CHAPTER - II

SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN:

PAKISTAN GETS ‘FRONTLINE’ STATUS

Pakistan and the United States came even closer in the wake of the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979. Eventually, Afghan crisis became a ‘turning point’ for United States-Pak strategic relations. The past deterioration in US-Pak relations on account of Pakistan’s nuclear programmes came in for reappraisal. The Soviet ‘adventure’ in Afghanistan brought a dramatic sea change in the geo-strategic situation and led the American policy makers to “rediscover” the strategic importance of Pakistan. The Carter Administration emphasized Pakistan’s new role as a “front line state” against the possible Soviet expansion. Pakistan, according to Thomas Perry Thorton, an American scholar, now became “an essential line of defence and an indispensable element of any strategy that sought to punish the Soviet for their action”.

Before the Soviet intervention Pakistan-US relations were fraught with deep cleavages over the former’s covert acquisition of Uranium enrichment technology, when Carter Administration suspended American aid to Pakistan under the Symington-Glenn Amendment to Security Assistance Act. However, in its efforts to re-establish close military and economic ties with the Pakistan
government, Washington over rode its nuclear and human rights concerns which had inhibited their relations in the past so much.

Similarly, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan posed both challenges and opportunities for Pakistan, an endemically unstable country situated uncomfortably at the juncture of South, West and Central Asia. The Soviet intervention underscored Pakistan's strategic importance as never before. Pakistan responded with a much more cautious and subtle policy. The Zia government immediately moved to repair its strained ties with Washington and other friendly countries to bolster its defence and form a 'broad' front against Soviet Union.²

The American response towards the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in general and towards Pakistan in particular has to be examined in the wider context of other developments in the region. The fall of Shah government in Iran, a strong and close American ally in West Asia and Persian Gulf, and coming into power of a revolutionary regime under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomayni, which was extremely critical of the USA. American's political and strategic interest in Gulf suffered a further set back when the US embassy personnel were taken hostage in Tehran by supporters of Ayatollah Khomayni in November 1979. The spiralling events were coupled by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Soviet action raised the spectre of renewed Soviet
expansionist strategy in the Middle East and had signaled a change in the strategic balance in the region.3

**Genesis of the Afghan Crisis**

Afghan crisis had its genesis in the pro-Soviet elements in the Afghan armed forces when they staged a successful coup on April 27, 1978, in collaboration with the Afghan communist party against President Mohammad Daud. Although, Pakistan recognized the new regime and expressed the desire to improve relations, still Pakistan was seriously perturbed over what it regarded as the Pro-Soviet leanings of the new government in Kabul.4 Islamabad was fearful of grave repercussions of the establishment of a leftist, a pro-Moscow regime in neighbouring Afghanistan. From Pakistan’s point of view the coup in Kabul caused a historic readjustment in this part of the world as Afghanistan ceased to be the traditional ‘buffer’ between South Asia and Soviet Union. The Pakistani establishment apprehended that once the new Afghan government had consolidated its position it would create difficulties for Pakistan by fanning political grievances and ethno-national tension by reviving the ‘Durand Line’ issue between the two countries. As expected by Islamabad Afghanistan soon expressed support to the “Baluch and Pukhtoon brethren” from the very out set.5
The change in the guard in Kabul did not go well with the tribal and religious conservative society of Afghanistan. They organized an armed resistance against the new regime which was denounced as communist and atheist. Soon the tribals posed great problems for Afghan government and it became quite difficult for it to strengthen its foothold due to the stiff resistance. The Kabul government alleged that Pakistan was sheltering and supporting mercenaries against Afghanistan. The allegations were not completely baseless as there were evidence that Pakistan organized Afghan resistance fighter from among the refugees, living in Baluchistan and North West Frontier Province, bordering Afghanistan with the cry of “Islam in danger”. Islamabad also supplied other assistance through American’s CIA and ISI of Pakistan, to strengthen the resistance and enabled it to survive the Afghan government’s effort to wipe it out. Soviet invasion in Afghanistan provided both opportunities and fear for Islamabad. Pakistan and Afghanistan had long standing border dispute along the North-Western part of Pakistan. To pre-empt future Afghan demand Zia administration organized and trained number of Pushtoons on the both side of the border under Pakistan control. Zia government used these fighters for its advantage to not only end Afghanistan claims across line but also create a formidable ‘buffer’ between it and the Soviet imperial domain to the North.
Pakistan perceived the communist government in Afghanistan as a serious threat to its security. Pakistan tried to formulate international opinion against Soviet threat to its security and enforce Afghan resistance fighters. Zia wanted the United States to take a serious note of the grave situation arising from the installation of a communist government in Kabul and respond forcefully in collaboration with Islamabad. Pakistan officially sought to impress upon the US officials, the need to hold their country as it had virtually became “a front line state”.

