CHAPTER 1
INDIA'S POLICY IN THE CONTEXT OF THREATS TO ITS SECURITY IN NEHRU ERA

When India got independence, the World had already been divided between the two hostile camps headed by USA and the former Soviet Union and each camp was endeavouring to contain the other and was in the process of attempting to muster the newly independent nations on its side. In such an International Scenario the newly independent India had to formulate its foreign policy in the context of the Cold War, military alliances, its geographical location, economic consideration and the protection of the security of the country and promotion of its national interests.

India's strategic location in South Asia has been a connecting link between West Asia, South Asia, and East Asia and also an important factor in its foreign policy. Nehru firmly believed that India's size, geostrategic location, frontiers and historical traditions entitled it to play a leading role in Asia as well as in world affairs. On March 22, 1949 he said to the Constituent Assembly that:

India is very curiously placed in Asia and her history has been governed a great deal by the geographical factor plus other factors. Whichever problem in Asia you may take up, somehow or other India comes into the picture. Whether you think in terms of China, or the Middle East or South East Asia, India
immediately comes into the picture. It is so because its past history and traditions that in regard to any major problems of a country or a group of countries of Asia, India has to be considered. Whether it is a problem of defence or economic policy, India cannot be ignored.

Nehru was aware that India could retain its influence and play a meaningful role in maintaining world peace, not by aligning with power blocs, but, by following an independent foreign policy. He said before the Constituent Assembly on 8 March 1949 that:

If by any chance we align ourselves with one Power group, we may perhaps from one point of view do some good, I have not the shadow of doubt that from a largest point of view, not only of India but of world peace, it will do harm. Because then we lose that tremendous vantage ground that we have of using such influence as we possess (and that influence is growing from year to year) in the cause of world peace.

He continued:

I feel that India can play a big part, and perhaps an effective part in helping to avoid war. Therefore, it becomes all the more necessary that India should not be lined up with any group of Powers. ...This is the main approach of our foreign policy.

2. Ibid., p. 246.
3. Ibid., p. 248.
Nehru believed that India was not to be unduly worried about external threats to its security. This was a perception which governed his security thinking even before independence. He also believed that big power rivalry would in itself act as an effective guarantor of India’s security. Thus Nehru pursued an independent non-aligned policy of judging every issue on the merits of the case to safeguard its security, to promote the national interests and to maintain its independent position in world politics.

India in the early years of its independent career, played a role of a balancer in world politics. The basic objective of its foreign policy was to promote the country’s security by insulating its strategic environment from the interference by the power-blocs. National security in Nehru ideas could be safeguarded not merely by defence preparedness but also by an effective foreign policy. He said:

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Every country's foreign policy first of all is concerned with its own security and with protecting its own progress. Security can be obtained in many ways. The normal idea is that security is protected by armies. That is only partly true, it is equally true that security is protected by policies. A deliberate policy of friendship with other countries goes farther in gaining security than almost anything else.\(^4\)

India's foreign policy actions, since the

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beginning of independence show that India's foreign policy makers have always been concerned about three kinds of threat to India's security—a threat from the politics of cold war, a threat from the side of Pakistan and a threat from the side of People's Republic of China.

The major threat to India's security during Nehru era was a threat from the politics of the cold war. For newly independent India, preservation of independence and its use both in thought and behaviour was the most natural and cardinal objective of the foreign policy of the country. The cold war with its bloc politics threatened to take away India's independence. The choice before India was either to accept a policy of alignment or join one of the power-blocs and thus be under its protective umbrella or adopt an independent non-aligned foreign policy and stay away from bloc-politics. The policy of alignment was ruled out because India did not want to give up its right to judge international issues on the basis of the merits of the case and more so within the framework of India's own national interests and subordinating its own position to that of the bloc-leader and thereby undermining its own potentially great nation or big-power role in the international affairs. Therefore, non-alignment, for Nehru, was the healthy foreign policy strategy for India.

For Nehru, independence and security were

inseparable. He told the Constituent Assembly on March 8, 1949 that:

What does independence consist of? It consists fundamentally and basically of foreign relations. That is the test of independence. ... Once foreign relations get out of your hand into the charge of somebody else, to that extent and in that measure, you are not independent.

In his broadcast to the nation on 7 September 1946, Nehru laid down the outline of India's foreign policy. He said:

We propose as far as possible to keep away from the power politics of groups, aligned against one another which have led in the past to world wars and which may again lead to disasters on an even waster scale. We believe that peace and war are indivisible and the denial of freedom anywhere must endanger freedom elsewhere and lead to conflict and war. ... We shall take part in international conferences as a free nation with our own policy and not merely as a satellite of another nation.

The cold war challenge was remarkable in the early years of India's independence status when the Big Powers showed cold attitude towards its non-aligned policy and firmly refused to recognise it. The Soviet Russia suspected India due to its association with the Common Wealth and the United States was disappointed by India's refusal to participate in its policy of containment of Communism. John Foster Dulles argued that by refusing to commit itself in

the great struggle of ideologies, India had adopted a wavering, indecisive and 'immoral' posture. In such an unfavourable international situations, the main task of India's foreign policy was to obtain an early recognition of the policy of non-alignment and thereby promote a conducive atmosphere for security. This was necessary if India had to play the role which Nehru had envisaged for it in world politics.

The Korean War of 1950 provided India with a good opportunity to demonstrate its policy of non-alignment. India's diplomacy during the war, not to sent its military contingent but only medical team on part of the United Nations operation in Korea. India's role in bringing about a solution to the crisis, which displeased the United States, led the Soviet leadership to reassess its policies towards India.

India played a role of mediator and peace keeper during Suez Canal crisis, and Congo crisis, without compromising its policy of non-alignment. In this way India gained certain position and acceptability in world politics in the post Korean crisis period. And India succeeded to preserve its national security after the Cuban Missile crisis which led the way for the beginning of Soviet-American detente.

Before discussing the security problem of India from its big and small neighbours, it is necessary to look at the strategic significance of its two immediate neighbours—Bhutan and Nepal. These neighbours by virtue of their geostrategic situation in the region cast their shadows on India's security horizon. The location of these neighbouring countries is significant to threaten or deny the threat to India's security.

Himalayas, in the Northern region, are sub-divided into Great Himalayas, middle ranges and lower Himalayas and the Terai region. In its centre lies the Indo-Gangetic plain which has no natural defence potential.  

