CHAPTER IV
The foreign policy of a country becomes an amalgam of continuity and changes when there is a change in government or leadership of the country. When the Janata Party came to power in 1977, it was expected that the foreign policy of India would also change. Hopes and fears were expressed both in India and abroad about the changes in India's foreign policy by the new leadership. This was mainly because some leaders of the opposition parties had in the past opposed some aspects of Mrs. Indira Gandhi's foreign policy.

The defeat of Mrs. Gandhi in 1977 General Election was a setback for Soviet policy. The election result was differently interpreted in Washington and Beijing. The American Administration expected that the new government of India would try to establish better relations with the US i.e. some tilt of India's foreign policy towards the US. The Washington Post expressed its opinion stating that changes in India's foreign policy would represent "something of a wind fall for Washington" and the defeat of the Congress Party had offered " fresh opportunities " for America.

Beijing Review regarded the election result as "a

serious setback to Moscow's expansionist scheme" in South Asian region. It observed that the bankruptcy of the internal and external policies pursued by Mrs. Gandhi who had followed after the Soviet policy harmed the country and brought suffering to the people.²

In short, it was expected in both Washington and in Beijing that the Janata Government would in all probability tilt away from the close relationship with the former Soviet Union and would try to improve India's relations with them.

When the Janata Government was formed in January 1977, the then Prime Minister of India, Morarji Desai reiterated his Government's firm commitment to the policy of non-alignment. He said "it will be fully non-aligned" and "India will have no special relations with any country".³ Obviously, when he made this statement he had the former Soviet Union in his mind because it was often stated that the twenty years Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation between India and the former Soviet Union had established "special relations" between the two countries. Commenting on that treaty, the new Prime Minister said "if it meant the special relationship with a particular country, then it should be changed and no such relations with any particular country, and at least we should not act upon it in that

³ India Express (New Delhi), 25 March 1977. See also India and Foreign Review, 1 April 1977, New Delhi, p.16.
manner". Atal Behari Vajpayee, the then External Affairs Minister of India, also gave the clearcut meaning to the policy of non-alignment when he said that "The policy of non-alignment must be pursued in the sense of "genuine non-alignment" avoiding too much dependence on any big power. This would required economic stability, military strength and the will to preserve independence of judgement.

Although the Janata Government spoke about "genuine non-alignment" policy, but in the actual practice it followed more or less the same policy as had been followed by the Congress Governments in the past. The Janata Government did not scrap or even did not modify the Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971 because it no way compromised India's policy of non-alignment. India's policy of non-alignment then continued to be based on pragmatism and strong determination to safeguard India's security and vital interests.

Meanwhile, the American Administration modified its policy towards India and for that it tried to persuade Pakistan to accept an alternative weapons package that could be less objectionable to India. The US disallowed the sale of the 110 American A-7 fighter planes to Pakistan.

motivation by Carter was to prevent Pakistan from going nuclear brought about an improvement in Indo-American relations and led to exchange of visits between the heads of the two countries. 7

Consequently, America resumed development assistance to India with a commitment of $60 million covered by three separate agreements signed in New Delhi in August 1978. 8 It was for the nuclear proliferation and shipment of enriched Uranium for Tarapur Atomic Plant. In March 1979, NRC approved 16.8 tones of enriched Uranium for Tarapur Atomic Plant. 9

But the cordial relations between India and US did not continue for long. The U.S. within a short span of time decided to give to Pakistan about five squadrons of F-5E deep strike aircrafts. 10 The US also offered to sell to Pakistan fighter planes and to give help for the production of nuclear power "if Islamabad agreed to restrictions against the production of nuclear weapons." 11 The Carter Administration defended this move on the grounds that they feared a nuclear arms race in the Indian sub-continent. 12

This naturally caused great anxiety in India because the F-5E planes having a range of 400 nautical kilometers, could have a direct run upto Delhi from Pakistani base. Therefore, the then External Affairs Minister of India, Atal Behari Vajpayee warned the United States that any attempt to rearm Pakistan would pose a direct threat to India's security. Thus we see that for a time when the Janata Government came to power, the prospects for better Indo-US relationship became bright. Carter was pre-disposed to look to India as the leader of South Asia, but soon after differences cropped up on nuclear issue on the supply of enriched Uranium to India for Tarapur Atomic Plant.

