful follow religious edicts i.e, pay zakāt, pay fair wages to labourers, work honestly and give charity and alms to the needy, their would be no economic inequality. Rich would not become
richer and poor would not become poorer day by day, if the Muslims keep themselves away from cheating, extravagance (tabdhir), hoarding (iktinaz) receiving usury (ribâ). There should be no monopoly of public utilities such as al-ma' wal-nâr, w'al-kalâ (water, fire and grazing land). Private property, profit and inheritance are allowed. Egypt is facing economic problems due to the handiwork of corrupt officers, the introduction and application of imported policies, low productivity and mismanagement of resources. The two groups were not holding over population, scarcity of cultivable land and other natural resources, the burdens of defence and the war efforts, responsible for Egypt's economic difficulties. Citing the examples of Sa'ûdi Arabia and Bangladesh, the two groups believe that true Muslim rulers should not allow some Muslims to enjoy too much wealth and others are starving.

On the issue of various classes in the society, both the groups believe that no one is superior to another on the basis of race, colour, creed or sex. It is man's labour, which makes him superior or inferior. The Holy Qur'ân says: "We (God) have put some of you in classes above others". The concepts of social justice (adâla) and equity (al-qistâs) are central in the envisioned Muslim society. It is the responsibility of the ruler, commander of the faithful (amîr-al-mu'mînîn) the caliph to see to it that justice and equity are observed. Such principles were strictly implemented by the Prophet Mohammad (SAW) and the rightly guided caliphs.

Both the groups are of the opinion that instead of parliament, Muslim countries should use the term 'Shûra' and it should be lead by the commander of the faithful. He should be adult, rational, pious, and male and should consult the faithful (Mu'mînîn) in the state affairs and
decisions should be given according to the *Shariah*. It clears that there is no room for kings and queens as the rulers of the Muslim states and man-made legal code. *Shūra* have the authority to check on the rulers because they are accountable and answerable before the people. The *Shūra* could remove them, if they fail to deliver the duties rightly. They should be obeyed until they are obedient to God and to the community.

The two groups strongly reject the tradition that unjust (*Zālim*) rulers should be treated for the sake of the Muslim Community (*‘Ummah*). They believe that it is the duty of every Muslim to remove the injustice (*al-Zulm*) and misguidance (*dhalālah*) including that committed by a rule.

About *‘Ulama*, they regarded that they were mere state employees, who have become bureaucrats and are not dedicated Muslims, they are just *babaghāwat al-manāber*.

Members of both the groups have no differences with al-Ikhwān. They consider themselves as offshoots of al-Ikhwān, which was banned before 1952 by King Farooq and by al-Nasser after it. They treat Hasan al-Bannā as their guide and torchbearer of the right path.

Now the question arises that why they part away from al-Ikhwān? The answer is that al-Ikhwān has adopted a moderate policy after its suppression before and after the revolution of 1952. The youngsters are not ready to struggle silently and peacefully. So they chose the second way, that is the use of power against the cruelty and suppression, and announce *jihād* against the corrupt rulers. They form separate militant organizations e.g. *al-Jamāʿat al-Muslimīn*, I.L.O., *al-Jihād*, *al-Jamāʿah al-Islāmiyyah*, Jund Allah, Vanguards of conquest etc., to achieve the ends.
AL-Jihād

After the assassination of Anwar al-Sadāt on 6th October 1981, confusion was created in the minds of the people about the assassins. Later on it was cleared that an organization (*Tanzīm*) namely al-Jihād was responsible for the act. Now the question arises what is al-Jihād?

The two groups, Jamā’at al-Muslimīn responsible for the kidnapping and killing of al-Dhahabi in 1977 and I.L.O, which attacked Technical Military Academy in 1974, were suppressed, tried and imprisoned by al-Sadāt regime in 1974 and 1977 respectively. Some of the key leaders of these two groups either left the Islamic movement forever or joined other militant Islamic organizations.

The survivors of I.L.O. grew up around local leaders of Asyūt, al-Minya and Fayyūm in Upper Egypt as well as in Cairo and Giza. New members from other fields e.g. presidential guard, military intelligence, civil servants, radio and television workers, university students and professors. All were united in their belief that the establishment of an Islamic society requires the restoration of the Caliphate. All Muslim rulers are regarded as apostates: “The rulers of this age are in apostasy from Islām. They were raised at the tables of imperialism, be it crusaderism or communism and Zionism.” So Ḥijād was considered necessary and justified against the ‘atheist’ ruler or state.

Al-Jihād drew its members from al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn and I.L.O. of Dr. Salih Siriyya. In retaliation to 1974 attack on Technical Military Academy, the regime suppressed and arrested the leaders and members of I.L.O., two members Hasan al-Halawi and Salīm al-Rahhāl (born in Palestine), managed to escape. Both of them established militant Islamic organization known as al-Jihād in
Alexandria, which is also known as New Jihad or Islamic Jihad. But during 1970s, and 1980s it was popular by the name of al-Jihad. The Egyptian authorities discovered this organization in August 1977 and suppressed it with might by arresting its eighty members including al-Halawi.\(^{101}\) According to R. Hrair Dekhmejian; “Al-Jihad organization was first uncovered in 1978 as a consequence of its involvement in anti-Coptic activities. However, its full potential was not revealed, until the assassination of president al-Sadat”.\(^{102}\)

There were bloody confrontations between al-Jihad militants and Egyptian security forces in Alexandria in 1978.\(^{103}\) Eighty members of the organization were detained and then released in 1979. 134 people were arrested on the charges that they had links with al-Jihad but due to lack of evidence all of them were released. After the suppression of top brass of al-Jihad, one of its former members, Mohammad ‘Abd al-Salam al-Faraj reorganized the group under the same name. He wrote a pamphlet entitled *al-Farīda al-Ghai‘bah* (The Neglected Imperative), which was treated as its constitution. He had been considered its chief ideologue. He was impressed by Ibn Taymiyyah (1263-1328).\(^{104}\) Al-Faraj argues that the situation Ibn Taymiyyah describes is similar to the Egyptian situation, as Egyptian laws are based on codes of Western inspiration. He regards such government un-Islamic and stressed that it is the duty of every Muslim to wage Holy War against the government in order to establish Islamic order therein. He is considered responsible for masterminding the assassination plan of Anwar al-Sadāt in 1981.

Al-Faraj joined the leadership of al-Jihad through ‘Abbūd al-Zumūr and Karem al-Zuhdi. ‘Abbūd al-Zumūr, a colonel in Egyptian military intelligence was in-charge of
military training and planning of the organization. Kareem al-Zuhdi was incharge of organization and recruitment in Upper Egypt.

*Majlis al-Shūra* was established in 1980 with sub-committees who would co-ordinate and supervise military training, fundraising and recruitment. Shaykh ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Rahmān, a 43 year old blind religious preacher and professor of religion at al-Azhar’s Asyūt branch, was appointed Chairman of the *Majlis al-Shūra*. He issued verdicts (*fatāwa*) to legitimize the policies and activities of the organization.