The Himalayan Kingdoms of Bhutan and Nepal are bounded by China on the north; and India, on their east, south and west. They are separated from one another by a narrow strip of India.

Bhutan, situated on the southern slopes towards the eastern sides of Himalayas with Tibet on its north; and India on its east, south and west, presents a succession of lofty and rigged mountains extending from north to south and is separated by deep valleys. Nepal, situated along the southern slope of the Himalayas separates the arid plateau from the gangetic plains of India forms the natural frontier.

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with the Tibetan region. Because of location, it serves as northern gateway to Indo-Gangetic plains.

Thus Bhutan and Nepal have strategic implications for India's security; so far as China's policy towards them is concerned. India's relations with Bhutan and Nepal have occupied an important position in regards to its security environment. Before discussing the role of Bhutan and Nepal in India's security, attempts have made to enquire about the responsible factors which have been playing a key role in determining India's security environment particularly in the Himalayan region.

Pakistan is strategically situated in the Indian sub-continent on its north-east, east and south-east lies India; on its north-west lies Afghanistan; on its north, beyond the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (also Azad Kashmir) lies China; on its west lies Iran; and on the south, it is open to the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf.11 It is separated from the former Soviet Union merely by a small strip of 12 miles of Afghan territory. It has common frontiers with Iran and Afghanistan and a long border with India. About half of its land frontiers meet with India; about one-third with Afghanistan; one-sixth with Iran; and a small strip through the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, with China. Its location at the hinges of South, Central and

West Asia confers on it ample significance. It has been a target of opportunity for a number of powers which have interests to access or denial to access to the lands south of the Himalayas, the Karakorams, the Hindukush mountains and to the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf.\textsuperscript{12}

Pakistan looms large on the security horizon of India and thus one of the aspects of India's foreign policy has been its relationship with Pakistan. Since 1947, India had faced a serious threat to its security from the immediate neighbour Pakistan. Kashmir has been a major security issue for India throughout, but after its tribal invasion of 1947, it has been intimately connected with problems of the security and defence of India.

With the termination of British rule in India in 1947, "Princely States" were given the choice to join either the Dominions - India or Pakistan. The position of Kashmir, however was unique in many respects, situated in the north-west of Indian sub-continent, it adjoined both India and Pakistan. Kashmir's strategic location also flanked by China, the former Soviet Union and Afghanistan speaks volumes about its importance to India's as well as Pakistan's security.

India, therefore from its inception as an independent state, was very much interested in the decision

\textsuperscript{12} Mahnaz Ispahani, "Pakistan: Dimensions of Insecurity", in Adelphi Papers, 246, Winter 1989/90, p. 5.
of Kashmir for accession in favour of one dominion or the other. Nehru stated the strategic importance of Kashmir for India's defence and security when he said to the Constituent Assembly on 25 November 1947:

We were of course vitally interested in the decision that the State would take. Kashmir because of its geographical position, with her frontiers marching with three countries, namely, the Soviet Union, China and Afghanistan, is intimately connected with the security and international contacts of India. Economically also, Kashmir is intimately related with India. The caravan trade routes from Central Asia to India pass through the Kashmir state. 13

Speaking in almost identical terms, although the emphasis was more on the religious factor, Pakistan Prime Minister, Liaqat Ali Khan told the Pakistani Constituent Assembly on 19 January 1950:

Geographically, economically, culturally and religiously, Kashmir is a part of Pakistan. The overwhelming Muslim character of its population, its strategic position in relation to Pakistan, the flow of its rivers, the directions of its routes, the channels of its trade, the continual and intimate association which binds it to the people of Pakistan from

time immemorial link Kashmir indissolubly with Pakistan.\(^\text{14}\)

The contending claims of India and Pakistan for Kashmir resulted in a situation where Kashmir came to occupy a unique position in the sub-continental balance of power. Nehru and his colleagues argued that the accession of Kashmir to India made by Maharaja of Kashmir, Hari Singh in October 1947 was irrevocable,\(^\text{15}\) and that the status quo should therefore continue. Pakistan, has also tried to alter the status quo by reiterating its argument for self-determination to the people of Jammu and Kashmir.

India's security, therefore, hastened the process of Kashmir's accession to India; the army plunged into action to protect India's vital interests in the valley. Kashmir became a nexus in India's security and foreign policy that Pakistan occupied about 5,000 sq. miles of India's northern, territories known as "Azad Kashmir".

The nature of Pakistani threat to India's security has to be seen against India's power position in the region. Pakistan launched itself on a foreign linkages by joining

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\(^{14}\) For details see Liaqat Ali Khan's Speech before the Constituent Assembly(L) of Pakistan, 19 January 1950, in Kashmir and Inter-Dominion Relations: Statements by Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan (Government of Pakistan, Publications Department, Karachi, 1950), p. 18.

SEATO and CENTO with Western Powers to attain artificial parity with India.

Kashmir's geo-strategic importance coupled with the perception that Pakistan supported by USA and UK in the United Nation would pose a grave threat to India's security led Nehru to devise a strategy of preempting future Indo-Pakistan conflict. For this purpose, he offered a No War Pact with Pakistan in December, 1949. The No-War Pact was a product of Nehru's faith in the pacific settlement of disputes and maintaining peace in the sub-continent. 16

But the No-War offer was rejected by the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaqat Ali Khan on the ground that Pakistan would not sign such an agreement unless the Kashmir problem was resolved 17 and thereby Pakistan wanted to retain the military option to solve the Kashmir problem.

The accession of Kashmir to Indian Dominion was intolerable for Pakistan. Pakistan felt that it could not take Kashmir through negotiation. Therefore, it joined the US military alliances to strengthen itself politically, militarily and diplomatically vis-a-vis India 18, in order to speak to India from a position of strength and in the hope

17. Ibid., pp. 324-25.
that it could compel India to concede to its claims in respect to Kashmir.

It was against the background of such Pakistani threat to India's security that Nehru told the Indian Parliament on 23 December 1953 that:

All this arming of Pakistan is a matter of concern to us.... It is a matter of concern to us because the quintessence of hatred for India plus accumulation of arms may lead to bad results.

He further added:

US military aid to Pakistan produced a qualitative change in the existing situation and therefore it affected Indo-Pakistani relations, more specially on the Kashmir problem.