The Carter administration was comparatively slow to appreciate the implications of the Afghan coup and did not comprehend the grave threat inherent in that. Since at that time the ‘Cold War’ was as its lowest ebb and there was détente between the super powers. Due to reduction in conflict in other parts of the world the Afghan coup was viewed in Washington as an internal event without Soviet Union’s role. There was no immediate official reaction by the US to the communist coup in Kabul. The US economic, cultural, educational and peace programme in Afghanistan continued. This studied silence maintained by Washington showed that it was unconcerned that another country apparently had joined the Soviet bloc.

The Shah of Iran was the first to draw Carter’s attention towards Soviet intention in Kabul. But American officials did not
pay heed to Iranian version of the coup. Tehran considered it one more example of the Soviet grand design and a further proof of the Soviet drive to encircle Iran. To Iran’s surprise US urged Shah to co-operate with Afghan government.

There appeared to be no serious thinking in Washington to review the US South Asia policy, particularly relations with Iran and Pakistan in the rapidly changing strategic scenario in this region. The US was well convinced by the Soviet Afghan assurance that the “Saur revolution” was an internal development committed to promote democracy and security and to pursue a non aligned policy.\textsuperscript{8}

**Assassination of US Ambassador in Kabul**

However, the events that followed made it very evident to the US policy maker’s that their Afghan assessment was erroneous. It was the murder of Ambassador Dubbs in Kabul in February 1979, which made the Carter administration to realize the ground reality and grave implications of the coup. He was first kept as hostage in Kabul and subsequently assassinated by four Afghan’s in Kabul on February 14, 1979. Dubbs assassination cast a spell on the already deteriorating US-Afghan relations. As it posed many unresolved questions about the role of Afghan government in the affairs and its consequent uncooperative attitude. Dubbs was kept hostage in a hotel and kidnappers demanded release of the
arrested leftist member in exchange for Dubbs. The US embassy advised the Afghan government to prolong the negotiations while applying rescue operations. But the Afghan forces along with Soviet advisers stormed the hotel which resulted in the death of Dubbs. According to Richard P. Cornin, Soviet Security advisers appeared to be directing the operation and the Afghan government disregarded US suggestion that an attempt to rescue Dubbs by force be delayed. The United States was highly provoked by this act. The outraged Carter administration blamed Moscow's involvement in the murder of Dubbs. On July 23rd, 1978 Washington announced the withdrawal of most of its diplomatic personnel from Afghanistan because of security reasons. Thus, US relations with Afghanistan reached at its nadir. Now Washington recognized effect of the coup on Afghanistan's neighbours.9

Given the anti-American orientation of the Iranian Revolution, and India's pro-Soviet stance, Pakistan was seen as the one country with which to work closely in order to protect US interest in the area. The development in Iran and Afghanistan forced the Carter administration to resume aid to Pakistan on October 24, 1978. This decision was taken to align closely with Pakistan.10 Carter administration took time to implement the decisions.
United States issued a warning to the Soviet Union of the adverse consequences of their expanding role in Afghanistan. In early September 1979, the United States consulted Egypt and Saudi Arabia regarding the resistance in Afghanistan. This consultation could be construed as the beginning of US aid programmes for the Afghan resistance forces against the communist government. The United States undertook this operation through other countries to deliberately avoid a direct dependence on Pakistan for its implementation. It implies that American concern for the Afghan situation did not meaningfully influence its relations with Pakistan.

