Afghanistan is a small, landlocked country whose geopolitical location has attracted great power rivalry for centuries in the past and presently it has become a focal point of superpower rivalry especially after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 and the continued presence of tens of thousands of Soviet troops on Afghan soil. Prior to the Second World War, Afghanistan had been subject to Anglo-Russian rivalry nearly for about seventeen decades but the former pursued a policy of strict neutrality while pursuing an independent foreign policy and thus safeguarding its territorial integrity and sovereignty. The conclusion of the Second World War witnessed the decline of traditional colonial powers leading to the emergence of United States and Soviet Union as superpowers vying each other for winning the independent countries to their respective spheres of influence. Thus the traditional Anglo-Russian rivalry gave way to the US-Soviet rivalry. In the post-Second World war years too Afghanistan has remained the focal point of superpower rivalry. But until the advent of Soviet-backed communist coup in April 1978 in Kabul, Afghanistan maintained a chequered history of genuine nonalignment. Following the advent of communist coup, Kabul regime abandoned the traditional Afghan policy of genuine nonalignment and made Afghanistan as a client state of the Soviet Union. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 virtually made Kabul as a satellite of Soviet empire. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has been condemned by the United Nations, nonaligned countries, members of the Islamic community, European Economic Community and other international forums.
When the deepening Afghanistan crisis has attracted the world wide attention, it has also formed the subject of serious academic research and general writing. There exists a plethora of literature which sheds ample light on Afghanistan from different perspectives. However there has been a paucity of serious academic literature which could shed analytical light on the action by one super power -- invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet Union, and reaction by other super power -- United States, to meet the challenge. Besides the existing available literature also does not present a dispassionate analysis of the response of the people of Afghanistan as to what they are struggling for, how they view the initiatives undertaken by the international community to meet the Soviet challenge etc.

All these aspects have been analysed in the present study which is divided into five main chapters and a conclusion. The first chapter traces out the emergence of Afghanistan as a modern state under Ahmad Shah Abdali in the second half of eighteenth century. The chapter is further subdivided into four parts. The first part deals with the period of consolidation of Afghan empire commencing from 1747 to 1800. The second part pertains to the period of foreign conflict which lasted from 1800 to 1880. The third part deals with the period of defensive isolationism which lasted for about four decades from 1880 to 1919. The final phase being identified as the period of defensive neutralism covers the period from the conclusion of the First World War to the conclusion of the Second World War.

During the first period between 1747 to 1800, the Afghan rulers consolidated the Afghan empire. By the time, Ahmad Shah
Abdali died in 1773, the Afghan empire extended from the Atrek river to the Indus and from Tibet to the Arabian Sea. This part of the first chapter further examines the rise of French power in Europe and its interest in the South West Asia which the British deemed as a threat to their rule in India. On the other hand the rise of Sikh power in Punjab which lasted up to the closing years of the third decade of the nineteenth century, had prevented any direct contact between British India and Afghanistan. Thus by the end of the eighteenth century Afghanistan continued its onward march on the road to progress uninterruptedly.

The chapter further proceeds to analyse the period of foreign conflict for Afghanistan which commenced with the dawn of nineteenth century and lasted for about eight decades. The rapid rise of Sikh power in Punjab was deemed as a threat to their interests in British India. Consequently during the first decade of the nineteenth century, the British made friendly overtures of friendship to the Afghan rulers with a view to secure the British interests against the possible threats from the Sikhs in Punjab and from Soviet Union. In 1809, both British India and Afghanistan signed a treaty in terms of which Afghanistan undertook to disallow French and Persian troops to pass through Afghan territory. However following the defeat of the then Afghan ruler Shah Shuja, the treaty could not be effected. Because of its borders with Soviet Union and Persia, Afghanistan had assumed immense strategic importance in British defence strategy with regard to consolidation and protection of British rule in India. In 1809 and 1814, the British signed two treaties with Persia now called Iran under which the latter assured the
British not to allow European forces to pass through its territory. However in the meanwhile, Soviet Union had also gained considerable diplomatic, political and economic leverage in the region by virtue of its treaties signed with Iran in 1828 and with Ottoman Empire of Turkey in 1829.

