Arms Race and Arms Control

And Damn'd be him that first cries "Hold, enough!"
Shakespeare, Macbeth, v.7

As long as war is a probability in international relations, the question is not whether states need military power. The relevant issue is how much and what kinds of military power are appropriate in order to achieve a state's goals and aims. The application of balance of power rules in international relations have not excluded war but have, in fact, made it the ultimate method for preserving the balance as a system. Vital national interests can be defended only by an ability, capability and willingness to employ force. A state's preparedness and willingness to go to war is the criteria by which its ability and willingness to defend its national interests is measured. If a state feels that a threat to some vital national interest is serious enough, it has to commit, or threaten to commit, significant military resources to resolve the dispute; and herein lies the importance of arms and military resources for the state.

Arms make all the difference in the capability of states in achieving their goals—the difference between taking what you want and making someone give it to you. The political value of arms is more elusive than their military worth, because it is constituted in the perceptions of individuals and states. Also, states may go on accumulating military power in the form of more and more weapons if they are not overly imaginative about what else to do in the field of international relations. If ideologically and economically, a state has not much to offer to international relations, then to influence
international relations it has to accumulate military power through weapons. As pointed out by David Singer: “Nations arm—and over-arm—for many reasons, of which self defense is merely the most obvious and legitimate. They also arm for aggrandizement, to exercise clout in world arena, to maintain or expand a sphere of influence, to inhibit other nations’ efforts to encroach on their turf, to support their colonists, to help defend friendly regimes and so forth. Then there are the essentially domestic incentives to absorb the unemployed or other potential trouble makers, to stimulate the economy, to aid certain industries, to develop a lucrative export activity, to maintain political order, and to perpetuate a given regime. Most important, of course, is the fact that each incremental addition to a nation’s military establishment or arsenals will increase the political and economic power of those who favour such arming” (1).

The Meaning and Nature of Arms Race:

An arms race would involve two or more states in competition to accumulate military power against each other. This has to be differentiated from the ‘normal’ process of military relations between states who are not at war with each other. The normal operations of the arms dynamic would be the maintenance of the military status quo; and arms race would be the extreme manifestation of this arms dynamic. Both are just the opposite of each other, but both can lead to each other. It may also happen that a state may resort to arms build up without attracting a response and there may be no arms race, consequently. The forces of mass production have led to the institutionalized innovation in the international system making the arms race a distinctive phenomenon in international relations. A war may be preceded by an arms race; but it does not mean that it was caused by the arms race. It is the perceived possibility of war that actually generates an arms race. An arms race actually enables the states to display their military and technological prowess without actually going to war.

Huntington defines arms race as “A progressive, competitive peacetime increase in armaments by two states or coalitions of states resulting from conflicting purpose or mutual fears”(2). And, according to Colin Gray, an arms race is there when there are “two or more parties perceiving themselves to be in an adversary relationship, who are increasing or improving their armaments with a rapid rate and
structuring their respective military postures with a general attention to the past, current, and anticipated military and political behaviour of the other parties" (3). He has listed certain basic conditions for an arms race:

i-There must be two or more parties, each conscious of their mutual antagonism

ii-They must structure their armed forces with attention to the probable effectiveness of the forces in combat with, or a deterrent to, the other arms race participants

iii- They must compete in terms of quantity (men, weapons) and/or quality (men, weapons, organization, doctrine, deployment)

iv-There must be rapid increases in quantity and/or improvements in quality.

Many believe (4) that arms race is causally related to war. Some believe (5) that it is the institutionalized arms race that maintains deterrence. Marek Thee (6) uses the term 'arms dynamic' to refer to pressures that make states acquire armed power and change the quantity and quality of the armed power they already possess. According to Galtung (7), arms race is the referent for arms control and non-provocative forms of defense. And Barry Buzan (8) believes that arms racing identifies an important element in relations between states that is distinct from other political and economic sources of conflict and cooperation.

It is the anarchical nature of the international system that produces military competition. Such a competition is particularly intense if attempts are made by a state, or alliance, to enhance its influence and to attempt to control the international system at the expense of others. This becomes a power struggle between status quo states and those who want to revise and modify it. The latter make efforts to generate enough political pressure in their favour through their enhanced military power so as to change the status quo in their favour; and such attempts are countered by others through their military power. For the goal achievement of both of them, enhancement of military power is necessary. In such cases, political rivalry initiates a power struggle that leads to arms race, and further political rivalry. No state can afford to take chances with national security and, therefore, prepares for a worst-case scenario to counter the steps taken by the other state with the same view. Both the two sides
tend to perceive each little adjustment as a threat to their national security and make even greater efforts to increase their military power; and this produces competitive accumulations of military power. Barry Buzan (9) talks about this security dilemma of states in which they cannot take steps to strengthen their own security without making others less secure; and because the others, feeling now less secure, would take similar steps to strengthen their security, the former would feel less secure and would take further steps to further strengthen their security. This action-reaction process can go on and on unless and until one side gives up (which hardly ever happens), or a new balance of power is reached which may be acceptable to both, or (more frequently) the issue is resolved by war. The security dilemma is characterized by an unbalanced perception wherein states are actually aware of the threats that others pose to them and are unaware of the threats that they pose to others. In this way, they always over react and escalate the cycle of provocation. Deployments of long-range theater nuclear weapons (LRTNW) by the NATO in Europe, and the Soviet deployments of submarine-launched missiles near North America are examples of forward deployments that explain the action-reaction dynamic of arms race. Also, even political actions sometimes may result in military reactions of the other side; and no consistency in reaction can be predicted. But the danger of war is most acute when the race is close to resulting in a shift in the balance of power. An exaggerated over-reaction is a signal that war is more likely to occur.

The fundamental proposition about arms race is that states consolidate their military position because of the perceived threats from other states. Such an action by a state raises the perceived degree of threat for the other state and causes the reaction in which the other consolidates its own military position. Within the framework of domestic resource constraints and some international counterpressures, states in their efforts to achieve political objectives against the interests of other state, feel compelled to increase their military power. And increases in the military capability in one state create pressures for responsive increases in the other state(s). There is an abnormal and simultaneous rate of growth in the military outlays of states involved in an arms race and this growth results from the competitive pressure of the adversary. Such an arms race is feasible only between those states whose policies are inter-dependent, and whose intentions, programmes and capabilities are of utmost concern to each other. There is no arms race between states who are not interested in each other or whose strength and capabilities are not
comparable. Whatever the differences between them and whatever the rapid growth of their armed capabilities, there can be no arms ‘race’ between the USA and Cuba, or the Soviet Union and South Korea, and, since their policies are not inter-dependent ,between India and Brazil.

Because of modern technological developments, states have to long anticipate the intended behaviour of adversaries and even potential adversaries. There is a long time required for a weapon system to travel between the stages of conception and deployment and, therefore, future deployments have to take into account what the real strategic situation might be when the new weapons become operational. This results into a spiral arms race, which is a process of simultaneous and anticipatory interaction and which may be called self-reinforcing pattern of mutual military stimulation.

