Whereas the concept of *vizarat* occupies an important position in the political writings of at Mawardi and Nizamul-mulk Tusi; their objects were primarily those of providing a theoretical bases for their respective states namely the Caliphate (750-1258) and the state of the Saljuqs. This object inevitably brings into discussion such institutions of vital importance as sovereignty, administration, justice, economic institutions, subjects and the officials of the state. To these subjects the elaboration of political ethics follows as necessary concommitant. In the background of their concepts of state should one, therefore, analyse their ideas about the ministeral office.

The emergence of the minor dynasties was a matter of great significance in the history of Islam. It cut across the basic structure and philosophy of Islamic polity as conceived in the principles broadly laid down in the scriptures and examplified by the pious caliphate. In Islam, sovereignty is understood to lie in the *Ummah*. The *Khalifa* is an elected head that represents the will of the *ummah* which in turn eminates in the injunctions of the *sharia*. The Caliph is only the first among the equals. He derives his authority from the people for the benefit of the people and for the protection and promotion of religion.
Difficulties arising in the practice of these principles after the expansion of Islam beyond the borders of Arabia, the Caliphate underwent transformation from democracy to dynastic autocracy. Disintegration set in with the establishment of the rival power of the Fatimids in Egypt and reached climax when the Buwayhids made the Caliph at Baghdad virtually subservient to their authority. The Buwayhids, the Ghaznavids and the great Saljuks were representatives of the absolutist monarchies of the eastern lands of the caliphate. They had usurped the power of the Caliph but had at the same time sought to legalise their existence by means of a formal investiture of sovereignty from the Caliph.\footnote{1}

The legal problems arising from this situation were by no means small. The Buwayhids and the Saljuks were de facto sovereigns, a position which the Caliph, unable to belie, sought to evade by insisting on their de jure subordination to his own authority. The Sultans, by no means unaware of their legal position, were not unwilling to respect the

\footnote{1. Early Saljuk Sultans also insisted on receiving diplomas from the Caliphs, partly to place themselves on label of other existing powers like Ghaznawids and Qarakhanids and solely to legalise their rule in accordance with traditional Islamic spirit. Malik Shah got recognition from the Caliph in order to consolidate his position against the other claiments.}
Caliph's authority. But in actual fact they were independent soverigns more powerful practically than the Caliph.

This peculiar situation called for a justification of the *de jure* authority of the caliph on the one hand and the *de facto* power of the sultans on the other. The former was the task chosen by al-Mawardi (972-1059), the later was the work of Nizamulmulk (1017-1091).

Al-Mawardi's purpose was primarily that of vindicating the supremacy of the Caliph over all temporal authority. Of necessity his approach is juridical in character. The Imam or the Caliph is presented as the supreme power, the sovereign personality whose will acquires incontrovertible authority from the Islamic Law. (Al-Mawardi) makes a special issue of the usurping power of the Sultans calling them as *Amirbil Istila*, a position valid for governors appointed by the Caliph. It clearly implies that the power of the Sultan was derived from the imperial authority of the Caliph and conveniently sets aside the presumption of any other sovereign authority existing within the Caliphal state except by usurpation. Hence, the Sultans presumed to enjoy independence under the legal sanction from the Caliph.  

1. *Al-Ahkam*, Chapter 3, pp. 30-34.
is theoretically an Islamic state and the Caliph its legal sovereign resting on God's will.

Knowing the hazards underlying the juridical approach, Nizamulmulk very cleverly avoids any reference to the Caliph. He treats the state as though it was the personal property of the sovereign and ventures to justify it by going to the origins of sovereign power. He considers human beings as basically selfish and undisciplined who rob and kill each other. God blesses them with a just king who suppresses evil, punishes the evil-doers, and brings out order from chaos. The sovereign creates a whole machinery of Government to assist him in the discharge of his responsibilities. For his actions he is responsible to God to whom alone he shall render his account on the day of judgement.¹

This line of approach is at once hypothetical and historical. Hypothetical for the questionable assumption about human nature; historical, in so far as it is based on a shrewed analysis of politics of the ages through which the institution of monarchy i.e., the Sultanate had emerged.

¹. Siyasat Nama, pp. 2-3.
Thus Nizamulmulk's figure stands out in relief as the intellectual God-father of the more widely known western philosophers, Machiavelli and Hobbes. The corollaries Nizamulmulk sought to draw from this novel argument in justification of Malik Shah's position as a sovereign, Machiavelli had drawn for Cesare Borgia in the 15th, and Hobbes for Charles II in the 17th century.

