INTRODUCTION

The significance of Latin American politics after the overthrow of the U.S.-backed Batista dictatorship in Cuba by a communist revolution in 1959, had acquired a global importance and gradually involved the interests of the Super Powers. Beside, during the 70s Latin American States, which initially accepted the big brotherly position of the United States, began to challenge U.S. status in the region and asserted their own individual national position. Obviously, the changing pattern of political balance in Latin America threatened to undermine the U.S. hegemony and posed a threat to its so-called "security interests."

In the history of Latin America, the United States rarely hesitated to intervene, overtly or covertly, in Latin American affairs. Specifically, the first cold war exposed that the major concern of the U.S. in Latin America has been to prevent Soviet Union from gaining foothold in the region. The U.S. policy-makers, therefore, always sought pro-Washington governments in the Western Hemisphere. They seemed determined to go to any extent in assisting such regimes which, obviously, might involve the greatest risks, i.e., Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. The Latin American affairs after the 1960s have signalled that the opposition to the U.S. "big-stick policy"
would get intensified and the countries of the region would get more and more radicalised.

In the cold, war, Washington was to be especially sensitive to the Communist influence in the hemisphere, and receptive to the complaints of private U.S. interests affected by socialist reforms. U.S. Administrations had been anxious to prevent consolidation of an "unreliable" government in Latin America, having the belief that it could roll back communism somewhere and, therefore, helped bring about its overthrow with all necessary means.

The successive U.S. Administrations used to rely in this perspective, too much on the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) which used to bring out assassinations, destabilisations, propaganda and proxy wars in pursuance of the camouflaged U.S. "gunboat policy." CIA covert action is being practised with deadly efficiency and cold ruthlessness, i.e. in Chile during 1970-73, to thwart the nationalist aspirations of the regimes. Allende's bold moves such as the proposed land reform measure, and nationalisation of the copper mines faced a political battle with the US.

Between 1945 and 1958, the year, the time span of the present study begins, the U.S. Administration saw no threat serious enough to demand fundamental change in
its Latin American policy. From the U.S. point of view, events in Latin America were under control. However, the political radicalisation in Guatemala, which the U.S. government branded as a stalking horse for Soviet penetration, could be easily eliminated in 1954 by an expensive CIA-engineered coup.

The scene changed in 1959. The Cuban Revolution loomed as a dangerous threat to American policy-makers. By the end of 1960 another CIA sponsored intervention in Cuba was in preparation. The Bay of Pigs fiasco in 1961, and Castro's turn toward Soviet protection, accelerated a fundamental rethinking of the U.S. Latin American policy which had begun in the final months of Eisenhower's presidency.

The end of the 1950s had seen the emergency of new regimes in Cuba, Argentina, Peru and Venezuela, while the beginning of 1970s witnessed the emergence of a democratically elected Salvador Allende government in Chile. These regimes wanted to show that representative governments could achieve economic growth and fundamental social reforms, and thereby make democracy seem legitimate to their masses. But, U.S. policy of the 1960s and early 1970s dealt harshly with democracy in Latin America. In fact, its calculations were severely influenced by political development in Cuba.

The year 1978 is regarded for the outbreak of the second Cold War. This was the year in which variegated and stirring political events happened. The deployment of Cuban troops, for instance, in Ethiopia in 1978, and introduction
of Soviet troops in Afghanistan strained the super-power relations. The year 1978 also witnessed the artful total exclusion of Soviet Union by the United States from the camp David agreement. The cancellation of talks between the Big-Two on the Indian ocean issues, and on conventional arms transfers initiated by President Carter also signalled the future challenges that the whole world could face.

The Soviet Union by 1974-75 was expected in the White House not to challenge the US status-quo. The People's Republic of China had moved away from its communist counterpart. The Pentagon was assuming a Sino-Soviet Conflict. The Camp David accord was considered the US victory. The US rich assistance had been proved conducive to good health for Iran and Saudi Arabia, the two oil giants with the Soviet "sphere of influence". The United States still had technological superiority in nuclear arsenals. The US was anxious and ambitious to preserve the status quo in international system. This was the period, to recall, Salvador Allende was eliminated by CIA - backed putsch.

Thus, the turbulence in the developing world including Latin American continent, can not be or should not be considered always of Soviet making. The US hostile actions towards the leftist and nationalist regimes in Latin America had been responsible enough to open up opportunity for the
Soviet Union to extend its reach in the hemisphere. The Latin American governments had been indicating this fact to the U.S. Administrations. The U.S. policy in Central America appeared to be proving the same opportunity. However developments in the Caribbean in the early 1960, had left the U.S. with a determination to have 'no more Cubas'.

