CHAPTER - II

SUPER POWERS

AND

SOUTH ASIA
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(a) American Interests in South Asia

The geo-strategic location of South Asian sub-continent between the two distinct but of serious significance regions of West Asia and South-East Asia, has figured as decisive factors in America's foreign policy calculations. The South Asian region has, consequently been a collateral factor in this regard. However, the primary objective motivating American involvement in South Asia has been the power politics among the big powers, especially their rivalry with the Soviet's Twenty four year earlier Olaf Caroe, the British scholar, said,

"It will not be denied that of the region of the globe where there is confrontation between totalitarian and free worlds, the largest in area and the most populous is in Asia not in Europe. The absorption of South Asia in totalitarian system would lay Africa open to further pressure and confine evolutionary political systems to the peninsula of Europe and of North America. This would be true whether the tide Swept it, from China, or from Russia, or from both. The main forces of these pressures may fall not so much on the wings not, that is on South East Asia or the Middle East but on the central position, the sub-continent of India and Pakistan. The sub-continent is in a very real sense the centre of the free world".

The US media and leaders continued to court India as a potential counter poise to China till the Korean war and its aftermath disabused them on account of Nehru's neutral stance. This became evident in the affairs of the Japanese Peace

United States Collective Defense Arrangements
Treaty in 1951 in which India joined Soviet Union while Pakistan, not only signed the Treaty but, gave it an absolute support. Traditional US interest in the affairs of South Asia limited, with active American involvement in Asia largely restricted to the pacific region countries notably China, Japan and Philippine. There was very little awareness of the Pakistan movement. Roosevelt-Churchill correspondence reveals how ignorant US leaders were about the demands and strength of Muslim League. Since, in the word of Churchill his mind was back in the American war of independence and he thought of the Indian in the American war of independence and Indian problems in terms of the thirteen colonies fighting George III. Emmanuel Celler, a US Congress representative called Nehru "almost a saint to uncounted millions, while Celler introduced a revolution to erect a monument to his memory and compared him a Moser, Budha, St. Francis of Asia and Abrulium Huicopn.\(^2\)

After the emergence of Cold War, United States tried to design India to contain the communism, but, India not only spurned all US advances, it also acted contrary to United States interest.\(^3\) Paniker remarked that "the US was deliberately opposing India at every stage and was taking an anti-Asian policy.\(^4\)

Following communist success in Vietnam the Western powers decided to establish a collective defence system in South East Asia. A conference at Manila created the South

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4. Ibid.
East Asia collective Defence Treaty (known as SEATO) in which Pakistan was a member. In 1955 Pakistan acceded to Baghdad Pact which was reinforced as central treaty organisation in August 1959. By joining CENTO and SEATO Pakistan had to pay a political price in terms of protests and hostility from communist powers. Though America aimed at encircling the communist world led by the Soviets, as also the Chinese, irrespective of the fact that it served no useful purpose for either Pakistan or America, G.W. Choudhury observed that,

"The military alliances between the America and Pakistan was based on different expectations and aims from the two sides, the America give military aid to Pakistan in the context of its global policy of containing communism, Pakistan considered the whole deal from the angle of its problems of security and defence vis-à-vis India...Pakistan's entry into the American sponsored pacts, both bilateral and multilateral, was mainly due to the desperate urge to improve the balance of power in the sub-continent".1

For much of the post world war II era, American policy towards South Asia was characterised by three major tendencies, the global policy of containment of communism was extended to and applied in South Asia as it was elsewhere, with the key exception that no American military forces were stationed in the region. American aid has been provided in the past 40 years, nearly 22 billion dollars in economic loans and grants in an effort to limit the reach of China and even more the Soviet Union. Pakistan was incorporated into the world wide system of alliance, while India was seen by many Americans as a potential show case of

non-communist development. Secondly, America sought to carry out a policy that promised close American relations both with India and Pakistan. They often ended up with a policy that left them little choice but to choose between friendship with India and Pakistan. And even this less than ideal policy often fell short of the mark, more than once they did enough on Pakistan's behalf to alienate India but, not so much that they could manage to please Pakistan.  

Thirdly, and the most significant aspect of American interest in these countries at best uneven as it was decided more on the basis of need and expediency. The tendency was to ignore South Asia except when local conflict or tension boiled up and forced themselves on to their agenda, America would then engage in some crisis-diplomacy, only to pull back once the crisis has passed. The result was that America was not in a position to do as much as they might have to help prevent crisis or manage them effectively once they did occur.  

The US attitude towards a regional framework of peace and security in South Asia has thus been ambivalent. Conceptually, there can be two possible approaches or models for peace and security in South Asia. One is the traditional balance of power approach, which regarded peace and security to be a function of equilibrium of power in a system that posits the weakness, tempts aggression. The other is the "Organski Model" where the dynamics of peace and security are provided by the preponderance of power in one state.

2. Ibid., pp. 2172-83.  
3. Ibid., pp. 2177-78.  
of the system. The weaker state have either to accept the protection and the diktat of the preponderant power or face the possibility of war, which they cannot hope to win. Thus, an environment conducive to peace and security is automatically created.¹

American interests in the sub-continent can be summed up less in terms of the "Defence of the sub-continent" than as the maintenance of some influence or the prevention of a dominant or exclusive position for the Soviets. India's place in American policy concerns has ranged from relative importance in a benign environment to irrelevance or marginality (if not opposition) in a security dominated one.² In 1970's the American policy with regard to the South Asian region especially India was reflected in statement of the American president Jimmy Carter:

"In global politics, history has casted our country in different roles, the America is one of the so-called "super powers, India is the largest of the non-aligned countries", each of them respecting the other's conception of its international responsibilities and the values which "provide a basis for cooperation in attaching the great global problems of economic justice, human rights and the prevention of war".³

It is for these and related reasons that South Asia have remained an important foreign policy concern for

the Americans. Having alliance relationship with America, Pakistan demonstrated its zeal by defending western attitude and interests at international levels such as Colombo Conference of April 1964 and Asian Conference at Bandung in 1955. However, America did not abandon its interest in retaining a friendly equation with India. Two countries signed a Mutual Defence Assistance Treaty in 1951 which was renewed in 1958 and 1962 which provided that Government of India is prepared to agree to participate effectively in arrangements for individual and collective self defence. The treaty which was not publicised amounted to India's membership of defence alliance. The US gave sufficient economic aid to India which enabled it to divert its own economic resources towards building up its military strength. In October 1962, a turning point came in US policies towards South Asia when an open clash occurred between China and India. The Chinese forces inflicted defeat on Indian troops. On India's demand, US decided to renew military aid to India which continued till 1963-64. In return for this India agreed to the installation of sensitive electronic devices in the Himalayas to monitor China's nuclear and missile programmes. United States, kept Pakistan away from any consultation. This led to change in its foreign policy and took steps to improve relations with Soviet Union and China. As Pakistan improved its relations with China, in the wake of large scale western aid to India, the US interest in Kashmir, visibly cooled


3. Ibid., p. 31.
when Kashmir was debated in the Security Council in 1964, the US representative suggested bilateral negotiations between India and Pakistan. By July 1965 there was talk of doubling aid to India from $435 million to 900 million a year.

1971 - A Crucial Year

The US cordiality towards Pakistan increased as Islamabad emerged in an intermediary for historic approach-ment between Washington and Beijing from 1969 onward. Premier Zhou-Enlai selected Pakistan from among various friends to be the channel for secret contracts between the US and China and it was due to Islamabad that Dr. Henry Kissinger flew to Beijing in July 1971 to plan for Nixon’s visit to China in 1972. The Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971 paved the way to take advantage of the political crisis in East Pakistan and midwife the birth of Bangladesh in December 1971. The break up of the country resulted in the end of martial law regime and under Z.A. Bhutto, Pakistan withdraw from SEATO which was considered meaningless without East Pakistan. However, Pakistan continued membership of CENTO and strengthen her relations with Iran and Turkey. Nixon administration warned India not to act towards its neighbours in a manner that would jeopardise the stability of the region. It did not get much enthusiasm in India and Kissinger, the Secretary of state received a cool reception when he visited India in 1974. The Indian nuclear explosion of 1974 and Emergency declared in 1975 by Mrs. Gandhi made the relations Chill. The change of administration in 1981 brought qualitative change in US attitude and policies towards South Asia. The Regan administration saw the need for a stronger and more active US-Pakistan relationship. The dialogue between US-Pakistan became unusually coordial and productive.
Until 1980 when Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan, Pakistan played a critical role and thereby received a leading position. After 1983 there was an improvement in Indo-US relations. India toned down its anti-American rhetoric and liberalized its economic policies to attract western investment, which continued up to Rajiv Gandhi. Michael Armacost, under secretary of state, has rightly claimed, that the Regan administration had forged close relations with both Pakistan and India. During the period when Afghanistan crisis was at its height, the Regan administration welcomed India’s efforts in Sri Lanka and action in Maldives. US counselled other South Asian regimes to accept India’s paramount role. President Bush also introduced changes and realignments and the differences between his rhetoric before the 1991 Gulf-war and his pronouncements thereafter, were based on different footings. The core alliances of the US being with western Europe and Japan, the other regions involving American interests are its immediate neighbours, Canada and Mexico, with which Washington is forging a free trade area, the Middle East for its oil and Israel’s security, and then the countries of the Pacific rim, now emerging as a major trading zone in the world. These include Korea, China, Australia and the ASEAN countries. Russia and other Republics of the former Union notably those adjoining Eastern Europe form an extension of Europe and Russia alone retains importance as the successor state of the Soviet Union which still possesses enough stockpile of nuclear and conventional weapons which still constitute a threat to American security. The three main components of the Third World namely Latin America which is historic domain of American influence under Monroe Doctrine, Africa, geographically closer than Asia and the South Asia which is the remotest in terms of the distance and is at present of less importance. The trade has declined from 26% to 1%
in recent years.\textsuperscript{1}

The recent US elections have thrown away the Democratic President after twelve years of Republican incumbancy. The US foreign policy has bi-partisan since the second world war. Mr. Clinton with his commitment to change have come with new changes and order. In view of the last democratic administration of Jimmy Carter, it is expected that non-proliferation issues will receive highest value. The pressure will be adopted on India and Pakistan to endorse the N.P.T. Since Pakistan has, already intimated its readiness to join Regional nuclear free arrangements the U.S. administration may centralize in India. The Kashmir issue may again be raised with new approaches. In the words of Narasimha Rao, U.S.-India relationship may rise to the level of cordiality that existed during the Kennedy Presidency in 1950.

