Security, essentially a negative term, implies the absence of real or perceived threats whether stemming from external sources or internal troubles. One of the main roots of conflict in the region is the incomplete demarcation of state boundaries. In accord with the fundamentals of the political structure of the modern world the state asserts jurisdiction over all within its borders, but the nation on which it is based and derives its legitimacy is neither likely to be wholly confined within the state frontiers not to have its state domain all to itself. In


the post world war II era, with the decolonisation, groups with common language ethnicity or religion found themselves in different countries. The separation created an irrendentist/anti-irrendentist struggle between neighbouring post-colonial states and ultimately led to war between them. Thus, the post-colonial readjustment of boundaries following decolonisation transformed the international system and introduced a new source of war. The regional roots of conflict in South Asia can be classified into two broad categories not completely unrelated to each other. They are: (i) the legacies of colonial rule and (ii) the post-independence strategies and processes of nation and state-building. In the first category, three of the colonial legacies stand out prominently, namely, the creation of an unnatural and absurd state system; incomplete demarcation of state boundaries; and the unresolved question of the status of ethnic and religious minorities of one country of origin present in another. This chapter deals with the issues regarding borders, mainly India-China and India-Pakistan.


A. **SINO-INDIAN BORDER ISSUE:**

India and China, the two biggest countries of Asia, had no doubt came into contact with each other since very old times. They were assumed to be models of coexistence. They had cultural contacts, trade relations and commercial ties. India had complete faith in the Chinese proclamation of 'Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai', which later proved hollow. It was realised that the much talked about century old Sino-Indian amity was nothing but a myth.

India being its adjacent neighbour has a common border with China, hence the dispute over the same. The era of Sino-Indian friendship commences with the signing of the Treaty of 1954, which outlined a set pattern of friendly relations, the famous five principles termed as Panchsheel. The preamble of the Treaty declared these 5 principles, as:

1. Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty;
2. Mutual non-aggression;
3. Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs;
4. Equality and mutual benefit;
5. Peaceful coexistence.

---

Through these principles both the states pledged to live in peace, enlarge the area of peace and work on anti-colonial lines. But very soon it was realised in the Indian parliament that the Chinese assurances of their faith in the Panchsheel, lulled India into a false sense of security. In 1961, these doctrines appeared sham and dead as dodo to the Chinese.

THE Mc MAHDN Line and the Simla Conference:

The North-eastern border of India that demarcates the territories of India and China, is traditionally known as the Mc Mahon Line. It was clearly drawn in 1913-14, with full cooperation and consent of India, China and Tibet. There was no doubt that the Mc Mahon Line (so called after Mc Mahon, The British representative at the conference) merely confirmed the natural, traditional, ethnic and administrative boundary in the area. No boundary in the world has been so well established by tradition, so free from dispute and administration, as the Sino-Indian boundary. But the Chinese have deliberately challenged

11. The Indian Express, 2 December 1961.
the legality of border settlement through this customary line. The first attempt, by the Chinese to open the question of the delimitation of Sino-Indian boundary was made in 1959 by Chou-En-Lai. He gave certain justifications to undo the already negotiated border. While Indian Government maintained that the Mc Mahon Line was absolute, clear and infragile.

In the meantime, the political situation in Tibet was fast deteriorating. In March 1959, the Dalai Lama along with his party entered India and asked for political asylum, which was subsequently granted to him. This greatly enraged China and in retaliation, Chou-En-Lai challenged the entire basis of the Mc Mahon Line. He argued that this matter was not on the agenda of the Simla Conference of 1913-1914. Through a letter, he laid claims to large portions of Indian territory, but the Chinese logic in challenging the legality of the line was both factually incorrect and legally irrelevant. The Chinese contention was:

1) Taking advantage of the instability in China's political situation after 1911, the British intended to separate Tibet from China and to bring Tibet under British control in the name of Tibetan autonomy.

16. Ibid., p. 164.
The question of the Sino-Indian boundary was not discussed at all at the Simla Conference, but only the boundary line between, Inner Tibet and Outer Tibet.

The Simla Conference of 1914 was not binding on the Chinese Government, as it had declined to recognise any treaty that might be signed between Britain and Tibet.

This stand of Chinese Government was however, regretted by Nehru in his letter to Chou-En-Lai on September 26, 1959. India's counter-arguments were:

(i) The tripartite conference at Simla had been arranged with the full knowledge and consent of the Chinese government.