The fast pace of technological innovation, and the requirement of keeping up with the pace of change, has not made it easy to make a distinction between arms race and maintenance of the military status quo. This is particularly true with regard to the offensive and defensive nature of the prevailing weapons-systems. Which nature (of weapons) is prevalent in any particular age determines the inter-state relations and international stability. Advancement of military technology results in a decline in international security. The anarchic pattern of proliferation of advanced weapons may upset the balance of military relationships on which regional political systems rest. If the regional stability is fragile, then changes in perceived military capabilities by large-scale arms transfers may lead a state, not satisfied with attempted changes, to act militarily without these changes becoming stable. If a state feels that its own military position is deteriorating because of the adversary’s accumulation of weapons, it may resort to preventive war before its military position is completely eroded. Arms race increases the uncertainty in a state about the first strike/ pre-emptive strike intentions and capabilities of the other state and about the security of its own second-strike capability. This uncertainty acts against the restraining conditions of MAD. A problem of categorization of weapons concerns the offensive versus defensive capabilities of weapons. No doubt a state might feel less threatened by the acquisition of defensive weapons by the other. But the difficulty is that very few weapons can exclusively be placed in one or the other categories, and mostly weapons have potentialities for both the applications. Not only this, but even the transferred advanced technology also can be used for civilian as well as military purposes. Misapprehension about the
strategic doctrine of the other side results in limiting the possible grounds for arms control. This was the position between the superpowers before the start of the easing of tensions from the mid-Eighties.

Though much has been said about the arms race, the central question is still whether the existence of an arms race between two states significantly increases the probability of their going to war. There are some who believe that military expansion enhances the danger of war and, since it provokes a countervailing expansion by the other side, it is self-defeating. But, on the other hand, is the argument that it is a strong military posture that can deter the adversary’s military action and, if unchecked, the adversary’s adventurism would lead to an armed conflict. Instead of arms race, it is a state’s failure to maintain capabilities towards its potential rivals that leads to war.

A balance of military power between two states can exist if they were symmetrical. Of course, there is no precise measurement of the balance of strength and one has to rely on judgement, which may be influenced by biased perceptions. Whatever these perceptions, a pursuit of balance among two states is bound to initiate and perpetuate an arms race. If it is believed that balance brings security then a state is bound to escalate its armed preparedness because it cannot be proved that there is balance. Because of security considerations, when one attempts to get ahead, the other is forced into the arms race to maintain balance. Efforts of states towards maintaining and increasing their security result in enhancing the threats, or perceptions of threats, for others. A competition, revolving around military technology, results which is self-stimulating. This military technology has its own logic of spreading in geographical and qualitative sense; and its impact on international relations is known as arms race.

An arms race does seem to enhance the likelihood of war between the states involved. This temptation is especially there when one state possesses a newly-developed/deployed weapon which the adversary does not yet have but might acquire in the future. Then the temptation is to start a war when the prospect for victory is greater instead of waiting till the adversary might acquire equality, or even superiority. The unending arms race may produce a technological breakthrough which will bring war closer. Having its own dynamics, an arms race leads to the militarization of social life of a state and affects the development of conflicts. Even then, it is difficult to find a causal link between arms races and conflict escalation. No doubt, a rapid military growth, on the competitive basis, may convert a military
confrontation into war. But arms races in themselves do not lead to the escalation of conflicts or initiate such conflicts. It is not possible to assume that an arms race will be like any other; whether it will lead to war; or, whether there really is an arms race (10). And several authors have discussed it as an alternative/substitute to war in the international relations (11).

Arms Acquisition:

Arms acquisition programmes of states may be independent, in which the acquisition is self-reliant and indigenously designed and developed; may be interdependent which involves cooperation between two or more states in design-development and production of some weapon; and may be dependent, in which procurement may be in the form of import or may be local production of foreign technology. Klaus Knorr (12) has argued that national scientific and technological progress enhances defense production potential by stimulating innovation through the adoption of new manufacturing methods and increased labour and resource productivity. He believes that the higher the proportion of the defense budget devoted to R&D, the more likely it is that the country will remain on the cutting edge of military technology and be capable of implementing a self-reliant acquisition strategy; and, therefore, the option of a self-reliant weapons acquisition can be successfully adopted only by countries who have highly developed and diversified scientific, industrial and technological capabilities. Joint acquisition necessarily involves cooperation between two or more states who presuppose shared perceptions of military threat and the ways of dealing with it, and this method is usually adopted because of economic reasons as the rising costs of self-reliant acquisition may not be within the reach of every state. It is intended to foster greater alliance, integration and cohesion, as among the West European NATO countries, as well as the reduction of dependence on military technology of a superior partner, like the USA. Dependent acquisition may be in the form of a direct import of foreign military equipment or the licensed indigenous assembly-and-production. It leads to military dependence and a curtailment of political freedom, and it is most prevalent in the Third World. In the absence of scientific-technological-industrial capability and confronted with perceptions of external threats and internal instability, the Third World countries became dependent on arms imports from the
industrially advanced countries. The superpowers, in a scramble for the Cold War allies, became the major arms suppliers for the Third World, and their arms-transfer policies fostered the Third World dependence on them. The vulnerabilities and limitations of a single source of arms supplies led many of the Third World countries to diversify these resources to reduce their dependence on a predominant source of supply. Dependence was thus distributed and spread around across a number of supplier countries and large scale military import substitution was resorted to (13).

By the end of the ‘Eighties, some thirty countries had demonstrated their ability to manufacture major weapon systems and even producing indigenously designed and developed systems. The desire to reduce the level of foreign dependence and promoting military self-reliance and political-military independence and autonomy triggered yet another aspect of arms race. This is so because of inherent political and strategic considerations. Whatever advantage a country, like India, might have achieved by indigenous development of weapons and reducing its foreign dependence, is usually eroded by the presence of countries in the neighbourhood (like China) who have very large military establishments or countries (like Pakistan) who offset any advantage by acquisition of more advanced and better weaponry from their allies and friends.

In the Third World, the form of arms proliferation greatly depends on the political economy of the state concerned. Organizational pressures from the military structure (for weapons acquisitions) and the internal insecurity of the ruling elite determine the requirements for arms, for these states. During the last two decades, the Third World’s share in global military expenditure ($ 2 billion a day) has increased from 9% to 25%. Whereas it is true that in many such states, internal security considerations, resulting from their internal political weaknesses, determine their weapons requirements, it is not correct to believe that weapons proliferation is more in states in which the civilian elite is subordinate to the military leadership. Similarly, it is not correct to believe, as Colin Gray does (14), that Third World arms races are local proxy manifestations of races among the great powers. It ignores the real independence of the arms dynamic in the Third World; and the one between India and Pakistan is its example. External suppliers can affect the arms race by the amount and quality of weapons supplied, but the race in itself remains independent and is not a proxy.
Those states who are in a position to acquire high-technology and advanced weapons try to offset the balance of power with their adversary. If they are not in a position to acquire such weapons, they make some political concessions and obtain the requisite weapons in exchange of military bases, political support or access to economic resources. And one of the ways a major power obtains the support of the lesser powers is through arms aid and arms supply. Politico-economic interests ensure that arms will invariably reach where they are perceived to be needed. Since the suppliers have strong motives to sell and the recipients have strong interest to obtain the advanced weapons, the arms trade continues to be one of the most durable features of international relations.