Attacks on specific targets were carried out after the justification and sanction of the *Majlis-al-Shūra*. There were three separate organs of the organization, whose activities were guided and supervised by the *Shūra*. The first organ was given the task of conducting propaganda, recruitment research and enforcement of religious laws. The second was given the responsibility of providing operational support in technology, engineering, arms procurement, intelligence, printing of propaganda materials, falsification of seals and documents, transportation and explosives. The third organ was provided with training in martial arts, marksmanship, medical support and weaponry, to prepare them for any type of action. Table-I shows clearly the general structure of al-Jihād organization.
### Table – I

**General Structure of al-Jihād organization**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leadership Apparatus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Mailīs al-Shūra</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>(Consultative Apparatus)</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Supervisory Apparatus |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combat Organ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weapons Training Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marksmanship and Leadership Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Training Section</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operational Support Organ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Propaganda Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence Section</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Propaganda, Enforcement and Research organ |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Medical Section</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Propaganda Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Section</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Supervisory Apparatus |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leadership Apparatus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Mailīs al-Shūra</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>(Consultative Apparatus)</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Supervisory Apparatus |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combat Organ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weapons Training Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marksmanship and Leadership Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Training Section</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operational Support Organ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Propaganda Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence Section</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Propaganda, Enforcement and Research organ |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Medical Section</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Propaganda Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Section</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

216
The main characteristic of the organization was that its members were divided into a number of groups (majmū'ah) and cells (anqūd) scattered throughout the country. Each cell was semi-autonomous and self-contained. The benefit to the organization was that if a member or one cell was captured, it was difficult for the security forces to discover the group.107

Mohammad ‘Abd-al-Salam al-Faraj, chief ideologue and lieutenant colonel Abbūd ‘Abd al-Latīf Hasan al-Zumūr-who was the operational commander, were in the group who assassinated president Anwar al-Sadāt. Shaykh ‘Abd al-Rahmān issued fatwā that al-Sadāt was Kafr (infidel) and the Shura collectively decided to kill al-Sadāt.108 Al-Faraj and al-Zumūr presented several scenarios in the Shūra but they were not considered, provided the reasons of cent percent chances that al-Sadāt would escape death. When lieutenant Islāmbuli was appointed by his supervisors to participate in the October parade, the anqūd produced the plan. He was influenced by the book Saba Rasail written by Juhayman al-Utaybi, which was given to him by his brother Mohammad al-Islāmbuли, who had witnessed al-Ikhwān takeover of the Grand Mosque in Makkah. He also read books of Ibn Kathīr and Ibn Taymiyyah.109

Lt. Islāmbuli gave three reasons in support of his action, when being interrogated during the trial.

(a) Egypt’s existing laws were inconsistent with Islamic Law- a fact that brought sufferings to the Muslims;

(b) Al-Sadāt’s peace with Israel; and

(c) the arrest, persecution and humiliation of Muslim fundamentalists in September 1981.
The leader of Asyūt province claimed before the public prosecutor, after the assassination of Anwar al-Sadāt, that the organization was established in January 1980. *Amīr* (leader) of al-Minya stated that the first meeting of the organization was held in March 1980,\(^{110}\) which was attended by the leaders of Upper Egypt and Greater Cairo, student demonstrations were on at that time against the government’s decision to provide asylum to Shah of Iran Faraj presented a plan in the *Majlis al-Shūra* prepared by ‘Abbūd al-Zumūr, to attack the vital installations and homes of public officials in Cairo.\(^{111}\) Amīr of Sohāj stated before the public prosecutor that issue of overthrowing the regime was brought forward in meeting in March 1981.\(^{112}\) Public prosecutor charged 12 members of the *Shūra* of plotting to overthrow the government and 290 were accused of ransacking jewellery stores in Naga Hamādī (in south) and in Shubra al-Khayma (in north) of Cairo and bomb explosion in Rod al-Faraj Church in the Summer of 1981.\(^{113}\) ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Rahmān was blamed for issuing a *fatwā* to legitimize the ransacking from Egyptian copts in 1981.\(^{114}\)

To achieve the objective, to assassinate Anwar al-Sadāt, al-Jihād used traditional means such as personal contacts with military officers, kinship ties, contacts in *ahāli* mosques and planting of secret apparatus of the organization in the military service. However, Abū Ghazālah, the Minister of Defence, denied the existence of secret apparatus belonging to the organization in the military service. He acknowledged the reports that an unspecified member of army personal were either retired or transferred to civilian posts.\(^{115}\)

During the interrogation, colonel ‘Abbūd al-Zumūr, the high-ranking military officer in al-Jihād, revealed that
help of other Islamic groups was not taken to plot the assassination of Anwar al-Sadat. However some al-Jihād members participate in the summer camps and the meeting held by university-affiliated groups. He also stated that al-Jihād was not fully ready for the overthrow of the regime but we were forced to do so because the security forces discovered the activities of some members.

Al-Jihād suffered heavy suppression by al-Sadat regime in September 1981. Consequently, in retaliation al-Sadat was assassinated on 6th October 1981 by Khālid Islāmībūlī of al-Jihād, while reviewing the annual parade in observation of the ‘Egyptian victory’ in the October war of 1973 over Israel. Khālid al-Islāmībūlī, a military officer of Egyptian military, was selected to participate only eleven days before the annual military parade on 6th October 1981.

In the aftermath of the assassination, hundreds of al-Jihād members were arrested including its key leader ‘Abd al-Salām al-Faraj. Al-Faraj and five others were executed. After three years 190 were tried and released including its chairman ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Rahmān. Seventeen others including Karem Zuhdi and ‘Abbūd al-Zumūr were sentenced to life imprisonment.

After the suppression in 1981, the organization was reconstructed and its membership reached 200 and had acquired 12 guns and explosive materials and bombs. But after only one year, in September 1982, the group was again suppressed and most of its leaders were imprisoned.

The members in the field remain in touch with the jailed leaders and were able to receive three letters from ‘Abbūd al-Zumūr in which he guided the group regarding the operations. They also attempted to contact Iranian government through ‘Abbūd al-Zumūr’s younger brother.
Mohammad 'Abd al-Salam al-Zumur. The group consulted Shyakh Hāfiz Salāmah, a militant religious figure, to sought fatāwa to legitimise its underground activities. He was a former member of al-Ikhwān. He is currently leader of the Islāmic Jamā'at and chairman of Suez’s Islāmic Guidance Society. He claimed that he was not in favour of militant activities while al-Jihād claimed that at certain occasions he was against while advocated certain.

Mohammad al-Faraj was the chief ideologue of al-Jihād. He expressed his ideas regarding the Islāmic state and struggle, in his pamphlet al-Faridha al-Ghai'bah (The Neglected Duty). The pamphlet describes the establishment of the Islāmic state and the restoration of the khilāfah as the duty of every Muslim. This pamphlet has been reprinted in many places and circulated throughout the world among Muslim communities. The pamphlet bears no publication data. It is generally prefaced by a quotation from Sayyid Qutb.

