CHAPTER - V

GLIMPSES OF INDIA
There are three continents on the periphery of the Indian Ocean, Asia to the North, Australia to the East and Africa to the West. By reasons of the sheer number of countries and of the population involved, Asia looms largest in the strategic equation, and India, as the biggest and most populous country emerges as the country most likely to seek a major role in the region. In terms of size, resources, technology and military capability there is an inherent imbalance in this region with India, containing 800 million people and demonstrated pre-eminence in the industrial and technical spheres a committed candidate for regional hegemony.\(^1\)

India has been so placed in South Asia that she has common border with all her South Asian neighbours, while none of her neighbours, share border with each other. Such a geographical context lends the nations of this region with a peculiar situation with socio-economic and political consequences for all of them. South Asia has been bestowed by nature a shared where-withal of natural resources. In that sense, it is a composite entity. The Indian sub-continent comprises virtually the whole of South Asia, Sri Lanka and Maldives being at the outer fringe of this geographical reality. Apart from common inheritance in terms of culture, tradition and socio-economic and political legacies, the countries of the sub-continent have more things in common than irritants among them. Despite of the linguistic and religious diversities and differences in milieu in different parts of South Asia region there does exist a unique cultural unity in the sub-continent.\(^2\) The states in this region - India,

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Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and Maldives belong to what Curzon conceived as the Indian Empire and are geographically compact.

Historically, the South-Asian sub-continent has experienced a constant stream of invasions and migrations, mostly through the mountain passes of the north-western region, now incorporated into Pakistan. Some four to five thousand years ago, one branch of fair-skinned Aryans moved into the sub-continent, pushing the dark-skinned Dravidians towards the Deccan in the South, where they constituted a different ethnic entity. Subsequently the Scythians, Parthians, Greeks, Huns, Turkish, Mughals and Arabs also came into the sub-continent providing the basis for a multiplicity of languages and cultural traditions. The last foreign occupiers were the British, who came by the sea, establishing their suzerainty over the entire region by the 19th century. The two centuries of British Rule resulted in the emergence of substantial Christian minorities. This mixture of ethnic cultural and religious traditions gave birth to many disputes that effect the interaction between them.

The British Raj was conscious of China's South Asian connections and status, and of Tibet and Sia Kiang as (security) zones of South Asia, especially after China's attempt early in this country to form a Himalayan Confederacy with Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and Tibet under Chinese patronage as they were all "subjects of China"; hence the presence of British consulates, trading marts, listening posts, and soldiers in three Tibetan towns, and in Kashgar in Sinkiang until 1947. In geographic terms, both cartographic map

projections (Mercators showing correct shapes and Arno Peters' showing correct sizes) leave no doubt that Tibet and Sinking were geographically contiguous to South Asia. The same is true of the spring-board area South of Hindikush it belongs ethnically and linguistically to South Asia, with another 3000 kilometers of common border with present day Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province.¹

The other regional misconception pertains to the so-called Indian Ocean. In ancient times, even in the Indian epic Mahabharat, this waterbody was called 'Dakina Samundra'. Until not long ago the Arabs who used this Ocean for trade called it Al Bahar Al Muhit (the enclosed ocean), the Arabian Sea being the Sea of Fars (Persia), and the Bay of Bengal being the Sea of Hind or Sea of Harkund. It was only the British Raj and its global maritime power that conceived it as an Indian Imperial Lake. The sub-continent contains a quarter of the human race, densely packed and characterized by the "triple crises of slow economic development, insufficient political integration and a disorderly arms race (which) with and feed upon each other."²

India has to play a more magnanimous role considering her central position in South Asia. On some occasions India's response to the developments in the neighbourhood have not been up to mark but, quite often her response could not get the desired reaction from her neighbours as in the case of India-Sri Lanka accord, which India entered honestly and lost money and power but, could get brickbats from her ungreatful neighbour. The repeated and much debated allegations

of India's hegemonistic designs in South Asia, the big brotherly attitude expansionist ambitions and bullying tactics vis-a-vis her small neighbours have been made on the basis of anti-Indian trade.

It is in India's interests to think in terms of the region as a whole, it is equally in the interests of the small neighbours to be cognizant of regional realities and imperatives of her national and security interests should also be considered by her neighbours. It is true that a lasting and unhindered growth of social integration in the South Asian region can not be expected unless fences are mended at the political front, ethnic and communal overtones played up by fundamentalists forces and the unabated phenomenon of terrorism have wieldered the political power in South Asia. The policy of divide and rule pursued by the colonialists exploiting ethnically mixed population in all parts of the sub-continent, nay the entire South Asian region created fertile ground for acrimonious relationship between South Asian nations even after they gained independence with serious social implications for all of them. Geographical continuity has made migration of the people from one country to another easier. The worst effected country is India which shares the boundary with each of South Asian neighbours and also shares largest migrants.

(B) Economic Compulsions

Economic compulsions play a significant role in pushing South Asian countries towards each other and into a situation in which India's neighbours stand to be in a closer economic relationship with her geographical setting and the natural distribution of resources are such that mutual dependence is an inescapable reality. Mistrust, psychological hang-ups arising out of much advertised small nation psyche and emphasis on competitive rather than on complementary
nature of economy, the growing protectionism shown by the developed nations, the inevitable political strings attached to foreign economic aid, and the tendency of the North to economically dominate the South should compel South Asian countries to come closer to each other. Spectre of Indian hegemony in the sphere of intra-regional collaboration haunts India's neighbours. This misplaced perception should be given up. If India had such expansionist ambitions, she would have occupied Sri Lanka when her armies were stalled legally or when she intervened in Maldives and easily when Pakistan was defeated in 1971 and major Pakistani forces were prisoners under Indian government. It was not beyond her capacity to merge newly created Bangladesh in her territory, which emerged only due to her help. There would have not been any cry if Nepal had been merged, when King took shelter in the country.

(C) India's Economic and Trade Relations

India's neighbours in South Asia sub-continent share a number of common characteristics. The one all small in size and have close proximity and/or common land trade frontier with India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka were subject to a common British rule during pre-independence period. Agriculture provides the main source of output in Bangladesh and Nepal amounting to 50 per cent of the GDP, while manufactured output is relatively small in all the four countries. Such activity is going momentum in employment in all the four countries. In this group Bangladesh and Nepal with GNP per capita at $208 & are also the least

2. Bangladesh 33%, Nepal 30%, Pakistan 44% and Sri Lanka 42% per cent.
developed among the developed countries. While Nepal is land locked, Sri Lanka are an islands economy. Exports from the above countries mainly comprise of primary commodities, textile and clothing covering more than 70% of the total export value. Merchandise imports of all these countries consists mostly of manufactures, the actual share of which in total imports is 55% to 79%. Food items and fuels are the two other items.

Geographical proximity, historic association and cultural affinity make Indo-Nepal relations unique and unparallel. Unlike other land lock countries Nepal can approach the Sea only through India. The Nearest Sea port Calcutta is 800 km. away from Kathmandu. Though Bangladesh has provided Nepal, transit route via Bangladesh also passes through India. Indo-Nepalies relations go back to ancient times. Sven Kautalya's Arthshastra gives reference to trade between India and Nepal.

The island of Sri Lanka has for India the next land mass just across the 23 miles of shallow wasters of Palk straits. Sri Lanka have common geographical, cultural, social and historical links with India, which goes back to 3rd century BC, when Ashok the Great Sent the message of Lord Buddha to his friend King Davanampiyalise of Sri Lanka though his own son.