Despite its growing concern with the Afghan issue, the Carter administration remained unmindful of the need, even after the fall of Iran, to discover the strategic importance of Pakistan and improve relations with it. The development in Afghanistan since the April 1978 coup, including the amassing of the Soviet troops along the Afghan border which was a clear indication of a large scale Soviet operation in late 1979, did not prove a catalyst towards an improvement in Pak-US security relations. A crisis of confidence persisted between Islamabad and Washington until the Afghan situation assumed a qualitatively new dimension after the Soviet intervention in December 1979.¹¹

**US Perception of Soviet Intervention**
The American official viewpoint regarding Soviet intention behind the intervention in Afghanistan was nothing less than as "invasion". To the US, States Department the activities had increased to the extent of "political threat to the security of nations in the region and the world's access to vital resources and shipping routes".\textsuperscript{12}

Carter Administration interpreted the offensive 'invasion' as part of Soviet master plan to undermine and overwhelm the West by increasing control of the oil rich Persian-Gulf and warm water of the Arabian sea. Richard Nixon former American President, remarked that the incident marked the assertion of the Soviet Union global power which posed a challenge to America's status as a super power.

Thus, the United States drew the worst possible scenario of the Soviet arms intervention and objectives in the occupation of Afghanistan. To the US, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan was an event full of repercussions and implications for the region. The crux of these implications was that the occupation of Afghanistan gave the Soviet Union an objective capability to threaten important US interest in the area which it did not have before.

The US perceived that the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan presented dangerous prospects of further Soviet advancement in the South and East, threatening the security of
the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean region and jeopardizing the supply of oil to the West. The Soviet move was seen to have altered the geo-political situation in the area in very ominous fashion, eliminating a “buffer state” Afghanistan between the Soviet Union and Pakistan, and presented a new threat to Iran. It was argued that even if the Soviet's did not exercise military option arising out of the occupation of Afghanistan, the strategic map of the world would have been irrevocably changed for the worse.\textsuperscript{13}

President Carter before the joint session of the Congress on January 23, 1980 stated that the region which is now threatened by Soviet troops in Afghanistan is of great strategic importance. The Soviet efforts to dominate Afghanistan has brought its forces within 300 miles of Indian ocean and close to the strait of Hormuz—a water way through which most of the world's oil flows. The Soviet Union is now attempting to consolidate a strategic position. That poses a grave threat to the free movement of Middle East oil.\textsuperscript{14}

Apart from maintaining geo-political implications the US administration also interpreted Soviet invasion in terms of a serious threat to world peace and violation of norms of international behavior. Carter observed that “the explosiveness of the region, its great natural wealth and Soviet willingness to use the forces which have been developed during the Kremlin’s enormous military buildup during the last fifteen years are what
combine to make the invasion of Afghanistan so unsettling to the future of international peace".  

The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan also represented to Washington a new departure in Moscow's policy. The use of Soviet military force in Afghanistan was interpreted as a signal of Soviet policy entering a more aggressive and overtly expansionist phase. This was the first use of Soviet forces since the 1940s in an effort to extend the Soviet domination beyond the traditional socialist camp. In this context the Soviet move represented an extension of the "Brezhnev Doctrine" outside the Soviet dominated Eastern Europe.

Some US analysts also concluded that Soviet intervention could lead to superpower struggle resulting in war in South Asia. Therefore, the US formulated policy response cautiously so that Moscow could not succeed in its desired goal and threaten vital US interest in the West and South Asia. Washington soon realized that regional co-operation is essential to check further, the expansionist policy of the Soviet Union. Carter administration sent back diplomatic envoys to win support of strategically located countries. American policy makers took steps that no country is frightened or neutralized in the wake of steadily growing Soviet Military power and Soviet proximity of the region. Washington was of the view that if the regional countries were ever neutralized or threatened into
inaction because of the Soviet proximity it would facilitate consolidation of Soviet position in Afghanistan and enable it to wield greater influence at the cost of US position in South-West Asia. So all the policies were made keeping in view the role of the regional countries in general and Pakistan in particular.

