CHAPTER- 1

The Origin and Historical Development of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

1. American Participation in the Alliance.

World War II left Europe economically enfeebled. The industrial infrastructure of most countries had been virtually destroyed. In the winter of 1945-6 there was famine in parts of Germany; bread rationing was introduced in France (a major agricultural country) and was tightened up again in Britain. Only American aid could ameliorate Europe's short-term problems and lay the foundations for long-term recovery.

Although the USA, with its role in Latin America, the Caribbean, the Pacific, China and the Philippines had become a major world power long before World War II, the feeling persisted in both public and political opinion that it was not and should not become one. Sending forces to Europe in World War I was not seen as a precedent but as an isolated incident. Doing the same in World War II was seen in the same way by many sectors of influential opinion which, at the end of the war, sought nothing but a return to the status quo ante. This issue is often understood as American 'isolationism' but that is largely a misnomer and misperception. The USA has been isolationist at least since the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 which attempted to shut the European powers out of the Americas, and thus retain the western hemisphere as an arena of US power and influence. Indeed, even before that, the United States had taken sides in the great European wars from the French revolution through to 1815 and the final defeat of the
Emperor Napoleon. The use of alliances has unquestionably been a major element in the traditional international politics of Europe. Whenever one state has threatened to dominated Europe, others have joined together to meet that threat. The political history of Europe for the last two centuries may be viewed, at least in part, as a continual process of alliance formation and dissolution as the great powers and their smaller consorts sought the elusive goals of security and aggrandizement. If in 1812 Britain, Prussia and Russia could combine to defeat the imperial Napoleon, why in 1949 should not Britain, France and later West Germany join to oppose the more contemporary threat of Soviet expansionism? True, crucial to the new pact, was the United States, culturally if not geographically European, but the method remained the same: to ally in order to meet a common enemy. President Woodrow Wilson’s ill-fated attempt to reorient American foreign policy around the principle of “Collective security” is too well known to require elaboration here. Senate rejection of the League of Nations graphically reaffirmed American isolationist attitude toward Europe. But it is significant that in the World War II the United States believed that the greatest threat to its own security emanated from Europe; hence American policy makers consistently gave a higher priority to the European theater of War than they did to the Pacific theater. Western Europe in the immediate postwar period, denuded of military strength following the rapid allied demobilization, was also economically and politically prostrate. It became clear that it was incapable of reviving itself unassisted, certainly not within an acceptable period of time. In this condition Europe faced the largely undemobilized and massive military strength of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was imbued with an ideological urge and supported by propaganda forms almost stridently hostile to Western
concepts and institutions of representative government or any form of collaboration in the political and economic recovery of Western Europe. Russia and America emerged from World II; They had different ways of life and different views of the World. The year after 1945 the Americans talked about ‘rolling – back’ the frontiers of Communism which meant a threat to remove the Communist governments which ruled in Eastern Europe. However, this talk soon stopped as it was obvious that any attempt to do this would provoke a world war because the Russains regarded control of Eastern Europe as essential to their security. So in March 1947, the United States announced that instead of rolling – back Communism it would contain it. The containment of Communism meant that the United States would not allow the Soviet Union to control areas other than those they held in 1947.

By 1947 the Monroe Doctrine had been superseded by the Truman Doctrine’s principles of containment as the guiding rule of America’s relationship to Europe. The mission was clearcut in Greece. To the American planners of 1947, World Communism had chosen Greece as its target, with Greek communists as the agent. Hence the United States had undertaken to arm, train, and supply a successful Greek resistance to Communist subversion. The absence of a requirement for official Greek reciprocity further simplified the situation. The aid itself would be increasingly military. The $ 300 million allotted for the economic rehabilitation of Greece was quickly shifted to the hard – pressed Greek army, barely able to hold its own against the guerrilla forces. Such was the situation when the first U.S. supplies reached Greece in the Summer of 1947. The threat was that the fabric of the West European economies and societies would come apart. There was an urgent need for a huge increase in the flow of imports to Europe to be paid
in Dollars that would supply the working capital. Unless the economies could be made to function again, a Communist takeover could occur without resort to external invasion or internal subversion, a strong economy would give strength to those who would defend themselves against the Communist alternatives. The Truman Doctrine set in motion a massive foreign aid programme in Europe. President Harry S. Truman, for whom the doctrine was named, stated the reasons clearly in his message to Congress on 12th March 1947:

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.

I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which essential to economic stability and orderly political processes.

The Marshall Plan projected at the Harvard Commencement of 5th June 1947, provided another major influence on the future military assistance programme. It stressed the importance of Europeans helping themselves through expanding their own resources and cooperating with their neighbors as a prerequisite for American help. The Marshall Plan, then, would not only promote greater efficiency in the use of funds but also accelerate the restoration of a United Europe in close relationship with the United States. So under French and British leadership, the countries of Western Europe responded immediately to this lifeline. The 'Marshal Plan' officially came to an end in 1951.

It was in this atmosphere that, the British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, commented to Marshall that what was really needed to support the economic reconstruction of western Europe was a military alliance. Marshall agreed—there was, he said, 'no choice in
the matter' but he also said it was necessary for the Europeans to take the initiative. The first steps followed quickly. The British government agreed on Bevin's course, and in the first months of 1948 a mutual defence treaty was negotiated between Britain, France, Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxembourg—the Brussels Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective self-Defence. The heart of the treaty, notwithstanding various commitments to raising living standards, common civilization and cultural exchanges, is Article IV which promises that if one party is attacked, the others will provide 'all the military and other aid and assistance in their power'. The European part of the groundwork for the future NATO had been laid. Indirectly, of course, Article 51 of the United Nations Charter encouraged this sort of security relationship. More concretely, in March 1947 the British and French signed the Treaty of Dunkirk. The main potential threat noted at that time was Germany. The text of the treaty mentioned that the signing nations would protect one another from any threat, 'a rising from the adoption by Germany of a policy of aggression or from action by Germany designed to facilitate such a policy? A year later, in March 1948, the Dunkirk alliance was widened into the Brussels Pact.