The chapter further analyses the growing Soviet influence in the region, its implications for the security of British India through Afghanistan and Iran. It further proceeds to assess the circumstances leading to the outbreak of First Anglo-Afghan War which took place in 1838 in which the British suffered heavily. The immediate impact of these developments was that the British followed a policy of non-intervention in Afghanistan for years. In view of the expanding Soviet influence during 1860s in Central Asia when Russia gathered control of Khiva, Khokand, Samarkand and later Bukhara, the British really became alarmed over the potential Soviet threat. The Anglo-Russian rivalry dragged on to the borders of Afghanistan especially when the British tried to dictate their terms to Afghanistan under the pretext of forward policy. In 1878 the British launched another armed expedition against Afghanistan which is known as the Second Anglo-Afghan War. In the aftermath of this war the British imposed the treaty of Gandamak on Afghanistan in May 1879 under which the Afghan foreign policy was subjected to British interference.

The chapter then deals with the third phase of defensive isolation in the Afghan foreign policy which lasted from 1880 till 1919. During this period Afghanistan asserted its national independence by pursuing a policy of strict neutrality. The Afghan rulers were very cautious about the implications of Anglo-Russian rivalry and thus refrained from being hoodwinked by either
When the First World War broke out, Afghanistan kept itself aloof from the power politics of great powers and did not favour the either belligerents. Afghanistan's steadfast pursuit of the policy of strict neutrality paid it good dividends.

The chapter finally deals with the fourth phase of defensive neutralism which began in 1919 and continued upto the end of the Second World War. In February 1919 Amir Amanullah became the new ruler of Afghanistan. He took steps to wriggle Afghanistan out of the British dominance and to pursue an independent foreign policy. In April May 1919, there occurred Third Anglo-Afghan War. The impact of the war was that the British recognized Afghanistan as an independent sovereign country.

The chapter makes an assessment of Afghan foreign policy under King Amanullah. Afghanistan's relations improved with its neighbours and with Turkey and Persia as well. Amanullah succeeded in asserting Afghanistan's independence in foreign affairs and secured the recognition of this assertion both from British and the Soviets. In 1921, Afghanistan and Soviet Union signed a treaty which recognized Afghan independence and neutrality.

It further analyses the foreign policy of Afghanistan under the regime of King Nadir Khan from 1929 to 1933. The hallmark of Afghanistan's foreign policy during this period was the determination to vigorously pursue the policy of neutrality.

When the Second World War broke out in 1939, Afghanistan had become heavily dependent on Axis powers especially Germany and Japan for economic and technical assistance. Keeping in view its traditional policy of maintaining strict neutrality, Afghanistan
declared in 1940 that it would remain neutral during the war. Thus Kabul ever abandoned the receipt of economic and technical assistance received from the Axis powers in the larger national interest. At the same time, Afghanistan also maintained neutral posture towards the Allied powers. Thus the pursuit of strict neutral policy by Afghanistan during the war period won it appreciation from the Allied powers and at the same time Afghanistan could also safeguard its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The second chapter deals with the basic postulates of Afghan foreign policy. After having analysed the significance of foreign policy for a country, the chapter further proceeds to assess the geo-political location of Afghanistan and its resultant impact on Afghan foreign policy. The faith of the people of Afghanistan in Islam and their sense of nationalism have been instrumental in influencing the course of Afghan foreign policy. The Afghan national character is reflected in the literature and culture of that country. Despite the ethnic and linguistic diversities there has always prevailed a cohesive national unity in Afghanistan.

Opposition to colonialism and neo-colonialism in all its manifestation is another postulate of Afghan foreign policy. The chapter further analyses the statements made by the Afghan representatives in the UN General Assembly on colonial issues. Afghanistan, because of its strong opposition to colonialism and active support for the United Nations efforts in the process of decolonization, was made a member of the Special Committee with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.
Full support to the national liberation movements struggling for the attainment of independence from the colonial domination has been another cornerstone of Afghan foreign policy. Afghanistan was the first country to recognize the freedom fighters of Algeria, when the latter was struggling for independence. Besides, Afghanistan has also rendered full support for the liberation movements in South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Angola and has expressed solidarity with the people of Palestine in their struggle against Zionism.

