CHAPTER III
NATURE OF THREATS TO INDIA'S SECURITY AFTER INDO-PAK CONFLICT OF 1971 AND INDIA'S POLICY TOWARDS BHUTAN AND NEPAL

The creation of Bangladesh became a strategic asset for India particularly in its north-eastern territory. India did its best to utilise the opportunity in shaping the sub-continental balance of power in its favour. The Tripartite agreement of April 1973 envisaged by the Defence Minister, Jagjivan Ram was to promote India's security environment in the sub-continent.

The Simla Agreement signed between India and Pakistan on 2 July 1972 was a part of the India's strategy of keeping the external powers out of the sub-continental affairs. The objective of India's foreign policy in the conclusion of the Simla Agreement was to safeguard its national interests. The Simla Agreement conferred two significant advantages on India which helped it to realize its objectives: (a) it checked the interference of outside power in the sub-continental disputes; and (b) by committing Pakistan to the non-use of force, India has indirectly succeeded in making Pakistan to accept its no-war pact proposal. 1 Paragraph 4, clause 2 of the Simla Agreement stated that the two countries shall respect the 'Actual Line of Control' in Jammu and Kashmir resulting from the ceasefire of December 1971 and shall not alter it

unilaterally. India's strategy and its success of linking up the delineation of the "new line of control" in the Jammu and Kashmir area with the withdrawal of forces to the international boundary and its success in making Pakistan to vacate Lipa-Valley and Tithwal, the two posts captured by Pakistan in May 1972 in the Kashmir sector after the ceasefire and also the strategically important Thako Chak in return for India's decision to give away 1.2 miles of area to Pakistan in the Uri-sector were India's diplomacy's aim to improve its security position.

To build up a constant peace in the sub-continent, India took some measures to strengthen the country's security position vis-a-vis Pakistan. One such important measure taken by India was the 'Kashmir Accord' signed with Sheikh Abdullah in November 1974. The Accord reaffirmed Kashmir's irrevocable accession to India. As for the implications of the accord to India's security position, it could be pointed out that the signing of the agreement and the installation of Sheikh Abdullah as the Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir, while strengthening India's position, took the steam out of Pakistan's call for self-determination to the people of Kashmir.

During 1972, the foreign policy of India characterised by peaceful course, consistently following the principle of non-adherence with war blocs—Pakistan and China. The main thrust of India's foreign policy during this period was the relaxation of tension and normalisation of relations among the nations of South Asian sub-continent. In pursuance of this objective India wanted to normalise its relations with Pakistan and to withdraw all its troops from its borders. The Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi persuaded President Bhutto to accept the Actual Line of Control in Kashmir because she wanted to end the war through negotiations.

The most serious gap in India's foreign policy continued to be the absence of normal or cordial relations with China. India welcomed the China's entry into the United Nations and assured that the Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971 was not directed against it. In the light of Indo-Soviet Treaty India was ready for a dialogue with China without any pre-conditions. After the emergence of Bangladesh there started a process of reapproachment between USA and the People's Republic of China with the help of Pakistan. Nixon visited China in February 1972. The Shanghai Communique issued at the end of the visit of President Nixon incorporated a reference to the peaceful settlement of the Indo-Pak dispute as a challenge and response to the change power equations in South Asia leading to the emergence of India as the pre-eminent power.

Beijing criticised India's Pokhran Atomic Explosion of 1974 because it indicated the emergence of India as a nuclear power in Asia which challenged China's status.

China's decision to launch a programme of modernization of its defence forces caused anxiety to India's security planners. It was conceded that in its drive towards military modernization, China was generally guided by its perception of threat from the former Soviet Union. Certain categories of weapons system in China's possession like the air to air Harrier, surface to surface and air to surface missiles which could be effectively used against India in the event of a conflict between India and China certainly heightened India's threat perception from China.

China's success in the development of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles was another dimension of its defence capability which caused concern to India. According to a report of International Institute for Strategic Studies (London) China in 1976 tested a multi-stage ICBM with a limited range of 3000 - 35000 miles. China has one G-class submarine with missile launching tubes. MRBMs with a range of some 500-700 miles are operational but may be phased out

6. Ibid.
and replaced by IRBM, also operational with a range of 1500 - 1750 miles. The missiles forces seemed to be controlled by the second Artillery, apparently the missiles arms of the People's Liberation Army. 9

Thus, the strategic implications of China's defence modernisation caused concern to India's foreign and defence policy makers. India in the context of Chinese defence modernisations, took several steps to protect its national security. The integration of Sikkim to Indian Union was one of them.

