CHAPTER – 3

Role Of NATO In Bosnian Crisis

1. The Background of the Bosnia and Herzegovina

The provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina formed part of the Turkish (Ottoman) Empire for almost 400 years before annexation to the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1878. On 4th December 1918 the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes were proclaimed when the Serbs and Croats agreed with ethnic groups to establish a common state under the Serbian monarchy, and in January 1929 King Alexander imposed a dictatorship, changing the name of the country to Yugoslavia.

Though officially banned in 1921, the Communist Part of Yugoslavia (CPY) operated clandestinely, and in 1937 Josep Broz (alias Tito) became the General Secretary of the CPY. During the second World War, Tito’s Partisans, who were from a variety of ethnic groups and were united by ideology rather than ethnicity, dominated most of Bosnia and Herzegovina, simultaneously waging war against invading German and Italian troops, the ‘Ustasa’ regime in Croatia and the Serb-dominated ‘Chetniks’. On Tito’s victory, after the war, Bosnia and Herzegovina was made a constituent republic of the Yugoslav federation (despite Serbian pressure to limit the region to provincial status).

The Federative People’s Republic of Yugoslavia was proclaimed on 29 November 1945. A Soviet-type Constitution, establishing a federation of six republics (Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina) and two autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina was adopted in
January 1946. The death of Tito and the collapse of Communist rule destroyed the fabric which has held the country together. The federal system, which balanced power between the large republics, slowly broke down, and the newly elected nationalist leaders in Croatia and Serbia set the course which led to war.

The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (formerly the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a constituent republic of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) was situated in South-eastern Europe. It was bounded by Croatia to the north and West, by Serbia to the east and by Montenegro to the South-east. The Muslims (the majority of whom belonged to the Sunni sect) were the largest religious grouping in Bosnia and Herzegovina, comprising 43.7% of the population in 1991. Religious affiliation was roughly equated with ethnicity, the Serbs (31.4% of the population) belonging to the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Croats (17.3%) being members of the Roman Catholic Church.

In the republican election in November and December 1990, the ruling League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina was ousted, and the three main parties to emerge were all nationalist: the Muslim (Bosniak) of the Party of Democratic Action (PDA), with 86 seats; the Serbian Democratic Party (SDP), with 72 seats; and the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (CDU-BH), an affiliate of the ruling CDU party of Croatia, with 44 seats. On 20 December 1990 they announced that Dr. Alija Izetbegovic of the PDA was to be President of the Presidency, Jure Pelivan of the CDU-BH was to be President of the Executive Council (Prime Minister) and Momcilo Krajisnik of the SDP was to be President of the Assembly.
In 1991 the politics of Bosnia and Herzegovina were increasingly dominated by the Serb-Croat conflict. Following the declarations of independence by Slovenia and Croatia in June, Serb-dominated territories in Bosnia and Herzegovina declared their intent to remain within the Yugoslav federation (or in a ‘Greater Serbia’). On 9-10 November 1991 the referendum of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Serbs overwhelming supported their remaining in a Yugoslav or Serb State. However, in another referendum held on 29th February and 1st March 1992, which was open to all ethnic groups but was boycotted by the Serbs, 99.4% of the 63% of the electorate who participated, were in favour of full independence. President Izetbegovic immediately declared the republic’s independence and omitted the word ‘socialist’ from the new state’s official title.7

When Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina declared independence and appealed for international recognition, Macedonia had no choice but to follow suit. Otherwise it would have been swallowed up by Serbia.8

The European Community (EC, now European Union – EU) and USA recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina’s independence on 7th April 1992. On 27th March the Serbs announced the formation of a ‘Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which comprised Serbian-held area of the republic (about 65% of the total area), which was to be headed by Dr. Radovan Karadzic.9

On June 1992, Francois Mitterrand visited Sarajevo. The French President’s trip galvanized humanitarian relief efforts in Sarajevo. Until the visit, Western leadership had been in a stupor. NATO declined a large role; the EC, riven by dissent and discouraged by its inability to make a cease-fire stick, more or less
gave up; the United States talked tough but refused to act unilaterally. On July 1992 there was a major development in the Bosnian conflict, when a breakaway Croat state, 'The Croatian Union of Herzeg-Bosna', was declared. The new state covered about 30% of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina and was headed by Mate Boban. Izetbegovic's Government promptly declared it illegal, and Karadzic proposed Serbs and Croats partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina among themselves. The United Nations started dispatching United Nations Protection Force – 'UNPROFOR' to Bosnia and Herzegovina in mid-July 1992, and it had imposed the 'no fly zone' on Bosnian airspace in October of the same year.

2. THE ROLE OF NATO IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (1992-93)

NATO foreign ministers, meeting in Norway on June 1992, approved for the first time the formation of a force that could be used outside the territory of the alliance states. Finally, impelled by scenes of civilian slaughter in Sarajevo, the U.S. and its European allies went to work on June, 1992 to impose economic sanctions on Serbia. NATO stated its readiness to provide support to peace operations under the auspices of the UN Security Council. So NATO adopted a series of critical decisions leading to NATO naval and air force operations. In June 1992 NATO ships belonging to the Alliance’s Standing Naval Force Mediterranean, assisted by NATO Maritime Patrol Aircraft, began monitoring operations in the Adriatic. NATO undertook these operations independently in support of the UN arms embargo against all republics of the formers Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 'FRY' (resolution 713) and sanctions against FRY (resolution 757). They also established full control of the Yugoslav coast. According to NATO reports, since
November 1992, 63,000 vessels were inspected, and after April 1993 no ship managed to break the barrier and violate the embargo, additionally tightened by resolution 820.\textsuperscript{14}

