Chapter-V
COMMUNICATION MANAGEMENT AND ITS IMPACT ON MESSAGE EFFECT

V.0 The purpose of this chapter is to present a theoretical analysis of Message Effects within the domain of structural relations and meaning relations. There are of course, numerous avenues for accomplishing this task, however this study restricts itself to analyse considerations to make strategic decisions about the content, style, and medium of messages produced to achieve certain effects. This chapter is about research and theory on the structural relations and meaning relations that cohere messages into discursive constructions, as that is informative about message effects. The pertinent sections of the chapter, respectively, are as follows: (a) Mental Model and Message effect (b) Premises about Message effect (c) Structural Relation in Discursive constructions (d) Meaning Relations in interactions

Section V. 1. Mental Model and Message Effect

The process of communication focuses on the delivered message and the production of messages for delivery. Hence, the communication research must be centrally concerned with the message as represented by the communicator. Any definition of communication does not underplay the role of sender and receiver of the message.
hence every definition of messages within a system of communication must be concerned with the messages as received. The questions about the effectiveness for comprehension, persuasion, or recall are questions about the message as received. It claims that to establish the norms of "message effect" the receipt of message is more important to communication studies. Therefore the first task of a theory of messages is to study how messages are represented by the communicator.

The second assumption is that messages are information-dense in an objective sense. That is, the stimulation of the visual auditory and other senses per unit time is very high even in ordinary social encounters where messages are not designed for maximum effect. We present these assumptions only because of the implications they carry.

The first implication is that the representation of the messages is an insoluble problem. Communication research indicates that certain problems are central to the study of human communication. These include the problems of comprehensibility, recallibility, and the effects of messages on attitude, beliefs and opinions.

The second assumption in combination with the first assumption implies that people cannot process the full complexity of information present in message and hence must use certain heuristic devices to handle the density of information. These heuristic devices may...
operate at the sensory, attentional, and perceptual levels. The evidence for the existence of such heuristic devices is very strong. For example, the receivers of the message lose the linguistic format of the messages very soon after hearing or reading the content, but retain the essential meaning of the message for a long.

The next implication is that text models of messages are strikingly different from mental models of messages. If one accepts the assumption that messages are too information dense to process completely and that the receiver of the message must use some simplifying heuristic on them, then one can not escape the claim that a representation of the message that is isomorphic with the message preserves too much of the complexity that the receiver try to escape. The solution to the complexity problem is to discover and to postulate a set of homomorphism that people use in representing messages to themselves. In other words the solution is to discover the mental models used in the psychological representations of messages. The scholars who have worked on these lines observe that when ability and motivation are low, then the receiver of the message presumably use other simplifying heuristic devices as their cognitive responses. In such examples message is reduced to a simple distal cue that allows the receiver to respond to the communication without the expenditure of much cognitive energy. The effect of the message is based upon a hypothesized combination rule pulling together the
various components of the message. The combination rule is crucial because under some circumstances all that will be left as the mental representation of the message will be its effect. In cases where no on-line judgement is made, the later judgements are related to memory of the message content. In these cases, the mental model of the message is crucially important because retrieval of the information from memory for the purposes of predicting judgements depend upon what is held in memory. In cases where judgements is on line, the memory for items in the message seems to be unrelated to judgement. The message’s effect in this case is predicted significantly by the on line judgement, which in turn, is determined by the combination rule for features of the message. It shows that successful theories of message effects will need to be sensitive to several matters.

Coming to the factors that alter the way in which audiences respond to messages, we observe that these factors are:

(i) The differential reaction of participants and observers.

(ii) The character of the contrived messages.

(ii) The use of restricted message channels.

In each case the study of mental models can be radically affected by an inappropriate choice or a choice whose implications are not well understood. Thus the methods one uses to study mental
representations can have a significant effect on the type of mental representation that results. It is imperative that we become aware of the impact of these methodological choices on the possible substantive conclusions.

The classical approach for studying “message effects” is to formulate messages differing on some dimensions of interests, control for potentially confounding variables. In effect the role is that of an observer of the message as opposed to that of a participant. This difference is not problematic unless theorists borrow from message variable research using observers to formulate theoretical propositions about the perceptual and behavioral responses of interactants. The assumption of course is that findings using observers as receivers applicable to interactants as well.

However, the research in this area indicates that this assumption is highly suspectable for several reasons. For example the nature of information available to observers is often qualitatively different from the information monitored by participants. Observes generally have access to only the speech of the participants. Participants not only perceive behaviour but also have access to feelings, thoughts, and relational considerations, given past experiences with these or similar partners. Because of differences in their roles and in available informations actors and observers tend to attribute behavior to situational and dispositional factors.
Due to this difference in perspective and communicative responsibilities participants and observers may produce different cognitive, affective, and behavioral responses to the same message. Several studies have reported few significant correlations between participants and observer's attribution of similar messages. Studies in this area (Allen 1974, Street 1985), have indicated that the same message features may elicit different relational and personal inferences from the perceptions of observes relative to those of participants. For example, participants usually evaluate their partners significantly more favourably than do observers.