Thus, when Nizamulmulk ascribes the rise of a king to the will of God who mercifully appoints him for saving the people from anarchy, disorder and bloodshed, he endows him with a divine right to sovereignty far more unassailable than that of Machiavelli and Hobbes. The king remains the fountain head of law, an absolute autocrat whom the subjects have no moral right to challenge, a position adopted by both Hobbes and Machiavelli. By placing God at the apex of the motivational force, the prime cause of social order, who appoints the sultan for saving the people from sin, Nizamulmulk creates a state far more powerful than the Leviathan of Hobbes, and a sovereign more absolute than the one arising from a social contract. The Sultan comes into existence not from an agreement of the people with an individual which, in the case of Hobbes, should make his power subject to the
right of popular resistance in the event of his failure to protect the agreeing party. He come into being from the divine will seeking to save the people from destruction at the hands of the covetous, nasty and unscrupulous neighbours. On the other hand, the sovereignty of the Sultan is never threatened by his failure. In all events the responsibility of the breakdown of law and order lies on the people themselves. He remains an autocrat whom the subjects have no moral right to challenge. They are bound to him by the original obligation to obey, since dissent tends to throw them back on the mercy of those who thrive by trading in disorder and bloodshed. Thus, the prime cause of society as also its antithesis is human sinfulness, or by the same logic, the subjects themselves. Sin and its punishment forms the keynote in the philosophy of Nizamulmululk; and he uses it with utmost convenience to save the king from all responsibility to the subjects. He is answerable only to God. Internal disorder and external aggression feature as the alternatives to obedience much in the same way as we find in the Prince of Machiavelli and the Leviathan of Hobbes.

Nizam was constrained to this position from a more acute though somewhat similar necessity that was faced by Hobbes
and Machiavelli. 1

The Turks constituted the ruling race in the dynastic states of central Asia as also the dominant element both in the armies and administration. They had risen to political power from what was only a conglomeration of scattered tribes; and though they had adopted many of the institutions of the organised eastern politics under despotic monarchy, they had retained the vestiges of tribal democracies. Owing direct allegiance to their immediate chiefs and through them to the hierarchy of ruling authorities, they still believed in parity with all. The sovereign was only the first among equals; and theoretically he was understood to share the conqueror's domains with the rank and file. This notion was the keynote in the relationship of the people with the state. In high politics it resulted in the reglementation of political influences exerted by his nobles, all contending for power and supremacy.

Nizam's concept of sovereignty resting as it does, on Divine Will and necessitated by the need to militate the

Turkish concept of equality is fundamental to his ideas about all the aspects of public administration. The vizier being the alter ego of the monarch, derives his authority from his sovereign and, representing him in all aspects emerges as the most powerful and the strongest single person. He is charged with the responsibility of protecting and perpetuating the rule of the sovereign, from internal and external enemies. As suppresser of evil he is the monument of virtue, as protector of religion, he is punctiliously religious and God-fearing. Above all he is a man of unquestionable integrity. This concept of vizarat is evident from his work as well as writings. Nizamulmulk sought to establish his power as vizier by introducing drastic reforms in the military organisation and the revenue department and carried out important public works to induce his popularity among the people. By changing the traditional composition of the military and by regularising the Iqta system he shattered the power of the officers and nobles and reduced them to subjection without affecting their efficiency.
Military commanders were given \textit{Iqta} lands which were not hereditary.\footnote{1} The military was divided into a number of regiments each composed of specified number of soldiers belonging to heterogenous races, tribes and regions, "so that like-minded soldiers may not dominate." At the outset of his career he recommended to Malik Shah that the retiring soldiers be granted pension. He was right when he argued that living on state money would ensure their loyalty and prevent them from joining the ranks of enemies. Malik Shah refused and twice faced the revolt of tribes.\footnote{2}

Nizamulmulk regularised the conferment of titles on nobles and recommended check on lavity in this respect.\footnote{3} He insisted on discriminative treatment by the sovereign of the nobles according to their ranks, tacitly to pamper their vanity and their sense of distinction and to create a psychological barrier amongst them. In the Siyasat Nama, he instructs

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1. Bundari's well known statement that Nizamulmulk introduced the practice of granting \textit{Iqtas} to the soldiery is evidently untrue; such grants were already in common practice under the Buwayhids. What Nizamulmulk probably did not to regularise those who had already possessed in order to avoid any disturbance in the lower strata of the military.