(ii) The question of boundary between India and Tibet and between Inner Tibet and Outer Tibet both were discussed at the Conference.

(iii) The 1914 convention was accepted by the Chinese, though it refused to sign on the final document.

The British Government described the Simla Conference as an attempt to mend relations between China and Tibet. The Government explained it in the Parliament that Great Britain played the role

of the honest broker. The Chinese claim branding the Treaty as based on legal myths was groundless. Nehru very confidently assured the Lok Sabha that the Mc Mahon Line was our boundary. India would not allow anybody to come across it. Sino-Indian differences arose soon after the conclusion of the Agreement of 1954. The years between 1957-60 were marked by the eruption of the Tibetan Revolt, the arrival of the Dalai Lama to India and the first incidents that occurred along the Sino-Indian border. These border incidents were at Longju in North East Frontier Agency in August and in Ladakh in October 1959. On 25 August 1959, Indian and Chinese forces clashed over possession of Longju, a small village in the eastern sector. India said it was on the Mc Mahon Line and, therefore, India's. The Chinese said it was two miles north of it and, therefore, China's. The Chinese said it was on October 20, the same year, Aksai Chin was ambushed by the Chinese. This preliminary phase of the boundary dispute with China terminated with Chou-En-Lai's meeting with Nehru in 1959. It provided a severe testing ground for Panchsheel, the five principles of peaceful co-existence which India advocated as an


original Asian contribution to international relations.

The change in Sino-Indian relations since 1959, resulting from the Chinese suppression of the revolt in Tibet and the Chinese moves along India's Himalayan frontiers, had been a source of greater concern to India. The Sino-Indian border, was generally unguarded. The area was remote and inaccessible to both India and China. In 1959, the Chinese claimed large areas in the NEFA, several small pockets to territory west of Nepal, and Aksai Chin plateau in Ladakh. These areas were referred to as Eastern, Middle and Western sectors respectively. In the Eastern sector, India claimed its areas in NEFA on the basis of the McMahon Line as defined by the Simla Conference. In the Middle Sector, the places of dispute between the two countries cover the area of 20,000 square kilometres. In the western sector, the traditional boundaries of Ladakh were included. China claimed that only a customary and traditional border line existed and the border had never been defined by treaty or negotiation. India maintained that a frontier existed which had been established by custom, tradition and treaty. The traditional line as recognised by China, differed from the frontiers claimed by India. It was the area

23. Ibid.

between these two lines which was in dispute. In 1958, it was noticed that the Chinese had constructed a 100 miles road, connecting Sinkiang with Tibet. However, Nehru and Cao En-Lai agreed to settle minor differences through negotiations.

The next phase which started from July 1958 to March 1959 caused concern as the clashes renewed. Despite the Indian Government's demand to change the maps, published by China in 1957, which India called as 'cartographical' aggression, the Chinese Government refused to do so on the ground that she had not as yet conducted the survey. This period was responsible for the emergence of strains in Sino-Indian relations. There were rare gestures of good-will but only the reciprocal charges of attack and counter-attack. The preliminary phase of border aggression can be categorised in three stages. During the first phase, the aim of the Chinese diplomacy was to win India's friendship and get Chinese claims. During the second phase, China established its military posts in the unguarded Indian territory taking the advantage of India's faith in peaceful northern borders. In the third phase, the Chinese levelled violent accusations against India and occupied Ladakh. Their first conquest enhanced

25. Ibid., p. 38.
27. Pathak, Suniti Kumar, op.cit., p. 176.
28. The Times of India, 10 June 1962.
their territorial appetite.

**CHINESE ATTACK OF 1962:**

On the surface it was all Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai and Panchsheel philosophy, but underneath was the realisation that the titles to large tracts of territory under the control of both parties were under dispute. The relations had deteriorated since the rebellion in Tibet. The Chinese refusal to recognise the McMahon Line and the Government of India's granting of Political asylum to the Dalai Lama added the fuel to the fire. Events moved fast after 1959 and reached a climax in October 1962 with the Chinese invasion of India. These developments were not concerned only with the boundary question but were motivated by many other factors - ideological differences, Chinese militancy, Chinese suspicion of western designs and India's asylum to Dalai Lama and sympathy for the Tibetans. Three years after the attack on the Kongka Pass in Ladakh, China launched a massive attack in the North East Frontier Agency on October 20, 1962, and took possession of large chunk of Indian territory. Though subsequently China announced a unilateral cease-fire and withdrew its forces from certain territories, it continued to be in occupation of vast tracts

