CHAPTER II
INDIA'S POLICY TOWARDS NEIGHBOURING STATES
AFTER THE CHINESE AGGRESSION

After the Chinese aggression of 1962, India's foreign policy towards its immediate neighbours was reviewed in the context of threat to its security from the side of Bhutan and Nepal because of growing influence of China in these states. The situation warranted a fresh look by India at some aspects of its foreign policy. Therefore, India adopted a policy of appeasement towards the Himalayan monarchies as a whole, i.e., a policy that was apparently conceived in terms of concern for stability there. In fact, India felt that any instability in the Himalayan monarchies would have grave repercussions along its northern borders. The appeasement policy also looked like an instrument for limiting Chinese influence in the Himalayan region.

The Chinese aggression made India more conscious of the need to maintain special relations with some of its neighbours. India realized that an unfriendly neighbour could become a source of major trouble using China which would pose a threat to India's security. The Chinese growing influence in the Himalayan Kingdoms diverted India's attention to change its dealings with its small neighbours. India had, of course, always acknowledged their independence
and territorial integrity, but now it made a special effort to remove all the differences in view of safeguarding its own interests.

In the evolution of Bhutan's foreign policy the Sino-India dispute of October 1962 worked as a catalyst. On the one hand it showed how vulnerable Bhutan was to Chinese forward moves while on the other hand the virtual defeat of India raised the question of how effective its alliance with India in safeguarding its independence would be. The fact is that in spite of these dialectics Bhutan decided in favour of aligning closely with India. Bhutan like Nepal did not follow the policy of equidistance from both India and China. A significant indication of this reaffirmed trust in India was Bhutan's acceptance of an "Indian Advisor" to assist the then Bhutanese Prime Minister, Jigme Dorji. But Dorji clarified that the acceptance of India's guidance to regulate Bhutan's foreign relations did not mean that India was to conduct former's foreign relations. Bhutan could establish diplomatic relations, but it had to consult India before embarking on any negotiations, including those concerning economic or military aid. The King of Bhutan had reiterated Prime Minister's views and said that although Bhutan desired to exercise its own

2. The Times of India (New Delhi), 16 September 1959.
external affairs, it was not yet prepared for it. "We have at present no roads", he said "no trade or industry. We must develop our state first".  

But the developmental plan of Bhutan suffered a lot after the assassination of Prime Minister Dorji on 5 April 1964 which led to a controversy in Bhutanese political circles over the role of external forces in the country's domestic affairs. The ruling elite was in favour of Indian ties but the top army officers and opposition parties as well as people of Bhutan supported a policy of equidistance towards India and China. It was suspected that the assassination of the Prime Minister was engineered by Chinese backing, involving top army officers. The rivalry between the pro-Indian and pro-China lobbies erupt into a civil war. But the situation was brought under control when the King appointed Lhendup Dorji, as acting Prime Minister.

The appointment of Lhendup Dorji, however, did not settle the issue. The conflict between both the lobbies persisted and soon the Prime Minister exposed himself with pro-China lobby. In July 1965, an assassination attempt was made on King's life and Lhendup Dorji along with many of his

3. Statement made in Calcutta on 30 January 1961 when he was on the way of Delhi, see The Times of India, 31 January 1961.
supporters fled to Nepal. The King and his supporters alleged India's hand in the plot to kill the King, which was refuted by both the Indian Ministry of External Affairs and the King. It was argued by the pro-China lobby that India was opposed to Lhendup Dorji because they were supposed to be in favour of neutrality vis-a-vis India and China. In fact, the ruling elite felt Jigme Dorji was one of the principle supporters of non-alignment and a close friend of Nari Rustomji—the Indian official appointed in Bhutan as advisor to the government. 6

In view of Pakistani attack on India in 1965, and Chinese Nuclear Explosion of 1964 as well as hostile postures of both China and Pakistan, developments in Bhutan were viewed with concern in India in regard to the defence of its northern borders. Therefore, in January 1965, Prime Minister Shastri met the Bhutanese King in Calcutta for a two-day meeting where both leaders reviewed recent events and discussed Bhutan's economic development. Regarding the anti-Indian propaganda, Shastri had told newsmen on 12 January that the King himself had been embarrassed about these statements and added:

Bhutan is an independent country and we have always accepted it. The King himself agrees that there has been no pressure in any matter

After 1965, both Bhutan and India tried to accommodate each other's sensitivities which brought them to a closer understanding. Bhutan accepted the growing Indian military presence in the country thereby reinforcing India's military strategic perimeter which included Bhutan in its purview. The spurt of visits exchanged in 1966, apart from these developments thus regarded as significant. Special significance was attached to King Wangchuk's State Visit to New Delhi from 27 April to 1 May 1966 as revealed in Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's speech on 27 April:

> In the world of today, it is necessary that we should all develop a sort of understanding which helps different cultures to enrich each other, instead of destroying each other.