2. There is no evidence of the introduction of pension system in the early phase of Malik Shah's rule. But it seems that later Nizamulmulk introduced it on his own, for we come across no evidences of disgenerented on the side of the enemy.

the Hajib that visitors should not be allowed presence before the king indiscriminately. Nobles should not be called frequently, for as he means to say, familiarity breeds contempt.¹ Peasants and other tax-payers received his special attention. In a situation charged with intrigue and malice, the support of the commoners was extremely valuable. To insure this he ordered administrators to choose tax-collectors with special care, and for steps to be taken in order to prevent oppressive methods in the collection of taxes. "Farmers should not be pressed hard", he writes, "for this would ruin them and the state as well."² Further, "the Ghulaman (state servants) should not be sent without written deeds especially in cases of the realisation of revenue, because they can misuse their power and position and can realise excessive dues."

Strong monarchy, especially when it stood open to challenge by traditional concept of equal right, demanded that the king should always be fullyaware of the attitudes of the peoples, the goings-on in public life, the activities of the nobles, officials and the influential persons in the city.

1. Siyasat Nama, p. 147.
2. Siyasat Nama, p. 22.
To realise this Nizamulmulk returns in his book to this theme again and again, viz. "a virtuous vizier brings glory to the name of the king." Conversely when the vizier lacks in virtue, such disorder is created in the state as may have no end and the monarch is overtaken by worry and grief and the empire is without tranquility.\(^1\) He suggests that the king should keep enquiring his confidants in secret about the manner of the vizier's functioning, for with him the good and bad of the state is bound.\(^2\) His bearing and his character inevitably affects the subjects, since the subjects are like a herd and vizier their protector.\(^3\) Darius lost to Alexander because the former's vizier had secretly joined hands with the latter and when Darius was killed, Alexander remarked, "negligence on the part of the king and dishonesty of the vizier carried him away."\(^4\)

Nizam's concept of virtue is however not mere philosophical abstraction. It includes certain qualities which are

\begin{enumerate}
  \item Siyasat Nama, p. 23.
  \item Ibid.,
  \item Siyasat Nama, p. 25.
  \item Siyasat Nama, p. 34.
\end{enumerate}
of immediate practical importance for the vizier as the high functionary of the state. Virtue includes right belief, kind-heartedness, goodness of habits, religious piety, knowledgeability, generosity and faithfulness to the monarch. 5

The belief in high birth was the hallmark of Persian culture and is not a fad with Nizamulmulk. In most of the courts of the Turkish dynasties viziers belonged to Persian extraction, and Iran, being an ancient seat of culture, had given birth to most of the men of letters, who rose to the ranks of nobility. In contrast to this the Turks, despite having acquired much from Iranians whom they emulated, had not as yet developed a cognizable background of civility. Their heathen past was still in close proximity to their present. The few families that had risen above their original identity through one or two generations could hardly be expected to add to their ability as administrators. The virtues so punctiliously set out by Nizamulmulk for a qualified vizier and his insistence on high birth are thus indirectly a justification of his own existence in the Turkish government and an

1. Siyasat Nama, p. 218.
appreciation of the existing situation. It is to be understood
as a subjective proposition of practically no universal value
and not as a condition of any doctrinal significance, yet
the virtues specified as part of the qualifications of a
good vizier are not mere altruisms with Nizamulmulk. These
are principles of immense political importance. These qualities
were natural to the high born. For this reason Nizamulmulk
prefers the sons of viziers as more suitable for the office
of vizarat than others, just like it behaves the sons of
monarchs to become monarchs.¹

His political opponents objected to the incurring of
this enormous expenditure on the propagation of his faith.
They precipitated frequent quarrels which gave room for the
vizier to put his foot down on every matter. Students gradua-
ting from these schools were appointed to the higher and lower
offices in the administration and their presence gave additional
strength to his position.² Thus to Nizamulmulk right belief
was plainly nothing else than belief in the orthodox faiths.