Al-Faraj was influenced by the thoughts of Ibn Taymiyyah, al-Banna, and Mawdūdi, and followed Qutb in pushing them to their logical conclusion. He maintained in his pamphlet, the Neglected Duty, i.e. jihād is the sixth pillar of Islām, which had been often forgotten by the ‘Ulamā and majority of Muslims. His message to the Muslims was to wage the jihād against the corrupt and who have deviated from Islām, state authorities and its ruler Anwar al-Sadāt. He maintained that:

"Jihād...for God’s cause, inspite of its extreme importance for the future of religion, has been neglected by the ‘Ulamā...of this age. They have feigned ignorance of it, but they know that it is the only way to the return and the establishment of the glory of Islām anew...There is no doubt
that the idols of this world can only disappear through the power of the sword.”

It is now clear that al-Jihād’s goal is the resurgence of Islāmic state, Islāmic laws and destruction of Western style. It believed the seizure of power would be the first step to pave the way for other steps. According to al-Faraj: “We have to establish ‘the Rule of God’s Religion’ in our own country first and to make the word of God supreme.... There is no doubt that the first battlefield for jihād is the extermination of these infidel leaders and to replace them by competite Islāmic order. From here we should start”.

Al-Faraj’s, ‘ The Neglected Duty’ can be summarized in eleven propositions:

(1) The duty of every Muslim is to strive for the Islāmic ‘Ummah. This is a duty ordained by Allah and his Shariah. Since the laws of the Muslim countries are the laws of unbelievers (Kuffār), the true Muslims must declare Holy War against their leaders who are trained in the West by Christians, Communists and Zionists.

(2) Muslim leaders or groups who reject the laws of Islām must be considered apostates (murtadd) despite their claims that they are Muslims. In other words, ‘Muslimness’ has to be constantly validated since a sinful individual shall lose his status as a Muslim if he persists in his sinfulness. Apostasy is the highest level of sinfulness.

(3) Cooperation with an infidel ruler who claims to be a Muslim is sin. The punishment for such a leader is death even if he is unable to defend him self. The Muslims should refrain from government work and military service.
Perpetual *jihād* against an infidel state is the highest obligation (pillar) and only solution for all true Muslims who desire to destroy *jāhili* society and revive Islām.

Armed struggle is the only acceptable form of *jihād*.

*Jihād* pursued by peaceful means through rhetoric, Islāmic parties, or emigration (*hijrah*) is considered cowardice and stupidity. Islām can succeed only through the force of arms as it did in the past, when a small group of earnest believers (*saffjadd*) were able to spread the message through conquest. Thus true Muslims should engage in *jihād* even if they are few in number.

First fight the internal infidel (the Egyptian state) then the external infidel (the non Islamic world).

Every Muslim without great effort or education can study *jihād*. Thus the lack of knowledge is no excuse to abstain from *jihād*.

Leadership in Islām must be granted to the strongest among the believers, who also has more fear (*taqwā*) of Allah, He must be chosen collectively, and once chosen must be obeyed. An arrogant and haughty scholar should not be a leader.

Abstaining from *jihād* is the main reason for the sorry situation of the Muslims today - humiliated, degraded, disdained and divided.

Allah has designated five periods in Islāmic history:

- (a) the *‘Ummah* under the Prophet,
- (b) the *‘Ummah* under the Caliphs,
- (c) the *‘Ummah* under the kingdoms,
- (d) the *‘Ummah* under the dictatorships,
- (e) the Islām of our time when dictatorship and tyranny will be Overthrown, and the *‘Ummah* shall became
controlled by a system similar to the Prophet’s community, and peace will reign. 126

Al-Faraj claimed that the rulers are not ruling the country according to the laws and injections of Islam. It will continue until the rule of God (al-hakimiyya) is established on earth. A Muslim must observe all the five fundamental religious obligations: al-Shahādah (that there is no God but Allah and Prophet Mohammad (SAW) is His messenger); five time prayers; fasting during the Holy month of Ramadhān; the offering of alms (zakāt); and pilgrimage to the Holy places of Makkah. According to al-Faraj, jihād (The forgotten obligation) is the sixth obligation and it is the duty of every true Muslim to wage jihād against the corrupt and un-Islamic society and its rulers. Islam legitimizes “letting the blood of apostates” and “the elimination of a despot for the establishment of an Islamic government.”127 Al-Faraj, treated rulers (al-Sadāt and his colleagues) as unbelievers and compared them with Mongol rulers, who were condemned by Ibn Taymiyyah as unbelievers. Islamist militants view that establishment of Khilāfah is the only solution. They believe that the characteristics of modern societies are similar to those, which came under the domination of the Mongol rulers in medieval times. Firstly the rulers on their subjects i.e. on true Muslims do not adopt ‘Divine laws’. Secondly, they are not secure. Thirdly, they must not live among unbelievers because it is the source of danger for them. In this way al-Faraj accepted the judgment of Ibn Taymiyyah as valid that such type of societies neither belong to Dār al-Harb (abode of war) nor to Dār al-Islām (abode of peace).

Al-Faraj condemned al-Azhar ‘Ulamā ignoring jihād despite well aware about its need. He also criticized
moderate militants and al-Ikhwān for their maintenance that the people were not ready for a certain and violent revolution by which the government is overthrown. Al-Faraj, believed that Egypt (atheist state) would become strong if Muslims shed blood for it. True Muslims should also fight against their foreign enemy i.e. the West.

Muslims should not join the government, nor should serve the state in the police and the military services because doing so is equal to strengthen the arm of an infidel state and ruler. Such persons should be dealt severely. Militants were in favour of taking booty from the non-Muslims. The consequences of this doctrine were that the militants attacked security forces, killed hundreds of them only in Asyūt and robbed some jewellery stores belonged to Christians in different parts of the country.

Al-Faraj in contrast to Shukri Mustafā, demanded his followers to stand up and fight not flight, the situation is different from that of Makkan society in the early period of Prophet Mohammad (SAW).

Official response of Grand Mufti, the highest religious authority in the land, to al-Farīdha al-Gha’ībah was that al-Faraj had misinterpreted Ibn Taymiyyah by selecting some verses of the Qur’ān; whichs favour his suppression of the opposites. He admitted that there was no dis-similarity between al-Jihād militants and Khawarijites, the latter raised the slogan of ‘La hukm illa li-Allah (there in no rule bul that of God) in struggle between Hardarat Ali (R.A.) and Mu’āwiyah (R.A.) for the caliphate. Al-Jihād group raised the slogan of al-hakimiyyah and upheld their beliefs, while rejecting all outsiders as unbelievers.¹²⁸

The then Grand Mufti opined that, “Withholding allegiance to the ruler would set the ‘Muslim community’ back to the pre-Islamic
condition of *al-jāhiliyyah* (the state of ignorance)".\(^{129}\)

Muttawali Sha'rawi, the popular Islamic thinker, stressed the virtues of tolerance and patience. According to him:

"The basic concern of the Muslims is the unity of the community of believers under a rightfully guided *Imām*. If the latter does not exist as under present conditions, Muslims must endure their rulers with patience."\(^ {130}\)

Commenting on *al-Farīdha al-Ghā'ibah*, Grand Mufti stated that *jihād* is not limited to warfare. It could be exercised in multiple forms including the higher order of personal striving (*jihād al-Nafs*). He argued that learning was a higher order than fighting. In an interview on 6\(^{th}\) December 1981, Grand Mufti said that Islām is a liberal religion, which also teaches the way of protecting non-Muslims. The Qu'rān says, 'La Ikrah fi al-dīn (let there be no compulsion in religion).\(^ {131}\) It teaches humanitarian values, compassion, forgiveness and social tolerance. Religious authorities supported, al-Sadāt's peace initiative and the 'Camp David Accord' but vehemently denounced by militants.