Thus the flow of massive military aid to Pakistan by USA and its alliances, presented a serious threat to India's security and its territorial integrity particularly in Kashmir. It became a serious challenge to the policy of non-alignment and its credibility for the protection of its national security. It compelled India to divert its resources into defence production and

preparedness. Not only this but the persistent conflict with Pakistan, which raised for India, the frightful begony on two fronts forced it to seek Soviet support to strengthen its position.

The Soviet opposed the US military bases in Pakistan because these bases were established to prevent the spread of the Soviet influence in Asia and the Middle East. Therefore, both India and the former Soviet Union were compelled by their vested interests to come close to each other and join hands to counterbalance the UA influence in the sub-continent.

It was under such condition that Nehru visited the former Soviet Union in June 1955. Russian had been in considerable pain to demonstrate their great friendship for India. Nehru wanted to strengthen Indo-Soviet relations but before opening a new chapter in Indo-Soviet relations, he also wanted to make it sure that the relations between the two countries would be based on equality, mutual benefit, mutual respect and mutual trust that was why he reiterated his faith in "Panchsheel" as well as in peaceful settlement of all international disputes. Nehru had several talks with the Soviet leaders, especially with the Prime Minister, Bulganin and the First Secretary of the Communist Party - Khrushchev, mostly on world problems and in the "joint decleration"

issued by the two Prime Ministers on their talks, they resolved that the relations between the two countries would continue to be guided by the principles of Panchsheel.  

The Soviet leaders Bulganin and Khrushchev visited India in November - December 1955. During their visits, they called India a great power and supported India on Kashmir issue. It was an imperative assurance of the Soviet recognition of India's independent status and its policy of non-alignment. The open support to India by the former Soviet Union on Kashmir issue was a landmark in Indo-Soviet relations because the diplomatic linkages which Pakistan had sought to achieve by the United States of America were counterbalanced by the Soviet political and economic support to India.

China has occupied areas in the Western sector, it continues to keep the claim alive in the sector. It sought the strategic areas of Aksai-Chin which connects Sinkiang with Tibet and keeps alive its claims in the Eastern sector as a bargaining point. China is in a geostrategic position providing the greatest challenge to India's security. Its occupation of North-Eastern Ladakh, which it considers an integral part of Sinkiang, and establishment of strategic

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23. Foreign Policy of India (Text of Documents): 1947-59, (Government of India, New Delhi), pp. 185-7. See also The Times (London), 24 June 1955.
24. The Hindu (Madras), 11, 12, 16 December 1955.
nexus with Pakistan is of great significance for any Indian security considerations. The Karakoram Highway via Khunjerab pass impinges much on India's security as it facilitates China's accessibility into Kashmir on a much larger scale than the Aksai Chin road.26

The establishment of the Communist Regime in China in 1949 put an end to the "independence" of Tibet and brought it back to China's fold. This caused concern to newly independent India about its security in the Himalayan zone.27 Questions on Tibet began to be raised in the Indian Constituent Assembly. Nehru confessed this much later when he said:

"From the very first day this problem about our frontiers was before us."

Even before the Communist Government was established in China, India had noted that Kuomintang China claimed Tibet as her exclusive concern.29 It was also familiar with the liberation war in Tibet; and therefore had already bothered about its security on the Indo-Tibetan border and its interests in Tibet.30

28. Ibid.
China's military march into Tibet and the adverse reactions in India darkened the Indo-China scene, but there was very little that Nehru could do. India did not have the military strength to intervene and help Tibet to retain its independence. Even not any big power was willing to recognise Tibet as an independent state. India tried to harmonize two contradictory approaches in regard to Tibet. The acceptance of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet and the maintenance of Tibetan autonomy. Once the Chinese were in Tibet, there was no way of ensuring autonomy. Therefore, India put the matter in the UN General Assembly to retain Tibetan autonomy, but all the efforts to support Tibet went in vain.

Tibet was obliged to come to terms with China and consequently, it signed the Sino-Tibetan Agreement with China at Peking on 23 May 1951. China was to take control of Tibet's external affairs, trade and communications, it was also permitted to maintain an army in Tibet. China promised not to interfere with the religious beliefs and practices of the Tibetan people, or with their political system or with the power and functions of Dalai Lama.

After the revolt began in Tibet on the eastern border of India, Nehru stated the Government of India's

31. A. Appadorai and M.S. Rajan, India's Foreign Policy and Relations, South Asian Publishers, New Delhi, 1983, p.121.
32. Ibid.
approach to the Tibetan question. He told the Lok Sabha that our broad policy towards Tibet was governed by three factors: (1) the preservation of the security of India; (2) our desire to maintain friendly relations with China; and (3) our deep sympathy for the people of Tibet. Nehru saw that sympathy for the people of Tibet might conflict with "our desire to maintain friendly relations with China". This is why, he told to the Lok Sabha on 30 March 1959 that:

While we want to have friendly relations with the people of Tibet, all the same time, it is important for us to have friendly with the great country China. ... It does not mean, however, that in a difficult situation, and not do anything in excitement which might lead our country into difficulties.

Thus the Government of India felt perturbed about the country's frontiers and avoided antagonising China and provoking the Communist bloc as a whole in order to keep India's non-alignment safe.

The relations between India and China were improved when in the Treaty of April 29, 1954, India officially recognized Tibet as the "region of China".

33. Nehru, n.4 p. 315
34. Ibid.
Apart from a "brief" and "bitter" experience about Tibet, there was particularly no point of disputes between India and China until the end of Korean-War in July 1953. At the invitation of the Government of India, Chou-En-Lai visited India on 25 June 1954. India and China concluded "Panchsheel" which became the guiding principles for their cordial relations. 37

But the relations between the two countries were strained after the Chinese challenge of mapmanship. On 18 October 1954, Peoples China, a fortnightly paper published a map of China which included about 50,000 square miles of the Indian territory in North East Frontier. The Government of India, consequently, enquired about this cartographical aggression and the Chinese Government put forth its lame excuse that the survey were not taken by the Chinese authority, they were the legacy of the past. 38 In such a situation, questions were asked in the Indian Parliament about the motives of the Chinese publications. In reply to a question, whether the Chinese Government had not recognised India's Frontiers? Prime Minister Nehru said:

There was no question about any body's recognising absolute fact. 39

The controversial map was republished in July, 1958 in the China Pictorial. The Government of India once

37. Foreign Policy of India, n. 23, p. 104.
again drew the attention of the Government of China to this matter, but the Chinese Government paid no heed to this and yet repeated her old reply.