1. The share of manufacturing GDP and the rate of interest.
2. Percentage of exports of primary commodities textile and clothing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>25 + 57</td>
<td>(1986)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>28 + 37</td>
<td>(1987)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>33 + 51</td>
<td>(1986)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>41 + 25</td>
<td>(1987)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>33 + 16</td>
<td>(1987)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

India's relations with Bangladesh and Pakistan are unique. These two countries are greater in size than Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and Maldieves. They were parts of Indian economy before independence. The unified economy of pre-partition India implied a considerable interdependence in the regional production pattern for the various parts of the sub-continent. East Bengal, West Punjab, Sind and North West Frontiers comprised the rural hinterland of undivided India.

India's trade with her neighbours has increased since 1970. Trade which was 36.2% with Nepal, 05% with Pakistan, 39.6% with Sri Lanka, in 1970, reached to 132% 26% and 83% respectively upto 1988-89. Commercial relations between India and Bangladesh are governed by Indo-Bangladesh Trade Agreement signed on July 5, 1973. This agreement was renewed for a further period of three years. India is one of the major trading partner of Bangladesh. While imports from Bangladesh have remained a more or less static, the exports from India have been steadily increasing. Indo-Nepal Trade was governed by Treaty of Trade of 1978 which is in status-quo and exports are being made under the per-view of the Treaty. Nepal's exports to India primarily consists of rich, butter, animal feed, jute and textile.

Trade turn over between India and Pakistan has been low. India has accorded MFN treatment to Pakistan but, Pakistan does not reciprocate the gesture to India. Government of Pakistan has adopted 'a list of approach'. The list of 240 items for imports by private traders of Pakistan was approved in 1988 and 322 items were added to the list in 1989-90. Most of these items have no significance to India. India's export include tea, betel leaves, ginger

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1. Director of Trade Statistics Year Book, IMF Issues.
iron ore, tubes and angles of alloys, steel, tractor tyres and the imports contain rock self, fish, pig iron and petroleum products. With other countries India has limited exports and imports under various treaties and agreements.

(D) The Political Systems and the Role of Political Leadership and Political Parties: An Indian Perception

It is one of the axioms of the contemporary science of politics that party has become an indispensable factor in the working of the representative form of government. It lays down this irrefutable rule that a political party in one form or another "is omnipresent". This phenomenon signifies the maximisation of political participation for the reason that it enjoins upon the members of a ruling community to take the people, as much as possible, in confidence either for the sake of observing the myth that the voice of the people is the voice of God or to justify the very legitimacy of their leadership and authority.

India is the world's largest and most populous democracy and largest developing country with a democratic system, surrounded by military-dominated and non-democratic state. It represents one of the most interesting cases of firm, stable and authoritative civilian control of the military. It is remarkable that the appalling problems of low economic development, sharp differences in income, mass poverty, over population, illiteracy, ethnic antagonism, absence of any linguistic, unity, cultural fragmentation, social diversities, and a complex class system do not seem to hinder civilian control of the Indian military. The two

neighbours of India-Pakistan and Bangladesh are comparable or closely matched to her in a number of ways, yet display divergent patterns of civil military relations.\(^1\)

Its ability to build a powerful institutional structure which ordered and moderated individual drives and ambition - a unique party system, a rule-bound administrative and judicial structural, planning machinery, a long network of autonomous institutions and voluntary bodies operating at various levels and plural basis of informed criticism and debate. Culturally and historically too, Indians have shown a remarkable capacity to order their plural identities and their considerable ideological ambiguity by resort to a well laid out operating hierarchy based on formalised rules and conventions. The Indian secular tradition has permitted considerable ideological fluidity but, it had always laid emphasis on an ordering mechanism. This was carried over into the modern period by conceiving the national state as such an ordering mechanism, a new all India cultural tradition based on the ideas and ideals of the new intelligentsia on which the Indian National Congress and the new state were based. The orderly growth of the first two owes itself to this institutional factor.\(^2\)

**THE LEVEL OF POLITICAL SYSTEM'S INSTITUTIONALISATION AND THE ROLE OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND POLITICAL PARTIES TOWARDS INSTITUTION-BUILDING**

No other on the marrow of independence was institutionally as well prepared as India was for self-government. In terms of institutionalisation, defined by 'adaptability',


'complexity', 'autonomy', and 'coherence' of its organisation and procedures\(^1\), according to Huntington, India has ranked high 'not only in comparison with other modernising countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America but also in comparison with many more modern European countries'.\(^2\) The survival and sustenance of the stable and effective parliamentary democracy in India rested largely on the Congress party\(^3\), the Indian civil service\(^4\) and the charisma of Nehru\(^5\). India not only inherited these two organisations, i.e. the Congress party and the administrative system, but these two highly developed institutions were prepared to assume the primary responsibilities for input and output functions. Additionally, the relatively slow pace of modernisation, and social mobilisation in India did not create excessively disrupting demands and strains which

\begin{enumerate}
\item Ibid., p. 84.
\item Michael Brecher views the ability of the Congress to handle three Prime Ministerial successions as a crucial index of Political development. See his *Succession India 1967: The Routinization of Political Change*, *Asian Survey*, vol. VII, no. 7, July 1967, pp. 423-43.
\item Paul H. Appleby considered India as one of the dozen best administered states in the world as its civil and military services were experienced and professional. See his *Public Administration in India: A Report of Survey* (New Delhi: Government of India, Cabinet Secretariat, 1953), pp. 8-9. Ralph Braibanti maintains that the Indian Civil service, dating from the early 19th century was appropriately hailed as 'one of the greatest administrative system of all time'. See his *Public Bureaucracy and Judiciary in Pakistan*, in Joseph Lapalombara (ed.), *Bureaucracy and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 373.
\item Huntington, however, argues that the success of democracy in India rested more on two developed institutions - the Congress party and the Indian Civil Services than on the charisma of Nehru. See his *Political Order in......*, op.cit., p. 84.
\end{enumerate}
the party and bureaucracy were unable to handle so long as these two organisations maintained their institutional strength.

The extraordinary leadership\(^1\) of Nehru for seventeen years instilled in the system a set of values, norms of behaviour and rules of the game, and gave exceptional push and support for parliamentary political system. Nehru had stifled initiative and leadership by others by the dominating, even domineering, position he had held in Indian public life. As S.K. Patil, a strong man of the Congress party, put in bluntly, while 'Nehru is the greatest asset we have because he is just like a banyan shade millions take shelter, he is also a liability because in the shade of that banyan tree, biologically nothing grows'.\(^2\) But on the whole, Nehru made tremendous contribution towards building a national outlook by developing the patterns of identification between the rulers and ruled and evolving a policy consensus.\(^3\) Nehru's ability to build national consensus on political, economic and social structuring, firm commitment to parliamentary democracy, an open society, respect for an independent foreign policy (culminating in the non-aligned movement) have made India the most stable policy in the Third World. In sum, it was leadership in the highest sense provided by a man of Nehru's world stature, calibre and orientation at the helm during the formative phase of nationhood. His leadership provided time for the powerful interest group to learn to mediate their conflicts through the centre, by procedures patterned on those of the British Parliament.\(^4\)

1. Appleby, op.cit., p. 3.
After the death of Jinnah and assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan in Pakistan and the bloody removal of Mujib in Bangladesh, the cult was that of mediocrity. Because the leadership that Pakistan and Bangladesh inherited was largely centred in the titanic personalities of Quaid - I - Azam Jinnah and Bangabandhu Mujib, respectively. Jinnah and Mujib ran the ML and the AL respectively like a General issuing orders to his troops and local commanders.