In July 1992, Washington sent conflicting signals. First it ordered a naval task force, including 2,200 marines, into the Adriatic Sea off the coast of Yugoslavia. Then, apparently satisfied that the Serbs took the point, Washington sent the ships to liberty ports in Italy and Greece for the Fourth of July weekend. The U.S. restricted itself to sending in supplies into Sarajevo aboard airforce C-130, transport planes and threatening air and naval action if the Serbs interfered. So the first two flights into Sarajevo completed safely, and there were contingency plans for retaliation if something went wrong later on.\textsuperscript{15}

NATO began enforcing the 'no-fly' zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina on 12\textsuperscript{th} April 1993. The Alliance's action, which was being pursued under the authority of UN Security Council Resolution 816, was decided by the North Atlantic Council on 8\textsuperscript{th} April 1993.\textsuperscript{16} NATO airborne warning and control planes were monitoring the 'no-fly' zone established by the Security Council over Bosnia and Herzegovina in October 1992, and since April 1993, fighter and reconnaissance planes of NATO member states, now numbering some 100, were providing the teeth to enhance the Council's interdiction on military flights. And, since July 1993, as a further precedent, member states operating in the NATO framework had been providing protective air cover for UNPROFOR troops operating on the ground to deter attacks against the 'Safe areas' established by the Security Council.\textsuperscript{17} Srebrenica was the first town to be adopted as a safe area in April 1993. The next June this formula was applied to another five areas, namely Sarajevo, Bihac, Tuzla, Gorazde, Zepa.\textsuperscript{18}
According to Bosnian government sources up to July 1993, the war in Bosnia alone had cost 139,000 dead and missing; 68,000 seriously wounded; 3 million refugees; 38 towns substantially destroyed; 800 mosques demolished; 200 Churches destroyed; 3 million people without power; 2.5 million people without water. 19

The Bosnian forces, which included Serbs and Croats as well as Muslims, now controlled only 10% of the land and were desperately seeking Western military intervention to reverse the Serbian tide. 20 In March, 1993, without firing a single shot, America had intervened in Bosnia. Bill Clinton's decision to parachute food and medicine to besieged eastern villages moved the United States a critical step deeper into the Balkan crisis if only by talking the lead in providing humanitarian aid. In fact, despite backing from allies, the United States ended up acting alone: with the exception of Turkey and the Netherlands, NATO members declined to offer planes or supplies. 21

Containing the conflict in the Bosnian area was one of the prime goals of President Clinton. The constrict and contain option was a hash of measures already in place. It preserved the no-fly zone and sanctions against Serbia and renewed the threat of a war-crimes tribunal. In addition, it aimed to:-

- Press Serbia to accept U.N. monitors or troops along with Serbia-Bosnia border to police Belgrade’s blockade of Bosnian Serb territory, and to place monitors on the Bosnia-Croatia border.
- Threaten Croatia with sanctions unless it cuts off support to Bosnian Croats. 22

This new option also raised fresh suspicions that the West was implicitly ratifying the process of “ethnic cleansing”. The first cracks in the alliance were French made. Foreign Minister of
France, Alain Juppe criticized Washington's minimalism, citing its continued refusal to commit ground forces to a United Nations contingent and its unwillingness to use air power to protect the Muslims. Italy was next, apparently miffed that it wasn't consulted. Then Germany and Turkey weighted in with objections on moral grounds, arguing that they ratified Serbian aggression. Lastly, in June 1993 the United States began deploying 300 troops to join a 700-strong U.N. peacekeeping force already in Macedonia. The force was supposed to be a tripwire, though after Clinton's cave-in over Bosnia, it was not clear that the Serbs would be deterred from attacking. In August 1993's attacks on U.N. troops in Sarajevo by the Bosnian Serbs - at the Olympic Stadium and T.V. Station - the allies seemed willing to help this time. Washington called a meeting of the North Atlantic Council, NATO's governing political body, to determine when and how airstrikes would be launched from Aviano, the Italian air base. Among the possible targets: Serbian artillery batteries and ammunition dumps, transport depots and routes, command-and-control centers and bridges over the Drina river.

A demilitarised zone had been established on Mt. Igman in August 1993, when Bosnian Government forces were in full retreat from the Bosnian Serbs. Following an ultimatum from NATO to the Serbs to withdraw their forces from Mt. Igman, an agreement was negotiated on 14 August 1993 by Gen. Briquenmont for all forces to be withdrawn from the region. On 6 October 1993, a Bosnian Army patrol crossed the demilitarised zone and killed 20 Serbian soldiers. The NATO's position regarding the use of air strikes against the Bosnian Army, which was in permanent violation of the NATO ultimatum covering the demilitarised zone on Mt. Igman. NATO was not prepared to carry out airstrikes against the Bosnian
Army merely because they were in the demilitarised zone in violation of the NATO ultimatum. For the first time it was being officially told that NATO had taken sides in the war. In the same month, President Bill Clinton once again warned of possible airstrikes on Serbian positions in the hills around Sarajevo. The Serbs, who on October 16, 1993 gave the city its worst one-day drubbing in at least three months.

3. THE ROLE OF NATO IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA IN 1994

At the moment, NATO air forces were operating in support of UNPROFOR whose ground operations were essentially humanitarian in nature, while the highly effective maritime embargo had been mounted in conjunction with the WEU to support the enforcement of UN Security Council Resolution 820. The reality was that NATO integrated forces made the largest single contribution to the international effort in former Yugoslavia. Excluding forces serving directly under UN Command, there were now over 100 aircraft, more than a dozen highly capable ships and some 10,000 men and women from Alliance nations conducting NATO integrated maritime and air operations in support of the United Nations effort, 24 hours a day, seven days a week. In addition, a further 15,000 personnel were contributed directly by Alliance nations to UNPROFOR operations. Thus out of a total of approximately 34,000 personnel now committed in support of UN operations associated with the former Yugoslavia, about 25,000 - that was about three quarters of them - came directly or via the Alliance from NATO nations.

