Chapter - II

INDIA’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS PAKISTAN
India's policy towards neighbouring countries has always been that of friendship and regional cooperation. However, response from different countries has varied.

The word Pakistan had first been put forward in 1933 as a religious concept by Indian Muslims undergraduates at Cambridge¹. Indian leaders never agreed with the two nation theory but accepted the partition of the country on the principle of the right of self determination. Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India made it clear that it is quite impossible to divide it on the basis of separating religious groups on one side or the other. So it was also clearly understood that those communities which would become the minority on this side or that must have the fullest protection and fullest security of their lives, otherwise, the whole structure which we had built up collapse².

Pakistan came into being on August 14, 1947³ as a result of the fulfilment of the demand of the All India Muslim League as a homeland for Muslims. It came into being because Britain wanted to create this state before leaving

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1. Russell Brines; The Indo-Pakistani conflict, London, 1968, p.28
3. B.G. Verghees; Our neighbour, Pakistan, Bombay 1965, p.54.
the Indian subcontinent. Mr. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the President of the Muslim League, decided to give a practical shape to this theoretical demand taking full advantage of the British policy of 'Divide and Rule'. It had a beginning in the form of the demand for separate electorate and which was conceded by the British Government.

The partition of the country and the problem arising in its wake embittered relations between India and Pakistan. In Pakistan there was a general feeling that India had not reconciled herself to the partition of the country and would do her best to undo it. Other factors which contributed to bitterness between the two countries were: (i) the canal water dispute, (ii) the Kashmir issue, and (iii) Pakistan's association with Western military alliances.

The canal water dispute remained unresolved. Though India herself needs water badly in the spirit of reconciliation and on humanitarian grounds, she has been prepared to provide water to Pakistan. This supply was continued for a long time, but Pakistan failed to renew the agreement before or after its expiry on March 31, 1948. Under these circumstances, India approached Pakistan and an agreement was signed on May 4, 1948, which worked for more than two years.

6. K.C. Saxena, Pakistan, her relations with India (1947-66), New Delhi, 1966, p. 1
7. S.S. Bindra, India and her neighbours, New Delhi, 1985, p. 46.
but on August 23, 1950, Pakistan suddenly repudiated it unilaterally, declaring that it had been signed 'under duress'.

Regarding payment of cash to Pakistan, Jawaharlal Nehru said:

"The Government's decision in regard to the payment of the cash balances to Pakistan has been taken after the most careful thought and after consultation with Gandhiji." 8

India agreed to allocate Rs.75 crore to Pakistan out of the cash balance to help the latter to make a start. Pakistan waged an undeclared war against India in Kashmir, failing which the payment of Rs.55 crores to her was withheld (Rs.20 crores had already been paid), pending a settlement over Kashmir. Mahatma Gandhi began his fast on January 13, 1948 and appealed to the nation to remove ill-will and prejudice which had poisoned the relations between India and Pakistan. 9 So, as Nehru said:

"The Government of India decided to pay the amount due, namely Rs.55 crore, to Pakistan immediately as a gesture of goodwill to that state and as her contribution to the non-violent and noble effort made by Gandhiji." 10

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9. Bindra, ob. cit, p. 20
Kashmir has been a bone of contention between the two countries since independence. Under the Independence Act of 1947, Kashmir was given the options to join either India or Pakistan or to have an independent status. The Maharaja of Kashmir decided not to accede to either country. Pakistan, however, was not happy with this decision and started applying pressure on Kashmir to gain its accession. When economic pressure failed, Pakistan allowed armed tribals to invade Kashmir. These tribesmen were assisted by regular troops of the Pakistan army. In October 1947, failing to check the raiders, the Maharaja asked for India's assistance. The Government of India refused to give any assistance unless Kashmir acceded to India. It was only after the Maharaja had signed the instrument of accession, that Indian forces were sent to Kashmir to check the intrusion of the tribals from Pakistan. In this connection, Jawaharlal Nehru said:

We received urgent messages for aid not only from the Maharaja's government but from representatives of the people, notably from that great leader of Kashmir, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, the President of the National Congress. Both the Kashmir government and the National Conference pressed us to accept the accession and to

send troops by air, but we made a condition that the accession would have to be considered by the people of Kashmir later when peace and order were established. We were anxious not to finalise anything in a moment of crisis and without the fullest opportunity being given to the people of Kashmir to have their say." 14

In the beginning, Pakistan followed an independent foreign policy. It did not join any blocs and embarked on developing friendship with Muslims countries, a policy that continued to be followed by Pakistan. Pakistan sought this friendship in the name of religious affinity and Islam. 15 At this time the Soviet Union was willing to provide help to Pakistan. India in those days could not depend on Soviet support except where Soviet and Indian interests coincided. Emphasis on religion in the official policy of Pakistan, the collapse of democracy and the rise of a succession of dictatorial military regimes there contributed, in no small measure, to inimical relations between India and Pakistan. In this situation towards the end of 1947 Jawaharlal Nehru told the constituent Assembly of India on 4th December, 1947:

"Whatever policy you may lay down, the art of conducting the foreign affairs of a country lies in finding out what is most advantageous to the country. We may talk about peace and freedom and earnestly mean what we say. But in the ultimate analysis, a government functions for the good of the country it governs and no government dare do anything which in the short or long run is manifestly to the disadvantage of that country." 16

The Indian Army drove back the raiders. On January 1, 1948 17 India took her case to the United Nations, complaining against Pakistan for aiding and abetting in the raid on Kashmir.

The Indian complaints against Pakistan were as follows:
(1) The invaders were allowed transit cross Pakistan territory
(2) They were allowed to use Pakistan territory as a base of operations
(3) They included Pakistani nationals;
(4) They got much of their military equipment, transportation facilities and supplies from Pakistan and
(5) Pakistan officer were training guiding, and otherwise actively helping them. 18

Pakistan on its side, tried to raise the question of Junagarh and Hyderabad during the discussion in the Security Council.

Bypassing the plea of India to declare Pakistan an aggressor, Security Council decided to send a mission to the subcontinent to get the fighting stopped and to create favourable condition

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17. A.Appadorai & M.S.Rajan: India's Foreign Policy and Relations, New Delhi, 1985, p.82.
for holding a plebiscite. Pakistan was successful in her efforts in the Security Council and the Indian appeal was not accepted by the Security Council because of American support for Pakistan. In this context, Nehru said on February 1948: "Instead of discussing and deciding on our reference in a straightforward manner, the nations of the world sitting in that body got lost in power politics." 19 Pakistan took to the stand that the Maharaja of Kashmir had specifically promised a plebiscite. According to the letter "as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and its soil cleared of the invaders, the question of the State's accession should be settled by a reference to the people." This, according to the Government of India, did not imply plebiscite. The Commission, in its third interim report submitted to the Security Council on 5 December 1949, said that while the situation in the state has changed, the Resolutions remain unchanged" - was at the root of the trouble. The Security Council failed to resolve the conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir.

The Security Council appointed a Commission to arrange for ceasefire in Kashmir. The Commission proposed ceasefire, demilitarization and plebiscite. In February 1950 Sir Owen Dixon, an Australian, was appointed as a mediator. But soon

19. The Statesman, February 16, 1948, p.1
20. SCOR, S/2967, para 57, SCOR(Suppl.No.1) 8 yr.1953, p.14
he admitted his failure and resigned. He was followed by Frank D. Graham of U.S.A. who also could not achieve much success.\textsuperscript{21} India insisted on 'vacation of aggression' by Pakistan as a pre-condition for holding of plebiscite, which was not accepted by Pakistan. In 1951\textsuperscript{22} Kashmir elected its constituent Assembly, which confirmed accession of the state to India on February 6, 1954.\textsuperscript{23} It declared Kashmir as a self governing state within the Republic of India. Thus the Indian government tried to solve the problem of accession of Kashmir to India by confirmation through the constituent assembly of Kashmir. On this issue, Prime Minister Nehru said on September 17, 1953:

"Certainly, so far as we are concerned, it is desirable for us from a strategic point of view. But however that may be, we can not impose our desire or wish in this matter. Therefore, we have put it aside and right from the beginning we have laid stress on this that the people of Kashmir should decide this question."\textsuperscript{24}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{21} Bindra, op.cit., p.25
  \item \textsuperscript{22} Dr.Dunga Das Basu, \textit{Commentary on the Constitution of India}, quoted in Birdwood, pp.179-80.
  \item \textsuperscript{23} \textit{The Hindustan Times}, Feb.7, 1954, p.1
  \item \textsuperscript{24} Parliamentary Debates, New Delhi, 17th Sept.1953, Vol.VIII no.34, col.3995.
\end{itemize}
In 1954 Pakistan joined the SEATO and in 1955 she joined the Baghdad pact which was renamed as CENTO and she recommend military assistance under these pacts.

The failure of the French to hold out against the Communist forces of Ho Chi Minh in Indo-China and the stalemate on the Korean issue prompted U.S.A. to take steps for the defence of other countries against communism in south-east Asia. It took a lead in this regard and convened a meeting at Manila, to which eight western and Asian governments sent their representatives. They concluded a pact on September 8, 1954, the signatories of which were U.S.A., U.K., France, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines. It may be noted that out of the eight states located in south-east Asia only Thailand and the Philippines joined this pact.

U.S.A. adopted the policy of forming military alliances in the West Asia. First she arranges for an alliance between Turkey, a member of N.A.T.O. and Pakistan, which was receiving military and economic aid from U.S.A. This alliance was concluded in April, 1954.


The next step was a treaty between Turkey and Iraq signed in 1955 at Baghdad. Soon Britain and Pakistan also joined the Baghdad Pact, and they were followed by Iran. Thus, there were five members of the pact. Iraq, however, later on withdrew due to revolution in the country and the Baghdad Pact came to be known as C.E.N.T.O. and shifted its headquarters to Ankara. U.S.A. was not a member of this pact, although she had been participating in the session of its military committee as observer.

In 1956 Jawaharlal Nehru appealed to Pakistan for accepting a no-war pact, an offer had been made earlier by India, on December 22, 1949 to the Pakistan High Commissioner. Nehru said:

"I do think that if both Pakistan and we are agreed that on no account should we go to war with each other but should settle our problems peacefully; they may not be settled for some time, but it is better to have a problem pending than to go to war for it. Therefore, it would be very desirable and helpful to have a no-war declaration."

This offer was not accepted by Pakistan.

India made slight changes in her stand on Kashmir. In March 1956, Nehru said that the first essential step was for Pakistani troops to withdraw but they are still there.

28. Saxena, op.cit., p.11
Hence all talk of plebiscit was completely beside the point. Secondly, India could not ignore the constitutional developments and economic progress in Kashmir. Thirdly, plebiscite would mean "uprooting of things that have become fixed - legally, constitutionally and practically." This obviously meant that India was not keen to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir.29

On November 19, 1956 the Kashmir Constituent Assembly adopted a constitution for the state which was modelled on the Indian Constitution.30 Pakistan was not at all happy with all these developments and requested the Security Council to solve the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. The Council met to discuss the problem of Kashmir at the request of Pakistan in January 1957 and it passed resolutions.

1. At a meeting of a joint committee of the Indian Pakistani representatives, convened by the United Nations Commission in March 1949, it had been agreed that both India and Pakistan would submit their plans for the withdrawal of forces to the committee. Pakistan did submit a plan but India did not.

Quoting from the report of the United Nations Commission, V.K. Krishna Menon pointed out that Noon's statement was inaccurate as "the Indian delegation informed the meeting that it was unable to respond

29. Russell, _ibid._, p.98
30. _The Hindustan Times_, Nov. 20, 1956, p.1
to the Pakistani delegation by presenting a similarly comprehensive plan" and on March 28 the U.N. Commission received the Government of India's own views.

