FOURTH

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS
St. Thomas Aquinas was a theist. He occupied a distinguished position in the history of Christian philosophy and religion in the middle ages. He was firmly convinced of the truth of revealed religion. He was sincere in his belief that the teaching of the Church is in accordance with reason and although, at times, some revealed truths may be supra reason, but they are never contradictory to reason.

This great philosopher and Theologian was born in 1225 A.D. in Italy. In 1244 A.D., at the age of nineteen years, he received the degree of Master in Philosophy from Naples University. Though his parents did not like to give him a religious education yet he, according to his own choice, studied Dominican courses in philosophy and theology.

In 1262 A.D. he started teaching at the University of Paris. Then he spent almost ten years in Dominican monasteries in the vicinity of Rome lecturing in Theology and Philosophy. In 1268 he came back to the University of Paris and taught there till 1272. "There he was engaged in three different controversies: (i) Against a group of conservative Theologians who were critical of his philosophical innovations (ii) Against certain radical advocates of Aristotelianism or Latin Averosism and (iii) Against some critics of dominican
and Franciscan and their right to teach at University.  

In 1272 he was sent to Naples in order to erect a "Dominican Studian General" where he continued his professorial activity until 1274, where Pope Gregory A summoned him to attend the council but he died on the way at the Cistercian monastery of Fossanuova between Naples and Rome on March 7, 1274.

Section B

His philosophy is a result of rethinking of Aristotelianism. It also reflects some of the thinking of The Greek Commentators on Aristotle and of Cicero, Avicena, Avoros, and Mamonicks besides stoicism, Neo-Platonism and Augustenianism. He was not subservient to the authority of Aristotle. As he himself says, "The object of philosophical study is not to know one's opinion of Aristotelian philosophy but the truth of things." He was a Catholic first and an Aristotelian afterwards. His philosophy is a complete reconstruction; therefore in certain fundamentals he is more Platonic than Aristotelian." Thus Aquinas had a very realistic and dynamic approach in philosophy. He believes that man's opinion limits the circle of his thought in philosophy and that the rethinking and reconstruction should continue till the truth of certain concept is found out. Consequently his philosophy is not a result of darting and sweeping concepts based upon the opinions of others but it is a rethinking of the Aristotel-
Aquinas believes that "God and angels are pure forms without matter but man is not a pure spirit, he possesses a soul or form which is united with a material body. In this sense he adopted Aristotle's definition of soul as the "form or actuality of an organic body". The union of matter and form gives rise to concrete individual existence or substance. There is a scale of existence, a chain of being, in the universe. At the lower end of which are the inorganic substances, whilst at the summit is God, a purely spiritual Being. There is also a hierarchical order in non-living objects. In the lodestone the form seems to display certain activities over and above its function of conferring being of a definite kind upon the matter which it forms. When we ascend the scale, we reach a point at which form manifests powers and activities apart from the matter in which it is realized. The living plant has a nutritive soul, and animal has a sensitive soul and the form is able to organize the matter to a further degree of perfection but plant's vital activities are exercised on the material level while animal has sense organs and is able to receive the form of an object without its matter and higher animal is capable of forming mental images too.

But man is a creature who can transcend immediate percep-
tion by the use of reason. Because human soul is the
highest and noblest of forms, it excels corporeal matter in
its power by the fact that it has an operation and a power
in which corporeal matter has no share whatever. This power
is called the intellect.

Soul is simply that by which we live. As soon as the
first sign of life appears, soul is present. He accepted
the principle viz., "the unity of Form". Only one substan
tial form can be realized in the matter of an object as
the human soul is the substantial form of the body, which
is intellectual soul. This intellectual soul contains the
sensitive and nutritive soul; it means that it contains all
inferior forms and itself alone does, whatever the imperfect
forms do in other things. Thus St. Thomas Aquinas represents
"the powers of the soul in ascending hierarchical order as
vegetative, sensitive, appetitive, locomotive and intelleg
tual".

"He is a definite opponent of materialism". In respec
t of sense-perception he follows Aristotle closely. He
admits that sense is necessary to intellect "Nihil est in
intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu". He further
says, that sense is not a material faculty, it receives
the form of an external object without its matter. To him,
to believe that like is known by like is an error of Greek
thinkers, who thought that the form of the object known must be in the knower in the same way as it existed in the object. Aquinas rejects this and says nothing corporeal can affect that which is immaterial " nihil corporeum imprimere potest in rem incorporeum". He also steers clear of "subjective idealism."

He further distinguishes between sense in potentiality and sense in actuality. In the former case, the actual object is external to the soul, in the latter, the sensible form in the object and the soul are one. "The distinction between the knower and the object known has been partially transcended in the act of knowing."

He recognizes five external senses arranged in hierarchical order. Vision is the highest because it is the least material touch. These senses are imperfect due to matter. There is also a common sense which is able to discriminate between the reports of different senses and relate them to the object perceived which is through mental images (Phantasmata). At the sense level other powers are vis., 'Aesthetic' and vis., 'cognitiva'. Former leads an animal to recognize the utility or the harmful properties of an object. And the latter implies a kind of judgement and choice. But in human being instinct directed by intelligence is the vis., cognitiva, this is particular reason. Thus in this
hierarchical arrangement of the powers of the soul we find, we are brought by stages to the very threshold of reason. The higher powers of sense in their operation foreshadow the activities of the intelligence. As he himself says, "The cognitive and remembrative powers in man owe their excellence not to that which is proper to the sensitive part, but to a certain affinity and approximation to the universal reason, which, so to speak, overflows into them".