Arms transfers are not just simple acts of supplying and receiving but involve bargaining relationships that are reciprocally and mutually advantageous and affect short-term and long-term interests, of both the sides. A compatibility of strategic interests or purposes between the two sides, involved in arms transfer, is not necessarily required. This transfer is not just a mutual concern of the two sides but also affects third states. Arms transfers, affecting third states, have continued though a convergence of interests did not exist between the supplier and the recipient. The US interests, in arming Pakistan, were governed by the policy of containment of communism through allies, but Pakistan’s motives focused on her relationship with India. Many times supplier states have used arms transfers to bolster regional security. The US had identified her regional interests in the Persian Gulf with the security interests of Iran and, consequently, Iran, under the Shah, asked for huge supplies of arms. This method is not confined to the superpowers alone. Iran provided arms supplies to Oman out of concern for regime stability there, just as the US had supplied arms to Iran for the same objectives. Further, arms are supplied not just for regime stability but also to dissident groups against the government of a state. Interventions in Laos, Cambodia, Congo, Angola, Chad, Cyprus, Philippines, El Salvador and Nicaragua, not just by the superpowers but also by other states of the Third World, were in the form of massive arms supplies to various rebel groups. States have also increasingly diversified their sources of arms supplies. Whereas earlier, many suppliers used to provide free arms assistance under their military assistance programmes, now they require payments for their supplies and this has led the recipients to be more selective in their choice of not only the weapons but also the suppliers.
Neuman and Buzan, in their separate studies (15), have shown that the phenomenon of arms trade has created a stratification of states based on their capabilities for military production. At the bottom are those who neither have, nor hope to possess in any near future, a capability for military production. They think they have the need but do not possess economic resources, industrial capability, scientific and technical know-how and, in some cases, not even enough capital. Since they do seek advanced-weapons for their security needs, they have to depend on the arms trade. In the middle are 'part producers' who have some arms production capability, produce some arms, but do not have enough resources and capability to match the quality and quantity of production done by the main producers. In this category are countries who have started production of small arms (like Pakistan), and countries who have a broad-based arms industry (like India and Brazil), and countries who produce a wide range of arms for the international market (like Sweden and Israel). But, as Brzoska and Ohlson have pointed out (16), all of them depend on main-producers for vital elements of their arms industry, particularly in areas of high-technology such as special materials and precision engineering. Further, countries in this category are both producers and buyers in the arms-trade. Since both the demand for armaments and sources of supply for armaments are invariably increasing, more and more states are likely to be in this complex middle hierarchy. At the top of this hierarchy are major supplier states who are capable of producing the widest spectrum of advanced weapons. They have sufficient capability for R&D, sufficient industrial capability, all the technological know how they need, do not have to import anything for their arms industry and can meet the supply demands of any one from the other categories of this hierarchy. Though only the superpowers can claim the first-rank status, Britain, France and, to some extent, Germany can also be placed in this category and, should it choose to do so, Japan can very easily become a member. But what is apparent for the future of international relations is the trend of a slow diffusion of technological capability for military production among a growing number of states. There has been an imbalance in the power of the states who had a surplus of arms and those who were deficient in arms and this deficiency has been sought to be reduced through arms trade (which includes sale, aid, transfer etc.). Even then, a qualitative advance continues to be there for the states who have the technological advantage. The dynamics of technological progress in weapon-manufacturing leads on its own to the process of weapon-proliferation.
For political reasons, states manufacturing high-technology weapons have to continually and qualitatively upgrade their technology so as not to decline in military capability relative to others; and for economic reasons, they have to channel this technology for arms sales and aid. When the advanced technology is thus piped down to a large number of states, not only the standard of military power is increased in these states but there is a demand for more, because of diverse political reasons. The technologically advanced states thus get more reasons, political and economic, to further advance their weapon-technology to maintain their own strategic superiority. States are always suspicious of their, present or potential, rivals achieving/obtaining some technological breakthrough or some more advanced technology and are ever sensitive to the quality of their opponent’s weapons. States, like Pakistan, for this reason, have sought to acquire superior technology which may, in fact, be not commensurate with their requirements or capabilities.

Before the nuclear age, there was no such thing as too much of military strength for its effective political utility. Any and every small addition of power was politically useful. This traditional concept came to an end in the nuclear age. The unlimited power has politically become useless, and has made its possessors vulnerable to stark feelings of insecurity. Nuclear weapons have become something of a status symbol and the strategy operates on the principle that ‘they’ should not have more than ‘us’. A state may want to acquire nuclear weapons so as to demonstrate political independence, like France; or to get a ‘seat at the head table’, like Britain. A state in the Third World may like this acquisition as a way of improving its position in the international hierarchy, or to gain the status of a great power or even a regional power. The ongoing vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, among the existing nuclear-weapon states, enhances the incentives for others also to seek nuclear status. The most powerful incentive for nuclear proliferation has been the success of the concept of deterrence in maintaining security and stability. This incentive, mixed with the diffusion of a wide range of technologies, has been the basis of nuclear proliferation. The purpose of, and incentive for, going nuclear is the prospect of becoming a major power and achieving a high degree of strategic autonomy. Since the deterrence has supposedly worked among the superpowers, it legitimizes similar hopes among present non-nuclear but threshold states. In spite of all the technological competition, constraints, difficulties and high costs, the status seems to offer such a position in international relations that the temptation is
overwhelming. There have to be compelling reasons for states to doubt the competence of nuclear weapons, in improving their national security, in not going nuclear.

With the spread of nuclear technology, it is not easy to avoid and prevent a horizontal proliferation through the means of technology-denial. Since there has been a continuous erosion of confidence in the capability of the international system to generate security of the individual states, and since conventional weapons are becoming not just more costly but technologically not much-less advanced, many states which find themselves in a threat environment, or perceive so, consider nuclear weapons an attractive option. Many of these states feel that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is discriminatory and should be replaced by a Comprehensive Treaty, which would make weapon development difficult equally for all the states. A more equitable and just NPT regime can emerge if it is based on an effective nuclear disarmament by nuclear weapon states and there is an undeterred access, for all the states, to technology for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Whereas the Third World is understandably keen on getting certain regions accepted as Peace Zones or Nuclear Weapon Free Zones, there is a strong possibility of a nuclear arms race among themselves also, not in a distant future. It was on these issues that the 1980 Geneva Review Conference had broken down. Small nuclear forces will generate vulnerabilities and intensify conventional arms acquisitions and conventional arms races. This would be done to improve deterrence and to keep high and make costly the imperative of nuclear first use. Actions of SNF states against local targets would increase the risk of escalation and miscalculation on the part of the superpowers. As Stephen Cohen has pointed out (17): "Nuclear proliferation is... troubling not because of the number of new weapons that it would produce, but because of the number of new decision-centres it would produce, subsequently increasing the risk of nuclear accident, nuclear theft, nuclear transfer, or nuclear war.... The critical period is the years in which a new nuclear state is still absorbing the strategic implications of nuclear weapons, when it has not yet developed effective command and control arrangements, and when its neighbours and potential enemies have not yet absorbed the implications of nuclearization".

Although there has been cooperation between the USA and Britain, the USSR and China, the USA-France and Israel, there has been no direct trade in nuclear weapons, though attempts have been made to purchase them from the nuclear powers. Actually, nuclear weapon states have cooperated to ensure nuclear non-proliferation.
They have tried to monopolize for themselves, and retain, the edge in international relations that the nuclear weapons are supposed to provide. Whereas they maintain that proliferation is risky for international security because it will increase the probability of some accidental or irrational (as if there can be some rational use also!) use, but in fact such apprehension is due to the uncertainty of deterrence and because such a proliferation will be against the dominant position, of a limited number of states, in international relations. This streak is perceptible in a number of writings from the 'Eighties (18).