The United States has been pressing India to sign the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty in 1977. The US has been insisting on "full-scope" safeguards in respect of all nuclear plants in India. At a Press Conference in New Delhi, on 1 September 1977, Morarji Desai revealed that "both the Soviet Union and the United States of America wanted that we should sign the NPT" and they have been applying pressure on this country for the last few years.  

Therefore, in India, there was also an effort to demonstrate India's genuine intention about the future explosion, if any, being for purely peaceful purposes. Morarji Desai told the Lok Sabha on 13 July 1977 that "further nuclear explosions are necessary to be carried out now by India for purpose of harnessing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. At the same time he reiterated India's
resolve not to sign the NPT on account of its discriminatory character\textsuperscript{14} and until nuclear powers had made convincing and non-convincing move towards nuclear arms control, if not disarmament. India would not throw open its nuclear facilities to international inspections except on reciprocal basis. India would not submit to international pressure to accept a nuclear policy that would hurt its national pride and its indigenous programme.

Infact, there was a big gap what the United States said and did. The United States deliberately tried to promote an arms race in the Indian sub-continent because it did not want to see India as a nuclear power of the sub-continent. Although the Janata Government did its best to improve India's relations with the United States but due to different perceptions, conflict of interests and geo-political factor they could not improve their relations beyond a certain point.

The Janata Government emphasised the policy of 'bilateralism and normalisation' of India's foreign relations specially with its immediate neighbours. To quote Vajpayee, the Janata Government gave top priority "to further improving relations with neighbouring countries".\textsuperscript{15} This is what he called the "policy of beneficial bilateralism". Addressing the first meeting of the Parliamentary Consultative Committee on 21 May 1977, Vajpayee said: "We

\textsuperscript{14} The Times of India, 14 July 1977.
\textsuperscript{15} The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 2 April 1977.
attach great importance to friendship and relations with all countries specially our neighbours on the basis of equality and reciprocity".\footnote{16}

It was expected that India's relation with China will improve and the new Government would try to establish friendly relations with the People's Republic of China and would resolve the outstanding issues between the two countries. The attitude of the Janata Government on the boundary issue was rigid than that of the Congress Government. Prime Minister, Morarji Desai, in November 1977 told the Japanese News Reporters that China had been in occupation of over 14,000 square miles of Indian territory since 1962 and that unless the boundary question was solved, "there can not be complete understanding between the two countries".\footnote{17}

China has been a permanent threat to India's security since 1962. Although China never repeated any military action against India, nevertheless her hostility continued in the following years. It was manifested in several world forums and major foreign policy statements.

Infact, the real problematic factor between India and China has been first Moscow and then Islamabad. Significantly as the Indo-Soviet relations improved Sino-Indian relations deteriorated in parallel stages. As Kuldip Nayer has aptly remarked, "China's hostility to India has been in

\footnote{16} Ibid., 22 May 1977.  
\footnote{17} The Times of India, 1 December 1977.
proportion to New Delhi's proximity to Moscow". In future too, the main determining elements in Sino-Indian relations was likely to be China's perception of Indo-Soviet equation. There was a geo-political inevitability about a rivalry between the former Soviet Union and China in the foreseeable future. If on the one hand, India considered the Soviet Union its unfailing friend, China regarded the latter as its implacable enemy. China suffered from an obsessive fear of Soviet conspiracy to encircle it. This strategic encirclement was its constant nightmare. China though that India was a link in the Soviet encirclement of China. Besides, Pakistan also occupied a high priority in China's calculation because it was in Russia's gateway to India. This divergence of security interest between India and China has been the main road block to reconciliation and real normalisation.