In January, 1994, once again NATO repeated its threats of airstrikes against the Serbs if they didn’t let up. The Serbs continued a bombardment heavier that any in the war so far. "Sarajevans will not be counting the dead", Bosnian Serb leader
Radovan Karadzic bawed in a speech to his rump parliament in January. "They will be counting the living." The Serbs had been threatened so many times with so little alliance follow up—more than 1,000 violations of the no-fly zone over Bosnia had gone unchallenged.

When a Serb shell killed 68 people and wounded an additional 200 in February 1994, NATO established a 20.12 KM heavy weapons—exclusion zone around the city of Sarajevo and forced the Serbs to put their guns under U.N. Control. It was decided that, ten days from 2400 GMT 10 February 1994, heavy weapons of any of the parties founded within the Sarajevo exclusion zone, unless controlled by UNPROFOR, would, along with their direct and essential military support facilities, be subjected to NATO airstrikes which would be conducted in close coordination with the UN Security Council and would be consistent with the North Atlantic Council’s decisions of 2 and 9 August 1993.

In February, 1994, NATO was satisfied that virtually all heavy weapons in and around Sarajevo had either been withdrawn or placed under effective UNPROFOR control. NATO’s objectives set on 9 February were now being met. Diplomacy could succeed when it was backed by credible actions. The solidarity and resolve of this Alliance had borne fruit. In March, 1994, six Serbian Jastreb ground-attack fighters left Banja Luka on a bombing mission to the Muslim munitions depot at Novi Travnik. Two U.S. Air Force F-16s, patrolling the no-fly zone over Bosnia, ordered the jets to descend; when their warnings were ignored, they shot down four of the Jastrebs in what amounted to NATO’s first military action in its 45-year history.

It was in March, 1994 also in Washington Bosnian and Croatian leaders signed two documents to establish a Bosnian
federation and link to Croatia. The federation agreements was both complex and incomplete. It provided for a merger of the Croat and Muslim areas of Bosnia under a strong central government and for a system of cantons with their own legislatures and courts.37

Within weeks after the Croat formed the federation with Bosnia planeloads of Iranian arms began arriving at Zagreb airport, waiting for shipment over the border to the weapons starved Muslims. John Kenneth Galbraith, the first U.S. ambassador to Croatia, his role in permitting Iranian arms to be sold to the Bosnian Muslims, not withstanding a U.N. arms embargo, Galbraith convinced Franjo Tudjman (Croatian President) that the road to favor in Washington was through friendship with Sarajevo.38 A three-week assault by Serbs during April 1994, turned Gorazde into a slaughter house, leaving more than 700 people dead and more than 1,900 wounded. NATO threatened the Bosnian Serbs with immediate airstrikes if they continued to attack Gorazde, giving them 24 hours to withdraw 1.9 miles from the centre of the town, and five days to pull back heavy weapons beyond a 12.4 mile exclusion zone.39 By Friday, April 15, 1994, Serb forces had moved artillery and armored vehicles into surrounding hills and pounded away at city of 65,000 civilians with howitzers, and mortars and tank cannons. On Saturday, April 16, 1994, afternoon, as Bosnian radio reported fretfully that tanks were rolling through Gorazde and firing into residential areas, NATO dispatched six planes to search for a Serb tank lobbing shells into Gorazde from the city’s outskirts. Bad weather forced the planes back, but not before a surface-to-air missile launched by the Serbs downed a British Sea Harrier Jet.40 The Bosnian Serbs wanted to just say no. They did not intend to accept the U.S. – European proposal for partitioning war-torn Bosnia and Herzegovina. The map was the heart of last-ditch peace
effort offered by the so-called Contact Group of the U.S., Russia, Britain, France and Germany. When the proposal was presented to the Muslim-led Bosnian government and the Serb rebels on July 6, 1994, it came with a ultimatum: if they turned it down, they would be punished. The Bosnian government signed on without conditions. But the Serbs, who never met a peace plan they liked, with called the bluff. The Bosnian Serbs, also viewed the 49% share they were allotted as too small, their troops had already captured 72% of the country. In August, 1994, NATO aircraft conducted airstrikes at request of UNPROFOR, NATO aircraft attacked a target within the Sarajevo Exclusion Zone on the afternoon of Friday, (5 August, 1994). The Strikes were ordered following agreement between NATO and UNPROFOR, after weapons were seized by Bosnian Serbs from a weapons collection site near Sarajevo early that morning. The Serbs in the zone brushed aside U.N. troops in the suburb of Ilidza and took back a T-55 tank, two armored personnel carriers and a mobile gun and shot at a U.N. helicopter trailing their escape. At this provocation, the United Nations asked NATO to strike. Two U.S. ‘A-10 Warthogs’ soon found an M-18 mobile “tank buster” cannon 14 kilometers outside Sarajevo and chewed it to pieces in seconds with their 30 MM Machine guns. Russia, which had opposed such action in the past, promptly blamed the Serbs for provoking it. Earlier in the week the rebel’s longtime patron, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, slammed their borders shut and even cut off their phones, furious over their final refusal to accept the peace plan devised weeks ago by the joint Western Russian Contact Group. On Thursday night (September 18, 1994) that NATO planes had struck again on the outskirts of Sarajevo. NATO fighter-bombers hit Bosnian Serb positions near the capital for the fourth time since February in retaliation for attacks on U.N.
forces. The planes struck a Bosnian Serb position 11.3 km west of Sarajevo, destroying a tank. The NATO action was authorized by Yasushi Akashi, the top U.N. official in the former Yugoslavia, after two French soldiers were wounded, one seriously, in four separate attacks. The peacekeepers had placed themselves between opposing Bosnian Serb and Bosnian government troops, when heavy fighting broke out on September 18, in the Sarajevo suburb of Sedrenik. Once again, NATO had bombed an obsolete Serb tank on September 22, 1994, in an attempt to enforce the breached heavy-weapons exclusion zone around Sarajevo, the Serbs quickly stopped all aid convoys. In the course of two weeks, for the first time in 31 months of war, the Bosnian government forces had retaken some 150 sq. km. of territory from the Serbs near Bihac in the north, made significant gains around strategic Mount Igman overlooking the capital of Sarajevo and recaptured the town of Kupres and perhaps an additional 100 sq. km. in central Bosnia. After the two Serbian jets bombed Bihac and the centre of the nearby two of Cazin. On Saturday (November 19, 1994), the U.N. Security Council voted to permit NATO airstrikes into Croatia, forcing NATO officials to confer nervously on how to put the resolution into effect. On Monday (November 21, 1994), 39 allied planes repaid Croatian Serbs for using napalm and cluster bombs against civilians in Bihac a so-called "safe area" in northwest Bosnia-by cratering an airbase in Udbina. "Clearly the signal had been sent", said Adm. Leighton Smith, commander of NATO forces in Southern Europe. Problem was, the Serbs didn't get it: they responded by repairing the runway, pressing their attack on the besieged enclave and firing on a couple of patrolling British jets. On Wednesday (November 23, 1994), more than 50 NATO aircraft hit three Serbian missile sites. In return, the Serbs took 250 U.N. soldiers hostage, and moved to
within a half-mile of Bihac, where they rained shells on 45,000 apartment dwellers, 20,000 refugees and the hundreds of mostly unarmed Bangladeshi U.N. troops. On Friday (November 25, 1994) NATO planes set off to pound the offending artillery pieces, but failed to find them.48