Al-jihād maintained that the rulers are servants of Imperialism and have given up Islām, which lead them towards infidelity. So it is the need of the hour and duty of every Muslim to struggle against these evil rulers, to restore the glory of Islām and establish rule of the Almighty Allah on His land. Al-Faraj is of the opinion that *jihād* is the duty of every Muslim.\(^ {132}\) He argues that it is the duty of every Muslim to struggle for the sake of God.\(^ {133}\) Islāmic state once established will be indestructible because it is God's will. Islāmic laws are sufficient and universal. There is the solution of each and every problem beginning with ablution to govern. It is worth subjugating
the corrupt people who go against the will of God. Islām teaches equality and justice, so it will be welcomed by everyone (Muslims and non-Muslims).134

The main objective of al-jihād was to establish Islāmic rule in the country and practise Islām in every field of life political as well as social. The people who would oppose their ideas were treated as unbelievers and enemies of Islām, who should be severely punished. According to them enemies of Islām—Jews and Christians (Ahl al-kitāb), atheists, secularists and Muslims, who accommodate them and religious establishment of the West.135

Al-jihād wanted the change from the top to the bottom i.e., infidel rulers should be changed and true Muslims appointed Khulafa. So that they could implement the Shariah and rule according to it, which would definitely bring an Islāmic revolution as happened in Iran in 1979.

The organization had assets valued £E 17,000 including a machine, which produced cassettes, tapes, recording speeches of Iranian militants as communication and information. Fifty percent of these assets came from the sale of stolen jewellery of Christians. Members of the organization, which were living in Saʿūdi Arabia, send donations to the organization totaling £E 20,000.136 A major part of this amount had been spent on the purchase of arms and ammunition. The cost of one rifle was £E 1100 in the underground market. Scarcity and dearness of arms and ammunition forced the militants to attack the police stations and get the arms. Twenty rifles had been snatched from the assaulted security forces personal in Asyūt.

Leading members of al-jihād recruited new members in the organization. In Cairo and Giza, five leading members recruited potential members who were attending regularly local mosques. No particular regional
responsibility or division of labour, recruitment could be carried out any where by any responsible member. ‘Abbud al-Zumûr stated that the activities of al-Jihâd did not spread outside the locality but it had such plans to bring popular Islâmic revolution.\textsuperscript{137}

According to al-Faraj, support of military officers was sought for the use of firearms and getting the hold of arms and ammunition. However, ‘Abbud al-Zumûr revealed that they joined al-Jihâd through kinsmen and friends in the service or contacts at local mosques.\textsuperscript{138} The military officers, who played a vital role in the assassination of al-Sadât joined the organization just a few days before 6\textsuperscript{th} October 1981. Al-Faraj enlisted the support of a reserve army officer from his hometown and Islâmbûli included in the team, his friend and kinsman, ‘Abd al-Hamîd ‘Abd al-Salâm’ a retired commissioned officer, who ran a bookstore. Hussain ‘Abbâs, a non-commissioned army officer also joined the team through al-Faraj. Military training was imparted to the members of al-Jihâd by Abbas’s sister’s husband, who was apprehended by the security forces while carrying a suitcase full of explosives on 25\textsuperscript{th} September 1981.\textsuperscript{139} When Islâmbûli thought about the plot, there were no connections among the four and they met Islâmbûli first time shortly before the plot.

Kinship and friendship was the important factor of recruitment. ‘Abbud al-Zumûr and Tariq al-Zumûr were cousins and the former married latter’s sister.

**Impact of Al-Jihâd**

Centers of learning the Qur’ân and other social activity centers attracted the rural migrants to join al-Jihâd.\textsuperscript{140} Activities of Usâr (fraternities) were established by al-Jihâd on university campuses for the purpose of
mutual aid and support, which resulted in that the Islamists also did it in their own localities. According to the Mayor of Delinjat, militants of al-Jihad distributed clothes and meat among the poor and the needy in the hometown of al-Faraj, which gave them more popularity.\textsuperscript{141}

\textit{Ahali} mosques of al-Jihad and other groups brought the militants together. Observers assess that the establishment of private mosques and independent Imams and preachers nourished the Islamic resurgence. According to one report, the number of \textit{ahali} mosques in 1970 was 20,000 and by 1981 the number had more than doubled.\textsuperscript{142} Out of 46,000 mosques in Egypt in 1981, only 6,000 were under the control of the ministry of Religious Endowments (\textit{al-Awqaf}) and were maintained by 3,000 officially approved Imams.\textsuperscript{143} Independent authority of Imams were responsible for the fame of \textit{ahali} mosques and militants contacted freely Imams of those mosques for instance Mahlwi in Alexandria\textsuperscript{144} and Hafiz Salamah in Suez.\textsuperscript{145}

The \textit{ahali} mosques played an important role for establishing contacts with the new people such as al-Faraj met Islambuli after the former concluded his regular sermon at the local mosques in Bolaq al-Dakrur,\textsuperscript{146} before six month of al-Sadat’s assassination. Afterwards they approached each other’s kinsman and friends. Sermons of al-Jihad leaders in various \textit{ahali} mosques influenced several people to join the group, for instance the person who lead the attack on Jewellery stores in Naga Hamadi confessed that he was influenced by the sermons of the groups leader in Asyut.\textsuperscript{147}

Noticing the Islamic resurgence and mass involvement of people with al-Jihad, Ministry of \textit{al-Awqaf} took some popular mosques under its own control in September 1981 in Greater Cairo including \textquotesingle Umar Ibn \textquotesingle Abd al-Aziz in Bolaq
Dakrūr al-Anwar in ‘Ain Shams, al-Tawhīd in al-Harām and Masjid al-Gharabi in Nahia. In the same month security forces conducted searches, crackdowns and watched secretly the activities of al-Jihād. The then Minister of the Interior, Nabawi Ismail, made a statement after the assassination of president al-Sadāt that: “Although the backbone of the extremists was broken, some elements remained at large.” 1,536 people were detained by the government in September 1981.

Out of 302 official list of al-Jihād, 27 i.e nine percent were on the September list, of whom twenty come from Fayyūm, al-Minya, Asyūt, Sohāj and Qina. The public prosecutor accused them as principal organizers of the plot to overthrow the government, which was confirmed by the governor of Asyūt. He claimed that the attack on the security forces was led by the Amīrs of al-Jihād, who were in the wanted list since 5th September 1981. He further stated that although the orders for their arrest were issued in the first week of September, but no one was arrested which might have provided them the information regarding the plot to assassinate Anwar al-Sadāt on 6th October and clashes with the security forces in Asyūt.