Pakistan and Iran the two strategically located countries with a friendly disposition towards the US could be further target of Soviet expansionist policy through Afghanistan. The Carter administration did not want to loose its strategic allies at any cost, because their co-operation was essential to make the Afghan venture a bitter pill for the Soviet to swallow. As America was still to recover from the shock of losing its old friend Iran when a revolution brought Ayatollah Khomayni to power in Tehran.

Hence, in the period when Soviet armed forces were engaged in a protected effort to conquer Afghanistan, when a revolutionary Iran was openly hostile to the American presence in West Asia, and when the Middle East was highly flammable, the interest of the United States lay in strengthening it ties with Pakistan. The US assured large scale economic and military assistance for Pakistan to preserve its independence and integrity to bring about a withdrawl of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. Thus eventual entry of Soviet army in Afghanistan brought sea change, resulted in close US-Pak strategic relationship.
Pakistan’s Perception of the Soviet Move

Pakistan’s perception of the Soviet intervention was different from the US. It was question of survival for the former and maintaining superpower status for the latter. President Ziaul Haque felt “the Soviet intervention had brought Soviet troops to the Pakistan frontier presenting Pakistan with a most critical situation.”

Feverish construction of infrastructure and steady process of sovietization of Afghanistan force shadowed a long term Soviet military presence in that country. As the Soviet would stay in Afghanistan, Pakistan was fearful of becoming the ‘periphery’ of a super power, with all the implications of super power rivalry. Another worrisome prospects from Pakistan’s stand point was the possibility of active Soviet support to Afghanistan on the Baluch and Pukhtoonistan issue.

In the mean time, a large number of Afghan refugees had begun to cross into Pakistan soon after the April 1978 coup it increased substantially, and after the Soviet intervention and the intensification of resistance in Afghanistan it reached alarming proportions. With the passage of time Pakistan became a safe and readily accessible sanctuary for the Afghan refugees and resistance fighters. Since the popular resistance against the Soviet troops would continue, Pakistan’s abiding fear was that the conflict in Afghanistan might spill over into its territory. This fear became
more pronounced in view of Moscow–Kabul allegation of Pakistani involvement in the war and threat of grave consequences for its alleged involvement. The threat turned into reality when Moscow-Kabul forces engaged in air violations and cross border raids against resistant Mujahideen fighters in Pakistan's territory.

The Pakistani establishment perceived four possible threats which could materialize in any form.

(a) A direct full fledged attack to amputate and isolate Mujahideens in Baluchistan or North West Frontier Province.

(b) Cross border reprisal to intimidate Pakistan, or crossing into its territory into hot pursuit of the resistance forces and destruction of sanctuaries of fighters.

(c) Standard practice of subversion and integration of secessionist forces:

(d) Pakistan also foresaw the future where Pakistan could face two front attack.

Zia government envisaged a situation where Soviet Union and India could attack in collaboration at two fronts.

Although the risk of Soviet attacks incursions and subversions was high in Pakistan still its policy establishment down played the gravity of a direct Soviet attack in public. The underlining thinking was to keep people ignorant about anticipated Soviet attack because that could have created serious law and
order problems in Baluchistan and North-West Frontier Provinces. Pakistan had vowed to fight back in case Soviet, attacks its interest any where.¹⁹

The Soviet Union threatened Pakistan repeatedly that upholding of “imperialist aggression” against Afghanistan from its territory was increasingly drawing it into a dangerous combination.²⁰ It was feared that the Soviet Union would not tolerate for long the resistance to its domination over Afghanistan.

Pakistan also perceived the possibility of Indo-Soviet collaboration against it. There was report that Soviet leaders were persuading the Indian leadership to help them dissipate opposition against the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and to put pressure on the eastern border of Pakistan to make things unbearable for Islamabad.²¹ Hence, Pakistan was faced with three front attack scenario viz. an Indian threat, threat from Afghanistan and internal threat on account of huge Afghan refugees sheltering there.