Mrs. Gandhi assured the Bhutanese King that India looked upon Bhutan's plan and its attempt to bring a better life to its people with the greatest sympathy and would give Bhutan all help and cooperation. Regarding Bhutan's defence, both Mrs. Gandhi and Defence Minister Chavan reiterated that India considered Bhutan's defence as part of its own

8 The Statesman, (New Delhi), 28 April 1966.
It was reported that the King wanted to raise the question of Bhutan's membership of the United Nations, but he appreciated the fact the time was not opportune as yet. At the end of the visit the King issued a Press statement appreciating India's help and advice. He said:

"I am deeply touched by the sympathy and understanding with which the Government of India views our problems. The help and advice furnished by the Government of India are of great value to us and are appreciated by my Government and my people." He also agreed to a substantial expansion of the Indian aid programme, including military aid, during the second five-year plan period.

In the summer 1966, the special relations existing between India and Bhutan were being tested when the Bhutanese territory was violated by Chinese troops and nationals. It was reported that between April and September 1966, there had been three incursions in Doklan pasture area along with the Chumbi Valley including 3/4 Km. of Bhutanese territory by Chinese troops and nationals. On 30 September, the Indian Government had sent a note of protest to the Chinese Government on behalf of Bhutan in which, it

11. Ibid
12. A. Appadorai, India's Foreign Policy and Relations, South Asian Publishers, New Delhi, 1985, p. 177.
said "in view of the persistence of these intrusions, the Government of Bhutan could no longer dismiss the incidents as accidental transgression of the frontier". It, therefore, urged that "the Chinese personnel and troops should be withdrawn from Bhutanese territory and should refrain from future violation".\footnote{14}{Ibid.}

On 3 October 1966, the Bhutanese Government had also issued a Press Statement to clarify its position and that of India's. It stated:

"In view of the succession of violations of the frontier, the Bhutanese Government had urged the Government of India to represent to the Chinese Government, so that Chinese nationals and troops refrained from entry into Bhutan in future".\footnote{15}{Press Statement of 3 October 1966 issued on behalf of the Bhutan Government, see White Paper, no.13, Appendix-II, p.63.}

China denied India's allegations and charged the latter with having ulterior motives with regard to Bhutan on the pretext of serving its vested interests. The Chinese Government also charged India that it was vainly attempting to realize its sinister design of tightening its control over Bhutan under the guise of protection.\footnote{16}{See, White Paper, no.13, Appendix-I, p. 62.}

A significant development in 1967 was the acceptance by the Tshongdu of the King's proposals for
democratic reforms in the country's monarchical system. This constitutional change in Bhutan resulted into an upsurge of new confidence in the people and a growing poise and strength in the Government of Bhutan.

India on its part did not mind that Bhutan had asserted its independence in its national affairs. In 1966, when Nari Rustomji was transferred, the question of representation was raised and it was further settled in 1968 when it was decided that the two governments would be represented by their missions in each other's capital.

A new era of Indo-Bhutanese relations was initiated when the Indian President V.V. Giri visited Bhutan in April 1970. President Giri, in his banquet speech on 23 April, assured Bhutan that India would continue its sympathy with Bhutan regarding its developmental plan as well as defence. He said:

Not only are the fortunes of India and Bhutan inseparably bound to each other, but it is evident that it is only in each other's happiness that the two countries can prosper. We wish Bhutan to be a strong, stable and viable state, since it will also be a source of great strength to India.

18. Rose, n.6, p. 201.
In pursuance of India's policy of allowing Bhutan greater exposure in international community, India sponsored Bhutan's application to the Universal Postal Union in April 1967, and it was admitted on 13 March 1969. Subsequently, in May 1970, Bhutan's membership of the United Nations was proposed by India on 21 September 1971, Bhutan was admitted to the United Nations. On 17 May, the Royal Bhutan Mission was established in New Delhi and India sent its representative to Thimpu on 15 July 1971.