The security forces detained Khālid Islāmbūlī’s brother in September 1981. According to an eyewitness, Khālid broke down upon hearing about his brother’s detention and swore to avenge the misfortune, which befell the family.

Majority of the militant groups affiliated with al-Jihād operated in Upper Egyptian region, as compared to Lower Egypt as shown in Table – II. The reason was that due to scarcity of resources, especially limited agricultural land, persistence in the extended family system and negligence of the central government. In recent years
provincial cities developed tremendously as a result of opening of universities and increase in construction with the help of hard cash remitted by the migrant workers in the Persian Gulf.

Table – II: Region-wise distribution of al-Jihād members

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greater Cairo</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Egypt</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>65.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Egypt</td>
<td>024</td>
<td>09.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Actually the total was 302 but twenty-two (22) were overseas workers. Central Agency for Statistics and General Mobilization conducted census in 1978, which shows that Asyūt and al-Minya came under the impact of rapid urbanizations and experienced instabilities in the form of sectarian and political violence. 45% of the total urban population lives in Asyūt as compared to 34% in al-Minya i.e 214,000 as compared to 146,000.\(^{152}\)

The increase in the enrolment of students at Asyūt University is responsible for the higher urban population rate for Asyūt. 15,000 students were enrolled in 1971-72 in Asyūt University as compared to 28,000 in 1976-77 where as it did not exceed 10,000 at al-Minya University in 1976-77.

Both the provincial capitals Asyūt and al-Minya witnessed communal disturbances and state repression Religious extremism began in 1975 in al-Minya.\(^{153}\) Militant Islām’s influence was on the educational system and on certain mosques. Out of 2,000 mosques only 500 were under the control of officially approved Imāms. Whenever
there was any confrontation between the militants and the security forces in Asyūt, some of the militants joined their co-religionists. In November 1980, militants of al-Minya joined militants of Asyūt against their counterparts (security forces). Asyūt University was badly interrupted during the violence. Tension was mounting in some parts of Asyūt and al-Minya, when security forces searched houses for the recovery of hidden weapons all through the late 1970's and in 1980-81, which culminated with bloodiest clashes between the militants and security force in Asyūt, two days after al-Sadāt's assassination.

Table – III shows provincial distribution of al-Jihād members. The table shows that Greater Cairo and Giza had the highest number of al-Jihād militants. In the northern belt of Greater Cairo such as Mataria, Zeitūn, Rod al-Faraj and al-Sahel, which "has been the receptacle for most of the twentieth century rural migrants." A few members were found in al-Wayli and ‘Ain Shams of Heliopolis. Misr al-Qadīmah or Sayyidah Zeinab witnessed no significant militant activities.
Highest proportion of al-Jihād members were in Bolāq al-Dakrūr, in Giza, which is near Cairo University and one of the most densely populated areas. A newspaper reported that pressure of rural migrants in Bolāq al-Dakrūr resulted in low standard housing of inhabitants, which is continuously deteriorating. Al-Faraj, the chief ideologue of al-Jihād was one of the migrants, whose followers included 70 persons in Bolāq al-Dakrūr.

Large proportion of militants was also in al-Harām, near the Pyramids. Agricultural land was converted in urban areas into private property by construction of residential houses during the 1970s. Pyramid road was the cradle of vices because of the construction of many nightclubs, which dismayed religious persons. The
inhabitants of the villages of Nahia, Kirdosa and Saft al-Laban, in which some of the most active militants grew including 'Abbūd al-Zumūr and his large family faced a number of problems to adopt Islāmic life-style and traditional values. President Mubārak issued orders for the demolition of all constructions on the Pyramids’ plateau, including the presidential Villa.\textsuperscript{157}

A number of families were forcibly evacuated from the center of Cairo, where luxury hotels and tourist centers were constructed. The families were settled in 'Ain Shams and al-Zawiyya al-Hamra, where communal riots took place in June 1981. 'Ain Shams was near the housing complex, Alf Maskan, in which Khālid al-Islāmī’s sister lived and where some of the group leaders met to plot the assassination.\textsuperscript{158}

Provincial capitals al-Minya, Asyūt and Suhāj contributed a large number of militants to the provincial areas. Unemployed or non-agricultural workers came from nearly villages, also joined militant ranks. Largest proportion was of students between the age group of 20-30 yrs. Percentage of farmers in the militants was very low because they treated Islāmic militancy as urban phenomenon.
**Table-IV**

**Occupational and age distribution of al-Jihād members**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>% age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>43.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>041</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>035</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>030</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shopkeepers</td>
<td>016</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt. officials</td>
<td>015</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police and Military</td>
<td>014</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>006</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>280</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age categories</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>% age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>≤ 20</td>
<td>049</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-30</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>70.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-40</td>
<td>030</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>≥ 40</td>
<td>005</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>280</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most of the militants come from lower middle classes due to political awareness, high literacy rate and higher mobility patterns. Technical education benefited the unemployed militants.

Colonel 'Abbūd al-Zumūr and Lt. Khālid al-İslāmī became rural elite origin, but were most effective in the execution of the assassination plot. People of rural elite origins provided the chances to the militant leaders to keep the rural areas under control.¹⁶⁰

'Abbūd al-Zumūr (age 35) was the highest ransaking officer in al-Jihād who was Lt. Colonel in the army. His
uncle, a General in the army, died in the October 1973 war. Another uncle was a member of Majlis al-Shūra, the Upper Chamber of the Egyptian parliament. His father was the ‘Umdā (Chairman of town corporation) of Nahia, in Giza. Three member of the family were in the rank of Major in the army, a family member was the secretary of the Imbāba district (Giza Governorate) branch of the National Democratic Party. Inter-marriages provided a link with other well-established families such as Ghurāb and Milkawī in the same district, having long-standing record in Egyptian parliamentary history before and after the July 1952 revolution.

Their property was confiscated in al-Nasser regime in 1966 by the Higher Committee for the ‘Liquidation of Feudalism.’ These decisions were cancelled by Anwar al-Sadāt to win the hearts of the rural elites. ‘Abbūd al-Zumūrs mother was sent on pilgrimage to Makkah at the states expenses. Tariq al-Zumūr was granted £E 5,000 as part of the state’s contribution for building mosques in Nahia.

Three members of al-Zumūr family lost their lives against a rival family who opposed the former’s plan to convert the village mosque to a militant stronghold before the crackdown of al-Sadāt regime on the secular and sectarian opposition. Al-Zumūr’s cousin, member and leader of the Pyramid group of al-Jihād, was forced to leave the village. He was wounded during the sectarian conflict in al-Zawiyya al-Hamra.