The formative phase of the nationhood the high level of institutionalisation in India, has largely been possible because of the strength of the ruling Congress - the oldest party of Asia which has often been called the heart of the Indian 'Political miracle'.¹ The most remarkable feature about the Congress has been its highly institutionalised character which is measurable in terms of its effective adaptation with changing times and contexts, its structural and functional complexity, and its autonomous and coherent performance despite factionalism and social pressures.²

As Huntington maintains, 'The decline in party strength the fragmentation of the leadership, the evaporation of mass support, the decay of organisational structure, the shift of political leaders from party to bureaucracy and rise of personalism, all herald the moment when colonels occupy the capital.³

Independence, Congress, unlike other 'movement' parties of South Asia, such as Muslim League, Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League - which also originated as 'mono-functional' organisation and 'functional exigencies' of freedom struggle has neither been reduced to mere skeleton nor faced electoral erosion. Additionally, (1967-72, 1977-79 and 1989-91), the congress has enjoyed a monopoly of power which has been characterised as one-party dominant system reflecting 'inter-party competition but no alternation in power. It functions simultaneously as a ruling party in terms of 'an authoritative spokesman of nation' and also as an opposition in terms of 'affirmative agent of criticism and change'; it has been thus able to domesticate dissent and pre-empt counter mobilisation. The obvious reasons for the congress dominance were its consensual authority, 'a unifying agent not merely in the obvious 'horizontal' sense in which it holds together a range of opinions and interests, but also in the important 'vertical' sense that it brings into contact and interpenetration all levels of politics from the most sophisticated to the most simple and traditional. Congress provided 'the chief competitive mechanism' of the Indian political system in


3. There has almost always been a remarkable ideological consensus around the professed goals of socialism, democracy, nationalism and secularism although the very operation of the system produced centrifugal drives. However, the recent Indian party system points to the disintegration of the consensus on which Congress retained its electoral success and legitimacy. See Kothari, 'The Congress System in India', op.cit., pp. 1161-73.

which competition has been 'internalised' and carried on within the ruling party.¹

The Congress, like the League, was not simply a political machine for the attainment of independence but a movement with nation-wide ramifications. The ML was not as committed as the Indian National Congress or the Ceylonese nationalist leaders to parliamentary institutions. Although the Congress and the ML both displayed strong central direction, the leadership of the Congress was 'collective' not 'dictatorial' like that of the League.² The ML had been to keep control of the party in a small group instead of popular support sought by the Congress. The socialists who broke away from the Congress, or the communists, Hindu communalists, and other group who organised their own national and local political parties, were not regarded by the ruling party as political traitors. While in Pakistan, loyalty to the state was often equated with political support to the League.³

After the brutal assassination of Mujib there was political chaos in the country 'The deaths shortly after the independence of their countries of Senanajake in Ceylon, of Jinnah and Liaqual Ali Khan in Pakistan, and of Aung San in Burma directly hastened the disintegration of their political parties. That the deaths of Gandhi and Patil in India had no such effect on the Congress was not due just to Nehru.⁴ The League could not develop enduring organisational loyalties which facilitated for the rapid degeneration of

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³. Ibid., p. 262.
the League after the departure of Jinnah, this was not immediately apparent because of the charismatic authority wielded by Jinnah in all sectors of political life. The ML was never able to establish the same level of political dominance in Pakistan that the Congress did in India. The ML failed to transform itself from a nationalist movement to a broad-based national party seeking to lead the nation on the road to democracy and planned economic development due to its weak and narrow political support base. Although it took credit for the creation of Pakistan, it rather failed and festered in coping with the different set of post-colonial challenges of political articulation and political aggregation.

The Congress has always been a party with a soft cell organisational frame which is sometimes exaggerated to the extent of the image of a 'mass rally'. The ML, the Congress committed itself to a programme of social and economic change in line with the modernisation theory. The Congress, thus, provided the new government of India with a programme of action, but the policies pursued by the Muslim League in Pakistan during its first decade were thoroughly


3. The Congress was more successful in aggregating diverse interests than was the League. The former aggregated diverse interests and permitted them to continue while the latter tended to absorb them at the cost of their identity. For elaboration see Weiner, 'Politics in South Asia', in Almond and Coleman (eds.), op.cit., pp. 187-95 and 219-20.


to social change and national consolidation. The Congress drew its strength from the urban classes of northern India, the League largely from the wealthy Muslim landlords, who abhorred the reform programme of the Congress.¹

The Congress played a double role as a parliamentry party and as a movement of social reconstruction which operates directly among the people outside the parliamentary institution.²

**FUNCTIONING OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS**

The success of democracy in India was partly a product of a long experiment with political ideas and practices and partly the integration of these with traditional Indian values. The basic political tradition in ancient India was normally monarchial, there were some elements such as the institution of Samiti, Panchayat, Sabha and the institution of Brahmin as the adviser to king, which put constraints on monarchial power, and, therefore, seemed supportive of tendencies towards democracy.³ Pakistan did not enjoy the same experience of representative institutions as India did.

Pakistan, unlike India, Iftikhar Ahmad observes: '.... inherited a military bureaucratic state structure, a strong landed class, an almost non-existent industrial...

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2. Horst Hartmann, Political Parties in India (Meerut : Meenakshi, 1982, p. 54.
bourgeoisie and a weak commercial one. These classes lacked a social base, and were dependent on the state for their economic and political power....

**LEGITIMACY**

During the first two decades the strength of civilian institutions representing effective centres of power under the leadership of Nehru, coupled with policy consensus of Congress, stable bureaucracy, flexible and sensible legislative response to social change and growing commitment of masses to use the ballot box—all these lent legitimacy to the government, and, consequently, paved the way for the consolidation of democracy. On the other hand, Pakistani ruling classes could not acquire legitimacy as they had a kind of viceregal government by civil servants in the guise of politicians, who were spending all their time in playing musical chairs for office and lacked agreement over the fundamental organisation and purposes of the Pakistani state.

A change has occurred now in political sphere of the South Asian countries and a democratic thinking has developed rather than military rule.

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Relevance of Non-Alignment on India's Foreign Policy

(a) Non-Alignment

Past and Present:

Nehru's perception that the big power rivalry in a way protected India's security and that India should therefore play its part skillfully in the global balance of power game and thus ensure her security and power position in World Politics.¹

Nehru proposed that, as far as possible, India should keep away from the power politics of groups, aligned against one other, which have led in the past to world wars and which may again led to disaster on an even vastal scale² speaking at another occasion, Nehru articulated. It consists fundamentally and basically of foreign relations. Once foreign relations go out of your hand into the charge of somebody else

1. Elaborating on this theme, Nehru wrote in his "Defence of India" article published in Gandhi's Young India:... It may be that some will cover her, but the master desire will be to prevent any other nation from possessing India. No country will tolerate the idea of another gaining domination over India and thus acquiring the commanding position which England occupied for so long. If any power was covetous to make the attempt, all others would combine to prevent this and to trounce the intruder. This mutual rivalry-in itself would be the surest guarantee against an attack of India.


This perception of Nehru continued even after independence and there are ample evidence to show that during the cold war years, Nehru wanted India to act as a balancer in the big power game and thus ensure her security and power position in world politics... For details see: Girija Shankar Baj Pal, "India and the Balance of Power", Indian Year Book of International Affairs (Madras), vol. 1, 1952, "Middle Ground between America and Russia", Foreign Affairs, New York vol. 32, no. 2, January 1954. Supposed to have been written by K.M. Panikkar, article argue that India had sought and achieve to some extent a middle ground between the United States and the Soviet Union, See also, P.S. Jayaramu, "Foreign Policy Behaviour of India, Afghanistan and the Himalayan Kingdoms: A balance of power interpretation",

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to the extent and in that measure you are not independent. He was keenly aware of the historic role that the Indian National Movement was playing in the resurgence of Asia and in the dismantling of colonialism and racism in Asia and Africa. As he told his fellow Asian nationalists in April, 1947,

We stand at the end of an era and on the Threshold of a new period of history..... Asia, after a long period of quiescence has suddenly become important again in world affairs.