At a NATO meeting in Brussels, the U.S. proposed creating a weapons-exclusion zone around Bihac, like the one around Sarajevo, from which all artillery and tanks would have to be withdrawn. For the French and British, it was typical American naïveté. Exclusion zones need ground troops to monitor the terrain, take weaponry into holding areas and report violations. The U.S. suggested policing the proposed zone with aircraft. The allies again said no.49

4. THE ROLE OF NATO IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA IN 1995

The United Nations embargo on arms shipments to Bosnia was full of holes. Of 24,200 vessels challenged by NATO warship in the Adriatic Sea over the past two years, only three were found to contain military contraband intended for Bosnia. Arms and ammunition filtered into the beleaguered country on other routes: by air from Muslim supporter such as Turkey or Iran and over land from Croatia, Bosnia’s new — ally. Tanks and heavy weapons were harder to smuggle, but even they were beginning to show up on the Bosnian side of the lines.50

On May 7, 1995, a Bosnian Serb shell killed 11 people in a Sarajevo suburb. The next day Bill Clinton asked Anthony Lake, his national security advisor, to persuade the allies to strike back. Soon after the attack Lt. Gen. Rupert Smith, the U.N. commander in Bosnia, requested airstrikes, but was overruled by his civilian counterpart in the U.N. mission, Yasushi Akashi.51 The Serbs had
already been shelling the Bosnian capital from inside the zone, breaking the February 1994, agreement. The Serbs made the nose thumbing official by brassily pulling three artillery pieces and a mortar out of U.N. impoundment depot, firing them at Sarajevo and ignoring a U.N. – NATO ultimatum to hand them back. This time, that was too much even for Yasushi Akashi; the top U.N. Official in Bosnia. He had vetoed several previous requests by local U.N. commanders for bombing strikes, but this time he approved one. It came on Thursday (June 1, 1995) and was more than the usual pinprick: a squadron of 15 NATO planes flying out of Italy-Mostly American-bombed ammunition dumps just outside Pale, the Bosnian Serb’s so called capital. The Serbs retaliated by shelling five to the six U.N. – established “safe zone” in Bosnia, killing 76 people.52
On Friday (June 2, 1995), a U.S. Air Force F-16 had been shot down over the Bosnian Serb stronghold of Banja Luka.53
After using tanks to drive Dutch peacekeepers out of their observation posts and taking several of them hostage, the Serbs drew up less than a Kilometer from Srebrenica. On Monday (July 10, 1995), Bosnian Serb Gen. Ratko Mladic issued his ultimatum: the population of the enclave and the 400-man Dutch battalion must leave. Throughout the day, fighting had been going on all over the area between Serbs and some 4,000 lightly armed Bosnian government troops; one Dutch peacekeeper was killed at a Bosnian roadblock. Serbs had already entered Srebrenica when NATO planes, finally called in for support, dropped their first bombs-500 pounders (225 kg) aimed at two tanks. That prompted the Serbs to threaten to kill the Dutch soldier they had captured and to shell the crowds of refugees already heading for the Dutch battalion’s base at Potocari.54 Srebrenica enclave fell on July 11, 1995. The relief workers and war-crimes investigators suggested that civilians in
Srebrenica around 6,000 to 9,000 men were killed by the Serbs. The war in Bosnia flared like a midsummer forest fire, defying the West’s wavering attempts to contain it. On Friday, July 21, 1995, the NATO allies announced a bold new plan to deter Serb aggression.

In the days that followed this call to arms, Gen. Ratko Mladic, the commander of the rebel Bosnia Serbs seized and “ethnically cleansed” one “safe area”, Zepa, and intensified a brutal assault of another, Bihac. By Tuesday, July 25, 1995, Bosnian Serbs finally occupied the eastern enclave of Zepa, which they had been attacking since June, and promptly ejected 5,000 women, children and old men because they were Muslim. “There are only 69 Ukrainians there,” said a senior NATO official. “And half of them are drunk”. The U.N. troops fired warning shots—not at the Serbs, but to warn Muslim Civilians of the Serb advance. This time, when the attackers closed in on the enclave, they reportedly left their tanks and artillery outside the town limits. “They are leaving them outside because they don’t want to suffer and more bad press”, said the NATO official.