The Signing of the Brussels Pact constituted the first European pole of defence. The signatories were only five powers, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Britain and France put forward several objectives. In the face of Communist danger, England suggested that moral and spiritual forces determined to defend the Western system be organized with the support of the Americans and the dominions. The Communist threat which could endanger the European democratic system required U.S. participation to offset Soviet power NATO, we must
keep in mind, was a European not an American product, having been based so closely upon the model provided by the Brussels Pact. American participation in the Alliance resulted inevitably in the Americanization of the pact – there was no gainsaying U.S. hegemony. The constant diplomatic driving force behind the treaty came from Britain’s great post war Foreign secretary Ernest Bevin. However, within the State Department and the Truman administration there were strong doubts and divisions for months about the wisdom or the necessity of an alliance with Europe.

The signing of the North Atlantic Treaty (NAT) in the Inter-Departmental Auditorium on Constitution Avenue in Washington on April 4, 1949, was a simple low – key businesslike affair. There were short speeches from each of the twelve foreign ministers from Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United states of America. The special applause for Ernest Bevin when he lumbered up to the podium. President Truman delivered a brisk address declaring the hope that the treaty “would create a shield against aggression and fear of aggression – a bulwark – which will permit us to get on with the real business of government and society, the business of achieving a fuller and happier life for all of our citizens”.

2. Rationale and Objective In The Formation of NATO

Britain, American and Russia had been allies in the Second World War. However, almost immediately after the war in Europe ended distrust grew between Russia and her other wartime allies. There were several complex reasons for this. It was, however a fact that after the war Russia directly or indirectly forced Eastern European countries to adopt Communist governments. As a result
the Western European countries with America and Canada, came to believe that their individual security was threatened by Russia. They considered that unless they did something about it, one country after another in Western Europe might be taken over by the Russians. They best course they believed was to band together in the NATO alliance for collective protection. The United States acknowledged that its security was inextricably connected with developments on the European continent. It believed in the domino theory of Communism which stated that if one country falls to the Communism its neighbors might fall next. The domino theory partly provoked the formation of NATO.16

It was testimony to the clumsiness if not the wickedness of Soviet behaviour in the years immediately following the Second World War that the security concerns of Moscow’s east-while allies should have so quickly shifted from their fiercely anti-German orientation to a primarily anti-Soviet one.17 The relevant circumstances in which that event took place were these:

1. The Red Army stood along a line in Eastern Europe “from stettin [Szczecin] in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic”. As a result, the Soviet Union had ultimate power with respect to the organization of government and society and the foreign policies of the countries to the east of that line.

2. The countries of Western Europe were individually much weaker militarily than the Soviet Union and were divided among the traditional national sovereign states. The leaders of most of them acted as if they felt threatened, more or less acutely and directly depending on their individual situations, by the proximity of Soviet power and their weakness in the
faced of it and as if they wanted a guarantee of their security by the only power able to provide it; the United States.

3. The United States, whose leaders acted as if they believed that the expansion of Soviet power or influence westward of the line that divided Europe would be harmful to American interests, provided that guarantee to the West European countries in the form of the Atlantic alliance. The guarantee included a declaratory commitment to and a substantial military presence in Western Europe and was proclaimed to be one manifestation among others of the U.S. Policy of "Containing" further Soviet expansion. NATO was constituted in accordance with the United Nations clause permitting regional organizations, but it was intended to provide the collective defence that was needed to meet a situation not envisaged by the drafters of the United Nations Charter just four years earlier. They had believed that the concept of collective security – backed up as necessary by an international army created by the Great Powers existing in a more or less harmonious alliance with each other and with the lesser states, could keep aggressors under control with moral persuasion at first and with force if necessary. Collective security, in other words was designed to preserve peace among the members of the United Nations. Escott Reid, for one, had written even before the San Francisco Conference created the United Nations that if a Great Power should in future act in such a way as to convince the other great powers that it is determined to dominate the world by force, the only way to prevent a world war from breaking out will be for the other great powers to form immediately an
alliance against that power and to declare that the moment it comits aggression they will wage total war against it... That declaration may bring the state which is planning aggression to its senses and so prevent the war from breaking out..." Reid may have written this, but neither he nor anyone else had truly foreseen a situation in which the Soviet Union would threaten to turn itself into an aggressor and simultaneously tie up the United Nations with procedural tactics and the consistent use of its Veto. NATO came into existence in other words, because in 1949 the UN had already demonstrated that it was going to be completely unable to provide the collective security it was supposed to deliver and the collective security that the Western democracies so desperately wanted. Moreover, it had no capacity whatsoever to offer collective defence against what seemed to be and was a genuine threat from the Soviet Union. Collective defence, to state the obvious, was the coming together of like-minded states to protect the group against an outsider. To be sure, the move of the NATO founding members toward collective defence was for all practical purposes a recognition that collective security was an idea that had failed. In effect, NATO was to be prepared to engage in "enforcement measures" against a fellow UNSC member (or any other possible threat) - if such action proved necessary. By counter-balancing a potential threat from a fellow UNSC members themselves and, if possible, to ultimately bring UNSC members NATO was consequently intended to deter the possibility of conflict among the UNSC members into cooperation in case of conflict among regional powers, in accord with the original purpose of the UN
charter. While NATO was primarily forged against the threat of any potential aggression, including that posed by UNSC members, it was secondarily formed for the pursuit of general UN goals. Put another way, behind-the-scenes NATO supporters for the predominant powers in Western Europe, and for cooperation among these governments, would indirectly help to maintain stability and well-being throughout the globe in the process of re-equilibrating international society. The Atlantic alliance was the core organization of the Western security system. NATO was a partnership of free nations for the purposes of security, based on a common conviction of civility, human rights and the underlying principle of individual freedom. The overdoing objective of the alliance was the preservation of peace and freedom so that its members could perfect their societies. Theoretically, the alliance would operate against any external threat, in practice, the purposes of the alliance had been to guarantee the security of the West vis-à-vis the common threat from the East.

