1. Europe after the Collapse of Soviet Union

In the 'Treaty on the Final Settlement with respect to Germany' of 12 September 1990, the four allied powers and both German states agreed on (Bulletin, 1990c):

- the recognition of the borders of the FRG and GDR as the borders of the United Germany (Art. 1);
- a commitment to peace and the non-use of force with the exception in accordance with its constitution and the UN Charter (Art. 2);
- a binding commitment of the United Germany to adhere to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and not to produce, acquire or control the use of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and to reduce its forces to 370,000 within three to four years (Art. 3);
- an obligation that no nuclear weapons and launchers and no foreign troops may be deployed on the territory of the former GDR after the withdrawal of all Soviet troops (Art. 5);
- the right of the United Germany to join alliances (Art. 6);
- the announcement that all allied prerogatives pertaining to Berlin and Germany as a whole will end on 3 October 1990 and that the United Germany will acquire full sovereignty (Art. 7).

Germany also promised 13 billion marks towards paying and supplying the Soviet troops on German soil and towards their
repatriation and housing in the Soviet Union which was to be completed in 1994.²

The defence of the Atlantic organized within NATO appeared to continue to be valued as the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the USSR did not bring to an end all threat to Europe. Right from the time of the London summit in June 1990, the heads of state and of government of the countries of the alliance drew the lessons of these first changes and concluded that it was necessary to renew NATO, hence implicitly rejecting the idea of disbanding it. After the reunification of Germany in 1990, then the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in July 1991, the disintegration of the USSR proceeded at a faster pace (it was finally completed in December 1991).³

The American response had been based on the assumption that at the end the Soviet Union would prefer to preserve NATO because Moscow looked to Washington to act as a restraint on a unified Germany. That was why together with its allies, the United States had proposed a number of concessions to make the idea of German NATO membership more palatable. Among them; changing the emphasis of NATO to make it a more political institution; imposing a variety of arms limitations on Germany; asking a unified Germany to provide economic assistance to the Soviet troops to remain in present – day East Germany for a specified period, and reducing the number of nuclear forces on German soil.⁴ As a hegemon outside Europe, the United States had equalized the European powers by burying the enmities that had led to two World Wars. It pacified Europe even though it provoked hostility in those countries that resented their loss of sovereignty, and it becomes the umbrella under which the E.U. could be established. For these reasons, Western Governments wanted the United Germany to
remain in NATO, for a Germany outside NATO would have caused concern, especially among the East and West Europeans and a NATO without Germany would have been deprived of personnel, logistics, and space. The Western Countries in cooperation with a Soviet Union that was then rapidly changing, seized the chance and produced what could be considered as the greatest triumph of diplomacy in this century. Not even a full year passed between the fall of the Berlin Wall and the final act of creating a United Germany. Along with East Germans, 400 million human beings were free from Communism, an achievement unthinkable without the persistent efforts of the NATO Allies.

In November, 1991, Allied Heads of State and Government agreed in Rome on NATO’s new strategic concept. The new strategic concept and developments since its adoption underline that crisis management; peacekeeping and peacemaking in regional conflicts were becoming new and central tasks for the Alliance. The concept no longer emphasized massive mobilization but rather enhanced crisis management capabilities using more mobile and flexible force and cooperative efforts to project peace. NATO’s contribution to conflict prevention and crisis management consists of three essential politico-military elements:

- the provision, by its existence, a cohesion and strength of security anchor and stabilizing factor in Europe;
- the contribution, through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council which united NATO with the former member of the Warsaw Pact and their successor states of a mechanism for achieving a common understanding in security matters and a collective approach to the peaceful settlement of local conflicts;
• a close interaction with the UN, the CSCE,† the Western European Union and the European Community in a complementary framework of interlocking, mutually reinforcing international institutions.⁷