In May 1970, Dinesh Singh, the then Indian Foreign Minister visited Bhutan. His visit was closely connected with future Indo-Bhutanese security matters, in which close cooperation was expected to be increased considerably. In January 1971, it was announced that the strength of Bhutanese Army was planned to be raised.

Bhutan sponsored by India, became a member of the Colombo Plan Council in 1963. During this period various steps were taken by the Indian Government in Bhutan's development plans such as its mineral resources, small industries and micro-hydel projects. For its First Five Year Plan which ended in 1966, India granted a sum of rupees 17.22 crores to Bhutan. The Government of India had

20. The Times of India, 14 March 1969.
22. Rose, n.6, Ibid.
23. Foreign Affairs Record, n. 19, Ibid.
assisted Bhutan in communications and transport, health services, education, agriculture, mineral resources, power and administration. It had also supplied food grains and foreign exchange for essential imports.  

In 1968, high level official exchange of visits were made by both the countries. The King of Bhutan paid a five-day State visit to India from 8-13 February 1968, and Indian Deputy Prime Minister Morarji Desai visited Bhutan from 23–26 March 1968. And above all, the Indian Prime Minister also visited Bhutan from 3-5 May 1968. During these visits the developmental plans of Bhutan were highlighted.  

Importance was given to the defence needs of both the countries. By September 1968, there were at least 1,000 Indian military advisers and road builders in Bhutan. The strength of the Indian defence forces meant for the defence of Bhutan was also considerably augmented. Senior Indian defence planners prepared blueprints for Bhutan's defence. The military cooperation between India and Bhutan continued and by 1970 the number of Indian armed forces in Bhutan had increased.

Thus not only that but India played a vital role in the all round development of Bhutan. With India's

assistance and encouragements Bhutan's economic, social and governmental infrastructure was reorganized on lines relevant to the modern world. As a result, India's imaginative understanding of Bhutan's needs and aspirations paid dividends in ensuring its own security needs. India's respect and efforts to Bhutan's sovereignty and development was highly appreciated by the Kingdom, and the friendship between the two countries continued on the basis of good neighbourliness.

India's foreign policy towards Nepal was also reviewed because India wanted to ensure that there was no danger from the side of Nepal. Actually, the danger from the side of Nepal started causing concern to the Government of India due to anti-India campaigns, allegedly launched by the Nepalese people and authorities. India gave a fresh look on the existing situation and adopted a policy of appeasement towards Nepal in the light of the policy of isolation it had pursued during India's conflict with China. India showed its keenness to improve relations with Nepal and restored the goodwill that had been eroded during 1962. Consequently, ministers began to fly from New Delhi to Kathmandu with a view to strengthen its relations with Nepal.

The first move in this direction was made by Lal Bahadur Shastri, the then Home Minister of India. He visited Kathmandu on 2 March 1963 with the specific purpose of examining new approaches for development of better relations. He had a series of talks with King Mahendra,
Tulsi Giri and V.B. Thapa. The Joint Communique, issued on 5 March 1963, emphasised that both India and Nepal were sovereign nations and India had no desire other than to have the friendly relations with Nepal. It was agreed that "frank consultation" on all issues of common interest would be continued "to settle small differences".  

Shastri returned to India with a more realistic appraisal of the prevailing situation. He reported to the Indian Parliament that India would act as a "big brother" and would play a vital role in the progress of Nepal. He played a magnificent role in smoothening deteriorated Indo-Nepalese relations. He succeeded in assuaging all fears and suspicions that Nepal had so far harboured against India. His report carried the seeds of a new phase in Indo-Nepal relations. The first concrete signs of this new trend in India's policy was evident during King Mahendra's visit to the country from 27-30 August 1963. A Joint Communique was signed between India and Nepal on 30 August in which emphasis was given on economic assistance and maximum cooperation to Nepal's needs. It was realized that such measures would ensure, not only the growth of better relations but would prevent Nepal from seeking friends and agreements detrimental to India's own interests. Moreover, President Radhakrishna's visit to Nepal in November 1963 seemed to indicate India's seriousness in the importance it

30. A. Appadorai, n.12, p. 167.
placed on positive relations with Nepal. When Shastri assumed the Office of the Prime Minister of India in 1964, he felt that the Nepalese strained relations might be improved. For this purpose, he sent the new Foreign Minister, Swaran Singh to Nepal. Swaran Singh assured the Government of Nepal that "we have nothing but a feeling of good will for the Government of Nepal". He also assured that the Indian Government would discourage hostile activities by Nepali residents in India against the regime in Nepal.