The proliferation of nuclear weapons has had no effect on the security of states or on the credibility of deterrence. A state may achieve an ability to destroy some part of the adversary's means of destruction; but it would have no effect on the general capability for an over-all destruction. Whatever the quantum of nuclear arsenals or the degree of the nuclear balance at a particular time, between the superpowers, mutual deterrence nevertheless remains valid. It is the development of tactical nuclear weapons that enhances the destructiveness of war because, ultimately, their use could not be limited in the geographical sense. Such weapons have changed the degree of acceptable damage, and the concept of limited nuclear warfare has weakened deterrence. The increase in the nuclear potential of the superpowers, or of their alliances, did not result in a superiority or security for them. If anything, their security got weakened by the weakening of deterrence which was the result of the idea of a limited nuclear war to redress the consequences of a conventional setback. Nacht and Wohlstetter (19) have questioned the existence of any 'arms race' between the superpowers, which appears more of the maintenance of the military status quo. No doubt, quantitatively the weapons-stockpiles are not increasing, neither is the explosive yield of warheads; defence-budgets have not suddenly grown as a percentage of the GNP; technological advances are not different from normal advances of technology; and SALT negotiations indicated that the superpowers treat each other as militarily equal. In spite of all this, the super power military relationship is not just the maintenance of the military status quo. To start with, the level of arms possession with them is much too high than what would be needed for a minimum deterrence. If they have accepted the equality of relationship, it was a question of accepting the inevitable after it had happened and, therefore, there is no genuine acceptance of the balance of power as each tries to take immediate advantage of the weaknesses of the other. They may not desire war but the high level of hostility does not rule that out either and,
consequently, they prepare for it also. Actually, when political relations between them deteriorate and resemble the Cold War, the military relations are symbolized by arms race, and when political relations improve and resemble detente, the military relations are symbolized by the maintenance of military status quo. Since deterrence achieves the political goal of avoiding the war, it serves to maintain the military status quo. And since deterrence is the condition that properly defines the super powers' strategic relations, the maintenance of military status quo has, at least, to be accepted as a normal condition of super powers' relations. The inevitability of this ensures the workability of arms control as against the more idealistic disarmament. As Rattinger has pointed out (20) there are no accepted criteria to ascertain whether a situation of arms race exists between two states.

The non-nuclear military strategy with peaceful aims is 'Defensive Superiority', and with offensive aims is 'Offensive Superiority'. Whereas the SDI might be placed in the former, the deep-strike capability is of the latter strategy. As Robert Neid has argued, the defensive superiority can be used as a technique of arms control: “To give your forces an offensive stance when your aims are peaceful is to provide grounds for doubt as to your intentions in the minds of your potential enemy: your capacity to attack he can see; your intention not to attack he must take on trust. On the other hand, to give your forces a defensive stance will reassure him: the limits to your ability to attack will be visible; and your declared intention not to attack will be confirmed by the evidence of your military stance” (21). In this way, two states engaged in arms race, but without any offensive aims against each other, can get over the arms race. Even for the same states, there may be different military requirements for different areas in the world. Both the two superpowers have the intervening capability in the Third World, primarily to keep each other out of the areas they consider paramount to their security; and the corresponding military strategy would be of an offensive capability. In areas, such as Europe, on the other hand, there is a wide agreement on frontiers and status quo and political aims of both the sides are peaceful and, therefore, the corresponding military strategy would be a defensive capability. There is no wonder, then, that it is much more easier to arrive at some arms control agreement in Europe. One way of solving the problem of arms proliferation and arms transfers would be an agreement to set up intervention-free zones in regions that are unstable. If the big powers accept an obligation not to intervene in such regions, crisis management among the Third World countries would become easier.
The Idealism of Disarmament:

Though direct, disarmament is a crude response to the threats that arms are supposed to pose for peace and security. It is based on the assumption that since arms are a threat for peace and security, the best way to ensure the latter is to get rid of the former. The simple trick of reducing the possibility of war was thought to be the removal of the weapons which make war possible and attractive and, sometimes, certain. Though the international public opinion has generally been in favour of disarmament, and there has been much enthusiasm for it, disarmament has centered around a series of unsuccessful negotiations. On the part of the superpowers, disarmament negotiations have not gone beyond propaganda exercises. On the part of the rest of the international community, it has been based upon a fear of a war between superpowers, providing devastation for everybody else also. There have been some isolated desires, may be genuine, to use the vast resources, being spent on arms, for socio-economic development. But the dominating motive has been the desire to avoid and prevent a war. This desire, experiencing the failures of idealistic attempts at disarmament, and mixed with varying degrees of realism, soon was centered around arms control as the main idea for international negotiations.

Disarmament was always beset with the problems of verification and the fears of cheating by the adversaries, of parity and rearmament and the conversion of potential resources into military technology and the uses of this conversion and mobilization for the balance of power. All of these were political problems which reflected insecurity apprehensions that would still be present after disarmament because of the continuance of the anarchical nature of international relations. Without the solution of these political problems, disarmament only in military terms, can not sustain. As pointed out by the Harvard Nuclear Study Group (22), this system would soon lead to a headlong armament race. In the anarchic system of international relations, the balance of power rests on the instrumentality of order provided by weapons; and disarmament is no way of dealing with the political problem of insecurity. Whereas political differences continue, disarmament offers no alternative to replace military power as a deciding factor in inter-state relations. As Lenin had said, disarmament simply means running away from unpleasant reality, not fighting it.
There will always be apprehension that the other side is cheating. Since total and complete verification is not possible, of measures under disarmament agreement, cheating will always be a possibility. States will consider even the small-scale cheating significant because they will perceive their security as being dependent on full and honest compliance of disarmament measures, by all. Since, in practice, this cannot be guaranteed, disarmament will fail to satisfy the states about their needs for security. Even if disarmament is achieved, the anarchical nature of international relations will continue. The interstate relations then will be evaluated, instead of on force and military power, on the mobilization potential of a state; not on the resources available with a state but on the speed with which such resources and capability can be converted for military use. Since military potential in the anarchical condition of international relations will continue, the fear of war will also continue to haunt and it will always be possible to convert the leisurely arms walk into a headlong arms race between the more capable states. Disarmament will hardly make a difference.

Paradoxically, disarmament may be shown to enhance, in a way, the chances for war. Since disarmament attempts to prevent war, it weakens the working of deterrence and thus removes restraints on waging a war. The restraints on war work because states fear the damage that they are sure to suffer from the devastating power of weapons that the adversary possesses. The removal of this devastating power, or deterrence, because of disarmament, removes the reason states do not go to war. There is no force in the argument that the disarmament would remove more deadly weapons, such as nuclear, and war would still be possible and states would still fear war and, therefore, deterrence would work. Massive destruction was still there in the Greco-Persian war, the conflict between Rome and Carthage, the Crusades, campaigns of Frederick and Napoleon though they were all fought without the weapons of overbearingly devastating nature. Disarmament cannot ensure that destruction will not occur or that wars will not be there.