The North Atlantic alliance was not limited purely to military matters. It combined collective defence with the readiness to enter into dialogue and practical co-operation with the East, interalia, in the field of arms control and disarmament, in accordance with concept of promoting international stability and a meaningful state of peace. The Atlantic Alliance had two main functions. Its first function was to maintain adequate military strength and political solidarity to deter aggression and other forms of pressure and to defend the territory of member countries if aggression should occur... the Allies would maintain as necessary, a suitable military
capability to ensure the balance of forces, thereby creating a climate of stability, security and confidence. In this climate the Alliance could carry out its second function, to pursue the search for progress towards a more stable relationship in which the underlying political issues could be solved. Military security and a policy of détente were not contradictory but complementary. Collective defence was a stabilising factor in world politics. The military capability of NATO, including its nuclear means, had not been acquired for the enhancement of power or for posturing, but exclusively for preventing aggression and war. The pledge in Article 5 of the Treaty that an armed attack against anyone or more of the members “shall be considered an attack against them all” and the agreement of each one to take “such action as its deemed necessary; including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic Area; “was a strong commitment, prescribing action under specified circumstances, and thus in fact limiting the freedom of action of each member of the alliance, because its treaty required no surrender of sovereignty by its members. The first Secretary-General of NATO, Lord Lionel Ismay, had succinctly described NATO’s real aims in 1957. “The U.S.” he said, “needs NATO to keep America in Europe, Germany in rein, and Russia outside Europe.” These goals had already been achieved.

One of the major tasks of the European allies would be to keep the USA engaged with the alliance. “The US would only be interested in NATO if it is viable military organization. But NATO will only remain a viable military organization if the US is properly engaged.” The United States could reasonably expect to maintain its leadership status by taking advantage of NATO’s consultative
function, by granting aid to its NATO allies, and by profiting from NATO's ability to deter the Soviet Union. And through NATO the United States had induced research, development, and production programs for military purposes—first in individual countries and later across national boundaries in cooperative undertakings and had promoted other kinds of cooperative programmes, including certain service functions for NATO forces. Bradley Klien, in a number of works, made the claim for NATO as a means by which its member states had formed a collective political identity and community. Klien asserted that Western strategies concerning deterrence, nuclear weapons, overseas military bases and institutions were part of an 'ambitious attempt to erect a globally stable framework for multilateral trade'. For Klien these pieces of the puzzle combined to create the 'Western System', with its focal point being the 'transatlantic network embodied — and consolidated — under the protective umbrella of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization'. Thus NATO was and is more than just a military alliance between western countries. It is 'one particular manifestation of a larger and more ambitious set of political and cultural relations that...have as their aim the reconstruction, intensification and perpetuation of a post-war order at both its core and its periphery'. Klien, after citing a member of leading politicians of Western Europe and North America to strengthen his argument, revealed what he meant when speaking of this set of relations. He posited that what was constructed was a 'whole way of life, a distinct civilizational project, which makes both promises to and claims upon its people? Above and beyond the political — economic aspects of this project is the military — strategic one which overlays the other.
In a radio speech to the country on March 18, 1949 U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson stated that after the successful completion of the Charter of the United Nations, the countries of North America and Western Europe were "joining" in the formation of a second arrangement, pertaining to the North Atlantic area.

The institutions (read: NATO) that will underwrite the peace and security of this area will express the underlying realities and commonly held interests of the countries of this area, those being the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.  

Finally, the NATO partners were anxious not only to deter a Soviet attack upon Europe but also to create the conditions on a worldwide scale for the growth of a reasonably stable international order of law in which the uses of violence would be minimised and the process of peaceful change guaranteed. In short, the NATO countries stood opposed to the forces of destructive revolution on the world scene; they stood for the forces of constructive evolution, looking forwards a genuine international community.

The North Atlantic Treaty was the political frame work for an international alliance designed to prevent aggression or to repel it, should it occur. It provided for continuous cooperation and consultation in political, economic and military fields. It was of indefinite duration.

The signatory countries stated their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments. Reaffirming their faith in the principles of the United Nations, they undertook in particular to preserve peace and international security and to promote stability and well – being in the North Atlantic area.
To achieve these goals, they signed their names to a number of undertakings in different fields. They agreed, for example, to settle international disputes by peaceful means, in order to avoid endangering international peace, security and justice. They also agreed to refrain from the threat or use of force in any way, which would not be consistent the purpose of the United Nations. They undertook to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and to encourage economic collaboration between their countries. Under this Treaty, the member countries therefore adopted a policy of security based on the inherent right to individual and collective self-defence accorded by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter (Appendix 1), while at the same time affirming the importance of cooperation between them in other spheres.

The text of the Treaty (appendix 1) consisted of 14 Articles, and was preceded by a Preamble, which emphasized that the Alliance had been created within the framework of the United Nations Charter and outlines its main purposes. Article 1 defined the basic principles to be followed by member countries in conducting their international relations, in order to avoid endangering peace and world security.

Article 2, inspired by Article 1 of the United Nations Charter, defined the aims which the member countries will pursue in their international relationships, particularly in the social and economic spheres, and their resulting obligations.

In Article 3, signatories stated that they will maintain and develop their ability, both individually and collectively to resist attack.
Article 4 envisaged a threat to the territorial integrity, political independence or security of one of the member countries of the alliance and provided for joint consultation whenever one of them believed that such a threat exists. In practice, this consultation took place in the North Atlantic and its subordinate committees.

Article 5 is the core of the Treaty whereby member countries agreed to treat an armed attack on anyone of them, in Europe or North America, as an attack against all of them. It committed them to taking the necessary steps to help each other in the event of an armed attack.

Although it left each signatory free to take whatever action it considered appropriate, the Article stated that, individually and collectively, the member nations must took steps to restore and maintain security. Joint action was justified by the inherent, individual and collective right of self defence embodied in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter; but it was agreed that measures taken under the terms of the Article shall be terminated when the Security Council had acted as necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Article 6 to defined the area in which the provisions of Article 5 applied. However it did not imply that events occurring outside that area could be the subject of consultation within the alliance. The preservation of peace and security in the North Atlantic Treaty area could be affected by events elsewhere in the world, and the North Atlantic Council must therefore, as a matter of course, consider the overall international situation.

Article 7 and 8, member nations stipulated that none of their existing international commitment conflicted with the terms of the
Treaty and that they will not enter into any commitments in the future, which did so. In particular, they stated that rights and obligations pertaining to membership of the United Nations were unaffected by the Treaty, as was the primary role of the United Nations Security Council in the sphere of international peace and security.