The traditional view of US interests in Central America and the Caribbean emphasizes a litany of security, economic and political interests. Historically, primacy had always been given to U.S. security interests, inhibiting direct military threats to the U.S., its military assets in the region as well, safeguarding vital maritime routes and ensuring U.S. access to strategic raw materials. The Caribbean is a part of the southern border of the United States, whose involvement in the Basin, in fact, is perceived not as a matter of choice but of necessity. This, new cold was era has reached at the doorstep of Central American region.

The Current U.S. obsession in Central America and the Caribbean is to defeat all challenges to the American hegemony that particularly emerged with the second cold war, in Nicaragua and El Salvador in 1979. The Central American politics has been simmering for a long time but now it seems to be coming to a boil. Nicaragua, Honduras, and El Salvador which geographically form the heart of Central America have become the centre of a political turbulence. The Administration feels that vital U.S. interests are at stake in the
Central America is in the U.S. "front-yard" and its region.

torn by civil wars, revolutions, military dictatorships, and pronunciamento's. Reagan believing his predecessor's policies "soft" toward" Soviet expansionism" and Cuba's support for "terrorism" which allegedly threatens the vital interests and security of the United States, embarked on a "tough policy" and thus once again emphasized more subtle methods toward interventionist direction. The Reagan Administration is carrying on an undeclared and clandestine war to throwout the leftwing Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. El Salvador is also in turmoil because of a running feud between the right and the left. The US insisted on presenting Central American problems like an East-West conflicts, whereas Nicaragua consider it North-South one. There is a temptation in Washington to pin the blame for the widespread opposition to the U.S. policies on leftist groups and organisation a part of their cold war strategy. The Americans are standing on some rather shaky political ground in El Salvador. Domestic violence is already at a level unprecedented in the country's history. More violence, therefore seem on the cards. More than 30,000 civilians have been killed in country's long-smoldering guerilla war between El Salvador's civilian-military government backed by the U.S. and about 6,000 Marxist led guerillas. Washington, however charges the guerillas are being supplied
with arms from nearly Nicaragua and from Cuba. Any guerilla victory, the Administration fears, would accelerate Soviet sponsored subversion throughout Central America. But, it looked as if the Reagan Administration was going to have a fight a war of its own. Indeed, in Washington the most extreme Critics of the Administration's policy are likening the growing US role in El Salvador to the early stages of U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

It seems that the Soviet Trojan horse theory is invented by Reagan Administration to lend intellectual credibility to the game the name of which is power. The bet is that Mr. George Bush, Republican presidential candidate, will win the American presidency. If it happens, one should not expect any major transformation in U.S. policy from the present course.

Factually, an objective analyses of the events shows that Latin Americans were flowing with their own nationalist ideals and ideas following the worldwide rapid industrialisation which gradually intensified more in the preceding years of the post second world war. The interests of Latin America were initially believed to be the interests of the United States. But later, in the consequence of growing nationalism, speedy industrialisation outside the western hemisphere and inventions of scientific utilisation of raw materials to bring internal development created tidal wave of desire and
ambitions in the entire region, to gain national control over economy and to innovate greater technological know-how in order to accelerate overall national development.

The U.S. policy-makers could not morally recognise nor adjust themselves with these nationalist sentiments which were forcefully dissolved in the Latin American mainstream. The U.S. itself, therefore, involved responsibility somewhere, in compatible conflicts which had taken place between her and Latin Americans with different shapes and colours. Basically, U.S. obstinacy and persistent attempts to carry on her hegemony and dominance in Latin America in trade and foreign investment making all possible efforts to suppress nationalist resentment in the region stood behind all these vexations. The rhetoric of nationalist passions in Latin America and U.S. tough postures in response to these may be disclosed more explicitly if we see the Latin American affairs since the Cuban Revolution in 1959.

In addition, economic development is promoted by the United States as a means for anxiously seeking outlets for its economic surplus. The U.S. has exploited growing interdependence of U.S. and the Latin American nations in economic and technical fields according to its own national and corporate interests. But, economic nationalism, diversification and regional co-operation, and demands for a new international
economic order, reflected resentment of U.S. economic policy in Latin America, the global upsurge in "North-South" demands and increasing external economic problems. All aimed at, obviously, changing the level or nature of U.S. economic influence. Panama's demands for sovereignty over the Canal were the best example of a rising Latin American nationalism.