Afghanistan has also consistently opposed the racial and apartheid policies of the white minority regime of South Africa. It keenly watched the developments within South Africa and supported the measures undertaken by the international community in this regard. In 1976, when the racist regime of South Africa resorted to massacres and massive repression against the innocent people, Afghanistan not only condemned them but expressed its wholehearted support to the legitimate struggle of the people of South Africa for self-determination and the eradication of the inhuman policy of the apartheid.

Afghanistan has also supported the people of Namibia in their struggle to attain independence from the racist regime of South Africa. After the First World War, the League of Nations had given the mandate over Namibia to the Union of South Africa. However after the Second World War, South Africa annexed the territory thus denying the independence to the people of Namibia. Rather Pretoria resorted to repressive measures. Afghanistan has frequently condemned the racial regime of Pretoria and supported the struggle of Namibian people.
Consistent and unqualified support to the people of Palestine in their just struggle against the Zionist Israel also constituted a basic trait of Afghan foreign policy. The problem of Palestine arose in 1947 when the UN General Assembly recommended the partition of Palestine into two — home for the Palestinians and the home of the Jews. However the Zionists unilaterally declared the establishment of Israel in May 1948 and annexed even the territory meant for the Palestinians thus making the latter to live as refugees. Since 1948, the people of Palestine have been struggling to regain their territory from Israel. The Arab-Israel wars of 1967 and 1973 and continued hostilities have added to the miseries of the people of Palestine. The formation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and its recognition by the international community in 1974 as being the sole representative of the people of Palestine was welcomed by Afghanistan. Kabul also welcomed the admission of the PLO into the United Nations. Afghanistan has continuously reiterated that the total and complete withdrawal of Israel from all the occupied Arab territories and the restoration of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people including the right of self-determination and the establishment of a Palestinian State were the only means of resolving the problem.

Afghanistan has consistently supported the right to self-determination in the United Nations and other international forums. Afghanistan, for the first time, suggested that the right to self-determination, which prior to that was incorporated as a political principle in the Charter of the United Nations and Universal Declaration on Human Rights to be treated as a
fundamental right. Consequently, the right to self-determination was incorporated in the first Article both in the UN Charter and the UN Covenant on Human Rights.

Afghanistan has continuously championed the cause of dependent people throughout the world and pleaded for the exercise of the right to self-determination.

Afghanistan has also strongly supported the New International Economic Order. The call for the NIEO was given by the Algerian NAM summit conference in 1973, which was later adopted as a Declaration and Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order by the General Assembly at its sixth special session held in April 1974. Ever since then, Afghanistan has not only supported the NIEO but has also called for its early and speedy implementation. Kabul has also succeeded in focussing the attention of the world community to the economic problems faced by the landlocked countries.

Afghanistan has also rendered unqualified support for general and complete disarmament. Either in General Assembly or Disarmament Commission or any other international forum, Afghanistan has vigorously espoused the cause of disarmament. Afghanistan has strongly pleaded that the resources exhausted on the armaments could be diverted to envisage the economic well being of the people. Afghan support for the nuclear disarmament measures undertaken by the United Nations has been lauded.

The chapter further proceeds to analyse the policy of non-alignment pursued by Afghanistan. Pursuit of the policy of
strict neutrality and genuine nonalignment has been the hallmark of Afghanistan policy. Even at a time when Afghanistan was sandwiched between British India and Soviet Union and being the focal point of Anglo-Russian rivalry, the rulers of Afghanistan followed the policy of strict neutrality and tried to maintain friendly relations with all countries. Afghanistan is the oldest nonaligned country in Asia which played a notable role along with other countries in convening the first summit conference of the nonaligned countries at Belgrade in 1961. Afghanistan not only participated in the NAM Summit Conference but also played a constructive role in furthering the cause of nonalignment. Until the fifth NAM summit held in Colombo, Sri Lanka in 1976, Afghanistan had striven hard to continue its active role in espousing the cause of nonalignment. By the time the sixth NAM summit was held in Havana, Cuban capital, Afghanistan's status as a nonaligned country had been vastly eroded in the wake of the advent of Soviet back communist regime in Kabul in April 1978. The present day Afghanistan is a client state of Soviet Union and no more a nonaligned country.