2. Pakistan had accepted the proposal made by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan that the differences arising from the interpretation of the August 13 and January 5 resolutions be referred to arbitration by Admiral Nimitz. India rejected it.

Menon's reply to this allegation was cogent and based on records. He said: "It is true we did not agree to arbitrate, but we were asked to arbitrate on questions which were not amenable to arbitration", viz, the question of the disposition of the Azad forces, and the determining of the quantum of forces to be kept by India after the bulk of its forces had been withdrawn. On the first, the Commission had given an assurance to India that there would be a large scale disbanding and disarming of the Azad forces; on the second, the withdrawal of the bulk of the Indian forces was to be agreed between the Government of India and the Commission; arbitration was not relevant to the issue.

3. Pakistan had accepted the McNaughton Proposals: India had not. It is true that India had not accepted the proposals, Memon argued, but only because McNaughton had, wrongly, equated India and Pakistan - a position which India would not accept, as there could not be equality between the victim of aggression and the aggressor.
4. Pakistan had accepted the demilitarization proposals formulated by Sir Owen Dixon; India had rejected them.

This was a summary of the position, Menon contended; Dixon had also said that when Pakistan crossed the boundary, it had violated international law; secondly, India had been prepared to examine his proposals for compartmental plebiscite, Pakistan had rejected them.

5, 6, 7. The Commonwealth Prime Ministers had made alternative proposals, the troops of Pakistan and India in Kashmir should be replaced by troops from New Zealand and Australia, or by a joint force of Indian and Pakistani troops, or by troops raised locally by the Plebiscite Administrator - all these proposals had been accepted by Pakistan.

Citing extensively from the minutes of the informal conversations with the Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Ceylon and Pakistan - taken down by Prime Minister Nehru in London, Menon said that there was no formal consideration of the question by the Commonwealth Prime Ministers. He quoted Nehru to the effect that "in the course of the conversations, no reference was made either by Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan or by me (i.e. Nehru) to the proposal about a Commonwealth force being sent."

8, 9. Both India and Pakistan had agreed to arbitration all points arising from the interpretation of the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949.

Menon said that there was no need to repeat what he had previously stated on the inappropriateness of arbitration.
10. Each one of the proposals made by Dr. Frank P. Graham on the subject of demilitarization was accepted by Pakistan and rejected by India.

The facts were exactly the reverse, argued Menon. First, India accepted the proposal that demilitarization should be a single and continuous process. Second, India had accepted the principles suggested by Graham as a basis for demilitarization, "India considered that the principles contained the germs of a settlement, but despite several efforts to evolve a suitable draft in terms of the language used in the Commission's resolution no understanding could be reached with the Pakistan Government."

11. Pakistan had accepted, and India had rejected the resolution of the Security Council passed at its meeting on 23 December 1952, urging the Governments of India and Pakistan to enter into immediate negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan in order to reach agreement on the specific number of forces to remain on each side of the ceasefire line at the end of the period of demilitarization. 31

Menon agreed that India had rejected the resolution. In fairness, he argued, the reasons must also be stated.

India's right and duty to maintain the security of the State had been acknowledged by the United Nations Commission; it was only normal to suggest that the Government of India must be the judge of what forces were required for the security of the state.

31. SCOR, Yr. 4, Special Supplement, No.7, doc.S/1430 paras 169 and 220; italics ours.
"It will, therefore, be seen," concluded Menon, "that out of these eleven statements made, every one of them is incorrect. In the majority of them the position is exactly the reverse. And if arguing a case before this body has any value on the decisions it makes or any impact on the Governments represented here, I beg to submit that this refutation, with chapter and verse from the documents must be regarded as an important item." 32

Nehru criticized the resolution and said on 4 April, 1958, "Any consideration of this problem which ignore certain basic issues and which endeavours to put us on the same level as Pakistan— that is the aggressor and the aggressed count on the same level— is not agreeable to us and will not be accepted by us." 33