The Sino-Indian relations were intrinsically mixed with hostile relations between China and the Soviet Union, and with China's relationship with the United States of America. Hence, India could not go ahead for enough to cultivate the friendship of worst enemy of its best friend. The enormity of the Soviet Paranoia about China made it possible for India to proceed but slowly on the road to normalisation.

19. Ibid.
Sino-Pakistani close friendship has also been an obstacle in normalising the relations between the two countries. Following the debacle of 1962, China and Pakistan came close to each other. Ever since 1963, China has been supplying arms to Pakistan and has gained territorial advantages in Azad Kashmir. China gave its unequivocal support to Pakistan against India both in the war of 1965 and 1971. Sino-Pakistani friendship further strengthened when Chinese Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping and Pakistani Administrator General Ziaul Haque inaugurated the 500 miles Karakoram Highway on 18 June 1978 completed with the Chinese help. At the same time Beijing agreed to assist Pakistan to build a factory in Karachi for manufacturing tanks and anti-tanks missiles. 20

China's expansionist policy has been a permanent threat to India's security and territorial integrity. China has always encouraged and helped Naga and Mizo tribes for the independence of Sikkim, and instructed and helped Indian Pro-Maoists through the Communist Party of India, "to unite peasants and guerilla groups so as to launch a "grandiose people's war" and consequently seize power in the country." 21

Additionally, China's support to Kashmiris people's struggle for self-determination had become the standard

expression of the Chinese policy towards the Kashmir issue, and this expression was seen in the speech of the Chinese Vice-Premier Li Xiannia when he visited Pakistan in January 1979.  

The overthrow of Z. A. Bhutto's government in Pakistan by a military coup in July 1977 and beginning of the General Ziaul Haque era was highly welcomed by China. When General Ziaul Haque paid his first good will visit to China in December 1977, Deng Xiaoping said: "We are happy to note that relations between South Asian countries have gradually improved."

Thus the changes of internal politics in both India and Pakistan were followed by a short-time detente between the two countries.

It was against the background of these developments that relations between India and China could not be improved. The diplomatic relations between the two countries suspended since 1961, were restored during the Indira Gandhi regime. Trade delegations were exchanged between the two countries in 1978. It was expected that the relations between the two countries would be normalised during the Janata rule. Consequently, A. B. Vajpayee's "good will visit" to Beijing in February 1979 received greater importance for the normalisation of Sino-Indian

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relations. It may be pointed out here that seventeen years after the Sino-Indian war of 1962, both China and India convinced, as Vajpayee put it, that "the establishment of a new relationship of friendship, respect and cooperation is imperative in the interest of both our countries." 24

In the talks with Chinese External Affairs Minister, Huang Hua, Vajpayee discussed the existing situation in the sub-continent at considerable length. Vajpayee conveyed the Indian view to Huang that "the attitude adopted by the People's Republic of China (on the Kashmir issue) in the last decade and a half had been an additional and unnecessary complication to the prospects of Sino-Indian relations." 25 Since China was seriously considering to improve its relations with India, it seemed that a change in its Kashmir policy was inevitable.

But the Chinese invasion of Vietnam, while Indian External Affairs Minister was still a guest in China; caused a serious setback in India's efforts towards normalisation of India's relations with the People's Republic of China. India openly condemned the Chinese military action against Vietnam. 26

As pointed out earlier that the Janata Government soon after coming to power, emphasised on giving "top

24. Ibid., p.491.
25. Ibid., p.508.
priority" to improving its relations with the immediate neighbours. The small neighbours of India—Bhutan and Nepal have always nursed a certain inevitable awe and fear of what has been described India's hegemonistic attitude towards them. There was the need to give more attention to improvement of relations with them and also of exploring possibilities of breaking the ice with China.

The new government claimed to have friendly relations with all neighbouring states especially with small neighbours. It took some initiatives in that direction.

It signed trade agreement with Bhutan in 1978. The same year India agreed to change the nomenclature of the Bhutanese mission in New Delhi; it now has a full fledged Embassy in the Capital. The diplomatic representation of both countries had been raised to ambassadorial level thereby symbolising equality of status for both the nations.