---

of Indian territory. They managed to occupy Dhola and openly declared that they are not restrained by the Mc Mahon Line. In the Western Sector also, the Chinese penetrated 15 miles. Many of the Indian outposts were captured by them. India's first reaction was one of sorrow, rather than anger, and it was soon expressed in the harsh tones of a betrayed friend. Nehru said in his historic broadcast on October, 22, 1962,

"Perhaps, there are not many instances in history where one country, that is India, has gone out her way to be friendly and co-operative with the Chinese Government and people to plead their cause in the councils of the world, and therefore, the Chinese Government to return evil for good, and even go to the extent of aggression and invade our sacred land. No self respecting country, and certainly not India with her love of freedom, can submit to this, whatever the consequences may be."

India saw at China as a menace to the neighbouring countries, and declared that "the Panchsheel doctrine is extinct." Till November 18, 1962, the Chinese launched their stronghold at Nathula, where

major Sino-India war was fought. Nathula had strategic importance as it formed the gateway between India and China. After an ominous lull at Ladakh and NEFA, on November 22, 1962, the Chinese Government offered a ceasefire proposal to India, thereby ending the 33 days war. Till November 25, the Government of India did not accept the Chinese cease-fire proposal as acceptance of such a proposal would amount to acceptance of Chinese control over large chunks of Indian territory in Ladakh and key positions in NEFA.

The Colombo Proposals:

On the initiative of the then Ceylonese Prime Minister Mrs. Bandarnaike and in cooperation with UAR, Ghana, Indonesia and Cambodia, the Colombo Conference was called to bring about a rapprochement between India and China. It was considered to be very significant in international quarters. On the eve of colombo conference on December 10, 1962, the Chinese Government again enquired of India if she was ready to abide by its cease-fire proposal. India, however, replied in the negative. As far as Colombo proposals were concerned, China disagreed with them on two points, one, that both India and China may establish Civilian

37. Sinha, Satyanarayan, *op.cit.* pp. 91-93

posts in the no man's land in Ladakh and the other was that the Indian army may move up to the McMahon Line. India had accepted them without any reservations. The Government of China also rejected the reference of the border dispute with India to the International Court of Justice. They were not in favour of Arbitration and finally had rejected the Colombo Proposals. In 1964, Chou-En-Lai was reported to be ready for opening up direct negotiations with India on the basis of the Colombo Proposals. The Colombo Proposals died a lingering death as neither India nor China had accepted them for reasons of their own. After sometime, normalcy was restored at the borders. Between 1962 and 1969, India and China had a state of relations which can be described as a cold war. The 1973-74 trend in both the quarters is to revise their friendly ties shattered through direct confrontation of 1962. In 1975, China started soft paddling with India. In Calcutta, the Chinese representatives said that the situation is ripe to open a new chapter of relations with India. They displayed their readiness to establish full diplomatic relations which were disrupted since 1962. Wisely, both India and China continued to maintain their diplomatic missions in each other's country at the level of the charge d'affaire. This enabled the upgrading of the two diplomatic missions

to Ambassadorial level in 1976 after a 14-year freeze. Therefore, the process of normalisation of relations continued, even though at a slow pace. The main obstacle in the way of complete normalisation of relations between the two was 'border problem'. In 1979 the then Minister of External Affairs, Atal Behari Vajpayee visited China but had to cut short his visit by a couple of days because of China's invasion of Vietnam. Norwithstanding this, the momentum in Sino-Indian interaction was maintained, and the Chinese Foreign Minister, Huang Hua paid a return visit to New Delhi in 1981. It was then decided that official level talks would be held periodically between the two countries covering the entire gamut of their relations, including the question of the boundary. While substantial progress was made in the economic, social, scientific and cultural areas, there was no real progress registered in resolving the boundary question. The maximum that could be achieved was that both sides agreed to maintain peace and tranquility along the Line of Actual Control, which now constituted the de facto border.