Sikkim has strategic implications to India. India's security situation in the Tibet-Sikkim region improved considerably. With Sikkim as a part of India, any future military threat in the region could be handled with greater ease and effectiveness. The integration of Sikkim with India in 1974-75 made it difficult for China to continue with its anti-India activities. 10 This development dealt a serious blow to the Chinese policy in the region.

China's continuous refusal to accept the integration of Sikkim with India in 1975 and the building of the Karakoram Highway by it and its use for military purposes were two other major issues before India. In strategic terms, it meant that Beijing sought to employ Sikkim as an instrument to pressurise India and project its

9. Ibid., p.9
image in the Himalayan Kingdoms of Bhutan and Nepal as a guardian of small countries.  

The insurgency problem in North-eastern India however, restarted to subside by the mid-seventies. The Naga insurgency was subsided by the Shillong Accord on 1 November 1975 between the Government of Nagaland and the underground Naga leaders. The main objective of the Accord was to bring out the arms from their possession. 

The Mizo insurgency also came to light but was subsided by Lal Denga, when he acknowledged that the Mizoram was an integral part of the Indian Union and the MNF (Mizoram National Front) accepted it within the framework of the Indian constitution. 

The Karakoram Highway jointly built by Pakistan and China though the Pakistan occupied Indian territory of Kashmir had not resulted in a dramatic increase in Sino-Pakistani border-trade although it had provided greater access to Islamabad to the interior regions of occupied Kashmir. In security terms, it means that this High Way provided China with a scope for intervention in the event of any major crisis in Kashmir region. 

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11. Ibid., pp. 93-4.  
13. R.S. Chauhan, n. 10, p. 94.
China's attitude to the Indo-Pak dispute over Kashmir itself has security dimension. From the 1960s onwards when its relations with India deteriorated, Beijing adopted the posture of supporting self determination to the people of Jammu & Kashmir according to U.N. resolutions. This posture appeared to had undergone some subtle changes in 70s. China then accepted Kashmir as a bilateral problem between India and Pakistan.

China continued to help Pakistan and it welcomed the Simla Agreement, but blocked Bangladesh admission into the UN using its veto in the Security Council. When India declared a state of emergency in 1975, the Beijing did not show any enthusiasm on the declaration of emergency in India and criticised it. Besides all these, a process was going on to establish normal relations between India and China, alongwith some public exercise on the part of Beijing of people to people diplomacy.

Thus the Chinese challenges to India's power position in the 70's was less menancing because of a marked improvement in India's power position after the conclusion of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1971. And after the war India emerged as a pre-eminent power of South Asia, and improved its relations with South-east Asian

14. Ibid.
15. V.P. Dutt, India's Foreign Policy, Vikas Publishing House, (New Delhi, 1984), p. 218.
countries specially the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and attained nuclear status in 1974. China took adequate note of the developments in the North-eastern region due to the insurgency problems created by Naga and Mizo rebels and responded to the Indian initiatives for normalisation of relations. The two countries resumed ambassadorial relations since 1976.

China's policy towards Bhutan and Nepal can be understood in the context of the disturbances in the region which caused concern to India's security. One of the important occurrences which encouraged China to activate its policy of weaning Nepal away from India's sphere of influence was the neutral posture adopted by Nepal in the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962. From the mid 60's onwards, Nepal began articulating its desire for an autonomous and non-aligned role in the region. The strategy pursued by China to achieve its objective was to issue statements from time to time expressing its support for an independent and sovereign role for Nepal in the politics of the region. Such policy of China was to vilify India's power-position in the region.

In early 70's, China made attempts to encourage the Pro-Chinese elements in Nepal in order to establish the GNF (Greater Nepal Federation) consisting of Nepal,

Sikkim, Bhutan and Darjeeling Hill areas. But China failed to do so due to the lacks of support within the region.

Since Bhutan’s membership of the United Nations in 1971, it did its best to play a meaningful role in maintaining and ensuring the regional peace. Its border talks with China was most significant for India’s security. As it has been pointed out earlier that India’s policy towards Bhutan is primarily determined by strategic considerations and any change in the existing reality would necessarily call for modifications in India’s policy towards Bhutan. And this cannot occur without having an impact on Bhutanese politics.

Bhutan’s membership of the United Nations and Colombo Plan in 1971 led its quest for a new role in the world community which got occasionally articulated in a demand for a change in the treaty of 1949. In 1973-74 it was felt in India that a section of the Bhutanese official circle was not satisfied with the working of the provisions of the treaty of 1949.

