CHAPTER - I

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND:
EVOLUTION OF US-PAK STRATEGIC RELATIONS

Introduction

The most remarkable consequence of the Second World War for post War international relations was the emergence of the USA and Soviet Union as the two mutually antagonistic superpowers dominating the world scene. The post Second World War world was witness to many other things, in an accentuation of nationalism in Asia and Africa and the emergence of India and Pakistan as two sovereign independent states. The United States of America, now being easily the greatest world power, started involving itself not only in all affairs of Europe and Latin America but also in all significant developments all over the world. The era of American "Isolationism" was at an end. The United States was playing a new role as the leader of the advanced industrialized countries of the West. The supremacy of the United States was not; however, universally accepted. It was challenged by the socialist countries led by the Soviet Union. Confrontation between the USA and Soviet Union resulted in the emergence of Cold War era, and containment of communism became the chief objective of the US foreign policy.

The United States having checked the advance of communism in Europe through the Marshal plan and North
Atlantic Treaty organization (NATO), was now turning its attention towards Asia. But the task was not so easy as the Soviet Union was also striving to expand its sphere of influence, or at least to deny the United States the friendship of as many countries in Asia as it could.

**United States Posture**

After the Second World War the thinking in the US government circles was that China should be united and made a democratic country to serve as a counter-weight to Japan and the Soviet Union in the Pacific. China did become united, but it did not become a friendly China. Infact the collapse of the Chiang regime and the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in October 1949 was a shattering blow to the diplomatic and military policy of the United States in East Asia. The ‘loss’ of China forcefully brought to the consciousness of American policy-makers the importance of strengthening relations with the two countries of Indian sub-continent, the only states whose combined population and resources could nearly match those of China.¹

The United States of America was thus desperately in need of friends to stem the advancing tide of communism in Asia.² In the early years of independence the United States undoubtedly tended to attach more importance to India than to Pakistan primarily because of its larger size, its industrial potential and the general
impression about India. However, India’s non-aligned posture was quite disappointing to the American Leaders. The last hope of the US was belied when Prime Minister Nehru, during his visit to the US in October 1949, made it clear, both in his public speeches and in his private talks, that India would definitely not align itself with one block against the other and remain non-aligned following an independent foreign policy.

Since India was not prepared to be satellite, or a client of the US to be used against communist countries by means of bilateral alliance and regional pacts, America moved towards Pakistan, the only alternative in the region. Moreover, the strategic location of Pakistan on the door steps of the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China was considered important. For US Military strategists Pakistan represented a centrally positioned landing and launching site for aircraft and missile aimed at either Russia or China. The proximity of North-West Pakistan and ‘Azad Kashmir’ (Under Pakistan control) to Soviet Union, Central Asia, and that of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) to Tibet and Sino-Burma border had been important strategic reasons for American interest in having a military tie with Pakistan. Apart from strategic importance, many Americans thought that it could be also used as a link between South-East Asia and Middle Eastern defence system as the eastern wing of Pakistan formed the Western boundary of South-East Asia.
The North Atlantic Treaty organization (NATO) was formed in 1949 in the Western Europe as a part of anti-communist regional defence system of the United States world strategy. In the Eastern Sector the US signed defence treaties with Japan, Thailand, Taiwan, Philippines and South Korea. But in the Southern Sector, comprising the Middle East and the South Asian countries which were strategically important from the American viewpoint were still undefended. Between Western Turkey and Eastern Thailand there was a wide gap which had to be filled so that the policy of the containment of communism might succeed. American saw that the leading Arab states were busy with their preoccupation with Israel, and therefore, were not inclined to listen to the Western reasoning of bringing these countries into its alliance system in defence of the 'free world'. They also knew that India was 'positively' neutral. In such circumstances importance of Pakistan certainly increased in the US strategic calculations.

**Pakistan’s Posture**

Pakistan’s thinking was quite different from that of the USA. It did not feel any threat either ideological or territorial from any of communist power. Whatsoever apprehensions Pakistani leadership had from Chinese and Soviet quarters, it was clear that they were not so much because of their being communist countries as they seemed to be, but because of their close relations with immediate
neighbours India and Afghanistan with whom Pakistan had long standing disputes.