...It is fitting that India should play her part in this new phase of Asian development..... We have no designs against anybody/ours is the great design of promoting peace and progress all over world. Far too long, have we in Asia been petitioners in western courts and chancelleries. That today must now belong to the past......We do not intend to be the play things of others.

India's policy of non-alignment does not imply pacifism or passive in difference. Nehru more vehemently explained the policy of non-alignment and said:

"Our policy is not to commit ourselves previously to follow a certain line. Our policy is independent of action. If we say we are permanently neutral, it has no meaning except permanent retirement from public affairs in the national sense, Sanyas."

In Lok Sabha on December 9, 1958 Nehru made his policy of Non-Alignment crystal clear and said,

"When we say our policy of non-alignment, obviously we mean non-alignment with military blocks. It is not a negative policy. It is a positive one, a definite one and I hope, a dynamic one. But, in so far as the military blocks today and the cold war are concerned, we do not align ourselves with either block.

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1. Ibid. p. 257.
3. Quoted in Mahajan, V.D., International Relations, S. Chand and Company Ltd., New Delhi, p. 786.
This in itself is not a policy; it is only part of a policy. Countries talk and act so much in terms of military blocks and the cold war in the world today, that one had to lay stress on the fact that we are not parties to the cold war and we are not members of or attacked to, any military block. Nehru had realized in other words, that non-alignment was a logical necessity from the points of view of India's economic development."

To quote Singham and Hune "Nehru had the ability to view issues within an international perspective. Tito insisted on maintaining contact and holding regular meetings. Naseer's political skills brought different groups together and he was especially able in committees where he methodologically achieved consensus. Ndikumah had the vision of a free Africa, Soekarmao provided an indomitable spininess to their activism. Each was an advocate for an issue that became part of the integrated set of principles known as Non-alignment. ¹

Nehru could see the emergence of the Cold war with all its implications and dangers and realize how the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, representative of the two different kinds of Social and economic systems, has likely to bring the colonial world under greatest control. ² India achieved its independence in August 1947 but Nehru could see that the other colonial powers were not willing to withdraw from their colonies. In 1949 the Dutch started an intensive and violent aggression in Indonesia, Nehru, now the Prime Minister of a fully independent India called the second Asian Conference in


2. The only major writer who has taken exception to Nehru's role as a founder of the movement is Alvin Rubinstein who argues that Tito was the Critical architect of non-alignment, Rubinstein Yugoslans and the Non-Aligned world, Princeton University Press, 1970, p. 112-118. Lex Mates, General Secretary of the Belgrade Conference in 1961 fully acknowledges the pioneering role of India and Nehru in his classic work, Non-Alignment Theory and Current Policy, Belgrade 1972.
New Delhi consisting of Asian and Arab Countries this time on a governmental level in support of the liberation movements. This led to the withdrawal of the Dutch and the independence of Indonesia. In the later days non-alignment became the symbol of freedom. Carter stated the view that the non-aligned countries can and should make an active contribution to the resolution of international problems and to the more favourable evolution of international relations.

Prime Minister Nehru, and after him also many other political leaders of young sovereign states, came to understand that full elimination of colonialism and peaceful co-existence of states with different social systems are indispensable conditions for the achievement of India's national arms and world progress.

Since, the 1959 summit at Belgrade 'The world Scene changed dramatically. The Soviet Union has bowed out and the presiding deity of NAM, Yugoslavia, is a shambles. The dismemberment of the Soviet Union has far reaching implications for the countries of NAM. As time passes we see, that the consortium of big powers of the North; that known by the name of G. 7, are preoccupied with furthering and consolidating their own economic interests. The NAM in a spirit of Trust and cooperation should initiated process to evolve a system to end regional wars and tensions amongst

the neighbours and should work as a check to powers detrimental to their interest. Bush emphasised the need for continuing American Leadership to prevent global instability and pave the way for a worldwide movement of democracy. In the joint session of U.S. Congress on September 14, 1990, Bush asserted.

"Out of these troubled times our objective - a new world order can emerge a new era free from threat of terror stronger in the pursuit of justified and more secure in the quest for peace. An era in which the nations of the world. East and West, North and South, can proper and live in harmony.

It is not an exaggeration to say that the western, specially North American understanding of the origins and objectives of the non-aligned movement have seen the movements origin and even its raison-de-tre in terms of the cold war, and are arguing that now the Cold war has ended. Non-alignment also has lost its relevance.

The decade of the 1990s has begun thanks to the series of summit meetings in the closing years of the 80s between the soviet and American leaders resulting in the

5. Janson, J.J. the noted Journalist has gone to the extent of daying that the nonaligned movement is deed and reedy for burial. See his recent writings in The Times of India and Deccan Herald.
signing of the INF Treaty by the two countries and a further decision to cut down their nuclear arsenals - with the winding down of the cold war. Not only has Soviet American relations improved considerably, but the map of Europe has undergone tremendous changes as a result of the unification of Germany, the virtual disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the survival of NATO as an in effective political alliance. As a consequence of the new detente many of the regional conflicts too have either disappeared or lost their importance. Nearer home, China and Soviet Union have normalised their relations. All these changes in the global and regional politico-strategic environment resulting in the dawn of the post-cold war era, argue some analysis.¹

The dismemberment of the Soviet Union has fast reaching implications for the countries of NAM. As time passes we see that the consortium of big powers of the North, that go by the name of G-7, are preoccupied with furthering and consolidating their own economic interests. They view the south as their fie. The IMF, the World Bank and GATT are used to change our economic and social projections to suit their purpose. Helplessly, we are forced to follow them dictates. Sometimes the prescriptions are sugarcoated but consequential result remain the same.²

For the first time it was realised that the presidency of the NAM was so crucial at critical moments in the world History. Unfortunately, neither our scribes nor

¹. For a representative view, See, Chopra, S.N. "NAM on the wayout World Focus, Vol. 11, No 5, May 1990, G.H. Jansen has written vigorously questioning the validity of Non-alignment his newspaper writings. Also see M.S. Rajan's article in the same issue of world focus.

parliament comprehended this new situation whenever the Gulf crisis was discussed in parliament it urged to activate the NAM. The scribes wrote about its glorious past. It was neither easy nor diplomatically expedient to elucidate that the nerve centre of the NAM system had paralysed particularly when the conflict involve two NAM countries - Irak and Kuwait. At its summit the NAM must realise that its political tasks have not ended with the end of the coldwar. Political sovereigntic are still threatened on one plea or the other. The NAM in a spirit of trust and cooperation, should initiate a process to evolve a system to end regional wars and tensions amongst the neighbours. India also need to use its influence among the developing countries to initiate effective measures for greater south-south cooperation. India should also be able to persuade and preswise the developed world to restart the global negotiations for the building up of a new international economic order based on equity and Justice. India has the inner strength and the sophistication to rise up to this tall order.