Thus the continued publication of maps in China claiming large chunks of Indian territory caused concern to the Government of India because it was a threat to the territorial integrity of the country. Besides, there were several border incursions between 1955 and 1959 by Chinese troops into Indian territory, causing concern to the Government of India to defend its borders.

In fact of the matter is that China refused to accept the Mc Mohan Line as Sino-Indian border. The Chinese had defiantly built the Aksai-Chin – Karakoram Highway, running through Indian territory of Ladakh connecting Sinkiang Chinese province with the Pakistani area around Gilgit during 1956-58. 40

Since 8 July 1956, both India and China claimed possession of Barahoti however, both agreed that Barahoti being a disputed area, neither party should send any troops there. 41 But the relations between India and China further deteriorated due to Chinese boundary incursion, and political asylum by India to Dalai Lama in 1959. The

40. Mahendra Kumar, "Sino-Indian Relations", The Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol. XXIV, No.1, January - December, 1961, p. 110. See also Appadorai, p.31,p.120
41. Nehru, p.4,p.327.
Chinese attitude towards India further stiffened and border clashes on the Sino-Indian frontiers became more frequent in the summer of 1959.\(^\text{42}\)

The talks between Prime Minister Nehru and the Chinese Premier Chou En-Lai in April 1960 failed to resolve the boundary dispute between the two countries. This was why, India set up a large number of forward posts in Ladakh to safeguard India's frontiers. This move was known as "forward policy" of India, which objective was to validate India's claim to territory in Aksaichin by establishing an Indian presence there. Pursuing the forward policy, it was necessary for the Government of India to assuage public opinion by taking some bold step to check the Chinese aggression in Indian territory. In this connection, Lieutenant General Kaul wrote that "We had established numerous posts which symbolized our administrative jurisdiction and were intended to ensure that the Chinese did not repeat the Aksaichin experience in other parts of Ladakh as well as NEFA"\(^\text{43}\)

China in a note to India on 30 November 1961 had protested against the "forward policy" in Ladakh against India's attempt "to realize its territorial claim

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42. Vijay Sen Bhudraj, "China as a Factor in Indo-Soviet Relations", in Surendra Chopra (ed), Studies in India's Foreign Policy, Department of Political Science, GND University, Amritsar, 1983, p.132.

43. See, B.M. Kaul, Confrontation With Pakistan, (Delhi, 1971), p. 272.
unilaterally and by force", and warned that if India continued its military probings in Ladakh, "the Chinese Government would have every reason to send troops to cross the so-called Mc Mohan Line and enter the vast area between the crest of the Himalayan and their Southern foot". 44

Therefore, Nehru saw no reason to discuss the question of frontiers with Chinese Government because he felt that "there was nothing to be discussed". 45 In retrospect, these incursions seem to had been a smoke screen to their aggressive design in the Aksai Chin area.

In short, India wished to cultivate friendly relations with China from 1950 to 1958. Nehru and Chou-En-Lai made an exchange of visits between June 1954 and January 1957. The historic but dogmatic slogan of Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai was used in March 1957 by both the countries. This was an evidence of growing friendship and mutual confidence between the two countries.

These events made it necessary for India to strengthen its defences all along the Chinese border in the

44. Notes, Memorenda and Letters exchanged and Agreements signed between the Governments of India and China (1959-1968), (New Delhi, 1968), pp. 3 - 4.
Himalaya and New Delhi, therefore, looked around for help. Since the former Soviet Union too was a victim of Chinese territorial claims and provocative acts, New Delhi and Moscow tended to get closer and the latter began taking more interest in former's economic and security needs. Moscow took a number of steps to strengthen India's hand. First, it authorised a loan worth about $378 million for India's Third Five year Plan in September 1959. Secondly, it refused to support the Chinese position on the Sino-Indian border clashes, and expressed "regret at the use of force and advised Peking to settle the border disputes through friendly negotiations". Thirdly, it stepped up its diplomatic relations with India. Soviet delegates headed by President K.E. Vorshilov arrived in India on 20 January 1960, for a 16-days official visit. In the following month, the Soviet Premier Khrushchev visited New Delhi for five days. Fourthly, Moscow agreed to help India in enhancing its military capacity in Himalayas.

On 14 May 1962, Nehru reiterated India's demand for the Chinese withdrawal from Ladakh creating a "no man's land" of approximately 11,300 square miles. The Galwan Valley incident was regarded as the returning point in the territory of the Sino-Indian conflict in Ladakh.

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47. The Hindu, (Madras), 22 July 1962.
48. Ibid.
Meanwhile China attacked Ladakh and thereafter North-East Frontier Agency on 20 October 1962. 49

Chinese invasion posed a serious threat to India's security as well as India's policy of non-alignment and its creditability to defend its border. The Chinese attack was the sadest chapter of Nehru's life and it affected his faith in non-alignment. 50 Nehru realized that the Indian foreign policy should be a defence oriented policy in order to perseve the policy of non-alignment. He was forced by the existing situation to make certain changes in India's foreign policy not in the sense of alignment in place of non-alignment but non-alignment with adequate defence of the country.

Nehru firmly believed in diplomatic negotiations regarding peaceful settlement of Sino-Indian disputes. In keeping with his belief in negotiation and mediation, Nehru after the war accepted the Colombo Proposals 51 of December 1962, put forward by eight non-aligned countries. The proposal, of course was a non-starter because of China's intransigence.

After the invasion, Nehru was forced by the reactionary forces that India should give up its policy of

49. Satayanarayan Sinha, p. 36, p. 77.
non-alignment and would join the Western bloc because they linked the Indian defeat to the policy of non-alignment. 52

In late October 1962, India had to turn to many countries for aid. Since November 3, 1963 India began to receive arms from the United States and Common Wealth countries. On November 14, 1962 however, the US and India signed an agreement on military aid. Under this agreement India consented to allow American advisors and observers to exercise control over the use of the arms and also agreed to make available to the United States a certain amount of military information. 53

The USA offered to build more airfields in India, install a system of radar stations at the border and establish communication with U.S. aircraft carriers which would be ordered, accordingly, to the station in the Bay of Bengal. 54 At a Conference at Nassau in December 1962, US President John Kennedy and Britain's Prime Minister Horald Mc Millan agreed to grant India urgent military aid to an amount of 120 million dollars. 55

Then that India had accepted military aid from the Western Powers and it influenced India's foreign policy. It

52. Yuri Nasenko, Jawaharlal Nehru's India's Foreign Policy, Sterling Publishing House, New Delhi, 1977, pp. 292-93.
53. Ibid., pp. 295-96.
54. Ibid, p. 296.
55. Ibid.
was simply that the American imperialists chose other ways of involving India in their military—strategic plan. They were not going to miss such a good chance of pushing India from the path of non-alignment. The American Administration was aware that the conclusion of a military alliance with India would impose on them the immense financial burden of re-equipping the Indian Army.