In the mid 1974, Bhutan not only sent an official invitation to China but also responded to the invitation by sending a delegation led by Ma Mu-Ming. This event opened a new page in the “friendly contacts” between Bhutan and China taking special note of the desires of the Bhutanese Government to rely on its own efforts in developing its

economy and safeguarding its sovereignty and economic self-reliance.

Although Bhutan is highly dependent on India, both economically and politically. In 1972, Bhutan took a few steps to expand its economic interests. On 19 January 1972 India and Bhutan signed a Trade Pact to regulate trade and Commerce. On 1 March 1972 steps were taken to modernize Bhutan’s monetary system from that of a barter one, with the help of India.

The boundary negotiations between China and Bhutan occupies an important position in India’s security considerations. India has kept open eyes on such developments between China and Bhutan. India’s concern has been regarding the possibility of Bhutan’s eviction from the strategic position vis-a-vis the Chinese Chumbi Valley region. Additionally, the development that had far-reaching political and strategic implications for the Himalayan Kingdoms and India was the integration of Sikkim into the Indian Union during 1974-75. It gave India a position of considerable strategic advantage in the Chumbi Valley area. The eastern side of the Chumbi Valley borders with Bhutan. The development further reiterated the limitations of Chinese role as a counter-weight to India in the Indian soft-belly of the Himalayan region. Further, the developments in Sikkim reiterated the vital relationship between the pursuance of India’s security interests in the

region and the nature of political order in the Himalayan Kingdoms.

During the Indo-Pakistan conflict of 1971, Bhutan was apprehensive that the Chinese might make such a move since the military strategic milieu was ripe for it. Bhutan had even asked India to station its troops along the former's border with China to take care of that contingency. India, however, did not oblige Bhutan reasoning that the same might provoke China. There could be several responsible factors behind all these changes and an extention of India's own policy of normalization of relations with China, a process which had started in 1976 with the re-opening of full-scale diplomatic relations with China by the appointment of an ambassador at the Indian Embassy in Beijing carried upto the Janata regime. The integration of Sikkim into the Indian Union caused considerable anxiety in the Bhutanese Kingdom. Suspicions about India's hegemonistic intensions with regard to Bhutan were rampant and the King made at least three visits to New Delhi during 1975-76 to seek reassurance.

Thus it may be said that Bhutan has not so far posed any serious challenge or threat to India's security. It has always been sided with India on several global

as well as regional issues. On the question of superpowers involvement in South Asian affairs; during and aftermath of the Indo-Pakistan conflict of 1971, Bhutan probably continued to respect India's concern. Also on the crucial question of declaring the region as a "Zone of Peace" in February 1975, proposed by Nepal and also "Nuclear Weapons Free Zone" proposed by Pakistan earlier just after the India's Pokhran Explosion of 1974, Bhutan voted in favour of India against Pakistan's stand. Hence, we can say that Bhutan remained and will continue to be of vital significance in the calculation of India's strategic and security interests.

India's role in the liberation of Bangladesh in 1971 and its nuclear explosion of 1974 were highly condemned by Nepalese Press. Nav Yug published from Kathmandu on 17 December, 1971 condemned India as "expansionist". Matrabhumi of 21 May 1974 and Shahi Awaz of 24 May 1974 published from Kathmandu openly expressed fear that India could use its newly developed nuclear power to interfere in Nepal's internal affairs. Events in Sikkim had also a malice effect on Nepal. The Motherland published from Kathmandu on 6 September 1974 criticised it and called it an Indian imperialistic design vilifying India's power position in the region.

The emergence of Bangladesh and India's pre-eminent position in the Indian sub-continent required better rapport between India and Nepal. Swaran Singh the then
Foreign Minister of India, went to Kathmandu in September 1971. He stressed that India had no desire to destabilize the Himalayan Kingdoms and was not supporting any rebel group in the Kingdoms. He also realized the Nepal's expression of deep concern over the developments and the need for a political settlement. He felt it necessary because India was opposed to any change in the policy of Nepal with regard to Gurkha recruitment in the Indian army or prevent them from fighting against Pakistan, and its support to India at the U.N. on the recognition of Bangladesh. 24

The "change of guard" in Nepal altered the political situation of the sub-continent. King Birendra the successor of King Mahendra brought about greater balance in his attitude towards its relations with India.