But it was towards 1978-79 that some members of National Assembly of Bhutan recalled for closer links with China. These members, it was reported earlier, had expressed certain reservations on the full implications of Article 2 of the Treaty of 1949 under which Bhutan was only to seek the guidance of India in the conduct of its bilateral relations. But the Bhutanese were not satisfied with the working provisions of the treaty. It was also

27. Indian Express, 30 March 1978.
reported that the King wanted to up-dating the treaty. On the question whether Bhutan was aspiring to have close relations with China the king said it as "utter non-sense."\(^{30}\)

At the first time in the meeting of non-aligned summit in Havana in 1979 Bhutan took an independent stand on the Kampuchean issue different from that of India causing concern to latter for its interests. To many in India it appeared that Bhutan was not fully happy with it sexisting relations with India. It was more disturbing since the dragon kingdom was found to be following a line of policy which China had adopted on this particular issue. Naturally, therefore, the incident had caused some anxiety to the decision makers in India.

Bhutan's stand on Kampuchean issue at the Havana summit can also be viewed in the context of the Janata Government's role in foreign affairs to protect India's vital interests as well as security interests. The Caretaker Government in India interpreted Bhutan's vote in favour of the ousted Pol Pot regime as a pro-Beijing gesture, and reacted badly. The king also reiterated his interpretation of India's advisory role in foreign affairs the decision to accept or reject the advice and guidance offered by India would be Bhutan's alone.\(^{31}\) It was likely that the sober and sensible Indian Ambassador at Thimpu pacified

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the Druk Gyalpo. There was no intention on India's part, he might have said, to interfere in Bhutan's internal affairs or over-rule the king. At the same time, he could have pointed out from his own experience, Kampuchea's tragic fate served as a caution to the gentle people of small states such as Bhutan against entanglement in great power conflicts. The India Foreign Office chose not to exaggerate the episode. It anticipated further deviations on detail as Bhutan enlarged its international transactions. New Delhi did not wish to jeopardise India's larger interests in Bhutan by a display of intolerance. The Druk Gyalpo may have recalled the Chogyal of Sikkim. He saw no need to antagonise India. He stated publicly that there was no question of renegotiating the 1949 Treaty. The King of Bhutan, however, was the first head of state to call on Mrs. Indira Gandhi after her return to power in 1980.

The Foreign policy of the Janata Government towards Nepal can not be viewed in isolation but in the context of its apparent commitment to India's supreme interest to make friendly relations with its immediate neighbouring countries and to promote that friendship on the basis of respect for their sovereign status, national integrity and independence. It has evolved a new style of settling all outstanding issues with neighbouring states i.e. through direct dialogue at high levels rather than through diplomatic channels and initiatives.
One of the major issues during the Janata regime between India and Nepal was India's reluctance to endorse the Nepalese King's proposal that Nepal should be declared a zone of peace. India's reluctance was presumably a reflection of its apprehension that once endorsed the proposal might render the Indo-Nepalese Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1950 automatically redundant and encourage Nepal to demand that it should be abrogated. Nepal was visibly at pains to convince India that the proposal to make Nepal a zone of peace was simply meant to institutionalize peace as a national anchorage so very needed for security, stability and development and that it would not use India's endorsement of the proposal as a weapon with which to strike down the treaty. 32

New Delhi also believed that it already has a "Treaty of Peace and Friendship" with Nepal and there was no need of having a separate agreement or declaration of the zone of peace. Emphasising these points, the then Prime Minister of India, Morarji Desai said, "We have a treaty between us (India and Nepal) and there is no question of Nepal being in danger from us." 33

Nepal's principal disappointment was its failure to persuade Desai to accept the proposal to constitute Nepal

into a zone of peace. Morarji Desai made it clear that instead of one country being declared a zone of peace the entire region of south Asia should be turned into a zone of peace by improving the atmosphere around it and making it "conducive to beneficial cooperation", so that "all countries" in the region might divert "their energies and resources" to economic and social reconstruction and there by strengthen "the structure of peace in the region". According to him, "nations south of the Himalayas" could make the sub-continent such a zone of peace "on the basis of equality, mutual respect, and cooperation." However, he was opposed to any resolution provided for such a regional zone of peace.