Indirect evidences also implicates participant observer response differences to similar messages. Receivers hearing audio tapes or reading transcripts have rated speakers with lexical diverse messages as more communicatively competent and effective, than those producing redundant messages. However among participants low lexical diversity has been linked to judgements of perceived influence in stimulated juries.

Thus there are ample evidences that indicate that observers and participants differ in their processing of message. These evidences further indicate that they (observers and participants) differ in their responses to similar communicative messages.
The notion of message acceptance or preference ranges also serves as a useful heuristic device for examining potential mediators of the width and range of the message. For example, contextual, personal, and relational factors can influence what message levels interlocutors deem appropriate and the range of acceptable messages. Thus receiver may prefer some message levels in one context but different levels in another context. For intimate topics, relatively slow speech is more acceptable, if not preferred than relatively fast speech. In informal conversations moderate speech rates are more appropriate. Personal characteristic of the receiver may also mediate preferences for message levels. It shows that the construct of acceptance or expectancy ranges may be a useful concept not only for explicating the effects of message extremes but also for explaining the impact of messages in natural discourse. Thus, a promising avenue for further research is the study of situational personal and relational factors that determine the content and scope of message preference regions.

In communication studies, it is easy to see that the less information available to receivers, the greater the likelihood that the information that is available will influence receivers responses. For example, in a message text with less information the receiver of the message will be influenced by the vocal style. In message texts with increasing informations the vocal cues are likely to assume less
importance. Keeping these facts in mind we may argue that message variable research should employ a functional approach. A functional approach is preferable because in communication process, meanings and intentions are grounded in contextual considerations.


Communication research today has its roots in a number of academic traditions and disciplines. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that communication research as an empirical science encompasses a number of different focuses and perspectives. How do messages influence the distribution of knowledge, people's attitude and behavior, the social change, the policies of government and the social institution are just a handful of the type of issues explored in communication research. Such diversity in the nature of the variables, scholars have labelled communication as variable field. This diversity in the focus of communication research has brought both problems and benefits to the field. The wide range of concerns embodied by communication science has probably served as an obstacle to the construction of any single theoretical perspective that might shape or guide exploration throughout the entire field. But it has also at times served as a vehicle to inspire cross fertilization in research perspectives across the field's different subdomains.

The purpose of message effect research is ultimately theory
development. If the primary purpose of research can be said to be the construction of theory, then it can also be said that the primary purpose of method is to help, build, test, expand, and refine. The theories established earlier. Even a cursory examination of research published in recent years reveals a dearth of studies in which message comprehension is the main dependent variable. This is possibly due to the fact that earlier studies designed to explore the relationship between message comprehension and attitude change frequently resulted in inconsistent findings. Many times attitude change was not found to be related to recall of arguments presented in the message. The inability of message comprehension variables to predict attitude change consistently may have discouraged communication researchers from examining message comprehension and message effect.

Our understanding of a message depends on our understanding of the world around us, including various variable and non-variable communication inputs. The ability of a receiver to understand the actions, texts, and messages produced by others does not arise solely from these inputs themselves. Rather, the receiver must have requisite knowledge about the physical and social world in order to comprehend meaningfully action, texts, and message. Without such knowledge, actions and message may be perceivable but not necessarily comprehensible. This assumption raises the interesting paradox of how it is possible for person to achieve understandings
of events they have never experienced before. If relevant knowledge is necessary for understanding sense data then how can one acquire the requisite knowledge for understanding a unique situation. Psycholinguists working in this area provide answer to this paradox with theory of reminding. They suggest that persons understand new situations by finding similarities between the new situation and general features of situations that are available in long term memory. As consequence, the new situation may remind persons of similar situations they have witnessed in past, thus providing them with a basis for understanding the present unique situation.

However, the assumption that comprehension of the world arises from the interaction of incoming data with existing knowledge is not fully endorsed in some quarters. Gibson (1966-1979) argues that the physical environment provides information to which perceivers must attend themselves so that they can behave adaptively. These scholars reject the idea that incoming information must be corrected by a cognitive system in order to achieve more veridical representation of the world. They assert that the construct of memory is not necessary to explain the facts of perception.

If the basic assumption that comprehension is the joint product of incoming data with existing knowledge is accepted, at least two implications about the nature of "message effect" follow. First as
noted earlier, old studies of persuasion, and attitude change were done under the assumption that if persons were informed by the message and learned its arguments, they would be persuaded. In view of the position advanced here, this approach was misguided because it failed to take into account the knowledge that message recipients brought with them to the persuasion situation. In fact, recent research in the cognitive response tradition has found that attitude change is rarely correlated with the acquisition of message arguments but is frequently related to the number of self-generated cognitive responses to messages. Receivers who themselves generate more positive responses to the messages are more persuaded by it. On the other hand, receivers who generate more negative responses are less persuaded. Thus rather than providing new informations, the persuasive communication may trigger extent knowledge. The triggering of this knowledge may be responsible for the persuasive effect cognitive response research demonstrates convincingly the important role played by prior knowledge in the processing of current inputs and the importance of assessing extent knowledge before attempting to predict message effect.