NATO’s involvement in peacekeeping operations could find its expression in three main forms;
• by contributing Alliance assets to a UN or CSCE peacekeeping operation;
• by conducting or coordinating a peacekeeping operation on behalf of either organization;
• by supporting the involvement of individual Allies in a peacekeeping operation.⁸

It is important to recognize that NATO is not an end in itself, it is a means to an end. And that end should the elimination of interstate war in Europe, not the preservation of NATO’s Cold War form and function.⁹ NATO remains crucial to the defence and security needs of the nations on both sides of the Atlantic. It is an placeable guarantor of Euro-Atlantic Security, an unparalleled provider of political and military stability for Western Europe and now for the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe as well. The real and potential threats to the physical security of Europe have to set alongside the growing threats to the values, to the trade, to the economic prosperity and, perhaps, to the political beliefs of both Europe and North America. What is needed is an Atlantic Community, a Community that will rest on the four pillars. The first pillar is its shared belief in the rule of law and parliamentary democracy. The second is liberal capitalism and free trade, which has given its entire people unprecedented prosperity. The third is

the shared European cultural heritage emanating from classical Greece and Rome through the Renaissance to the shared values, beliefs and civilization of its own centuries. The fourth pillar must be defence and security as represented by the NATO Alliance.10

In a nutshell, NATO needs North America, and North America needs NATO. Europe is inextricably linked to North America and security. The logic goes something like this: peace and stability in Europe create the conditions for economic growth and economic growth is what creates the opportunity for prosperity. Peace and stability are fundamental prerequisites for prosperity.11

2. North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)

The German–American initiative in December 1991 to create the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), which brought together foreign and defence ministers of the 16 countries, reflected US State Department determination that NATO should develop a broader role in European Security through extending its security regime across eastern Europe. By 1997 the NACC had been transformed into the Euro–Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), bringing together 20 allies and 27 partners. Its wide-ranging agenda included cooperation on political and security related matters, arms control, international terrorism, peace keeping, defence, economic issues.12 The inaugural meeting of NACC was held on 20 December, 1991, attended by all 16 NATO allies as well as representatives of 9 other countries including member states of the then already dissolved Warsaw Pact (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union) and three Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania). On 10 March 1992, a further 10 newly–independent states on the territory of the former Soviet Union joined the NACC. Georgia and Albania followed suit at the NACC meeting in Oslo on 5 June 1992. NACC member states were Albania, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Moldova, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Spain, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States of America, Uzbekistan.

It was an important step to raise the alliance's liaison relationship with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to a qualitative new level in recognition of the democratic progress they had made. The invitation to these nations, including the three newly independent Baltic States, to join the NATO allies in an institutionalized framework of consultations was more than a symbolic gesture and may evolve soon into a primary security forum of a future Euro-Atlantic community. The NACC was conceived as a means for NATO to contribute to healing the division of Europe. It aimed to foster political dialogue, practical cooperation, transparency in military affairs, and the peaceful integration of the new democracies into the transatlantic community. The NACC was becoming a central element in the growing web of security ties that bound European and North Atlantic together.

3. NATO enlargement and the partnership for peace (PFP)

American policy-makers wanted NATO to serve both as framework for European security and as a vehicle for supporting US strategy in the rest of the world. These two objectives might well prove irreconcilable. Further enlargement to Europe's east and south-east spread security and stability across the region, but weakened NATO as a strictly military alliance. The idea was first planted with President Bill Clinton in April 1993, during a Washington ceremony to open the Holocaust Museum. With time on
their hands before the speech making, Vaclav Havel and Lech Walesa, the President of the Czech Republic and Poland, cornered Clinton to urge that NATO admit East European countries. Havel and Walesa had got nowhere with George Bush on the idea, but Clinton, in office only three months, was intrigued.  