Human soul has the power of thought which is not exercised through a bodily organ. "Like the soul of the brute, the human soul is the form of body, but unlike the former, since it does not need a bodily organ, and what can function per se, can exist per se, it is a self-subsisting spiritual substance".

Angelic intelligences are pure forms, above the human soul, knowing immaterial things intuitively without any process. Man occupies the intermediate position between lower forms of animals and pure form or spiritual existence, i.e. angel. Here he differs from Aristotle regarded man as "a little higher than the dogs and cattle while he lays emphasis on his kinship with the angles".

About the creation of soul he says that soul and body were created simultaneously by God who infused soul into body
In respect of individuality he regards "matter as the principle of individuation because Form is universal and is common to all members of the species.

He further says that soul is immortal. To prove the immateriality of the soul, he based his argument upon the fact that the essence of a material body consists of extension in three dimensions. Extension is due to the presence of the form of corporeality. "All matter is clothed with the form of corporeality so that if anything is incorporeal, it must be immaterial". Secondly he develops another view, due to Averroes, which depends on the doctrine of "indeterminate dimensions". But later he was not satisfied and he says one cannot define a particular, one can only point out to all.

He further argues that "matter taken in its general meaning is not the principle of individuation but only 'materia signata' - i.e. matter in a determinate sense. In other words, matter under determinate dimension". The term 'materia signata' seems to have been borrowed from Avicenna who calls it 'materia demonstrata'. Thus the distinction of corporeal things is due to 'materia signata', e.g. Plato and Socrates are both men by virtue of possessing
the form of humanity but Plato is distinguished from Socrates by his *materia signita*, i.e. in disposition, temperament and character they are different personalities".

"The soul eventually, depends upon certain features of the individual's environment, his use or misuse of free will and his cooperation with the Creator through the Means of Grace*. Man's fully developed personality, however, is largely due to the individual's own effort and the environmental influences brought to bear upon him. His original disposition can be modified through experience, training and education and as creatures possessing free will they can build up for themselves certain qualities of character which can be further refined and developed through the Operation of Divine Grace. Soul's individuality is due to the quantified matter of the body. But in the case of human soul, God is the agent who adapts each soul to a particular body, and it is because of His efficient causality that the soul becomes the soul of a particular body, thus "the human souls are individuated according to their bodies, but not as though the individuation were caused by their bodies".

To him the "rational soul survives the death of the body and is immortal*. Because man has a 'natural craving' or complete knowledge. And in this mortal world partial satisfaction is possible, through the exercise of reason. After
death the redeemed soul achieves the perfection of knowledge in the Beatific vision of the Blessed Trinity. "Soul without its body is not truly a human being. Reason demands a final resurrection of the body so that the soul can enjoy once more that perfection of being for which it craves.

The intermediate position of man, between corporeal nature and purely spiritual existence, is the key to the understanding of the activities of the intellect. Therefore "the human soul, although it is united to the body as its form, has a being elevated above the body and not depending on it".

Human knowledge in this present life is based on data received through sense perception and stored up by means of imagery. Abstraction is the outstanding feature of the operation of thought, and through abstraction the mind, setting aside all the individualizing conditions of objects, can rise to the consideration of the universal. Universals, however, have no existence apart from the concrete things in which they are realized. Thus Aquinas takes his stand as a "Moderate Realist". Universals are obtained by abstraction from sense particulars; and because man is a body-soul, a process is necessary.

Man has to gather knowledge from individual things by means of the senses. Human intellect is in potentiality with
regard to things intelligible and is first like a clean tablet on which nothing is written.

The human intellect must understand through composition and division. It first grasps something about its object, then it understands the properties and accidents and the various relations of the essence. He denies that universals may be innate or discovered by the mind within itself, but he says universals are derived from sense images by the process of abstraction through the agency of active intellect.

He makes a sharp distinction between knower and the object known in potential knowledge. Thus he rejects the subjective idealism.

As it is said that man is a spiritual being with a material body and this nature of man restricts his thought in two ways. His intellect is only potentially capable of knowing, and a process of learning is necessary by which potentiality is transformed into actuality, and he is limited to what is abstracted from data accumulated by sense perception. Aquinas does not accept that human intellect can attain knowledge of Divine Essence in this present life. He further says that we can know that God exists, but not what He is.
Aquinas rejects the a Priori form of proof in favour of the a posteriori and argues from the effects of God's causality to His existence. As everything, in motion must be moved by another. If the mover also is in motion, then it must have been set in motion by some other mover. Therefore, we must grant a first mover which itself is unmoved. This First mover is God. Secondly he proves the existence of God on the basis of causality like Albert the Great and Avicenna. We find a causal series. Thus if there is no first efficient cause, there can be no middle term nor a final effect which is not possible. Therefore first efficient cause is God. Third proof springs, from the ideas of the possible and the necessary beings for the existence of God. He argues that all beings are contingent beings therefore, we must assume a Being existing necessarily, and this Being is God. Fourthly we find different grades of perfection existing in nature in a series so that the most perfect Being, God, must exist. Again he says that we see that all objects are ordered to some end, it demands a purposive intelligence directing all things to their appropriate ends, such a supreme intelligence is God.

In short Divine Nature is such that "it is wholly beyond the grasp of any finite intelligence." He can only be described by the negative method. These five proofs show only that God exists and not what he He is. But Analogy, however,
does give us a positive knowledge of God. On the basis of our experience of the world of finite existence we attain the knowledge of the infinite First cause.

He further says, "No diversity exists in the Divine Nature and God is none other than His goodness, wisdom, truth, justice and all His other attributes.