Throughout this period, China had kept open the "package proposal" of Premier Chou-en-Lai, reiterated by the Chinese leader

41. Ibid.
42. Times of India, 29 December 1981.
Deng Xiao-Ping in 1980, which envisaged the boundary settlement on the basis of the existing ground realities, namely, acceptance of the Line of Actual Control. This would have meant conceding to China an area of 14,000 square miles in Aksai Chin, in return for which the Chinese were prepared to accept the Mc Mahon Line in the Eastern Sector, with minor modifications. This had been found unacceptable by India. The leaders of two countries showed their eagerness to improve relations on a number of occasions, but could not succeed on account of their inability to arrive at any settlement on the border issue. Serious efforts to improve relations between India and China started in 1981 when Huang Hua, Foreign Minister of China, paid visit to India and the two countries agreed to hold discussions on their long standing border disputes. The first round of talks were held at Beijing in December 1981 where the two countries agreed to continue their efforts to resolve the question. Second round of talks was held at New Delhi in May 1982, followed by the Third round in Beijing in January 1983, fourth round in New Delhi in October, 1983 and fifth round in Beijing in September, 1984. In the fifth round, the two sides formulated principles upon which the border dispute would be negotiated on a sector-by-sector


44. The Hindu, 26 September, 1991.
basis. Ultimately towards the close of 1984, the Chinese and Indian teams decided to set aside the procedural aspects which had blocked further progress in the direction of normalisation of relations, and agreed to discuss the substantive aspects of the dispute which clearly indicated that the two countries had come long way in their efforts to solve the problem between them. However, much progress could not be made in improving relations on account of Chinese reported assistance to Pakistan in developing nuclear capability. In November 1985, India and China held the Sixth round of their talks on the vexed issue of their boundary, and concentrated only on matters relating to the eastern sector. This improvement proved short-lived and in June-July 1986, the Chinese intruded approximately seven kms. in the Indian territory in the Somundrong Valley in Arunachal Pradesh. In December 1986 following conferment of statehood on Arunachal Pradesh, the Chinese accused India of violating Chinese territorial integrity and sovereignty and criticised Indian action. The Indian Government, however, described the Chinese protest over Arunachal Pradesh, as a clear interference in her internal affairs. In the same year, i.e. 1986, the Chinese had backtracked on the "package proposal" and insisted that India must make 'concessions' in the

Eastern Sector, in return for which China would be prepared to make "corresponding concession" in the Western Sector, without specifying what these 'concessions' and 'corresponding concessions' were, which they had in mind. India was in no position to concede any Chinese claim in the inhabited area in the Eastern Sector.

A NEW BEGINNING:

After three decades long period of strains and tensions, Rajiv Gandhi, the then Prime Minister of India took an initiative towards a new beginning. He visited China in December 1988. Viewed in the perspective of the changed world scene, in which the set mould of the past few decades was crumbling and a new pattern of international relations was shaping up, Prime Minister's visit to China served a useful purpose. His meeting with Deng Xiaoping was considered to be historical and very significant. The mechanism and framework for both a normalisation of relations and resolution of the obstructive border problem in the form of a joint ministerial commission and a joint working group (J W G) at Secretary level were laid down. The joint working group was charged with two tasks: to ensure tranquility along

46. Venkateshwaran, A.P., op.cit.
the long border and to come up with a new formation for resolving the border problem. The two sides agreed that a border settlement must be fair and equitable for both and should be acceptable to both. An encouraging step in the direction from Chinese side was taken in December 1991, when Chinese Premier, Li Peng visited India. This visit was the first even at that level after 31 years after Chou-En-Lai's visit. The joint communique on Mr. Li Peng's talks with the Indian leaders, issued before his departure spoke of the resolve of the two sides to work for the earliest possible solution to the boundary question. A directive to this effect was given to the Joint Working Group, now engaged in the task of evolving common approaches to the problem. Efforts were to be made for an "early and mutually acceptable solution through friendly negotiations." Soon after Li Peng's visit, the then President of India, R. Venkatraman visited China in early 1992. He had discussions with Chinese leaders. They emphasised the need to resolve the complex border problem in a patient and systematic manner without resorting to violence or use of force and without setting any time-frame, which shows a qualitative change in the Indian stand. The position of India, which initially maintained that there could be no improvement in relations before


the border dispute was resolved, now changed as both India and China stressed the need to improve economic ties between the two nations with the border issue not coming in the way.