In October, 1993, the US government decided the policy that the immediate issue was not enlargement of NATO but promotion of Partnership for Peace ( PfP), and proposed the unofficial meeting of defence ministers for the first time in NATO's history to discuss the opinions of the allied states. As a result, this proposal by he US was approved at the Travemunde talks, and the North Atlantic Council made a decision on PfP in December 1993. In January 1994, NATO officially announced its policy for PfP. It was not a good idea to openly promote the NATO enlargement issue at this point of time considering the conditions of the former East European states that contained a number of uncertainties and the expected opposition by Russia. In the Russian eyes, there had been a series of unfulfilled promises and slapped in the face by the West. Mikhail Gorbachev thought that Soviet acceptance of a unified Germany meant that NATO would not expand eastward.

Some observers still see the Alliance mainly as an insurance guarantee against a future revival of Russian power. Others see NATO as a vehicle for exporting stability and ensuring democratic development in the new democracies of Central Europe, some see the Alliance as an instrument for developing multilateral responses to new security problems, particularly with regard to crisis management in Europe and beyond. Analysis have identified at least four threats which NATO may need to face. Firstly the issue of latent Russian power. Russia remains a large military state in possession of large nuclear arsenal which is still one of the primary
concerns of analysis and governments in NATO member states. Whether Russia remains politically stable, the complexion of its leadership, and the nature of Russia's relations with the West will all be key determinants of concerns about the risks of latent Russia military and particularly nuclear power. A second threat is associated with new fault lines which some analysts argue are opening in relations between the West and other states or regions of the world. Such concerns have explored with varying degrees of conviction by scholars such as Huntington who points to a 'clash of civilisations which may shape the future security. A third concern lies in the divisions between the prosperous developed, industrial and technically advanced 'North and the less prosperous, undeveloped, less industrialised and less technically advanced 'South'. In this analysis the North and South or the West and the Third World, may clash over issues as diverse as population migration, access to natural resources, the spread of weapons of mass destruction (biological, chemical and nuclear) and political and social instability. Finally, the West has also begun to articulate concerns about an 'Islamic threat with particular resonance in Europe given the close proximity of the Middle East and North Africa and the presence of large Islamic populations within many European states. Whatever the respective force of these arguments it is difficult to argue that NATO lives in a threat-free context, despite the end of the Cold War. The reality is that NATO, like most defensive alliances before it, lost its original purposes with the end of the cold war. It survives because it has redefined itself as an instrument for consolidating new European democracies. The PfP had become a learning experience on the NATO to international security planning, budgeting and civilian control over the military. PfP is based on the declaration that the alliance has no offensive
anti-Russian objective rather, it welcome Russian, participation in the promotion of peace, security, democracy and a free-market economic system in all of Europe. Albeit with reluctance, Russia joined the PfP with the reassurance that it would have a voice but not a veto power in the enlargement process, and that the eastern extension of the alliance would include a parallel strategic partnership between Russia and NATO. In June 1994, Russia had agreed to NATO's proposal of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme, which in effect simply meant that Russia would be associated with NATO without any decisive or effective role in it. The West also tried to placate Russia by agreeing against deployment of nuclear warheads in the territory of the proposed new member countries of Eastern Europe and also to inform in advance any joint exercise or troop movements.

The wider scope of PfP is reflected in its objectives, as set out in the Framework Document, issued at the Brussels Summit in January 1994, i.e.

1. to facilitate transparency in national defence planning and budgeting processes;
2. to ensure democratic control of defence forces;
3. to maintain the capability and readiness to contribute, subject to constitutional considerations, to operations under the authority of the UN and/or the responsibility of the CSCE;
4. to develop cooperative military relations with NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, training, and exercise in order to strengthen their ability to undertake missions in the fields of peacekeeping search and other as may subsequently be agreed, and;
5. to develop, over the longer term, forces that are better able to operate with those of the members of North Atlantic Alliance.
The Brussels Summit therefore invited PfP partners to establish their own liaison offices at NATO Headquarters in Brussels to facilitate their participation in NACC/PfP meetings and activities.\textsuperscript{25} The strategic objectives of NATO and PfP in this context can be summarized as follows:

* to involve Central Asian countries in the European security architecture based on cooperative process is and on mutual consultations in case of threat;
* to increase military cooperation and information exchange;
* to increase inter-operability for interalia peace keeping operations on the basis of common conceptual approach.