Another implication of the basic assumption is that because receivers do not have identical experiences in their interactions with the world, their world knowledge is somewhat idiosyncratic. Thus, there understanding of the “same message” are likely to show
variations. Obviously, persons have many experiences in common that lead them to develop common knowledge. For example, children are generally told from an early age that by being nice to others they can expect others to be nice to them. Most of the time, this relationship seems to hold. However, because this relationship does not hold all of the time, for most of them, this piece of social knowledge is not invariant across persons. As a result, when this knowledge becomes relevant to the comprehension of a message individual differences in understanding are to be expected. In a sense, then there are as many message effects, as there are receivers who are exposed to a message. While the individual differences in comprehension that flow from individual differences in knowledge have been emphasized here, it is important to note that, in many routine communication transactions, there is enough common knowledge derived from common experience so that the parties involved generally achieve, some degree of mutual understanding.

Some communication researchers have argued that the appropriate focus of social interaction research should be on patterns of message transactions between persons rather than on the impact of messages themselves. The study of patterns of messages exchanges can tell us something about relationships between participants, however it tells very little about the basic processes involved in message comprehension. How communicators, comprehend the
messages, they exchange is vital to understanding how they will respond to each other. However, in order to understand how communicators comprehend each others messages, it is necessary to understand and how they use their knowledge of the social world and each other to process their message exchange. Simply charting patterns of message exchanges can not tell us very much about the meanings that communicators derive from their exchange of messages. Rather, it is necessary to examine how cognitive structures and processes interact with message inputs to produce understanding or misunderstanding.

There are different specific models of message processing. The ability of these models to explain and predict how conversations are encoded, stored and retrieved from memory remains undetermined.

One of these specific models of message processing is story grammar model. The story grammar model breaks narratives into the constituents by applying a set of re-write rules. For example, a basic re-write rule is that a story consists of a setting and an event structure. Other re-write rules specify the nature of setting and event structures. The terms used in these re-write rules are specified further by additional rules. Using this model stories can be represented as hierarchies in which more abstract story units appear at the top of the hierarchy and the details of the story at the bottom.
Through repeated exposure to stories containing similar structures, receiver develops mental representation of story structure called story schemata. It is assumed that when persons are faced with the task of understanding a story, story schemata that contain the features represented in story grammars are instantiated in order to achieve comprehension. Story grammars are systems for describing narratives, while story schemata are mental structures used in the processing of these texts. Although a number of story grammars have been developed, empirical tests aimed at examining the effects of story schemata on the processing of narratives have fielded similar findings. For example, when persons read and then recall stories, they show better memory for story units that are more abstract or higher in the hierarchical representation of the text than units that are lower in the hierarchy. This phenomenon has been labeled the levels effect in story recall. Although recall of the lower level details of stories is less likely than higher level units. It shows that on recognition memory measures, receiver could discriminate above chance levels among verbatim propositions, false propositions, and paraphrases of propositions from a story. This finding suggests that less abstract representation of text are not lost but may be more difficult to retrieve than are more abstract discourse units. Goodman (1982) provided evidence for psychological validity of story structure by demonstrating that arranging story constituents in unusual orders
showed reading times significantly at the points where the unexpected units were placed.

Some types of story unit appear to be recalled consistently better than others. For example, in Glenn's (1979) Story grammar, Story episodes consist of the sequence of events: settings, initiating events, internal states (cognition, emotions and goals), attempts, consequences and reactions. Among these events, settings, initiating events, goals and consequences are better recalled. One explanation of this finding is that events that play an important part in organizing the story are better recalled than are categories of events that are not critical to the organization of the story. A second explanation is that events that are part of a causal chain tend to be better recalled than events that are causally connected. A final explanation for this effect is that event types that have more connections with other events in the story because of their centrality, are more likely to be recalled than events with fewer connections. These three alternatives were contrasted in a study which exhibited that whether or not an event was part of a causal chain, each alternative accounted for substantial common and unique portions of variance in immediate recall, delayed recall, summarization, and judged importance of the events. However story grammar approach to story comprehension never claimed to account for all aspects of processing and that, such features of stories as sentence structure, word frequency, and the
emotive properties of the text are not commonly used in other varieties of communication.

