ABSTRACT

NATO and European Security: A Case Study of Bosnian and Kosovo Crises

The political history of Europe for the last two centuries may be viewed, at least in part, as a continual process of alliance formation and dissolution as the great powers and their smaller consorts sought the elusive goals of security and aggrandizement. If in 1812 Britain, Prussia and Russia could combine to defeat the Imperial Napoleon, why in 1949 should not Britain, France and later West Germany join to oppose the more contemporary threat of Soviet expansionism? True, crucial to the new pact, was the United States, culturally if not geographically European, but the method remained the same: to ally in order to meet a common enemy.

An attempt is made in this thesis to trace out the bond between the United States and its European allies since the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949.

This Thesis "NATO and European Security: A Case Study of Bosnian and Kosovo Crises" consists of five chapters and select bibliography.

The first chapter deals with the origin and historical development of NATO.

For a short period after 1945 the Americans talked about rolling back the frontiers of Communism, but any attempt to do this would provoke a World War III, because Russians regarded control of Eastern Europe as essential to their security. The mission was clearcut in Greece. To the American planners of 1947, World Communism had chosen Greece as its target, with Greek
communists as the agent. Hence the United States had undertaken to arm, train, and supply a successful Greek resistance to communist subversion. In March 1947 the United States announced that instead of rolling back Communism it would not allow the Soviet Union to control areas other than those they held in 1947. The American followed up this statement with attempts to form alliance system which would effectively surround the Soviet Union. The most important of these alliances was the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); formed in April 1949.

The second chapter deals with NATO and European Security, when Soviet power collapsed in Eastern Europe in 1989, and intense debate developed over the roles Europe's security institutions should play in the new era. Some, led by Moscow, favored abolishing both the Warsaw Pact and NATO and giving primacy to a pan-European collective security organization, perhaps in the form of a strengthened Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Others, led by Paris, believed that NATO was still needed, but that primacy should be given to European institutions such as the Western European Unions and the European Community (now European Union). Still others, led by Washington and London, believed that direct American engagement in European security affairs was still indispensable and that NATO, which provided the organizational framework for American engagement in Europe, was indispensable as well. According to this line of thinking, NATO needed to be preserved, reformulated, and made the centerpiece of Europe's new security architecture. American policy — makers wanted NATO to serve both as framework for European security and as a vehicle for supporting US strategy in the rest of the world.
The NATO Summit held in Madrid on July, 1997, was to invite the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary any to join the alliance by 1999.

The NATO summit held in Prague on November 2002, NATO took the historic step of inviting seven Central and East European States, i.e. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria to join NATO, increasing the number of NATO’s member states from 19 to 26 countries.

The third chapter deals with role of NATO in Bosnian crisis. The provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina formed part of the Turkish (Ottoman) Empire for almost 400 years. Following the declarations of independence by Slovenia and Croatia in June, 1991. On 1st March, 1992, Bosnia and Herzegovina declared the republic’s independence but Serb-dominated territories in Bosnia and Herzegovina declared their intent to remain within the Yugoslav federation, then war broke out in Bosnia.

NATO foreign ministers, meeting in June 1992, approved for the first time the formation of a force that could be used outside the territory of the alliance states. On 12 April 1993, NATO began enforcing the ‘no-fly’ zone over Bosnia and Herzegovina. As a further precedent, member states operating in the NATO framework had been providing protective air cover for UNPROFOR troops operating on the ground to deter attacks against the ‘safe areas’ established by the Security Council, namely Sarajevo, Bihac, Tuzla, Gorazde, Zepa.

The Serbs provoked the Western allies on August 28, 1995, by firing a shell into a Sarajevo market, killing 38 civilians and triggering NATO’s air strikes. Then NATO conducted the largest combat operation in its history. American, French, British, Italian, Dutch, Spanish and Turkish warplanes flew 500 missions from
bases in Italy and aircraft carriers in the Adriatic. Even as the
diplomats put the final touches on their agreement to divide Bosnia
and Herzegovina into “two entities”, 49% of Bosnia to go to the
Serbs and 51% to go to Muslim–Croat Federation, NATO warplanes
were blasting Serbian military targets throughout Bosnia for the
second straight week. By Friday, (September 11, 1995), when the
diplomats met in Geneva, NATO airforces had flown more than 2000
sorties.

The Dayton Accord, which ended the war was signed on
December 14, 1995 by the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

The forth chapter deals with role of NATO in Kosovo crisis,
Kosovo was the autonomous province of Serbia. In 1974, the Kosovo
Albanians had been given autonomy by Tito, to help protect their
tradition and culture. On July 5, 1990, when the Serbian Parliament
took over the functions of the Assembly and the government of
Kosovo, thereby withdrawing from the province the autonomy it was
granted by the Yugoslav Constitution of 1974.

The North Atlantic Council was firmly opposed to
independence for Kosovo and to a continuation of the unacceptable
status quo. In mid-1998, NATO conducted a number of military
exercises in Albania, in conjunction with the Albanian armed
forces, in an attempt to increase pressure on the Serbian
Government to end military action in Kosovo.

On March 24, 1999, U.S.-led NATO forces launched cruise
missiles and bombs at targets throughout the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (FRY), plunging America into a military conflict that
President Clinton said was necessary to stop ethnic cleansing and
bring stability to Eastern Europe”. On June 10, 1999 , UNSC
Resolution 1244 set the basis for ending air campaign. The air
operation was suspended by Secretary – General Javier Solana of NATO on June 10, 1999, after Milosevic had accepted the prescribed conditions and was formally ended on June 20, 1999, consequent to the withdrawal of all Serb military, special-police and para-military forces from Kosovo.

The fifth chapter, the concluding section deals with the distinctive aspects of NATO and European Security and its future course of action. The larger issue for NATO is how to deal with such security threats far from its traditional sphere of operation. The alliance last revised its strategic concept in 1991, shifting from a policy of static defence against the Soviet Union to a regional – oriented one reflecting the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact. When NATO intervened in Bosnia that involvement at least had the formal sanction of the U.N. Security Council and the Dayton Peace Accord signed by all parties involved in the conflict. In the Kosovo crisis, it had no mandate from the U.N. Security Council for acting against Yugoslavia. Its indulgence in military muscle flexing was quite contrary to the wishes of the Security Council which in its resolution 1199 on Kosovo had refrained from prescribing use of force to achieve the purpose of the resolution. But Washington and NATO had sidelined the U.N., thus signalling the formal transition of NATO from an organisation committed to mutual defence to that of international policemen.