(b) Relevance of Non-Alignment in India's Foreign Policy:

The promotion of national interest is the principal objective of every country's foreign policy; in fact it is the objective of all government policy. It provides the 'eternal' or the permanent element in a country's reactions with foreign countries. Lord Palmerston said we have no eternal allies and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interest are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow. Very often national interests are projected through doctrinaire ideological or system expositions, but,

even then the primary factor influencing the utterly realistic nature of foreign affairs in the countries national interest Nehru observed -

"Whether a country is imperialistic or Socialist or communist its foreign minister thinks primarily of the interests of that country."

The Brookings Institution defined -

"Interests'(as) what a nation feels to be necessary to its security and well-being objectives are interests sharpened to meet particular international situations, policies are thought out ways of attaining objectives and commitments are specific undertakings in support of policy, national interests reflect the general and continuing ends for which nationa acts.

India adopted the policy of non-alignment as the surest way of assuming peace in a world devided by 'Cold War' The policy of non-alignment has not an accidental one but it has the expression of a complete historical process. Non alignment became the logical framework of India's foreign policy. An independent foreign policy responded to the conscious and sub concious urges of the people impaired a sense of pride and belonging and helped cement the unity of the country. Defining India's foreign policy, Jawahar Lal Nehru said, "any attempt on our part,

1. The observation of Admiral Mohan is worth notice. He says self interest is not only a legitimate, but, a fundamental course of National Policy.


4. Dutt, V.P. India's Foreign Policy, Vikas Publishing House, N. Delhi, p. 4.
that is, the government of the day here, to go too far in our
direction would create difficulties in our own country. It
would be resented and we would produce conflicts in our own
country which would not be helpful to any other country\(^1\). On
October 13, 1949, Nehru said before the both houses of the US
Congress "where freedom is menaced or justice threatened or
where aggression takes place, we can not be and shall not be
neutral. What we plead for and endeavour to practice in our
own imperfect way is a binding faith in peace and an unfailing
endeavour of thought and action to ensure it". In order to
achieve it India introduced the policy of non-alignment.

Non alignment helped India to have a friendly peaceful
relationship with China till the end of the fifties. 1962 war
between India and China was broke out not only because of
non-aligned strategy, contrary to the popular belief that China
exposed our non-alignment in 1962, there was a perceptible gain
from the entire episode because of our non-aligned posture and
strategy. We were able to get military assistance from United
States in the course of the war and from the Soviet Union after
the war. The Soviet decision to assist India in the manufacture
of MIG air crafts; the starting of five year defence plan by
Nehru (which was continued by his successors) and the efforts
during 1964-65 to secure some kind of security guarantees by
the big powers, which of course failed need to be looked upon
as attempts made to argument India's defence capability within
the framework of non-alignment\(^2\). The final and the most
rewarding effort in the direction of strengthening India's
national security and non-alignment came with the signing of
the Indo-Soviet Treaty on 9th August 1977. That the Treaty did

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1. Speeches at the Indian Council of World Affairs, March 22,
1949, Indias Foreign Policy, Selected Speeches, September
1946 - April, 1961, New Delhi, publication Division, p.
42-50.

2. Jayaramu, P.S., "Jawaharlal Nehru and India's National
Security", Mainstream, vol. 26, no. 33, May 28, 1988,
pp. 17-20.
not mean a compromise with non-alignment is seen from the manner in which Mrs. Gandhi ensured a written commitment by the USSR about its respect for Indian non-alignment of the text of the treaty itself.¹

India did not feel constrained by the Soviet Union, in the following years, in the free conduct of its foreign policy was evident from the signing of the Simla Agreement with Pakistan in July 1972, explosion of the nuclear device in 1974, signifying our capability to produce the bomb, the need arose, and the resumption of ambassadorial relations with communist China in 1976. Needless to say, all these actions of Mrs. Gandhi not only added to the country's security and power profile but won universal acceptability for its non-alignment strategy.² Through non-aligned diplomacy India cautioned the US and USSR that while it welcomed their efforts at super power detente, the same should not result in a condominium by them over the developing nations and pleaded for an condominium by them over the developing nations and pleaded for an extension of detente to the Third World³. While it is debatable as to whether detente conferred any benefits on India, thanks to the diplomatic postures of India and other countries, the super powers were forced to exercise restraint in their policies towards the Third World. During 1976-78, India welcomed the USSR efforts at limiting their Naval presence in the Indian Ocean.⁴ The Soviet intervention in

Afghanistan and India decision to abstain in UN General assembly voting on the subject in January 1980 when more than 103 nations voted the Soviet Union calling for withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Indira Gandhi also favoured the policy of Non-alignment. In a speech on August 31, 1970, she restated basic principles of India's foreign policy. In particular she affirmed India's faith in non-alignment. There were people she said, who though non-alignment had not served India's interests; the obvious alternative was for India to be aligned. "I am sure", she said, "anybody who looks clearly at this picture will immediately come to the conclusion that it would not be in our interest to join any block. I do not think that it is an idealistic position. I think it is the only hard-headed practical path that is open to any country which wants to keep itself independent".

After Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister Morarji Desai in the first Conference held in March 24, 1977 asserted that the countries foreign policy would be properly non aligned. The Washington Post in an article published on March 26, 1977 stated:

"Mr. Desai's record and India's circumstances alive indicate that he is most likely to pursue a truer non-alignment. The history of Indo-American relations angers strongly that it is not particularly in the interest of either country to try to build a patron client relationship, India resent it".

In the conference of Foreign Ministers of the Coordinating Bureau on Non-aligned countries, held in New Delhi, from April 7, 1977, Desai assumed the members and said,

"During our recent general elections, there were many issues which were the subject of fierce controversy. But the principles on non-alignment and the essence of foreign policy were not among them. I have no hesitation in assuring your Excellencies that India will remain non-aligned in
the real sense of the term".  

Foreign Minister Vajpaye in Janta Regime also reiterated India's commitment of non-alignment. He said, "This is a welcome opportunity for us to reiterate India's continuing adherence to the policy of non-alignment which has been the cornerstone of our foreign policy since independence?"

Rajiv Gandhi followed up this traditional policy of non-alignment and extended India's hand for co-operation to the Third World, as also to the East and the West, V.P. Singh and Chandra Shekhar too, did not rule out the policy of non-alignment. Prime Minister Narsimha Rao, adopted the policy of Non-Alignment and in an interview with Times said,

"If I am to..... retain any independence of judgement and action, it does not matter to me whether there are two blocks or three blocks or one block" he further added, "people are pointing out that there is only one block and my reply is "do you want me to align with it? The answer is no because I am to remain independent and retain my independence of judgement."

1. FAR, April, 1977, p. 55.
The British conquered India on the strength of the Presidency Armies. The East India company, which had been granted a charter on 31 December 1600 by Queen Elizabeth I to trade across the world and permitted by Emperor Jahangir's "Firman" in January 1613 to establish a trading post at Surat (which remained the headquarters of the Company's western Indian trade until 1687, when it was succeeded by Bombay) supplemented its protected forces in 1683 by adding to it two companies of Rajputs each 100 strong and commanded by its own Rajput officers. This small force, auxiliaries to the Bombay-European troops, though not the first Indian Soldiers of the English may be regarded in the opinion of Sir Patrick Cadels as the beginning of the Indian Army. In 1752 Major Stringer Lawrence, who was appointed the Commander-in-Chief of the company's forces in India, was subsequently deemed by the English as "the father of the Indian Army".