The policy of Clinton administration towards South Asia is still not clear. The efforts so far have been akin to those of the six blind men attempting to become familiar with the elephant. Each one received a different impression depending on the issue.\textsuperscript{2} The fact is that there is just no Clinton policy on South Asia and the Clinton administration is taking more time to accomplish the task of resetting agenda. The democrates have been out of power for 12 years and are short of intellectual date base. During his election campaign President Clinton set few principles including non proliferation of nuclear weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, promotion of democracy and human rights, encouragement of unfettered trade and investment

\textsuperscript{1} Regional Studies, vol. XI, No. 1, under 1992-93, p.25.
\textsuperscript{2} Menon, N.C.,"Focus on South Asia", The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, August 7, 1993.
opportunities on a global scale.

The U.S. has great interest in much talked about Indian middle class market of 200 million plus. Clinton administration takes it seriously that South Asia covers an area of 1.3 billion people, one fourth of the mankind and after the end of cold war, a unique opportunity has clicked to Washington to solve all global problems independently.

America's new administration is serious to the South Asian developments and want that internal problems do not jeopardise the South Asian region.  

American Policy Towards India

The crux of the problem that besets the relationship between the two largest democracies of the world, the United States and India, springs from the reality that it is a relationship of unequal stature. In the international hierarchy of power, the United States is an undisputed global power while India is a regional power, but, still uncertain of status because the guardian of the international system has not recognized. There was a phase when US wanted to befriend India for reasons of what one could call idealism on the basis of shared democracy, value, commitment to rule of law etc. India, also sincerely believed that this was indeed the motivation of American policy, but, soon the American commitments to the cold war and the consequential globalization of the American interpretation of its national interest introduced a radical change in the American perspective on the sub-continent, particularly India.

1. The Indian Express, New Delhi, March 16, 1993.
In stark contrast by the 1940's the US and India had friendly relationship. On the eve of India's independence the US President, Harry Trueman sent a telegram to Lord Mountbatten:

"On this memorable occasion, I extend to you, to Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru, and to the people of the dominion of India, the sincere best wishes of the government and the people of USA. We welcome India's new and enhanced status in the world community.... In the years to come the people of this great new nation will find the US a constant friend. I earnestly hope that our friendship in the future as in the past, continues to be expressed in close and fruitful cooperation in international undertakings and in cordiality in our relations one with the other".

US search for a military alliance system to contain China with the sub-continent as the pivot of that system rendered the common democratic values permeating the two internal systems of the US and India less relevant in shaping their mutual relations. India believed that America in befriending Pakistan has projected the primacy of its strategic interests over promoting democratic values. America on the other hand considered that the obligation to contain communism lain on its shoulders and should work for it. US interest in 1950 was thus based upon the criterion of an active strategic presence conched in terms of the defence of democracy. The American decision to build a cold war Maginot Line along the Hindukush and the Western Himalayan Range, meant the cultivation of Pakistan to the detriment of India. During 1950 to mid 1960's Indo-American relations reached a significant level of conflict of interest, though varyingly interpreted by either side.¹

¹ Quoted in A Common Faith: 40 Years of Indo-U.S. Cooperation, 1947-87, New Delhi, 1988, p. 17.
John F. Kennedy's strong sentiments about India were well known. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. puts it "Kennedy was most interested in India, which he had long regarded as "the key area" in Asia. Schlesinger recalls Kennedy's remark in 1959" we want India to win the race with China... If China succeeds and India fails, the economic development, balance of power will shift against US. At the time when US was channelising its efforts towards military strengthening the Afro-Asian nations to meet the assumed threat of international communism, Nehru spoke in terms of establishing a "peace area". Nehru's conceptualization of a "Zone of Peace" strove to keep the cold war out of Asian boundaries. The United States tried to achieve peace through military security, while India tried to secure security through binding, mutual measures of peace.

In December 1956 Vice President Richard Nixon condemned the brand of neutralism that makes no moral distinction between "the communist world and the free world". Nehru opposed it and said "the world can be divided into good and evil" and that "it is not democracy to want all people to think the same way as you do". John F. Kennedy's era of Presidency raised hopes of closer US-Indo relations, but, Washington's criticism of New Delhi action in Goa in 1961 and America's continued Arms supplies to Pakistan undermined Indo-US relations. Sino-India war in 1962 deeply appreciated the action of the US and British government in immediately providing shipments and military


equipment during the immediately after the Chinese attack in October 1962. Though Nehru was happy over their actions his hopes turned into disquiet when US started using India's crisis with China as a lever to force for concessions to Pakistan on Kashmir. Chester Bowles said,

"Pakistan was high, we had attempted to force him to make compromise which the Indian people and the Indian parliament would not possibly accept".¹

By 1966 partly due to Johnson's unsympathetic stance towards India's arms shopping list and partly due to India's rather insensitively harsh attacks against American policy in Vietnam, the Indo-US policy cordiality vanished. By the early 1970's, the situation had changed. Broadly, in 1970s once again became considerably significant for super power impact over the sub-continent. In the spring of 1971, led to the inflow of almost ten million refugees to India and the slaughter of thousands of East Pakistanis at the hands of repressive West Pakistani military rulers. The Nixon administration refused to condemn these developments.² Kissinger too repeatedly warned India that China might not remain aloof from a war in sub-continent and that the US might not give it's support as it had in 1962.³ President Nixon's well known theme "From confrontation to negotiations" resulted in the US standing forth for the role of safeguarding her security interest for long term purposes. The development of SIB technology made it possible for the US to adopt a sea-based deterrence policy. The US has a substantial economic stake in India. K.R. Narayan, former Indian

Ambassador to United expressed the view that the economic and commercial ties that bind our two countries are strong and growing. Douglas S. Rose also observed "the US has a substantial economic stake in India. We are the countries largest trading partner, its leading foreign investor and an important partner in its development programmes."

Even before the end of cold war, the US had taken steps to improve its own perception of India. This was done under the Regan administration. Since India was tilting towards the Soviet Union, the Regan administration desired to wean India away from the Soviet Union and help it to move towards greater autonomy in military arms. Since 1976, the US Congress has taken an increasingly active role in the making and implementing of foreign policy. Its efforts at co-determination indicate the siliency of foreign policy issue to domestic politics in the United States today, but, also reflect legislative discontent with part executive manipulations abroad. The dominant image of India in the United States is of poor, over-populated, inefficient, hot, hungry and harmless land, needing help, but refusing to express gratitude. While acknowledging India as the

"dominant" power in South Asia destined to play a significant role in the region. US policy makers spokesmen disclaim any intention to advocate or support the notion of Indian hegemony. India being considered as ally of the US in the efforts contain and frustrate Islamic fundamentalism. An awareness has developed in Washington of the likely adverse reaction among friendly Islamic countries to any impression that US views Islam as the next "issue" confronting the most or threatening world peace. As Edward P. Djereiia stated in a public address on June 2, 1992, that "Americans recognize Islam "one of the world's great faiths which is practiced on every continent including the US. Acknowledging the role of Islam as a historic civilized force, he mentioned that while countries throughout the Middle East and North Africa were seeking to reform their societies in keeping with Islam ideals, the US did not see any monolithic or coordinated international effort behind these movement'. Further, he declared that American principles encouraging greater openness and responsiveness of political system everywhere, and declared that the US would oppose any extremist philosophy that "practiced terrorism, preached intolerance or violated internationally accepted standards of conduct regarding human rights. 1

When an American scholar wrote a couple of year back could still be the last words of Indo-US relations. He wrote ".... in both the traditional and intermestic areas, the new structure of interest involving US foreign policy will probably have positive effects on US-Indian relations. That relationship is not likely to be too close because there are few central common interests to pull it together but it should be possible to avoid some of the hostilities

of the past. Neither country will be very high on the foreign policy priority list of the other but that should also help keep them off the enemies list". Indo-US relations have now entered a crucial phase of negotiation which will test South Blok's diplomatic skills severely as it seeks to establish an honourable equation with the sole military power determined to police a post cold war world. There were clear discussions between Indian foreign secretary and the US officials on several vital issues during visit to Washington. Washington did not appreciate India's space and missile programme. India's replies were equally blunt, as it reiterated the peaceful nature of these programmes, but the tone and terror of the US administration left no one in doubt here that "the fancing had begun in earnest".1

India's military capabilities and the policy of non-alignment are baffing the think tank of the American administration and the United State. The only super power in the world is anxious to know the purpose of building its military strength after demise of the bipolar world2 and the reason for sticking to its non-alignment policy.