Nehru visited Karachi on 19 September 1960 34, to resolve the problem of Indus waters. After some discussions, a treaty regarding the issue was signed 35 between the two countries through the World Bank. On this occasion, Nehru expressed his gratification in these words:

32. A. Appadoria and M.S. Rajan, *op. cit.* p. 90.
33. The *Hindustan Times*, April 5, 1958, p. 1
34. O.P. Ralhan, *op. cit.*, p. 334
"This is indeed a unique occasion and a memorable day, memorable in many ways, memorable certainly in the fact that a very difficult and complicated problem which has troubled India and Pakistan for many years has been satisfactorily solved .... This settlement is memorable because it will bring assurance of relief to large numbers of people - farmers and others-in Pakistan and India .... These waters have flowed down for ages past, the greater part going to the sea without being utilized. This is a happy occasion for all of us.  

Nehru expressing his gratitude to the World Bank for its role in the matter he said:

"I should like to express my deep gratitude to the International Bank and to all those who have laboured within Pakistan, in India and in the other friendly countries, and to all who have come to our assistance in this matter and generously made contributions towards solving this problem."  

Under this treaty, waters of the Indus, the Jhelum and the Chenab were allotted to Pakistan and those of Sutlej, Ravi and Beas were given to India. Pakistan had to receive contribution from India and other countries for the construction of canals for link purposes.

37. Nehru speeches, Vol.IV, op.cit., p.293
After a long gap, the Security Council again took up the issue of Kashmir between India and Pakistan in its sessions from February to June 1962. However, the Council could not solve the problem. The Council again held discussions on the dispute over Kashmir in February and May, 1964, but could not reach at any decision because its members differed on the issue. On April 13, 1964 addressing the Lok Sabha, Nehru expressed his views about India's policy towards Pakistan. He said:

"With the coming in of China as more or less an ally of Pakistan, Pakistan has become even more aggressive. I do not know what secret understanding they have come to with each other, but such understanding, if any, cannot be of advantage to India. It is extraordinary that even in these circumstances some of the Western powers are inclined towards Pakistan and help it in regard to Kashmir. The Kashmir issue would have been solved long ago but for Western help to Pakistan."

Again, on May 22, 1964 at a press conference, Nehru said:

"Sheikh Abdullah is going to Pakistan the day after tomorrow, I think, he will have some exploratory talks there. It is best that these talks take place without any inhibition. As I said in Bombay, he looks upon the Kashmir

38. A. Appadorai & M.S. Rajan, op.cit., p.93
issue not as one by itself but as one between India and Pakistan. He thinks that it is important that India and Pakistan should come nearer to each other and that automatically the Kashmir issue will then be partly solved."

On April 9, 1965, following the Kutch dispute, Pakistan sent organized groups of infiltrators across the ceasefire line, and later mounted large-scale attack in the Chhamb-Jaurian Sector area, violating the international border, thereby threatening the communication line between Kashmir and the rest of India. Indian troops went into action and foiled the Pakistani designs. On September 2, 1965 the U.N. Secretary General U. Thant issued an appeal for ceasefire. Two days later the Council met and called upon the two countries to withdraw their forces to the old ceasefire line. This appeal was again repeated on September 9. The Council authorised the Secretary General to visit the two countries and bring about a peaceful settlement. As a result of his efforts India agreed to an unconditional ceasefire but Pakistan wanted a 'purposeful ceasefire based on an "honourable settlement of the Kashmir problem."

41. V.P. Lutt, op.cit., p.141
42. Saxena, op.cit., p.22
44. Bindra, op.cit., p.37
At that time Ayub Khan was the President of Pakistan. The Soviet Union perceived that under his leadership Pakistan was leaning towards China and therefore the U.S.S.R. made efforts to win her over. The setback suffered by Pakistan at this time compelled her to develop friendly relations with the Soviet Union who extended her hand of friendship to Pakistan and gave a lot of economic help including some military help.