Under Article 9, the parties to the Treaty established a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, which shall be able to meet promptly at any time.

The Council in turn was charged with the creation of such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary to implement the provisions of the Treaty. This was the basis on which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization had been gradually built up.

Article 10 provided the possibility of accession to the Treaty by any other European state in a position to further the principles of the Treaty. In 1952, Greece and Turkey, in 1955, the federal republic of Germany and in 1982, Spain acceded to the treaty under the terms of this Article.

Article II described the process of ratification of the Treaty, in accordance with the constitutional processes of the signatories, and the manner in which the Treaty was to enter into force.

Article 12 and 13 dealt with the possibility of revision of the Treaty after a period of ten years, and renunciation of the Treaty by any party to it, after 20 years. They had never been invoked.

Article 14 gave equal authority to the English and French texts of the Treaty, and arranged for their safe deposit in Washington D.C.

3. The Structure of NATO
The Treaty having come into force on August 24, 1949, after all the ratifications had been deposited, the Governments of member countries were faced with two tasks: that of setting up the various bodies necessary for the implementation of the Treaty and working out a common defence policy. At its first meeting in Washington on September 17 and 19, 1949, the North Atlantic Council began the establishment of the various NATO bodies. In particular, it decided that the North Atlantic Council, the principal authority in the Alliance and composed of the Foreign Ministers of member countries, would meet in ordinary session annually and could, at any time, at the request of any of its members invoking Article 4 or Article 5 of the Treaty, convened in extraordinary session. In accordance with Article 9 of the Treaty, the Council created a Defence Committee composed of the Defence Ministers of member countries, charged with drawing up co-ordinated defence plans for the North Atlantic area. It was agreed that this Defence Committee would meet at least once a year. The military structure of the Alliance was begun by setting up a number of permanent bodies, first and foremost the Military Committee. It consisted of the chiefs-of-staff of the member countries and its function was to give the Council advice on general questions of a military nature and to provide guidance to its executive agency, the Standing Group. The latter consisted of representatives of France, United Kingdom and the United States, who were responsible for strategic guidance in areas in which NATO Forces operated. The first organizational chart for NATO established five geographical planning groups under the Standing Group: Northern European Group; Western European Group; Southern European Group; Southern European /Western Mediterranean Group; Canada/United States Group; and the North Atlantic Ocean Group.
At a second meeting a month later, the Council established two further bodies, which had also been features of Western Union Organization: a Defence Financial and Economic Committee and a Military Production and Supply Board. The Defence Financial and Economic Committee was to be composed of the Finance Ministers of member governments and was to report directly to the Council thus matching the Defence Committee.34

3.1 The North Atlantic Council (NAC)*

The Council was the only formal NATO organ mentioned in the Treaty. Article 9 stipulated that the members establish a Council “on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty”. Although the Treaty did not explicitly state that the representation would be equal, this had always been understood. In fact, the term “representation” was not well chosen, for the Council was not a representative body; it was a vehicle for executive co-ordination. Within NATO the traditional concept of the legal equality of states prevailed. Undoubtedly the four major allies (United States, Britain, France and West Germany) carried a great deal more political weight than, said, Iceland or Luxemburg. But, unlike the Charter of the United Nations, which reserved special privileges to five powers, the NATO Treaty did not spell out any special powers (such as a veto) for the major members which were withheld from the lesser allies. The Council reached decisions by unanimous consent. The Council was fundamentally a meeting ground for governmental Ministers. Actually, however, it could meet at three levels (1) the Permanent Representatives; (2) the Ministers; and (3) Heads of Government. Since the Lisbon Meeting in February, 1952,

* See Figure 8, North Atlantic Council, p.XXII
the North Atlantic Council had been a permanent body. The permanent representatives, who were of ambassadorial rank, met in sessions of the Council at least once a week during the intervals between Ministers' meeting, and wield virtually the same powers of decisions as did the Ministers themselves, with whom they remained in close consultation.35

Whatever the level at which the Council met, its chairman was the Secretary General of NATO. Each year the Foreign Minister of a member state was honorary president of the Council. This presidency rotated annually according to alphabetical order in English. Since the organization of the North Atlantic Treaty was not supranational, all decisions taken were the expressions of the collective will of the member governments. It was in the Council that the views of governments were exchanged on all major issues. Consultation covered political, military, economic and a wide range of other subjects.

Military policy matters were discussed at the same level in the 'Defence Planning Committee'. As in the Council, members countries were represented on this Committee by their Permanent Representatives. They met round the same table as the Council and also under the same chairmanship of the Secretary General. Since the withdrawal of France from the integrated military organization in 1966, her representative did not attend these meetings.

3.2 The Permanent Representatives and Delegations

The Permanent Representatives were assisted by national delegations also located at NATO Headquarters. The Delegations varied in size but the majority of them included officers specifically charged with representing their countries on the various specialized committees. Before a meeting of the council notice was given of the
agenda and any subjects to be discussed so that representatives had time to seek the instructions of their governments. 36

3.3 The Secretary General and the international staff. 37

Committees established by the Council were supported by an International Staff, made up of personnel drawn from all member countries, responsible to the Secretary - General. The Secretary General himself was responsible for promoting and directing the process of consultation within the Alliance. He proposed items for discussion. He had the authority to use his good offices at any time in cases of dispute between member countries, and with their consent, to initiate enquiries or mediation, conciliation or arbitration procedures. The Deputy Secretary General assisted the Secretary General in his functions and deputised for him in his absence. The international staff comprised the Office of the Secretary General, five major Divisions, the Office of Management and the Office of the Financial Controller. Each of the Divisions was headed by an Assistant Secretary-General, who was normally the Chairman of the main committee dealing with his responsibilities. 37

The Council accordingly decided at its fourth session in May 1950 to establish the council of Deputies to be in continuous session and to be responsible for implementing the decisions of the Council and for formulating issues requiring decisions by member governments. 38 Before even the Council of Deputies had time to meet, however, war had broken out in Korea. What might happen in Europe. There were only 200,000 poorly armed Allied occupation forces in Western Germany many, and in all no more than 14 Allied divisions and 1000 aircraft in Western Europe, compared with