However, United States considered India under US Pacific Command (PACCOM) area of responsibility as one of the emerging power centres in the new multipolar world3 of Europe, US, Japan, Russia and China.4 America

1. The Indian Express, May 2, 1993.
2. The Times of India, New Delhi, March 11, 1991.
3. The Indian Express, New Delhi, January 7, 1993.
considered India as a fast emerging strong U.S. partner. Clinton's administration is adopting two-track policy towards India. It is supportive of Indian economic reforms policies and helpful with loans from International institutions. On the other track, it will continue to pursue relentlessly its agenda to force New Delhi to follow its non-proliferation goals and use human rights as a lever to try to get India to conform to American strategic and political objectives.

American Policy Towards Pakistan

Pakistan-US security relations during last thirty seven years have been based as much on the geostrategic realities and compulsions of both the South and South-West Asian region as on super power globalism after world war II. In a message to Quaid-i-Azam on Independence Day, US President Truman assured Pakistan that the new Dominion embarks on its course with the firm friendship and goodwill of the United States of America. Waltier Lippmann high ranked the US relations and said, "Though Pakistan and America are far a part in space, though they are very different in their ways of life, each has great responsibilities for the peace and welfare of mankind which it can not hope to meet fully without the advice and help of the other." In 1981 a new era in U.S.-Pakistan security relations began as the Reagan administration realised that "some where, somehow, US foreign policy will have to find a way of


2. Ibid.

rewarding friends and penalizing opponents.\footnote{Pakistani to perceived, \textit{"we do believe in the determination of the New US administration to strongly support the independence of Pakistan"}.} Pakistan-US relations have been both cooperative and confident. The surprising thing is that the relationship has survived the stress and the strains it has been through; even during the worst of times, the two governments, no matter who the incumbents were, have managed to retain at least a working relationship.\footnote{The present Pakistan-US relations are revival or reinvigoration of their past ties. The new relationship is an add - cum sales relationship. Though the 1959 bilateral agreement between Pakistan and the United States is still in force. It is not an alliance relationship. This agreement is not binding on Congress and is hostage to public mood in America. The new relationship is also not an "exclusive" relationship. The Washington membership is not the anchor of Pakistan's security as it was in the 1950's. Pakistan's membership and status in the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) and in the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) and its very close relations with China as well as with Muslim neighbours to the west are important components of its security architecture.}

The new US-Pak relationship is more durable and credible than the old one, not only because it is more informal and flexible but because it is based on greater commonality of perceptions and interests. The US never

backed up the Pakistan's arms race and comparison with India. As early as 1951 office of the Intelligence Research, in the report 'Pakistan's current Economic Situation and Prospects' opined as follows:

"Pakistan's main reason for devoting more than a quarter of its budget to defence, and seeking additional US arms is not to protect the country against a Soviet or Chinese attack for which Pakistan's resources will never be sufficient, nor to maintain internal security for which the present military establishment is excessive. Its chief purpose is to bolster Pakistan's position vis-a-vis India. Although every Pakistani increase in military expenditure has been justified in Pakistani eyes by the need to counter Indian military development, it may also be true that the Pakistani Army has developed as a pressure group to the point that regardless to Indian movement. It might continue to have priority over economic development for appropriations. What is required to mobilize Pakistani resources and utilize foreign aid effectively is a government that is strong and stable enough to carry out a consistent development program... and politically skilled enough to reduce its large defence budget by improving relations with India". 1

After 1960 Pakistan came to rely almost exclusively on America for its military hardware. Nearly total Pakistan's combat tanks, much of its artillery, all fighters, bombers, and transport aircraft including supportive equipments, were of American origin. 2 By 1962 America shifted from strategic to political emphasis, implying a


2. Quoted from SIPRI worksheet, the total value of US Military shipment to Pakistan during 62 to 64 at $ 1-5 billion, Stockholm, 1975, p. 122.
departure from a containment of Soviet policy in West Asia, though the American administration retained the containment of China as an essential aspect in their foreign policy.¹ The India-Pakistan war of 1971, revealed the new alignment of international forces in the sub-continent. The Soviet gave diplomatic support to the liberation movement in Bangladesh and were behind India in the war, whereas America and China gave diplomatic support to Pakistan along-with providing necessary military equipment.² The American position after the declaration of cease fire was stated in the official communique of the Sino-American Conference held in Peking in February 1972 as follows:

"The US favour the continuation of the cease fire between India and Pakistan and the withdrawal of all military forces within their own territories and to their own sides of the cease fire line in Jammu and Kashmir, the America supports the right of the people of South Asia to shape their own".

The America-Pakistan strategy of having the substance of a security alliance without it seems to be based upon a programme of preparing the infrastructure of military facilities in Pakistan with American support with a political understanding that such facilities could be made available to America on short notice if and when the situation so demands. Alternatively, Pakistan could perform assigned military tasks, with the help of these facilities and equipment under American guidance to meet necessary contingencies.³ The Americans in pursuance of

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² Shelton Kodiker, op.cit. p. 43-44.
this strategy in the region, have been taking initiatives of providing equipment/stores prepositioning and forwarding deployment in the other pro-American regional countries such as Oman, Egypt and Saudi Arabia etc. The American assurances about "not seeking buses" in Pakistan are often tagged with an exception unless Pakistan asks for them. The main plan of American policy in South Asia is of building and consolidating an anti-Soviet strategic consensus has met with very receptive and responsive ground in Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.

The American support to Pakistan existed widely. Surveying the region early in 1982 Richard Cronin of the Congressional Research Service observed that the US - Pakistan relationship is largely devoid of any sentiment of affection from the Pakistani side. In fact he noted later on, that President Zia attempting to move in a direction (Islamicization) that implicitly rejects many western values. Doubts on the reliability of the US are widespread among supporters and opponents of the regime. As a matter of fact there is considerable doubt as to whether the US has gained anything at/in this shift of policy. Pakistani reactions to American concerns over the threat to their country were quite sophisticated. The Fukuyama report was clearly overstating the case for

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parallel US-Pakistani relations. Writing in the Muslim, Mushahid Hussain, an independent journalist, criticized those in Pakistan who were going overboard on the renewal of the Pakistan-US relations. He called for Pakistan retaining faith in its non-aligned and Islamic block ties. In his view, American policy had come to accept Indian pre-eminence in the South Asian region which would negate all security ties in the event of a future Indo-Pak conflict.

Most of the Pakistani opposition leaders do not see the opportunities provided by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in the manner of the Zia regime. Retired Air Marshal Asgher Khan probably speaks for many Pakistani when he advocates closer Soviet-Pakistani relations as the only method of redressing the security threat to Pakistan. He does not advocate breaking of the Pak-American relations but, argues that a neutralist stance offers more benefits in the present international context than an open identification with the super powers.

There were some differences between America and Pakistan. America showed its anxiety over the question of Terrorism and Narcotics. Washington was keen to check out a more even-handed policy towards South Asia. Having shifted openly towards Pakistan in the past, it tried to right the balance. Though Pakistan was also out of the six countries Cuba, Iran, Libya, Iraq, North Korea, Syria


and Pakistan but, America considered Pakistan differently and weighted all the lapses in the light of its friendship and military partner. The Gary Ackerman house foreign affairs committee expressly warned Pakistan against terrorism but, did not like to designate it as a terrorist state as it would affect a whole range of US interest. and only asked Pakistan to desist from the questionable activities. America did not feel happy over the supply of missiles and missiles technology by Beijing to Pakistan, but, did not like to took it seriously.

**US Arms Sales to Pakistan**

During the period 1954-1965, the U.S. provided military assistance valued at $619 million, (defence support assistance valued at $619 million and cash or commercial based purchases of $55 million) Arms sales were at a peak from 1954 to 1961. As a result during the period 1955-1965 Pakistan was able to forge a credible deterrence against India and Afghanistan.

The terms of US-Pakistan bilateral agreement of March 1957 covered communist aggression only. On the eve of the council meeting in January 1958, Prime Minister Firoze Khan Noon said, that Baghdad Pact should have the same rule as NATO. The main aim of US to provide arms to Pakistan was to keep the Pakistani Army commanders friendly to US rather than to Russians. USA pleaded

1. Ibid.
that, "we are arming Pakistan in order that she may defend herself against Soviet attack".\textsuperscript{1} Substantial amount of modern planes and equipment supplied to Pakistan by US consisted of B-57 Jet-Bombers, F-86 Sabre Jets, F-104 Supersonic Star Fighters, Sidewinder Missiles, Transport planes, helicopters and supporting equipment. USA also supplied Radar for the F-104, M-47 tanks, Anti-tank missiles and C-130 turbo Jets, Cargo planes, F-104 to Pakistan after General Ayub Khan's return from his tour of Washington in 1961.\textsuperscript{2}

After the 1965 Indo-Pak hostilities, Washington formally suspended the supply of arms to both the countries (India-Pakistan). But in case of Pakistan, this policy was suddenly reversed in 1967. America started arms supply to Pakistan on a grant basis.\textsuperscript{3} In 1967 Pakistan turned to China, which agreed to equip three newly raised Pakistani divisions and to provide tanks and MIG-19 Aircraft (renamed F-6) and some fast patrol boats for its Air Force. Pakistan also approached France for Mirages and sub-marines. In 1968 the Soviet Union agreed to offer Pak $ 30 million worth of guns, M-18 helicopters and vehicles and even offered to develop Gwader as a naval base.\textsuperscript{4}

Between 1965 and 1971, Pakistan was not able to obtain significant quantities of modern equipment, largely due to US embargo and lack of funds. The American reluctance until 1972 to supply arms to Pakistan in a big way

\textsuperscript{1} Raw N. 11 p. 100 : Quoted from U.S. Arms to Pakistan : A Study in Alliance Relationship, Devadas B. Lohakeker, p.48.
\textsuperscript{2} Raw N. 11, p. 101.
\textsuperscript{4} Hussain No. 23, p. 4.
had been the result of various factors. USA understood that there was no real danger of any massive supply of American arms to Pak as a guild Pro quo for Islamabad's series in West Asian region. The Pak-US relations remained strong, despite Pakistani withdrawal from SEATO as Pakistan enlarged its participation in CENTO.