So far the Sino-Indian Joint Working Group on the boundary question has held six rounds of talks, some in Beijing and some in Delhi. During the all rounds of talks the focus seems to have been on improving arrangements for maintaining peace along the disputed border. This is a sensible thing to do because the conflicting territorial claims are not likely to be settle in a hurry. Though China has proposed for "mutual understanding and mutual accommodation" implying Chinese acceptance of the boundary in the Eastern sector, with minor alteration, in exchange for Indian acceptance of the Chinese territorial claims in the Western sector, but India has not reacted clearly because of the vagueness of the proposal. Despite all the vagueness, there is no doubt that there is an onward move in the success in maintaining tranquility along the line of Actual Control (LAC) since the joint working groups are working. The series of talks have also revealed a measure of agreement on additional confidence building measures. On the basic and complex border question, India and China are in a position now to think in terms of exploring "derivative principles" at future meetings of the Joint Working

50. Sino-Indian Talks' (Editorial), The Times of India, 3 November 1992.
Group to resolve the border issue. Clearly, the end of the cold war and the imperative need for rapid economic development have had a positive impact on the security perceptions of both China and India.

B. India - Pakistan Border:

The two countries, India and Pakistan, belong to a single geo-political unit. Their territories are interlocked. Pakistan and India, respectively, emerged as separate states on 14th and 15th of August 1947. The actual territorial award prepared by Cyril Radcliffe was an extremely hurried exercise and both India and Pakistan resented the final outcome. If the partition was intended to bring peace to the sub-continent, this will not be achieved until India and Pakistan settle their differences and begin to live together as good neighbours. The main factors which have contributed to the strained relations between the two countries have been disputes over the borders and the question of Kashmir. Kashmir provides a vital access to the strategic area of the north-west. It is rich in mineral, hydro-electric energy and forest wealth. Its territorial, strategic and economic importance and the ideological differences made it the core issue.

51. Towards Greater Trust’ (Editorial), The Hindustan Times, 30 June 1993

of India - Pakistan relations between 1948-1965, and even afterwards. Two months after partition came the invasion of Kashmir by armed tribesmen, aided and abetted by Pakistan's regular army. At the request of the ruler of Kashmir, India sent her troops to assist the ruler in meeting Pakistan's aggression after he signed the Instrument of Accession in favour of India.

The Prime Minister of India, in a letter dated December 23, 1947, requested Pakistan's Prime Minister not to give aid to the raiders and prolong the struggle. But the Pakistan government only repudiated the charge on December 30, 1947. After several months of grim fighting, the Indian armed forces were in a position to stem the advances of the invaders in Kashmir and to push them back. While the fighting was still going on, India lodged a complaint with the UN Secretary General on December 30, 1947, against the invasion of Kashmir by Pakistani raiders. The Security Council appointed a commission to look into the complaint. After studying the situation on the spot, the UN Commission concluded that the presence of Pakistani troops in Jammu and Kashmir was illegal and that it must withdraw its troops and vacate the aggression against India. In 1948, Indian troops under the command

56. Ibid.
of Gen. Thimmayya entered Ladakh via the Zojila pass, beyond Sonamarg in Kashmir, to expel Pakistani raiders from the region. UN Commission had proposed a ceasefire and truce on August 13, 1948. The 15 months gruelling battle ended with the announcement of the ceasefire agreement on January 1, 1949. As a result of the war the northern territories (as much as 5000 sq. miles), now known as Pakistan occupied Kashmir (POK) were occupied by Pakistan. This territory had been used by Pakistan as a base for continued aggression against India ever since.

The UN Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) prescribed a ceasefire line on April 15, 1949, eliminating all noman's lands and based on the sectoral position of the forces in January 1949. Initially, India had agreed to all the proposals including a UN supervised plebiscite. But other condition of resolution such as withdrawal of the Pakistan troops from the area was not fulfilled by Pakistan and UN failed to bring about the necessary conditions for a final decision. Later, India rejected the plebiscite idea. The UN in December 1949 recommended the appointment of a UN Arbitrator. Consequently, Owen Dixon, an Australian jurist was given the task. He could not achieve much success. He came to

59. Kal, B.L., op.cit.
the conclusion that a wholesale plebiscite was neither desirable nor possible. He recommended a compartmental plebiscite, but Pakistan rejected it. In 1951, Security Council appointed Dr. Frank Graham as the UN representative in Kashmir for demilitarisation according to the earlier resolutions. He submitted three reports in 1952 over demilitarization, but India and Pakistan remained non-conciliatory on their attitude over the status of Jammu and Kashmir.