From 1776 till 1857, the Bengal Army was almost entirely recruited from among the 'Purbias' and till 1857 they were viewed as brave and manly" and were mostly Brahmins and Rajputs. After describing the "Early Beginning in his book "The Indian Army" from the 17th to the 21st century, Stan Menezes, Surveyed the Presidency Armies in war before 1857", as a consequence of Plassy, the English prospered and the Dutch influence declined. Buxur (1763) supplemented Plassy by strengthening the English hold over Bengal and Bihar. By 1765, the English had subdued as far as Allahabad, Banaras, Faizabad, Lucknow and Emperor Shah Alam II sought British Protection. In 1893 Army organisation

commission abolished the Presidency Army System and introduced unified Indian Army system. Lord Kitchner reorganised the Army. During World War I, more than a million Indians served abroad and 60000 were killed. The First World War proved to be, as the Second World War was to prove later, both an engine and catalyst for social change, particularly for the millions who served in the Indian Army. After appointment of Auchinleck as C-in-C in India in 1941, the expansion of the Indian Army started in earnest. After the Indian Army's reverse in 1962, President Radha Krishnan remarked "War or no war, invasion or no invasion, attack or no attack, we must not be caught napping again. We must increase our strength... Military weakness has been a temptation, a little military strength may be a deterrent", and actually manpower ceiling was raised on its Indian Army thereafter.

The Civil Military Relations

The major blow to the Autonomy and influence of the military—especially to the only substantial service, the army was struck on Independence Day, August 15, 1947, when the position of Commander-in-Chief in India was abolished and three Chiefs were made responsible to the Defence Minister and were collectively, the professional military advisers to the government. The ostensible reason for this drastic reduction in the relative influence of the chief of the army to promote balanced growth among services and to follow all 'modern' armed forces which have each of the three services under an independent chief.

1. Ibid.
Sketch 2: Indian Army: Peacetime Locations

- Naval Command boundaries
- Naval Command and HQ

Map showing locations such as Daman, HQ Western, Dumas, Pondicherry, Southern Cochin, Trichinopoly, Pondicherry, and SRI LANKA.
There were also other reasons. The only challenge to the civilian authority could come from the numerically dominant army, reducing the authority of its Chief to the point where he was not even first among equals made it easier to balance off the army with the other two services.¹

The strengthening of the civil service dominated ministry of Defence was a second critical organizational change. The military had also been under close financial scrutiny of the ministry of Finance. Some bureaucratic change were also made in the warrant of Precedence. A secretary in the government of India ranked lower than a lieutenant-general until 1947; afterwards he was made to be ranked to a full general. The Chief Secretary of a state formerly ranked with brigadiers, after independence he was made to rank with a major general. In 1948, the Chief of the Army Staff, ranked with judges of the Supreme Court of India, but, was senior to Chief Ministers outside their states or the Secretary General of the External Affairs Ministry, In 1951. Chief of the Army Staff became junior to Chief Ministers outside.²

All these changes resulted in the reduction of the military's role in the decision making process. The military was thoroughly indoctrinated with the principle of civilian control and never protested against the reduction of its own powers. Krishna Menon's formulation of the proper relationship between the civil military relations were clear.

He asserted:

"It is wrong for the army to try to make policy. Their business is to be concerned with military

¹ Ibid.

tactics. Military planning and arrangements and things of that kind must remain in the hands of the Government and even inside the Government these questions are largely conditioned by finance. I believe, the statement that was made recently, that strategy was left with the army, was due to misuse of terms. The Government is not going to say that it wants one company here or two companies there, but, the Government will certainly say we should attack Pakistan or we should not attack Pakistan "or" we should accept trainees from Indonesia and Malaysia" or things of that kind; these are all matters of policy.... of course, military matters are nearly questions of expertise, strategy includes considerations that are related to our political orientation. 1

There is an interesting postulation on the organizational matter,". If the officer corps are originally divided into land, sea, and air elements and than is unified under the leadership of a single overall staff and military commander-in-Chief, this change will tend to increase its authority with regard to other institutions of Government. It will speak with one voice instead of three. Other group will not be able to play off one portion of the officer corps against another. 2 The statue of the Armed Forces was declined after Independence both in Society and State. 3 The absence of any apparent threat to Indian Security during at least the first decade of Independence reinforced the belief that Gandhi had shown the Superiority of moral over physical force. There was, thus, philosophic barrier to attacking undue glamour or importance to a military uniform, 4 in independent India. A steady Shrinkage of the economic content of an officer':

4. Ibid.
Emoluments also started, "Lt. Generals lost their former entitlements to gun salutes, and military officers leave and travel concessions were also terminated and reduced. During the first decade after independence the Defence portfolio seemingly carried little weight in the Cabinet. In this evolving pattern of Civil military relationship, decisions on defence matters were taken depending on individual services being able to present their cases fully and frankly to the appropriate civilian officials clearly made the decision. This arrangement, however, had a serious flaw because the ignorance of civilian officials about military matters is not complete as to be a self-evidence and in controvertible feet.

During this period a military coup took place in Pakistan in 1958 which further vitiated the atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust of the Indian military among political circles in India. This fear was natural as in some newly independent countries military rule was adopted. This view may precisely be explained in words of Kuneramangalam. He said:

'Pre-independence, our nationalist leaders, even at the height of the non-cooperation movement, never tried to involve Indian officers in national politics. This British tradition which was tacitly accepted by our political leaders, has continued... Unlike our political leadership, League leaders were getting Muslim officers involved in politics immediately before and after independence. Therefore, politicisation of the Pakistani Officer cadre was there from start.... Our politicians have a very real fear of a military take-over. I had once explained this to the Defence Minister, Chavan,

when I was vice Chief and he voiced this fear about General Chaudheri, I could not make any real headway in convincing him that he was talking nonsense. The main culprit was X. Who spent most of his time keeping an eye on successive chiefs, who never thought of Coups'.

General Thimayya, who had taken over as the Army Chief in 1957, came in conflict with Menon's interference in the Army promotions and his persistent misrepresentation of service views on military policy to Nehru. Thimayya resigned and was persuaded by Nehru to take back his resignation, but the controversy did immense damage to the morale of the officer corps.

"Towards the end of his many in New Delhi who became jealous of him. One of them was a politician and the other was a soldier. Both were very influential men and both were equally ambitious particularly, the soldier. A plot was hatched by these two to pull Timmy down in Panditji's eyes and thus to lower his image generally".

However, the plot did not work. After the setback suffered by Indian, in the hands of Chinese, Thimayya was appointed to the most prestigious national Defence Council. During another tenure, a canard was let loose that Thimayya was planning a Coup. General, S.P.P. Thorat, who was a close friend of Thimayya and who, as per the Army's expectations, should have succeeded Thimayya, recalls:

1. Mangaloom, Kumar PP, DSO, Ex-Chief of the Army Staff, in his answer to a questionble for authors book Military Leadership to Present Military Coup, Lancer International, New Delhi, 1986.