Another aspect was also stressed particularly on collaboration and partnership. In this direction, Shastri visited Nepal from 23-25 April 1965. The Joint Communique was issued at the end of Indian Prime Minister's visit to Nepal. It was noted with the satisfaction "the growing sense of partnership" and the determination to continue to strengthen this cooperation between the two countries.

Lal Bahadur Shastri visit to Nepal proved to be fruitful. The deteriorated relations between the two countries returned to smoothness. In retrospect it appeared that Shastri's visit proved to be a turning point in India's policy towards Nepal.

Meanwhile, China also became a new factor in Nepal's economic relationship so far as Nepal's international relations were concerned. The major project China undertook was the construction of the 67 mile

31. Ibid
33. Cited in Appadorai n.12, p. 168.
Kathmandu-Kodari High Way, and committed itself to help to build some 200 mile roads. In the field of power-potential, Peking agreed to assist in the construction of a 10,000 KW hydro-electric Station.

The Indian effort to handle the problems with Nepal softly continued. Indira Gandhi, after assuming the Office of the Prime Minister in early 1966, pursued her predecessor's policy with increasing vigour and awareness. After Nepal's neutral stand on the Indo-Pakistan War in 1965, it had come to be an accepted fact that Nepal could not be depended upon to stand by India in the event of conflict with either, China or Pakistan. India, however, continued to attach considerable importance to Nepal's continuing goodwill and friendship. Mrs. Gandhi visited Kathmandu on 4 October 1966. During her 3-day visit, she announced aid of worth Rs.40 crores during Nepal's Third Five-Year Plan. Mrs. Gandhi also promised Kathmandu machinery for the supply of the proposed paper factory and indicated India's interests in the multi-million killowatt hydro-electric project, whose surplus power could be purchased by India itself.

The Joint Communique issued at the end of Mrs. Gandhi's visit to Nepal emphasised the traditional friendship and common ties of history, geography and culture binding their countries and peoples. The two sides

35. Ibid, 19-25 November 1966, P.7403. See also The Indian National (Patna), 7 October 1966.
reaffirmed a vital interest in each other's territorial integrity, prosperity and they strongly reiterated their faith in the principles of non-alignment and peaceful co-existence. The two sides agreed that work on the Kosi Canal and on the East-West Highway should start without delay. After two months, two important agreements were signed in Kathmandu on 19 December 1966 on the building of the East-West Highway from Thapa to Janakpur along the Southern Terai, and the construction of a joint project over the Kosi river for irrigation, power and flood protection that would benefit some 800,000 acres in Bihar (Indian state) and 70,000 in Nepal.

The opening of the Chinese built Khatmandu-Kodari road and the anti-Indian activities by the Chinese in Nepal considerably influenced both Government and public opinion in India. It was the general view that the road posed a serious threat to India's security and that India could not afford to be complacent about it. Whether or not China would actually use the road for an attack on India, the potential danger had been created and, in any case, India's defence perspective could never be the same again. The then Foreign Minister, M.C. Chagla told the Lok Sabha on 3 July 1967 that India was prepared to meet any threat to its

38. V.P. Dutt, India's Foreign Policy, Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1984, p. 194.
security posed by the road. He also gave the curious reply that there was no proposal at present for such a defence alliance "but if the House feels so, we are prepared to consider it". It was a reply to the question based on the suggestion of the SP member Madhu Limye who made the curious suggestion to the Government of India that it should take steps to enter into a defence alliance with Nepal and Burma to meet the growing Chinese threat to India's security. An equally question asked by SP member, M.G. Ranga, whether the Government would take steps to convene a Conference of representatives of India, Burma, Nepal and Ceylon to strengthen their common defence against Chinese aggression. The Foreign Minister replied that "we will see whether we can act according to it". 39

India lodged a strong protest on 26 July 1967 with the Nepalese Government against the repeated anti-Indian campaign and demonstration by the Chinese lobbies at Kathmandu on 24 and 25 June. 40

The spurt of high level visits to Kathmandu was made by the Indian leaders to continue the goodwill and friendship with Nepal. Deputy Prime Minister Morarji Desai paid a goodwill visit to Nepal on 22 October 1967. He was followed by President Zakir Husain a year later on 12 October 1968. Indeed, during Zakir Husain's visit, King Mahendra publicly pleaded for free and unrestricted flow of trade with and through India. 41

40. V.P. Dutt, n. 38, p. 194.
41. See The Hindustan Times, 10 June 1969.
In spite of India's efforts and assistance to settle the political and economic problems, Nepalese authorities in Kathmandu were engaged to encourage the spread of anti-Indian feelings. In short, differences were expanding.