The Kashmir issue was raised again in the UN in 1962 and 1964 by Zafarullah Khan and Z.A. Bhutto, respectively. But both had to return empty handed. Significantly, since 1964, the UN has lost all interests in the dispute for all practical purposes. The Kashmir problem so far has defied all solutions. The two sides do not agree even on the facts of the dispute. Pakistan's contentions are that: India integrated Kashmir by force of arms; Kashmir is a Muslim majority state and, therefore, belongs to Pakistan on the basis of the two nation theory; the ruler signed the instrument of accession against the people's wishes; and India has not honoured its pledge of plebiscite. It was also declared by Jawahar Lal Nehru in constituent Assembly on March 5, 1948, "we would abide by the will of the people of Kashmir ....

60. Subrahmanyam, K., 'Kashmir : Pakistan has no case', The Hindustan Times, March 5, 1990.
60A. Kak. B.L., op.cit, pp. 52-53.
and are prepared to have a plebiscite." Indian contentions are that: Kashmir had traditionally been part and parcel of the British India and acceded to India according to the Act of Independence Act, 1947, and, hence it is legally valid; the constituent Assembly of Kashmir has formally accepted Kashmir's integration with India in 1954; India has held free elections many times to elect Kashmir people's representatives to the Lok Sabha; plebiscite was an assurance to the people of Kashmir and not to Pakistan. Further the pledge was voluntary and unilateral. It was not a part of Instrument of Accession under which the integration was unqualified and final; and the argument of Muslim majority was never accepted to India as she never subscribed to two nation theory.

In October 1962, India and China clashed in a brief but decisive encounter which was to have far-reaching repercussions for the sub-continent. It heralded the era of rapprochement between China and the twin became a consolidated threat to India's security both in the northern and western borders. It left a legacy of heightened suspicion, distrust and increased tension between India and Pakistan. By October 1963, India faced a rapidly


deteriorating state of internal security in Kashmir. The stalemate which had developed between India and Pakistan over Kashmir took the state out of the limelight after Nehru's death, and trouble broke out in a different area along the India-Pakistan border, known as the Rann of Kutch. Fighting occurred in the Rann of Kutch on April 9, 1965, involving infantry, tanks and heavy artillery. Early in February, 1965, Pakistani armed personnel made intrusions south of the boundary between Kutch and Sind, and set up two posts near Kanjarkot. The government of India protested against these intrusions, and demanded that the status quo ante be restored. The then Prime Minister said in May 1965. "Pakistan had invaded and occupied Indian territory by force. Now for them to sit on Indian soil and say that all outstanding matters relating to the Indo-Pakistan border should be discussed first, rounds highly improper." It was true that the exact boundary line dividing the Rann of Kutch had not been drawn. India had agreed in 1960 to discuss the matter with Pakistan and settle it through talks, but rather than adopt that course Pakistan had chosen to mount an attack on India.

Again on 19 May 1965, the Pakistani troops launched a battalion attack on an Indian patrol South-west of Mendhar. Pakistani attack was repulsed vigorously by India. There was a

64. Ibid., pp. 41-42.
sudden flare up on the Kutch-Sind border on the morning of June 15, 1965. This is the second time that Pakistani forces had violated the de facto cease-fire on the Kutch border.

The Rann of Kutch agreement effectively closed that area of dispute between India and Pakistan, not because it was an especially brilliantly conceived document, but because Pakistan did not really have its heart in the claim which it made, and in any case, the Rann was hardly worth quarrelling over for any but political reasons. The long awaited agreement between India and Pakistan for a cease fire in the Rann of Kutch was signed on June 30, 1965. It provides, among other things, for restoration of the status quo as on January 1, 1965, as demanded by India and for the setting up of a three-man tribunal to settle the disputed boundary in the event of no agreement being reached between the Ministers of the two countries. In 1965 itself, Pakistan took recourse what is called the 'Operation Gibraltar'. She sought to wrest Kashmir on the battle field. She was encouraged by the heavy dose of arms assistance from America in 1964-65. There was a large scale infiltration in August 1965. After few days Pakistan mounted a large scale attack on Chamb Jaurian area violating the borders. The Indian Army advanced across the border towards Lahore in self-defence.