¹. Siyasat Nama, pp. 217-19.
². Rawandi, Rahat-al-Sudur, V. 2, 156, cf. SOAS' Bulletin,
1959.
Religious piety is an important virtue; and for a Muslim it implies strict adherence to Islamic law. It is questionable, however, as to how the execution of Islamic principles was possible in an autocratic state. Such a state must necessarily employ Machiavellian principles in order to justify its existence and to maintain firm hold on the state. Especially in a situation where other political forces are pressing hard it becomes difficult to practise complete piety. Nevertheless, as it was a Muslim state the Sultan, the vizier and other administrative officials were required to be pious to practise religion in its true spiritual sense. The administration must essentially be run in accordance with the basic tenets of Islam and its law, the sharia must be the guide in the matters of administration and justice. Here again the emphasis on religious piety is suggestive of the fact that other existing Islamic sects were devoted of this virtue. The other reason may be political motivation. The other reasons. The neighbouring Fatimid State of Egypt also propagated the inculcation of this virtue and considered themselves as divinely ordained people being most pious in the matter of religion. They claimed themselves to be the descendants of Fatima, the
daughter of Prophet Muhammad. It was indispensable then for the Saljuqs to practise religious piety, for, they claimed themselves to be the champions of Sunni faith. Yet, another fact for its being indispensable was that every dynasty which emerged on political scene sustained the claim of being the champion of the Sunni cause and declared the extinguished dynasty as irreligious or corrupt. The Samanids ousted the Saffarids on this basis and in turn the Ghaznavids did the same with them. The Saljuqs who also overpowered the Ghaznavids on the same old pretext could not retain power without adherence to religious piety.

In Islam wine is forbidden; yet Nizamulmulk recommends wine for kings, though by implication. This recommendation makes religious piety a shallow virtue, which otherwise is essential even for kings.

Vizier is an important organ of the autocratic government and the essential function of the government is to look after the welfare of the people.¹ It is for this reason that almost every important political thinker has rejected all forms of tyrannical governments. Nizamulmulk also aims at

¹Siyasat Nama, pp. 23, 34, 35.
establishing a welfare government which would undoubtedly benefit the people; but not by sacrificing the interest of the state. According to the traditional Semitic concepts, the king and the state have precedence over the subjects. The latter belong to the former; but not conversely so. The king is the repository of sovereignty and the subjects have no right to defy his authority.¹ The interest of the state, therefore, is prior to the personal or collective considerations. The position that Nizamulmulk has taken in this respect is therefore, in effect, little more than the reiteration of the rule already in vogue in the Islamic States.

Nizamulmulk like his predecessors safeguards the interest of the state yet he recommends the qualities of kind heartedness and generosity as essential for a vizier, but the connotation of the term is not as wide as commonly accepted. Kind heartedness is not synonymous with useless and vain piety. It only means benevolent attitude towards the people when necessary. At the time of draught, for example, when the crops are damaged the farmers must be exempted from the payment of revenue. They should not be pressed to pay unless they are, in fact, in such

a position. Under the burden of taxes they must not be compelled to sell their cattle, for, they are their means and instruments. The ruin of the farmers would mean the ruin of the state.¹ Nizamulmulk instructs it to be strictly against the use of coercive methods for realising taxes from the people.

It is in the interest of the state that it must provide livelihood to everyone. Absence of adequate means of livelihood brings turmoil. He recommends that more than one job should not be entrusted to one man and conversely more than one man should not be employed for one job. This rule would provide employment to many and would create efficiency of the state services; for, the person employed for a single job would solely be responsible for its completion.²

Keeping in view the historical background of revolts and rebellions, Nizamulmulk recommends that the vizier must acquaint himself with the affairs of the state. He must have the knowledge about the activities of the nobles, feudal lords (Mugtiyan) and other government officials such as Mutasarrif and Amil etc. He must also be informed about the

¹. Siyasat Nama, p. 22.
². Ibid., pp. 198, 199, 209-212.
ability and functioning of each and every qazi. One who is inefficient should immediately be removed from his post. Balance of power in the recruitment of army is a point of unanimous agreement in Al-Mawardi and Nizamulmulk. During peace time Vizier should be strict and in war time, he should be polite. Machievalli has also advised the prince to make the best use of them and a balance of power between mercenary and regular troops should at any cost be maintained and it is advisable for every wise prince.