The chapter finally deals with the Afghan objective of strengthening the United Nations. Afghanistan is one of the founding members of the United Nations and it has played a positive and constructive role by active participation in the various organs of the world community. Though being a country with limited resources Afghanistan could not contribute economically in a big way but it has rendered moral support to the United Nations important decisions having bearing on the international peace and security.
The third chapter presents an indepth assessment of Afghanistan's relations with the Soviet Union since the conclusion of the Second World War till the advent of Soviet-backed Communist coup in Kabul in late April 1978. The chapter begins with the declaration of the then Afghan Prime Minister, Shah Mahmud, made in May 1946 in which he declared that the principles of establishing friendly relations with all countries, especially with the neighbouring countries, formed the bedrock of Afghan foreign policy. On 13 June 1946, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union signed an agreement to define the Amu River border.

It further proceeds to analyse the developments leading to the partition of Indian subcontinent in August 1947 which led to the emergence of India and Pakistan as two independent and sovereign countries and their impact on Afghanistan. The emergence of Pakistan gave rise to the issue of Pushtunistan as an apple of discord between Pakistan and Afghanistan. In July 1949, Afghanistan abrogated all of its international treaties which supported the Durand Line as a border or which referred to the status of the Pushtuns. The detailed analysis of the Pushtunistan issue is not undertaken in this chapter but only referred to briefly in the context of Afghan-Soviet relations. However, Moscow supported the Afghan stand on Pushtunistan.

In July 1950, Moscow and Kabul signed a four year trade agreement which envisaged Soviet petroleum products, cotton cloth, sugar and other commodities in exchange for
Afghan goods like wool, fur, raw cotton, fruits and nuts. In January 1954, Kabul and Moscow signed a major agreement in terms of which the Soviets advanced a loan of $3.5 million for the construction of grain elevators at Kabul. During 1954, Soviet Union advanced a loan worth $5.3 million to Afghanistan under different agreements.

The chapter then proceeds to analyse the visit of Soviet leaders - Khrushchev and Bulganin to Afghanistan in December 1955 and its influence on Soviet-Afghan relations. During their visit, the Soviet leaders affirmed their support to Afghanistan on Pashtun issue. This visit resulted in procuring a Soviet credit worth $100 million for Afghanistan to be repaid in thirty years at two per cent interest. In terms of an agreement signed in March 1956, regular air flights between Tashkent and Kabul were started.

The chapter then proceeds to analyse the visit of Afghan Premier, Sardar Mohammad Daoud to Soviet Union in October 1956. Then in July 1957 the Afghan King Zahir Shah visited Soviet Union. During this period, Moscow promised Kabul to advance a credit worth $15 million. The chapter also deals with the augmentation of Soviet military influence in Afghanistan during 1950s. In August 1956, Soviet Union offered military assistance to Afghanistan as well as to impart military training to Afghan personnel. Between 1950 to 1955, the Soviet assistance to Afghanistan amounted to $246.2 million. The underlying objective of Soviet economic and military assistance to Afghanistan was to gain a foothold in that country to perpetrate its long term strategic gains.
In March 1960, the Soviet Premier, Nikita S. Khrushchev paid an official visit to Afghanistan which proved instrumental in the conclusion of a cultural agreement between the two countries. The chapter's assessment about the Afghan foreign policy during 1953-63 when Sardar Mohammad Daoud was the Prime Minister, is that Soviet Union did render considerable economic assistance to woo Afghanistan to its fold, however, the latter did not fall a prey to Soviet overtures and pursued an independent and genuinely nonaligned foreign policy.

Between 1963-73, the Soviet-Afghan relations continued on the friendly pattern. There was no major point at departure in the traditionally friendly relationship. In February 1968, Moscow and Kabul signed an agreement for economic and technical assistance. The chapter further examines the Soviet proposal for collective security in Asia advanced by Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev in June 1968 and again enunciated in March 1972. However Afghanistan did not endorse the Soviet proposal for collective security in Asia.

The third chapter finally makes an assessment of Afghan-Soviet relations from July 1973 to April 1978 during which Sardar Mohammad Daoud was at the helm of Afghan affairs. In early June 1974, Daoud visited Soviet Union. During 1974, Moscow granted an interest free ten years moratorium on a $100 million debt and promised another $428 billion in development aid to Afghanistan. In December 1975, the Soviet President, Podgorny, visited Afghanistan. During 1974-75, Moscow tried to increase its sphere of influence in Afghanistan but Daoud was cautious enough to foresee such an eventuality as detrimental to Afghanistan. Consequently Daoud forged close
relations with nonaligned and Islamic countries to reduce Afghan economic dependence on Moscow. The Daoud regime was wooed by Soviet Union but Kabul did not encourage Moscow. The resultant impact was the "cool off" stage in Afghan-Soviet relations during 1977 and the early months of 1978.