According to the Central Asian governments, the PfP programmes serves the objective of strengthening and modernizing their national armies. They consider this cooperation, supplemented by other military cooperation agreements with individual NATO countries, especially with the U.S., Turkey and Germany, as an efficient way of reducing their dependence on Russia.\textsuperscript{26}

Partnership for Peace (PfP) participants at 30 April 1995; Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan.\textsuperscript{27}

The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), created in 1997, provides the overarching political framework for all the outreach and cooperation activities among allies and partners to complement the expanded opportunities provided by an enhanced PfP. The EAPC superseded the North Atlantic Cooperation Council
(NACC), which had been NATO's first means of giving its outreach a systematic structure.\(^\text{24}\)

The Manfred Worner building, a new annex to NATO headquarter was officially inaugurated on 7 April 1998 by NATO Secretary General Javier Solana. The building housed diplomatic delegations of non NATO partner countries members of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). In addition, 24 out of a total of 28 EAPC partner countries have now named ambassadors and established diplomatic missions to NATO under the 1997 Brussels Agreement. These include Albania, Austria, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Macedonia, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.\(^\text{24}\)

The Allied leaders launched the Training and Education enhancement Programme at the Washington Summit in April 1999—a structured approach to improving and harmonising NATO and Partner training and education activities, particularly through the establishment of PfP training centers.\(^\text{30}\)

The PfP Training Centres already designated in Partner countries are described below:

- Yavoriv Training Centre, Ukraine. This was the first Partner facility to be recognised as a PfP Training Centre, and has a long track record of P&P and similar exercise.
- Almnas PfP Training Centre; Sweden: with excellent facilities and accommodation for 80 participants, this centre aims to enhance PfP cooperation generally, as well as more specifically promoting PfP cooperation in the Baltic sea region.
Bucharest PfP Training Centre, Romania: Established in 1997 to conduct joint training activities and promote a better understanding of common NATO/PfP related issues, this centre offers "army brigade", joint service, peace support operations and other courses in English.

Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP), Switzerland; This international foundation with NATO/PfP members was created within the framework of Swiss Participation in PfP. Its core missions are training, research and conferences for diplomats, military officers and civil servants from the foreign and defence ministries of NATO and PfP countries.

Austrian International Peace Support Command: successor to the former Austrian Training Centre for Peacekeeping, this centre specialises in training civil and military personnel and units for peace-support operations.

In major foreign policy statement delivered in Detroit, President Bill Clinton declared that "by 1999—NATO's 50th anniversary and 10 years after the fall of the Berlin wall—the first group of countries we invite to join should be full-fledged members of NATO. At the same time, the President pointed out that "NATO enlargement is not directed against anyone", and he invited Russia to take advantage of "the best chance in history to help to build that peaceful and undivided Europe, and to be an equal respected and successful partner."

President Boris Yeltsin's stance against NATO expansion, however, underwent a dramatic change during his Helsinki meeting with U.S. President Bill Clinton in April 1997. In return for vague promises on the future Russian membership in what is now G-7, Yeltsin gave the green signal to the West on NATO expansion. On May 27, 1997, amid much fanfare and media hype, the leader of the
16 NATO countries and Russia signed a charter at the Elysee Palace in Paris, by the terms of which Moscow formally agreed to NATO’s eastward expansion. The charter, called the NATO-Russia Founding Act, gives Russia on paper a permanent consultative role on security issues relating to Europe. Russia however, will have absolutely no say in the affairs of NATO. The parties agreed first on the establishment of the "Permanent Joint Council (PJC)" and the deliberation system (Joint Chairmanship by the Secretary General of NATO, a representative of one of the NATO member states on a rotation basis, and a representative of Russia). They also agreed the PJC would meet at the level of Foreign Ministers and that of Defence Ministers twice annually, and also monthly at the level of ambassadors permanent representatives to the North Atlantic Council. It may also meet, as appropriate at the level of the heads of State and Government.