To know God in His Essence is "a reward of the redeemed soul in heaven". Beatific vision is bond up with his view concerning the supreme end of man. Like Aristotle he also "accepted that life proper to man is a life in accordance with the exercise of his highest faculty, that of intelligence and it is in the complete fruition of his intellectual desires that each individual will find his good". No created good can satisfy the human soul and worldly things cannot give him perfect happiness. He believes"in the primacy of intellect over will, and therefore, to him, happiness consists in an act of understanding and the supreme end of man lies in the knowledge of God, the 'Summum Bonum', that is to know God in His Essence, and such is the completeness and perfection of this act of understanding and love that it merits the name of vision. But the intellectual vision for man is not possible in this present life but it is only possible by grace, and he can see "God as though seeing an object reflected in a mirror". This capacity is lost due to
the Fall.

Now we can say that the object of intellect is being and universal truth but it is impossible to achieve its object in one single act of intuition like angels because man's nature lies in between animal and the separate intelligences, but it (intellect) can attain its object through the laborious path of learning. Therefore Aquinas makes careful and systematic analysis of the human act.

'The nature of the human will is to incline towards universal good but in practice it is always concerned with particular good'. And the will remains free to choose or reject them.

He further distinguishes between the psychological or subjective aspect of an action, the order of intention as he calls it, and the practical and objective, the order of execution. Every voluntary action is performed in order to attain an end or a good but this end is the last the order of execution and first in intention. Thus moral action is very complex and consists of the interplay of the intellect and the will. The first step is taken by intellect, though no human act can be apart from the will, volition can be exercised only with regard to an end which has previously been presented to the intelligence. Our will necessarily
tends to thing which is universally good and such a good is happiness, but if the thing is good only from certain point of view we can reject it too and being deficient it may be regarded as not good. If the good or end is approved by the will, intellect may judge that the end is one worth seeking. If the attainment of the end is possible, individual decides that he will pursue it. Then he makes use of his cognitive powers to find suitable means for carrying out his desire. Now the next step for the will is to give assent to the employment of the means. There may be considerable delay before the final consent of the will is obtained since the consideration of the means may be every a complicated process of deliberation involving much detailed planning. The whole of sequence so far belongs to the orders of intention.

Now we come to the order of execution. The agent makes up his mind to employ the means due to the mature reflection. He follows his decision by putting into effect the action or series of actions he had chosen. If the action is successful and the end is achieved, the process ceases and man feels happy at the satisfaction of his desire. With this background of the conception of God, nature of soul and analysis of the voluntary action of Thomas Aquinas, we shall discuss problem of evil.
Section C

Thomas Aquinas as a theistic philosopher believes that "Every thing, that in any way is, is from God. God is the first exemplary cause of all things. It is also said "The Lord has made all things for Himself". It means in willing this universe, God did not will the evil. But now the question arises; did not God foresee the evil in the world, and if He foresaw the evils in the world and yet willed the world; did not God will the evil in the world? Now it becomes a theistic problem, that is, the belief in God who is both omnipotent and good, incompatible with the fact of Evil, i.e., how can all good God create a world in which there is evil?

In solving this perplexing question, Aquinas agrees with Augustine, 'that evil is the privation of good', because "evil is neither a being nor a good" as Dinnysi, 0. says, "The being and the perfection of any nature is good, therefore evil cannot signify any being, or any form or nature but it signifies only some absence of good or goodness of perfection in being or in action. But it does not mean that evil is not a fact, it simply shows that it is like a wound in being or defect in action. It is important by virtue of what is lacking. And this lacking is the privation of good."
This privation is two-fold. One privation as a result (Privatum esse), and this leaves nothing, but takes all away, e.g., blindness takes away sight altogether; darkness takes away light etc. In this privation, there can be no medium in respect of the proper subject.

The other is privation in process (privari) e.g., sickness is privation of health; not that it takes health away altogether, but that it is a kind of road to the entire loss of health, brought about by death. And since this sort of privation leaves something, it is not always the immediate contrary of the opposite habit. It is in this way that evil is a privation of good, as Simplicius says in his commentary on the categories, "For it (evil) does not take away all good, but leaves some. Consequently, there can be something, intermediate between good and evil." And this intermediate thing is privation. This privation has the nature of Evil. Evil is not nature.

But some criticise that every difference which constitutes a species is a nature. And evil is also a difference constituting a species in the field of moral, i.e. bad habit differs in species from a good habit, therefore evil signifies a nature. Secondly, evil is being and a nature because it acts, for it corrupts good.
But Aquinas argues that "good and evil are not constitutive differences except in moral matters which receives their species from the end, which is the object of the will, the source of all morality; that is the good is in itself but evil is the absence of the due end. Thus, therefore, the evil which is constitutive difference in morals is a certain good joined to the privation of another good, just as the end proposed by the intemperate man is not the privation of the good of reason, but the delight of sense against the order of reason. Hence evil is not as such a constitutive difference.

He further argues that a "thing is said to act in three-fold senses (1) Formally, as whiteness makes white, and in that sense evil corrupts good, for it is itself a corruption. (11) In another sense, to act effectively as painter paints a wall white, (iii) As a final cause, as the end is said to come to effect by moving the efficient cause. But evil in these last two senses does not affect anything of itself". Therefore evil is not a positive entity but only absence of good.