Indian observers, however, came to realize more clearly the dangers involved in the foreign policy strategy of non-alignment. Some of them sided with Nehru and stepped up their support to Nehru's faith in the policy of non-alignment. Some had expressed their views that the American plan for joint air defence exercise would certainly threatened the country's sovereignty and independence. Some had clearly criticized Nehru's rigid stand on Sino-Indian border dispute.

Despite Nehru's espousal, the public opinion in India was highly critical of the Colombo proposals. The resolution of the CPI National Council suggested the proposal that India and China should be held to break the dead lock on the Sino-Indian disputes had strong repercussions among the public.56 The Bharatya Jana Sangh was most critical. It felt that "The Colombo Conference has totally by passed the aggression issue".57 Swatantra and Praja Socialist Party in a joint meeting asserted that

57. The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 21 January 1963.
"... the so-called non-aligned Powers are not really non-aligned". The public did not care much for Nehru's plea to accept these proposals even as a tactical move to gain diplomatic advantage vis-a-vis China "a rigid posture by us while the aggressor makes a show of flexibility may land us in a diplomatic lapse". 

Against such hostile public opinion, Nehru could somehow got the parliamentary approval to clarify version of the Colombo proposals, but not before he assured the Lok Sabha that he would not agree to any Chinese amendments to the Colombo proposals. In short, Nehru was not left with much leeway to bargain on this issue and had to take a rigid attitude of insisting on a prior Chinese acceptance of the Colombo proposals intoto, before holding any talks with China.

Thus these developments made Nehru to follow the course of non-alignment more consistently and simultaneously to build up the country's defence capability by utilising internal resources as well as getting outside aid without military or political strings.

India signed the Moscow-Treaty of Banning Nuclear Weapons Test in 1963. The Indian Government saw the signing

of the treaty as "a turning point in recent human history for opening the way to disarmament and to secure a peace all over the world". This step was taken by India for strengthening the friendly relations with the former Soviet Union.

The new approachment between India and former Soviet Union started in May 1963 when the Soviet Government offered to help India to construct an integrated Iron and Steel Plants at Bokaro. The Soviet Government also agreed to extend aid to build up the defence capability of India.

Mrs. Indira Gandhi’s visit to Moscow in July 1963 was a landmark in strengthening the Indo-Soviet relationship. The friendship between the two countries was further strengthened in April 1964 after Jakarta Conference of Afro-Asian Countries. Indian representative to the Conference, Sardar Swaran Singh sided with the Soviet Union because it was an Asian power and which ever since the Bandung Conference had supported the policy of non-alignment pursued by the Afro-Asian countries and given economic assistance to survive these countries as sovereign independent states.

After Jakarta Conference, Nehru realized that the

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policy of non-alignment must be followed to meet the needs of India's security. Before Chinese aggression, India was ready to face the threat from Pakistan in future. India was fearless from China, but after the Chinese aggression it started full defence preparedness against both Pakistan and China.

As far as the implications of the Chinese action on India's security environment particularly in the Himalayan perimeter is concerned, India's strategy was to overcome by consolidating the relationship with Sikkim, Bhutan and Nepal through a network of diplomatic security agreements.

Bhutan, like all the other border states, occupies a vital position in India's security environment. Bhutan is situated on the North by China and Tibet, on the West, South and East by Sikkim, West Bengal and Assam (Indian States) respectively. The two big neighbours, China and India have very vital geostrategic interests with Bhutan.

The establishment of Communist Government in China in 1949 and the likelihood of its expansion, therefore, hastened the conclusion of the Treaty of Perpetual Peace and Friendship between India and Bhutan on 8 August 1949. The need for the conclusion of such treaty with Bhutan was also conceived largely in the context of free India's strategic and security interest in the Himalayan region.

64. A. Appadorai, n.31, p. 172.
In short, after the independence of India and the birth of Communist China; the need for a buffer region between India and China led the Government of India to review the existing security environment and to conclude the treaty with Bhutan. Treaties with identical objectives were also signed with Sikkim in 1950.

The Treaty of 1949 between India and Bhutan was concluded to regulate and promote the relations of friendship and good neighbourliness. The most important thing in the Treaty was mentioned in Article II, the provision stating that India would assure Bhutan not to interfere in the internal administration of Bhutan, on its part, Bhutan agreed to be guided by the advice of the Government of India in its external relations. This article is the most important part of the treaty that governs the relations between the two countries. Since it is difficult to strictly separate internal policy from its external relations, India is expected to give due consideration to the interests of Bhutan while tendering any advice.65 Article V of the Treaty grants free trade and Commerce between the two countries. Under this article, India agrees to grant Bhutan every facility for carriage by land and water of its products throughout India.66


66. A.G. Naidu, Ibid.
Article VI allows Bhutan to import arms and ammunition through India with the assistance and approval of the Government of India necessary for the strength and welfare of Bhutan. This treaty has been the guiding factor in the relations between the two countries.

The establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, and the Chinese occupation of Tibet during 1950-51 brought vital changes in the Himalayan region which called for certain adjustments in India's bilateral relation with the Himalayan states. India's formal recognition of Tibet as a region of China in Sino-Indian agreement of 1954, a new phase of Sino-Indian relations started. In the past, the British Government of India had emphasized upon Tibet as a large frontier zone. Once Tibet became a part of China, its borders were stretched closer to those of India. The commanding position of China in the Himalayan region posed new threats to the security of India. Similarly, the Himalayan Kingdoms of Bhutan and Sikkim came to have a common border with China. China is now closer to Bhutan with about 350 Km. long common border, than ever before. Moreover, the occupation of Tibet has enabled China to exploit the old intimate ties between the people of Bhutan and Tibet which indirectly became a serious matter for India's security.