Many in Europe feel that the hidden American agenda is to ensure that NATO and not the E.U., defines the structure of a wider Europe, and that the European allies share the bulk of the financial burden that NATO expansion will entail. The U.S. arms manufacturers apparently had an important role to play in influencing the US administration's aggressive blueprint for NATO expansion. The NATO Summit to be held in Madrid in July, 1997, was to invite the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary to join the alliance by 1999.

The U.S. had ruled that only three new countries would be admitted to NATO in the first round, though others are to come in later. The welcome mat was out for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. But France, Italy, Canada and other members of the alliance were pushing the candidacies of Romania and Slovenia. The U.S. would prevail, on these countries, because such decisions
must be unanimous. At the Madrid Summit in July 1997, NATO leaders invited the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to start accession talks with the Alliance. These accession talks were followed by the signing and the subsequent ratification of accession protocols. The formal accession of the three new members took place on 12 March 1999. The Washington Summit in April 1999 provided a fitting opportunity to respond to this desire. NATO was able to draw upon the experience gained not only during the three years of intensified dialogue meetings, but also through the integration of three newest members, into the Alliance. The result was the Membership Action plan, which provides assessment and feedback mechanisms for partners aspiring to NATO membership. Each aspirant is invited to submit an annual national programme on its preparations for possible membership, covering political and economic, defence/military, resource, security and legal aspects. Indeed, the decision by NATO to open its doors has led many countries in Central and Eastern Europe to accelerate their political, economic and military reforms. It has also encouraged them to bury old enmities and establish good neighbourly relations. Moreover, NATO's opening to Central and Eastern Europe is not happening in a vacuum. NATO's other initiatives the Partnership for Peace programme, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the NATO/ Russian Founding Act, the NATO-Ukraine Charter and its dialogue with six countries from the Mediterranean - have created a powerful momentum for continent-wide security cooperation. These initiatives have united almost all the nations in the Euro-Atlantic area around a common security standard. The ending of the Cold War and of East-West confrontation has not eliminated serious threats to the Western democracies or to the world as a whole. These threats do exist, and
will persist until the new states—the Republics of the former Soviet
Union and, above all, Russia—achieve final success on their round
to democratic transformation and economic reform. Privately,
there were suggestions that Russia would eventually like to join
NATO. While the idea caused a stir of interest in alliance think-
tanks, most rejected it. The allies ultimately concluded that even to
start a study on Russian membership would be a mistake, for it
might lead Moscow to think entry was an eventuality, thereby
reducing its incentives to reform and become more transparent.
However, a Europe without Russia cannot be peaceful, undivided
and democratic. If Russia remains on the outside, it will be a
destabilising presence for the Baltic countries, for Ukraine and the
Caucasus and for Western interests in central and southeastern
Europe. It follows that the United states and Europe have much to
gain by engaging Russia as a partner in building the new Europe
rather than as a potential adversary. Since the threats to Russia
now come, not from America or NATO in the west, but from the
south and the east, it makes sense to work with America and
Europe to counter the problems of terrorism and weapons
proliferation. America and Europe, moreover, are home to the
firms and stock markets Russia needs to help finance its economic
revival.