"Yes, there was an attempt in 1960-61 against Thimayya but, it had nothing to do with Civil military relations and it was not intended to frame the General for an attempt to intervene in the country’s politics. The attempt was intended to lower Timmy’s image in the eyes of the Prime Minister, Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru. Timmy was really a blue-eyed boy of Panditji. He was treated like a member of his house hold and a valued friend. Naturally, there were officer described that there was never any attempt by any chief to intervene militarily in the political life. A feeling of fear was created by the action of some senior officers carrying tales, maligning seniors by falsehood and lies by imaginary anti-Government mores of Seniors...This was much to the liking of certain politicians and civilian officials, who encouraged, aided and abetted such despicable activities. In 1960, a rumour was set a foot of General Thimayya staging a coup. Tanks, armoured cars and infantry from some formations near Delhi were brought to Delhi without knowledge of the chief.1

When the country was griped under debacle of 1962 and when General Thaper resigned, the obvious choice to succeed him was General Chaudhari. The Home Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri showed reluctance to appoint him as Army Chief, because he had political ambitions. Mr. L.P. Singh laid hands on the biography of Abrahims Lincoln and readout the following to General Hooker:

"I have placed you at the need of the Army of the Potomac. Of course, I have done this upon what appears to me sufficient reason, and yet I think it best for you to know that.... I have heard in such a way as to believe it, of your recently saying that both the Army and the Government needed a dictator. Of course, it was not for this, but, inspite of it, that I have given you the

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command. Only those Generals who gain success can be set up as dictators. What I know ask of you is military success, and I will risk the dictatorship”.¹

Having read the passage the Home Secretary advised the Minister for Home that first requirement was to fight Chinese and consequently General Chaudhuri, has appointed Army Chief. For some time the fears of coup were accentuated after 1962. Nehru wrote to Bertrand Russell in December 1962 that the danger of the military mentality spreading in India, and the power of the Army increasing.²

In fact there is no chance of any military coup in India. General Bewoor, the chief from 1973 to 1975 observed that there is little chance to day that the Armed Forces can effect a political change by getting themselves into power. They are being used as a unified factor as the only reliable body in the country to ensure law and order and they are being wooed by the powers in the centre by meeting their needs in terms of financial and career prospects.³

India has a constitution in which there is a provision for handle almost every type of political and financial instability. From the Punjab Trouble to the Hazratbal episode, the Army has stood by the Central Government to safeguard the law and order position without any cast and creed considerations.

The position in other SAARC countries is different. There are no chances of any military coup in Bhutan, Maldives and Nepal as the army strength is limited. As regards to Bangladesh and Pakistan, the position is absolutely different and both the countries have come out of the military pressure in the near past but the political ambitions of the army are still alive.
The Military Balance

The comparison of conventional forces in South Asia is difficult. India and Pakistan have fundamentally different perspectives on the question of military balance. To use some of the American Terminologies used during the SALTI negotiations, Pakistan has established essential equivalence with India, while India, has sought to achieve 'Equal Security' taking into account the "Chinese threat." India sought merely matching capabilities with Pakistan in the 1950s and early 1960s, and a slight edge between the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pakistan wars. Thus following the American military aid to Pakistan under the SEATO and CENTO defence pacts forged in 1954 and 1955, India sought to offset Pakistani acquisitions of American F-86 Sabre, F-104 Starfighter and B-57 Canberra Combat aircraft and the M-47/48 Patton Tanks by purchasing British F-6 Hunters Fighters and B-1 Canberra bombers, The French Mystere IV Fighter Bombers and British Centurion and French AMX-13 tanks.¹

The quality and quantity of Indian military procurements before the shock of the 1962 Sino-Indian war certainly did not exceed the military capabilities of Pakistan. During this time Pakistan had two armored divisions to India's one division while the total number of infantry divisions were 8 for Pakistan and 10 for India. The United States had made Pakistan the second largest recipient of Military Assistance Programme (MAP) aid, providing some $650 million aid but, the admitted fact is that India's military forces are so superior to

those of Pakistan that even US Aid can not do any thing, other than improve Pakistan's ability, to deter Indian attacks. The position may be made clear from the table given below.

Table

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It shows that Indian has a massive lead in military manpower, in military spending, and arms imports. Indian military spending has exceeded by 150% in the last few years, and India's advantage is increasing. In 1987-88 India spent 125-12 billion rupees and was four times of
Pakistan. Because of the Himalayas, India faces only a limited peripheral threat from the PRC, and Bangladesh is now more a dependent ally than a threat. India has great strategic depth. Its major cities and economic facilities are far from the Pakistan's target while all of Pakistan's cities, economic targets and military targets are within easy flying range of even India's shorter range attack fighters.

The Balance of Military Manpower

India has made major reductions in its military efforts since its victory in 1971 but, still it has three times men in military than Pakistan. In 1970 Pakistan tried to maintain a large standing army, but, could not afford due to financial burden and now, had attempted to maintain a large reserve. India's para military forces are much better trained and equipped than those of Pakistan.

India's superiority in army manpower is matched by its overall superiority in ground forces combat units and equipment. This is as a result of both Indias superiority in equipment and the structure and history of the Indian and Pakistani Armies. The Indian army has two armoured divisions, one mechanized division, 1/2 infantry divisions, seven mountain divisions and 19 independent brigades. The Pakistani army has two armoured division, 19 infantry

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4. Ibid., p. 18.
divisions, and 12 independent brigades. It is one third to one half of the combat and service support available to Indian forces.¹

India's advantage in the size of its army's manpower is matched by an overall superiority in the quality and quantity of its land forces. Although, India's numeric lead of 5:3 in tanks is not striking its qualitative superiority of its armor force is quite evident. Most of the Indian army equipment is of Soviet origin and is being replaced, by indigenously produced. Soviet T-72s tanks are being replaced by Vijayants² BMPIs and BMP-23 are being placed in place of BTR-60 PB. Indian army is based on British tradition and is made up of combat elements. The active Indian army has 12,60,000 regulars selected out of the 86 million men between 18 and 30 years of age.³ India has 3200 main battle tanks to equip its armoured divisions. The Indian produced Vijayanta is said to be a weak link in Indian armor. It is light and its armor is insufficient to modern anti-tank weapons. Its chassis can not carry the needed additional armos to make the Vijayanta Survivable. The T-54/553 tanks are similar to Pakistan's Chinese Type 59s but, have more modern range finders, transmissions and engine. Indians have added sheet metal to change profile of their gun barrels⁴ and are being modernized with beller sights laser

range finders. The Indian army is largely an infantry force with limited motor transport and is better mechanized than Pakistan and have 1360 modern MICVs and armoured personal carriers.

India has far more artillery strength than Pakistan and can supply much larger rates of ammunition to the front and are also truck mounted 122 mm rocket launchers. India has Mark 11,105 mm self propelled guns and 400 Bofors FH-77B 155 mm self-propelled howitzers. Indian army also has Soviet 5A launchers. Overall quality of Indian Army air defence are far better than those of Pakistan. The Pakistani Army has limited numbers of crotale missiles, it has only obsolete CS A-I heavy SAM system and does not have modern radar guided AA Guns. India has ten divisions of mountain troops.

The Pakistan Army

Pakistan feels that it has reached proportionately very close to Indian military strength. But, it fails to recognise that the modern military power primarily rests upon industrial might and this power determines the strategic importance of the country. Since Pakistan is not highly industrialised strategically, after Afghanistan

1. Ibid., p. 18.
"the US need to protect Pakistan" is much reduced, while there is a genuine prospect of a constructive American-Indian relationship" wrote political scientist Scalapino recently.¹

Pakistan has adopted a policy of offence against India. Under some misperception it has engaged itself in a more aggressive policy, including initiating war without notice. The offence-defence balance studies have been carried out in the USA in relation to containment theory. Jervis², Quester³ and Levy⁴ show that when offence is or is thought to be easy (i.e. states can expand at low cost) then national leaders worry more about security and do more to protect it. By contrasting when defence is easier (especially when it is easy to distinguish between offensive and defensive capabilities) states can protect their territory with greater confidence at lower cost.⁵

In addition to direct military action, Pakistan has resorted to clandestine sub-version and propaganda. Walt in his 'Origin of Alliance' has stated that such campaigns rarely succeed, even against relatively weak governments.⁶ and India is comparatively strong nation in size, population, natural resources, political stability and

militarily. Pakistan is using these tactics in vain and these mechanization may strike back at Pakistan once it is found that it has cooled off to sustain.