A series of anti-Indian demonstrations took place in December 1968 in Susta region at the border between Bihar and Nepal. Nepalese newspapers close to the Nepalese traders and their organisations, fuelled anti-Indian sentiments through a continued barrage of articles against India.

In 1969, Nepal proposed two separate trade and transit treaties and also sought transit facilities through Radhikapur in order to facilitate flow of goods between erstwhile East Pakistani ports and Nepal. The Indian side declined to admit the Nepalese demand presumably in view of the alleged tendency to align between Pakistan, Nepal and China. Thus India seemed to have assessed the Radhikapur route issue as political rather than genuine trade and transit interests of Nepal.

Some serious troubles had appeared when Nepal made public demand for the withdrawal of the Indian Military Liaison Group and Indian Technicians stationed on Nepal's

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42. See V.P. Dutt, n.38, p. 195.
Northern Border check-posts. Actually, the Nepalese Prime Minister, Kirtinidhi Bista in an interview with the Official Nepali English daily, Rising Nepal on 24 June 1969, demanded the withdrawals of this group and technicians from Nepal. He also disclosed an Arms Assistance Agreement with India of 1964 which he said Nepal had agreed to cancel on India's suggestion. With this new development, the old relationship between the two countries was transformed into strained relationship.

Dinesh Singh, the then Foreign Minister of India has visited Kathmandu on 5 June 1969 to discuss the problems and to eliminate existing tensions between the two countries. For the same purpose, the Foreign Secretaries of the respective Governments held talks in August 1969. The Joint Statement issued on 4 September 1969 "covered a wide range of subjects of common interest to both countries in the field of economic relations, trade and transit, irrigation and power, location of boundary, defence and security".

44. The Indian Personnel had been posted at Nepal's specific request to assist it in modernizing and training its own military personnel. India had been allowed to collect information on Chinese military activities, in exchange. For details see the Times of India, (New Delhi), 5 September 1969.


46. Ibid.

On the question of the withdrawal of the Indian Military Liaison Group, Nepal made successful effort at some kind of a salvage operation. The Nepalese replaced the Indian personnel on the Northern Checkposts on 1 January 1970 and the Indian Military Liaison Group was withdrawn on 18 August. The salvage part was clearly exposed after the King Mahendra's interview to the Times of India on 19 October 1970 that Nepal and India had arrived at a full understanding on exchange of "military information" on the event of Chinese threat to their respective national security. The King said that Nepal had agreed to the Indian proposal for the stationing of senior military personnel at the Indian Embassy in Kathmandu for the exchange of information and for liaison between the armed forces of both the countries. But the King emphasized that Nepal must pursue an independent foreign policy in conformity with its own national interests.

In India, it was widely believed and realized that the King had been trying to play China against India and now Pakistan against India also. It was seen in September 1970, while India opposed Pakistan's membership of non-aligned countries, Nepal strongly pleaded in favour of Islamabad. The King was engaged in an effort to deliberately whip up public sentiments against India and to divert their attention from the failures of the Rashtriya Panchayat and

50. Ibid., 26 September 1970.
to turn popular discontent against India, blaming it for all the developments. The King's obvious strategy was to separate the political issues from the economic issues. But India had decided to play its cool and believed that the two were inter-related and refused to budge. Nepal also proclaimed counter economic measures directed against Indian traders and businessmen. In the anti-Indian campaign being whipped up, some 1300 Indians fled from Nepal into Bihar. Kathmandu was also playing China and Pakistan against India in an effort to pressurize the Southern neighbour.

To meet the existing situation, India adopted a more formal stiff and assertive attitude towards Nepal. India made it clear to Nepal that the established relationship based on reciprocity was essential to keep both the countries friendly towards each other. India's such attitude implied vital significance for both the countries. The King realised that he had to backtrack somewhat to avoid gravious hurt to the Nepalese economy and Kathmandu should not be unmindful of India's basic interests in the Kingdom. Thus with the growing interdependence between the two countries for the pursuit of their respective national interests, India would be concerned about the likely threat to its national interests as well as security, in case of a political instability in Nepal caused by either domestic factors or external factors. For this perspective, India would play a stabilizing role in Nepal.