On May 28, 2002 President Vladimir Putin along with the
leaders of NATO nations were present at Pratica Di Mare, a
military base just outside the Italian capital, to sign the new
"Rome Declaration". The Rome Declaration establishes a NATO-
Russia Joint Council. The new deal gave Russia equal standing in
decision of common interest, ranging from counter terrorism to
peacekeeping and arms control. President Putin declared that
while Russia would not itself seek to join NATO, it would not
oppose the next round of NATO’s expansion, which looked likely to include the three Baltic republics.\textsuperscript{44} In November 2002, NATO issued membership invitations to seven former Soviet block countries stretching from Estonia in the North to Bulgaria in the South. All seven states: Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Slovenia, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia formally joined the alliance in April 2004, bringing the number of NATO members to 26, as the flags of the seven new Allies were raised at the entrance to the Alliance’s Headquarters in Brussels.\textsuperscript{45} After that, NATO had identified the three countries of Albania, Croatia and Macedonia as candidates for the new batch of countries to accede to the alliance. NATO would fulfill the process of accession of the 3 countries around 2007.\textsuperscript{46} 

4. NATO AND THE WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD);

The proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and their means of delivery are identified as a threat to NATO. "The principle non-proliferation goal of the Alliance.... is to prevent proliferation from accruing or, should it occur, to reverse it through diplomatic means. "The non-reference to "diplomatic means" of preventing proliferation is not accidental, the use of force is clearly what NATO has in mind."\textsuperscript{47} In 1994's Summit, NATO Heads of state and Government formally acknowledge the security threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and recognized this as a matter of direct concern to the Alliance. They therefore decided to intensify and expand NATO's political and defence efforts against proliferation. The North Atlantic Council subsequently established two groups to carry out this work. The first is the Senior Politico- Military Group on Proliferation, chaired by the NATO Assistant Secretary General for
Political Affairs. The group's focus is on the political and preventive aspects of NATO's approach to dealing with proliferation. The second is the Senior Defence Group on Proliferation. This group is co-chaired by a European and North American nation. The group is responsible for considering how NATO's defence posture can support NATO's non-proliferation effects but also provide protection should those efforts fail. The work of the two groups is brought and reported to the North Atlantic Council by the Joint Committee on Proliferation, Chaired by the Deputy Secretary General.48

NATO allies have resolved to quickly ramp up their capacity to respond to attacks involving chemical, biological and radiological weapons while at the same time not ruling out preemptive strikes as part of their strategy against terrorists. The increasing likelihood that terrorists will obtain and use Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) was a central theme at the 6-7 June 2002 meeting of NATO defence ministers in Brussels. At the end of the meeting, ministers issued a statement identifying four general areas whose European allies and Canada need to improve capabilities, including response to WMD threats as well as acquiring strategic lift, secure communications and modern weaponry.49 In December 1998, Alliance Foreign and Defence Ministers expressed their determination to prepare NATO's forces to succeed in the full range of missions that they might have to face despite the threat or use of chemical or biological weapons. Building on the successful work of the NATO groups on proliferation that were created as a result of the 1994 NATO Summit, Ministers indicated that they were prepared to expand NATO's effort to address the evolving proliferation risk. A WMD
Centre will be created in the NATO International Staff in Brussels to improve coordination of all WMD-related activities at NATO. The Centre will:

- Maintain the Matrix of Bilateral WMD Destruction and Management Assistance Programmes, a database designed to expand information sharing between member states on national contributions to WMD withdrawal and dismantlement in the former Soviet Union;
- Serve as a repository for information on WMD-related civil response programmes in Allied nations;
- Support the Alliance Groups dealing with WMD proliferation and through them, the North Atlantic Council;
- Develop briefings, fact sheets and other information documents on WMD issues for a wider public audience.