The importance of the post of Qazi lay in the fact that the incumbent dispensed justice in the name of the king who derived this authority from the God Almighty. The qazi was the preserver of the life and the property of muslim ummah. The vizier must be fully aware that they protected the people and dispensed justice as they should. Nizamulmulk also suggests the methods for procuring correct information about the different classes of nobles and officials. He advises the king to appoint the spies and informers to keep vigilence over nobles, to study the conditions of the subjects and to

2. Siyasat Nama, Chapter 20.
watch all kinds of activities going on, at the frontiers. He supports all other measures which were being practised earlier to check and watch various departments and particularly mentions the measure of appointing spies, for, Alp-Arsalan believed in no such institution. In brief, the government must fully be aware of all affairs that may affect the functioning of the state.

In order to justify the co-existence of the virtual head, i.e., the Caliph and his partner in sovereignty i.e., the tutalar head, the Buwahids, al-Mawardi classifies the Amarat into two categories i.e., the Amarat bil Istikfa (delegated Amarat) and Amarat bil Istila (Amarat by seizure). He speaks of the Iqtas as being of two kinds, Iqta-i-Istiqlal (land with fiscal rights only) and Iqta-i-Tamlik (land with proprietary rights). The former was held by an Amir with delegated authority and the latter was occupied by Amir bil Istila. Contrary to it incidentally, Nizamulmulk did not accept any existence of Iqta-i-Tamlik, for such a concept envisaged the existence of a state within a state. Muslim political thinkers like al-Farabi and al-Mawardi emphasize that

1. Siyasat Nama, Chapters 6, 9, 12, 13, 19.
2. Abonaward, Al-akhham-al-Sultania, Chapter 3.
Caliph is viceregent of God on earth. Asserting the same fact Acquinas speaks of monarchy as the best form of government, describes its virtues and discusses the safeguards against its degeneracy into tyranny, the rewards of rulership and the true aim of Government etc.¹ Thus, according to both al-Mawardi and Nizamulmulk Tusi rulership is indivisible. Like al-Farabi, al-Mawardi, Nizamulmulk and Ibn Outeba, Thomas Acquinas also stresses on the point that there are few born to rule and others to be ruled. The qualities that these scholars prescribe are also unanimous. While Machiavelli maintains that those who rise from private citizens to be princes merely by fortune or such who are granted state either by money or by favour of ruler in order to secure glory or to maintain his power or secure the throne by bribing army can last till the ruler is in power who had favoured him, is harmful to the stability of ruler and such prince or power.²

Al-Mawardi like a grammarian conducted a study of vizarat institution on lexicological grounds and limited himself to

1. W. Ebenstein - Great Political Thinkers, pp. 209-228.
The word 'vizier' is said to be derived either from vazr, avazr or vizr (burden, the back-bone or place of refuge). According to al-Mawardi the institution originated in Arabia. Although in a preinstinctive form it existed in Abysinya, Byzentenian during the life time of the Prophet, the Arabs were familiar with this institution. Prophet Mohammad called Abu Bakr as his vizier. Nizamulmulk does not enter into such discussions. His study is on the basis of institutional structure only. To him, the institution existed long before the Prophet. Like Plato he thinks that the minister is the trustees a shepherd while state is the trust and peoples are the flock.

Political consideration as intimately in al-Maward's concept of vizarat and in that of Nizamulmulk is the same. But the approach radically differs. He makes a theoretical distinction between two types of vizarat, viz., Vizarat-i-Tafwiz and vizarat-i-Taufiz. The viziers prior to the Turkish

2. Siyasat Nama, pp. 218-220
3. Al-Mawardi places vizier-i-tafwiz equivalent to the caliph for all practical purposes. In fact, he maintains the continuity with the past conception of historians like Tabri, Masoodi and Baladhuri who make special reference to those who held both military and executive authority like the Barmakids. The vizier-i-taufiz of al-Mawardi means the master of nothing but pen only.
domination may be said to belong to the office of the vizarat-i-Tafviz and the latter viziers, who were actually less effective and little more powerful than ministers with special portfolios. Nizamulmulk recommends some limitations on the viziers yet he believes in no categorization in general and vizarat-e-Taufiz in particular.¹

The position of al-Mahallabi, the Hanbalid vizier of Muti'Billah Abu-al-Qasim al-Fazal bin Muqtadi and al-Tai bi-Amr Allah (334-381 A.H.) Ali bin al-Hussain and Fakhr al-Daulah the ministers of al-Qasim were those whose rise and fall was in the mind of al-Mawardi while compiling his treatises on administrative craft. These viziers were subservient to the will of the Buwayhids in all matters of policy and the mode of their execution. They did not act as Caliph's alter ego but they were placed as the mediators between the army and the ruler, between the officials and the rulers between subjects and the sovereign. He served orders of appointment of important officers, give legal sanction to the co-existence of Buwahid Amirs and an Abbasid's vizier al-Mawardi considers their appointment as legitimate and confirms the fact that two great