It is not difficult to see why disarmament had an appeal that appeared to be workable, simple, definite and decisive. The periods following the world wars were dominated by idealistic leaders, starry-eyed with their visions of a future world of peace and harmony which would have no need for weapons of mass destruction. Disarmament appeared to them an unambiguous and clear way of building such a world. Since the military build up symbolized the problems that were there in achieving this ideal, the solution was seen to be dismantling of
this build up. It was easy to believe in the ideas that military build up meant huge wastage of resources that could be utilized more usefully for socio-economic development and that the establishment of peace required the abandonment of violence, and the means of violence, in inter-state relations. The idea may not be politically feasible, but morally and logically it was definitely appealing. But then, in politics, the popular appeal of an idea is inversely proportional to its logical power.

It is not difficult to see the difference between disarmament and arms control. According to Ken Booth (23), disarmament is a continuation of politics by a reduction of military means, and arms control is a continuation of politics by a mutual restraint on military means. Disarmament implies arms reductions, or banning of the arms, on the assumption that they are a major source of international tension and promote the likelihood of war. Arms control implies the creation of a stable military balance and, therefore, desires that the superpowers retain their nuclear weapons so as to ensure mutual deterrence. This belief is based on the assumption that political conflicts, rather than the consequent military build up, are the primary causes of international tension. The advocates of disarmament have stressed the need of not depending totally on the military interpretations of security and have pointed out the tendency of states to channel arms competition into new areas. The advocates of arms control have stressed upon the concern of states for their military security and their consequent reluctance to agree to comprehensive disarmament measures. Whereas disarmament views weapons as the main problem for international security and aims at rendering arms racing and deterrence unnecessary, arms control attempts to manage and restrain arms racing, thereby reducing instabilities in the international system. For arms control, arms are not the problem and, as Freedman observes, if managed properly, arms control process may be used for the maintenance of international security. Arms control believes that international security is threatened, not from arms racing, but from the mutual fears and suspicions of states and their resultant attempts for attaining superiority. Arms control, therefore, aims at the maintenance of military status quo at the lowest possible level required to achieve some deterrence stability. This is a more realistic management of inter-state conflict, and as Hedley Bull points out (25), it aims at strengthening the balance of power against arms race and technological developments, and at restraint rather than reduction. Arms control gained priority over disarmament when
ambitious-idealistic plans for disarmament were found to be unrealistic and failed to make any progress. Since it was not practically possible to disavow nuclear weapons and to roll back the technological developments, there was no logic in states disarming themselves of the existing weapons. With the development of nuclear strategies, states came to believe that the best way to establish peace was to be prepared for war and, therefore, deterrence became the operative strategy in the nuclear age. Whereas disarmament may be said to be based on the assumption that peace and security can be promoted by abolishing weapons, arms control is based on the assumption that this can be achieved even by a skilful management of weapons. Whereas disarmament necessarily involves, at least, a reduction of armaments, arms control may not necessarily require a reduction, and may freeze armaments at existing levels or at mutually agreed levels. Even arms increase may be included in arms control measures if this increase promotes the goals of arms control. Arms control involves cooperation among potential adversaries for the achievement of some goals in managing and controlling potential conflict. In this, all the sides aspire for preferred positions but give an advantage to each other thereby achieving potential mutual gains. Whereas disarmament may even be unilateral and does not have to be internationally agreed, arms control is necessarily a matter of international agreement. Further, arms control is broader than disarmament as it includes a variety of agreements that do not affect the acquisition, or deployment, of particular weapons. The essential element in arms control is restraint not reduction. It is the restraint that provides stability, which is the goal of arms control. It is based on the assumption that security is a shared value and states, without renouncing their rivalry or even hostility, can share in its pursuit because it is not to be acquired at the expense of the other. The aim of arms control is to reduce to the minimum the possibility of an unlimited conflict. Arms control does not pretend to be a single solution to the problem of arms race. What it provides is the maintenance of military status quo and a method and a process of crises-management in changing political and technological conditions. It came to be generally believed (26) that small successes in arms control might prepare the ground for disarmament at some future date.
Management and Limitations of Arms:

Since arms control is concerned about reaching an agreement on military measures that are to be undertaken in a graduated manner so as to de-escalate the crisis, the focus is on controlling the use of weapons and controlling the actions that escalate the crisis, and not on reducing the number of weapons. Arms control includes both arms management and arms limitations: reducing the incentives and reasons for military conflict, and attempting weapons reduction. The former is done by establishing crisis stability and enhancing deterrence, and the latter is done by reduction, prohibition or even renunciation of the ability to make some particular weapons. This balance of deterrence is achieved by creating a situation wherein the incentives for going to war are outweighed by the dis-incentives, and such a balance creates a stability which is required for successful arms control.

Thomas Schelling, who is considered intellectual father of the arms control concept, defines it to include "all the forms of military cooperation between potential enemies in the interest of reducing the likelihood of war, its scope and violence if it occurs, and the political and economic costs of being prepared for it. The essential feature of arms control is the recognition of the common interest, of the possibility of reciprocation and cooperation even between potential enemies with respect to their military establishments." (27). According to Hedley Bull, "arms control, in its broadest sense, comprises all those acts of military policy in which antagonistic states cooperate in the pursuit of common purposes even while they are struggling in the pursuit of conflicting ones.... It is a restraint internationally exercised on armaments policy, whether in respect of the level of armaments, their character, development or use"(28). And, according to Ken Booth (29), arms control encompasses all measures which make war less likely; make it less catastrophic in terms of death and destruction; and reduce the economic costs of military programmes. The whole policy of arms control is based on the assumption that arms race can and should be controlled so as to reduce its war generating effects. It is a restraint internationally exercised on armaments policy and in the qualitative design, quantitative production, deployment, protection, transfer, and planned, threatened, or actual use of arms for political-strategic purposes. In this way, these definitions emphasize on the motive of arms control as being the reduction of the likelihood of war and the mitigation of its effects. The focus is on the control of the use of weapons and on the control of actions, not on the reduction of the quantity of weapons. The goals of arms control are thus, first of all, to ensure strategic stability, that is to reduce the chance of war; secondly,
damage limitation, or to reduce or limit damage if war breaks out; and thirdly, cost containment and reduction of the cost of armaments. Arms refer to quantity, quality and configurations of weapons, and control refers to control over their potential use.

Comprehensive measures for arms control would cover immediate problems of reducing the probability of accidental war, short term problem of preventing the decline of mutual deterrence, and long term problem of controlling a proliferation that might destabilize the military status quo, and all of this would have to involve unilateral, bilateral and multilateral approaches of dealing with the problem. Paradoxically, arms control encompasses the interest of both the sides in each other’s strategic force security. The former US Defence Secretary, Robert McNamara had testified the US preference for the Soviet Union developing secure, hardened underground missiles rather than soft missiles above ground, as the latter both invited and threatened pre-emptive strike and the former would be conducive to Soviet patience in a crisis (30). Brodie and Kahn, in their separate studies (31), believe that if arms control measures are to act to reduce the possibility of an accidental or unintended war, then they must deal with the problem of the potential failure of warning systems, of a potential loss of control by the national command authority, and of a potential escalation from a regional conflict. These measures would cover all the modifications affecting the use or effectiveness of arms so as to reduce the probability of war. It would involve, not just weapons reductions changes in weapons configurations or modifications affecting the effectiveness of the use of weapons, but bilateral negotiations, a maintenance of military status quo, establishment of a deterrence-based stability, cooperation with adversaries/potential enemies in achieving certain goals of controlling potential conflict and, if the goals of arms control can be achieved by it, then even some arms increases also.