It may be recalled that the nature of threat to

51. The Times of India, 30 June 1971.
India's security became crucial and challenging in the post 1962 period. The nature of Chinese threat to India's security was of three dimensions. This three dimensional threat was disclosed by the Government of India by an address made by the then Defence Minister of India, Y.B. Chavan in May 1964 to the National Press Club, Washington D.C; when he said:

"It is a three-fold threat. It is a threat to our territory, it is a threat to our economic development and thirdly it is a political threat, a threat to our way of life. We consider ultimately it is a threat to those countries who share and treasure with us the same values in life and in the mode of economic development."

One of the important components of the Chinese threat to India's security has been military strategic threat. Chinese nuclear explosion of 16 October 1964 once again heightened India's perception of threat from China. India's foreign policy makers oriented their diplomatic efforts towards exploring the possibilities of obtaining joint guarantees from the nuclear weapons powers in order to safeguard the country's security. At a Press Conference in London on 4 December 1964, the Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri stated that: "It was for the nuclear power to provide some kind of guarantees which was needed not only by India but also by all other non-nuclear countries". Later

in another Press Conference, he stressed the attitude of non-nuclear country in response to its security need. He said:

It could not put in more precise terms. I wanted to throw this idea out for the consideration of the big nuclear powers like the USA and the USSR.....I have not suggested my kind of special guarantee, but it is for the nuclear powers to consider how to maintain peace in the world.

Thus China's nuclear explosion resulted in a pro-bomb thought in India. External Affairs Minister, Swaran Singh made a statement in the Lok Sabha on the subject that "the policy of making a bomb is kept under constant review". Reiterating India's option for nuclear weapons plan, his idea was that non-proliferation was not necessary for non-nuclear powers. The non-nuclear powers would be agreed if the nuclear powers assured to give up their such plan.

There was a change in India's security doctrine when M.C. Chagla succeeded Swaran Singh. India, under Chagla gave up the proposed guarantee through the UN stating that "before the Security Council even called a meeting we might be destroyed". He announced that India now hoped to obtain a joint guarantee from the US and the USSR.

55. The Hindu (Madras), 7 December 1964.
56. Lok Sabha Debates, Vol. 55, 10 May 1966 (New Delhi), cols. 15712.
58 The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 13 April 1967.
against nuclear attack and said that President Johnson's statement in that regard was not enough. In this context, the then Prime Minister of India, Indira Gandhi stated on 17 July 1967:

We must realize that in the final analysis, the effectiveness of any such shield in the field of security would depend not on the spirit in which protected power accepts such a shield but on the national and vital interests of the giver.

From the above statement given by the Prime Minister, it was clear that if the nuclear shield were to be available to India, it would have been largely to serve the interests of the giver countries. It was also meant that there would be demands on India to allow a dilution of its policy of non-alignment which was not acceptable to India. The reluctance of support by both the USA and the USSR to India on its security threat and also its own unpreparedness allowed a dilution of its policy of non-alignment which brought to an end, India's search for security guarantees.

Thus India's nuclear option strategy implied clearly its right to make the bomb in the event of a nuclear threat to its security. The rejection of the Non-Proliferation Treaty by India was not unjust due to the treaty's unequal and discriminatory character but a response to its security threatened by the Chinese nuclear explosion.

India not only faced the nuclear threat from China but also from its growing conventional military strength. According to evidences available, between 1963-64 and 1967-68, the strength of the Chinese army increased up from 2,250,000 to 2,500,000, that of the air forces from 9,000 to 100,000 while the navy's position stood at 136,000. This was in sharp contrast to India's military strength upto 1968—900,000 army, 60,000 air force and 17,000 navy. This was why India's Defence Minister Swaran Singh told the Parliament that the main threat to India's security from China continued to be not so much from China's nuclear explosion as from its conventional weapons and army. 61

As for India's responses to the existing grave threat to its security, it realized in view of the adoption of a nuclear option which was not enough to meet the Chinese challenge. India felt the need for developing an effective foreign policy response which included not only the maintenance of a close and cordial relationship with the Soviet Union but also making negotiations for normalising relations with China. It was indicated from the address of Mrs. Gandhi to a Press Conference on 1 January 1969. 62 China did not give any response to India's overtures which coupled with the border skirmishes at Nathu La resulted in a heightened perception of threat to India's policy makers. 63

The Chinese attitude towards India in the post 1962 period was to consolidate and strengthen its position in the Tibet—Sinkiang region, Ladakh—Kashmir area by the construction of a road through Aksai Chin territory and communication systems and deploying troops as well as missiles in these areas. By 1965-66, China had 15 divisions in Tibet, of which at least six were stationed near the border with India, Sikkim and Bhutan. Even during Indo-Pak War of 1965, China chose the Sikkim borders for armed provocation, which jeopardised India's security in the region. Thus 60's remained a decade of insecurity for India. The Chinese growing threat continued to affect seriously India's security position particularly in North Eastern Frontier Agency.

