CONCLUSIONS
CONCLUSIONS

India's foreign policy action since the beginning of its independence shows that India has always been concerned about three kinds of threats to its security. A threat from the politics of the Cold War, a threat from the side of Pakistan and a threat from the side of People's Republic of China. The first major threat to India's security during Nehru era came from the politics of the Cold War. For newly independent India, preservation of independence and its use both in thought and behaviour was the main goal of its foreign policy because the Cold War between the East and the West threatened to take away India's independence in foreign affairs. The choice before India was either to join any power bloc or adopt an independent non-aligned policy. The policy of alignment was ruled out because India did not want to give up its right to judge issues on merit or more so within the framework of its national interest. For Nehru, non-alignment was the healthy foreign policy strategy to maintain independence in foreign affairs and to protect the security of the country.

The second threat to India's security has been from the side of Pakistan. Pakistan is strategically situated in the Indian sub-continent. Its geo-strategic location looms large on India's security horizon, and one aspect of India's foreign policy since 1947 has been its relationship with Pakistan. Kashmir has been a major
security issue for India, more particularly after its tribal invasion of 1947-48. Kashmir is situated in the north-west of Indian sub-continent; and it adjoins both India and Pakistan. Kashmir's strategic location also flanked by China, the former Soviet Union (Russia) and Afghanistan, speaks volumes about its importance to India's as well as Pakistan's security. India, therefore, from the beginning of independence, was very much interested in the decision of Kashmir's accession in its favour. Nehru verily emphasised the importance of Kashmir for India's defence and security when he said in the Constituent Assembly on 25 November 1947 that India was very much interested in the decision that state would take. Kashmir because of its common frontiers with China, Russia and Afghanistan is intimately connected with the security and 'International Contact' of India.

The contending claims of India and Pakistan for Kashmir resulted in a situation where Kashmir came to occupy a unique position in the sub-continental balance of power. India argued that the accession of Kashmir to the Indian Union was irrevocable and thus the status quo is to be maintained. Pakistan on the other hand has made different attempts to alter the status quo by reiterating its support for the self determination of the Kashmiri people. The nature of Pakistani threat to India's security has to be seen against India's power position in the region. Pakistan joined Western alliances such as
SEATO and CENTO and entered into bilateral military pact with USA in order to make itself stronger against India and to solve Kashmir dispute from the position of strength.

Kashmir's geo-strategic importance coupled with the perception that western support to Pakistan in the United Nations would pose a grave threat to India's security led Nehru to devise a strategy to prevent any Indo-Pak conflict in the future. For this purpose, he proposed a no-war pact with Pakistan in 1949, but the offer was rejected by the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaqat Ali Khan on the ground that Pakistan would not sign such an agreement unless the Kashmir problem was resolved, and thereby Pakistan wanted to retain the military option to solve the Kashmir problem.

The flow of massive military aid to Pakistan by USA and its alliances presented a serious threat to India's security and its territorial integrity particularly in Kashmir. It became a serious challenge to the policy of non-alignment and its creditability for the protection of its borders. It compelled India to divert its resources into defence production and preparedness. Not only this but the persistent conflict with Pakistan, which raised for India, the frightful begony on two fronts forced it to seek Soviet support to strengthen its position.

The Pakistani threat in the post 1962 period
revealed itself in military and politico-strategic forms. Pakistan signed boundary agreement with China and collaborated with latter against India with wars with India in 1965 and 1971. After the birth of Bangladesh, Pakistan made various attempts (in mid 70's) to make a nuclear bomb which once again heightened India's threat perception from the side of Pakistan. After the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Pakistan became a "front line state" and received massive arms assistance from USA and China. This arms assistance to Pakistan during the period of first half of the 80's posed serious challenges to India's security. Pakistan by providing support to Nepal's proposal of 'Zone of Peace', and by declaring South Asia as 'Nuclear Weapons Free Zone', tried to hide its own nuclear programme from being inspected by world nations. Pakistan in the first half of 90's declared itself as a nuclear power and also intensified militancy in India by supporting and providing arms and ammunitions to the militants of Punjab and Kashmir. All these developments caused serious concern to India regarding its security, territorial integrity and peace of the region.