Pakistan which shares a 2400 km long border with Afghanistan felt directly exposed to Soviet military pressure. This affected greatly the security considerations of the military regime in Islamabad. The Zia regime perceived drastic shift in the regional balance of military power and the emergence of growing security situation far beyond its ability to manage on its own.
Pakistan realized that without adequate defence it was fumbling towards a position in which its security would rest on the good will of the Soviet Union and India. The state of Pakistan’s feeble defence could not remain unremedied because a weak Pakistan would increase the temptation for any power pursuing its strategic designs. It was argued that Pakistan capable of self defence could deter hegemonic and expansionist ambition in the region.\textsuperscript{22}

Besides it was clear to the Pakistan authorities that if Pakistan wanted to hold steadfast against the Soviet pressure and pursue its Afghan policy, it needed international diplomatic as well as material support. Among available options Islamabad found the US as an effective and willing partner which could shore up its defence and help it counter the mounting Soviet pressure on it by establishing a close security relationship. Thus, it was natural for Pakistan leaders to improve relations with their erstwhile ally and benefactor.

\textbf{A Revived Friendship}

Moscow’s adventure totally changed the situation for Pakistan and for the US-Pakistani military and strategic relationship. Over night Zia obtained internal political breathing room and an opportunity to refurbish his external ties. The United States moved quickly to revitalize the moribund US Pakistan
security relationship. Pakistan drew closer to its regional friends. Thus, Soviet intervention in Afghanistan became a watershed in US-Pakistan strategic relations. President Carter reversed his foreign policy priorities in the light of changing international scenario. There was convergence in US-Pakistan security perceptions. Once again Pakistan suddenly became a frontline and an essential anchor of the US in South West Asia. Pakistan was up-graded dramatically in the United States global strategic designs within few days of the Russian invasion. Carter categorically announced that the US was committed to the security of Pakistan and other aid to Pakistan to defend its territorial integrity. He also emphasized the US commitment to Pakistan under 1959 executive agreement. (which had remained operative only on paper in the past) and declared that the USA's willingness to use force if necessary to protect Pakistan against Soviet attack.

The first aid package of $400 million to Pakistan which was made on January 12, 1980, had three components. An American commitment to guarantee Pakistan's security. Secondly, $200 million worth of America's economic aid to Pakistan spread over two years. Thirdly, $200 million worth of military hard wares to be supplied to Islamabad by Washington.

Besides this, Carter urged the Congress to reconfirm the 1959 executive agreement with Pakistan on January 31, 1980, the
Carter administration informed key Congressional leaders that, it intended to enter into long term military support relationship with Pakistan.\textsuperscript{25} Congressional sources said that originally the US administration had thought of seeking only an emergency 'onetime exception' of the law\textsuperscript{26} barring Pakistan from America aid because of its nuclear weapons programmes but ultimately the administration planned to seek repeal of the ban on aid to Pakistan without any time limit.

However, much to US surprise about revival of friendship with Pakistan through US aid programmes President Zia-ul-Haque, dismissed American aid offer of $ 400 million as “peanuts”. He felt that the aid package was “terribly disappointing” and that it could not buy security for Pakistan.\textsuperscript{27} He added that it was too small to be effective but large enough to buy greater animosity from the Soviet Union which is more influential in the region than the United States.\textsuperscript{28} A few days later foreign minister Agha Shahi phrased the rejection more diplomatically telling the Washington post “the assistance must be commensurate with the size of the threat.”\textsuperscript{29}

The obvious reason for his rejection were that Pakistan found the level of aid pledged by the USA insufficient and the USA was still resisting Pakistan’s pressure for formalizing the 1959 security agreement into a treaty.\textsuperscript{30} President Zia, in fact, thought
the leaders of the United States wanted to give a little aid, “let Pakistan burn its bridges forever with the Soviet Union and then leave it in the lurch”. Zia held the view that Carter administration was in a state of panic after the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan and that it was the most opportune time for him to extract the maximum commitment from them. Washington was expected to “prove its credibility” as an ally before Pakistan accepted US aid.