The Croats helped out the Bosnian Muslims and took two towns in Bosnia controlled by the Serbs. Following that action, the Croats seemed to gear up for a full scale offensive to retake Krajina from the Serbs. On Friday (August 11, 1995), A Danish Soldier was killed and two poles were wounded when Croatian units began shelling several U.N. observation posts, two more peacekeepers, both Czech, had been killed, and more than 90 U.N. soldiers had been detained by the Croats. There was no immediate allied military response to the attacks, French General Bernard Janvier, head of U.N. troops in the former Yugoslavia, pledged air support to U.N. peacekeepers who were coming under fire. A pair of U.S. Navy
EA-6B warplanes demonstrated the allies' resolve at dust on Friday, when they unleashed a pair of missiles at a Serb missile battery near Knin. France and Britain condemned the assault, while the U.S. and Germany all but applauded it. The Serbs finally provoked the Western allies in August 29, 1995, by firing a shell into a Sarajevo market, killing 38 civilians and triggering NATO's air strikes.

At 2 a.m. on Wednesday (August 30, 1995), the first wave of aircraft took off in the dark from NATO bases in Italy and the USS Theodore Roosevelt. They bombed Serbian airdefense installations from Mostar to Gorazde to Tuzla. A second wave of F-18 and F-16 fighters and radar-jamming planes targeted ammunition depots and Serb command posts near Sarajevo. Succeeding waves on August 30, targeted Serb command posts and ammunition depots. NATO suspended bombing to look for French Pilots shot down near Pale. On August 31, NATO warplanes continued to strike targets around Sarajevo, hitting at least two ammunition dumps. Bad weather and low clouds prevented wider attacks.

Over three successive days from Wednesday (August 30, 1995) to Friday (September 1, 1995), NATO conducted the largest combat operation in its history. American, French, British, Italian, Dutch, Spanish and Turkish Warplanes flew 500 missions from bases in Italy and aircraft carriers in the Adriatic. When Richard Holbooke landed in Belgrade on Wednesday (August 30, 1995), the bombs had already been dropping from nine hours, and he had no idea whether Milosevic would even agree to see him. However, Milosevic handed the American envoy a document signed by Bosnian Serb leaders, including Gen. Ratko Mladic and Patriarch Pavle of the Serbian Orthodox Church. "Look", said Milosevic "I now speak for Pale". The Serbian President did what he had boasted he could do he had
delivered the Bosnian Serbs to the negotiating table. The idea was to bring the warring parties in Bosnia closer together, and with some overt stage management, the U.S. accomplished it literally. When the foreign ministers of Bosnia, Croatia and Serb-led Yugoslavia arrived at the American mission in Geneva of Friday (September 11, 1995). All of them accepted the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina in its present borders, they also approved dividing it in some undefined way into “two entities”, one a Bosnian Serb republic and the other the Muslim-Croat federation, 49% of Bosnia to go to the Serbs and 51% to the existing federation of Bosnian Muslims and Croats. Even as the diplomats put the final touches on their agreement, NATO warplanes were blasting Serb military targets in Bosnia for the second straight week. By Friday, (September 11, 1995), when the diplomats met in Geneva, NATO airforces had flown more than 2,000 sorties. For Holbrooke persuaded the Bosnian Serbs to end the siege of Sarajevo. Milosevic assured him he could force such an outcome. So NATO would halt the air campaign if the Bosnian Serbs moved some of their heavy weapons out of a 12.4 mile exclusion zone and the Bosnian Muslims refrained from the capital. On September 14, 1995, Bosnian Serbs agreed to withdraw heavy weapons from around Sarajevo and allow U.N. access, opened up the Sarajevo airport and one of two relief routes for the first time in months. NATO promptly put its airstrikes on hold and gave the Serbs three days- until Sunday (September 17, 1995) night – to begin fulfilling their promises. If they did so, the bombing pause would be extended for another three days to complete and verify the pullback.

The agreement, negotiated by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke in October, 1995, signed by Izetbegovic
and Bosnian Serb leaders Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, and witnessed by Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic, called for:

- A comprehensive cease-fire to commence at one minute after midnight (Tuesday, October 5, 1995) and continue for 60 days or until completion of peace talks.
- Restoration of gas and electricity to the besieged Bosnian Capital, Sarajevo.
- Exchange of all prisoner of war.
- Free passage of non-military traffic between Sarajevo and Gorazde, the Muslim enclave in eastern Bosnia.\(^6\)

In Dayton, Ohio, on November 1995, where the President of Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia were beginning negotiations aimed at ending the brutality of the war in Bosnia. Bosnia will be remained as a single state, with an equitable distribution of territory, free elections and democratic government. If peace is achieved, NATO must help secure it – and only NATO proven, strong, effective – can give the Bosnian people the breathing space they need to begin to reconcile and rebuild.\(^6\)

One proposal was for Bosnia’s new territories to be bordered by “zones of separation” that would provide a 2-KM wide buffer zone to keep opposing armies apart. There would also be “heavy-weapons-exclusion zones” to keep artillery, mortars and tanks an additional five miles from each side of the line. One task for the NATO troops would be maintaining those zones.\(^7\)

In November 1995, NATO planners were also working flat-out. They seemed to have made a breakthrough—an agreement on the terms under which Russian troops would join the 60,000 person “implementation force” that was designed to oversee a peacedeal.\(^7\)
The overall commander of IFOR, U.S. Adm. Leighton Smith, would set up his headquarters in Sarajevo. The country would be divided into three sectors: The American, headquartered at Tuzla; the British, at Gornji Vakuf, and; the French, at Sarajevo. A Russian contingent of roughly 3,000 men probably would deploy in American zone. IFOR troops would employ standard NATO rules of engagement, meaning that they can shoot first if they think they have to. President Milosevic had agreed to give up the safe haven of Gorazde, connected by a corridor to Sarajevo. In return, Bosnian Muslim would give up Srebrenica and Zepa, and permitted a widening of the Posavina Corridor, which linked Serb-controlled Bosnian territories in the northwest and the northeast with each other and with Serbia. The settlement on Sarajevo not only turned the city over to the Muslim-Croat federation’s administration but also ceded four Serb Suburbs. It would be a very tricky business for the Muslims and Croats to take control of them.