This war lasted till 23rd of September 1965. The UN Security Council succeeded in imposing a ceasefire on September 23, 1965 and both sides agreed to withdraw to their positions held prior to August 5, 1965. The war enhanced India's prestige, she regained her self-confidence lost since 1962. But war left a trail of bitterness between the two countries. However, the Soviet leaders played the role of a mediator and a Summit Conference was hosted by the Soviet Union at Tashkent. An agreement was reached known as Tashkent Declaration on January, 1966. This nine-point declaration pledged the two to restore normal and peaceful relations. But the agreement left the Kashmir dispute intact.

From 1965 onwards, the divergence between east and west wings of Pakistan in almost all matters, including that of foreign policy, increased at a greater rate. In the beginning of August 1970, the tension on the Indo-Pak border mounted again. This was followed by serious Skirmishes between Pakistani and Indian troops at some places in Uri and Tithwal in Kashmir and Poonch and Mendhar in the Jammu region during the first two weeks of September. And after the violation of the cease-fire line by Pakistani

67. Wright, Denis, op.cit., p. 75.
soldiers in Kargil, Naushera, Chhamb and Akhnoor, Indian troops deeply centred themselves in these areas by the end of November 1970. Outbreak of hostilities between India and Pakistan immediately after an attempt was made by a few fighter aircraft of the Pakistani Air Force to destroy the Srinagar airport on December 3, 1971 brought about a complete change: creation of Bangladesh after it was liberated from Pakistan with the help of the Indian troops and para-military forces on the one hand and the fall of Chhamb in the Jammu region in spite of India’s ground and air superiority on the other. After this conflict the leaders of India and Pakistan met in 1972 at Simla in a bid to lay the foundation of a new relationship. An agreement known as ‘Simla Agreement’ was signed by Mrs. Indira Gandhi and Mr. Z.A. Bhutto. Article I of the Agreement states,

“The Governments of India and Pakistan are resolved that the two countries put an end to the conflict and confrontation that have hitherto marred their relations and work for the promotion of a friendly and harmonious relationship and the establishment of durable

68. Kak, B.L., op.cit. p. 100
peace in the sub-continent, so both countries may henceforth devote their resources and energies to the pressing task of advancing the welfare of their people."

India readily restored to Pakistan the territory occupied in the western region in the 1971 war. Delineation of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Jammu and Kashmir and the repatriation of the prisoners of war were completed by the end of 1973. Although, the Simla Accord failed to solve Kashmir issue yet it succeeded in defusing the issue for sometime. After the birth of Bangladesh, Sheikh Abdullah the acknowledged leader of Kashmir realised that he could no longer use Pakistan factor for greater concession from India. Taking advantage of this mood, Indira Gandhi patched up with Sheikh Abdullah. After protracted negotiations in February 1974 both agreed to enter to what is known as Kashmir Accord. Under this accord Sheikh was acknowledged the real leader of Kashmir who in turn withdrew the demand for plebiscite. The government of India reiterated that Kashmir shall continue to be governed by Article 370 of the Indian Constitution.

70. Quoted in Sareen, Rajendra, Pakistan : The India Factor, (New Delhi, 1984), p. 9.

India holds Pakistan responsible for non-compliance with that part of the U.N. resolution which envisaged that Pakistan would withdraw its troops from Pakistan occupied Kashmir that was never done. The intractibility of this issue was brought out in full measure at the summit of the NAM in New Delhi in March 1983; when President Zia-ul-Haq called for a 'just solution' of the Kashmir issue and a spokesman of the Government of India affirmed that so far as this country is concerned the only question that remained to be settled was the vacation of Indian territory still in occupation of Pakistan.

**SIACHEN:**

Siachen glacier in J & K is the highest altitude war theatre in the world. For several years past, the troops of India and Pakistan have been engaged in active hostilities in this area. The genesis of the Siachen issue can be traced back to the cessation of hostilities in J & K, effective from January 1, 1949. The Cease-Fire Line (CFL) of 1949 was replaced by the present Line of Control (LOC). Siachen sector lies on the Indian side of the LOC. For nearly a decade after 1972 the area remained

unoccupied, a sort of no man's land. Then, the government of India decided to garrison the Siachen sector because of its strategic importance. Pakistan reacted by trying to establish its own military presence there, thus activating dormant tension into open conflict. All these years since then an undeclared mini-war has been continuing in the Siachen region. Many rounds of talks have been held on the siachen issue. Hundreds of military personnel of both sides have already died. Yet over 90% of the casualties have been caused by the extreme cold and forbidding terrain. There is nothing there to fight over except a vast and frozen wasteland. In August 1992, there was a mini-war in Siachen. So after many bilateral talks and efforts, the question of 'ownership of Siachen' has not been solved yet. Even after many efforts to solve the border problem, the external threat is inextricably enmeshed in the situation and India is faced with low intensity conflict (LIC) on its western front. The primary task of the

Army deployment on the Punjab border or the LOC in Kashmir is to prevent infiltration and to apprehend maximum number of infiltrators and capture their arms. The project of border fencing in Punjab, which was started in 1988, aimed at covering 433 km. of the total stretch of 465 km. was completed in 76 February 1993.