And this privation or absence is possible only in being or in action. Privation of good in action is called moral evil. Aquinas like Augustine considers only these two types of evil. First we will discuss the evil in being.
Aquinas says that being in itself is good because all beings emanate from universal cause - God. Thus contingent beings owe their existence to the necessary Being or finite being must proceed from God who is all good. Therefore being cannot be evil in themselves. But evil is found in beings, because there are different grades of beings or goodness. First type of being or goodness is incorruptible while other is corruptible. As Augustine also says "that one can misuse the virtue (the great good), i.e., bodily good and other goods can be used wrongly. Evil thus, consists, namely, in the fact that a thing fails in goodness."

But he justifies evil as a corruption in beings by the argument that God or another agent makes what is better in every single part, except in relation to the whole and the whole is -- all the better and more perfect; if there be something in it which can fail in goodness and which we do sometimes fail without God preventing it, as fire cannot be generated if air was not corrupted, not would the life of lion be preserved unless the asses were killed. And "the cause of this inequality is nothing other than Divine wisdom, i.e. God."

Secondly it is good because "the subject of evil is good." As Augustine also says, "evil exists only in good". Because evil indicates the absence of good but every absence
of good is not evil as the absence of the swiftness of the
coe -- in man is not evil but the absence of good, taken
as privative sense, is an evil. And the subject of privation
and of form is one and the same. The form, which makes a
thing actual is a perfection and a good. Hence, every actual
being is a good, and potential being is also good because it
has the potentiality of being good. Similarly the subject
of evil is good because if there is no good there is no
question of evil.

Now it is clear that the evil cannot exist in itself
but it is possible only is being or good in the form of pri-
vation which is corruption. Here question arises "whether
evil corrupts the whole good or a part? Aquinas says Evil
cannot wholly consume good because it is privation of good,
if there is no good how can privation be possible as the
blindness consumes the whole sight but the other goods of
body or being cannot be consumed. He further argues that
"there are threefold good". One kind of good is wholly de-
stroyed by evil and this is the good opposed to evil as light
is wholly destroyed by darkness. Another kind of good is
neither wholly destroyed nor diminished by evil. This type
of good is the subject of evil; as the goodness of man's
being, the blindness of man cannot injured the goodness of
man's being. There is also a kind of good which is dimi-
ished by evil but is not wholly taken away. This good is the
aptitude of a subject to some actuality as though there is a privation of good in form of blindness in man's being. Augustine also says, "Evil injures in-as-much as it takes away good.

Again question arises why does corruption or evil happen? What is the cause of it?

Aquinas answers that "it must be said that every evil, in some way, has a cause because that anything falls short of its nature and due disposition can come only from some cause drawing it out of its proper disposition. But only good can be a cause; because nothing can be a cause except in as much as it is a being, and, every being, as such, is good".

As a material cause of evil there is nothing rather than good. As a formal cause, there is no cause, because the subject of evil is good, but there is only privation of order to the proper end. "Evil, however, has a cause by way of an agent, not directly but accidentally".

In other words Evil has different causes in things as sometimes it is caused by reason of a defect either of the agent or of the matter and sometimes by the power of agent. For example on the form of 'fire' there follows the privation of the form of air or of water; the fire is more perfect in
strength so it impresses its own form more perfectly and it thus, corrupts the contraries, viz., air and water. This evil is due to the perfection of fire, but it is accidental because here the aim is not the privation of air and water, therefore it is only accidentally.

Sometimes it is due to the defect in the proper effect as fire fails to heat, this happens due to the defect of action or by the indisposition of matter. Thus, it can be said that it has no direct cause, but only an accidental cause.

Sometimes the corruption of something can be referred to God as a cause because "some agent, in-as-much as it produces by its power a form which is followed by corruption and defect, causes by its power that corruption and defect". But these are good for the order of the universe. Secondly, due to the order of justice He is the author of evil which is penalty, but not of the evil which is fault.

Evil can have an accidental cause. And it is impossible to reduce evil in any 'per se cause', or it cannot be the first cause because we uphold two first principles, one good and the other evil, we find the error from the same cause. We must come at last to one first common cause though the contraries have particular causes because there cannot be a
highest evil, as the first principle of good is the highest and perfect good, although evil lessens good, yet it never wholly consumes it. The good always survives, while perfect evil cannot and if there is no good, no question of evil at all because it is privation of good and not the negation of good. That is why, it is said "If the wholly evil could be it would destroy itself".

In Aquinas' view "evil in the majority of cases is absolutely false". For things which are generated and corrupted, in which alone there can be natural evil, are a very small part of the whole universe. Secondly the order of the universe requires that there should be something that can and sometimes do fail.

Thus he tries to solve the dilemma that of the compatibility of evil with God, on two grounds. First there is no evil that exists in itself because evil can exist only in good; it means if there is any evil; there must be good. Secondly he treats God as an artist and the universe is a work of art.

Now comes the evil in action. Before discussing the evil in action it will be better to understand the nature of man because, it is his only voluntary actions that are subject to moral judgements, that is, they are subject to
moral evil.

To Aquinas, man has an intermediate position between the non-intelligent matter as brute on one side, and angels who are pure incorporeal spirit on the other; his intellect cannot attain its object of knowing of universal truth being through single act of intuition like angels, but he acquires through laborious path of learning. Similarly his will cannot make an irrevocable choice or judgement between good and evil, like angels, who by a single act of free will are either inclined towards God or turned away from Him. But man's will by its very nature inclines towards the universal good, but in practice it is always concerned with the particular goods, which being unsatisfactory cannot determine it. So choice is made after a great swinging.

Man, who is composed of body and mind, conceives the good and has to develop his virtues by the help of concrete choices in which the good is determined by specific ends and individual circumstances. Thus, through the constant repetition of an act he develops his moral habit.