5. The NATO’s Role After the Dayton Agreement

The Muslim-Croat Federation and Republika Srpska (RS) were created by the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (commonly known as the “Dayton Accord”) which ended the war. The Accord was signed on December 14, 1995 by the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia when the transfer of authority took place on 20 December 1995, from the commander of UN Peace Forces to the commander of IFOR. IFOR’s first priority was to establish a secure environment, in which that IFOR was indeed different from its predecessor, UNPROFOR—the United Nations Protection Force. This was accomplished within hours of transfer of authority by IFOR forces knocking down checkpoints and crossing
the former confrontation lines into Serb-held areas, areas in which UNPROFOR had not previously been allowed to venture.  

In Sarajevo, some 40 positions (20 Serb and 20 Bosniac) were evaluated and/or destroyed on D+7 that was seven days after transfer of authority; former warring faction forces removed all forces and weapons from the two-kilometer exclusion zone along the entire former line of confrontation and the checkpoints were removed. 60 days after the authority was transferred from the U.N. to NATO on December 1995. Some 2,500 transport flights, 50 ships and 380 trains moved over 200,000 tons of Cargo and nearly 40,000 troops into Bosnia and Herzegovina. In January, 1996, an Italian sentry in Vogosca, Serb Sarajevo Suburb, was shot, apparently by a serb. In the move difficult British and French sectors – as had four of the five woundings of NATO troops by mines so far. In this month also, it forced a resolution of the most serious incident D-Day. Serbs in the heartline Sarajevo of Ilidza, which was not under French jurisdiction, abducted 16 Muslims traveling through the area. NATO sent its top aides to visit the Serbs in Ilidza and read them the riot act. The 16 were quickly released.

In February 1996, a NATO unit of commando from a U.S. Special Forces Blackhawk helicopter landed onto a snow-covered former skichatet 20 miles west of Sarajevo, in territory controlled by the Bosnian government. They stormed in. By the mission's end, they had arrested end, they had arrested 11 men suspected of being terrorists, three of them Iranians, the rest of them Bosnian Muslims. The commandos found a stunning array of sniper rifles, rocket-launchers and children's toys wired with plastic explosives – one a booby - trapped ice-cream cone. And NATO also discovered six similar outposts in Sarajevo, Zenica and Tuzla, the base of the American forces.
IFOR's original mandate was to separate the warring parties and take away their heavy weapons, arresting accused war criminals only “if they happened to bump into them,” as a U.S. official put it. Already, NATO forces were paying more attention to war crimes. As many as 200 U.S. troops were assigned to protect investigators digging up mass graves near Srebrenica. Some 7,000 IFOR military engineers had repaired and maintained over 2,500 kilometers of roads, repaired and opened up airports, demined and repaired rail-lines; surveyed damaged power supplies and assisted local engineers with repairs, assisted in repairing water supply system and constructing new systems, and constructed or repaired over 60 bridges in the country.

IFOR had a specialised group of about 350 personnel such as lawyers, educators, public transportations specialists, engineers, agriculture experts, economists, public health officials, veterinarians, communications experts and many others. These were part of a Civil-Military team, referred to as CIMIC, who provided technical advice and assistance to various commissions and working groups, and to parties, civil organizations and non-governmental organizations, IFOR units and local authorities. In July, 1996, war crimes investigators, guarded by NATO troops, began exhuming the mass graves of the victims, more than 60 bodies had been founded at a site called Cerska. When the Dayton accords that ended the fighting in Bosnia were signed, the national and municipal elections scheduled for September 14, 1996. NATO deployed every available soldier to guard 4,000 polling places and in effect instructed troops to shoot anyone who tried to disrupt the process. The world's most complicated election. Fifty-five parties were fielding 3,492 candidates for federal and regional offices, electing three ethnic presidents to a joint presidency, and a separate Serb
president, and two pair of parliamentary bodies, one for the Muslim-Croat federation and one for the Serb Republic.

4.1 IFOR support covered three areas:

- **Planning:** A team of IFOR officers worked with the OSCE for some three months to assist in preparing the elections, assisted in selecting polling station sites, organizing local election commission.

- **Logistics:** IFOR provided extensive air and ground transportation for OSCE officials, supervisors and observers. IFOR arranged for printing the massive voter registration list. Out-of-theatre, and then transported them to Bosnia. IFOR delivered election material to and from the 4,000 polling stations, including over 17,000 ballot boxes.

- **Security:** On election day, IFOR conducted deterrent patrols for voters to cross the Inter-Entity Boundary Line, closely monitored the 19 recommended sites and established quick response teams. IFOR successfully completed its mission during its one-year mandate. At the end of 1996 a two-year civilian consolidation plan was drawn up in Paris and London. NATO foreign and Defence Ministers concluded that a reduced military presence had to maintained to provide the necessary stability for this plan to succeed. The result was the organization of a Stabilization Force, which was subsequently activated on 20 December 1996. The mission of the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) was to deter fresh hostilities and to stabilize peace. The North Atlantic Council intended to review the force levels of SFOR periodically with a view to shifting the focus from stabilization to deterrence and completing the mission by 1998.
During the first 100 days of its 18-month mission, the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina:

- Ensured continued compliance with the 1995 Peace Agreement;
- Promoted freedom of movement throughout the country;
- Confiscated and destroyed 3,147 unauthorised weapons;
- Conducted over 1,600 weapons site inspections;
- Monitored 900 training and movement activities;
- Oversaw approximately 150 de-mining activities;
- Directed the parties to the Agreement to reduce their weapons sites, by 25 percent and increase de-mining. Under IFOR, the Entity Armed Forces (EAF) were separated, their heavy weapons were put into cantonment sites, and their training was brought under IFOR control. SFOR continued to ensure that the EAF remained in compliance with the military aspects of the Peace Agreement. SFOR patrolled a 1,400 KM-long Zone of Separation, all year in all weather conditions of cantonment sites – almost 450 inspections per month. SFOR was requiring the EAF to carry out their responsibilities for de-mining. Failure to carry out these de-mining activities could result in unit training bans. With SFOR encouragement the entities produced detailed plans for counter-mining operations in 1997, and more than 20,000 mines and 1,100 other unexploded objects had been removed.