¹. Siyasat Nama, pp. 29, 30, 35, 36.
powers cannot exist simultaneously unless a clear division of powers and functions is made between the two authorities. In this case, however, the state governed by a dictatorial regime would suffer a clash of power or the military authority would exercise a superior hand. Realising the nominal character of the vizier in this state of affairs. Al-Mawardi recommends the qualities of the person to be appointed on this post. Even a zimmi may be appointed to such an office. Other qualities, however, are those which cannot be excluded in the case of vizier-e-Taufiz.

Both al-Mawardi and Nizamulmulk are unanimous in specifying faithfulness to the monarch as one the prime virtues of the vizier; but he does not ignore monarch's duties to his vizier. Unlike al-Mawardi, Nizamulmulk speaks of no such possibility which may turn a king to hostility towards the vizier.

Al-Mawardi on the other hand includes the monarch in the list of the vizier's enemies whom the latter exercises excessive powers. As a result of this hostality, the authority of the

Al-Mawardi, seems to recommend that the vizier should resign as soon as he fails to maintain trendquality. And for that reason he justifies the use of power if necessiated in order to deal with anti-social elements in the days of disturbance.¹

As the chief, Qazi of Baghdad, Mawardi should have given more importance to the state of justice in the Abbasid state. He seems overcautious in his emphasis on the administration of justice when he says that the people need nothing but justice. Of course, his concept of justice rests on a more comprehensive, philosophical definition of justice than the mere judicial form of its dispensation, yet in this specific sense he is particular enough to elaborate further. Disturbance, acco-ding to him, may be caused even by the actions and politics of the monarch, corrupt administration, unworthy staff and failure in supervision may also create disorder and chaos among the people. For this vizier should be cautious. He should improve

the means of livelihood, protect people against injustice and keep a vigilant eye over the aggressive tendencies of neighbouring states. He should check economic offences as well. In the matters of taxation the vizier should avoid over-estimation. The funds of the state should be allocated equitably lest feelings of injustice should be created among those deprived.

It is worth recalling that the sovereign of Nizamulmulk's conception is divinely ordained and as such he portakes no blames for any wrong or injustice done to the people. The responsibility devolves on the vizier. On the other hand al-Mawardi, while giving divine status to the Imam considers him to be wholly responsible for his own actions.

Al-Mawardi, believes in mutual understanding between the vizier and the Caliph in matters of executive power. The condition is slightly different in the case of vizier-i-tafwiz. So long as the Imam acts in confirmity with rules and regulations the vizier's position is strong and the Caliph has no right to revoke his orders.¹ Yet he would advise that the

¹. Al-Ahkam, pp. 24, 26.
vizier should not insist on his own policies or plans and actions if the Caliph disagrees. For the Caliph is the ruler. If the actions of the Imam go wrong the responsibility is entirely on the vizier. Contrarily, the king of Nizamulmulk is completely independent for his actions but the responsibility of his actions devolves not on himself but on the vizier. According to al-Mawardi, as head of the army, the vizier should have the qualities of bravery, zeal, courage, strong will, impressiveness and effection. He can himself appoint his deputies to lead the army in the campaigns. Both al-Mawardi and Nizamulmulk believe that the salaries of the soldiers must not be delayed. The military personnel should be given immediate audience. In Nizam's view all noble hence must be given this privilege.

Mawardi, is of the opinion that the applicant for the post of vizarat is required to fulfil all conditions except pedigree, because it is essential for the Imam only i.e., he should be from amongst the Quraish. Nizamulmulk considers it to be one of the essential conditions of the vizier, probably because he intends to make this post heridatory in

1. Al-ahkam, p. 22.
his family for which vizarat in hereditary succession like the kingship for the kings, becomes primary virtue.\(^1\) Mawardi believes in his educational qualifications. In the light of Mawardi's recommendations appointment for the post of vizarat is more difficult than acquiring a multi power post like the Caliphate. He not only wanted him to fulfil all the conditions which an Imam should have but adds more regulations for the candidate. Religious piety, knowledgability physical fitness, intelligence, statesmanship, courage should be common in the vizier and the Imam. Nizamulmulk disapproves none of them but tacitly implies. Religious piety in the vizier indicates the same circumstances as had later developed in the time of the Saljuqs. To al-Mawardi religious piety was not essential only because of Carmathian propaganda or Fatimid prominence but for the reasons that Abu Kalidar had embraced the Ismailite faith.\(^2\) Shite domination on the political landscape and their tutelage posed for al-Mawardi the problem of keeping intact the very fabric of sunni faith and Shariat, hence to 'assume'  

\(^1\) Siyasat Nama, pp. 217-19.