67. Ibid.
68. Manorama Kohli, "The Chinese Factor in Indo-Bhutanese Relations", in Surendra Chopra (ed.), Studies in India's Foreign Policy, Department of Political Science, GND University, Amritsar, 1983, p.163.
Almost an identical diplomatic posture of China was witnessed and the "special relations", which the treaty of 1949 established between Bhutan and India were not acceptable to China. By treating Bhutan as an independent entity beyond the framework of the treaty, Peking hoped to drive a wedge between India and Bhutan. China's attempts to send some gifts to the Maharaja of Bhutan in 1953 and two years later when the Chinese officials started issuing visas directly to the Bhutanese indicated the Chinese strategy followed even during the period of Sino-India friendship. But Bhutan paid no response towards Peking and had always been unfavourable.

Nehru the first leader of a sovereign India, visited Bhutan in September 1958 because India was serious in retaining responsibility over Bhutan's foreign affairs. That Bhutan had a road link with Tibet, which territory had to be crossed, in part, to enter Bhutan, made this all the more necessary.

During his visit, Nehru assured Bhutan of India's intentions and willingness in its welfare. He said:

Some may think that since India is a great and powerful country and Bhutan is small one, the former might wish to exercise pressure on

70. The Times of India, 24-27 September 1958.
Bhutan. It is therefore, essential that I make it clear to you (Bhutanese people) that our wish is that you should remain an independent country and taking the path of progress according to your will. At the same time, we two should live with mutual good will. We are members of the same Himalayan family and should live as friendly neighbours, helping each other. The freedom of both Bhutan and India should be safeguarded so that no one from outside can do any harm to them."

Infact, Nehru visit to Bhutan seemed to coincide with the growing anxiety in India about Chinese design of expansion. China Pictorial magazine published a map in July 1958 denoting large chunks of Indian and Bhutanese territories. This posed a threat to territorial integrity of not only Bhutan but India too. The revolt in Tibet of 1959 increased the tension already developing and reports of Chinese troop movement on the border therefore caused great concern to India. The Government of India seemed to take action, not only to safeguard its own security interests but also for Bhutan as per treaty of 1949.

On 28 August 1959, Nehru declared in the Lok Sabha that:

The Government of India is responsible for the protection of the borders of Sikkim and Bhutan and of the territorial integrity of these two states and any aggression against

71. Nehru, _n.4_, p.15.
Bhutan and Sikkim will be considered as aggression against India.

Nehru, on 7 September 1959 presented a White Paper before both the Houses of Parliament which included a note drawing attention of China to the differences of China's boundary as shown in the July 1958 edition of the China Pictorial magazine, not only against India but also Bhutan. The White Paper also disclosed other protests lodged by India on behalf of Bhutan which contained the violation of jurisdiction by Chinese authorities over Tibet region and the ill-treatment with Bhutanese nationals.

Referring to the boundary, Premier Chou-En-Lai, on 8 September 1959, replied that "this question does not fall within the scope of our present discussion". Further he stated that:

China is willing to live together in friendship with Sikkim and Bhutan, without committing aggression against each other, and has always respected the proper relations between them and India.


Nehru pursued the matter in a letter dated 26 September 1959, seeking clarification and rectification. He said:

It is not clear to us what exactly is the implication of your statement that the boundaries of Sikkim and Bhutan do not fall within the scope of the present discussion. Indeed, Chinese maps show sizeable areas of Bhutan as part of Tibet. Under treaty relationships with Bhutan, the Government of India is the only competent authority to take up with other Governments matters concerning Bhutan’s external relations. ... The rectification of errors in Chinese maps regarding the boundary of Bhutan with Tibet is therefore a matter which has to be discussed along with the boundary of India with the Tibet region of China in the same sector.  

In fact, it was the Tibet revolt (Khampas Revolt) in 1959 and its aftermath which opened the eyes of the King of Bhutan to the realities of the Chinese menace. Realizing that China might achieve through pressure diplomacy and infiltration from the side of Tibet what it had failed through peaceful diplomacy, Bhutan sealed its borders with Tibet in 1960. Consequently, all trade contracts came to an end putting serious economic strains on Bhutan. And the occupation of about 300 square miles of Bhutan territory by China had brought home to Bhutan the realization of its insecure situation. That it had shown a sympathetic attitude towards the Tibetan

75 Ibid., p. 41.
76 Kohli, n.68, pp. 166-67
refugees merely to appease China. The overall effect of this threat, however, was that Bhutan became closer to India. The King Jigme Wangchuk decided to rely almost exclusively upon India's help and assistance. This decision of Bhutan's King was helpful to India also because India was being secured from the side of north-eastern borders.

China continued to follow its two pronged diplomacy in Bhutan with a view to bringing Bhutan out of closeness and intimacy with India. In 1961, China made an offer of assistance to Bhutan for its economic development which was turned down by then Maharaja of the Kingdom. Side by side China continued its subversive activities in Bhutan to pressurize it to open direct negotiations with the Chinese authorities. But China failed to wean Bhutan away from India.

Against the background of such Chinese threat there were meetings between Nehru and the King of Bhutan in February 1961 which led to long ranging security arrangements. India provided its full economic and military assistance to Bhutan which made it to secure its north-east frontier.

China, during the 1962 Sino-Indian War, had been

77. V.H. Coelho, Sikkim and Bhutan, (New Delhi), 1969, p. 78.
willing to accord Bhutan and violated the Bhutanese air-space.\textsuperscript{79} India lodged a protest against the action of Chinese Government because the sovereignty of Bhutan was threatened. China denied the charges declaring that Indian Government had invented the lie about so-called violations and it might be considered an attempt to break the friendly relations between China and Bhutan.\textsuperscript{80} That this attitude was motivated more by a mischievous intent to cause India suspicion and concern than from a genuine respect for Bhutan's status.

Thus we see that the treaty of 1949 provided for free trade between the two countries. India had been providing facilities for the carriage by land and water, of Bhutan's production. Further, India had given Bhutan the right to use Indian forest roads in the border areas. Bhutan was free to import, through India, what ever arms and ammunition and machinery were needed for the defence and welfare of the Kingdom. India's such assistance to Bhutan enabled it to protect its north-eastern borders.