* See Figure 5. NATO International Staff/Secretariat, p. XIX.
between 175 and 200 Soviet divisions and 20,000 aircraft. Europe, in other words, was more afraid of the Soviet Union than was the United States. The United States benefited in the bargaining which led to the alliance because she had to be persuaded, somewhat reluctantly, to assist in Western defence. However, President Harry S. Truman decided to station American combat troops permanently in Europe, and appointed Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower as the first Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) in September 1950. He encouraged planning for a defence of Europe based on the thousands of nuclear weapons. He took orders from President Truman to proceed forthwith to Europe to establish a Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). On 1st January 1951, Gen. Eisenhower landed in Frankfurt with a small personal staff including his Chief of Staff-designate, Gen. Alferd M. Gruenther. They then began a quick initial round of the NATO capitals with plans for organizing the new command. In February 1951 the French government requisitioned the Old Hotel Astoria to serve as temporary headquarters for Eisenhower's new command. However, the French decided to provide the new command post on the outskirts of Paris at an Old military drill and training ground of the French Kings near Versailles. Under SHAPE there would be subordinate headquarters for Northern Europe at Oslo, Central Europe at Fontainebleau and Southern Europe at Naples and later on Atlantic Naval Command at Norfolk, Virginia. And on April 2, 1951, Gen. Eisenhower formally declared SHAPE Headquarters to be "operational".

On June 19, 1951, the NATO states signed an agreement on the status of their armed forces, providing the mechanism for maintaining "internal stability". This document gave the NATO
military command the right to deploy its armed forces, bases, command and control and other military bodies in member countries and what was the main thing, to introduce any number of its troops to any country which was part of NATO's militancy wing.43

In the event of aggression, the role of the Alliance was to re-establish the territorial integrity of the North Atlantic area. NATO must therefore maintain sufficient forces to preserve the military balance with the Warsaw Pact and to provide a credible deterrent. NATO forces were made up of three interlocking elements known as the NATO Triad. They were:

- Conventional forces strong enough to resist and repel a conventional attack on a limited scale, and to sustain a conventional defence in the forward areas against large-scale conventional aggression;

- Theatre nuclear forces to enhance the deterrent and defensive effect of NATO conventional forces against large-scale conventional attack, with the aim of convincing the aggressor that any form of attack on NATO could result in very serious damage to his own forces, and of emphasizing the dangers implicated in continuing a conflict;

- United States and United Kingdom strategic nuclear forces which – provided the ultimate deterrent.44

In peacetime NATO's military forces were subordinated to the political North Atlantic Council (NAC) and Defence Planning Committee (DPC) through NATO's Military Committee (MC)45.

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43 See Figure 6. NATO's Civil and Military Structure, p.XX
3.4 The NATO theatre itself was divided into three commands areas:

(1) Allied Command Europe (ACE)*; ACE was commanded by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), ACE was NATO's principal military command. Its militancy forces operated over area bounded by the northern most part of Norway, the southern most part of the Mediterranean, the western most part of the European Atlantic coast and the eastern most part of Turkey. SACEUR, as commander of ACE, thus had the dominant military role in NATO and, although his authority was theoretically subordinate to the Military Committee, in practice this was not so.

In addition to SHAPE, Allied Command Europe composed four major subordinate commands (MSCs);

(i) AFNORTH, headquartered at Kolsaas (Norway), was the command area of Allied Forces Northern Europe.

(ii) AFCENT was the command area of the “Allied Forces Central Europe” which extended from the Elbe river in the north to the borders of Austria and Switzerland in the South. AFCENT had its headquarters in Brunssum in Netherlands.

(iii) AFSOUTH was the command area of Allied Forces Southern Europe which covered Italy, Greece, Turkey and the entire Mediterranean Sea. AFSOUTH was geographically the largest of the three ACE MSCs and had its headquarters at Naples in Italy.

* See Figure 3. Allied Command Europe, p.XVII
(iv) 'UKAIR' was a unique ACE MSC in that it was essentially a single service (RAF), single nation MSC. UKAIR was based at high Wycombe in the UK and provided both air defence and attack airforces for employment within ACE. UKAIR operated British nuclear weapons.46

SACEUR also had the responsibilities of commander-in-chief of American forces in Europe (USCOMEUR), in accordance with the double-hatting system, thereby placing him in the exclusive chain of command of the American civilian and military authorities.

It was the latter provision more than any other that explained how NATO functioned as a military organization. This independence of the American commander with respect to the political authorities of the Alliance was greatly strengthened by another circumstance which derived from the fact that his area of responsibility as US commander in Europe extended over an area much greater than that available to him as SACEUR. It included both shores of the Mediterranean and a large part of East Africa and the Middle East. In this sector, USCOMEUR clearly could not be subjected to any multinational control, a reality which gave him wide scope for independence in all his activities, including those that came under his SACLEUR hat. This circumstances explained the significant gap between the written word and reality in the structures of the Alliance. Political consultation did exist inside the North Atlantic Council and its subordinate committees, but the state of independence into which the geographical imbalance put the European nations relative to the United States guaranteed that these negotiations were very often no more than a formality.
NATO in its military sense—that was, mainly the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) was essentially designed not to implement the military plans that it had formulated, but to enable the United States in the shape of the US Command in Europe (EUCOM), to take charge of military operations, using its own concepts and its own plans if it thought fit. In Cold War scenarios, therefore, once operations had been launched, the military organization was to be placed under a command that appeared to be SACEUR, subjected to the theoretical political authority of all the nations in the Alliance, but was in reality USCOMEUR, subjected to exclusive political control by U.S. national authorities.47

SACEUR and the other commanders* were the Council’s military stewards, directing the pooled citizen-armies. The United States, of course, did retain national control over the nuclear umbrella, but American plans and strategies for Europe’s defence were the product of intensive consultation among partners. If, in theory, the Council was the political master and SACEUR the military steward, in practice, even strong partisans of NATO saw little integration between the political machinery and the military commands. Hence the Council had never functioned as the Alliance’s principal center for policy making, or even consultation. The Council’s role had always been peripheral to the military machinery built up around the Supreme Allied Commander. This lack of integration between the political authority and the military command had led one famous observer, General Beaufre, to call NATO “a body without a head”. But there was a head—not in Europe, but in Washington. The Supreme Allied Commander had never been the first servant of the Council, but

* See Figure 4. Major NATO Commands, p. XVIII
the viceroy of the American President. Nevertheless, he was a man from the center, and it was from Washington that his ultimate authority came, for Washington controls the nuclear weapons everyone believes constituted the real defence of Europe. The line of nuclear authority passed directly from Washington to the American military commander in Europe, who, almost necessarily, was also SACEUR. NATO was the rather elaborate apparatus by which we had chosen to organize the American protectorate over Europe. In practice, the arrangements reflected dependence and not interdependence, hegemony and not integration. In short, NATO, which in theory suggested interdependence, integration, and potential federation, in practice involved dependence, subordination and potential empire.

2. Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT)

The second of NATO’s major NATO commands (MNC’s) ACLANT commanded an area, which extended from the North Pole to the Tropic of Cancer and from the coastal waters of North American to those of Europe and Africa, though not including the British Isles and the Channel. The office of SACLANT, as with SACEUR, was always held by an American officer and was headquartered at Norfolk in Virginia, U.S.A. The ACLANT was commanded by the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT).

3. The third major NATO command was the Allied Command Channel (ACCHAN) Allied Command Channel managed to pack no less than five subordinate commands into its tiny but important area of responsibility in the Channel and the southern part of the North Sea. The commander (CINCHAN) was a British admiral who worked

* See Figure 1. Allied Command Atlantic p. XV
* See Figure 2. Allied Command Channel p. XVI
from Northwood, near London. Wearing another figurative hat he also directed the Eastern Atlantic (EASTLANT) major subordinate command under the authority of ACLANT.\textsuperscript{51}

4. Developments Soon After NATO'S Formation

Following Germany's defeat, it was divided into four zones controlled by the occupation forces of Britain, France, the Soviet Union and the United States. The former capital, Berlin, which fell within the Soviet Union Zone, was also divided into four sectors of Britain, France, and the United States.\textsuperscript{52} During the Winter and Spring of 1948, the economic aid under the Marshall Plan was extended to the Western occupation zones. The Soviet Union, concerned that Germany could again pose a threat, sought to keep Germany economically weak, and made it clear that it considered these Western initiatives as violations of the Potsdam Agreement between the victors of 1945. A decision to introduce currency reforms in the Western occupation zones was the immediate cause of the crises. On March, 1948, the Soviet imposed the "baby blockade" by demanding inspection of military trains bound for Berlin through Soviet-occupied territory. The Allies responded by dispatching a train with armed guards with orders not to submit to search, but the Soviets shunted it into a siding from which it eventually had to be withdrawn. They allied then mounted a small airlift to carry supplies to the military garrison.

Soviet harassment resulted in a midair collision with some fatalities. Allied cargo planes were than given fighter escorts, whereupon the Soviets formally apologized for the incident. Ten days after its inception, the baby blockade was suddenly lifted without explanation. On June 24, 1948, the Soviets imposed the "real" Berlin Blockade by halting all military and civilian surface traffic to West Berlin. The Soviets did not hide their objective: The
Soviet military governor told his American counterpart, General Lucius Clay, that the Blockade "would continue until the West abandoned plans for a West German government."

The Soviets sought to prevent the formation of a separate West German government by means of the blockade, as George and Smoke summarized it: The Soviet hoped that the blockade would help to achieve their primary objective by shattering western unity. The blockade provided almost perfect leverage for exerting political – diplomatic pressure. Furthermore, in the event that the blockade failed to achieve its primary objective it could be expected to at least remove the West from Berlin. Neither objective was achieved, however. Instead, the airlift kindled public attitudes in the West that facilitated the birth of NATO and the Federal Republic. The Berlin Blockade, therefore, culminated in a serious setback for the Soviet Union. Ultimately the West Berlin was given special status within the Federal Republic of Germany, known as West Germany, which was created in 1949 in the British, French and United States occupation zones and a Communist German Democratic Republic (East Germany) was established in the Soviet Zone.

In an effort to build good credentials with NATO, both Turkey and Greece eagerly dispatched combat forces to Korea in 1950 that performed credibly on the battlefield. Turkey in the early 1950s pursued it diplomatic objective for NATO entry without respite. Foreign Minister Fuat Koprulu declared publicly on August 1, 1950, that NATO entry would be an "acid test of U.S. interest in Turkey". However, on 15th May 1951, the U.S. State Department finally convinced of "mutuality of benefits", announced its decision to support Turkey's case for full NATO membership. It was followed by British declaration of support on 30 May 1951. With the United States leading the way, a NATO foreign ministers meeting in Ottawa
(September 1951) approved Greek and Turkish accession into NATO. Throughout 1951, the Council of Deputies sitting in London took two major decisions: first, to admit Greece and Turkey to the alliance, and second, to recognize the political machinery with a new Permanent Council and a strong international secretariat under a Secretary General. At the meeting in Lisbon of Foreign Ministers of the alliance – now enlarged to February 1952. Patrick Lione Hastings Ismay (Lord Ismay) from the United Kingdom was appointed the first NATO Secretary General.

On February 18th, 1952, Greece and Turkey acceded to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and their forces were incorporated in Allied Command Europe. After successful missions in Europe, Gen. Eisenhower returned back to the United States for the Presidential election, General Mathew Ridgway succeeded him as SACEUR on May 1952.

In the same year the Atlantic Command (SACLANT) and the Channel Command (CINCHAN) were established

President Dwight D. Eisenhower had been elected in 1952, he then proposed that East and West exchange blueprints “of their armed forces and permit mutual “open skies” aerial inspection of their territory found no favour with the Russians. On the European Security, Russian insistence that NATO be disbanded and American troops withdrawn from Europe was equally unacceptable to the West. The Soviet conventional military threat to Western Europe could not possibly be countered without Germany, just as Germany could not possibly defend itself on its own. The only way for Germany to protect itself was to receive protection from the United States. And the only way for America to protect Western Europe was to protect Germany.
The ‘Schuman Plan’, secretly prepared by the French technocrat Jean Monnet, bounced through the French Cabinet, and released with a flourish in May 1950: A United Europe was not achieved [After 1918]; and we had war. Europe will not be made all at once or according to a single general plan. It will be built through concrete achievements, which first create a de facto solidarity. The gathering together of the nations of Europe requires the elimination of the age - old opposition of France and Germany.