The fourth chapter provides a critical assessment of the Afghan-US relations since their advent till April 1978. Though the formal diplomatic relations between Kabul and Washington were established in 1940s but efforts in this direction were initiated during King Amanullah's time. In July 1921, an Afghan mission headed by Mohammed Wali Khan visited the United States to explore the possibilities of establishing diplomatic relations between Afghanistan and the United States. Despite his frequent meetings with the US officials and leaders, Wali Khan's mission failed to get positive assurance. For subsequent four years, neither Washington nor Kabul took any initiative to resume negotiations on establishing diplomatic ties between the two countries. The negotiations resumed in 1925 continued for about a decade without any tangible outcome. It was in March 1936 that the United States recognized the Afghan Government and on 4 May 1936 that Hornybrook was accredited as the first US ambassador to Kabul with his headquarters at Tehran.

The outbreak of Second World War adversely affected the Afghan exports of Karakul to the West European countries. At this crucial juncture, the United States came to Afghanistan's rescue to help it export its Karakul in American markets. Despite the establishment of diplomatic ties between Washington and Kabul, the former had not yet opened any diplomatic mission
In Afghanistan by the end of 1940. It was on 6 June 1942 that the US diplomatic mission was inaugurated in Kabul. During the period of Second World War, the Afghan-US relations had become friendly and formal. Immediately after the conclusion of the Second World War, the Afghan Government asked the United States to send American teachers and engineers. In 1946, the Afghan Government signed an agreement with the Morrison-Knudsen Company of the United States worth $17 million for repairing the dams and their reconstruction and the construction of 350 miles long highway.

In 1949, the Afghan Government urged the US to provide economic assistance worth $118 million. However, Washington sanctioned only a loan of $21 million. At this stage, the Afghan request for arms supplies was not accepted by the United States. The US reluctance to provide substantial economic assistance and to supply of arms to Afghanistan showed that Washington had attached no strategic importance to Afghanistan during the early 1950s. The US foreign policy during the Dulles era of early 1950s led to the negligence of Afghanistan and the latter had to meet its defence requirements by procuring arms mainly from the Soviet Union. The consequential impact of these developments was the augmentation of Soviet influence in Afghanistan. During 1956-57, United States provided economic and technical assistance worth $14.4 million to Afghanistan.

The chapter further proceeds to analyse the impact of Prime Minister Daud's visit to the United States in late June and early July 1958, on Afghan-US relations. The US Government evinced interest in the development of Afghan civil aviation, the Helmand Valley, surface transportation projects etc. In
December 1959, the US President Eisenhower, paid a short visit to Afghanistan and exchanged views on bilateral issues with Afghan leaders.

Subsequently in early September 1963, the Afghan King, Zahir Shah, visited the United States. Afghanistan was assured of US economic assistance to help develop Afghan economy. The United States praised Afghanistan’s pursuit of the policy of nonalignment. During March-April 1967, the Afghan Premier Mohammad Hashim Mainwandwal visited the United States. The Afghan Premier exchanged views on regional and global issues with the US leaders and the latter appreciated Afghanistan’s steadfast commitment to the policy of nonalignment. In July 1967, both countries concluded an agreement for the sale of agricultural commodities.

In early January 1970, the then US Vice President, Spiro Agnew visited Afghanistan. The US Vice President said that his country was interested in the overall development of Afghanistan. He also assured Afghan leaders of continued US support.

The fourth chapter further analyses the visit of US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to Afghanistan in November 1974 and its impact on Afghan-US relations. Both the leaders while sharing the identical views on global issues reiterated their determination to further consolidate the bonds of friendly relations between the two countries. In early August 1976, Henry Kissinger again visited Afghanistan and held discussions on bilateral and global issues with the Afghan leaders. The US Secretary of State reiterated his government’s desire to participate closely in Afghanistan’s economic development. The fourth chapter finally concludes that the pattern of Afghan-US
relations remained friendly until April 1978 when the Soviet-backed communist coup was staged in Kabul.