5. The Mediterranean Dialogue

NATO has already started a dialogue with six countries of the region—Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. They have all said they find it useful and want to go further. The purpose of the dialogue is to build confidence and to lay the ground for future cooperation. NATO's dialogue with six non-NATO countries of the Mediterranean region, launched in 1995, aims to dispel possible misconceptions about the Alliance and to build confidence through greater transparency, discussion and cooperation. Simple geography means there will always be a link between security in Europe and that of the Mediterranean. The main purpose of the dialogue is to contribute to security and stability in the Mediterranean, achieving a better mutual understanding and correcting any misperceptions between NATO and the Mediterranean partners countries and NATO's dialogue is meant to reinforce other international efforts such as those undertaken by the
E.U., the OSCE, the WEU, and the Middle East Peace Process. Another important step in the effort to exchange information was the decision taken by Alliance foreign ministers in May 1998 to establish "Contact Point Embassies" in Mediterranean Dialogue countries. Under this system, similar to that which has been successfully operating in Central and Eastern European partner countries since 1992, the embassy of a NATO member country will represent the Alliance in each Dialogue country. And every year, some 500 representatives from NATO member states and countries participating in Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the Mediterranean Dialogue come together at the College to attend an increasingly wide range of courses. Key Alliance and geo-strategic issues are analysed with the help of top political, military and civilian leaders, as well as outstanding international academics.

6. THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE IDENTITY (ESDI)

NATO has transformed itself from an alliance for collective defence and transatlantic consultation into an organisation with most emphasis on defence cooperation and cooperative security. In the 1991 Alliance strategic concept, NATO's political strategy, it was agreed that within NATO "a European security identity "should be developed. The 1994 NATO Summit endorsed concepts of "Separable but not separate forces and 'Combined Joint Task Forces' (CJTFs) that could be made available for European led operations other than collective defence. The Combined Joint Task Forces" (CJTFs) concept. This will provide NATO for the first time with deployable and mobile commands, trained and ready to respond to a range of contingencies. CJTF would also allow NATO assets to be put under WEU command in cases where NATO itself decides not to act. Providing forces for the WEU which are
"separable but not separate" from NATO will help the European Allies to turn an emerging European Security and Defence Identity into an operational reality.\textsuperscript{56} The foundations for the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept were laid by NATO Heads of state and Government at their Brussels Summit in January, 1994,\textsuperscript{57} and was approved at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Berlin on June 1995.\textsuperscript{58} The creation of a permanent framework for implementing the CJTF concept poses particular challenges. These include the need:

- to ensure that its development is consistent with other elements of NATO's adaptation, including in particular the prospective revision of the command structure;
- to take full account of the WEU dimension by developing the concept of separable but not separate capabilities which could be used either by NATO or by the WEU;
- to provide for the possible involvement of non-NATO nations in a CJTF;
- to maximize cost-effectiveness and avoid duplication.\textsuperscript{59} The Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) concept is closely linked to the emerging European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI). By making available such NATO assets and logistic, and command and control for operations, the CJTF will avoid wasteful duplication of capabilities and prevent competition between NATO and the WEU.\textsuperscript{60} At their meeting in Berlin in June 1996, NATO Foreign Ministers took the decision to build ESDI within the Alliance. The main element of ESDI include:

- Political commitment to making a more effective European contribution to the Alliance and to close cooperation between NATO and WEU.
- ESDI to be developed within NATO.
- Regular joint meetings of NAC and WEU Council.
- Potential availability, case by case of NATO assets and capabilities to support a WEU-led operation.
- Mechanisms for releasing and returning NATO assets and capabilities and monitoring their use.
- Close consultation between NATO and WEU on planning and conduct of WEU-led operation involving the use of NATO assets and capabilities.
- Requirements for WEU-led operations to be taken into account in NATO's defence planning system.
- NATO's command structure to be able to provide H.Q. elements and command positions to command and conduct WEU-led operations.
- Planning and exercises for illustrative WEU missions to be conducted by NATO at request of, and in coordination with, WEU.\textsuperscript{61}

The further impetus by Heads of State and Government at NATO's Madrid Summit on July, 1997, gave the Europeans more clout in Alliance decision making and provided the WEU the tools it needed to carry out its own missions. The ESDI formula endorsed by Alliance leaders in Madrid includes:

- NATO's full support for the development of ESDI within NATO by making available NATO assets and capabilities for WEU operations;
- Providing for the support of WEU;
- Led operations as an element of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept;
• Provision within the future new command structure for European command arrangements able to prepare, support, command and conduct WEU-led operation;
• Creation of forces capable of operating under the political control and strategic direction of the WEU;
• Arrangement for the identifications of NATO assets and capabilities that could support WEU-led operations and arrangements for NATO-WEU consultation in the context of such operations;
• Commitment to full transparency between NATO and WEU in crisis management, including through joint consultations;
• Strengthening of the institutional cooperation between the two organisations;
• Involving WEU in NATO's defence planning processes.  