\(^2\) The Abbasid Caliph was living on the licence of Abu Kalijar than the Buwabyd ruler of Iraq and its adjoining territories.
the virtue if one had it not. Probably none of the Abbasid viziers had ever possessed religious piety to that extent, and therefore, hastened the ruin of the Abbasid power.

Military penetration into the root of the administration led al-Mawardi to recommend courage, statesmanship, shrewdness and so on as the essential virtues for the vizier. During the time of Turkish domination the Caliph and the vizier lived as long as they could please the Turkish army and its officers. The same fear existed under Buwahyd and Saljuq Tutelage as well. None of the viziers that is Muhallabi and Hussain bin Ali and Fakhral Daulah who held this office could exercise effective authority on the administration even over the nominee of the Malik-al-Rahim, al-Bassassiri, or Amid al-Baghdad of Saljuqs, Hajjaj bin Jaffar. The Imam al-Qaim failed to suppress Bassassiri's rebellion in which he was made prisoner in 1057-58 A.D.

Knowledgability covers a wide conception of vizier's virtues. He should acquire knowledge of the nature and psychology of the subjects. It would be helpful for his success in the implementation of king's order.¹

¹ Adab-al-Vazier, pp. 11-12.
For instance worldly men (ahl-al-duniya) expect monetary support. Farmers and artisans (li-zarati va-al-Imarati) demand justice and labourers (al-Mihan) gratitude. None of these should become hurdles or means of economic exploitation to achieve any of the vizier's goals. Knowledge of the friends of the king and their psychology of enemies of the state, vizier's own friends and foes and their attitude and of seditious elements, internal or external are the primary elements of the knowledgability in Mawardi's writings.¹ Sources of income, items of expenditure increment in state treasury, causes of the fall in the state finances and possible means to check inflation or deflation must be evident to the vizier.²

The person or a group who at any time may be hostile to the existance and survival of the vizier be eliminated for he may become the cause of downfall of the vizier.³ Thus, he clearly recommends that a vizier should have some talents for hatching conspiracies without which he cannot survive in his

1. Ibid., pp. 13-18.
2. Ibid., pp. 19-23.
3. Ibid., pp. 35-38.
power. Court politics probably had compelled to recommend this virtue for the vizier in his practical life. The vizier al-Musailimah was contemporary to al-Mawardi whose rise and fall was clearly hated by the later. The humiliation and the manner in which he was killed had certainly influenced al-Mawardi's approach. Thus whosoever failed in hatching conspiracy, against such persons or groups was either put in jail or treacherously murdered. He recommends that vizier should prepare a clique of his friends which would help him in the days of his trouble.

Excess of anger or affection could influence decisions, keeping of words, and implementing of threats are also of practical importance. A promise, if it had ever been made, becomes the right of others but as threat to its maker; and it should be avoided, or if made, it must be fulfilled unless a suitable e-cause may be advanced for its nonfulfilment. All these recommendations would help him in his practical life.
While speaking of the institution of **Vizarat** in Islam, a distinction must necessarily be made between the **vizarat** as it existed under the pious caliphs and the **vizarat** which emerged under the influence of the monarchies of Central Asia. The former is a function, the latter denotes an office. The Prophet used to assign various functions of executive nature to his companions depending on their respective abilities. Abu Bakar acted as chief adviser, Umar was consulted in the affairs of war and Ali was generally entrusted with the 'alam' in the battle fields. Bilal often looked after the finances. Abu Bakar has been called the Prophet's **Vizir** by the historians and was so regarded by Arabs. These companions held no official designation and were expected to conform in their functioning with the **shariat** as also to the practices of Arab tribal democracy.

The latter concept of **vizarat** inevitably embibed the prestige of the supreme executive of the state from the tradition existing in the conquered territories of Iraq and Ajam. It grew from the political necessity of controlling the vast Caliphal domains under the Umayyads and the Abbasids and achieved maturity under the powerful rules of the minor dynasties.