The mechanisms responsible for the comprehension and generation of both spoken and written communication are critical ingredients in the communication process. Regardless of whether knowledge is represented in the form of story schemata, atomic and macro prepositions, or scenes scripts and plans, the important point is that world knowledge interacting with information provided by communication message and the context within which the message is presented are responsible for producing comprehension. This, in order to understand, how receiver comprehend message, one can not simply focus upon attributes of the text or the message itself, rather one must study these relationships between message attributes on the one hand and cognitive structures and processes on the other. Moreover, to manipulate message attributes in order to determine how they influence various judgments without a simultaneous concern for the role that cognitive structures and processes play in transforming message inputs into judgments is to engage in what is essentially a theoretically vacuous enterprise. Explaining how message inputs eventuate in judgments of communicator competence or attractiveness, for example requires some theorizing about intervening cognitive processes, simply providing correlations between message attributes and judgments does not explain how these transformations occur.
There are reasons to believe that findings derived from studies employing narratives as stimulus materials might be generalized to comprehension processes in social interaction situation. The plan hierarchy helps to determine how the communicator will play his or her role in the interaction. Thus the plan serves to guide actions. This plan scheme may be little different from one that would be used to process a story involving the pursuit of a similar social goal. Thus plan-based theories of social interaction may go a long way toward explaining why communicators act the way they do in social interaction situations.

Section V:2.(i) : Premises about Message Effect.

The premises about message effects make considerably different empirical predictions about the product of respondents to messages and also the conduct of products of messages. For example:

The classical premise predicts that people will act in a consistent way across social contexts in regard to some matter, until and if new experiences or messages regarding that matter produce a change in their cognition of the world. In contrast the alternate premise predicts that respondents can be expected to vary what they say or do regarding some matter from one social context to another independent of changes in cognition of world, in so far as those contexts present antecedents or possible consequents that change
what relevance and social meaning particular utterances and behaviors regarding that matter will have. Evidences that bear out the key prediction of the classical premise that individual conduct varies as a function of cognition of world is relatively sparse simply because little research has been carried out on long term patterns of speech and behavior about particular matters relative to change in cognition of world. The most systematic data available have been obtained in the context of studies of PUBLIC SERVICE campaigns. Consistent with classical premise, some communication campaigns have succeeded in producing stable, long term behaviour changes regarding smoking cessation, family planning practices, heart disease risk reduction, AIDS risk reduction and so on.

On the other hand, much of that research on communication campaigns shows that creating belief and attitude change alone often was not sufficient to produce those behaviour changes. It was common to have to supplement the mass media campaigns that did achieve belief and attitude changes by providing opportunities for face to face interaction between campaign representative and respondents. The interactions sometimes were devised to give respondents opportunities to practice the skills needed to make the sought after change, but invariably they offered respondents opportunities for interaction about the sought-after changes outside
their ordinary social contexts, in socially supportive ones. Moreover, this was particularly important when the behaviour change being sought ran counter to the values or norms of the actor's reference group. In accordance with the alternate premise, this suggests that what individuals say or do, depends on its utility and meaning in their local social context.

A second empirical prediction of the alternate promise about message effects is that some portion of the context of percussive messages can be exploited not to be informative about the matter at hand, but instead to recast the basis of the relevance of desired responses within the discursive constructions in which they will occur in order to change their social meaning and utility. Recent taxonomies of persuasive communication are consistent with this. Constituent strategies such as proffering rewards as indictments inviting conformity with a reference group or making interpersonal obligation salient can be differentiated more by the basis they establish for the relevance and thus the social meaning of desired responses than by any change, they are likely to induce in respondents cognition of world about the matter in hand. More telling, perhaps, a close inspection of the content of actual persuasive messages will reveal in many cases materials that is uninformative about the matter at hand but that functions to recast the basis of the relevance of sought-after actions/messages within the discursive constructions in which they are
expected to occur so as to attach certain social meanings to those actions/messages.

Both premises have in common the view that cognition of the world are subject to formation and change by communication. The main difference between the two promises involves what cognitions and cognitive process are taken as being formative of speech and behavior.

From the perspective of classical premise, speech and behaviour are neutral instruments for expressing or externalizing cognition of world that are salient in the present instance. Depending on one’s motivation and ability to do so other’s messages are processed for the information they have encoded about the subjective conditions and environmental states of affairs that those others are experiencing or know about. This processing is based on knowledge structures that discriminate new from old information and it results in changes in cognition of world. Such changes in cognition of world are presumed to foster changes and behaviour.

The alternate premise reverse this. It treats cognition of word’s resources to use in giving messages, content and form sufficient to promote desired outcomes or inhibit undesired ones in social interactions. Other’s messages are processed for the interaction outcomes and relational orientations that their production makes more
or less probable. The processing is based on rules and principles for identifying structural relations and meaning relations in discursive constructions and it foster changes in one's expectations of the outcomes of interactions, the goal and agenda of others with whom one interacts, the social treatment one can expect from others and so on. Such changes in ones expectations are presumed to foster changes in one's speech and behaviour.

In these terms two premises are independent and nonexclusive, not contrary like the classical premise. The alternate premise takes as given that what actors say and do is an expression of cognition of world, and that changes in cognition of world will correspond to changes in the respondent's speech and behaviour. But the alternate premise qualifies the classical premise by treating this as not being necessarily so, and not at every juncture. In contrast to the classical premise, the alternate premise entails that when and whether such changes in cognition of world are registered in speech and behavior depends on whether and how they are relevant in the discursive construction to which their expression would contribute. Accordingly, the real difference between the classical and alternate premise is not about whether the changes that messages produce in cognition of world will ultimately result in speech and behaviour. The real difference is about when such changes will manifest themselves, and how reliably across contexts, given the
constraints of discursive constructions on what actors say and do.