The European Union's efforts to develop a credible, autonomous European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) were concretized with the launch at the France-British Summit at St Malo, France in December 1998 of ESDI. It has been the top defence policy priority for many European members of NATO for the past several years. New, EU-based security organisations - a Political and Security Committee, a European Military Staff - have been set-up in Brussels, and the Union is developing its 'head line goal' force of 60,000 troops, capable of being deployed with 60 days notice and sustained on mission for at least a year. In November 2000, when European governments individually pledged to put up enough troops, aircraft and warships to enable a 60,000 strong force to begin operating over a wide range of missions from 2003. The largest contributor to the force will be Germany, which has pledged 13,500 ground troops, while the UK has committed 12,500 and France 12,000. Italy and Spain will each contribute
upto 6,000 and the Dutch 5000. Other contributions range from Greece's 3500 to Luxembourg's 100 of the 15 EU nations, only Denmark has declined to take part. The new 100-strong EU military Staff will be in place in Brussels by early 2001 under its first Director of Military Staff German Army Lt Gen Klaus Schuwirth. However, General Gustav Hugglund, the EU's military chief, said in January, 2002, the 60,000 strong rapid reaction force would launch its first exercises in May, 2002 but he admitted it would be another 10 years before it could carry out "all operations". Lord Robertson, the Secretary General of NATO quoted Mr. Javier Solana-Chief of the proposed common European defence and foreign policy assignment who wrote recently. "If NATO and the US want to tackle the crises, all the better. But if the US does not engage, as we saw in the Balkans from 1991, to 1995, someone else may need to, it is better for our overall security, if we Europeans can do so effectively. "Hence he argued that "Europe would have to ask the United States to do something they feel reluctant about, and the United States and NATO would be dragged into operations simply for lack of alternative".

The Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) was introduced by US Secretary of Defence William Cohen in 1998 and formally accepted at April 1999's Washington Summit. The DCI, which according to one NATO official, is "to direct national plans increasingly to NATO priorities" address five areas: mobility; sustainability; precision engagement, command, control and communications (C^3); and survivability. NATO's Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) has provided a sharp focus for nations to improve capabilities in critical areas. On a list of 59 action items, adopted at Washington on March 1999, only a few are in a
stage of being "nearly or fully implemented." These include resource implementations for joint logistical centres; requirements for multinational logistic formations; interoperability though standardisation; national exercise programmes; concept development and experimentation; NATO policy on training; evaluation and exercises; clearing house mechanism for multinational formations; exercises for multi-national forces to promote command and control procedures and common doctrine; and the need for a wide-Area Network. Another 23 DCI action items were said to be showing "Significant progress as given by the heads of state and government. However, other DCI areas, mostly supporting key improvements in "effective engagement" and "survivability of forces and infrastructure work either started late, move studies needing to be completed before further activities can be launched or, progress depends on procurement of resources not forthcoming. Examples include capabilities against weapons of mass destruction; suppression of enemy air defence and support jamming; combat identifications system; and nuclear, biological and chemical protection and detection means. NATO's Prague 2002 Summit, decided to consider 27 of the 59 action items as candidates for either multinational, joint or common NATO funding. Of those, only 15 were found to be promising, including sealift and airlift, co-operative approaches to logistic stocks, precision-guided munitions, combat identification, sea-mine protection equipment and tactical communications, air-ground battlefield surveillance, intelligence and reconnaissance systems and unmanned air vehicles."
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74


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