In March 1973 US again removed arms supplies to Pak with a simultaneous sugar coated announcement, declaring that India too could buy communication equipment worth $91 million. Later on, US changed its policy and started to give arms on the basis of 'Selling Arms' and Pakistan started to purchase $301035 million of arms every year.

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in the last week of December 1979 provided a lease of life to Zia's martial law regime. In view of Zia's exploitation of religious feelings of entire Muslim world, Zia consolidated power at both the internal and external fronts in the name of Islam. The Carter administration decided to make Pakistan stronger and propose $4000 million aid. Pakistan even considered it short and called 'peanuts'. The Reagan administration in 1981 gave a clear signal that the US need to supply arms to Afghan insurgents through Pakistan. The US supplied arms and equipments including TOW missiles, Cohre helicopters, Missile Launchers, 2000 anti-Tank missiles etc. Washington's resumption of security relationship with Pakistan in June 1981 raised Pakistan to a position of prominence in hierarchy of Americas arms clients and the major arms supplies were made by USA.

China has emerged as a major player on the Asian stage with the potential to effect the global balance of power. The freedom from the geo-political embrace of the former super powers has resulted in the emergence of six actual centres of power in the post cold war world. These are USA, the E.C. (with Germany, France and UK playing a more active role) Russia, China, Japan and India.¹

Speaking about China's policy towards South Asia, Gerald Segal said, "In short China is a major player on the international stage and potentially major trouble maker for the other four Great Powers who are interested in developing a concert of power".² Beginning with North Korea, through Indo-China to Thailand, Bangladesh and westwards, to Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia, China has managed to "Ring" Asia as it were and the strategic implications of this for nations like Japan, India, Indonesia and Vietnam needs little amplification. In assessing China's role in regional security, two things are certain. China will only grow stronger and its central geographic position in Asia will dictate that it has an interest and a role to play in almost every regional issue.³

China, though primarily an East Asian Power unlike Japan or Korea, has maintained a rather close relationship with South Asia. It appears that the first contact of the

Chinese with South Asia took place at the beginning of the Christian era. The border region between China and India was mostly inhabited by 'barbarian' tribes of Mongoloid. The first effort to delimit a clear boundary between China and India was made in 1914 Simla Conference where the British put pressure on China to accept a British proposal for a new border. In the western sector too, the Indo-Tibetan boundary was first set by the British Government of India between 1873-78. "China seeks to set limits on India's role in South Asia by hobnobbing with some of its difficult neighbours. Apart from the obvious case of Pakistan (where it has even helped in the development of a nuclear bomb) other countries like Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal had also provided significant military aid or political support as an exercise in Indian baiting".

China refused to recognize Sikkim as India's part and disregarded in Lin Uang Guang, a Chinese scholar called Indian 'expansionism' and 'hegemonism' toward its smaller neighbours and said, "Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim denied even breathing spell were placed under Indian Umbrella overnight" after the British left India. The Chinese 'Weltchananung' enables them to "maintain an objective over an unusually long period of time without seeing frustration or impatience resulting from long delays. Time to the nth degree multiplied by the nth root of effort equal results", described Mao. A touching point in Chinese foreign policy was entente cordialy with USA which resulted from Sino-Pak

3. The Indian Express, New Delhi, March 30, 1992.
relations. It created a Washington-Beijing-Islamabad axis which led to stronger India-USSR relations. China's first issue is towards war. Mao had consistently urged that China should be prepared "for an early nuclear war". Deng Xiaoping made a departure from this view in 1978 when he stated that, a major war between the super powers was not likely in the near future. Time was opportune to build the national economy. China sees new development in the arena of international relations in the coming decade. Primarily, on the basis of US-Soviet detente, it sees the triangular China-USSR-USA relations as maturing. China do not now prefers to be a "Card" to be 'used' by one super power against the other. A mature balanced and equal relationship will emerge in which China will be the 'third polar' in the Asia-Pacific region.

China considers that South Asia will continue as an area of peripheral concern to China even though minorities Xinjiang and Tibet may be cause of increasing anxiety which may then enhance this region's future importance. It will be in China's interest to see that these outlying provinces adjacent to the 'Islamic' belt remains stable and secure. China's first most effort will lie to see that relations with Pakistan remain close to provide easy access to West Asia. The people's war doctrine is, "only by loss can loss be avoided". China consider disadvantageous position easy and follow, "We should have the courage to retreat so as to preserve our forces and hit the enemy when new opportunities arise". The policy of, "turning the enemy in deep" is the, "most effective military policy for a week army

strategically on the defensive to employ against a strong enemy".\(^1\) China aftermath of the Tiananmen Massacre\(^2\) convinced that the PLA performance in May-June 1989 had exposed political and ideological deficiencies and China should modernize his defence.\(^3\) P.R.C. Minister of Defence Gao Jiwei stressed that the PLA "is determined to make new contributions". CCP Secretary General Jiang Zemin stated - "To ensure a stable environment for socialist modernisation, we must maintain a strong force and build up strong national defence. If we have a military force whose strength corresponds to our country's status, we will easily deal with whatever contingency that may occur and will remain inmiscible.\(^3\)

China-India Today

There had always been a sense of rivalry between India and China. In a dialogue between Chinese Monk Hsuan-Tsang and monks of Nalanda when the former announced to return to China. The monks of Nalanda, when they heard of it, begged him to remain saying, "India is the land of Buddhist birth, and though he has left the world, there are still many traces of him. What greater happiness could there be than to visit them in turn, to adore him and chant his praises? Why then do you wish to leave having come so far? Moreover, China is a country of the mlecchas who

1. *Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung*, Published by Beijing's Foreign Language Press, p. 81.
despise the religions and faith. That is why Buddha was not born there. The mind of the people is narrow, and the coarseness profound, hence neither saints nor sages go there. The climate is cold and the country rugged you must think again". It reflects past reflection of China's positions, attitude and coarseness.

The history also established the fact when China betrayed India once more and shrunk all the ties of friendship, struck off the principle of 'Panchsheel' and occupied a sufficient part of its border. The policy between the two countries remained of doubts and miseries. The steps taken by either to fill the vacuums can not be described an act of friendship. Rajiv Gandhi, soon after taking over as Prime Minister in 1988 had frequent discussions to normalize relations with China. To accomplish this he called for a process of modernization on all fronts. There was a change of opinion in the eightees and China praised Indian achievements in the field of education, science and technology. India-China entered into a Trade Agreement in August 1984 after a gap of thirty years. Both the countries accorded each other the most favoured nation treatment in trade and commerce. A degree of professionalism now has created rather than friendship and both countries have exchanged trade and transit. But, the main problem for which Indian Prime Minister lost his life, the Defence Minister, Menon lost his seat and, on account of which India lost his world wide influence and credibility stands the same. It is a misfortune that today's politics is based on interests, India has become victim of the Chinese psyche, had he taken strong hold of the situation, the boundary problem would have altered so far.

With regard to territorial disputes with China and Pakistan, Izvestia said, "the territorial dispute between India and China is not decided. It is solely 'frozen' and whether they want it or not, the dispute is literally a "hot geyser" which periodically comes into open". After the disintegration of Soviet Union, China is much safer on his borders today while India has further weakened politically, economically and psychologically. India and China has taken major steps towards normalising their relations by signing four agreements including the long awaited peace and tranquility along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the border areas and pledged to work for expanding their relations in the economic, scientific, technological, cultural and other fields.

Sino-Bhutan

China's connection with Bhutan are equally relevant for the study of Bhutanese political developments as that of India. Shortly after the establishment of the People's Republic of China in October 1949, China started its claim on Tibet. In October next year China entered Tibet through eastern frontiers. After few months China entered the western side from Sinkiang through Indian areas. Indian Prime Minister announced in Parliament in December 1950, "that an attack on Nepal or Bhutan would be tantamount to an attack on Indian territory".

2. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, September 8, 1993.
China adopted a policy of blow hot and blow cold towards Bhutan. The accent of this diplomacy was not to treat Bhutan as an appendage of India, China insisted to deal with Bhutan directly without India in the Sino-Bhutan boundary matters. Chou En-Lai reiterated the Chinese position that Sino-Bhutanese border question was not within the scope of Sino-Indian border discussions. Nehru refuted this idea and replied to the Chinese Premier's letter dated September 8, 1959, "It is not clear to us what exactly is the implication of your statement that the boundaries of Sikkim and Bhutan do not fall within the scope of the present discussion. In fact, Chinese maps show sizeable areas of Bhutan as part of Tibet. Under Treaty relations with Bhutan, the Government of India are the only competent authority to take up with other Government matters concerning Bhutan's external relations and in fact we have taken up with your Government a number of matters on behalf of the Bhutan Government". In 1959 there were even incursions into Bhutanese territory by armed Chinese. The Chinese war 1962 and the defeat of India raised suspicion in the minds of Bhutanese but, despite these dialectics Bhutan decided in favour of aligning closely with India and did not like to share the same fate like that of Tibet at the hands of Chinese.