Another irritant in bilateral relations was the Janata Government's failure to revoke the order passed by the Congress Government imposing restrictions on the movement of Nepalese nationals in certain border areas in India, including parts of North Bengal, Sikkim, parts of Assam, Meghalaya, Manipur, Nagaland, Arunachal Pradesh, Tripura, three districts of Uttar Pradesh and adjoining districts of Bihar. These areas were designated "prohibited" and "protected" areas for Nepalese nationals on economic, political and security grounds.

34. Gorkhapatra (Kathmandu), 10, 11 December 1977.
The differences between India and Nepal regarding trade and transit agreement were yet to be resolved. Reviewing Nepal's relation with Bangladesh, China and India it may be pointed out here that Indo-Nepalese relations had a setback in 1976 due to the failure of the "Woo India" Policy.

It may be mentioned here that the Indo-Nepalese Treaty of Trade and Transit had already expired in August 1976. On Nepal's request India had agreed to extend it until such time as a new treaty was signed between them. An unnecessary delay in the signing of a new treaty caused concern in Nepal and raised doubts of India's intentions. Nepal was in a disadvantageous position that it was to depend totally upon India in matters of trade and transit because of its geographical position. India's hesitation to concede Nepal's demand for unfettered right to and from the Indian port of Calcutta for goods originating from and destined to it was related partly to the obvious apprehension that such a concession once granted, would in itself constitute a precedent and even encourage Nepal to demand corridors through Indian territories for alternative outlets to the sea both in Bangladesh and in Pakistan for its trade with those countries. It implied that to deny such trade and transit facilities through India was to impede its national economic development and prosperity.

36. Ibid., p. 263.
It was against the background of these developments that a new treaty of trade and transit was signed on 17 March 1978 between India and Nepal, opening a new era in bilateral relations between the two countries. The treaty threw open the use of overland routes for the export of Nepalese goods to Bangladesh. It thus conceded a long-standing Nepalese demand for an alternative transit for goods originating from and destined to Nepal. The two countries also agreed to hold regular consultations alternately in Kathmandu and in New Delhi for ensuring harmonious implementation of the provisions of the two treaties.

Cordiality in Indo-Nepalese relations was restored following Vajpayee's 3-day official visit to Kathmandu from 14 to 16 July 1977. His visit paved the way for the reactivation of the long-pending Karnali and Devighat hydro-electric projects, besides the Dhankuta-Dulaghat mid-hill highway project, which was expected to open up, when constructed, several eastern districts of Nepal. There was also agreement on the execution of projects for flood control in the areas on the Indo-Nepalese border.

The difference between India and Nepal regarding internal affairs of the latter's was the declaration by King Birendra to hold a "National Referendum" on the choice of

37. Ibid., pp. 281-82.
38. Ibid., p. 277
... political system for the country. In this referendum, all eligible citizens were asked to decide whether they want to retain the present Panchayat System with suitable reforms or they would prefer a multi-party system of government. Thus an attempt was made by the king to obtain a national consensus on Nepal's political set up. A clear decision by the people was bound to influence Nepal's foreign policy.

Regarding the internal political set up of Nepal, it may be pointed out that India has preferred a democratic system because a democratic Nepal would promote its national security by remaining a buffer state between China and India and deter the Chinese from advancing into the "region south of the Himalayas watershed. India, thus looked upon a democratic Nepal as a significant component system of security system.

Keeping in view India's concern for democratic system in Nepal, the King also apprised the Indian authorities of the steps he was taking to give opportunities to democratic forces in the country and sought their cooperation for containing the free movement of Naxalites and other extremist elements between India and Nepal. He even complained that these elements were often engaged in insurgencies in the country. Indian authorities on their part told the king that due to constitutional constraints there was little that this country could do not check free movement of the people across the border. The Indian leader, Vajpayee and Desai, however, advised the king that the best

way of dealing with such elements was to restore democratic freedom as far as possible in Nepal and to devote greater attention to the economic upliftment of the Nepalese.  