The present work is confined to the case study of the following distinctive political upheavals which took place in Cuba, Chile, Peru, Argentina, El Salvador and Nicaragua within a specific time span-1958 to 1982, following the Cuban revolution and directly affects the U.S. Latin American policy:

(1) In 1970, a socialist and Marxist President emerged in Chile for the first time through the ballot box in the Latin American history. The same was forced only to die just after three years by a military putsch assisted and instigated by the CIA.

The new military regime led by General Pinochet, was not only quickly recognised by the United States but provided massive financial and military aid by the U.S.
(2) The U.S. Administration designed its policy towards Chile regional perspective too. Because, at that time, Ecuadorian, and Guyanese regimes also nationalised some U.S. owned multilateral corporations. Both the regimes started resisting U.S. imposed free-enterprise system. Like Chile, there was a consistent pattern in the U.S. attitude of active involvement, in support of Ur. economic and political interests, utilising loans, credits, subsidies, and military programmes, in Ecuador and Guyana. The U.S. had effective power in all of the international financial institutions upon which Ecuador and Guyana were dependent for credits and long-term financing. The U.S. government fully exploited its influence in these institutions in order to safeguard its super-power interests in Ecuador and Guyana, similarly as it did in Chile.

(3) Argentina, a biggest neighbour of Chile and one of the most industrialised nations of the region, experienced a wave of military coup and subsequently faced great political instability during first half of the 1970s. Consequently, the country witnessed the re-emergence of Juan Peron, an exceptionally wise military General, a nationalist with his own unique characteristics and an open opponent of US leadership in the region.
In 1972, U.S. backed Jose Napoleon Duarte was elected President of El Salvador by a narrow margin against the leftist candidate. In 1979, a coup occurred in El Salvador which pushed the traditional rightist rulers of El Salvador out of office, and established a coalition of army officers and members of the Centrist Christian Democratic Party. Duarte was installed as the President of the civilian-military government. The United States quickly and actively supported Duarte regime through massive arms shipments and rich economic assistance. As a result, the civil war in El Salvador began badly between leftist guerillas and the United states supported armed forces of the rightist regime.

After the 46 years of suffering inflicted by the corrupt Somoza dynasty, socialist oriented Sandinistas captured power in Nicaragua in 1979. Cuba is a perpetual embarrassment for the United States, and Nicaragua, if it consolidates itself, would clearly be another, the U.S. decision makers assume. Cuba's alleged arms supply to the Sandinistas and the leftist Salvadoran insurgents heightened U.S. concern in Central America and the Caribbean region.

The main focus of present study is on the political and motivational bases of the US policy toward Latin America. It has been the purpose of this study to bring out:

(i) immediate as well as permanent political and economic U.S. interests in Latin America, and to point out, (ii) the particular internal system of economy with strong political
ideas in Latin American nations which led to the establishment of their friendly and fruitful relations with the U.S., as well as, turned hostile to the U.S. eventually leading to an antagonism in bilateral relations.

The present work is organised around three hypotheses:

(1) The US Administration always attempted to check the expansion of the area under the dominance of leftist or communist regimes by various means, including the maintenance of the military and economic strength of the United States and its allies.

(2) The United States policy which claims and attempts to create and maintain a community of interests between itself and the developing nations of the Latin America has proved a failure.

(3) Latin American's nationalist challenge to U.S. dominance in their socio-economic structure has always been categorised by the United States as pro-communist and subsequently conceived as a threat to U.S. security. Such pre-conceived perceptions have also been responsible for the emergence and expansion of communism in the Western Hemisphere.

In other words, the more the U.S. identified itself with reactionary or the rightist regimes in Latin America the more it contributed to emergence of socialist influence in the popular nationalist movements.
The turns and twists of international affairs are difficult to analyse. The present study believes that foreign policy, in practice, rarely corresponds fully to broad statements of aim and principle, for it must be based also on calculations of national interest in the specific circumstances in which decisions are made and actions taken.

It has been emphasised in this work that the combination of great power and expansionist ambitions represent by the United States and the Soviet Union pose the threat that this massive agglomeration of power would continue to expand in international politics and threaten the security of developing nations.