India took timely steps against the perceived Chinese threat, strengthened its defence forces at Bhutan and also provided adequate economic aid in the five years plan of

the Dragon country. Broadly, Indian defence strategy since the mid 1970's was to meet at par what ever forces China was likely to deploy in Tibet along the northern border of India and Bhutan to maintain enough superiority of striking power over Pakistan, so as to deter attack to police the border with Bangladesh and to defend India's economic zone and island territories in the Indian ocean.¹

The fact China does not recognize India's special relations with Bhutan and Nepal from the very beginning due to his vested interests. Fearing Indian resistance the Chinese questioned primarily India's special relations with Bhutan and accused India of harboring expansionist intentions with backing of the imperialist power.² In the early 50's China criticised the Indian Treaty with Bhutan and said, "The Nehru government can not deny that it has sent man to Lhase. The New York Times reported from New Delhi on August 8th that the spokesman of the Indian Foreign Ministry announced that night that Bhutan has become a protectorate of India. Since, the Indian Government has announced its sovereignty over Bhutan and declared that Tibet had never recognized Chinese suzerainty, will it not declare suzerainty over Tibet.... The Nehru Government has no right to declare sovereignty over Bhutan. The United Nations should examine the matter."³ The Chinese impact on Bhutan and Sikkim would seem to be greater in comparison, in recent years. Peking has repudiated India's special relationship with both kingdoms and has been

¹. Interview in New Delhi and unpublished thesis at Natural Defence College, New Delhi, 1980-81.
urging them to edge out of Indian fold. In fact Chinese policy in the northern part of South Asia has been of continuous tensions. Mao and his followers took practical steps to establish China's supremacy in South East Asia. To this end, they employed, "No war no peace" tactics which were designed to weaken the countries and bring them under Chinese rule. The border conflict with India is going on, for ten years now with tension alternatively heightening and relaxing. Peaking periodically presents India with ultimatums and tries to interfere in her affairs. Mao's agents are weaving a network of intrigues and plots in Bhutan and Sikkim. In the early stage Bhutan did not like any change in the provisions of 1949 treaty under which Bhutan's external relations were bound by India's guidance. The young King declared at various occasions that part with India needs no change. The King said, that we feel what is in practice is more important than what is on paper and declined for any new treaty with India. But, it began to flex its diplomatic policy soon and declared the treaty can certainly be brought up to date. The King further asserted that there are no problems between our countries, and our friendship is deeper today than in 1949, but, why lose any thing for loose interpretation it will be the advantage of both India and Bhutan to up to date

3. The Patriot, New Delhi, November 9, 1979.
5. The Indian Express, New Delhi, November 9, 1979.
the treaty. In fact, the tiny kingdom began to seek international recognition and came out of the isolation. In 1979 at the Havana, Cuba, Bhutan supported the Pol Pot regimes claim to be recognized as the representative of Kampuchia (Cambodia) while India was neutral. The King draw its own interpretation to Article 11 of the 1949 Treaty and contended that the clause, "agrees to be guided by "Indian advice implies that the advice will not be mandatory". When Bhutan joined the UN and acquired a Charter relationship with India as a fellow sovereign member of that international. Bhutan Prime Minister ascertained that "from time immemorial the Himalayas have provided us into magnificent frontiers... we can not allow the barrier to be penetrated because it is also principle barrier to India". Later on Nehru ascertained the logic of not allowing the barrier to be crossed or weakened would apply equally to Bhutan.

Sino-Tibetan relations in 1950s strengthened. A cause of distrust made home in the minds of the Bhutanese and consequently their trust for India was cemented. Chinese policy destroyed the Tibetan way of life and the religious Institutions. It had a direct effect upon the psyche of the Bhutanese people, most of whom were Mongoloid and from Tibetan origin. The stories of Chinese cruelty, harrassment and atrocities narrated, by the Tibetan refugees, who came to Bhutan created hatred and fear against China. Simultaneously India came much nearer due to asylum to Dalai Lama and the fear psyche removed to some extent.

1. The Times of India, New Delhi, September 10, 1979.
Sino-Pakistan

Friendship makes room for indulgence, but enmities also mellow in the course of time. The fact of international politics are subject to constant change. "World affairs" said Hans J. Morgenthau have surprises in store for whoever tries to read the future from his knowledge of the past and from the signs of the present.¹ Pakistan choose to be the first Muslim country to accord recognition to the Beijing government and vociferous support to China on its right to the seat in the United Nations. In the Korean war Pakistan adopted an ambivalent attitude and its stand on Japan Peace-Treaty was pro-west although Pakistani leadership was aware that Chinese stakes were involved in these two issues.² Pakistani leaders interaction with the Chinese leaders at the Bandung Conference led to some understanding between the two countries. The reciprocal visits of the leaders of the two nations improved the relations further and established that there was no clear clash of interest.³ China had succeeded in keeping its relations with Pakistan fairly free of strains. Pakistan membership in SEATO and CENTO was not condemned in Chinese Press.⁴

Chou-En-Lai made the declaration "Although Pakistan was a member of SEATO since its government and people had

expressed friendliness for China, there was no reason why China could not be friendly with Pakistan. In the first instance the relations between China and Pakistan were not friendly. In New Delhi, Chou found India and Burma responsive to new image and gave a clear formulation of the policy of peaceful coexistence and said, "All the nations in the world, can peacefully co-exist, no matter whether they are big or small, strong or weak, and no matter what kind of social system each one of them has. The rights of the people of each nation to national independence and self determination must be respected.... Revolutions can not be exported, at the same time, outside interference with the common,will expressed by the people of any nation should not be permitted."1 After the border dispute Pakistan approached China to redemarcate the boundary between Pak-occupied Kashmir and Sinkiang, but China did not agree because Sino-Indian talks were going on: In 1960 Chou-Nehru talks resulted in a failure. With the signing of the Indus water Treaty in 1960, in September 1960, the process of peaceful settlement of Indo-Pak disputes came to an end. Pakistan changed his policy in favour of China after the American aid to India.

After development of ICBMs and Polaris submarines the importance of military bases at the periphery of the Soviet Union was reduced and a favourable atmosphere of cooperation was installed, Kashmir question was basically not important in relations with China. Bhutto said, if Indo-Pak talks resulted in a settlement of Kashmir dispute they would strengthen Pakistans relations with China.2 Bhutto considered that Pakistan should attempt,

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"to set up bilateral equations with each one of them with the clear understanding that the nature and complexion of the equation should promote... mutual interest (of the great power and Pakistan) without adversely affecting the legitimate interests of the third parties (each equation was to be) determined by the limits of tolerance... and acceptance of third parties with whom might be able to establish bilateral relations of mutual benefit.¹ Soon Pakistan-China received a complete agreement on the location and alignment of boundary between Sinkiang and the areas of Kashmir under Pakistan's control and signed the Sino-Pak boundary agreement on March 2, 1963. On October 23, President Ayub Khan disclosed his intention to approach China for peaceful settlement of the border. In case China showed encouraging responses to Pakistan's desire for settling the boundary between Sinkiang and northern regions of Gilgit, ranking statesmen of the two countries may eventually meet to lay down principles for specific demarcation of the boundary.² The sole purpose of the agreement was to eliminate a possibility of conflict in future.³ However Pakistan did not enter with any defence treaty with Pakistan, as it would have meant a complete break away from the West.⁴ China provided Pakistan, economic and $142 million and also supplied 4 MIG-15, 4-11-28, 40 MIG-195 (F-6) and 80 T-59 Tanks between 1965 and 1966.⁵ When Yahya

Khan succeeded, he changed the foreign policy and declared, "We, therefore, try to hold a balance in our relations with the major powers around us and with the USA. We do not solicit the friendship of one at the expense of the interests of the other".  

In 1977 Pakistan was again beset by political upheavels. In July, General Zia seized power from Bhutto. By that time there was a change in Chinese policy towards India and when Zia raised the question of Kashmir on his visit to China, Deng Xiaoping said, "South Asian countries could solve their mutual relations through consultations". Pakistan played its cards with considerable skill during Zia ul Haq's regime, while the old CENTO links with Turkey were kept up, very close economic and military links were developed with Saudi Arabia and Gulf states. China's friendship was kept at an intimate level. The other neighbours did not go as far as Pakistan, but, they too saw the western and Chinese relationship as a useful lever against India. China has acquired an important position, as one of the most important suppliers of arms to Pakistan. Chinese weapon systems form the back bone of the Pakistani military arsenal. Not only this, China also helped Pakistan in the Nuclear Set up. According to CIA intelligence report China also helped Pakistan to achieve nuclear weapon capability.

2. Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, December 1977, p. 6-8.
Chinese Arms Transfer to Pakistan

As regards China's arms transfer policies, proceeding since the position of the first embargo, China being Pakistan main supplier in the period from 1966-71 and had provided Pakistan $133 million worth of arms. China had sent apart from the arms, rod instructors to Pakistan to train their troops in counter-guerrilla warfare. China also offered to equip, two divisions being raised in West Pakistan to replace those sent to East Pakistan. In 1971 when Pakistan defeat became imminent, Chinese rescue ships were based in Ganges delta for evacuation of Pakistani forces in East Pakistan. However China supplied all weapons and ammunitions that Pakistan needed and that some were supplied free.

Contd.

China has emerged as a major conventional weapons supplier in Asia and specially to Pakistan. The Arms Sales from 1950 to 1990 are as below.

**Countries receiving Major Conventional Weapons from China 1950-1990**

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<tr>
<th>Missiles</th>
<th>Land Weapons</th>
<th>Ships</th>
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Reproduced from Strategic Digest, November 1992.