Secondly, man is free to judge and to choose while a brute has no such freedom. Though sometimes a man acts due to fear, ignorance and force but such actions have nothing to do with morality because they are non-voluntary actions.
Only conscious and free acts of a normal adult can be the subject of morality or we can say that it is his voluntary actions that are subject to moral judgments. We apply reason to determine the goodness or badness of an action. He further says that good and evil of an action as of other things, depends on its fullness of being or its lack of fullness. Every action is good so far as it has being, whereas it is lacking in goodness in so far as it is lacking in something that is due its fullness of being; and thus it is said to be evil, for instance, if it lack the measure determined by reason, or its due place, or something of the kind. In other words, if good were not deficient, there would be no evil, but the action done is a deficient good, which is good in a certain respect, but evil absolutely.

A moral action derives its primary goodness from its suitable object and such action is called "good in its genus, e.g. to make use of what is one's own". Likewise the primary evil in moral actions comes from its object, for instance "to take what belongs to another". Though it is correct that the things (external things) are good in themselves as Augustine also says "evil is not in things but in the sinner's use of them", but sometimes, they have not a due proportion to this or that action.

The whole fullness of perfection does not come only
from substantial form or the object that gives it its species, but sometimes it derives from supervening accidents or circumstances as shape and colour in man etc., if in any one of these accidents be out of due proportion, evil is the result. Similarly the fullness of the goodness of an action does not depend on only in its species (or object) but it consists also in certain other circumstances such as its due circumstances. Therefore, if "something be wanting that is requisite as a due circumstance, the action will be evil".

Sometimes it happens that an action which is good in its species or in its circumstances in ordained to an evil end or vice-versa. However an action is not good absolutely unless it is good in all these ways; "for evil results from any single defect, but good from the complete cause" as dionysuis says.

Thus the goodness of an action can be divided into four kinds. First, that consists of its genus, since, as much as it has of action and being, so much has it of goodness. Secondly, that derives from its species; thirdly, that depends on its circumstances and fourthly it has goodness from its end, to which it is compared as to the cause of its goodness. Thus "an action may have one element of goodness and be wanting in another. In this way an action
that is good in its species, or in circumstances, may be
directed to an evil end and vice versa. Still it is not
simply a good action, unless it combines all the elements
of good.

To remove this complexity of moral action, Aquinas
divides it into two parts, viz., formal element and material
element. Formal element relates to the end, towards which
the act is directed and the material one relates to the means
that are adopted to attain that end and the circumstances
that are connected with the choice of the means. If all
these are good the action is good; if all these are evil,
the action is evil; and there is no problem. But there are
some actions which may be materially good and formally evil
and vice versa. For example, when "Saul persecuted the
Christians, he probably sinned materially not formally.
When Caiaphas spoke the truth without knowing it he said well
materially but ill formally. Thus in judging the action,
regard must first be given to the end the agent desires and
wills. According to Aristotle, one who steals to commit
adultery is even more an adulterer than a thief.

Thus, voluntary act can be further divided into two
parts; interior act of will and the external act; and each
of these acts has its object; the end is the properly the
object of the interior act of the will, while the object of
the external action is that on which the action is brought to bear. Thus the formal part of an action relates to the end while material part relates to the object on which the action is brought to bear. Sometimes it would seem that goodness or evil derived from the end is the same which is derived by the external object as when a man wills to steal in order to give as alms. But Aquinas says "the specific difference derived from the end is more general, and that the difference derived from an object which is essentially ordered to that end is a specific difference in relation to the former. For the will, the proper object of which is the end, is the universal mover in respect of all the power of the soul, the proper object of which are the objects of their particular acts".

Now we should consider the goodness or evil of the interior act of the will, i.e. end. The end of a thing is in its perfection and perfection of a thing is its goodness as already said, therefore everything is directed to good as its end.

Now question arises what type of good is its end. In Aquinas view, "Happiness is man's proper good". But man is man through the possession of reason, therefore, it must be in accordance with that which is proper to reason. Thus, the proper end of an internal act of will is 'Happiness'.
Again question arises, what type of happiness is the end of interior act of will because we find different types of happiness, such as one finds happiness in table, food and sex, while another person finds it in virtue or the other higher values as in God or in vision of God.

Aquinas says the ultimate happiness does not consist in carnal pleasure, chief of which are pleasure of table, food and sex. Pleasure is for the sake of operation and not conversely. If an operation is not the ultimate end, so pleasure derived from it cannot be the ultimate happiness.

Similarly, ultimate happiness does not consist in Honour, Glory, Wealth, worldly power, goods of the body, senses, moral virtues, the act of prudence, practice of art or in contemplating God, in the knowledge of God acquired by demonstration, knowledge of God by faith, speculative sciences and knowledge of separate substances though these are the different grades of goodness but not highest good.

Again question rests what type of happiness or end gives a mad ultimate happiness. Aquinas says, "The supreme good is supremely the end of all. Now there is but one supreme good namely, God. Therefore, all things are directed to the highest good, namely God, as their end." As Aristotle says, "that which is supreme in any genus is the cause
of everything in that genus. Therefore the cause of goodness of all things is the supreme good, viz., God, and being an end, He is the ultimate and of every end. Therefore God is the ultimate happiness of man due to His supreme good and ultimate end. It is also said, "The Lord hath made all things for Himself; and I am Alpha and Omega, the first and the last.

Secondly every thing tends to some good as its end by its movement and it partakes of good in so far as it is like the first goodness, which is God. Therefore, by their movement and actions each thing tends to a likeness to God as to its last end.