Zia’s dismissal of the aid offer as “a quibble” perturbed the Carter administration. However, Carter still sounded optimistic about the revival of friendship with Pakistan, in his State of the Union speech before US Congress on January 23, 1980. Jimmy Carter said that one of “highest legislative priorities” was a new military and economic assistance programmes/package for Pakistan. He also sent a military and diplomatic mission headed by his National Security advisor Zbignew Brzezinski to Pakistan in February, 1980 to reaffirm American commitment to the security of Pakistan under the 1959 agreement and to negotiate the proposed aid package. Although, Zia expressed satisfaction over the renewed US commitment to Pakistan, but did not accept the offer. Nevertheless, American authorities continued to negotiate with Pakistan to improve relations.
The rejection of U.S. aid offers by Pakistan, effectively, scuttled the revival of friendly relations, Pakistan had bitter past experience when Washington had let it down in 1965 and again in 1971. Pakistan was also irritated over the hypocrisy of the non-proliferation policy of the United States. It was also feared that President Carter would not be very forthcoming in extending strong political and military support to Pakistan in view of its keen desired to maintain its friendly relation with India. A number of explanation for Zia’s rebuff of the aid package could be given:

(1) Pakistan was vary of developing a close and formalized association with the United States at the very outset of Soviet intervention. The rejection suited the Pakistani rulers as they were interested in the formation of a broad international diplomatic front against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. As of now when world opinion was building against Soviet Union, alignment with US would have hit badly the Afghan cause and Pakistan’s stand on it. Thus, hurting Pakistan’s efforts to muster support for a broad based front against Soviet Union.34

According to another viewpoint Pakistan had sufficient reasons to reject the aid offer. In view of a magnitude of the problems posed by Soviet move, the consequent US assistance was not “commensurate with the size of the threat”. Pakistan expected the Carter administration to put together a substantial aid
programmes but that fell well short of Pakistan's expectations and needs. The Pakistani officials termed the proposed aid programme as inadequate it would, unless substantially modified and increased, instead of reducing Pakistan's security problems enhance Pakistan's insecurity.

Moreover, the aid package had been announced without prior consultation with Islamabad. To Pakistan's dismay US refused to supply Pakistan the F-16 aircraft which Pakistan considered extremely important to bolster the country's defence capability.

Pakistan wanted to upgrade the status of 1959 defence agreement to a formal treaty endorsed by the Congress. In view of its expectations not coming true at the hands of the United States, Pakistan insisted for guarantees against Moscow-Kabul-Delhi axis, which weighed high in its security calculations. Perhaps the most important reason for refusal of aid package was Zia government's low confidence in the Carter administration. Pakistan's past disappointment made it to realize that the United States was fundamentally an 'unreliable' partner in international politics and should not be taken seriously.35

The officials of the Pakistan foreign office were less enthusiastic about the prospect of realignment with the United
States, believing there existed profound doubt in Washington about the wisdom of deeper involvement in South Asia.

Pakistan was reluctant to credit the pledges and assurance to an administration that swung almost overnight from a position of neglect to one of over reaction. It seemed inconceivable to policy makers in Islamabad that the same administration which had failed to acknowledge the transformation of Afghanistan into ‘Soviet satellite’ from 1978 to December to 1979 branded the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as the greatest challenge facing the free world since world war II.36

In the light of this shaky faith of Pakistan in US, Brezezinski urged Carter to ensure that no ambiguity should be left in Pakistan’s mind regarding US position.37

To assuage Pakistan’s suspicion about the seriousness of the US intentions, the President spelled out the “Carter Doctrine” the new policy under which a Soviet attack against the Persian Gulf would be regarded as an attack on US vital interest. He reaffirmed the security commitment to Pakistan, declaring “The United States will take action consistent with our laws to assist Pakistan to resist any outside aggression.”38