The approaches for the achievement of arms control can be unilateral, bilateral and multilateral. A state may take some unilateral initiative and there may be no reciprocal action from other states. This may involve some self-imposed restraint in the development/deployment of some weapon by a state, like chemical weapons or anti-satellite weapons. The bilateral approach would mean formal agreements, in the form of inter-state treaties, requiring mutual similar actions by parties to the treaty, and its examples would include the limited test ban treaty of 1963 and SALT-I etc. The multi- lateral agreements, like the NPT, involve mutual understandings, through
formal treaties, among a number of states. An agreement to declare a region a nuclear weapons free zone, or peace zone, would also be part of such a multilateral approach. Such designated regions may be a country, like Japan or Norway, or areas like Antarctica, seabed and outer space.

Before the advent of the Second Cold War, arms control meant an initiative for reducing the war probability and damage-limitation, in case of war; and this concept included all the changes in types of weapons or their deployments modifications that were expected to reduce the war probability; and this broad concept of arms control, as developed on the basis of a deterrence, was reflected in the writings of Kahn, Brodie, Schelling and Peter Jarvis (32). Several international agreements and developments affected arms control since the beginning of the ‘Seventies. The 1972 SALT-I and ABM Treaties, the 1979 unfinished SALT-II, START since 1982, several summit meetings between leaders of the superpowers, during the course of a period that witnessed the second Cold War, led to the narrowing down of the concept of arms control to mean super powers’ negotiations on limiting and reducing strategic weapons, and giving it only a bilateral character.

Military tension is not the cause but the effect of the political process and, therefore, arms control cannot resolve some political deadlock. In arms control negotiations, military concessions are useful for clear political objectives, and a policy based on technical priorities is not very successful. Some general conditions for the success of arms control negotiations would include:

i- Perceptions of participants that negotiations are in their own, and the others’, interests;
ii- Conditions of stable detente under which negotiations proceed;
iii- Political understanding among the allies and their common political strategy.

Arms control agreements are effective when they can be verified (33). No doubt, verification is a technical process but it is more than that. Essentially, it is intelligence gathering which is used to find out what the other side is doing. For this, states use National Technical Means (NTMs), which is the capability to verify, unilaterally and without any cooperation from the other side, adherence to or violation of arms control agreement. Such technologies range from covert
means, like espionage, to space-based surveillance systems. They include radar and satellite surveillance, communications intercepting, radioactive air sampling, geophysical observations by seismographic methods etc. There are certain cooperative means of verification also and they include making available certain features of technology to surveillance; on-site inspections of technology and installations; and conventional methods of verification through analyses of information leaks. The negotiations for an arms control agreement, by themselves, lay down different measures and procedures for verifying the adherence to the terms of the agreement. After that, a monitoring process starts which obtains and interprets the technical data about adherence. The results of such monitoring are then evaluated to determine whether the agreement is being followed. This evaluation determines compliance or a violation of a specific agreement. Any enforcement process, including any sanctions, is the result of all this verification and evaluation. In this long and tedious process, it is possible for some interests to find some technical/technological fault on the part of the other side, or its intentions, and then to sabotage the whole process of arms control. Its example is the refusal of the US Senate to ratify the SALT-II agreement because its one technical expert, Senator John Glenn, believed that it was technically non-verifiable. The feet dragging over what constitutes adequate verification and effective verification has politicized the whole issue. Since non-technical means of verification are not generally acceptable, there are big difficulties for verification process and arms control itself, if technology thus becomes politicized, or if the political aspects of verification do not keep up with technology.

Effective and acceptable means of verification are those that do not violate either the national security and sovereignty or purposes of an arms control agreement. The national security implications of an arms control violation are definitely the most important criteria for determining the response of a state. In such cases, what is generally overlooked by states is the distinction between their evaluation of the adversary’s compliance and their own desires to pursue new military programmes in accordance with their perceptions of national security. Many times, accusations of violations of agreements by the other side are only a smoke screen for own projected programmes. Not only verification is good for military and political reasons; strategically also, a good capability for verification acts as a deterrent against any intending violations. Since an exposed violation will not just be an internationalized embarrassment, but may as well jeopardize the
agreement, which the violator would not want (otherwise why would he sign the agreement? and why the sneaky attempt to violate, instead of an open?). In this way, verification technology deters any possible, or intended, violation.

Efforts for non-proliferation include measures for the prevention of the spread of particular weapons to a region, containment of that weapon in a region, preventing its spread to other regions and management of the effects of proliferation.

Peace Zones and Nuclear Weapons Free Zones concepts are considered practical means of preventing the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. This is supposedly done by banning them from specified areas. Further, it is believed that the security concerns of non-nuclear weapon states will be met by this measure, as it is considered part of confidence building. The United Nations General Assembly, on December 11, 1965, (in its Resolution 3472 B -xxx) had defined the concept of the NWFZ: "A NWFZ shall, as a general rule, be deemed to be any zone, recognized as such by the General Assembly of the UN, which any group of states, in the free exercise of their sovereignty, has established by virtue of a treaty or convention whereby—(a) the statute of total absence of nuclear weapons to which the zone shall be subject, including the procedure for delimitation of the zone, is defined; (b) an international system of verification and control is established to guarantee compliance with the obligations deriving from that statute". The Tenth Special Session of the UN General Assembly, in 1978, was of the view that the establishment of the NWFZs on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the states of a region concerned constituted an important disarmament measure, and that the process of establishing such zones in different parts of the world would be encouraged with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons (35). Such attempts involve prohibitions of nuclear weapons in certain geographical areas and in certain environment. The Antarctica Treaty, the 1967 Tlateloco Treaty and the 1985 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty symbolize the former; and in the latter are the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil thereof, and the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. In 1984, the Disarmament Commission had submitted to the 39th Session of the UN General Assembly its
proposals regarding the NWFZ: “The establishment of nuclear weapon free zones in different parts of the world on the basis of agreements and or arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned constitute an important disarmament measure and should be encouraged, with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons. In the process of establishing such zones, the characteristics of each region should be fully complied with and the effective respect for the status of such zones by nuclear-weapon States should be subject to adequate verification procedures, thus ensuring that the zones are genuinely free from nuclear weapons (36).

Under the NWFZ agreements, states are prohibited:

i-to test, use, manufacture, produce, possess, acquire or have control over, by any means whatsoever, of any nuclear weapons, directly or indirectly, or on behalf of anyone else in any other way;
ii-to receive, store, instal, deploy any nuclear weapons, directly or indirectly, by themselves or by anyone on their behalf in any other way;
iii-to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture or acquisition of any nuclear explosive device;
iv-to take any action to assist or encourage the manufacture or acquisition of any nuclear explosive device by any state.