The improvement of relations between the two countries was facilitated by the top-level visits of the heads of government and other leaders of the two countries. Nepalese Prime Minister Kirtinidhi Bista visited India in April 1972 and said in a statement that in the context of "geographical reality", Nepal "has always to be more oriented towards India". While denying the need for a treaty like the Indo-Soviet Treaty between Kathmandu and New Delhi in view of Nepal's "extensive and intimate relations with India", he emphasized the need for bilateral talks on security matters from time to time. 25

Thus in the context of security need of India Mrs. Indira Gandhi in February 1973 paid a good will visit to Kathmandu. She was warmly welcome there and took the opportunity to underline India's interest in the developments and prosperity of Nepal. She assured Nepal that India was not providing any assistance to Nepalese nationals in India against the Royal Government.  

King Birendra accompanied by the Queen also visited India in October 1973. In the joint communique, issued on his visit, emphasis was given on bilateral relations and mutual understanding of each other's problems. Consequently, the King in a press interview on 1 March 1974 said that there was much more understanding now between India and Nepal and that the two countries had improved their relations after the exchange of visits by the leaders of the two countries.

The process of smooth working relationship between the two countries was disturbed by the integration of Sikkim to the Indian Union in 1974-75 and Nepal's reaction to it. Kathmandu felt a direct threat to its security from the development in Sikkim. The fear was all the more increased because B.P. Koirala gave a public statement that the developments in Sikkim would have a noted effect upon neighbouring monarchies.

27. Ibid., 15-21 January 1974, p. 11797.
28. Ibid., 17-22 April 1974, p. 11971
Nepal's political divide between the King Birendra and the Nepalese Congress got directly involved in the Sikkim developments with the King extending support to Chogyal and the Nepali Congress joining hands with the popular forces. On the part of the King there emerged a real possibility of Indian backing for Nepali Congress in its revolt against monarchy. This was not so withstanding the fact that the Government of India, in difference to the King’s fears, had restricted the movement of the Nepali leaders in India. Earlier, King Birendra during his visit to India in October 1973 was explicitly assured that "no hostile activities" will be allowed against the regime from Indian soil.

However, India remained firm on its stand. It assured the Nepalese Government that the Nepali Congress would not be allowed to use Indian territory for political-subversive activities against the monarchy. India also reminded Nepal that "we will reply to friendship with greater friendship but we also know how to deal with hostility." It also took some steps at diplomatic level through consultations. Indian resentment was aimed at making Kathmandu modify its attitude on the Sikkim issue.

31. Nepali Congress Leaders were barred from entering Indian territory (a 50-mile zone) along Indo-Nepal border from 1973 to 1975.
33. The Times of India, 23 September 1974 and also Hindustan Times, 29 September 1974.
34. M.N. Rastogra, the Indian Ambassador in Nepal was summoned to New Delhi for consultations.
In the economic sphere, India adopted stiff attitude towards Nepal and told Nepal that from 1 January 1975, it would not be in a position to supply its quota of petroleum and oil. India’s such attitude paid dividends and indeed Kathmandu adopted soft attitude towards India. Nagendra Prasad Rijal, the then Nepalese Prime Minister paid a visit to India in December 1974 and had frank discussion with the Indian Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi followed by a fading out of the anti-Indian campaign and normalisation of their immediate relations.

India, however, offered to provide all facilities for oil and petroleum import by Nepal from other countries. From the Indian point of view, smuggling, now aggravated by Nepal’s policy of granting bonus incentives for exports, remained a serious problem. The economic issue also remain linked with political controversies and differences.

As Nepal stopped criticising India on the developments in Sikkim and moved towards removing the tensions and improving the relations, India too responded demonstrably for a warmer relationship. Foreign Minister Y.B. Chavan visited Kathmandu on a four-day good will mission from 19-22 January 1976. His visit proved an asset to build up more healthy relationship between the two countries. Chavan assured Nepal of India’s continued economic help, India would remain Nepal’s major "development

partner", he said, as it had been in the last 11 years. Chavan's visit was followed by the Nepalese Prime Minister Dr. Tulsi Giri's visit to India in April 1976. During his stay he stressed the importance of the strong relationship between the two countries based on mutual trust and understanding. Although Nepal wanted to keep an equidistance state of relationship with both India and China, Tulsi Giri, however, conceded the inevitability of a definite "tilt" towards India because of special factors, among some of which he mentioned Nepalese nationals serving with Indian army.