Leader of the assassination team, Lt. Colonel Khālid al-Islāmbūli, had a good educational background particularly in the profession of Law. He was from Mālawi in al-Minya governorate. His father was a legal consultant for the sugar factory in Naga Hamādī and uncle a retired
judge. The family also enjoyed political and social influence through a close family member, who was chairman of al-Minya district council. Khalid Islāmbūli’s aunt’s husband was an army General. Khalid’s brother was also a militant, who was student of commerce faculty at Asyūt University, went twice for pilgrimage to Makkah. In 1979, he was arrested by the police station Asyūt for shouting anti-al-Sadāt slogans outside the railway station and re-arrested in September 1981.

Although al-Ikhwān denounced the activities of the militants and denied their links with them, but it is a fact that some of them were its old members who later on disagreed with their moderate behaviour towards al-Sadāt regime, hence formed their own militant groups. Al-Faraj’s father, an employee of the ‘Ministry of Health’ was a dedicated member of al-Ikhwān and had been arrested several times. He lived in Imbāba, a small village in Giza, district before setting in Delinjat (al-Buhayra province). Al-Faraj settled in Bolāq al-Dakrūr, graduated in electrical engineering and was appointed in the administrative staff of Cairo University. He wrote a pamphlet of forty-five pages al-Farīdah al-Gha’ibah (The forgotten duty) or the Absent obligation or jihād or Holy struggle which is also called the constitution of al-Jihād. Al-Farīdah al-Ghā’ibah called upon the Muslims to wage armed struggle against the corrupt and un-Islāmic state and its rulers, which was interrupted by the authorities.

Primary engagements of al-Jihād were to recruit new members and make the organization active one. They also made efforts to acquire weapons and explosives. To achieve this goal, they shot and killed an Egyptian guard outside the Cypriot cosulate in Alexandria in July, 1977.
After that they engaged at large scale thefts and stealing of arms from police and army weapon stores. They were also active in violent student demonstrations in Asyût in 1980\textsuperscript{168}. It was involved in sectarian conflict with Egypt’s Coptic community throughout the country, which started from Upper Egypt. They robbed Christian jewellery stores, attacked Coptic churches, bombed a Coptic wedding and warned the people that Egyptian Copts were armed, to challenge Islām. In June 1981, they took an active part in the sectarian fighting which erupted Zawiya al-Hamra in Cairo.\textsuperscript{169}

Four al-Jihād sympathizers assassinated Anwar al-Sadāt on 6\textsuperscript{th} October 1981 as he was reviewing a parade commemorating the 1973 war. Lt. Khālid Islāmbūli, the leader of the assassins, cried out: “I am Khālid Islāmbūli, I have killed pharaoh and I do not fear death.” Though al-Sadāt was regarded a popular and international figure by the West but at home both secularists as well as Islāmists referred to him as a ‘Pharaoh’ For many in Egypt, “Khālid therefore appeared as a sort of ‘right arm’ of the popular will, and not merely as a militant exponent of an Islāmist group.”\textsuperscript{170} Fifty cadres of al-Jihād attacked security forces in Asyût killing fifty-four security forces personnel. In the shoot out sixty-four others were also killed and more than two hundred injured.\textsuperscript{171} Security forces arrested 3000 fundamentalists mostly belonging to al-Jihād and al-Takfīr wa al- Hijrah, which resulted in many other clashes.

The last group of al-Jihād, which was formed after the assassination of al-Sadāt, considers three plans whereby it would either:

(1) attempt to rescue imprisoned al-Jihād members in conjunction with an airline hijacking at Cairo airport; or
(2) engage in a series of attacks and assassinations of government targets; or
(3) attempt a combination of the two plans whereby the group would also seize arms under cover of a local riot or uprising.\textsuperscript{172}

State Response

Egyptian Islamic militant organizations of 1970s such as Jamā'at al-Muslimīn, al-Jihād and Islamic Liberation Organization were the direct descendants of al-Ikhwān. The connections between the newer Islāmīst groups and al-Ikhwān seem meager. There are twenty nine Egyptian Islāmīc societie as shown in Appendix-III including a semi-public organization al-Ikhwān; medium sized groups like al-Jamā'at al-Jihād and I.L.O. and smaller societies such as al Faramawiyyah, Jamā'at al-Ahrām, Jund Allah, Jamā'at al-Munazilah Shuuriyyah, Jund al-Rahmān, Jamā'at al-Muslimīn lil Takfīr, Mukafferatiyyah, Qif wa Tabayyīn, Jamā'at al-Harakiyyah and the Qutbiyyīn. Most of them are militant groups which operate secretly, however none of them possess the size and have fighting potential of Jamā'at al-Muslimīn or al-Jihād. Many more such groups are continuously formed than the twenty-nine presented in the Appendix-III. These societies appear and disappear, suppressed or contained, when unearthed by the regime. According to Egyptian authorities, some ninety-nine Islāmīst groups operate therein while as Kuwait based fundamentalist periodical puts their number at sixty.\textsuperscript{173}

There are two types of Islāmīst groups. The first type are located in the small towns of Upper Egypt and the Delta, who recruit members, educated and semi-educated elements of society, including the sons of provincial bureaucrats, college students, blue collar workers, and
lower middle class peasants. They became politically dangerous, as Shukri Mustafā. The second type operate in large cities like Cairo consist of students, unemployed graduates, blue-collar workers, soldiers, and low ranking officers. These militants were not permanent residents of these cities but came from rural areas for study purposes and to achieve professional aspirations.

Injustice oppression and foreign policy of the state is responsible for the development of these militant groups. They are not allowed to propagate their cause through public meetings, so they take the help of mosques during the *Fajr* and *Isha*. They discuss and converse various things in groups on the mosque floor after *Khutbāhs* (sermons). These societies discuss and assign the various types of activities to the members of self-help groups for the next day. The activities include sending food to needy, a doctor to visit the sick or a lawyer to represent a client in courts. Examples of these self-help societies are: Jamiah al-Shariyyah. Ansār al-Sunnah al-Mohammadiyyah; Jamā’ah al-Hidāyah; al-Wāz wa al-İrshād; al-Amr bi al-Ma‘rūf wa al-Nahī an al-Munkar. Alternately these societies also discuss political matters, plan public demonstrations and violent actions as anqūds (cells) of a larger organization.

The regime regarded these activities of self-help groups a rebellion against state, although it is not only unable but also unwilling to perform such type of social services, which are desperately needed by the people.

Religious fervour has been seen among the cadets in military academies such as in Air force Academy where cadets gather in groups to pray in recreational activities such as playing and watching movies. Their officers often ignore such activities, despite certain branches of military discipline, fearing that any disciplinary action against such
cadets might provoke them for disobedience or even in surrection.

Members and sympathizers of Islāmist groups were present in the military as well in the state security e.g., assassins of Anwar al-Sadāt-Islāmbuli and ‘Abbūd Zumūr were army officers. Islāmists recruit among relations including members’ serving in the armed force. It is not easy to block Islāmist influence from military latter being a part of society.