The fifth chapter critically examines the advent of Soviet-backed communist regime in April 1978. Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 and the international response to get the Soviet aggression vacated. The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) with the Soviet-backing seized power in Kabul on 27 April 1978 by overthrowing the government headed by Sardar Mohammad Daoud. Noor Mohammad Taraki became the new Prime Minister of Afghanistan and Hafizullah Amin and Babrak Karmal were two other most prominent leaders. The pronouncements made by the Taraki regime in early May 1978 had made it evident that the post-coup Kabul was toeing pro-Moscow line in the realm of foreign affairs.

The chapter further analyses the attitude of United States to the Taraki regime. There was no immediate response by the United States to the April 1978 coup in Kabul. The media in the US reacted very sharply to developments in Kabul but there was no official US reaction.

The Soviet response to Taraki regime was very encouraging. On 3 May 1978, Moscow recognized the new regime in Kabul. The pronouncements made by Moscow and Kabul showed the mutual desire of both countries to forge close relations. In early December 1978, Kabul and Moscow signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation. Under this treaty, though Moscow was not bound to prevent the downfall of the new communist regime in Afghanistan, it was already preparing the possibility of saving it from failure and keeping that country under Soviet influence even by force if needed.
On 14 February 1979, the US Ambassador in Kabul Adolph Dubs, was assassinated by some unidentified persons. The communist regime in Kabul held its opponents responsible for Dubs' assassination while the Western and US media blamed the Taraki regime. This incident led to the deterioration in Afghan-US relations and by August 1979, Washington suspended all economic and technical assistance to Kabul.

In September 1979, Hafizullah Amin assumed the reins of power following Taraki's ouster. Both Soviet leaders as well as Amin had harboured distrust towards each other since the emergence of Amin at the helm of affairs. Amin also served Soviet interests. There was no change in US policy when Hafizullah Amin assumed the reins of power in Kabul. Though overtly, Amin tried to convince the United States of his desire to improve the relations while he continued pushing Afghanistan into Soviet orbit. The United States expressed concern over the violation of human rights in Afghanistan.

The chapter further proceeds to analyse the developments leading to Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on 28 December 1979. The Soviet forces in tens of thousands invaded Afghanistan in December end 1979 and help install Babrak Karmal as the new head of communist regime in Kabul. The Soviet media justified Soviet military aggression of Afghanistan on the plea that the Afghan Government "requested" Moscow to send their armed forces and the latter complied it. The emergence of Karmal regime backed by Soviet forces pushed Afghanistan into Soviet orbit and its nonaligned status was completely undermined.

The chapter than proceeds to analyse the US response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. During the first few days
preceding the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Washington watched with keen interest the Afghan developments. It was during the first week of January 1980, the Carter Administration swung into action to oppose and criticise Moscow for its military adventures in Kabul. On 4 January 1980, the Carter Administration imposed some sanctions against Soviet Union which included blockade of supply of US grains to Moscow; stopping of sale of high technology and boycott of the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow. The United States implemented these sanctions but its other allies were reluctant. However the Soviet media was critical of US sanctions. The Carter Administration called upon the Soviet Union to vacate its aggression from Afghanistan.

Following the advent of Reagan Administration in Washington in 1981, the US policy toward Soviet Union on the issue of Afghanistan became more critical and practical. The main elements of President Reagan's policy towards Afghan crisis included humanitarian assistance to the Afghan refugees seeking shelter in Pakistan, diplomatic support for a political settlement along the lines of the United Nations Resolution and the resolutions passed by the Islamic Conference and Nonaligned Summit Conference. The chapter also presents a detailed analysis of the pronouncements made by the US representatives in the UN General Assembly, Senators and Congressmen and the media on Afghan crisis. The US President has designed 21 March as "Afghanistan Day" to express the solidarity of the United States with the people of Afghanistan in their just struggle against Soviet invasion. The US support has been instrumental in boosting the morale of Afghan freedom fighters.
The chapter further analyses the response of the United Nations to Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In early January 1980, a six-power draft resolution was introduced in the UN Security Council. The resolution avoided "condemnation" of Soviet military adventure in Afghanistan and called "for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan". However the Soviet Union vetoed it and consequently the question of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan came up before the UN General Assembly. The draft resolution on Afghanistan was adopted by the General Assembly with overwhelming majority on 14 January 1980 with 104 in favour, 18 against and with 18 abstentions. The resolution deplored the armed intervention into Afghanistan as inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the UN Charter and called for the immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of foreign troops. Again on 20 November 1980, the General Assembly adopted another resolution was was mild in its criticism of armed intervention into Afghanistan. The chapter makes as assessment of these resolutions passed by the General Assembly on Afghanistan and finds them similar in contents on which Soviet Union has not cared to think.