With the harmonious climate of the relationship, India's engineering and consultancy services were extended to Nepal in the field of Hydro-electric power, construction of cement plants etc. Some of the major projects and schemes financed by India were Tribhuvan Rajpath, Kosi area roads, Sonauli Pokhara Road, the airport at Kathmandu and telephone line between Kathmandu and Raxaul. In eastern Nepal, the major irrigation scheme of Chatra-Canal was undertaken to irrigate 2,00,000 acres of land in addition to some other irrigation schemes. In April 1976, India and Nepal began the exercise of serious discussion on harnessing Himalayan rivers which would be long-term projects and equally bring long-term benefit to the people of Nepal and in some cases to the people of

38. See The Hindustan Times, 8 and 9 April 1976.
both the countries. Thus it may be recalled that India's assistance to Nepal has protected its interests from being challenged by anti-India feeling and also checked the Chinese influence in the Kingdom.

India's role in the liberation of Bangladesh and the merger of Sikkim into the Indian Union and the emergence of India as a pre-eminent power in the sub-continent led to suspicions in the minds of the Nepalese ruling elite that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Nepal might be challenged by India. In such a 'psycho-fear atmosphere' it was felt that Nepal being situated between the two giant neighbours — India and China, it should play neutral role in the politics of the region.

It was against this background that King Birendra declared Nepal a "Zone of Peace" on 25 February 1975 on the following grounds:

> We need peace for our security; we need peace for our independence, we need peace for development ... It is with this earnest desire to institutionalize peace that I propose that my country, Nepal be declared a Zone of Peace.

Actually the U.S. was interested in restraining India in the sub-continent since 1974. The U.S. had secret links

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40. See V.P. Dutt, n. 15, p. 205.
41. Gorkhapatra (Kathmandu), 26 February 1975.
with Chogyal through his American wife. It was against the background of these developments that Pakistan was encouraged to pursue the proposal of South Asia as a 'Nuclear Weapons Free Zone'. Another 'Zone of Peace' was proposed by Nepal to embrace India in its pursuance of the proposal of Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace.

Kathmandu has also offered a seven points proposal which committed Nepal to declare itself as one of the champions of non-alignment and peaceful co-existence, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states; non-use of force.... seeking simply a parity and reciprocity with India.

Nepal has made some vigorous diplomatic efforts to get support from other countries on the zone of peace proposal. Both China and Pakistan supported it because their aim was to change the existing nature of Indo-Nepalese relations to India's disadvantages. It may be recalled here that the two countries lauded Nepal's proposal during the late Prime Minister Z.A. Bhutto's official visit to China in May 1976. The then Chinese Premier Hua-Kuo Feng said: "We firmly support the just stand taken by His Majesty, the King of Nepal, in declaring a 'Zone of Peace'. "We are ready to assume appropriate commitments arising there-from". Initially, the Chinese used to describe the proposal as a step in the direction of struggle against "hegemonism and expansionism". Pakistan has considered the proposal as

42. See S.D. Muni, "Nepalese Peace Zone Proposal", in Sharma & Nagar, n.21, p. 173.
43. Ibid., p. 174.
44. Ibid, 174.
being in consonance with its own move to get South Asia recognised as a nuclear weapons free zone. Infact, they have tried to interpret it in the context of growing need for cooperation, peace and understanding in South Asia. And also Nepal’s intension was to mobilise international support for the proposal and an attempt to indirectly pressurize India for doing the same.

India did cast doubts on Nepal’s proposal for declaring zone of peace because it felt that accepting Nepal as zone of peace would weaken India’s opposition to Pakistan’s plea for declaring South Asia as ‘Nuclear Weapons Free Zone’.

Thus India has shown its reservation on security grounds. The Indian response to the proposal basically emanated from its security concern of the entire sub-continent, particularly the Himalayan border, the 1950 treaty of peace and friendship and its claim of special relations between the two countries. These concern were expressed by the Indian press and scholars. According to the Times of India:

... India’s security is tied up with Nepal’s in a way China’s is not concerned ... while an Indian presence in the Kingdom cannot threaten China's security, China’s presence can threaten India’s security. For, while the China-Nepal border is demarcated by the world’s mightiest mountains, there is no natural barrier of any kind on the Indo-Nepal frontiers. It is also an open border. But
even if it was not, it would not have been easy to patrol it and seal it effectively.\textsuperscript{45}

The \textit{Times of India} also cited Nepal's dependence on India for its developments, trade and transit needs and it suggested that Kathmandu while "formulating and presenting" it policy should show an awareness of, and respect for India's susceptibilities\textsuperscript{46}.