**Consequences of al-Sadāt’s Al-Infitah**

*Al-infitah* is regarded as one of the primary reasons for the rising of militancy in the state. A big gap in income had been growing continuously between the rich and the poor. Table-V clearly shows the comparison of income of two main sections of the society. The data was collected from seven different reliable sources.\(^{175}\) The table shows that the top 5% of Egyptian house holds receive 19.2% of the income in 1964-65, which had increased to 22% by 1979. The income of the poorest increased by 0.5% during the same period. That of the lowest 60% decreased 9% from 28.7% to 19.93% and middle 30% experienced 5% loss in income from 40.2% to 21.52%. The income of top 10% almost doubled their wealth from 31.9% in 1964-65 to 58.55% in 1976. It is now clear with the data available that the gap between the rich and the poor is widening. In other words the rich are becoming richer and the poor poorer, with the passage of time due to the failure of *al-Infitah* economic policy introduced by al-Sadāt.\(^{176}\)
Islamists are referred as *al-jil al-dai* (lost generation) by the Egyptian authorities and the mass media. 'Lost Generation' includes not only the youth but also older and settled occupational categories like workers, shopkeepers, military and police officers, engineers, professors, doctors and even landowners. Al-Jihād members arrested prior to the assassination of Al-Sadāt revealed this. The later neither succeeded in blocking the Islamists nor developed his own ideological formulas to educate and socialize millions of Egyptian youth. The result was that the gap he himself filled by the fundamentalist *da’wah* of al-Ikhwān and its offshoots to counter the Nasserists, became headache for him. Table-VI shows the occupational background of 303 al-jihād members, arrested prior to al-Sadāt’s assassination, represented a cross-section of Egyptian society. Table-VI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Top 5%</td>
<td>17.5° (rural)</td>
<td>19.2°</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>21.0°</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top 10%</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>31.9°</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>58.55‡</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle 30%</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>40.2°</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>21.52‡</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowest 60%</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>28.7°</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>19.93‡</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowest 40%</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>14.1°</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>13.9°</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowest 20%</td>
<td>6.6° (rural)</td>
<td>4.6°</td>
<td>5.2°</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>5.1°</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table -V
Showing shares of Income in percent
Occupation                      No.
College and University students   112
Workers                          041
College and University Graduates  031
Employees and Bureaucrats         026
Fugitives                         021
Secondary School Students         017
Military, Police, and Intelligence officers 011
Businessmen and Shopkeepers       010
Engineers                         007
Unemployed                        007
Landowners                        006
Physicians                        006
Professors                        004
Teachers                          003
Journalists                       001

Total                              303

Neither al-Sadat nor his associates were able to educate the youth in becoming loyal citizens. His promises proved deeply disappointing. Though he succeeded in regaining the glory of the Nile in 1973 by his peace treaty with Israel and growing gap between the rich and the poor paved the way for his opposition from the Islamists. The long detention and execution of militant leaders was one of the reasons, which irritated their followers, and loyalists to show severe stand against him. Moreover, he used the Azharite ‘Ulama, who propagated and issued verdicts against the Islamist groups. They propagated against militants through the mosques and media. This counter propaganda against the militants resulted the assassination of al-Sadat.
The underground militants have relationships with semi-legal Islāmist movements in the form of University based Jamā’at groups and al-Ikhwān. These underground Islāmic militants are the outcome of urbanization and rural migration into the cities. Political opportunism of al-Sadāt regime resulted in the unavailability of the militants among Marxists and Nasserites. Latter on there were confrontations between the militant groups and the regime due to the intervention of the latter in the former’s business. A minority group forms the left called ITSELF THE Islāmic Left, expressed sympathy for the militant cause. The liberal intellectuals see the militants as outside the social order because they were frightened by the Lebanese civil war and the blood bath of Ayatullah Khomeini in Irān.

Traditional ‘Ulamā wanted the unity of the Muslims because they were anxious about their authority. They should regard the militants as true Muslims. Al-Ikhwān condemned certain actions of the militants in order to demonstrate themselves as moderates to convey the regime about the manner of acting.

It was seen that many members were not well aware about the fundamentals of the organizations ideology but also of the faith they profess. The organizations have neither furnished the policies to be implemented once power is not achieved nor gave the thought about the structure of government and administration. They put these things pending till their message is to be accepted by the majority of the people and new genuine ‘Ummah has been established. In other words, once a genuine Muslim state is formed in which all citizens follow al-Sirāt al-Mustaqīm (The straight way), it is necessary to establish structure, laws and regulations.
Assassination of al-Sadāt, on 6\textsuperscript{th} October 1981 by Islāmbūli and his fellow members of al-Jihād, did not lead to a general revolt due to the lack of future plans and strategy of the militants. They seized power in Asyūt for a meager three days and surrendered before the strong state forces, because the former were neither supported by other Islāmic organizations (militants or moderates) nor by the public.

The peace treaty between Egypt, Israel and America did not establish peace in the Middle East but complicated the Palestine problem. It is the main cause of conflict in the Middle East. There will be no peace in the region unless and until the problem is solved. 'The Camp David Accord' totally failed and resulted in several new wars such as the Lebanese war. Israel took the full advantage of the peace treaty entered in the South of Lebanon and struck at Beirūt, and later reached out to attack the nuclear power plant in Bagadād. It also proved dangerous for Egypt and the Sūdān, who were shielded by America, threaten Libya and Chad. In this way can we say that there is no peace either, to be gained from isolating Egypt from the Arabs because it is impossible for a nation to be torn from its identity, and it is also impossible to impose a Western lifestyle in the name of modernity on a society, struggling with poverty and lastly because it is impossible to impose military bases in countries were they are not wanted, so that one occupation is exchanged for another.

In this way we can say that assassination of al-Sadāt was not of the person but of the policies such as dictatorship, 'Camp David Accord,' economic policies that proved fruitless and the growing poverty and continued absence of progress.
Educational background of many militants and occupation of their fathers show that they were neither frustrated nor irrational. But the question arises here that why were they motivated for joining militant ranks? There were so many reasons e.g. food riots in January 1977 in Cairo, unemployment, acute housing shortages, the 'Camp David Accord' with Israel, secular policies of al-Sadat, his inclination towards the Americans, negligence towards the Palestine issue and support to the Shah of Iran.

Al-Sadat was not a democrat but a dictator throughout his reign and left dictatorial regime in the hands of Husni Mubarak. He commanded complete authority and never recognized any democratic constitution. He created the title of General Socialist Prosecutor and abolished the usual judicial obligations to detain anyone on trivial charges without trial and for several years.
Notes and References


4. Ibid. See also *The Cambridge Encyclopaedia of ME/NA*, op. cit., p. 321.

5. Sawlat, Tharwat, op. cit., p. 140.

6. Ibid.

7. East Pākistān is now called Bangladesh, which was disunited from Pākistān in 1971.

8. Sawlat, Tharwat, op. cit., p. 140. According to *Cambridge Encyclopaedia of the ME/NA*, op. cit., p. 321, 15,000 military experts were present at that time in Egypt.