It was against these developments that the Nepalese Prime Minister, Kirti Nidhi Bista, paid a 11-day official visit to India on 15 April 1977. It was a landmark in Indo-Nepalese relations. When he returned to Kathmandu he assured to his countrymen of India's good will for Nepal, its disinclination to interfere in the internal affairs of its neighbours, and its desire to live in peace and harmony with Nepal by forging relations based on respect for each other's sovereignty, equality and dignity.

Bista also gave indication of Nepal's anxiety to strike a balance between its relations with India on the one hand and its relations with China on the other, particularly by securing Chinese participation in projects of regional cooperation relating to the use of waters of the eastern rivers flowing into the Gangetic basin. India's Prime Minister Morarji Desai and External Affairs Minister A.B.Vajpayee expressed their concern to be more anxious about this matter than Nepal in view of the increasing annual devastation caused in West Bengal, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh by floods in the rivers flowing from Nepal to the Indo-Gangetic basin.  

40. Ibid., p.225.  
In 1979 some new developments took place in South Asian region, i.e. developments in Afghanistan, Vietnam and Kampuchea. The notable development in South Asian region has been the Soviet intervention and the super powers rivalry in Afghanistan which has accelerated the process of cold war in the area. This crisis has created need for the south Asian countries to cooperate with each other to cope with the challenges for their country's security.

Keeping in view of this development India and Nepal took some concrete steps to solve their political and economic issues on bi-lateral basis. Some visits by the leaders of both the countries were made in that direction. India's Foreign Secretary's visit (in late 1979) to Kathmandu and shortly afterwards King Birendra's visit to New Delhi could be cited as cases in point.

Nepal was agreed with India that the withdrawal of foreign troops and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries should form the basis of stability in the region. It was understood that king Birendra during the talks with Indian leaders, conveyed his concern over the alleged Soviet activities not only in the neighbouring countries but also in his own country especially after the recent developments in Afghanistan, Vietnam and Kampuchea. Nepal probably fears a similar Soviet inspired turmoil which might include the pro-Chinese element also. Thus king assertion that only non-interference, non-alignment

42. Ramakant, n.39, p.225.
and a rejection of bloc approach of the super powers can ensure peace and stability in the region, has brought Kathmandu closer to New Delhi in foreign policy perceptions in the context of each others' security needs. For this King Birendra emphasised intimate and close relationship between India and Nepal when he said:

We in Nepal have always believed that a strong and stable India can be bulwark of strength for Nepal as, I assure, a strong and stable Nepal can also be for India.\(^4^3\)

Thus we may recalled here that the Janata Government tried its best to maintain cordial and friendly relations with India's immediate neighbours. It took initiatives to secure normalisation of relations with China which led to minimise the Chinese influence in small neighbours. It has too evolved an understanding with Bangladesh on the sharing of the waters of the Ganga. It has consented Bhutan's having direct trade relations with third countries. It has also took initiatives for strong bilateralism with Pakistan and Nepal. These two neighbouring states of India; Pakistan and Nepal were too much engaged in anti-India activities during the Janata regime. But the diplomacy and foreign policy of Janata Government made them to come close to India on bilateral basis which ensure the security and territorial integrity of the country.

\(^{43}\) The Times of India, 7 March 1980.
India once again came close to the former Soviet Union because of its security needs. India's security and territorial integrity has always been threatened either from the side of Pakistan or China or by a combination of the two countries supported by USA. Therefore, India established close relations with Soviet in order to neutralise Sino-US military support to Pakistan.