For over three decades, the prospect for a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) agreement has remained on the arms control agenda, without any success. CTB may appear of interest to threshold states, not party to the NPT, because it is comprehensive and, unlike the NPT, is non-discriminatory; does not restrict the development of peaceful nuclear technology; is less intrusive in terms of verification; and has a wider global acceptability than the NPT. A CTB agreement would signify a determination to gradually move away from reliance on nuclear power for the national security. No doubt, nuclear weapons would continue to exist. But a prohibition on their tests would limit the development of new types of weapons. By this demonstration, states will indicate their intention to finish the existing conditions of nuclear arms race and proliferation. Verification of existing and expected arms control agreements involves detailed and technical proposals. Already there are regimes for the treaty eliminating medium-range nuclear weapons, the expected strategic missile and
Open Skies agreements and confidence building measures. All of these require states to let others see vital elements of their military preparations and activities. And that is an effective deterrent against secret arms buildup. It is a long-term programme, since not only will destruction of existing weapons and withdrawal of troops be monitored, but inspections will continue to make sure they are not replaced. Once they have gone into effect and states feel they have adequate warning against new threats, broader agreements may be possible.

Arms dynamics among the superpowers was attempted to be controlled through parallel restraints on the nature and quantum of their strategic forces. Because of these restraints, it was possible for them to arrive at understandings about not deploying in areas like the Antarctica, space and the seabed and not to engage in some acts, such as atmospheric nuclear testing. Not only a framework was created to maintain the military status quo, but more open arms race was attempted to be curtailed. Just as MAD signifies a parity of equal vulnerability, arms control can operate on parity as a basis of understanding between adversaries. The need for parity has been stressed in terms of such concepts as ‘balanced asymmetries’ wherein states agree to trade off areas of preference in their force structure rather than try to find a uniformity (37). For instance, whereas the US prefers strategic warheads at sea, the USSR prefers large land-based ICBMs. If, within the parity framework, such balanced asymmetries are not allowed, arms control becomes difficult. All this was evidenced during the US-USSR closed door negotiations, in March 1990, about a ban on land-based missiles with multiple warheads but excluding sea-based ballistic missiles which the Soviets wanted to cut. This proposal, which may form part of a possible strategic arms treaty to be finalized by the end of 1990, would prevent the deployment of 10-warhead MX missiles and SS-24 missiles, and then, in the second stage, elimination of all land-based missiles with multiple warheads. This agreement would be significant from arms control and stability point of view as the multiple-warhead missile increases the likelihood that a state may decide to launch a pre-emptive strike in a crisis and wiping out, as many as possible, the other side’s nuclear weapons so as to reduce damage from retaliation. No doubt, eliminating multiple-warhead missiles on land would reduce each side’s offensive ability to launch a pre-emptive strike; but the Soviet objections also have a logic that similar capability can be obtained by the sea-based ballistic missiles.

Arms control may be seen as a result of improved political relations because, only under such improved relations, any arms
control negotiations or agreements are possible. Thus, it is not correct to assume that arms control promotes detente, as it is the other way round. If a state feels aggrieved after an arms control agreement and considers the terms of such an agreement unequal, then all this may cause tension. Further, perceived violations of arms control agreement lead to distrust, hostility and more tensions. Arms control do not lead to goodwill; it is required to achieve arms control. No doubt, an arms control agreement does consolidate moves for better political relations, but these moves must have been already initiated. Detente symbolizes attempts by two states for benefits through cooperation, in spite of their continuing international competition. This is also the objective of arms control—cooperation in various fields, in spite of continuing, but balanced, military competition. Also, detente is not sure to result from arms control negotiations because it may not be the objective of these negotiations. States may be engaged in arms control negotiations for gaining some unilateral advantages, for winning diplomatic prestige or simply to politically embarrass the opponent. Arms control merely symbolize a lowest common denominator of military balance of power, agreeable to all the parties.

Both the superpowers have linked their commitment to arms control on their own perceptions of good behaviour of the other side and they feel that their policies are not inconsistent if they suspend negotiations or refuse to ratify a treaty or adopt delaying tactics and juggle concessions. The US has done this "when the Soviets actively supported national liberation movements in Angola or the Horn of Africa, invaded Afghanistan, engineered the imposition of martial law in Poland or reduced the rate of Jewish emigration" (38). Similarly, the Soviets, while agreeing to an East-West arms control see no harm in the East-West competition in the Third World. They agreed to SALT-I at the time of the heaviest US bombings on North Vietnam, a Soviet ally. The Soviets have a feeling that the US, to begin with, overstates the Soviet capabilities as a ploy to justify the increases in US arms capability. They feel that the objective is to regain a military superiority and to put the Soviet Union into a position of permanent inferiority. These Soviet apprehensions about being left behind get reflected in their bargaining/ negotiating behaviour, and then this is cited by the US as additional proof of the insincerity of the USSR towards arms control which necessitates further increases in the US capability.

Actually, arms control only consolidates certain aspects of the status quo, and even this is possible if there are various conducive conditions available. Instead of achieving some confidence-building,
the two sides in arms control negotiations get embroiled in such coercive bargaining tactics that, in fact, eat up whatever trust might have existed. This leads to more arms race instead of arms control. Many weapons are used, in arms control negotiations, as bargaining chips and, thus, arms control in a way accelerates arms control. Many military programmes, like binary gas programme, are justified in these terms, to prevent a weakening of the position in arms control talks. Accumulation of new weapons as coercive bargaining chips in fact toughens the bargaining position of the other side also. Such postures actually strengthen those, on both the sides, who are against any cooperative arms control. Both sides may perceive parity requirements as resulting in levelling up to the higher numbers of the other side, thus accelerating the arms race instead of achieving some arms control. Such negotiations actually consume, rather than create, trust and hope and make the anarchic nature of international relations even more anarchic. Negotiations, for arms control, in a way aggravate and perpetuate the arms race by intensifying the arms competition. Such agreements are usually about non-important, and peripheral, issues and areas (such as, the demilitarization of the Antarctica and the Seabed). Not only those who have some stake in the arms race are not offended by these methods; the international public opinion feels reassured, by these trivial agreements, that progress towards arms control has been made, and there is a big international sigh of relief. In the meantime, the arms race goes on as before. A particular weapon or a military activity is chosen and negotiations follow as how best to achieve a balance on it. Both the sides highlight the other’s alleged superiority and then to achieve a balance, and to justify their threat perceptions, deploy some new, better and more offensive weapon. The pursuit of balance makes it difficult to prevent this, because then disagreements start cropping up over questions of verification which, in its totality, is unattainable. The differences as to what constitutes the ‘balance’ and how best to verify it become the focal point of interest in any arms control negotiations and are used to justify the perceptions of perfidy of the other side, and thus the race goes on spirically.

States do not have the requisite confidence in themselves, or trust in the others; and make a distinction between mere rhetoric and concrete proposals about arms control. Not only states are afraid of making any move that might be suggestive of giving the adversary some advantage, but they are highly suspicious about the possible cheating behaviour and actions of the other. As Louis J. Halle has pointed out (39), the pervasive mistrust of the Cold War led the US to
be even more suspicious of reasonable Soviet proposals, believing them more dangerous behind the cloak than proposals that were downright unacceptable, searching grounds on which to discredit the opponent. A similar rejection by the US was there of Gorbachev’s test moratorium proposal of 1985. There are reasons to believe, from past experience of super power styles of negotiations, that when emphasis is on large-scale arms reductions or sweeping proposals for disarmament, there is a high propaganda content in the proposals and that a state proposing these measures is not serious. The other side immediately becomes suspicious and doubts the sincerity of the proposals. This factor gets mixed with that of diplomatic prestige to be gained from these proposals, and together they delay the arms control negotiations, which is usually fatal for these negotiations. Actually, so far no real limitations have been placed under various arms control agreements. The agreements that have been reached concern weapons that either are obsolete or do not exist or are irrelevant immediately, like the treaties concerning Outer Space and Seabed, treaties concerning biological weapons and ABM defences; or these agreements apply very marginal and inconsequential limitations, such as the ones in SALT-I & II. No success could be achieved to limit weapons developments in spite of the test ban treaties because all of them had more of a political, rather strategic, significance.