China had succeeded in keeping its relations with Pakistan fairly free of strains. Pakistan Membership in SEATO and CENTO was not condemned in Chinese press.\(^1\)

Chou-En-Lai made the declaration "Although Pakistan was a member of SEATO, since its government and people had expressed friendliness for China, there was no reason why China could not be friendly with Pakistan".

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China has emerged as an important factor in South Asia. Nepal's relationship with China goes back to a hoary past and is a story of indifferences and friendship. Nepal and China have no close contacts at any time. Contacts between the two countries were limited and may be traced back to the fifth century A.D. Tibet was more important and close to the hill state than China.

After the end of the second world war, there were many changes of far reaching importance all round the world. Success of Indian national movement influenced Nepal and touched off several abortive revolts against the Ranas. It was only around the mid 1946, when Interim Government was formed in India, that the Ranas realized the might soon have to deal with elected, representatives of the Indian people while they were not prepared to introduce any change in the domestic affairs, they decided to expand international relations with the US, France and Brazil. They also made overtures to China but, the civil-war and the communist victory stalled any further development in Nepal-China relations. The Ranas were also of the view that they may persuade the Nehru Government not to interfere in the Nepalese domestic affairs. They even decided to conclude the Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1950. As the pressure of democratic mounted and the Nehru Government supported the King, the revolution of 1950 in a way swept the Ranas. In fact India initiated Nepal to proceed to develop relations with China. Sure of its hold on Nepal, India in order

1. Kant, Rama, Ibid., p. 16.
to defuse the anti-foreign statement of the Nepalese towards China and at the same time to assure China that it had no designs against it, put pressure on Nepal to establish diplomatic relations with China. What India did not foresee was that Nepal after establishing relations with China would try to balance the two for achieving more freedom in its affairs. Diplomatic relations with China were established in August 1955 to counterweight the influence of India. After the Chinese military takeover of Tibet, India and China came nearer. China also enlarged a picture of reasonableness and accomodation both towards India and Nepal. India and China concluded the convention of Tibet, in April 1954 signed the Panchshila. China reoriented its policy towards Nepal on three point bases.

(a) Termination of unequal rights and privileges that Nepal enjoyed in Tibet.
(b) Remuneration of its own imperial claims on Nepal.
(c) Prior understanding with India on the Himalaya Region.

King Mahendra's accession heralded a new era of foreign policy in Nepal. In his design China occupied a vital place. India having readjusted its relations with China, Nepal had to breakway from the an chronicistic relationship and bring it, to live with modern ideas based on the principle of equality and reciprocity. In 1955 Nepal and China entered into an agreement and established normal diplomatic relations. As a first step an Agreement to maintain Friendly Relations and on Trade and Inter course was signed between Nepal and China, which regulated the travel across border, normalized trade relations and did away with the privileges of the Nepalese traders in Tibet.

China's policy towards Nepal moved with caution. Despite their interests, Chinese Government continued to pay regard to the Indian position and sensitivities in Nepal. During 1955 to 1958 Nepal made significant changes in his policy towards China. After the appointment of B.P. Koirala as Prime Minister, there was a change in the policy. Dalai Lama, taking shelter in India and the Khampa rebels in Tibet taking refugee in Nepal territory, the newly elected government was put to a difficult position. There was yet a national consensus in Nepal that a meaningful relationship with China should be enlarged. B.P. Koirala was pro-India and his party on Tibet was highly critical of the Chinese. China appeared more appealing and more honourable than India's "middle way" of non-alignment and mixed economy. On the sub-continent the Indian Government was unsympathetic to revolutionaries, had difficulties with the tribal people in the North-East and vacillated in its dealings with the Himalayan kingdom of Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim. On each court, China projected itself as friend and sympathiser against a reactionary bourgeois imperialist India.¹

Soon after, Nepal was faced with a grave situation, Sino-Indian relations had deteriorated much. China challenged the entire Sino-Indian border and even questioned its relations with Sikkim and Bhutan. The interpretation of the 1954 convention as well as the Nepalis border with Tibet were challenged. The Chinese attack on India in 1962 marks a watershed in the Nepalese foreign policy towards China. The revolution of 1950, the Delhi Agreement of 1951 and the Constitution of 1959 could not resolve the basic issues whether the sovereign power lay with people or the king.

¹ Singh, Surjit Man, India's Search for Power, Sage Publication, New Delhi, p. 196.
India wanted that monarchy may develop as a symbol of national unity and make the government broad based with the help of peoples representative. King Mahendra preferred to abrogate the Parliamentary system. It was criticized by public and the Indian press. Nehru declared that kings action was a set-back to the democratic process. In view of the king Nehru's diplomacy was an obstacle in his way, so king used China to gain popularity and scare India. It was in the wake of this dilemma that the Chinese Foreign Minister declared on behalf of the Government and people of China to assure His Majesty king Mahendra, His Majesty's Government and the Nepalese people that if any foreign forces attack Nepal, we Chinese people will stand on your side.1

In this way Nepal was successful to pressurize India and gain substantial concessions both in economic and political field. Chinese conflict with India and its increased involvement in Nepal, occurred at a time when Nepal had started asserting its international personality. China wanted Nepal to protect Chinese interests by observing centrality in Sino-Indian struggle and not allow its soil to be used against Tibet. The period of 1961-62 was set back to India. Chinese attack on India led to some hard thinking. The rise of powerful China altered the balance of power in the Himalayan kingdom. Nepal assured China, of its goodwill and friendship. It supported China on Tibet, did not allow its soil to be used by Tibetan refugees and even disarmed the Khampas. In 1972 when Mahendra passed away, his son Birendra succeeded on Throne. The Chinese leadership after 1971 particularly after the death of Mao, adopted the way of flexibility in its foreign policy.

1. Survey of China Main Land Press, No. 1835, October 9, 1962, p. 34.
Towards India, it agreed to discuss all border issues while no headway could be made. It did not extend full support to the king as before.

King Birendra has been trying to keep China in good humour. While China has extended fair amount of economic and technical aid to Nepal in some important sectors, road constructions and industries, China has acquired an important place in Nepal's foreign policy.

China's new policy shift opposes super power's domination and encourages the unity amongst third world countries. In this broad frame work in South Asia also she tries to establish friendly relations with India and encourages a bilateral settlement of disputes between the core and peripheral powers of the region. From this point of view she has welcomed the emergence of SAARC and finally for the present. She seem not to have any desire to involve herself in the internal crisis of the South Asian countries.\(^1\) Sino-Nepalese relations in post 1980s may be viewed in this perspective, China has taken pain to assure Nepal that there was no weakening of its friendly relations with her\(^2\) but, she can not efforts to strengthen friendly ties with India.

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1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, June 4, 1981.
Bangladesh-China relations may be traced in their countries old ties. Sultan of Bengal, Chiyas-ud-din Azam Shah, sent emissaries to China's emperor Yung-log of the Ming dynasty in 1405-1409. The emperor of China also reciprocated this friendly gesture of the Sultan of Bengal and sent enjoys and gifts in return.¹

China did not support the Bangladesh war of Independence, because of China's perception that the new state Bangladesh, in the creation of which both India and ex-Soviet Union played important role, would remain under influence of New Delhi and Moscow and consequently, China declared it "Manchuko" Government, thereby dubbing it as "the quisling government" set up by New Delhi.² China's post-1971 diplomacy was tailored to contain the Soviet and Indian influence in South Asia. The Indo-Bangladesh Treaty of Friendship and cooperation of March, 1972 was considered by Beijing as inimical to the Chinese interests. The Mujib government which explicitly tilted towards Indo-Soviet axis following its independence was viewed by Beijing to be antagonistic to the latter's Strategic interests. Obviously, China's attitude towards Bangladesh did not change until the fall of Mujib government specifically, belong the Mujib government remained determined to try the Prisoners of war (POWS) and also blocked the admission of Bangladesh into the United Nations.³

² Peking Review, December 17, 1971, p. 15.
The changed political scenario in Bangladesh following the overthrow of Mujib in 1975 suited China's perception of its role in South Asia. The beginning of Ziaur Rahman's period witnessed a marked slide back in Bangladesh-India relations. By contrast, China has been cultivated as a counterbalance against perceived hegemonic designs of New Delhi. During the Zia regime foundation of close ties between Bangladesh and China was laid and cooperation took off in all aspects, political, economical and strategical. During Zia's visit Chinese Vice Premier Li Hsinienien stated that, "China firmly supports the Government and people of Bangladesh in their just struggle to safeguard national independence and state sovereignty and resist foreign interference." On the other hand Zia while speaking of a banquet said:

"We believe that only in an environment of stability free from outside interference can we consolidate our independence and state sovereignty. The people of Bangladesh are determined to continue their struggle and in concert with the people of the third world will oppose expansionism and hegemonism." The Chinese charged Affairs in Dhaka, Man Ping declared in March 1977, "We firmly support the reasonable stand taken by Bangladesh on the question of sharing the waters of the Ganges river."

The foundation of Bangladesh's close ties on the military front was also laid during Zia period. Several factors motivated the two countries to cooperate in this field. Following the dramatic change in Bangladesh in 1975, Kremlin refused to supply spare parts for military equipment to Bangladesh in 1976. China stepped into fill in the vacuum. Besides the supply of arms, China built

the country's arms and ammunition factory in Joydevpur. Bangladesh and China signed a memorandum of understanding on cooperation in the shipping sector on May 29, 1988.\(^1\) China also supplied to Bangladesh a multipurpose cargo-Banglar Doot, on December 13, 1989 and promised for another ship of 30000 metric tons capacity.\(^2\) Every year since 1977 China also offered Bangladesh 12 undergraduate and 2 postgraduate scholarships and developed cultural relations. After assuming power through bloodless coup in 1982, Ershad in an interview to the New York Times termed Russians as "Crude and imtrusty"\(^3\) and applauded Bejing having very good military terms\(^4\).