India's opposition for the zone of peace proposal was criticised in Nepal. A leader of Nepal Communist Party, Man Mohan Adhikary noted that "the security of India is its own problem, and we are not concerned with this in any way. It is the responsibility of Nepal to protect the northern Himalayan region. India need not be involved in this responsibility". He further observed that Nepal's security "depends on a balanced foreign policy"\textsuperscript{47}. He viewed 'zone of peace' as a right step in this direction, and India should recognise it.

Taking an overview of all these developments it may be recalled here that the Himalayan Kingdoms (Bhutan and Nepal) have always been of vital significance in the formulation of India's foreign policy in the context of its security needs.

The break up of Pakistan and the emergence of a new triangular relationship between Pakistan, China and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{45} \textit{The Times of India}, 27 February 1976.
\item \textsuperscript{46} \textit{Ibid}.
\item \textsuperscript{47} \textit{Matribhumi} (Kathmandu), 3 February 1976.
\end{itemize}
the U.S.A. changed the nature and dimensions of threat to India's security. Although Pakistan affirmed its commitment to ensure peace and cooperation in the sub-continent, but it pursued the policy of rearmament and started to get arms from all corners: the United States, France, China and the Arab nations. The massive rearmament programme of Pakistan heightened India's perception of threat from Pakistan.

In 1972, Pakistan decided to continue its membership of CENTO to strengthen friendly relations with Iran. In a statement on Pakistan's foreign policy in the National Assembly on 13 December 1973, Z. A. Bhutto emphasised the importance of Iran for Pakistan when he said:

... the opposition has chosen to pick on Iran because Iran supported us in 1965 conflict because Iran helped Pakistan in the 1971 conflict, because Iran has sided with us on the Bangladesh issue, because Iran has very good relations with Pakistan in all fields-economic, social and cultural.48

In the security context, the Shah of Iran also declared that in case of an attempt for further dismemberment of Pakistan, Iran would certainly intervene 49. And it was clear that Iran was going so far as to assure guarantee to Pakistan's security 50. Pakistan and Iran strengthened their

49. Quoted in Dawn (Karachi), 1 July 1974.

Improvement of Pakistan's relations with Iran, as mentioned above and hosting of the Islamic Conference at Lahore in February 1974 were the efforts of Bhutto to restructure the regional balance of power in favour of Pakistan and to strengthen and nurture Pakistan's Islamic connection with other Islamic States. Bhutto sold the idea of the Islamic Bomb to Saudi Arabia and Libya: both were ready to finance Pakistan to make an Islamic Bomb. Bhutto also made plans to promote military collaboration between Pakistan and friendly Muslim countries with emphasis on training assistance and joint ventures in armament industries. Bhutto launched a strategy of seeking arms from the United States and France. The U.S. Congress decided on 14 March 1973 to lift the arms embargo imposed on Pakistan after the December 1971 war. The US released the delivery of 300 armoured personnel carriers (APCs) to Pakistan and described its supplies to be defensive in nature.


Commenting on the implications of the U.S. Government's decision on India's security and the peace process at work in the sub-continent, India's Foreign Minister Swaran Singh said:

The United States decision to resume the arms supplies to Pakistan will jeopardise the process of normalisation and adversely effect the chances of establishment of durable peace in the sub-continent. In the light of the past record of Pakistan's aggression against India; arms shipment to that country will once again pose a grave threat to India's security.

In 1975, the American Administration announced its decision to lift ten years arms embargo and resumed arms supplies to Pakistan on regular basis. It supplied to Pakistan with one Lockheed transport plane, Corsair-11 bombers, F-5 fighters, anti-tank missiles, some lethal equipments and combat air crafts. The supply of these weapons by the USA it was justified on the ground that it was not military parity with India, but a military balance between India and Pakistan. As the balance of power was not in favour of United States of America due to the former Soviet influence in the region the former did its best to alter the balance of power in its favour. India's nuclear explosion of 1974 was also cited as one of the reasons for the change in the U.S. arms supply policy towards Pakistan. This US attitude towards Pakistan caused

55. Foreign Affairs Record, Ibid.
57. Ibid., See also Foreign Minister Chavan's Statement in the Lok Sabha, Lok Sabha Debates, Vol.48, no.7, 25 February 1975, Cols. 281-2.
concern to India. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi reacted to the US decision and said:

... the decision of the USA to resume the arms supplies to Pakistan shows that the policy makers of that great country continue to subscribe to the fallacy of equating India with Pakistan. It is this policy which has caused tension in the sub-continent\textsuperscript{58}.