To approach this from other angle the alternate premise carries with it the idea that the relative probability of a possible action/message depends on the way it is relevant to its antecedents, because the basis of its relevance gives it a social meaning that it will be more or less socially desirable to express. But the social desirability of expressing some meaning in cognition of world. Thus messages that produce changes in cognition of world can correspondingly change the respondents subjective estimate of the desirability of producing a given action/message and thereby the probability of its production but only at those junctures when it is relevant to produce that action/message at all. As above, this entails that the real difference between the classical and alternate premise is not whether changes that messages induce in cognition of world will have tangible consequences but when and how frequently those changes in cognition of world will correspond to changes in what respondents say and do.

Section V:3. Structure Relations in Discursive Constructions

A discursive construction is structured if it is formed from the combination of distinct parts. Such parts are structurally optional when the discursive constructions can be made complete regardless of whether they are included. Such parts are structurally obligatory
when making the discursive construction complete or whole depends on their inclusion. When it is structurally obligatory to contribute a message then not contributing are would be a conspicuous omission that at minimum will interfere with achieving closure, and in addition may be interpreted as an action.

Sigman (1987) has postulated that what people say and do is structured on one or more of three distinct levels. One is the *semiotic* level, on which constituents are structurally obligatory to produce complete alterances and behaviors. A second is the *interaction* level on which constituents are structurally obligatory to complete the interaction. And the third is the *social* level on which constituents are structurally obligatory to complete institutional forms of life.

**V:3:1 Semiotic Level**

At semiotic level the structure of the utterance can be termed as *comsigns*, signs that are produced with communicative intent and interpreted as such by their interpreters. An important aid in making explicit the conditions for communication is H.P. Grice's theory of what he calls "non natural meaning" Grice wants to distinguish cases in which a person interprets natural events and objects as meaningful from cases of interpretation of consigns used to communicate. Grice formulates three necessary and sufficient conditions for an event being an consign:
(i) A communicator C intends X to produce some effect E on an interpreter I.

(ii) C intends I to recognize the intention of (i)

(iii) I's recognition of the intention of (ii) is a reason for the effect E on I.

All three conditions in Grice view are necessary for X being a comsign. Suppose that a person "A" leaves a suspect's handkerchief at the scene of the crime intending to induce a belief in a detective B that the suspect is guilty. Then A may have made evidence available to B with the intention specified in (i), but he is clearly not openly communicating with B. It is important to see that the class of objects and events Grice is distinguishing as comsigns does not include natsigns and hence his distinction is not that which we are seeking. To interpret "signs" is, in fact, to use an inference in which these generalizations are an essential premise. Grice has thus used the traditional natural signs as one term of the contrast he seems to draw.

Grice's theory of the meaning of a comsign consists of two parts. It is primarily a statement of conditions by which a given event can be distinguished as a comsign. Grice claims that the meaning of significance that a given comsign "X" has for an interpreter I is what
I recognizes a communicator C as intending to mean by X on a given occasion. Thus Grice distinguish the “occasion meaning” of a comsign from its “timeless meaning”. Timeless meaning is established out of repetitions of comsigns with occasion meaning. Thus recognizing the communicator’s intentions is essential for interpreting the linguistic symbols as comsign, but this recognition does not determine the signs significance.

Our focus so far has been on the problems of distinguishing comsigns from natsigns and of specifying features that serve to demarcate conventional comsigns. We consider now the internal structures of comsigns and the logical features of their use and interpretation. complete grammatical sentences are those comsigns with a subject predicate (NP - VP) structure and whose reference is provided by subject terms as distinct constituents. Thus language is a communicative system with a lexicon consisting of a finite number of morphemes as basic elements and grammatical rules for combining these morphemes to form subject - predicate (NP+VP) sentences and combinations of such sentences. There are six principal features of language which establish language as a communicative system.

V:3:1:(i) Feature of Semanticality

This feature is present when the elements of the system are objects of cognitive interpretation and are related by interpreters to
independent events or things in the environment. Single word 

imperatives like "come" or "Go" have semanticity. It is conceivable 

that there be communicative systems whose elements are only used 
to prescribe and which would thus lack this feature of semanticity. 
Animal signals seem to have only an expressive or addressing function 
Animal signals for example seem usually to have the addressing function of announcing the presence of the caller. For all such cases feature of semanticity would be absent.