Before independence, India was secured from the side of its northern border as so long as British control over Tibet was concerned. After independence, Tibet remained a buffer between India and China. But with the

\textsuperscript{79} The Times of India (New Delhi), 4-5 December 1962. 
\textsuperscript{80} Ibid., 25 December 1962, See also note given by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Peking, to the Embassy of India in China, 24 December 1962.
emergence of People's Republic of China as a powerful state and its occupation of Tibet, the latter ceased to serve the role of a buffer. And ultimately an independent India could not adopt the same stance with regard to Tibet. Indo-Nepalese relations assumed even greater significance from the point of view of India's defence and security. The threat to India's security became real because the Himalayas on the north of Nepal could be penetrated at quite a few places, particularly the Nara Pass, the Kodari Pass and the Kuti Pass, in Nepal. 81

Despite its small size Nepal's strategic location has made it an important buffer state between India and China. And in this respect, Nepal occupies an important strategic position in India's northern security system.

Nehru adopted a strategy of good neighbourliness through Nepal for the protection of India's northern border. He regarded Nepal as an essential part of India's security environment. He did recognize Nepal's independence but at the same time wished that no inimical power should interfere in the Nepalese affairs as it would jeopardise India's security. He, therefore, evolved a theory of India's "special relationship" with Nepal.

Nehru's policy towards Nepal was governed by the emergence of People's Republic of China. His basic idea

was that it would not be in India's long-term interest to adopt a confrontation with China because at that time India did not have sufficient military power to fight against Pakistan and China simultaneously. Therefore, Nehru adopted a policy of friendship with China and thereby maintained peace and prosperity in the Himalayan region.

Maintenance of a close or special relationship with Nepal became cardinal objective of India's foreign policy from the point of view of its own security and power position. Referring to India's interests in Nepal Jawaharlal Nehru said in the Lok Sabha on 6 December 1950 that:

Apart from our sympathetic interest in Nepal, we are also interested in the security of our own country. From time immemorial, the Himalayas have provided us with a magnificent frontier. Of course, they are no longer as impassable as they used to be, but are still fairly effective. We cannot allow that barrier to be penetrated because it is also the principal barrier to India. Therefore, much as we appreciate the independence of Nepal, we cannot allow anything to go wrong in Nepal or permit that barrier to be crossed or weakened because that would also be a risk to our security.62

He further said:

Frankly we do not like and shall not brook any foreign interference in Nepal. We recognize Nepal as an independent country and wish her

well, but even a child knows that one cannot go to Nepal without passing through India. Therefore, no other country can have as intimate a relationship with Nepal as ours.\textsuperscript{83}

The emergence of China in 1949 on the north of Nepal changed the entire course of politics in the Himalayan region. China soon claimed its territorial occupation on Tibet as well as Sikkim, Bhutan and Nepal. These developments prompted India to take interest in Nepal in order to make it an open frontier to be secured. India, therefore, evolved a policy towards Nepal to safeguard its basic interests in the Kingdom.

The first step taken in this regard by India was the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship with Nepal on 31 July 1950. The treaty specifically provided that "neither government shall tolerate any threat to the security of the other by a foreign aggression" and enjoined upon them to "consult each other and devise effective counter measures" in case of any such threat. The treaty also provided that Nepal would consult India before importing any war equipment from any country other than India but gave the right to Nepal after such consultation, or warlike material and equipment necessary for the security of Nepal.\textsuperscript{84}

Thus the treaty recognised each other's

\begin{footnotes}{83}Ibid.\end{footnotes}

\begin{footnotes}{84}Text of Treaty in S.D. Muni, Foreign Policy of Nepal, National Publishing House, New Delhi, 1971, pp. 283-85.\end{footnotes}
sovereignty and independence, that the two countries agreed to mutual consultations on matters relating to each other's national security. Obligations for mutual consultation in matters of each other's security were further emphasized in letters exchanged at the time when treaty was concluded. In the wake of this treaty, India established 17 checkpoints to watch the passes between Tibet and Nepal and Bhutan manned jointly by Indian and Nepalese personnel. An Indian Military Mission was also set up in Kathmandu for the organisation and training of the Nepalese army.

The special relationship between India and Nepal was further strengthened by the signing of a separate Treaty of Trade and Commerce on the same day (31 July 1950). The treaty acknowledged Nepal's "full and unrestricted right of commercial transit of all goods and manufactures through the territory and ports of India" from third countries without the payment of any duty. The treaty also provided for fixing the same level of duties by both on imports from third countries.

Jawaharlal Nehru was very firmly convinced that Nepal being a buffer state between India and China, must enjoy its sovereignty and independence. The Treaty of Peace and Friendship acknowledged the complete sovereignty,

85. For the Text of the Treaty See A.S.Bhasin, (ed.)Documents on Nepal Relations with India, New Delhi, 1970, p. 23. See also V.P.Dutt, India's Foreign Policy, Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, 1984, p 186.
86. S.D. Muni, n.84, pp. 286-87.
territorial integrity and independence of Nepal. Nehru was not only confined to security arrangements with Nepal but he was fully aware of the danger of the Maoist expansionism and the political developments of Nepal. Nehru felt that to ensure stability in the Himalayan region it was necessary to take keen interest in the political developments of Nepal.

Since India believed that stability could be ensured in Nepal only through a political system more responsible to the nation and to the people. Indian leader, Jawaharlal Nehru tried to establish a more democratic system by supporting the anti-Rana forces. Nehru's bold and decisive initiative during the democratic movement of Nepal in 1950 proved fruitful in bringing about a change in the political system of Nepal, thereby turning it into a bastion of India's northern security environment or system. 87

The years following political resolution in Nepal proved best for cordial relations between the two countries. Nepalese ruling elite looked towards India for guidance in both internal and external affairs. Thus India maintained its position in Nepal by reaching a political understanding with China over Nepal and Tibet. India also made efforts to further bring Nepal into close relations with it and put the defence and foreign policies of the two countries on a more formal basis. The two countries remained

close to each other and coordinated their foreign and defence policies.  

In 1955, some new developments occurred in Nepal which had an impact on Indo-Nepalese relations. The most important developments were the passing away of King Tribhuvan and the accession of King Mahendra to the Nepalese throne which brought about a substantive changes in the attitudes of the Palace and added certain new dimension to the politics of Nepal. King Mahendra did not act like his father and soon came under the influence of anti-Indian feelings. He started moving away from India. He made short shrift of Parliamentary system, took over all power in his own hands, and instituted so-called National Panchayat to give legitimacy to his rule.

These developments in Nepal caused great concern in India and Nehru could not provide his help for the King because his Panchayat system was a setback to democracy. This attitude of Nehru towards the Kingdom agitated the King and his supporters which led to a phase of suspicious relationship.