Pakistani nuclear programme has been in practice from the late sixties onwards, Z.A. Bhutto in July 1972 disclosed the Pakistan's decision on a nuclear programme. Bhutto no doubt argued that Pakistan's nuclear programme was for peaceful purposes; a similar Indian explanation was made in 1974 after its Pokhran Nuclear Explosion. He was not prepared to accept the argument that there was any such thing as peaceful explosion and so on\textsuperscript{59}. Bhutto was serious about Pakistan's acquiring the capability to make the bomb and it became clear from his book \textit{If I am Assassinated}:

Due to my singular efforts, Pakistan acquired the infrastructure and the potential of nuclear capability ... when I assumed charge of atomic energy, Pakistan was about twenty years behind India's programme. When I ceased to be Prime Minister ... Pakistan was five to six years behind India. If the internal opposition to the nuclear programme had not come from the beginning from certain

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\textsuperscript{58} India and Foreign Review, Vol.12, no.11, 15 March 1975, (New Delhi), p.6. \\
\textsuperscript{59} See the Text of Bhutto's Reply to Mrs. Gandhi's Letter Foreign Affairs Record, Vol.20, no.11, November 1974, pp.194-196.
\end{flushleft}
powerful ministers and bureaucrats, I could have further narrowed the gap.\textsuperscript{60}

In his quest for nuclear capability for Pakistan he emphasised the Islamic brotherhoodness.

He wrote:

We know that Israel and South Africa have nuclear capability. The Christians, Jewish and Hindu civilizations have this capability. The Communist powers also possess it. Only the Islamic civilization was without it, but that position was about to change.\textsuperscript{61}

The consequences of the possession of bomb by Pakistan would be a sense of psychological insecurity that it would inject into the Indian decision-making elite. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by Pakistan would upset the military balance and the resultant nuclear asymmetrical situation would make it difficult for India to safeguard its security against any possible use of nuclear weapons by Pakistan.\textsuperscript{62}

The Indian decision-making elite also analysed that Pakistan might use the bomb to settle the Kashmir dispute or to get more concession from India for its nuclear programme. Thus the significance of Pakistani nuclear threat would be understood in the context of the heightened security concerns of India's decision makers as a result of the narrowing of the gap between the two

\textsuperscript{61} Ibid., p. 138
\textsuperscript{62} See U.S. Bajpai, n.5, pp. 77-78.
countries, conventional military strength\textsuperscript{63}.

The relationship between India and the former Soviet Union was always dominated by India's security needs. The security of India has always been threatened either by Pakistan or China or by a combination of both the countries. As earlier it is pointed out that whenever Pakistan joined hands with China India's national security was threatened. That is why India had to come close to the former Soviet Union to get its help for the defence of its security and territorial integrity.

In 1973, the former Soviet Chief, Brezhnev visited New Delhi. This visit was another link to establish strong relations between the two countries. His visit was most significant for Moscow's proposal for a plan for an Asian Collective Security. Moscow had solicited support from India for its proposal and had made a strong effort at building up opinion within the country in its favour. The Soviet proposal for collective security in Asia had not been spelt out in any detail. While the West and Chinese regarded the proposal as directed against Beijing, the Soviets denied that they excluded any Asian country from this arrangement. They claimed that their stress too was on economic and other forms of cooperation. India's view was to emphasize independence of Asian countries, to encourage

\textsuperscript{63} For details see K.Subrahmanyam, "India-Pakistan Military Levels: Fallacies of Mutual Forces Reduction", \textit{The Times of India} (New Delhi), 26 May 1980.
bilateral and mutual cooperation among them, and to strive for the definition and observance of norms and principles to govern their mutual relationship.\footnote{64}

At the end of Brezhnev visit, a joint-declaration issued reflected the Indian principles and norms for governing relationship between Asian countries which could set the pattern for the future. It also stressed detente rather than security, and freedom of Asian countries rather than any military arrangement. It advocated growing economic cooperation on a mutually advantageous basis to reduce tensions and build up an environment of peace and confidence.\footnote{65}

India and the former Soviet Union re-affirmed that they attached particular significance to a broad development of mutually beneficial cooperation and strengthening of peace and stability in Asia through common efforts by all states of this largest and most populated area of the world. They wanted to create such an environment in which people could live peacefully with good neighbourliness. They believed that the relations between all Asian countries should be based on the principles of renunciation of the use of force, respect for sovereignty and inviolability of borders, non-interference in internal affairs and broad development of economy on the basis of

\footnote{64} Cited in V.P. Dutt; n.15, pp. 125-26. Proposal given by the External Affairs Minister Swaran Singh at the meeting of Parliament Consultative Committee for External Affairs.