Pakistan Army has the same British heritage as Indian Army. The Pakistan Army of 620,000 regulars is adequately supported by the population of 113.1 million.¹ The dominant ethnic group is that of Punjabi who dominate 65%. The second most prevalent group is that of Pathan tribesman. The Pakistan has also a reserve force of 500,000 which are soldiers released from active service.² Some thirty thousand Pakistani soldiers are serving in the armed forces of twenty two countries ranging from Saudi Arabia and Jordan to Libiya.³ The Pakistani Army is primarily an infantry force. Twenty two regiments are equipped with roughly 1000 PRC Type 59 tanks.⁴ and have poor guns and fire control system. Pakistan has brought Chinese copies of the same artillery pieces that India bought from the Soviets. In addition Pakistan is purchasing greater number of US self-propelled artillery. The few helicopter owned by Pakistani Air Force are not capable of moving more than two battalions and are only suited for liaison duties.⁵

2. Ibid.
US intelligence experts estimate that Pakistan Army could defend against Indian invasion for a few days to a few weeks. This accurately reflects the numerical imbalance in sides force, strength and order of battle. Pakistan will do better in defense only. Its army is though now strong but had little offensive capability. Pakistan has weak air defense forces and lacks clear strategic objectives.

The Balance of Air Force

India has such a high margin of superiority that none of the arms the US plans to ship Pakistan would do more than strengthen its deterrent capability. India possesses a 4:1 advantage over Pakistan in all-weather fighter and attack aircraft. Qualitatively, the Indian Air Force must also be considered one of the best equipped services in the third world, Indian Air Force assets are being improved as MIG-23s, MIG-27 Floggers and MIG-29, Fulcrums armed with AA-7 and AA-8 (Aphid) MIG-21 equipped with AA-2 (Atoil) AAM. India has 31 Jaguar attack fighters, 165 MIG-27 MS and at least 40 MIG-29 Fulcrums and at least 24 French Dassault Mirage 2000 Hs. This compares with Pakistan order of 10 F-16A/Bs and roughly 100 Chinese F-5 and Xian J-7 fighters.

Despite the addition of 46-50 F-16s, Pakistan Air Force possesses a fleet of predominantly Chinese furnished combat aircraft, but, that are far inferior

2. Two Squadrons of MIG-29s called Baz have been assembled at Nasik factory, James Defence Weekly, May 30, 1987, p. 1846.
to India. The Chinese F-6 (MIG-19) is troublesome and need frequent repairs. This imbalance in the air is matched by the imbalance in ground based air defence systems. India has 30 battalions of SA-2 and SA-3 surface to-air missiles in addition to its 120 SA-6 fire units. Pakistan only has a token surface-to-air missile force of six batteries of crotale missiles with four fire units.\(^1\) India's overwhelming numeric superiority can gain rapid dominance over its neighbour's smaller and antiquated airforce. Indian force is large modern with a total strength of 850 aircraft. The Indian Air Force has a total active manning of 113000 men compared to only 17600 for Pakistan. This gives nearly six times Pakistan's active air force manpower. India has also the advantage of better command and control and battle management system, better sensors and more strategic depth.

Pakistan's Air Force is much smaller than the Indian Air Force and is less modern. Due to the limited strategic depth of the country, Pakistani air bases are located within striking range of India, while Pakistan has limited targets to select from the fighter range problem. Indian Air Force has a numerical and qualitative advantage over Pakistani Air Force. It is also important that F-16A and other aircraft in the Pakistan Air Force can not face MIG-21 or MIG-23 threat.\(^2\)

**The Balance of Naval Forces**

India's Navy enjoys numeric as well qualitative superiority over Pakistan. India has conducted a large scale expansion programs. In 1971 Indo-Pakistan war,

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the Indian Navy was able to carry out a successful sea blockade of Pakistan. Pakistan's inferior naval capabilities are the result of its small fleet of aging surface combatants of British and Chinese origin.

The Indian Navy is a formidable force when compared to other navies in the area. No local Navy including that of Pakistan is able to compete on the open sea with the Indian Navy. India's Navy is large. India has two air craft carriers Vikrant and Hermes. Each carrier has a capacity for 18 Sea Harriers and 4 helicopters. India has 17 submarines while Pakistan has only 6. Pakistan Navy is small force India has the force to control the sea lanes to Pakistan, and Pakistan can do little to stop it. Pakistan is still dependent on foreign supplies for its military and can not afford a long war during which India can cut its ocean life-line.

Estimate

India's population and land area is almost eight times the size of Pakistan compared to the essentially equivalent population sizes of the United States and the Soviet Union (USSR) Indian Military preponderance in South Asia is precisely, the goal of Indian defence policy to maintain peace and stability in the region. According to Professor A.F.K. Organiski of University of Michigan, 'the weaker state dare not to attack, while the stronger state need not attack'. Even when wars do take place, often it occurs because the weaker state is attempting to catch up in the military balance with the stronger state. The fact that there has been no Indo-Pakistan

wars since the last in December 1971 attributes to India’s military preponderance. After the creation of Bangladesh, India now appears determined to maintain its military superiority on the subcontinent.

On the eve of the 1971 war with Pakistan, the Indian army consisted of 830000 men and included one armoured division. There were 13 infantry divisions and 10 mountain divisions against China along the Himalayan frontiers. Against this, Pakistan Army consisted of 365000 men including 2 armoured divisions, 12 infantry divisions. The Indian Navy consisted of 47000 men and the Pakistan Navy consisted of 10000 man, 4 smaller Italian Daphne-class submarines and 3 destroyer escorts. There is a greater quantitative imbalance in the air and at sea. 12 armoured helicopter distributed among 50 squadrons. Indian Navy had expanded to 47000 military personal along with 2 carriers, 5 destroyers 21 frigates, 17 submarines and another 34 patrol and costal combat vessels.

Comparatively, Pakistan is consisted of 620000 man organised into 7 corps Headquarters including 17 infantry divisions, 2 armoured divisions, 12 independent armoured brigades. It had 2100 MBT's. There are 25000 men in air force equipped with 451 combat air craft organized into 12 fighter squadrons.

The Indo-Pakistan balance of military forces on the ground measured in terms of military personal is 1.26

million to 620000 (ratio 2.5:1) and measured in terms of main battle tanks is 3200 to 2100 (ratio of 1.8:1).

After twenty two years, the situation has substantially changed in South Asia. By 1992, the Indian Army consisted of approximately 1.26 million military personal in 5 regional commands and 10 corps headquarters. This includes 19 infantry divisions 11 mountain divisions supplemented with 8 armoured, 7 infantry, one mountain and 3 independent artillery brigades. The Indian army carried 3150 main Battle Tanks organized into 5 Air Commands. Indian Air Force now comprise 115000 men and carried 836 combat air craft.

Indias naval expansion is generally unrelated to the traditional sino-Pakistani threat. The growth of the Indian Navy since the 1971 war has been based on a wider strategic perspective and proximate objectives to establish sea power and defend India's Trade and to protect the mineral resources within its 200 miles economic zone.

The basic problem in South Asia is that India perceives itself as an Asian power with the need for military capabilities that reflect, its size and land boundaries, while Pakistan would like to keep India militarily on level with itself. Pakistan claims that India is

determine to undo partition and absorb it into a greater India. India do not think in this direction. India could have done it quite readily in 1971 when it occupied East Pakistan and has poised to crush the demoralized Pakistani military forces along its borders with West Pakistan.¹