12. Ibid., p. 142 see also *The Cambridge Encyclopaedia of the ME/NA*, op. cit., p.322.

13. On 23 July 1952, the R.C.C., (Revolutinary Command Council of Free Officers) overthrew King Farooq and took over the power in their hands. Since then 23 July had been celebreated as National Day.


15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid. p. 143.
19. Ibid., p. 144. See also Dekmejian, op. cit., p. 86, also Armajani, op. cit., p. 408.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
26. Ibid., p. 72.
30. Ibid., p. 86.
31. Ibid., p. 87.
33. Nadvi, op. cit., p. 175.
35. Ibid., p. 96.
37. *The Cambridge Encyclopaedia of ME/NA*, op. cit., p. 322, see also Dekmejian, op. cit., p. 89.
41. Dekmejian, op. cit., p. 90.
43. Hasan al-Banna is the founder of al-Ikhwan al-Muslimumin of Egypt and Maulana Abul Ala Mawdudi is the founder of Jamat-i-Islami (Indo-Pak) and well known writer of the 20th century of Indo-Pak subcontinent
44. The crisis theologian of 14th century.
45. Dekmejian, op. cit., p. 94.

47. Ibrahim, Saad Eddin, op. cit., p. 435.

48. Ibid., p. 436.

49. Ibid., p. 437.


51 Ibrahim, Saad Eddin, op. cit., p. 442.

52 Ibid. p. 452.


55 Ibid., p. 431.

56 Ibid., pp. 429-35 and 441.

57 Ibid., p. 441. see also *al-Ahrām*, 7 July, 1977.


60. Ibrahim, op. cit., p. 452.


62. Ibid.

63. Ismael, Tareq Y., op. cit., p. 118.


68. Ibid.
69. Islamic Liberation Party is a branch of al-Ikhwan al-Muslimūn, Jordan.
70. Sayyid Abul Ala-Mawdūdī (1903-79) of Jamā'at-i-Islāmi Pākistān and Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) of al-Ikhwan of Egypt described hijrah as withdrawal from the new jāhiliyyah, which they identified as the policies of secularism, capitalism, socialism, and modernization (westernization of the Muslim nation states).
72. Ismael, Tareq Y., p. 118.
73. Shoukri, Ghali, op. cit., p. 293, see also al-Ahrām, 30 July, 1977.
76. Shoukri, op. cit., p. 298.
79. Shoukri, Ghali, op. cit., p. 296.
80. Ibid.
82. Ibid.
83. Ibrahim, op. cit., p. 435.
84. Al-Ahrām, Cairo, 21 October, 1979; Al-Musawwar, Cairo, No. 3009, 11 June 1982.
86. Ibrahim, op. cit., p. 432.
89. Two books were written by Qāsim Amīn Tahrīr al-Mar'ah (Freedom to Women) and al-Mar'ah al-Jadīdah (The Modern Women.).
90. Abū al-Khayr, op. cit.,
91. Ibrahim, op. cit., p. 437.
92. Ibid.
93. Ibid., pp. 436-39
94. Ibid., p. 441.
95. Statistical figures provided by Ibrahim in his article Anatomy, op. cit., p. 439.
96. Ibid.
97. Ibid., p. 441.
98. Ibid.
100. Al-Musawwar, Cairo, 24 September 1982, pp. 4-9, cited by Ismael Tareq Y., op. cit., p. 119.
104. Ibn Taymiyyah (1263-1328) was a medieval theologian of the Hanbali school who issued a fatwa ruling that the Muslim Mongol rulers in Marden (modern Turkey) were not to be considered Muslims because they applied a mixture of Shariah and Mongol laws (the Yasa), Islamists draw parallels with modern governments that only partially apply the Shariah.
106. Dekmejian, op. cit., p. 98.
110. Ansari, op. cit., p. 126.
111. Ibid.
112. Ibid.
113. Ibid.

117. Ibid., p. 143.

118. *Asharq, al-Ausat*, London: 1st October 1984 cited by Ismael, Tareq Y., op. cit., p. 120.

119. *Al-Musawwar*, Cairo, 24 September 1982, pp. 4-9 cited by Ismael, Tareq Y. op. cit., p. 120.

120. Ibid.

121. *Al-Musawwar*, Cairo, 11 September 1981, pp. 10-11, 65 cited by Ismael, Tareq Y., op. cit., p. 120.

122. *Al-Musawwar*, Cairo, 24 September 1982, pp. 4-9 cited by Ismael, Tareq, Y., op. cit., p. 120.

123. *Al-Farīdah al-Ghai'bah*, p. 7, cited by Ismael, Tareq Y., op. cit., p. 120.


125. Ibid., p. 193.


132. Faraj, Mohammad al-Salam, op. cit., quoted by Ismael, Tareq Y. op. cit., p. 121.

133. Ibid.

134. Ibid., p. 122.


136. Ibid., pp. 126-127.

137. Ibid., p. 127.

138. Ibid., pp. 127-128.


140. The Information is based on an interview taken by Ansari with Kamil Zahayri, the former president of the Egyptian Press Syndicate, on 24 November 1981.

142. Al-Jumhūriyya, 8 September 1981 quoted by Ansari in, Islāmic Militants, op. cit., p. 129.


144. Shaykh Hāfiz Salāmah was born in Suez in 1925, where he grew up and continued his jihād activities. Due to this type of activities, he was put in various jails of Egypt. He was suppressed by every ruler but he never got upset or depressed, which made him more and more strong. In an interview with Kuwait based weekly international newspaper, al-Mujtama (Urdu Translation publisher in Zindagi Nav, Delhi, March 2000), he revealed that he took part shoulder to shoulder with Palestinians in jihād against the British in 1944. He also participated alongwith al-Ikhwān volunteers in 1948 jihād against the British military for Palestinians. He also took part in 1956 and 1973 wars against Israel and demonstrated his courage and dedication towards Islām. He criticized peace treaty of Anwar al-Sadāt with Israel and described it the treaty of Istislām (Surrender). He was accused by the al-Sadāt Govt. of being involved in the Sectarian conflict in al Zawiyya al-Hamra in June, 1981. Sadat called him the made man.

Hafiz Salamah delivered sermons at both ahāli Mosques al-Shyhada Mosques in Suez and al-Nūr Mosque in Cairo al-Nūr Mosque is regarded as meeting place of militants. He is currently, head of Jamīyyat al-Hidaya al Islāmiyyah (Islāmic Guidance Council Suez).

145. Shaykh Ahmad al-Mahalawi also criticized Anwar al-Sadāt for peace Treaty with Israel, over his sermons at al-Qāid Ibrāhīm Mosque in Alexandria. Ministry of al-Awqāf dismissed him from the service in July 1981. He was the government Imām of the mosque for nine years. He always referred al-Sadāt as ‘corrupt ruler’ and in turn al-Sadāt publicly called him ‘the filthy Imām,’ which irritated Islāmic militants as well as moderates.

146. Ansari, Islāmic Militants...op. cit., p. 129.

147. Ibid.

148. Ibid.

158. Ibid., p. 133.
159. Ibid.
175. Ibid., pp. 104-105.

177. Dekmejian, op. cit., p. 106.