**V:3:1:(ii) Feature of Conventionality**

The feature of conventionality is marked by the arbitrariness of the elements of a communicative system, as contrasted with element bearing an iconic relation to what they signify. It might seem possible for a set of conventional elements to be used solely for prescriptive purposes and be objects of dynamic interpretation only, and thus lack semanticity, but it is difficult to conceive how the significance of such elements could be learned by as interpreter learning would seem to require a correlation between elements and independent things or events the situation seems the same for expression of emotions or feelings. The feature of conventionality thus does seem to presuppose semanticity.
V:3:1:(iii) Feature of semantic field placement

The term refers to relationships which elements of a communicative system can bear to each other. It occurs when a given number of mutually exclusive elements together exhaust a semantic field.

V:3:1:(iv) Feature of duality of patterning

A complex signal is a signal formed by combining two or more of the basic elements, in contrast to a basic element used in isolation as a simple Signal. The basic element of a spoken human language are its morphemes. Human languages also have a second level of patterning by which their basic elements are formed by combinations of phonemes as sub-elements which themselves lack significance. The second level of patterning enables the generation of a potentially infinite number of morphemes by combinations and reiterations of a relatively small number of sub-elements. Human languages exhibit this duality of patterning, and they seem to be unique in this respect.

V:3:1:(v) Feature of Grammaticality

If the order between the element is relevant to the meaning of the whole, then the system in which the signal is formed exhibits weak grammatically system may also exhibit how the form of one element is to depend on the form of the other. The rules are conventional, and hence Grammaticality also requires conventionality.
V:3:1:(vi) Feature of Displacement

Displacement occurs when a communicator uses a comsign which refers to interpreter to a referent occasion remote in time and space from the occasion at which the sign occurs. The primary means for making this possible meaning is the use of sentences with subject predicate structure. Use of a subject term as a distinct constituents enables a speaker to refer to a distant object which the hearer can identify. The referent occasion then becomes the indefinite occasion at which the object referred to is identified. The referent occasion is the place at which the hearer would identify a ‘place’ as referred to by the subject.

Having outlined these six features, we are in a position to give an abstract characterization of a language. Thus a language can be defined as a communicative system with duality of patterning, displacement, and strong grammaticality. These features entail as we have seen conventionality and hence also semanticity. Actual human languages possess also the feature of semantic field placement making possible along with the other features unlimited expressibility, the capacity of language users. to form an unlimited number of complex combinations of basic elements and to express more precisely intended meanings by introducing more elements to exhaust a given semantic field.
**V:3:2 Interaction Level**

When we speak, we also interact, is the essence of the theory of speech act first developed by J.L. Austin, and then elaborated by John, R. Searle. This theory propounds that when people utter sentences they also perform acts of various kinds such as "declaring", "asking", "requesting", "commanding", and "promising". Austin gives the list of three types of acts which are performed in the delivery of a single utterance.

**V:3:2(i) Locutionary Acts**

We produce a meaningful alteration in accordance with the phonological syntactic, morphological and other rules of language. Searle sub-divides locutionary Acts into:

(a) *Utterance Act*: The physical production of morphemes and sentences.

(b) *Prepositional Act*: Act of referring and predicating

**V:3:2(ii) Illocutionary Act**

When we say something, we perform illocutionary acts in saying something, such as asking a question, ordering someone to do something promising, asserting the truth of proposition etc. It is the illocutionary acts indeed, which constitute the speech acts while uttering utterances.
V:3:3. Perlocutionary Act

When we say something, we perform perlocutionary acts by means of saying something, such as persuading someone to do something, convincing over interlocutor, moving him into anger etc. Perlocutionary acts are the consequences of our speaking. They are the effects which our utterances have upon the listener.

V:3:(iii) Social Level

Socio linguistic approaches to communication grew out of years of field studies of verbal communication. It was originally intended to answer, questions and test hypothesis arising from earlier ethno graphic work on the realization of social categories of language (Blount & Gumperz 1972, and Gumperz, 1972) Detailed observing on verbal studies reveals that in individual choice of speech act style has symbolic value and interprative consequences that can not be explained by correlating the linguistic variants with social and contextual categories.

Section V:4: Message Effect: A Psycholinguistic perspective

Just and Clark (1973) found psycholinguistic evidence for distinguishing implications from presuppositions. Subjects were asked to make true/ false judgments about pairs of related sentences. The first sentence was the “premise”, i.e. the input sentence and the
second sentence was a conclusion based on the premise. Both implications and presuppositions were tested as conclusion. Just and Clark (1973) found that presuppositions took longer to process than implications. They conclude that implications of a sentence are scanned before presuppositions. This finding is significant on its own merits, although the plausibility of their linguistic explanation for it is rather circumspect. They contend that presuppositions of a sentence contain information which the speaker and the hearer both share and that implications contain new informations which the speaker is trying to convey to the hearer. Since it is the implication which contains new informations, Just and Clark maintaining, it is more important to the hearer for comprehension and draws his first attention. However, as we saw in earlier sections, presuppositions can be used to convey new information as well, both in normal conversation and in mass communication. Similarly, there is no known constraints on implications which states that they must convey new information. The psycholinguistic finding of Just and Clark's experiments that presuppositions and implication can be discriminated is useful for understanding comprehension. However, the linguistic reasoning on which they draws for support needs clarification.

