Introduction

An introduction offers an interpretation of the arguments presented in the main body of the work and should not be just a menu of chapters. The main argument in this study is based on the relevance, rationality and usefulness of force in international relations, and the entire work, that follows this introduction, is structured around this cumulative argument.

States coexist in a condition of anarchy. In conducting their foreign policies, states find it convenient or necessary to use force or to threaten to do so. This raises some pertinent questions: How can states most effectively employ military force in pursuit of national goals? What effects has the growth of national military power had on the ways in which force has been used? What kinds of military threats are productive or otherwise? Have nuclear weapons changed the nature of international relations or drastically altered the ways in which states can use military power? Does force, both in its employment and the threat of its employment, affect the behaviour of states in international relations? These are the questions that the present study attempts to answer. It examines the role of force in international politics in the nuclear age. It is based on the hypothesis that force does continue to play a role despite the development of thermonuclear weapons and ICBMs. There is a line of thinking that since, because of nuclear weapons, any future war may become a total war, such weapons have made war impossible. The present study asserts that, despite our best efforts to avoid a nuclear war, it may occur; and, therefore, it is necessary to try to understand what may lead to a nuclear war and what it might be like. Strangely, the relation of technology to military strategy and foreign policy has not been much discussed in contemporary writings. It is necessary to have some understanding of the effects that developments in military technology have on international relations. The search for disarmament and arms control
has changed the focus and emphasis from the attempts by idealists to create a world of total peace to an attempt by realists to improve the nature of the military balance and to reduce the likelihood of general nuclear war, and to avoid situations of intense international political crisis.

The existence of adequate force is necessary for the maintenance of national self-confidence in an era of negotiations. But what each country does with its force is a legitimate concern of all the others. To reiterate Clausewitz's central point, war does not have its own logic and it is, and ought to be seen as an instrument of policy and the logic of force must be that of politics. It is for this reason that the study of conflict among states is important. The task of studies, like this, is to outline, in times of complacency, a framework for national security to which a nation may turn at moments of crisis. This study is an analysis of how military factors determine the shape and nature of international relations.

There has been little recognition, both among the professionals and the academics, that the use of force in international relations and the study of warfare is a matter worthy of more than technical study. Professionals have not put sufficient effort on the fundamental problem of a conceptual foundation of their profession. A more general theoretical appreciation would give a greater breadth to the vision of the strategist. Similarly, it would be useful if the University Dons compare how many doctoral theses have been written on topics that concern the survival of the state and its security environment, or on such weighty matters, time and time again, as Insignificantia's role in the NAM in the 'Sixties, or political participation of retired people in the municipal elections of Hoshiarpur, or some equally important place!

During the past years, I have learnt much from discussing these issues with many scholars and strategists. Though the source of ideas and stimulation have been many, it is not possible to acknowledge, in this limited space, my debt to all of them. But I am particularly indebted, in this regard, to Mr K.Subrahmanyam, Prof.K.P.Misra, Prof.R.V.Chandrashekar Rao, Prof. M. M. Puri, Prof.Stephen P. Cohen and Mr Rodney Jones. I am thankful to three very distinguished officers of the Indian armed forces, for making clear to me many strategic concepts, unfamiliar to a layman like me: Lt.General M.L.Chibber, Vice Admiral M.K.Roy, and Air Commodore Jasjit Singh. I am thankful to a number of colleagues for their stiff opposition to any studies of these issues as this only strengthened my resolve to

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