Indian response to the Pakistani threat has a mixed success in the 60's and an unequivocal one in 1971. The war of 1971 with Pakistan was a marked success for India. The main objective of India's decision makers was to pave the way for a smooth and peaceful settlement of the disputes between the two countries. After the war
India emerged as a pre-eminent power in South Asia. The Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace and Friendship strengthened India's defence position. The creation of Bangladesh became a strategic asset for India's north-eastern security. India did its best to utilise the opportunity in shaping the sub-continental balance of power in its favour. A general improvement in India's security environment was seen following the Simla Agreement (1972), Tripartite Agreement (1973), Kashmir Accord, India's nuclear explosion of 1974 and the Sino-Indian normalisation. The challenges from Pakistan's rearmament and nuclear programme was met both diplomatically as well as indigenous defence preparedness.

Next to Pakistan, China has been a major source of threat to India's security since 1949. The occupation of Tibet by China in 1950; its claim of a large chunks of Indian territory in 1953 and its aggression of 1962 posed a serious threat to India's security as well as its policy of non-alignment.

Chinese threat since 1962 has been of three dimensions: (a) the military strategic threat including the nuclear threat that impressed itself upon India after 1964; (b) threat to India's status, its power and influence in South Asia and South-east Asia; (c) the threat resulting from China's support to the anti-India movements in India's small neighbouring states like Bhutan.
and Nepal and also insurgencies movement in North-eastern India. Chinese support to insurgencies was the highest in the 60's. China also became a source of military-strategic threat by its building up of a network of roads (Karakoram Highways) and communication system in the Sinkiang region; its strategic collusion with Pakistan; its growing defence strength and placing of missiles in Tibet in 1988-89.

India's wars with China and Pakistan in 1962 and 1965 and Chinese nuclear explosion of 1964 made India more conscious of its defence and security. India's decision makers laid equal stress on diplomatic and defence preparedness. Defence preparedness was materialised in the form of MIG deal with the former Soviet Union, the commencement of the defence plan and the subsequent growth in India's armed forces. This defence preparedness made India to come close to the former Soviet Union. India discussed its boundary dispute with China in the context of Colombo proposals and also initiated boundary talks with China in the mid 80's. Boundary talks with China further improved the security environment of India.

The strategic environment marked a definite improvement when India signed the Friendship Treaty with the former Soviet Union in August 1971. The treaty provided India strategic reassurance at a time when Sino-US support to Pakistan was most dangerous to India's
security. All the more India emerged as a pre-eminent power in the region. India's strategic environment became strong when it exploded nuclear device in 1974 and Sikkim became a state of Indian Union in 1975. Much of the sting of Chinese-supported insurgency in North-east India was taken out with the creation of Arunachal Pradesh, the Shillong Accord and the announcement by Laldenga that Mizoram was an integral part of India and that the Mizo National Front would accept a settlement within the framework of the Indian Constitution. The Chinese challenge to India's interest at the South-Asian level was sought to meet by upgrading the economic relations with the countries of the regions. India tried to prevent the Asian balance of power from tilting in China's favour. India, somehow, adopted the deliberate policy of friendship and good neighbourliness with the countries of South-Asian region.

Bhutan and Nepal because of their geo-strategic location are important for India for the protection of its security. Therefore, India's relations with these states have occupied an important place in its security calculations. But India's intimate relations with these states were jeopardised after the emergence of Communist regime in China.

The Chinese occupation of Tibet in 1950 cast a
dark shadow over Indo-Chinese relations. Consequently, India took certain steps to strengthen its political and strategic position in the Himalayas. The conclusion of Peace and Friendship Treaties with Bhutan in 1949 and with Nepal in 1950, and a protectorate treaty with Sikkim in 1950, strengthened India's strategic environment in the Himalayan region. These treaties have established "special relations" with Bhutan and Nepal and ensured the security of India from the side of China.

Chinese policy towards the Himalayan kingdoms of Bhutan and Nepal has been a clear indication of its intention to wean these states away from India's influence. China pursued its two pronged diplomacy in Bhutan with view to bringing it out of closeness and intimacy with India. China offered economic aid to Bhutan in 1961 which was turned down by the King Jigme Wangchuk. Chinese claim on Bhutanese territory and also its subversive activities caused great concern to both India and Bhutan about their respective borders. It was against the background of a common threat to India and Bhutan that Nehru and the King Jigme Wangchuk met in February 1961 and India decided to provide large scale military and economic assistance to Bhutan for its defences and for the protection of its own north-eastern frontier.