Carter Doctrine was primarily regarding American’s own military power, the five specific parts of the doctrine’s architecture amply justified this39. These were, first, the Rapid deployment
force, to improve American's capability to deploy US military force rapidly to distant areas. Second, enhanced naval presence in the Indian Ocean and acquisition of base facility in the Gulf and the North East Africa. Third, it was recommended that the Congress should approve a strong defence budget for 1981 encompassing a 5 percent real growth in authorization without any reduction. Fourth, the creation of security framework in the region with the countries with different values and political belief under the US auspices and fifth, defence commitment to Pakistan in order to assist it in resisting any outside aggression and accordingly a reaffirmation of the USA 1959 executive agreement with the Pakistan. By using the label "a frame work of regional cooperation for his doctrine Carter seemed to imply what USA did not intend, to wage a global Cold War with the Soviet Union, rather than its intention was to contain Moscow in the Persian Gulf region. In essence, therefore "Carter Doctrine" conferred doctrinal justification on the USA to intervene in the Arab, Persian Gulf, South West Asian region to protect the interest of the West.

Consequent upon Pakistan's stubborn attitude Carter administration suspended Congressional approval of $400 million in order to hold further talks and reach an agreement with Pakistan. Islamabad was assured that $400 million package was only a beginning and more would be available in later years. Thornton an American scholar said that the offer was not
munificent but was surely not “peanuts” as Zia described. Further more, Carter administration was prepared to form a group of donors to assist Pakistan.42

Minor Disagreements and Misunderstandings

The Pakistani establishment were not convinced by these assurances and initiatives taken by Washington. An impasse was created where by Zia noted that the invasion of Afghanistan has brought the Soviet Union to our doorstep.43 He stated that in the absence of “active participation” by the United States, Pakistan may have to adopt itself to the new reality. “If you live in the sea you have to learn to swim with the whales”, became a part of his lexicon. He cited the fact that “history has taught us not to harbour any illusions”,44 regarding US participation. Zia administration looked towards China and Islamic Nations for support.

Pakistan’s effort to forge a strategic alliance with the China as a bulwark against the Soviet threat created more gulf than friendship vis-a vis the US. Apart from this, the issues of non proliferation, the execution of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and India’s objection over military assistance to Pakistan continued to imperil Pak-US security relations. All this led to the fear that either the Carter administration failed to fully comprehend Pakistan’s enhanced strategic importance and security problem in the new
setting or was intentionally not doing enough for her. It appeared that the Afghan issue did not elevate Pakistan in the list of American priorities and it was still of 'peripheral' interest to the United States.

Thus no significant breakthrough in Pakistan-US strategic relations was achieved during the Carter administration. Despite, a mutual desire and a clear recognition in Islamabad and Washington to revive friendship in order to meet the challenge posed by the Soviet intervention. However, the Afghanistan issue appeared to be changing the US attitude towards Pakistan when the Carter administration supported the rescheduling of Pakistan's foreign debt and the $1.6 billion IMF credit for Pakistan.\textsuperscript{45}

The Carter administration also strongly supported Pakistan's stance against recognizing the Soviet installed regime in Kabul. Pakistan and the US also co-operated in creating a broad international support for the Afghan cause and provide material assistance to the Afghan resistance fighters. Though, the co-operation remained confined to the Afghan issue only and could not make solid impact on Pakistan-US security relationship. It did create a land of dependence on each other for implementation of Afghan policy. This dependence in return facilitated the establishment of a close security relationship between Pakistan and the United States under Reagan administration.
REFERENCES


23. The US Pakistan bilateral agreement was signed on March 5, 1959, an executive agreement, which unlike a treaty did not require approval by the Senate. The operative language in Articles committed the United States, in the case of aggression against Pakistan, to "take such appropriate action including the use of armed forces as may be mutually agreed upon", in case of communist aggression. The 1959 agreement did not commit the United States to come to Pakistan's aid against an attack by India, the commitment that Pakistan really wanted.


26. It was referred to as the Symington amendment which barred aid to countries indulging in suspect nuclear activities.

28. The Times of India, New Delhi, January 18, 1980.


42. Ibid.


44. Ibid.