The first concern in any action taken must be these two countries. With this in view, the French government proposed to take action immediately on one limited but decisive point.....to place Franco-German production of coal and steel under a common higher authority, within the framework of an organization open to the participation of the other countries of Europe. So 1951 brought agreement on a European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) to consist of France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg.65

In September 1950, Dean Acheson, US Secretary of the State Department, asked his French and British colleagues to accept Germany’s rearmament so as to enable West Germany to participate in the defence of its own territory. Robert Schuman, French Foreign Minister, reacted promptly with the cold comment: ‘Germany’s malady dates too far back to have been permanently cured; Reading this comment, one can gauge the extent of reservation there was in the attitude of the French. Schuman had been the architect of Franco-German reconciliation when he had proposed in May 1950 the plan which was to engage the future European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), a treaty signed in Paris on 18th April 1951), but the matter of defence was a stake of an altogether different kind.66

With the failure of the French Parliament to ratify the E.D.C.

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'European Defence Community' in 1954. The gap left by the collapse of E.D.C. had to be filled, and it was the British Foreign Secretary who took prompt action to fill it. As the result of his tour of the European Capitals, a Western European Union was created to take the place of the defunct E.D.C. at the price of an unprecedented British commitment to the Continent. A nine power conference was convened in London to try to reach a new agreement. This conference's decisions were embodied in a series of formal agreements drawn up by a ministerial conference held in Paris in October 1954. The agreements entailed arrangements for the Brussels Treaty to be strengthened and modified to include the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy, the ending of the occupation regime in the FRG and the invitation to the later to join NATO.

In order to calm the French fears of a rearmed Germany, SACEUR'S powers were expanded to ensure in effect, that all German armed forces would be under his command, and at the same time the members of NATO declared that the North Atlantic Treaty was of "indefinite duration".

As a result the West European Unity Treaty was signed and the Western European Union established. It was under this treaty that West Germany agreed not to attempt any changes to its borders by forces, and not to make nuclear, chemical or biological weapons.

It also agreed not to make large naval vessels) long-range missiles. So West Germany had become a sovereign state by joining NATO in 1955. And on May, 1955, Germany acceded to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and contributed forces to the Alliance.

In order to counter aggressive NATO moves, the countries of the Socialist Community signed, on May 14, 1955-(six years after
NATO was formed), the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, subsequently called the Warsaw Treaty. The Treaty itself was formally modeled on the NATO treaty, although it did not establish institutions comparable to those of the North Atlantic Alliance. The Treaty explicitly stated that in case of armed attack against any signatory, the others would immediately come to its aid. The birth of the Warsaw Treaty Organization was a forced response. It was and continued to be strictly defensive.

The French caused a further sensation when, on 29th March 1966, President de Gaulle announced that France was pulling out of the Integrated command structure (though not the alliance itself), and that all foreign NATO establishments must leave French territory in short order. The followed some complicated reshuffing and uprootings. Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) abondened Rocquen Court outside Paris for a new home at Casteau near Mon in Belgium, while the headquarters of Allied Forces Central Europe betook itself to a still – smoking coalmine at Brunssum in the Netherlands. The Americans transferred their naval units in the Mediterranean from France to Italy, they had to re-route their lines of communications to Germany around French territory, and they transferred their aircraft from French airfields to bases in Britain and a dangerously crowded area of Germany. In the Rhineland and the Palatinate. In due course it transpired that France was quite willing to have NATO's political headquarters stayed in Paris. However, the other allies, spurred on by Britain and the USA, decided that, partly for operational reasons, it would have to accompany SACEUR'S military headquarters (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, alias SHAPE) in a more to the Brussels area.
But the last Paris meeting of NATO Council, which took place that December, showed how prevalent a desire to keep close relations with France was among NATO members.  

5. NATO’S Policies

In 1949 the Soviet Union exploded its first nuclear bomb and in 1953 its first hydrogen bomb, only nine months after the first similar test by the USA. In 1950s they both brought the so called tactical (or battle field or theatre, nuclear weapons to Europe – the USA about 1953, the USSR about 1957. The Eisenhower administration (1953-61) developed a strategy known as ‘massive retaliation’ to deal with the growth in nuclear capability. According to this doctrine, aggression against the United States or its allies would be deterred with the threat of massive retaliatory nuclear strikes. The Alliance adopted “The Massive Retaliation” in 1957 (contain in NATO document MC 14-2). This was based on the firm intention that, should deterrence fail, nuclear weapons would be used at any early stage. The conventional forces would not, because of their limited size, be expected to defeat a determined attack but rather to act as a trip-wire to allow time for nuclear retaliation to be implemented.

The whole concept of nuclear deterrence, especially in its present version which called for maximum deterrence, and above all, the insistence of NATO on the first-use option for nuclear weapons was based on the assertion that the Socialist States had massive superiority in the field of conventional weapons in general and in the military situation in Europe in particular.

During 1950s, NATO adopted a military strategy of “the sword and the shield”. NATO ground forces supplied the shield. They served the dual purpose of blunting an enemy’s initial attack and (sometimes referred to as the “trip-wire”) alerting Western
government to the threat. Then the NATO "sword"—overwhelming nuclear air and missile power was to strike against both the source of aggression and hostile armies in the field. It was said that the American and other allies NATO ground forces deployed in Germany were there as 'trip-wire' designed to set off the NATO nuclear deterrent. On July 1953, General Mathew Ridgway was succeeded by General Alfred M. Gruenther as a new Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). In 1954, in response to NSC162/2, NATO, under the direction of General Alfred M. Gruenther, conducted a study to assess the implications of changing NATO's strategy to a greater reliance on nuclear weapons. The findings of this study, leaked to the press in July 1954, by nothing:

1. Warfare in the future would inevitably by nuclear;
2. the first atomic targets would be armed forces and military installations rather than major centers of population;
3. the peak of destruction would come at the outset of war;
4. therefore the outcome would be determined by the active forces in being.