In an effort to assist Bosnia to build confidence and mutual trust in the military sphere, NATO conducted a two-week course on international security for military and civilian defence officials from Bosnia and Herzegovina. The course was held from 23 June to 4 July 1997 at the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany.
total of 45 military officers and civilian officials participated from both the Federation and Republika Srpska and from all three ethnic groups in Bosnia.\textsuperscript{91} Until autumn 1997, the international community in Bosnia was obliged to tolerate the hate speech spewing from Srpska Radio-Televizija (SRI), the station controlled by Milosevic's poteges in Pale, Republika Srpska, just outside Sarajevo. On October 1, 1997, SFOR, troops intervened and seized four transmission towers.\textsuperscript{92} Thanks to its action, SRT had now been put under international supervision and was being reoriented and restructured to conform to democratic standards of broadcasting.\textsuperscript{93}

In August, 1997, British and Czech troops intervened in the northern city of Banja Luka, to clean out several nest of pro-Karadzic police. They confiscated 12 tons of weapons.\textsuperscript{94} In the same month, SFOR's announced a new policy for control and restructuring of paramilitary Special Police. SFOR's Operation SECURE BEAT was designed to ensure that these forces were disbanded or properly incorporated into the armed forces or civil police. On 10 November 1997, SFOR took military action to shut down a non-compliant Special Police unit in Doboj.\textsuperscript{95} NATO Foreign and Defence Ministers, meeting in Brussels on December 1997, noted that "securing the peace over the long-term will all require further steps to promote confidence and cooperation among the armed forces of Bosnia and to encourage the development of democratic practices and central defence mechanisms". Accordingly, they endorsed an initial set of Security Cooperation Activities between NATO and Bosnia and Herzegovina, to involve representation from both entities and all three ethnic groups. Building on the trail Security Cooperation Course conducted by NATO in June 1997, these activities would include additional such courses, seminars, visits and assessment of how NATO can assist
the Bosnian government's central defence institution, the Standing Committee on Military Matters (SCMM). The aim of the Security Cooperation Activities is to contribute to regional stability by:

- Promoting confidence and cooperation among the armed forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina; and
- Encouraging the development of democratic practice and central defence structures such as the SCMM.96

6. NATO ON WAR CRIMINALS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

On 10 July 1997, during a daring operation, UK peacekeepers arrested one war crimes suspect, Milan Kovacevic, and killed another, Simo Drljaca. Kovacevic and, in particular their removal broke the cycle of impunity which had characterized the wars of Yugoslav dissolution.97 On 22 January, 1998, SFOR acted to detain Goran Jelisic, who was indicted for war crimes by the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). He had been indicted by the ICTY for the murder of more than 16 persons, torture, theft, plunder and ordering the murder of many others.98

The Alliance determined its commitment to peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina was reconfirmed by February 1998's, decision to continue SFOR's mission beyond its initial mandate which ended in June 1998.99 Simo Zaric surrendered himself voluntarily to SFOR on February 1998 and on 4 March 1998, Dragoljub Kunarac surrendered himself voluntarily to SFOR. They had been indicted for war crimes by the ICTY.100

On 8 April, 1998, SFOR detained Miroslavvkoćka and Mladen Radic, who were indicted for war crimes by the ICTY.101 On 28 May, 1998, SFOR detained Milojica Kos, who was indicted by the (ICTY) for grave breaches of the Geneva Convention, violations of the laws and crimes against humanity and command responsibility and on 15
June, 1998, SFOR detained Milorad Kronjelac indicted for war crimes by the ICTY. He was a commander of the KP DOM Prison camp. He was accused of beatings, murder, willful killing, and inhuman acts towards prisoners in this camp during the period of April 1992 until 1994. On 22 July, 1998 SFOR detained two individuals who were believed to be indicted for war crimes by the ICTY. On 27 September 1998, SFOR detained Stevan Todorovic, indicted by the ICTY for war crimes committed while serving as the Chief of Police for Bosanski Samac between 13 June 1992 and 29 July 1992, and on 2 December 1998, SFOR detained General Radislav Krastic, who was indicted for war crimes by the ICTY.

On Wednesday, December 2, 1998, NATO forces arrested the most senior Bosnian Serb military figure yet seized and within hours were preparing to send him to The Hague for trial by the ICTY on genocide and war crimes charges. Gen. Radislav Krastic was arrested in the sector of north Bosnia controlled by American troops as part of the NATO – led Stabilization Force (SFOR).

On April 3, 2000, NATO-led peacekeepers in Bosnia arrested Momcilo Krajisnik, an ally of the notorious former Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic. On 21 April 2000, SFOR peacekeepers arrested war crimes suspect Dragan Nikolic, and transferred him to the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague. Nikolic was commander of the Susica detention camp and was accused of crimes against humanity and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. On 25 June, 2000, Dusko Sikirica, was snatched in Bosnia by SFOR peacekeepers and transferred him to the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague. Sikirica, a former commander of the Keratorm prison camp, was accused of genocide, violation of the laws and customs of war and grave breaches of the Geneva conventions. During the night of October 12-13, 2000 (NATO-led)
SFOR forces conducted an operation to arrest Janko Janjic, a Bosnian Serb war crimes suspect indicted for gang-rape and his war crimes committed between April 1992 and February 1993 in Bosnia. During the course of the arrest on October 12, 2000, Janjic detonated a hand grenade, which killed himself.  