Even after many talks and dialogue between India and Pakistan, the differences over borders and specially over Kashmir remain unresolved. There are frequent incidents of firing from across the Line of Control from Pakistan side. Pakistan occupied Kashmir, apart from serving as the propaganda flashpoint for continuing subversive struggle, has become the target staging zone for training and infiltration of terrorists. Now serious efforts are needed from both the sides to solve the dispute. Solution lies only in the endeavour of both the countries to establish peace, stability and prosperity in the sub-continent on the basis of Simla Agreement. If the Kashmir problem remains unsettled the two countries will continue to be distant neighbours, which is detrimental to the whole region.

C. Other Minor Border Issues:

Though India played a vital role in the independence of Bangladesh and their relations started on a cordial note yet certain conflicting situation appeared in the course of time and produced strains in their relations. One of the main issues which strained relations between the two countries were the clashes over borders. Though the two countries reached an amicable settlement regarding border and disputed territories in May, 1974, border incidents continued in the Garo Hills area.

The relations between India and Bangladesh have also been strained over the possession of a new island in the Bay of Bengal, called New Moore by India and South Talpatty by Bangladesh. This island, located in the estuary of the river Hari-bhanga, which formed the border between India and Bangladesh, was formed after the cyclone and tidal waves in 1970, and was discovered by India in 1971. Bangladesh put forward its claims to the island for the first time in 1978. In April 1979, during the visit of Morarji Desai, the then Prime Minister of India to Dhaka, it was agreed that a joint survey would be undertaken to determine the location and ownership of the island.

77. Chander, Prakash, op.cit., p. 629.
In May 1981 Government of Bangladesh lodged a protest over the presence of 'Sandhyak' near the Island. India justified that it was there only for collecting necessary statistics for a joint survey which the two governments had agreed to undertake. Not satisfied with the Indian stand, Bangladesh sent certain gun boats. India also sent a figure to rescue its ship. In September, 1981, the Foreign Ministers of India and Bangladesh met at New Delhi and discussed the issue. However, they were not able to resolve the controversy. The controversy slowly cooled down, specially after the assassination of President Zia-ur-Rahman.

TIN BIGHA: The 178 metre by 85 metre big piece of land, the Tin Bigha Corridor had become an irritant in relations between India and Bangladesh. This corridor is situated near Cooch Behar in West Bengal, linking the Bangladesh mainland with its enclaves Dahagram and Angarpota inside India. In 1974 India had agreed to lease in perpetuity this corridor to Bangladesh. The accord on the leasing was signed by the then Prime Ministers of India and Bangladesh, Mrs. Indira Gandhi and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in 1974. It was agreed that residents of Angarpota and Dahagram enclaves of Bangladesh would be provided passage to

the Bangladesh mainland through the corridor. But the accord could not be finalised due to complications. Another agreement was signed in 1982 between the two countries making it clear that the lease was only to enable Bangladesh to exercise sovereignty over the two enclaves while India would retain sovereignty over the area. But the litigation delayed the transfer. Ultimately on June 26, 1992, after the verdict of Supreme Court that there was no transfer of Indian land and no loss of sovereignty by the lease, the corridor was opened ending the controversy and protest raging over it.

The Indo-Bhutan boundary question relates to a four-kilometre stretch on the Assam-Bhutan border. In 1980 Bhutan had asked for its settlement but on account of the then ongoing Assam agitation the matter was put aside. But ever since the signing of the Assam Accord in 1985, Bhutan has been pressing for its settlement. In 1987, Bhutan's National Assembly even passed a resolution to this effect.

Though India and Sri Lanka do not have common land border, yet there was some controversy over Kachatíví island which is situated in Gulf of Mannar. After some negotiations

in 1975 India leased it to Sri Lanka. In early 1992, the issue was again in light when the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, Jayalalitha, raised the voice to take back the island. But the matter cooled down very soon.