Again, "since a thing is good so far as it is perfect, God's being is His perfect goodness; for in God, to be, to live, to be wise, to be happy, and whatever else is seen to pertain to perfection and goodness, are one and the same in God. Therefore, if a thing is good so far as it is, and if no creature is its own being, none is its own goodness, but each one is good by participating in goodness, even as by participating in being it is a being".

Thus the perfect happiness or ultimate end is to be found only in God who is supreme and infinite Good. He is the end of the rational and irrational creatures but it is
only rational creature, who can attain this final good by way of knowledge and love; or we can say that who can attain the vision of God in which alone perfect happiness lies. And this perfect happiness is only possible in next life, in which man can know God as He is, while in this life he can know only that God exists.

Lastly we can say that the ultimate end of a man is happiness which lies in the vision of God. In Aquinas words the last end of man and of any intelligent substance is called happiness or beatitude, for it is this that every intellectual substance desires as its last end, and for its own sake alone. Therefore the last beatitude of happiness of any intellectual substance is to know God. As it is said (Matt. V. B.) "Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God; and (Jo XVII 3). This is eternal life, that they may know thee, the only true God".

But to know God in His essence is not possible in this life, because end is man's natural appetite, when he has obtained it, he desires nothing more; because if he still has a movement towards something, it means he has not attained its last end since the more man understands the more is the desire to understand Him, unless perhaps there be someone who understands all things. Therefore, the ultimate happiness is not possible in this life.
Secondly man naturally shuns death and is sad about it, because it is but the nature of man to avoid death. He avoids it not only at the moment when he feels its presence, but also when he thinks about it. But man in this mortal life, cannot escape death, therefore, "it is not possible for man to be happy in this life".

Thus man’s ultimate happiness (the ultimate end) will consist in that knowledge of God which the human mind possesses after this life, "hence lord promises us a reward -- in heaven".

Thus, consequently, we can say that those actions would be morally good which lead to or are compatible with the attainment of such beatitude, happiness or ultimate end, that is, God; while those actions would be morally evil which are incompatible with the attainment of such beatitude.

But to judge the action, end is only one part, the other is material one, i.e., circumstances and means. Therefore Aquinas says that end does not justify the means.

After this, Aquinas discusses the external or material aspect of the act which primarily consists of means and circumstances.
External acts may be said to be good or evil in two ways. First, in regard to their genus, and circumstances connected with them. Secondly, a thing is said to be good or evil from its relations to the end. End is the proper object of will, so the nature of good and evil is to be found first of all in the act of the will. On the other hand, the goodness or malice which the external act has of itself, in that it is about due matter and is attended by due circumstances, is derived from the reason. Thus actually the goodness or evil of an external act in so far as it comes from reasons ordination and apprehension, it is prior to the goodness of the act of the will, but if we consider it in so far as it is in the execution of the act done, it is subsequent to the goodness of the will, which is its principle.

"Actually voluntariness applies not only to the interior act of the will, but also to external acts, in-as-much as they proceed from the will and the reason. In reality the difference of good and evil is applicable to both the internal and external acts, i.e. a man sins by his will, not only when he wills an evil end but also when he wills an evil act. "Sometimes the goodness or malice of the interior act is the same as that of the external act and sometimes not". As a bitter medicine is good merely because it procures health. Therefore there are not two goodness, the goodness of health and the goodness of the draught but one and the same. But when the external act has goodness or malice of itself, i.e., according to its matter and circumstances, then the goodness of
176

external act is distinct from the goodness of the will derived from the end; yet so that the goodness of the end passes into the external act, and the goodness of the matter and circumstances passes into the act of will.

Thus internal and external acts are different as realities but they combine to form one thing in the moral order. Circumstances are those conditions which are outside the substance of an act, and yet in some way touch the human act.

Circumstances are related to acts in both these ways. For some circumstances, that have a relation to acts, belong to the agent otherwise than through the act, e.g., place and condition of person; whereas others belong to the agent by reason of the act, e.g., the manners in which the act is done.

The circumstances which is outside the substance of an act touches the act in three ways, (1) It touches the act itself, either as a measure, as time and place or by qualifying the act as the mode of acting (ii) It touches cause of act, as to the final cause, by the circumstances why; as the material cause, in the circumstances about what; as to the principal efficient cause, in the circumstances who; and as to the instrumental efficient cause, in the circumstances by
what aids. (iii) It touches the effect, when it is considered that what is done.

Tully gives seven circumstances in his Rhetoric, which are contained in the verse.

Quis quid Ubi quibus auxili is cur quomodo quando who, what, where, by what aids, why, how, and when.

The circumstances viz., why, it is done and what is done are the most important, because the object or motive of the will is the end. And in voluntary action, the object of will has a importance. Therefore these circumstances touch the act on the part of end, viz, the circumstance why and second which touches the very substance of the act, viz., the circumstance what he did.

"The fullness of the perfection of an action lies not wholly in its species, but some additional perfection is conferred in the way of accidents or due circumstances. Hence, if any thing be wanting that is requisite in point of due circumstances, the action will be evil.

Thus Thomas Aquinas believes that if end (interior act of will) and means and circumstances (external act and circumstances) are all good, act is good or if one of them is evil, action is evil.
Now there remains the question as to why a man is moved towards a wrong end and why does he choose wrong means? Man is free to do good and to commit evil, because he has freedom of will and intellect also. Now it is obvious that when a man is misled for this, his very will is responsible.