Subsequently, the dispute was resolved through the efforts of the Soviet Union which arranged a meeting between the leaders of the two countries at Tashkent. After a virtual breakdown of the Tashkent talks on the night of 9 January, 1966, the Prime Minister of India, Shri Lal Bahadur Shastri, and the President of Pakistan Mr. Ayub Khan, reached an agreement on 10 January, 1966, reaffirming their obligations under the United Nations Charter not to have recourse to force but to settle their disputes through peaceful means, without prejudice to their basic positions on Kashmir.

The major points included in the declaration are as follows:

1. By reaffirming their obligations under the U.N. Charter not to have recourse to force both India and Pakistan

45. Bindra, op. cit., p. 60
46. Russell, op. cit., p. 140
47. The Hindustan Times, 11 Jan. 1966, p. 1
publicity committed themselves to abandoning war as a means of settling their differences.

2. Both the countries pledged to turn hate propaganda into promotion of friendship, understanding and amity between the two countries and would take measures to settle all other differences across a conference table.

3. Both sides agreed to implement the Security Council resolution of 20 September 1965, asking them to withdraw their troops to the positions they held before the conflict.

4. It opened a way out of the terrible impasse created by the war in September 1965, by opening various avenues such as restoration of diplomatic missions, economic and trade relations and repatriation of the prisoners of war.

5. Both countries recognised that the continued tension between the two countries was not in the interest of the people.

6. It offered opportunities to the U.S. policy makers to remove much of the cobweb that had embedded in their minds over the years. It also helped them in building up understanding with India on the issue of Chinese expansionism.

7. It has been described as a powerful nail in the China's coffin of expansionism.
8. It made a deep impression upon Asia and Africa. In the opinion of a number of Asian and African leaders what had been achieved in Tashkent was a blow against the plans and intrigues of the imperialists who had all along been following the despicable formula of divide and rule.\footnote{S.S. Bindra, \textit{op. cit.}, pp.70-71.}

The Tashkent Declaration was also a landmark in the history of Indo-Pak relations. Though the Kashmir issue was not settled, the declaration opened up the possibility of maintaining peace in the subcontinent.

After the Tashkent Declaration the relations between the two countries showed a sign of improvement. After this some procedural agreement was signed on August 1, 1966 in the consideration of Farakka barrage dispute.\footnote{\textit{Asian Recorder}, 9-15 April, 1966, pp.7018-19.}

The Tashkent Declaration, which had been signed after the aggression of 1965 is more or less a defunct document. Its spirit has not been adhered to by Pakistan, although India has been trying her best to follow the Tashkent spirit.

The Tashkent Declaration was like a no war pact because both India and Pakistan had agreed not to use force in settling the disputes between them but Pakistan never discharged the obligation in the declaration. Pakistan has
always been harbouring the belief that in her search for security through military alliances and pact, she would be able to create such a situation as would make India realise that she could not sustain status quo in Kashmir. On the other hand, India also secured military and economic help from the U.S.A. for raising it as a bulwark of democracy against Communist China.

Likewise, Pakistan was also engaged in all out efforts to improve its armed strength. The Tashkent Declaration was not appreciated by some political parties in Pakistan, like the Jammat-i-Islami, the Council Muslim League and the Nizam-e-Islam Party. They felt that the only solution of the Kashmir dispute was war.

The then foreign Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Z.A. Bhutto, in response to criticism, said on 9 February 1966, that Kashmir was not a party issue and that it was necessary to pursue the path of meaningful dialogue rather than to move in different directions.

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51 V.P. Dutt, op.cit., p.144
52 Asian Recorder, 27 Aug.- 2 Sept.1966, p.7254
53 Asian Recorder, 9-15 April,1966, p.7018-19
54 V.P. Dutt; op.cit., p.142.
All these actions and reactions between the two countries show that tensions arose after signing the Tashkent Declaration. To remove their tensions Mrs. Indira Gandhi proposed on 15 August, 1968, a 'no war pact' to Pakistan, which was rejected by President Ayub Khan on the ground that to talk of a no war pact without settling the Kashmir dispute has only an attempt to hoodwink the world.  