On November, 1956, General Lauris Norstad succeeded General Alfred M. Gruenther as a SACEUR. On the other hand Paul-Henri Spaak (from Belgium) succeeded Lord Ismay as NATO's Secretary-General in 1957. In this period General Norstad a NATO Supreme Commander had twenty-five divisions or the equivalent, most of them in markedly improved fighting condition.

The strategy of massive retaliation changed when the Soviet Union developed a nuclear arsenal comparable with that of the United States. It was all very well to threaten the Soviets with genocide when they could not reply in kind. But when they could NATO changed its tune and took on a policy flexible response. The adoption of flexible response (advocated by the Kennedy administration from the start and continued by Johnson, although not adopted as official NATO doctrine until 1967. This strategy
went through various iterations, its last formulation being in document known as MC-14/3, which was approved by NATO in 1967. According to MC14/3, NATO military strategy aimed to preserve or to restore the territorial integrity of NATO countries. Initial reliance should be placed on forward defence along the inter-German border or other frontiers subjected to Soviet military penetration. If the Soviet advance was not halted, NATO forces should fall back, continuing the struggle with conventional weapons. If this still did not produce a successful defence, NATO would then go through a process of flexible response, gradually escalating to the use of battlefield nuclear weapons, theatre nuclear weapons, and, if necessary, intercontinental nuclear weapons. NATO 'flexible response' strategy was the result of a political compromise between Americans who desired more options before nuclear weapons were used, and Europeans who felt too many options would weaken rather than strengthen deterrence. The doctrine of 'flexible response' was regarded as a strategy primarily for countries with vast space, time and resources, the doctrine which it replaced of an early resort to nuclear weapons. But this posture soon lost its appeal in the early 1980s when the Soviet nuclear threat was enhanced by the SS-20s and NATO planned to meet this threat through the deployment of cruise missiles.

By 1980 NATO had 7,000 tanks on the Central Front (in Europe) compared to Warsaw Pact's 20,500 and 13,500 of which were Soviet. Soviet plans for rapid rates of advance, if successful, would overwhelm NATO's forces more quickly than they could be reinforced. Soviet deployment of SS-20s had also served the same purpose. It was a gross oversimplification to see the Soviet's maneuvers and arms buildup as a clear indication that they contemplated offensive action against NATO, just as it was naive to
wonder why Warsaw Pact forces were being expanded and equipped far beyond the defensive needs of the Soviet bloc.\textsuperscript{92}

In 1982 the Alliance was shaken by the reverberations of the Siberian gas pipeline issue. To the unwelcome spectacle of public bickering among Alliance members over strategic dependence on the Soviet Union and contributing through trade to Soviet military potential was added the trauma of sanctions being applied by one member state against commercial companies in others. This unfortunate state affairs had arisen by degrees as a result of marked changes in international economic intercourse. Western European Countries, in the light of a relatively recent experience of an oil embargo, had decided to diversity their sources of energy and raw material supplies. Meanwhile economic recession and unemployment had driven them to intensify, in part by offering – advantageous credit terms, their attempts to exploit the market offered by the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.\textsuperscript{93} Edmund Burke wrote, "A state without the means of some change is without the means of its conservation". The North Atlantic Alliance had shown since its foundation that its leaders appreciated the truth of that commend. NATO had never been afraid of change and indeed had welcomed it whatever it had seemed to offer the prospect of building a safer and saner world. In doing so the Alliance had been guided and would continue to be guided by the fundamental principle of renunciation of the threat and use of force which was enshrined in Article 1 of the North Atlantic Treaty. NATO's program for peace in Freedom adopted by the Bonn Summit in June 1982, provided another guideline enabling the Alliance to face further changes in the international environment whenever they occurred. The summit declaration also confirmed the purely defensive nature of the Alliance by stating that none of its weapons – and that
comprised conventional as well as nuclear weapons would ever be used, except in case of attack.  

The Eastern European revolutions against Communist rule occurred during Manfred Worner’s chairmanship of NATO, he succeeded Lord Carrington as Secretary General of NATO in 1989. On November 9, 1989, the decision of the East Germany government to pull down the Berlin Wall at the height of the Eastern European revolutions against Communist rule, and set the seal on the momentous political changes that took place during the year. At the insistence of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, the military structures of the Warsaw Pact were dissolved on April 11, 1990 in Moscow and the seventh member East Germany ceased to exist with German Unification on October 3, 1990. Finally on July 1, 1991, the leader of the Warsaw Pact signed the protocol dissolving the Warsaw Pact, thus ending a 36 year era of East-West conformation. Thus in one sense NATO had outlived its utility because its aim of arresting expansion of Communism had almost been achieved with the breaking up of the Soviet Union.

6. NATO’S NEW STRUCTURES*

Just a little more than a year after the terror attacks of 9-11, Alliance members met at a NATO Summit held in Prague in November 2002. The outcome of this historic summit resulted in an agreement providing for a truly remarkable set of changes for the Alliance, transforming the fifty year old, cold war structure of NATO into an organization designed to meet the uncertain world. NATO set a new course that is transforming virtually every aspect of the organization. Among the changes, NATO leaders agreed to at the Prague Summit were to streamline its command structure to provide a leaner, more efficient, effective and deployable force

* See Figure 7. NATO’s New Military Command Structure, p.XXI
capable of meeting the operational requirements for the full range of Alliance missions. With remarkable decisiveness and discipline, NATO best demonstrated its commitment to transformation by reducing the number of major headquarters from twenty to eleven. Considering that NATO’s military command structure during the Cold War stood at 78 major headquarters, this achievement is truly revolutionary. The most substantial changes was the redesignation of Strategic Allied Command Atlantic (SACLANT) as Atlantic Command Transformation (ACT), which no longer has an operational command function. With its headquarters located in Norfolk, Virginia, ACT’s primary function is to “oversee the transformation of NATO’s military capabilities.”

Allied Command Europe (ACE) is now designated as Allied Command Operations (ACO) but its functions remain unchanged. With three major joint forces commands, ACO has assumed an expeditionary posture. Joint Headquarters Command is located in Lisbon and has assumed the operational command function of SACLANT with the capability to form a maritime Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF). Joint Forces Command North and South integrate their land, air, and naval component commands into a functional joint force. Between them, they can form a land-based CJTF.
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