Thus will plays an important role in voluntary action, i.e. moral action. Therefore, to know the evil in action we must consider the action of will. Aquinas distinguishes the act of will into two categories, i.e. first those acts which belong to the will itself immediately as being elicited by the will. Secondly those acts which are commanded by the will. These are divided and sub-divided as follows:

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Act of Will

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Volition Intention Enjoyment

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Now it is clear from the chart that acts are of two kinds (i) Those acts of the will whereby it is moved to the end; (ii) Those acts whereby it is moved to the means to attain the end.
With reference to the end there are three acts of the will: volition, enjoyment and intention.

Volition or "will is the rational appetite". And every appetite is only some thing good, because appetite is nothing other than the inclination of being (good) and everything in as much as it is being and substance, is a good. Therefore will is of good. And volition is not only of the end but it is also of the means, because the nature of good, which is the object of the power of will, may be found not only in the end, but also in the means. But will cannot move to the means, as such, unless it is moved to the end, since the end is willed in itself, whereas the means, as such, are willed only for the end. In other words, we can say that will is a rational appetite and it moves towards not only end but towards means too.

This will is moved by the intellect. Will is good in general, which has the nature of an end, and the object of intellect is universal Being and Truth. The object moves, by determining the act, after the manner of a formal principle, whereby in natural things actions are specified, as heating by heat. By this kind of motion the intellect moves the will, as presenting its object to it. Sometimes it is moved by the sensitive appetite, because the things that which is apprehended under the nature of what is good and
befitting moves the will as an object. And man sometimes is affected by a passion, because something seems to him fitting. But sometimes will, through its volition of the end, moves itself to will the means. On the other hand exterior principle can move the will, as its object, offered to the senses. Similarly it is also maintained that heavenly bodies also have an influence directly on the will. Lastly God moves man's will, as the Universal Mover to the universal object of the will, which is the good. And without this universal motion man cannot will anything. But man determines himself by his reasons to will this or that, which is a true or apparent good.

The will wills something naturally because it follows the act of the intellect and intellect understands something naturally. As will tends naturally towards 'good in general' knowledge of truth, which befits the intellect, and to be live and other like things which regards his natural well-being - all of which are included in the object of the will as so many particular goods. In other words there are two types of movement of will. First, as to the exercise of its act; secondly as to the specification of its object, derived from the object. As to the first way, no object moves the will necessarily, for no matter what the object be, it is man's power not to think of it, and consequently not to will actually. But as to the second manner of motion the will is moved
by one object necessarily. If the will be offered an object which is good universally and from every point of view, the will tends to it of necessity, if it wills anything at all, since it cannot will the opposite. If, on the other hand, the will is offered an object that is not good from every point of view, it will not tend to it of necessity. Though passions of sensitive appetite moves the will in so far as the will is moved by its object, in as much as a man judge something to be filling and good, which he would not judge thus were it not for the passion. There will is not moved of necessity by the lower appetite. As it is said "The lust shall be under thee, and thou shalt have dominion over it" (Gen iv-7). But the will is moved of necessity by the exterior mover which is God. The will is an active principle that is not determined to one thing, but having an indifferent relation to many things, God so moves it that He does not determine it of necessity to one thing, lest its movement remains contingent and not necessary, except in those things to which it is moved naturally.

Second act of the will in reference to the end is 'enjoyment'. Enjoyment (fruition) is an act of the appetitive power because the end and the good is the object of the appetitive power. As Augustine says "To enjoy is to adhere lovingly to something for its own sake. But this is for those only that are endowed with knowledge. And knowledge of the end is of two folds, perfect and imperfect.
Perfect knowledge of the end is that by which we know not only what it is that is the end and the good, but also the universal nature of the end and the good; and such knowledge belongs to the rational nature alone. Consequently, enjoyment in its perfect nature, belongs to the rational nature; to irrational animals, imperfectly; and to other creature, not at all. Similarly Augustine says, "It is not so absurd to suppose that even beasts enjoy their foods and bodily pleasure". The notion of fruit implies two things: first, that it should come last; second, that it should calm the appetite with a certain sweetness and delight. Now a thing is last either absolutely or relative. Therefore the last end alone is that which man does not desire for the sake of something else. Thus the enjoyment is of the last end. It is possible to enjoy the end even though it be not possessed. To enjoy implies a certain relation of the will to the last end, according as the will possesses something as a last end. And end is possessed in two ways, perfectly and imperfectly. Perfectly when it is possessed not only in intention but also in reality; imperfectly, when it is possessed in intention only. Perfect enjoyment, therefore, is of the end already possessed. Augustine also speaks of perfect enjoyment.

Now we must consider intention, the third act of the will. Intention belongs first and principally to that which
moves to the end, as an architect moves other by his command to that which he intends. Similarly this is the will that moves all the other powers of the soul to the end. Intention is always of the end, it need not always be of the last end, therefore, one can intend several ends at the same time because two things may be taken in two ways.

The acts of the will which are related to the means that is, those acts whereby it is moved to the means. There are three acts of the will in reference to the means viz., (1) to choose, (2) to consent and (3) to use.