There was no major strains on India's security
arrangement with Bhutan before 1962, however, the Chinese factor caused a lot of strains in the relationship between the two countries. In the evolution of Bhutan's foreign policy the Sino-Indian conflict worked as a catalyst. Bhutan like Nepal could not follow equidistance policy with India vis-a-vis China. Bhutanese King accepted 'Indian Advisor' to regulate the country's foreign affairs. When Lhendup Dorji became the Prime Minister of Bhutan, he came under the influence of China and top army officials and people of Royal Bhutan were engaged in anti-india campaign. Thus India's vital interests were jeopardised in the Himalayan kingdom. India adopted the policy of appeasement towards Bhutan in order to protect its security interests in the kingdom. After Indo-Pak conflict of 1965, both India and Bhutan accepted the presence of Indian army in the country. India reiterated its support to Thimpu and chased away the Chinese invaders in 1966 from Bhutan. This event compelled Bhutan to realize its special relationship with India.

After the death of King Jigme Wa'gchuk some irritants were seen in the bilateral relations of the two countries in the early 70's and 80's. Bhutan's membership of the UNO led to its quest for a new role in foreign affairs which was articulated in a demand for a change in the treaty of 1949. Bhutan during 1973-74 moved towards China to become self-reliance in its economy. The merger of Sikkim with India and India's nuclear explosion further
caused considerable anxiety in Bhutan about India’s intention.

Bhutan’s independent stand on Kampuchean issue (1979); its assertion to play an independent role in foreign affairs, its demand to update the treaty of 1949; its close relations with Bangladesh; its stand on the question of declaring South Asia as a nuclear weapons free zone and its support to Pakistan on this question have been major cause of tension between the two countries. During the mid 80’s Bhutan and Nepal tried to move away from India’s influence and came under the considerable influence of China. These states were advised by China to group together as a bulwark against India.

However, India’s policy towards Bhutan has been friendly. India signed trade pact with Bhutan in 1972 and in 1978 respectively. India did its best to improve its relationship with Bhutan and for that it provided economic and military assistance to that country. India also encouraged and supported Drukpas-Nepalese marriages to settle the ethnic issue in Bhutan and to weaken the growing Gorkha’s movement in Darjeeling Hill area.

The opening of Bhutan-China boundary talk in 1985 was an important event for India because of its direct impact on India’s security environment. India, therefore, played a key role in the resolution of the problem and also opened an observation post in the
Sumdorong Chu area and altered the status quo in its favour.

Thus India's main objective in Bhutan has been to deter the Chinese influence in the kingdom. The danger of Chinese presence in Bhutan looms large in India's security concern. The growing relationship between China, Bangladesh and the strategic significance of the narrow Silliguri Corridor for uninterrupted links with North-eastern India has made Bhutan a prime security concern to India. Thus a survey of Indo-Bhutanese relationship shows that Bhutan has not so far posed any serious challenge to India's security and its strategic planning and the relationship between the two countries has remained friendly on the basis of mutual trust and good neighbourliness.

Since the Chinese occupation of Tibet (1950) Indo-Nepalese relations assumed greater significance from the point of view of India's defence and security. The threat to India's security became real because of the Nara Pass, the Kodari Pass and the Kuti Pass were endangered. Its strategic location has made it a buffer state between India and China and it occupies an important strategic position in India's northern security system. To ensure security in the Himalayan region, Nehru took keen interest in the political developments of Nepal and supported anti-Rana forces to established a democratic system in
But King Mahendra’s declaration of National Panchayat caused great concern in India because it was a setback to democracy in Nepal. Nehru tried to impress the king that only a democratic system in Nepal could bring political stability in the kingdom.