But the statement "no special relationship" with any country given by the then Prime Minister Morarji Desai and the use of "genuine" before non-alignment by him had caused some alarm in Moscow. The Soviet Union felt that the Janata Government might tilt away from the close relationship established by Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace and Friendship. The Soviet Union needed India's friendship as much as India needed Soviet's friendship. The Soviet Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko's visit to India on 25 April 1977 was success because he found the atmosphere "good", "constructive" and "friendly" towards the Soviet Union and the two countries signed three agreements, one for long term credit to India, another for trade and the third for Soviet Technical Assistance for Tashkent Srinagar Tropo-Scatter Link to improve tele-communication between the two countries. At the end of Gromyko's visit a Joint Indo-Soviet Communique was signed on 27 April 1977 in which

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the two countries reaffirmed their faith in the spirit of the 1971 Treaty and noted with "full satisfaction" their "identical" or "close" position on many important world problems.

The Janata era could not ushered in any radical innovation in India's foreign policy because the international situation that had force the two countries to establish special relationship was more or less the same and any radical change by the Janata Government in India's relations with the Soviet Union would have proved to be injurious to its national interests. It was for the same reason that Morarji Desai indicated the importance of the former Soviet Union attached to its friendship with India and also acknowledged that the Indo-Soviet relations were not based on personalities or ideologies but on equality, national interests and common purposes.

The first and the most important common purpose was to prevent the Chinese influence in the South Asian region. The second common purpose of the foreign policies of the two countries was to reduce the US influence in Pakistan to persuade Pakistan to establish "good neighbourly" relations with India. The third common purpose was to

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48. Ibid.
curtail the military activities in the Indian Ocean. They urged the removal of all foreign military bases existing in the Indian Ocean and the prevention of establishing the new ones. The re-emergence of super power politics in South and South West Asia, with the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan and the US decision to rearm Pakistan had once again created insecurity to India. The super powers rivalry had come to India's doorstep as South West Asia became a theatre for global rivalry between the two super powers. India protested against the super powers involvement in Afghanistan which had increased tension and instability in the region. India being a major power of the region, played an active role to subdue and de-escalate the Afghan crisis and to keep the area free from super powers rivalry.

It was on 27 December 1979, that Soviet troops entered in Afghanistan on the request of Afghanistan's new President, Babrak Karmal. The Soviet military intervention occurred due to the US involvement in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. Before the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, the US had been providing all sorts of assistance to Afghan revolutionaries and after the Soviet military action it began to assist them with massive arms via Pakistan.

49. Ibid., pp. 21-22.
India was in the midst of fierce General Election campaign. The internal situation of the country was in turmoil on the one hand and the situation of the Indian sub-continent was too much fierce due to the arms-race between the two super powers on the other hand. The practical chances of US military involvement was ruled out on the basis of the experience and lesson from Vietnam war. However, the possibility of US motives to increase its influence and hold over the area by strengthening Pakistan via its military aid posed serious threat to India’s security.

In such a situation, India’s primary concern was to meet its security needs by defusing the super powers rivalry in the region on the one hand and by neutralising Pakistan’s military ambitions, on the other hand. India disapproved of the super powers’ moves to seek military solutions to international problems. The Caretaker Government of Chowdhry Charan Singh expressed its concern on 31 December 1979 to the US resumption of arms supply to Pakistan that posed a serious threat to India’s national security and to the peace of the region. Charan Singh also disapproved of the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan because India’s close link with non-aligned Afghanistan was deep rooted in history.

53. Indian Express, 1 January 1980.
However, the Prime Minister Charan Singh did not condemn the Soviet intervention and urged immediate withdrawal of its troops. He indirectly expressed his disapproval of the Soviet action when he reminded Moscow of the June 1979's Joint Indo-Soviet Statement which opposed any interference by outside forces in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. He realized the importance of historic Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1971 which met the threat to India's security posed by the US and its ally Pakistan. Therefore, the Care taker Government of Charan Singh did not displease the former Soviet Union of its condemnation of the Soviet military action in Afghanistan because the Soviet help was absolutely necessary at that time.

55. The Joint Indo-Soviet Statement was signed during the Prime Minister, Morarji Desai visit to Moscow, 10-14 June 1979. For full text see Soviet Review, Vol. 16, No. 28, 18 June 1979, pp. 16-19.