Choice is an act of will, because choice is nothing other than the desire and desire is an act of the will. Reason proceeds the will and directs its acts, namely, in so far as the will tends to its objects according to the order of reason; for the apprehensive power presents to the appetite its object. Accordingly, that act whereby the will tends to something proposed to it as being good, through being ordained to the end by the reason, is materially an act of the will, but formally an act of the reason. Therefore, choice is substantially, not an act of reason, but of the will; for choice is accomplished in a certain movement of the soul towards the good which is chosen. It is only of the means to the end or sometimes also of the end but the last end is in no way a matter of choice, e. g. in
the work of physician health is the end, and so it is not a matter of choice for physician, but a matter of principle. But the health of the body is ordained to the good of the soul, and consequently, with one who has charge of the soul's health, health or sickness may be a matter of choice. It is that choice is always in regard to human acts. Choice is of those things only that are done by us. The end is either an action or a thing. And when the end is either an action or a thing. And when the end is a thing, some human actions must intervene and this either in so far as man produces the thing which is the end and the same for means. It is only of possible things. It is always concerned with our actions. Now whatever is done by us is possible to us. Therefore we must needs say that choice is only of possible things. And man makes this choice freely. Man wills happiness of necessity, nor can he will not to be happy or to be unhappy. Now since choice is not of the perfect good, which is happiness, but of other end particular goods. Therefore man chooses, not of necessity, but freely.

Choice is preceded by counsel. Choice is an act of reason and reason must of necessity institute an inquiry before deciding on what is to be chosen and this inquiry is called counsel. And this counsel is not of the end but of the means too. And this is only of things that we are able to do. The inquiry of counsel must needs be one of resolution,
beginning, that is to say, from that which is intended in the future, and continuing until it arrives at that which is to be done at once.

The second act of will which are related to the means is consent. It is an act of appetitive power. But it is not in irrational animals, because, in irrational animals, the determination of the appetite to a particular thing is merely passive whereas consent expresses a determination of the appetite, which is active rather than merely passive. It is directed only to the means as counsel is only about the means. It belongs to the higher part of the soul because as long as a man is uncertain whether he should resist or not, according to divine principles, no judgement of the reason can be considered as a final decision. And final decision of what is to be done is the consent to the act. Therefore consent to the act belongs to the higher reason, but in the sense in which the reason includes the will.

Now we consider the third act of the will relation to the means to the end. The use of a thing signifies the application of that thing to an operation; and hence the operation to which we apply a thing is called its use. And it is the will which moves. The soul's powers to their acts; and this is to apply them to operation. Therefore use,
principally, belongs to the will as first mover; to the
reason as directing; and to the other powers as executing
the operation, which powers are compared to the will, which
applies them to act, as the instrument are compared to the
principal agent. Therefore, use is an act of the will, use
signifies the application of one thing to another now that
which is applied to another is regarded in the light of a
means to an end; and consequently use always applies to the
means. And it follows choice. The will, in a way, moves
the reason also, and uses it, we may take the use of the
means as consisting in the consideration of the reason,
whereby it refers to means to the end. In this sense use
precedes choice.

The act of the will is commanded by us because whatever
is in our power is subject to our command. But most of the
acts of the will are in our power, that is voluntary actions.
And not only the acts of the will are commanded by us but
the acts of the reason are also commanded by us because the
act of the reason are accomplished through free choice and
by his free choice man inquires, considers, judges and
approves. And the acts of sensitive appetite are also the
subject of the command of reason as Gregory says, "that
which obeys reason is two fold, the concupiscible and the
irascible" which belongs to the sensitive appetite.
On the other hand the acts of the vegetative soul are not subject to the command of reason because they proceed from the natural appetite not from intellectual appetite. In this way the external members of the body are not subject to the command of reason if they are moved by the natural powers. But if they are moved by the sensitive power they are subject to the command of reason.

In short except natural appetite or vegetative soul, all human acts are subject to the command of reason. Hence they are good ones if they are subject to the command of reason and they are evil ones if they are commanded by lower appetite.

He further argues that human actions are also guided by some principles viz., Intrinsic and Extrinsic. Intrinsic principles are powers and habits of man and extrinsic ones are Devil, inclining to evil and God who both instructs us by means of His law and Grace.

In conclusion we can say that in Aquinas view God did not will the universe which contained evil in it. God necessarily loves His own essence which is infinite goodness and He freely wills creation as a communication of His goodness. He cannot love what is opposed to goodness namely evil.
Moreover, evil as such cannot be willed even by a human will, for the object of the will is necessarily the good or what appears as such. The adulterer does not will the evil, the sin precisely as such; he wills the sensible pleasure of an act which involves evil. No will, therefore, can desire evil precisely as such, and God in creating a world the evil of which he foresaw must be said not to have willed the evils but to have willed the world which as such is good and to have willed to permit the evils which he foresaw.

Thus, the doctrine that evil as such is a privation, St. Thomas Aquinas means to imply that evil is unreal in the case of being an illusion. Evil is not the being (entity) in the sense that it falls under the definition as a privation of good, not in its own right as a positive entity. For example lack of ability to see is not a privation in a stone because it is the mere absence of power which would be incompatible with the nature of the stone; but blindness in a man is a privation, the absence of something which belongs to the fulness of man's nature. This blindness is not, however a positive entity; it is privation of sight yet the privation existed is real; it is not apart from the being in which it exists but as existing in that being the privation is real enough.
Evil, therefore, cannot of itself and by itself cause anything, but exists and can be caused through the being in which it exists as the deformity in the will of a fallen angel. It cannot by itself be a cause, but it is real privation and can be a cause by means of the positive being in which it exists. Indeed, the more powerful the being in which it exist, the greater is its effect.

In short, physical evil was permitted by God and even it can be said to have been willed by God. God did not will it for its own sake, of course, *per se* but He willed a universe, a natural order which involved at least the possibility of physical defect and suffering. By willing, God willed that capacity for feeling pain as well as pleasure which is, truly speaking, necessary for human nature. He did not will suffering as such but He willed that nature which is good and simple and contains the supreme perfection of goodness.