China also posed a grave threat to India's security by supporting insurgency problem in North-eastern India. It was a challenge to India's democratic institution just after its independence. In the mid 60's China intensified the Naxalite movement in the region which afforded an excellent opportunity to the People's Republic of China to overthrow the Indian political system through revolutionary means.

Around the same period the Naga insurgency problem and the Chinese support to it also assumed serious

64. The Times of India, (New Delhi), 17 June 1966. See for details, K. Subrahmanyam, "India's Security: Policy Options", Quest, (Bombay), no. 61, April-June 1969, pp. 9-16.
proportion causing concern to India's security. The Revolutionary Government of Nagaland set up by the rebel Nagas in 1967 posed a serious threat to India's security because the rebel were trained by the Chinese experts in guerilla warfare and provided arms and ammunitions.  

With the emergence of China as a major power, Pakistan infiltrated with Beijing. Prior to 1963, there was a Sino-Pak-Axis and the USA sided with the Pakistan's stand on the Kashmir issue in the Security Council of UN. On 2 March 1963, the Government of India protested against the agreement signed by the Government of China and Pakistan on the alignment of the border Sinkiang and that part of the Indian territory of Jammu and Kashmir which has been unlawfully seized by Pakistan. The Government of India made it clear that Pakistan had no common border with China and the agreement with China and Pakistan to locate the line of the boundary in Kashmir was proof of the Chinese design to exploit the differences between India and Pakistan.  

A Boundary Protocol was signed between China and Pakistan on 26 March 1965 setting up boundary pillars; on 7 April 1965, the Government of India strongly protested against the signing of the Boundary Protocol. This was an

open hostility towards India, the Chinese Government and the
Government of Pakistan were opportunistically making use of
their unlawful seizure of parts of the Indian Union
Territory of Jammu and Kashmir. 69

The visit of Chou-En-Lai to Islamabad in 1964 and
Ayub Khan's visit to Beijing in 1965 were directed towards a
new strategic-linkages between the two countries. The
Chinese leaders reportedly assured Ayub Khan of their
support to Pakistan in the event of an Indian attack on
it. 70

Meanwhile, in April 1965, Pakistani armed forces
attacked the Indian border at Sardar post and Biarbet
post. 71 Pakistan's strategy for the so-called liberation of
Kashmir was executed on 5 August 1965 when it invaded
Kashmir in Tithwal and Kargil-Poonch sectors on the Indian
side of the cease-fire line. 72 In the month of September
Pakistani tanks rolled into the Southern area of Kashmir. 73

It was under such a situation that Indian defence
policy makers concluded that the only way of safeguarding

69. NMLIC, XII, 1965, pp. 2 - 3.
70. G.W. Choudhry, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Major
Powers: Politics of Divided Sub-Continent, (New York,
p. 288,
72. D.R. Mankekar, Twenty Two Fateful Days: Pakistan Cut to
73. Report of the Head of U.N. Observer Group, General
Nimmon's to the U.N. Secretary General, 8 September
1965, pp. 194-96.
The country's security was to cross the cease-fire line and to chase away the invaders. The Prime Minister Shastri declared that:

"If Pakistan continues to discard reason and persist in its aggressive activities, our Army will defend the country and it will decide its own strategy and the employment of manpower in the manner in which it deems best."}

Accordingly, the Indian Army crossed the cease-fire line and captured Pakistani strategic position in Kargil, Tithwal and the Hajipur Pass. By capturing Pakistani military posts, Indian armed forces removed a constant threat to India's security. It was a landmark improvement to the country's security environment.

China also tried its best to help Pakistan by threatening to open another front in the North-Eastern Frontier across Sikkim. China provided 200 tanks and MIG-15 aircraft to Pakistan. The supply of arms to Pakistan, therefore, posed a serious threat to India's security.