In the formulation of arms control policies, states have to take into consideration their national security requirements, potentialities and risks of war, the probability or risk of dilution of status or influence, and a risk of domination by the adversary. Their primary fear is a radical change of the whole political system and, to preserve this status quo, they are prepared to risk a war also, instead of going in for arms control.

Though Evan Luard believed that any negotiations for arms control would be incomplete if they involved only the great powers and exclude states which may pose a threat to stability or equilibrium and which engage in armed conflict, he concludes differently and says that “ultimately the only way out of the impasse will be through the development of an effective collective security system to ensure the certainty that there is always available a superiority of power to deter” (40). But such an involvement of the superpowers would preserve the existing status quo in the international balance of power and would preserve the relative spheres of influence of the superpowers; and such an arms control process would naturally be not welcome in the Third World, on ideological, political and economic grounds.
Confrontationalist thinking and behaviour among policy makers, and those who have some influence on the decision making, is the main detriment for any arms control measures. Such 'hawks' in international relations are fairly common in all the countries, particularly big and superpowers: John Foster Dulles, Senators Joe Mcarthy and Jesse Helms, Casper Weinberger and William Casey, Colin Gray and Paul Nitze on the US side, and Mikhail Suslov, Boris Ponomarev, Gromyko and Ligachev on the Soviet side. They view their respective adversaries in a negative light and their foreign policies aggressive and expansionist and believe that international relations are conflictual in all respects and that force is the only language which is understood by the adversary; and, therefore, military superiority is the only viable technique. This technique envisages deterring an armed attack by covering every conceivable target of the adversary and maintaining a numerical edge over the adversary's arsenal. They want to curtail the adversary's forces while maintaining own superiority and continued modernization. Even during any negotiations, they adopt coercive bargaining tactics, treat conciliation as weakness, negotiations as zero-sum games that have to be either won or lost. The hawks, in short, make worst case assumptions and judge the adversary guilty until proved innocent.

The difficulty in compliance with arms control agreements is understandable. In the presence of conflicting interests between states, a perfect agreement, without the possibility of divergent interpretations, is not possible; and there will always be suspicions about the intentions and behaviour of others. But this should not be taken to discredit arms control agreements. These agreements have to operate within the environment of sophisticated advanced technology, but such a technology makes it difficult to distinguish between allowed and forbidden activities under arms control. Depending on geographical locations, tactical systems can perform strategic missions also, and defensive technologies (like the SDI) have offensive capabilities also. April Carter has categorized (41) obstacles to arms control agreements between the superpowers and they include: the propaganda contest, seeking to acquire or maintain prestige, seeking political advantage, political linkage and political conflict, alliance politics, strategic goals in negotiations, strategic asymmetry, ideological conflict and perceptions, psychological obstacles, the momentum of weapons technology, military and bureaucratic resistance, political, organizational and technical problems, divergent negotiating styles, bargaining tactics, problems of verification, bargaining chips effect, military price tag,
parity and levelling up, displacement and channelling of weapons, erosion of trust during talks.

The need for maintaining a military capability is common to all the states, and that is to ensure its security. The logical contradiction in arms control and disarmament is that they aspire for the security of the states by limiting and reducing their capabilities for ensuring this security. The basic difficulty in arms control and disarmament efforts is the result of this inherent dilemma. It is for this reason that states go on enhancing their military capability even when they are engaged in arms control and disarmament efforts and negotiations. An arms control agreement has to provide assurances for the basic needs of security for each of the states party to that agreement. Otherwise, such an agreement will never last long.

The process of arms control results into diversion of resources from one military activity to another. If arms control places some restrictions on specified military activity, some new weapons development or further deployments, then the resources thus saved just flow into the R&D of some new military programmes. Whereas the shape of the arms dynamic may thus be regulated by arms control, the size and pace is not affected by it. Sometimes, by defeating its own purpose, arms control may even stimulate the arms dynamic. Since the objective of arms control is conflict management, rather than conflict resolution, it gets merged into the political rivalry framework. Since, in this framework, related strength has to be displayed, concessions over arms control are treated as signs of weakness. Even if concessions have to be given, they are regulated in the process of bargaining in such a way that new weapons programmes are first introduced so as to be able to give concessions over it, thereby managing to save other programmes, and also to be able to bargain from a position of strength. This process of arms control bargaining legitimizes virtually any weapon system in the competitive context, because someday it may be a bargaining chip to wrest concessions from the adversary. The slow process of arms control may not keep up with the fast pace of weapons development. Arms control thus even generates more weapons than it controls. Arms control operates and is effective within the general framework of deterrence in which both the sides believe in MAD. In such a situation, arms control attempts at the maintenance of the military status quo. The chances of arms control are reduced, not only by a high degree of hostility, but also the higher degree of maximum deterrence. If states increase their level of deterrence for the other side and widen their scope of strategic options, the possible areas for arms
control become, accordingly, narrow. The effect of counterforce eats up the deterrence framework and dampens arms control. Conditions which are difficult for deterrence are difficult for arms control.

During the period of a developing detente between the superpowers, there were some successes for arms control, but with the development of a second Cold War between the superpowers, since late ‘Seventies, and their competitions for the Third World, arms control not only got entangled into political rivalries of the superpowers but could not cope with the new technological developments, like the cruise missile, back-fire bomber and the SDI. The new rivalries led to the dissolution of political control for arms control and soon, like disarmament, arms control also became a victim of propaganda duel between the superpowers. A common interest in arms control and war prevention /avoidance result from conditions of MAD. These common interests were supposed to lead adversaries towards a joint action to manage destabilizing developments in their arms race. This military rationale was to transcend the political differences and rivalries between adversaries. States were not required to surrender their military strength, and even political rivalries were allowed; only some actions were to be taken for mutual security within an interdependence framework.

It would be appropriate to round off this discussion by a narration given by Winston Churchill: “Once upon a time all the animals in the zoo decided that they would disarm, and they arranged to have a conference to arrange the matter. So the rhinoceros said when he opened the proceedings that the use of teeth was barbarous and horrible and ought to be strictly prohibited by general consent. Horns, which were mainly defensive weapons would, of course, have to be allowed. The buffalo, the stag, the porcupine, and even the little hedgehog all said they would vote with the rhino, but the lion and the tiger took a different view. They defended teeth and even claws, which they described as honourable weapons of immemorable antiquity. The panther, the leopard, the puma and the whole tribe of small cats all supported the lion and the tiger. Then the bear spoke. He proposed that both teeth and horns should be banned and never used for fighting by any animal. It would be quite enough if animals were allowed to give each other a good hug when they quarrelled.... “ (42).
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