In this area Offir's (1973) research finds are equally important. Offir gives evidence that assertion and presupposition are distinguishable as well. In her experiment, subjects were read a
paragraph with a specific test sentence in it. That sentence would assert some information and presuppose some other information. After they heard the paragraph subjects were given a statement and were asked if it was identical to or different from a sentence they heard in the paragraph. When the new sentence reversed the information which was asserted and presupposed from the way it was presented in the test sentence, subjects were able to identify it as being different from what they had heard in the paragraph. Offir explains that, based on this experiment presuppositions and assertion are subject to different levels of recall and recognition and are discernible from each other.

In another experiment Harris (1976) applied his finding of the vague bounding between assertion and implication to a stimulated advertising context. Subjects heard mock radio commercials and were asked to judge the truth value of the various implication that were built into them. As Harris had predicted, the implications were judged to be true based on the commercials rather than being of indeterminate truth value, which would have been the proper evaluation. The relevance of this experiment to the matter of truth in communication message has its own communicative effect. In his experiment Harris has found that the distinction between direct assertion and implication is blurred with the passage of time. However, Offir maintains, that ascertain and presupposition are
distinguishable in memory. In another research, Just and Clark found that presupposition and implication are also psycholinguistically distinct entities.

V:5: Method of the Present Experiment

Based on the analysis done earlier in Chapter III, seven news captions were chosen in which most of the information was given by implication. This was done because discrimination of the ability to perceive implication was the primary focus of this study. The opportunity for subjects to make deduction not included in the literal meaning was, therefore great. The first step of the experiment was to show five news headlines to the respondents. Each news headline was shown twice so that subjects could get a good look at them and remember and understand them better. Then the subjects were asked to write down all the ideas they could remember each news headline was trying to get across. After that subjects were given a list of ideas communicated by the news headlines. Subjects were asked to check off those ideas which they remembered having been mentioned or implied in the news headline. The responses to the open end questions were coded for the propositions which they expressed. These responses were then qualified to see which propositions were recalled most frequently. The purpose of the close end question was to help the subjects remember the key points of each commercials if they
were not able to do so on the unaided question. The new captions were as follows.

1. *Medical Institute doktaron ke hathon bimar.*

2. *Astralia-West Indies Jang ki goonj.*

3. *Imran Khan elehshan me klin bold.*

4. *Kashmirion ko hher bakrian tassavur karna Pakistan ke liye khatarnak sabit hoga.*

5. *Hind me malaria ke khilaf haarti hui jang.*


7. *Laloo Parsad ki chara joi.*

Since the experiment was done on two separate groups of respondents, the order in which the pairs of news captions were shown was changed so that any biasing effect of order be minimized.

In this experiment a total of hundred respondents mainly students were used. The homogeneity of the group made it impossible to observe any differences in ability to discriminate assertion/presupposition/implication which may correlate with such standard demographics as age or education. Furthermore 67 of the hundred
respondents were male, so sex was necessarily disregarded as a possible variable.

Other possible variable were sought in order to divide the sample into different subgroups. Subjects were asked on an open end question how much time do they give on newspaper reading. Analysis of the responses found a natural divisions between those who said they give less than an hour and those who said they give more than an hour in a day. The sample was thus divided into light and heavy newspaper reader.

After that some questions were administered to judge the subject's general predisposition towards newspaper reading or news telecast. Seven pairs of positive negative words or phrases were given which may describe one's feeling about "news" in newspapers or in news telecast. Respondents were asked to circle the answer which better described their feelings. For each positive answer circled a score of +1 was assigned to that question, for each negative answer, a score of -1 was assigned. If neither alternative was circled no score was assigned. All the +1 and -1 were added up to derive a net predisposition score. Anyone with negative score was placed in a category called negative category and those with a positive score or a zero score were placed in non-negative category. This allowed for a division of the sample into one group with a Negative
predisposition to "news" and another group without a negative predisposition.

An attitude change question based on a five point scale was also asked for each news item to try to discriminate still another variables based on a change of opinion about the news item being highlighted. The scale was:

(1) *My attitude has changed very favourably.*

(2) *My attitude has changed somewhat favourably.*

(3) *My attitude has not changed at all.*

(4) *My attitude has changed somewhat unfavourably.*

(5) *My attitude has changed very unfavourably.*

However for all the news items at least 72% of the respondents answered on the middle point of the scale showing no effect on their attitude. Therefore variable like sex was dismissed as a potential variable.

The information that was played back as having been communicated in the selected news headlines was categorized as to "implication" "presupposition" and "assertion".
The number of responses for each of the informational questions was tallied according to each of the above semantic categories. The answering pattern according to these categories of each subgroups like light versus heavy news reader positive versus negative predisposition to news items was then noted. This kind of analysis was done equally for each question, each commercial, each product category and, finally, on a total response basis.