On 15 April 2001, SFOR troops detained Dragan Obrenovic, one of three Bosnian Serbs indicted for the Srebenica massacre, and transferred him to the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague. In April 2001, roughly 4,000 NATO troops descended on the Bosnia's strongest private financial institution headquarter (Herce-govačka Banka in the city of Mostar), in 80 armored vehicles, backed by 20 helicopters and two fixed-wing aircraft. The troops loaded six trucks with confiscated documents from the bank. The bank raid was supposed to help prevent a new ethnic collapse. International officials believed that militant Croat secessionist were using the bank to launder money for their cause. SFOR helped to expel the breakaway forces from military bases and weapons depots. Instead SFOR commander Lt. Gen. Michael Dodson,ordered all units to retrieve munitions from Bosnian Croat storage sites and consolidated them under SFOR control.

The NATO-led Stabilisation Force troops maintained control of the Croatian component of the Federation Army arms and ammunition throughout the crisis, forcing hardliners to drop their demands. On 29 and 30 October 2001, two illegal arms caches were discovered by SFOR troops, in Han Pijesak, a Serb-controlled village in Bosnia and Herzegovina which served as a Bosnian Serb-military headquarters during the Bosnian War. In March 2002 NATO-led SFOR had launched the operation to arrest Radovan Karadzic, former Bosnian Serb leader in the village of Celebici involved armored vehicles and helicopter-borne troops but found no
sign of Mr. Karadzic who had been indicted for war crimes. But the operation uncovered nothing more than a weapons store.\textsuperscript{114}

By the end of 2004, NATO’s Stabilization Force (SFOR) would be handed over to the European Union Force (EUFOR). The next stage in the path from the active peace enforcement of NATO’s Implementation Force (IFOR) and reduction of military presence in SFOR to co-operative arrangements of EUFOR. NATO approved EUFOR at its Istanbul Summit on 28-29 June, 2004, and the transfer to the new force was planned by the end of 2004. EUFOR would be supported by ‘Over The Horizon Forces’ (OTHFs) that could respond to areas that flare up. These included both rapid reaction forces capable of deploying within 48 hours and a larger capability that could respond over a longer time.\textsuperscript{115} Finally, the 7,000 - strong European Union Forces took over from SFOR on December 1, 2004.\textsuperscript{116}

REFERENCES

10. Tom Post, “How the West Lost Bosnia Four missed opportunities on the road to Chaos”, Newsweek, November 2, 1992, Volume: CXX, Number 18, p.16.
12. George J. Church, "Times come apart The drive toward self-determination could produce a genuine new world order or a future of chaos – or some of both", Time, June 22, 1992, Volume: 139, Number 25, p. 21.


19. James O. Jackson, “The Lessons of Bosnia The failure to act in the Balkans is the West's most shameful mistake since World War II and should not be allowed to happen again”, Time, July 26, 1993, Volume- 142, Number 4, p.22.

20. Bruce W. Nelan, “Serbia's spite Milosevic should be pleased. The West’s peace plan will reward his aggression by giving him almost everything he wants”, Time, January 18,1993, Volume 141, Number 3, p.23,


29. Rod Nordland, “Leaving the Balkans to Their Fate”, Newsweek, November 1,1993, Volume CXXII, Number 18, P. 18.


31. Joel Brand, “Counting the living Sarajevo: Reflections on a city whose troubles define its times”, Newsweek, January 24, 1994, Volume CXXIII, No. 4, p. 11

32. Christopher Ogden, “Clinton’s Battered Hymnal”, Time, January 24, 1994, Vol. 143, No.4, p.18


37. Bruce W. Nelan, “A Whiff of Spring In a negotiating flurry, the factions have produced a plan for federation and an easing of the long siege of Sarajevo”, Time, March 28, 1994, Volume- 143, Number 13,P.21.


40. Bruce W. Nelan, “A Little Bombing Is a Dangerous Thing Despite NATO raids, the Serbs tighten their vise around Gorazde, confounding Clinton and his allies”, Time, April 25, 1997, Volume 143, Number 17, p. 19.

41. Bruce W. Nelan, “A Pink Envelope, but The Answer Is Not yes Another peace plan fizzes, and International mediators struggle to put persuasive pressure on the serbs”, Time, August 1, 1994, Volume 144, Number 5, p. 28.


44. Zlatko Dizdarevic, “Remember Sarajevo? Winter is coming the suffering goes on and the outside world is far away.”, Time, October 3, 1994, Volume 144, Number 14, p. 32.


49. Bruce W. Nelan,” Marching Toward Bihac After 31 months of war, the world has still not found a way to stop the Serbs”, Time, December 5, 1994, Volume 144, Number 23, p. 16.


60. Kevin Fedarko, “At The Edge Of Peace with a nudge here, a shove there, the Balkans move tantalizingly closer to embracing a deal”, Time, October 2, 1995, volume – 146, Number – 14, p. 19.


77. Ibid, p.13.
81. Rod Nordland, “The Fugitive Gen. Ratko Mladic has been indicted twice for war crimes against the Muslins”, Newsweek, April 22, 1994, Volume - CXXVII, Number ,17, p.25.
83. Rod Norland, “Angry at Everybody A year after the fall of Srebrenica, there is little relief for the women who survive it”, Newsweek, July 22, 1996, Volume-CXXII, Number 4, p.40.


86. Rod Norland, “It'll Be Messy No One expects that Saturday’s election will be pretty. But hope that it comes off peacefully”, Newsweek, September 16, 1996, Volume-CXXVIII, Number 12, p.29.


94. John Barry and Russel Watson, “The Devil They Know Biljana Plavisic may be a bigot and a warmonger, but she’s fighting someone even worse”, Newsweek, September 1, 1997, Volume - CXXX, No.9, p.34.


98. Texts of Statements and Communiques issued during 1998, NATO office of Information and Press 1110 Brussels, Belgium Fax : (32-2) 707, 1252 E-mail Distribution @ HQ, NATO, INT., p. 146.
99. Op. Cit. no. 93, p.27
100. Op. Cit. no. 98, pp.151-152.
103. Ibid, p.158.
108. Ibid, p.4.