The study covers two and a one fourth decades of the history of U.S. policy toward Latin America to find out the consistent dimensions of U.S. policy vis-a-vis with Latin America. It carefully selected at least one major political happening from each decade which not only encircled the United States and Latin America as a whole but deeply touched the process of U.S. policy formulations in Latin America. For instance, the 1960s begins with the sensational emergence of Marxist Cuba under the leadership of Fidel Castro, the 1970s with exciting emergence of Socialist regime in Chile led by Allende, and the 1980s with alarming Central American tangle which severely gripped El Salvador and Nicaragua.
The study begins with a brief description of the historical background of U.S. policy toward Latin America. Chapter I examines the Castro's seizure of power in Cuba in 1959 which brought the country in Soviet orbit and its implications on U.S. policy considerations in Latin America. The discussion highlights Latin American's determination to shape the course of its own world which began to gather during the 1960s. The chapter also introduces the US policy response to the emergence of democratically elected socialist regime in Chile and unstable political environment in Argentina during the first half of 1970s.

Chapter II inquires the U.S. interest and involvement in Chile's presidential elections in 1964 and in 1970. The US policy had been prompted to prefer an anti-leftist government in Latin America and to prevent a subsequent socialist regime in the region. The Chilean affairs (later in El Salvador) exposes this fact. The political situation in Chile after the emergence of socialist regime in Chile was of strategic significance for the United States. Allende successfully overcame the initial threats and created a new wave of nationalism in Chile by expropriating foreign assets. The Chapter briefly indicates the trouble which the US policy could create in Chile.

Chapter III deals with the main features of U.S. policy toward socialist Chile under Allende presidency which determined the economic relationship between Chile and the United
States and provided a definite shape to American strategy against Allende regime. The US policy was a ruthless warfare against the nationalist measures taken by Allende regime in order to maintain U.S. hegemony over Latin America. The U.S. policy makers drove bilateral economic relations toward deep depressions in Chile and maintained as well close links with Chilean military.

Chapter IV further analyses US policy which successfully destabilised Allende regime through massive military aid to Chilean armed forces and financial assistance to the opponents of the socialist regime. CIA played an active and subversive role. Finally, Chilean armed forces took over Chilean political system in their hands. The US policy reversed entirely.

The U.S. policy-makers affection for the military regime in order to create a dependency syndrome by a process of development through foreign aid and multilateral collaboration is discussed with Argentina and El Salvador.

The United States gradually penetrated its capital into Argentine economic structure through client military regime. Chapter V deals with the US policy postures in Argentina which did face few setbacks during the Campora and Peron regimes. However, frequent revolution could not pose any serious threat to US interest in Argentina.
A separate chapter has been devoted to the economic, political and social factors in Central American politics. Central America and the Caribbean is the region of vital concern to the United States. The U.S. policy-maker assume that America's long-range interests would be harmed by continuing indifference to the mounting desire in Central America for greater social justice, as our indifference will only make it easier for Castro's Cuba to exploit that desire. The US policy, therefore, is concerned to avert immediate external destabilisation by strengthening the internal security of reliable regime in the area, i.e. El Salvador. It, thus, recognises the role of army in domestic affairs. The chapter deals with the long standing policy thrusts of the United States in Central America especially under Carter and Reagan Administration.

Chapter VII deals with the U.S. policy in El Salvador which is based on domino theory. El Salvador lives under an unbearable dictatorial US-backed oligarchy which is at war with Marxist insurgents.

The United States believes that socialist-oriented Sandinista regime in Nicaragua who overthrew the 46-year old entrenched Somoza dynasty in 1979, is assisting militarily the Salvadorean insurgents. However, the U.S. backed Contra rebels also are fighting with the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. Chapter VIII attempts to explain the US goals in Central America in General and in Nicaragua in particular which is aimed at overthrowing
the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua.

The last chapter is devoted to drawing the conclusion. A prologue is inserted after that which denotes the political happenings which have taken place in Latin America after 1982 and must be relevant to the present field of study. The study closes with a Bibliography.

In fact, immense wealth, power, and policies predicted on national self-interest established U.S. hegemony in Latin America. However, a consensus is yet to be achieved in the region that the right of all the Latin American countries to live in peace and to decide their own future, free from outside interference may be universally recognised. The rallying of Latin America around the Cantadora group was an evidence of the growing political consciousness among the regional states to settle the disputes independent of the United States. In fact, the desire of the Latin Americans to deal on their own with the situation in Central America was engendered by the crisis of the Inter-American system which was eloquently corroborated during the conflict between Britain and Argentina over the Falkland Islands.

The United States has endeavoured sometimes with success, to stifle the revolution in Cuba and legitimate Allende government in Chile; to pressurise Peruvian solidarity campaign, to quash the revolutionary movement in El Salvador,
to suffocate socialist movement in Nicaragua; and to fortify its military springboard in the region. But, the study believes that the regional or international stability must rest on mutual respect and co-operation, respect for every nations' right to shape its destiny as it thinks fit.