At the political level both countries continued to share identical views on matters related to international, regional and disarmament issues. The two maintained identical approach to the question of the New International Economic order on regional issues like Indo-China, Arab. Israel conflict Indian Ocean as zone of peace, de-nuclearization of South Asia, both China and Bangladesh hold similar views which brought them on a common political platform.

SINO-Sri Lanka Relations

In the beginning Sri Lanka adopted the policy of "Mid-way" - the way of not getting involved in the conflict of rival ideologies and power blocks, they maintained an attitude of antipathy towards the communist block countries. The UNP Prime Minister had an intense dislike for communism and communist countries. Prime Minister, John Kotelawale expressed his views and said, that "I have all my life been opposed to this lamentable. And if there is anything that I can do, whether in my capacity or anywhere else to stop the further advance of communism, I shall certainly do it". However, they had different attitude towards China and Soviet Union. Lalithe Raj Pakasa, a UNP member said, "I have no sympathy for Russia but, I am quite sure that Ceylon has a great deal of sympathy and good will for China...... ... I earnestly hope she will be able to shake off the Russia impediments and get rid of the Bolshevist hindrances that stand in the way of her progress". UNP leadership never branded China as an aggressive communist power John Kotelawale once expressed his opinion -

"We have no reason to consider Red China a growing menace to peace in South Asia. We have to observe its actions before we come to such a conclusion. China has its own troubles and so long as it keeps its redness to itself and does not seek to impose it on others, there would be little justification to consider it menace".

China was the first country with whom Ceylon established trade relations. In 1951 Sri Lanka sold rubber to

2. Ceylon, Senate Debates, vol. 5, June 26, 1951,
China "Not so much from economic motives as from economic compulsions".¹ Ceylon’s administration was cautious about Chinese closeness and Sri Lanka even refused to permit the visit of the Chinese good will mission to Sri Lanka in 1953 because Sri Lanka considered "visiting communists were apt to disseminate more harm than goodwill".²

When Bandaranaike came to power there emerged "New Sri Lanka" with new look and neutralist policy. British evacue Trincomalee naval base on 15th October 1957 and Katunayake air base on November 1, 1957, Sri Lanka also granted diplomatic regt to China and USSR.

China offered economic assistance and cultured cooperation. An agreement on Economic Aid was signed between the two countries providing for Sri Lanka Rs. 75 million in commodities spread over a period of five years.³

In 1965 when Dudley Senanayake took over, he declared his adherence to non allignment and friendship with all nations. His attitude towards the communist countries was cautious and at times strained particularly with China during the cultural Revolutions.

After the 1971 war, the balance of power in South Asia to the extent it had existed earlier between India and Pakistan disappeared. China constituted the principal 'counter weight and the ceylon's government considered its relations with China in this context. China also increased its interest in Lanka's affairs and offered" fullest

cooperation to speed up the socialist merch of Ceylon by helping it economically and in every otherway appreciated later on and said, "a relationship based on mutual respect and good will has sufficient substance to stand by itself without the need for formalization. We, therefore, sincerely appreciate the understanding which China has shown in its relation. With us these relations are a model of interstate relations". ¹

J.R. Jayewardene, advocated for "independent foreign policy" Rubber, Rice, Agreement was changed for the Sixth Time. Both China and Sri Lanka condemned the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Foreign Minister of Sri Lanka said, "the principle of intervention or to give it legitimacy in any form would be to make small state vulnerable and powerful states belligerent". ²

The Soviet interest in South Asia were determined by its conception of global strategic interests. The beginning of its regional states in the developments in South Asia can be traced more particularly since 1950's, because of two major factors, viz. Pakistan's adherence to American military pacts; and the Soviet rift with China.¹

The process of image building was initiated by Khrushchev during 1950's through the projection of ideas based on the spectacular growth of the Soviet military and economic power under the Soviet dominated socialist bloc to help the newly liberated "peace-loving, anti-imperialist nations, such as India, in their political and economic development".²

In August 1971, the Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko came to New Delhi and signed a Treaty of Peace, Friendship and cooperation, the first of its kind that India had signed.³ The Indo-Soviet Treaty within provisions indicating the determination of the two powers to repel aggression and stipulating immediate mutual consultations in case either country has subjected to attack from outside unequivally aroused suspicion and dismay in the West and angered Pakistan.⁴ The Treaty lent a new dimension to the

1. Shelton, Kodikara; Strategic Factors in Interstate Relations in South Asia, New Delhi, 1984, p. 45.
Indo-Soviet relationship wherein Soviet backing came to be crucial forwarding off the most serious threat to India's integrity and socio-economic policy.

Individual humans dies when they do finally and irretrivably, whether death comes suddenly or in a lingering manner. It is not the same with nations, states or countries. Through the history of centuries one has seen how they evolve, growing strong or weak culturally, economically, geo-politically or militarily. They either flower or bloom, or wilt and drop. Occasionally, they lose territory, or gain, or regain it. Sometimes there is an effort to erase them through war but, mostly such a phenomenon ultimately proves a temporary one. The mix of history and geography and literary, cultural and ethnic traditions, that fashion nations and people and countries is such that they hardly if ever, can be said to die in a final or irretrievable manner.¹

Lenin must have thought that he had destroyed the Czar's family but not his domain. Many think today that the Soviet confederation is dead, never again to be seen on the world stage. One can not state with any finality what kind of picture will emerge in those territories, a quarter of a century, or half a century, down the road. After all we have just witnessed chancellor Kohl regain the territories lost by chancellor Hitler.

On December 8, 1991 the death Knell toiled for Soviet Union. Leaders of the three slavic republics - Russia, Ukraine and Belarus - called for the creation of a commonwealth of independent states (CIS) to replace

the impolding Soviet State left moribund in the wake of the failed August Coup. Within two weeks this confederation had replaced the decaying Union, with eleven former Union Republics joining the CIS. The newly independent Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania decided not to join as did Georgia. The once powerful central apparatus in Moscow, weakened by failing economic output and a lack of popular legitimacy, was unable to fight off the final blows against it. The Soviet Union officially passed into history on December 25, 1991, taking with it the legacy of the world's first socialist state committed to the task of restructuring society.1

The death of Soviet Union did not alleviate the immense problems that faced the new commonwealth. Rather, the problems of the former all union governments were placed squarely in the hands of the eleven member states. It was left to the new commonwealth foreign policy structure to sort out the problems of the Soviet Union international debt, the remnants of the Soviet Army, and most alarmingly for the West, the fate of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. The Soviet successor states have managed the drive each other apart, with petty turf battles over the removal of Soviet troops from their territory, the imposition of trade restrictions, and discrimination against non-majority ethnic communities. Vice President Alek Sandra Russkoi, called for a re-establishment of Russian hegemony over

the erstwhile republics of the Soviet Union.¹

After the demise of the USSR, the Western and Soviet concerns focussed immediately on the issue of control of the Soviet Union's nuclear weapon arsenal. Among the first provision of the new CIS security structures was the agreement on the control of the nuclear stockpile. On December 23, 1991, the four nuclear states of the CIS (the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Kazakhistan, and Belarus) signed an agreement on joint measures of Nuclear Weapons. It followed the Soviet non-first use pledge of nuclear weapons and granted control over eventual usage to the Central CIS authorities. The article of the agreement noted that until nuclear weapons have been completely eliminated on the territory of (Belarus, Kazakhistan and Ukraine), decisions on the need to use them will be taken, by agreement with the heads of the member states of the agreement by the Russian Soviet Federation Socialist Republic (RSFSR) president, on the basis of the procedure drawn up jointly by the member states.² This agreement was strengthened further by the agreement between the Member States of the commonwealth of Independent States on Strategic Forces of December 30, 1991. Article 3 of the agreement laid that the member states agree to the joint control of the nuclear weapons of the former USSR. Article 4 has Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan relinquishing control of their nuclear weapons to the Russian Federation for destruction


by the end of 1994.\(^1\) Belarus was to be free of strategic nuclear weapons by 1996 or 1997, reported by Chairman of the commission for Matters of National Security of the Belarusian Parliament.\(^2\) The Kazakhstan's missiles were to be returned to Russian territory by 1994.\(^3\)

Ukraine President suggested that an international commission needed to be set up, consisting of the four nuclear states of the CIS, but also international observers, to assure that the missiles were actually dismantled. Kravchuck proposed the establishment of a nuclear processing region in Ukraine to take care of nuclear waste within republic. Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin emphasized the problems of dissolving the unified command of the army.

The real conflict in the CIS arose when Ukraine claimed control over the Black Sea fleet as the new independent navy, but Ruslan Khasbulatov of Russian Supreme Soviet, claimed that all the fleets naturally belong in their entirely to Russia.\(^4\)

In addition to the above problems between the CIS members, there were economic problems. The highly integrated structure of the centralized Soviet economic system meant that economic developments in one republics or

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region would have almost immediate influence elsewhere. TASS referred to the commonwealth as a way to promote economic development in the former Soviet Republics. The member states of the CIS proposed the formulation of an International Economic Commonwealth. Its role was to institute a common economic area for market relations with the free movement of goods, labour, services and capital. It called for improving the currency and tax regulations. Finally it called for coordination of the development of inter-republic trade relations.