\footnote{65} Ibid.,p.126.
equal and mutual benefits. They also affirmed that they were ready together with other states on the basis of equality to find a fair solution making the Indian ocean a "zone of peace".

The Soviet help in building up India's defence capability has been substantial. India has received considerable success in it, attempt to work towards greater independence through expansion of its domestic defence industry, through diversification of its sources of arms supply, and through production of sophisticated defence equipment under foreign licence, its main air and naval strike forces are of Soviet acquisitions .... Moreover, the majority of new acquisitions continued to be of Soviet origin.

Thus the reconstitution of the 1969-74 Defence Plan on a roll-on basis in order to mitigate the drawbacks of defence planning and the decision after 1972 to integrate the defence plan with the five-year development plan (1974 - 79) in order to bring about a balance between defence and development were some of the significant decisions taken by the Indian Government.

Emphasis was also given to strengthen the Army, Navy and Air forces of the country. As regards the army, in addition to the high budget allocations and

66. Ibid., pp. 126-27.
improvements in the training facilities, care was taken to raise the infantry divisions from 13 to 16 in 1972 onwards. The strength of independent armoured brigade also went up by 3 to 5 during this period. The strength of the Naval force went up from 28,000 in 1972; and the submarine strength from 4 to 6 during this period. One of the marked features was the replacement of the absolute British Sea Hawk by the Sea Harrier USTOC aircraft, the aircraft carrier for INS Vikrant. In the Airforce, one noticeable aspect of the air defence programme was set up at 45 squadrons. The main firepower of the Indian Air Force was built to improve MIG-21 and the Gnat and they were given new names as the MIG-21 M and the Ajeet. This continued amidst the importing of Soviet Sukho-78 fighters bombers.

The major objective of Indian foreign policy after the Indo-Pak Conflict of 1971 was to establish friendly relations with all the neighbouring states. This policy of friendship with immediate neighbours and its efforts to make the Indian Ocean a zone of peace were to safeguard the security of the country. The another major objective of Indian foreign policy was to attain self reliance in defence and to make it known that India was not prepared to accept discriminatory treatment at the hands of nuclear power. Thus India rejected the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on the ground that it was unequal.

70. Ibid., p. 124.
and imposed one sided restrictions on the non-nuclear weapons states. India exploded a nuclear device in 1974 and sought its position in nuclear power states. Although India emerged as a nuclear power state it still needed support from Nepal and Bhutan to reduce the Chinese influence in the region.

The normalisation of relations with China and the strengthening of bilateral relations with Iran were important foreign policy moves to improve its regional strategic environment. India's foreign policy appeared to have had the objective of weakening Pakistan's strategic linkages with China and West Asian countries. This decision of the Indian Government was to reduce the seriousness of Pakistan's challenge to India's security and its power position in the region.

But the economic situation of the country posed a threat to the stability of the country. It was under such condition that Mrs. Gandhi declared a state of emergency in the country on 25 June 1975.

Consequently, the declaration of emergency influenced the foreign policy and foreign relations. It was

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73. Shah of Iran stayed away from the Lahore Islamic Conference of February 1974 because of Gaddafi's presence in it— the exchange of visits by Mrs. Indira Gandhi had the Shah to each other's capitals, improved their relations. For details see, Mohammad Ayoob, "Indo-Iranian Relations", India Quarterly, Vol.33, no.1, January-March 1977 (New Delhi), pp. 1-6.
criticised by the USA and UK and also by the People's Republic of China and Pakistan.

Mrs. Gandhi reacted to Western critique to the emergency. She gave a clear warning to them while addressing a session of the AICC on December 29-30, in Chandigarh. She said ... these were the countries that were against India during the freedom movement and at the time of independence. If we were invaded, they were on the side of aggression. The former Soviet Union supported Mrs. Gandhi on the declaration of emergency in the country.

However, the Congress Party paid a heavy price in electoral terms for the imposition of the Emergency and for the excesses committed during June 1975 and December 1976. In the General Election of 1977, the Congress Party was defeated by the Janata Party and ultimately, the Janata Party came to power and formed the government at the centre.