India's dilemma was that it was frightened of Chinese influence in Nepal. Thus New Delhi tried to face the situation with astute diplomacy. On the one hand, Nehru

88. Ibid.  
89. V.P. Dutt, n. 85, p. 188.  
90. Ibid.
tried his best to cultivate friendly relations with China to maintain peace in the entire region and on the other hand tried to impress upon the King that only a Government which had a popular mandate could bring political stability and accelerate economic developments of the country.

With Indian diplomacy, negotiations for normalization was initiated in August 1955, Nepal and China agreed to open their diplomatic relations with India. Again, under the sponsorship of India, Nepal was admitted to the United Nations at the end of 1955. Both these events were bound to enhance Nepal's status as an independent nation and encourage it to pursue a path independent of Indian influence. King Mahendra sent a message to Nehru which stated his feelings on China's admission to United Nations. He expressed his feelings as: "I am convinced that our presence in the United Nations, side by side with India, will enhance the scope of the cooperation between India and Nepal and further strengthen the close relations established between our two countries".

The rise of Chinese power in Tibet and Nepal's friendship with China qualitatively altered the situation for India. King Mahendra depended more on China for economic assistance and reduced India's influence in

91. See Appadorai, n. 31, p. 164. The agreement was signed in New Delhi and Ambassadors of both countries posted at New Delhi were also accredited to Peking and Kathmandu respectively.

Nepal. Beijing used the opportunity to play the game and encouraged anti-Indian sentiments. It also gave concession on a border treaty while obtaining the right to build the Kathmandu-Kodari road, that gave the Chinese their chance of implanting strategic presence in Nepal and cast themselves as a protector of Nepal's territory and independence. The King made a bid to be regarded as a champion and spokesman of Nepalese nationalism supporting anti-Indian elements in the Kingdom and gave an impression that it was playing China vis-a-vis India.

Meanwhile, the election in Nepal were held in 1959, and the Parliamentary democracy was formed. This was indeed a remarkable achievement of Indian diplomacy. The political developments in Nepal made it possible for the Indian Government to face the situation with confidence. New Delhi found the political system and the leadership closer to its ideology. This development proved helpful to India in creating and safeguarding its basic interests in Nepal.

India's prime concern with its security interests in the context of increasing tension in Sino-Indian relation, however, led to a great deal of misunderstanding between India and Nepal. It was only due to Nepalese psyche which was trying to move away from Indian

94. Ramakant and Dharamdasani, p. 87, p. 220.
influence in order to take an independent stand for its vested interests. Nehru's visit to Kathmandu in June 1959, was regarded with some special significance relating to the Tibetan affairs including the flight of the Dalai Lama to India three months ago. It was reported that discussions had made in terms of the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship for joint security arrangements. It was stated that the Governments would consult each other and devise effective counter-measures in the event of a threat to the integrity of Nepal.

Nehru once again asserted India's special position in Nepal by repeating and reminding the clauses of the Treaty of 1950. He even observed in the Lok Sabha on 27 November 1959 that:

May I just say this to repeat what we have said previously, that any aggression on Bhutan or Nepal would be considered by us as aggression on India. I know very well what all this involves. ... What I am saying, it is very grave responsibility. But realizing all this and thinking it out, we said so long ago, and now I want to repeat it, because not only wider considerations of India's security.

It was a warning to Peking to keep their hands off Nepal and a reminder to Nepal Kingdom of its treaty obligations. The Nepalese Prime Minister B.P.

Koirala did not contradict Nehru's statement and observed making a statement on 29 November 1959 that:

I take, Mr. Nehru's statement as an expression of friendship that in case of aggression against Nepal, India would send help, if such help is ever sought. 97

B.P. Koirala visited India in January 1960. Following his visit, a Press Communiqué was issued on 28 January 1960 in which it was stated that "Nepal and India have a vital interest in each other's freedom, integrity, security and progress and agreed that the two Governments should maintain close consultation in matters of common interest". 98

In 1960, certain bold decisions were taken which renewed India's apprehensions regarding its relations with Nepal. For instance, Nepal signed a Treaty of Peace and Friendship with China in April 1960, when Chou-En-Lai visited Kathmandu. 99 India was disturbed due to the failure of democracy in Nepal, when the King by a Proclamation dismissed the Koirala Government on 15 December. Constitutional provisions like fundamental rights were suspended and the King assumed full powers. 100 Under this new leadership, India could not maintain its close relationship with Nepal.

99. Appadorai, p. 31, p. 165
100. Ibid., pp. 165-66.
The proclamation, however, brought no new commitments in foreign policy. Nepal’s desire to strike an independent course of action as reflected in the conduct of its foreign affairs was evident. A major step in this direction was its friendly overtures towards Pakistan, and move for closer ties with China.

India took all these developments seriously because of its security interests and the investments made in Nepal. The Sino-Nepalese Boundary Agreement signed on 5 October 1961 and the Sino-Nepalese Agreement regarding road construction from Lhasa to Kathmandu, concluded on 16 October 1961, caused concern to India because it was an open hostility towards India.

However, the visit of King Mahendra to New Delhi in April 1962 provided an opportunity for both the countries to make fresh attempts to improve the deteriorating state of relations. It was also acknowledged that mutual interests could not be served by the suspicion against each other. Thus the Joint Communique, issued on 23 April, which recognized that “both India and Nepal have a vital interest in each other’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity and reaffirmed their intention to consult together on appropriate measures of mutual assistance at the request of either party.”

102. Appadorai, __, p.166.
however, succeeded in asserting his position due to the eruption of Sino-Indian conflict of 1962, which made India hurriedly retrace its steps.

The Sino-Indian conflict of 1962 made the situation more delicate and difficult for India. Nepal played a neutral role in the conflict and not condemned China's action. After the conflict, process of readjustment started between the two countries. India now decided not to exercise its influence to change or support the Congress Workers for establishment of democratic political system in Nepal. India also extended more and more economic assistance to Nepal in the hope that it would keep the Royal regime satisfied and favourably disposed.

In short, we can say that India's primary objective in Nepal is strategic. India needs Nepal as a dependable neighbour for its security and defence purposes particularly in the Himalayan region. Nepal's objectives towards India being extremely involved, Indo-Nepalese relations are highly complex giving rise to occasional differences. Despite the differences, efforts have been made to resolve such differences. India has taken several steps to assure Nepal of its good neighbourliness.