After 1965, the dominant objectives of India's foreign policy were to defend its borders and to settle its disputes by peaceful means. With the help of the Soviet

74. Lok Sabha Debates, Vol. 42 (Third Series), 28 April 1965, Col. 11579.
75. Mankekar, n. 72, pp. 71 - 75; and see also Defence Minister Chavan's statement in the Lok Sabha. Lok Sabha Debates, Vol. 44, 25 August 1965, Col. 1778.
leader Kosygin the Tashkent Declaration was signed on 10 January 1966 to restore peace and to establish bilateral relations between India and Pakistan. On the other hand India decided to reorient its defences in order to face a dual threat to its security. A well arranged diplomatic campaign by India highlighted the dangers of Pakistan using outside arms against India. India's war with Pakistan in which China played a role on the side of Pakistan made India to conscious of its defences. Therefore, an effort was made by India to remain prepared even for a war, simultaneously on two fronts—Pakistan and China. India's foreign policy became more defence oriented policy and less doctrinaire. India's defence oriented policy brought it much closer to the Soviet Union than ever before. Considerable importance was given to the building up of the defence forces of the country with the help of the former Soviet Union. The Soviet Union provided India not only that what it wanted but much more to strengthen and modernize its defence capabilities. This put the Indo-Soviet friendship on more solid foundation and counterbalanced the US support to Pakistan.

The Soviet support to India was not tolerable for Pakistan. Pakistan moved to USA for more assistance. The US President Nixon showed greater sympathy to Pakistan's appeal for parity in defence with India and provided more arms to Pakistan. The US arms assistance to Pakistan was motivated to

77. Pravda (Moscow), 11 January 1966.
counter-balance Soviet support to India. Henry Kissinger's secret visit to Peking via Rawalpindi in July 1971 was managed by Pakistan to improve Sino-US relations.

Meanwhile, there developed a Civil War in East Pakistan in the mid 1971. An influx of refugees from erstwhile East Pakistan came in India and put heavy burden on the Indian economy and threatened the peace and the security of the country.

In such a situation, India had no other choice but to act wisely with the help of the former Soviet Union because Pakistan had threatened to go to war with India and US had warned not to support India in the event because China was ready to help Pakistan in the war. 79

It was under such condition that Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace and Friendship was concluded on 9 August 1971 80. The Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace and Friendship was criticised both in Pakistan and China. Pakistani Prime Minister, Z.A.Bhutto described it "a pact of aggression against Pakistan and China". He also stressed that "Islamabad should take serious notice to it". 81 China also criticised the treaty and it was viewed by China as an "unfriendly act". 82

82. The Hindu (Madras), 4 October 1971.
The main purpose of the Indo-Soviet Treaty was to safeguard India's security. It was not contrary to India's policy of non-alignment. Article IV of the Treaty had entitled India to follow the policy of non-alignment. It was not a defence pact against Pakistan or China. It helped India to establish special relations with the Soviet Union to counterbalance the Washington-Beijing-Axis in favour of Pakistan.

It may be pointed out here that Pakistan wanted to get help from China in its war with India. China supported Pakistan during the war declaring that the East Pakistan crisis was an internal affairs of Pakistan. There were movements of Chinese troops near the Indian borders while the US Seventh Fleet was sent to the Bay of Bengal. Both US and China were acting against India's land and sea frontiers. China openly denounced Soviet-Indian Collusion and accused Moscow supporting India with "military provocations and subversive activities" towards Pakistan.

Since the civil war in East Pakistan started, the Soviet Union supported the Indian stand. The Soviet Union warned the third country—China that it should not be involved in the affairs of India because it might lead to a

85. The Dawn, 6 December 1971.
further deterioration of the situation in the Indian sub-continent. The Soviet Union too despatched its powerful naval fleet into the Bay of Bengal to prevent the US operation. Soviet support to India was in the context of Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace and Friendship and India's friendship with the Soviet Union was within the framework of the policy of non-alignment.

Thus East Pakistan crisis of 1971 escalated into a war between India and Pakistan and ultimately Bangladesh came into existence. After the war India emerged as a major power in South Asia. The period of 1971 became a landmark in India's foreign policy and its security environment. The Indo-Soviet Treaty provided India the necessary strategic reassurance at a time when strategic triangle consisting of China, the United States of America and Pakistan posed a serious threat to its security.

86. The Times of India (New Delhi), 15 December 1971.