V:6: Result of the Experiment

The pattern of responses showed no significant differences between subgroups in their degree of frequency is recalling information that was presented either by implication, presupposition, or assertion. This finding holds true at all levels of analysis. On the total response bases, there were different responses given by the hundred subjects. The responses were further categorised into light news reader, heavy news reader, positive predisposition and negative predisposition. The result of the experiment is presented in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table V:1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Impact of Presupposition, Implication, and Assertion on Message Effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presupposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assertion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Impact of Presupposition, Implication and Assertion on Message Effect
All subgroups recalled implied information approximately 60% of the times, which is the same level for the entire sample. All subgroups recalled presupposed information about 27% of the time and asserted information 13% of the time. These levels of recall were very identical to the pattern of the total sample. The differences in the total number of responses given by any subgroup is directly related to the number of subjects in any given cell. However, an analysis of the data shows that these differences are not significant at any high level of confidence. That is although the light news consumer and subjects with a negative predisposition gave a higher level of responses in total, the differences between them and their complementary subgroups were not significant. This shows that for this sample, at least, these characteristics do not play a role in distinguishing between groups of people who may have varying abilities to perceive assertion/presupposition/and implicantly.

Since no variables were discriminated which distinguish subgroups with significantly different levels of recall of the different semantic categories, the first part of the question can not be answered.

It has been noted above that implied information was recalled much more often than information that was either presupposed or directly asserted in the news captions. This is not surprising,
however, in these news captions, there was a total of 25 information pieces were given. Of the 25 information pieces, 15 are given by implication, 8 by presupposition and 2 by assertion. The details of the information pieces are given in the tabular form in the table below:

**Table V:2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Information Typology</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Implication</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presupposition</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assertion</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It stands to reason, then that since most of the information was implied in these news messages, that implied information should be recalled most often. The question still remained of whether the differences in frequency of recall of the different semantic categories were significantly different from each other relative to the input.

At this point, the measurement was used to compare the input of implied/presupposed/asserted meaning to the levels at which these categories were recalled with regard to each specific information question asked, each news viewed. This analysis, then was done
Information Typology of Implication
Presupposition and Assertion

- Presupposition
- Assertion
- Implication

Graph showing the relationship between Presupposition, Assertion, and Implication with data points.

- Presupposition: 8
- Assertion: 2
- Implication: 15
similarly to the attempt to distinguish subgroups within the total sample. Although the frequencies with which implication/presupposition/assertion were recalled are directly related to the frequencies with which they are used in these news messages. When these differing frequencies are examined relative to the output, there is no significant differences in the degree to which these semantic categories are recalled. No high level of confidence is attained at any other step of the analysis. That is in terms of the subject’s ability to recall information which is implied/presupposed and asserted no one semantatic category is recalled any better than either of the others.

Thus finding can be related to earlier observations. Subjects can and do remember information which has been either asserted or presupposed, on the one hand, or implied or presupposed on the other. Contrary to Offir’s experiment and Just and Clark’s experiment, however the differences in the current experiment were not significant. Nor was the difference in recall between assertion and implication significant and this is exactly what Harris had found both in his laboratory data and in his applied situational data. These differences may be attributed to the different procedures used in each experiment and the author’s different backgrounds.
As shown above, Harris found his subjects unable to discriminate between asserted and implied information. He then goes to conclude: If people remember implied claims as asserted facts, then it is perhaps eminently appropriate that federal regulatory agencies prescribe the implication of falls claims as vigorously as the assertion of such claims.

As a result of the experiment undertaken here, we may say that because implication/presupposition and assertion are not significantly discriminated from each other in the recall of news items, that lack of discrimination has no real effect on the issue of truth in news-media. There is no way for a news editor to predesign a news item by semantic category so that some element can be recalled better than another. In a situation, where no one remembers that a message was communicated, the issue of its reliability just may not be important. Since no one semantic category is remembered any better than any other in these news items, there is no way for a news editor to load the dice in his favour.

However, it can be assumed that directly asserted information is fairly well understood by all. Neither the vocabulary nor syntax of the language used in news items is so complicated to any significant degree as to invalidate such an assumption. Entailment and presupposition are less direct ways of providing information, yet they
are still closely related to the literal meaning because of the interrelationship of truth values. The degree of mental deductions required to understand what is entailed or presupposed is not that great. Implicated meaning is further removed from the literal meaning than either of these other two concepts requires more kinds of previous knowledge to be understood and probably requires a greater reaction time to make. This scale of indirectness is constructed so as to suggest the possibility that information which is conveyed by more indirect means is more likely to be misunderstood because of the greater amount of prior knowledge which is required for its comprehension. Different people with different kinds of degrees of information are more or less likely to make different deductions, not all of which will be accurate.

In the present experiment, we have examined one part of this question: whether or not, within a sample there can be discrimination in recall between information that is implied/asserted/presupposed. The answer to this probe indicates that implications/presupposition and assertion are not significantly discriminated from each other in the recall of news items. It shows that assertion, presupposition, and discrimination are not significantly discriminated from each other despite the fact that, directly asserted meaning are fairly well understood.