In the 60’s and 70’s some irritants were seen in the bilateral relations of the two countries. As for instance, Nepal’s assertion of its independent role in foreign affairs; its neutral role in Sino-Indian Conflict of 1962; its construction of Kathmandu-Kodari road; its reluctance to Gorkha recruitment in Indian army, the dismissal of Koirala government; its close ties with China; and its demand for separate trade and transit treaties; and transit facilities through Radhikapur route; its demand for the withdrawal of Indian Military Liaison Group from kathmandu; its open condemnation of the liberation of Bangladesh, India’s nuclear explosion of 1974 and the integration of Sikkim in Indian Union in 1975. During the period of early 80’s, King Birendredra’s call for a National Referendum on his National Panchayat, and the Sino-Us support to Nepal’s proposal of Zone of Peace further deteriorated the relationship between the two countries. Sino-Nepalese support to Gorkha movement for a separate state in Darjeeling Hill area, and Nepal’s import of sophisticated weapons from China (in 1988) further caused anxiety and fear among Indian policy makers regarding the defence of the country and the protection of
its vital interests in the Himalayan region.

After the Chinese aggression, process of readjustment started between the two countries. India decided not to support the Congress workers for the establishment of democratic system in Nepal and provided more and more economic assistance to Nepal in order to keep the kingdom under its influence. India adopted the policy of appeasement towards Nepal and restored the good will that was eroded during 1962. India began to act as "big brother" in the affairs of Nepal. There were exchange of visits and mutual consultations between the leaders of the two countries on the matter of vital interests.

However, after Nepal's neutral role in the Indo-Pak conflict of 1965, it was realized that Nepal could not be depended upon to stand by India in the event of conflict either with China or Pakistan. Therefore, Mrs. Indira Gandhi followed the policy of her predecessors towards Nepal and considerable importance was given to the continuing good will with that country. India's Military Liaison was withdrawn from Kathmandu and India signed agreements to construct a road from Thapa to Janakpur along the Southern Terai and for a joint project over the Kosi river. These agreements were beneficial to both the countries.

The emergence of Bangladesh and India's power position in the region required better rapport between
India and Nepal. India was opposed to any change in Nepalese policy regarding the recruitment of Gorkhas in Indian army. India did cast doubts on Nepal's proposal of zone of peace because it felt that accepting Nepal as a zone of peace would endanger India's security and also weaken India's opposition to Pakistan's plea for declaring south Asia as Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. When the Janata Government came to power it also rejected Nepal's proposal of Zone of Peace because it was viewed against the spirit of Indo-Nepalese Treaty of 1950. The Janata Government concluded trade and transit treaty with Nepal in 1978 and advised the King that the best way of dealing with naxalites and other extremist elements was to restore democratic freedom as far as possible in Nepal and to devote greater attention to the economic upliftment of the Nepalese.

Nepal has diplomatic relations with most of the countries and follows an independent foreign policy. Nepal during the Indo-Pak conflict of 1971 exploited the situation to maximise its manoeuvrability and autonomy. However, both India and Nepal after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan came close to each other because at that time the security of the two countries was threatened from the side of China. The two countries also solved their problems on bilateral basis. But within a short period the relations between the two countries were strained. India strongly condemned Nepal's support to
Gorkha movement and its import of arms from China because these moves were against the Indo-Nepalese treaties of 1950 and 1965.

The impasse in Indo-Nepalese relations came to an end after the conclusion of a treaty for trade between the two countries in June 1990. The relations between the two countries were further improved when they concluded agreements on Tanakpur hydel project in 1992. The two sides also agreed to contain terrorism in the region. Manmohan Adhikari during his election campaign has declared that he would review and change the Indo-Nepalese treaty of 1950 but after assuming the office of the Prime Minister of Nepal he did not make any change in the existing relations between the two countries. He emphasised the importance of the treaty and said that "Indo-Nepalese Treaty of 1950 will not be abrogated". Indian Prime Minister, Narasimha Rao too stressed the importance of Tanakpur project in their mutual relationship. During his visit to New Delhi in April 1995, Manmohan Adhikari assured the Government of India that Nepal would abide by the treaty of 1950 and safeguard the needs of India's security.

In short, India has been strongly opposed to Chinese presence in Bhutan and Nepal. India has taken keen interest in the democratic reforms and developmental plans of these countries. It has provided economic assistance to these countries to keep them away from the Chinese
influence. India's attitude towards these landlocked states has been based on stable, reliable and lasting friendship rather than displaying any discontent to each other.