While the economic collapse hastened the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the commonwealth states have been facing severe economic challenges. Production of industrial and agricultural goods has been going down steadily during last few years. In 1991, the decline was officially reported to be 20-30 per cent over the level of 1990. Budgetary deficit reached to a very high level. Soviet external debts swelling to 80-100 billion.

Despite agreements concerning continued economic collaboration, problems arose almost immediate in the arena of ethnic nature. The ethnic situation of groups unleashed from central rule has proven to be the bloodiest part of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Soviet rule had promoted the ideal of a nation where the 130 ethnic groups lived together in peace and harmony. Ethnic problems

became a major headache for Mikhail Gorbachev in the waning days of the Soviet Union. Apart from it human rights involving minorities were one of the highlights of the initial meetings of the CIS but, were not sustained.¹

One of the most unexpected results of the demise of the Soviet State has been the fact that the focus of Moscow's foreign policy concerns is now the former republics of the former Soviet Union.

The External Relations with Asian States

These new emerged countries are conscious of their 'Asianness', as also their Islamic identity. With the disappearance or removal of the old heroes of the Soviet era, they are busy discovering new ethnic cultural heroes like Ali Sher Nawai in Uzbekistan and the poet Abai in Kazakhstan. These countries recognize their traditional historical, cultural, geo-graphical and religious links with Turkey, Iran, India, Pakistan and China. Kirghizistan and Kazakhstan, also seeing the logic of geography and of economic requirements, they are working to build closer relations with South Korea, China and Japan. The Arabs are showing great interest in the emergence of these republics. Basically it is their attraction as Muslims mingle with curiously about how communism has affected their perceptions. The Saudis have made a beginning by inviting the state recognized Muftis and Mullahs of these countries to join the Rabita-al-Islami and by sending hundred of thousands of copies of the

¹. Moscow, Central Television, December 21, 1991; in FBIS-SU, p. 34.
Holy Quran for distribution. The new Republics can not afford to appear unsympathetic to these moves as they expect Arab and oil countries to a future gain. Since Pandit Nehru's two visits to this area, in 1956 and 1961 India forged special cultural and economic links with Central Asia even while these republics were part of Soviet realm.¹

This region of Central Asia is full of historical memories. Places with evocative names intimately tied up with India's political architectural, artistic and dynastic history. Samarkand, Tashkent, Bokhera, Alam Ata, Askhabad and Ahokbad are all part of the medieval lore. Babar's beloved Ferghane Valley Andijan City and Ulugh Begs observatory in Samerkand are known places.

Soviet Union marked a certain stage in Indo-Soviet relations. Both countries so adjusted their relationship that it has survived the radical changes in the international order in Asia and in Europe not to forget the growing understanding between the super powers.² On Indian territorial integrity and security on Kashmir and in all the established sphere of Indo-Soviet cooperation, the Soviet stand has remained substantially the same. Soviet Union, consistently taken a strong stand against nuclear non-proliferation, it has cooperated with India in the nuclear field, despite India's opposition to the NPT. For some past India's special relations' came into hot exchange. Ms. E. Arefeva criticised the Izvestiia and

said, that the ideologized policy of sustaining special relations between India and the Soviet Union also lacks geo-political clarity. Alexander Mozgovoi on the point of supply of another submarine to India criticised Russia and said why did nuclear fuel to the fire of Indo-Pakistan disputes further he added that the supplying nuclear submarine to India runs counter to the idea of turning the Indian Ocean into the zone of peace. Not all this a new. On October 26, 1989, a Soviet journal specialising in American affairs, U.S.A. Economics, Politics, Ideology, urged Moscow and Washington to take joint steps to restrict Arms sales to the countries in the Indian sub-continent on the basis of principles of responsible sufficiency, it added that the two could discuss a number of concrete joint steps regarding promotion of the policy of nuclear weapons. Russian Foreign Ministry was of the view that while maintaining close relations with India, Russia should not let it be interpreted that its policy is deliberately pro-India. A draft concept paper prepared by Russia Foreign Ministry said, that 'On the whole the policy towards India should be pragmatically renewed based on realistic possibilities and the legitimate interests of both sides with an emphasis on economic stimuli.'

1. E. Arefeva is an expert of economics in Moscow.
India thought otherwise and considered the Russian changes on the basis of time-tested relationship\(^1\) between them. India and the erstwhile Soviet Union were able to develop a unique phenomenon in the world by developing what came to be known as the Rupee-Rouble rate of exchange. It kept dollars and hard currencies out of all transactions between the two countries, and increased up to Rs. 9000 crores in 1990. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union Rupee-Rouble exchange system has now broken down. There is practically no movement now either in the sphere of trade or in joint ventures, between India and the CIS Republics. The Russian Federation is still willing to maintain this old Rupee-Rouble rate.\(^2\)

India and Russia finalized a new political treaty and signed memorandum of understanding (MOU) on trade and supplies of defence and power generation equipments in 1992. The political treaty contained elements of the 1971 Indo-Soviet friendship treaty, while the memorandum on trade, defence and power equipments have been structured to all flexibility to meet changes. Indian delegate described the steps as the 'finalization of the political treaty as a positive response from India to Russian President Boris Yeltsin's suggestions for such an arrangement'.\(^3\) The two countries agreed on a two year transitional arrangement that would ensure continuity of all existing contracts between the two, specially with regard to the defence supplies, spares and setting up of power projects.

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In January 1993, India and Russian Federation reached an understanding on utilization and liquidation of Indian technical credit by the latter, repayment of Russian loans and improvements of counter trade arrangements.\(^1\) India agreed that Russia could utilize till May 31, 1993 the technical credit granted by the former in 1992. For liquidating the 285 million credit, Russian Federation agreed to pay India Rs. 850 crore by transferring this amount from the Central Account of the Bank for Foreign Economic Affairs with Reserve Bank to the Central Account of the Bank for Foreign Trade with RBI. As regards Russian debt, it was decided that the funds received from India as repayments of credits granted by the erstwhile Soviet Union shall be utilized by Russia for purchase of goods and services. In pursuance of the five years bilateral agreement on trade and economic cooperation signed on May, 1992, the two sides agreed that persons of either country shall be free to import and export goods and services from each country.\(^2\)

Mr. Kremenjunik, Deputy Director of the Institute of USA and Canada in Moscow said, "in the post-cold war world, the only super power was using all the means at its disposal to win contracts and guarantee for itself a major place under the sun". A space expert further added that ('The American have become the world's policeman and we have no option but, to follow when they blow the whistle".\(^3\) India regretted on Saturday (July 18, 1993) the Russian decision to cancel the cryogenic rocket engine deal.\(^4\)

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The visit of President Boris Yeltsin proved very successful. For the first time Moscow considered Delhi as an equal partner rather than a client state. This explains the offer of defence joint ventures rather than the existing Licence-production implies equal sharing of finances, joint research, development and exports. Whereas Licence production means assembling of important components, called semi knock Down (SKD) and complete knock-down (CKD). A more practical suggestion was the offer of spares technology transfer and joint ventures, both of which, however, were limited to the use depending upon the cost-effectiveness on case to case basis.

A solution was sought for very urgent equipments for the defence purpose by transfer of technology to India. Speaking to the members of Parliament and other eminent persons, President Yeltsin talked of an overall Asian policy as the Russian objective and the improvement in Russian-Chinese and Sino-Indian relations were perceived as part of this policy.

The relations of India with the CIS countries remained more sympathetic than expected. It was expected that the new Republics will move towards Pakistan as a muslim majority country and Pakistan was also hopeful to make a consideration of these countries including Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia to fulfill its growing ambitions. Kazakhstan signed two pacts with India on May 25, 1993 for bilateral cooperation in political, trade, economic, scientific, ecological cultural and information areas. India Uzbekistan signed five agreements to promote

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1. Indian Express, New Delhi, January 30, 1993.
2. Times of India, New Delhi, May 26, 1993.
cooperation in the economic and commercial fields, science and technology, and tourism. The agreement on cooperation between the foreign ministries provided for regular consultations every year and to train Kazakh diplomats. Another agreement on Science and technology stated that the governments would promote development of cooperation in area of mutual interest, and for close interaction between scientific institutions. The agreement was valid for five years. President Nazarbaev said, that the future was in favour of Asia which had immense human resources, but, unfortunately the continent was riven with conflict which could be only resolved by the Asian nations themselves.

There were some differences over the supply of cryogenic engine by Russia under pressure from the USA, which India considered discriminatory in its attitude. The U.S. has not been able to subscribe to stop China from providing M-11 and other missiles to Pakistan, Saudi Arabia. India, considered it a voluntary agreement and not binding. The future of Indo-Russian cooperation in the defence field does not seem very bright either despite agreements and promises. The supply of spares for the equipment supplied by the former Soviet Union to the Indian armed forces which had stopped completely has yet to pick up. It is not possible to tie up supplies from individual manufactures numbering above 3000 spread over the CIS. The search for spare for AN-32 transport aircraft has been intensified in the Ukraine.

In the political field, admittedly India is a vital factor in Russia's Asian policy but due to the woes of the

2. Times of India, New Delhi, May 26, 1993.
crisis - ridden national economy during its transition to market relations and pressure from United States, the Russia's policy towards South Asia and specifically India may be changed. Jyoti, Malhotra, rightly observed that the days of 'Hindu-Russi Bhai Bhai' are over. Those old Soviet hands who so pains takingly developed a special relationship between the two nations may now be told that they belong to a super fluous generation, while the pragmatist knights of a new shining order hold up candles to terminologies such as 'Self interest' and 'Commerce'.

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