The chapter also examines the Geneva Talks on Afghanistan which came into the offing in June 1982 in pursuance of the resolutions passed by the General Assembly. The UN Secretary General deputed his Special Representative to hold proximity talks with the Afghan Government, Pakistan and Iran to find out means for defusing the Afghan crisis. The Special Representative has held various rounds of talks with the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan while Iran has preferred to be kept
informed. The Geneva talks have veered round four main points -- withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan, non-interference in the internal affairs of states; international guarantees of non-interference; and voluntary return of Afghan refugees to their homes. There has been no outcome of Geneva talks as yet.

The chapter further proceeds to analyse the response of the Organization of Islamic Conference to Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The extraordinary session of the Foreign Ministers of the OIC in its session held in January end 1980 at Islamabad (Pakistan) condemned Soviet Union by name for invading Afghanistan and called for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Soviet troops stationed in Afghanistan. Besides, the Conference also suspended the membership of Afghanistan. However the subsequent resolutions passed by the OIC on Afghanistan issue failed to mention Soviet Union by name but called for the unconditional withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

The response of the European Economic Community (EEC) to Soviet invasion in Afghanistan is also analysed in this chapter. The EEC in its various resolutions passed since 1980 has expressed grave concern over the military operations by Soviet troops in Afghanistan and has called for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and restoration of latter's nonaligned and independent status.

The chapter finally makes an assessment of the response of the nonaligned movement (NAM) to Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the nonaligned countries held in February 1981 at New Delhi expressed concern over developments in Afghanistan and called for the withdrawal of
"foreign troops" from Afghanistan. The similar stance has been reiterated by the seventh NAM summit held in 1983 at New Delhi and the eighth NAM summit held in 1986 at Harare (Zimbabwe).

The final chapter of the present study is in the form of conclusion which critically examines the present state of affairs prevailing in Afghanistan in the wake of the continued presence of hundreds of thousands of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and the struggle waged by the Afghan freedom fighters to liberate their homeland from Soviet occupation. The Soviet Union being a super power and the founding member of the United Nations owns a special responsibility in maintaining international peace and security. But the unprovoked and unwarranted invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet Union is in utter violation of the existing norms and practices of the international law and the provisions of the UN Charter.

The study suggests that the resolutions passed by the UN General Assembly should strongly condemn the Soviet Union by name as an aggressor and ensure the complete, immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Soviet military and civilian personnel from Afghanistan. Besides, the nonaligned, independent and sovereign status of Afghanistan should be restored. It further observes that the Geneva talks are a futile exercise because neither of the belligerents -- Soviet Union as an invader and Afghan Mujahideen as defender are party to it. Thus it suggests the participation of the Afghan Mujahideen as the sole legitimate representative of the people of Afghanistan in the UN General Assembly and Geneva talks in order to facilitate an acceptable
solution of the Afghan problem. The study also calls upon the EEC, Organization of Islamic Conference, NAM and other international organizations to amend their resolutions on Afghanistan by strongly condemning the Soviet Union by name as an invader and call for the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of Soviet military and civilian personnel from Afghanistan. The study also suggests that the United States, another super power should impose strict economic, diplomatic and political sanctions against the Soviet Union to compel the latter to vacate the invasion.

It has also suggested the various resistance groups of Afghan freedom fighters to close their ranks and forge unity. The study further makes the suggestion that the member countries of the NAM, Islamic Community and the United Nations should suggest and support the holding of an international conference on Afghanistan in which all the permanent members of the Security Council and the representatives of all the political parties of Afghanistan, including the Communist Party of Afghanistan as a political party, should be invited to find a political solution of Afghan problem. The study finally suggests the formation of "Afghan Government in exile" which should be recognized by the freedom loving people of the world. Unless the political solution to Afghanistan problem is had, the Government in exile should work as the true representative of the people of Afghanistan.