The perceived threat of India, however, has been the main factor in Pakistan relations with United States. India has been the principal preoccupation of Pakistan's defence and foreign policies. Its overall weakness\(^8\) and strategic vulnerability vis-à-vis India, the continuance of several disputes in which it accused India of having changed the rules of the game according to its convenience\(^9\), and lingering memories of partition disturbances and communal hysteria, have combined to present India as the most important threat to its existence and security. This has often loomed large over the political horizon of Pakistan\(^10\) and impelled it to seek allies and military aid.\(^11\)

Among the varied reasons for the Pakistan Government seeking US military aid, the decisively and most important was to strengthen itself militarily against India. Both official spokesman and unofficial sources have committed enough indiscretions publicly and privately in support of these reasons, foreign (especially American) observers and journalists have also testified to this.\(^12\)

Pakistan hoped that its strategic relationship with the United States would bring several benefits: (a) a guarantee against Indian aggression\(^13\) (b) military aid to establish parity with India, and\(^14\) (c)
pressure on India to resolve the Kashmir dispute. It was this Pakistani outlook and posture which led Pakistan to appear pro-west and anti-communist, to give up its erstwhile policy of non-alignment, seek and accept US military aid and eventually to join the SEATO and the Baghdad Pact (CENTO). This was done on the one hand to strengthen itself militarily against India, and on the other to ensure Western support to its stand on Kashmir. When the Pakistani Government, found that the sympathy and support of the Western powers (in particular of the USA and UK) would not go as far as backing publicly and fully the Pakistan stands on the Kashmir disputes (as the Soviet Union did in favour of India at the end of 1955). Pakistani leaders not only complained against and denounced the West but threatened to walk over to the communist camp.

It is evident that Pakistan was less moved by Ideological interests which were in any case subsidiary to its Indo-centric goals. Pakistan's Foreign Policy makers took advantages of the many opportunities inherent in the Cold War environment by using the right rhetoric in the right place at the right time.

One aspects of Pakistan's rhetorical tactics was to emphasize the strategic value of Pakistan and the danger of the Russian drive toward the Indian Ocean. Another was to assert that Pakistan was the most dependable friend, the staunchest ally of the United States in Asia. Moreover, Pakistan's Policy makers often stated that
future of Pak-US relations was very bright because as one of Pakistani finance minister commented, "we have the same way of looking at things and we are the two peoples who talk the same language"\textsuperscript{18}, that the same language was the language of communist threat.

This rhetorical tactic has an impact, American Official heard and appreciated them. For instance, Philip Talbott, then Assistant Secretary of State made the following comments during Congressional Hearings: "Pakistani Statesman have spoken strongly in defence of the free-world, both privately and at various world forums"\textsuperscript{19}. American officials were defending military aid to Pakistan on the basis of Pakistan’s supposed anti-communist stand. For example, in discussing military aid to Pakistan, David Bell AID Administrator, stated that despite flirtation with China, Pakistan was strongly anti-communist and Pakistan’s military forces should be improved through additional aid\textsuperscript{20}.

Thus the United States and Pakistan were moving in the same direction for different reasons; the United States was guided by its global policy of containing international communism; and Pakistan was motivated by problem of national security and defence.

**Korean War**

Pakistan’s outspoken support to the USA on its stand on Korean War and signing of peace treaty with Japan was a significant factor in promoting friendly relations between
Washington and Karachi. The out-break of Korean War in July 1950 and the developments that followed sharply intensified the interest of the American leaders in the reaction of the two States of the subcontinent. The involvement of the United States and the profound emotional impact of the conflict on American opinion provided an opportunity that was skillfully used by Pakistan to build and image of itself as a “trust worthy” friend in south Asia\textsuperscript{21}. However, in the beginning American did not pay much attention to the attitude of Pakistan, actually, it was busy in applauding India because of its acceptance that the aggression had been committed by North Korea\textsuperscript{22}.

American enthusiasm for India diminished when India abstained from the vote on the “Uniting for Peace” resolution and even more, when Nehru urged a ceasefire and negotiations in Korea as well as seating of representative of the Peoples Republic of China in the United Nations. The proposal, however, reportedly aroused considerable misgivings among American policy makers and was turned down by the then Secretary of State, Dean Acheson\textsuperscript{23}.

In contrast to the Indian attitude, the American policies in Korea were vigorously supported by the Pakistani Government without any reservation. Pakistan was not slow to judge how much a movement of American public opinion could be turned to its own advantage. At the outbreak of war, Liaquat Ali Khan who was in
America itself, lost no time in declaring in a public statement that his government will back the US to the fullest, in any action it may take in Korean War. Pakistan also expressly supported the US on "Uniting for Peace Resolution" in the General Assembly in November in 1950. The United States needed the support of important Asian countries and now considered Pakistan's usefulness as a potential ally.

On August 29, 1950, Pakistan informed the Security Council that it could not spare any ground troops to help fight, the War in Korea because of grave danger that confronted it. It shrewdly sought to spread the impression in the United States that unlike India it was ready to send troops to fight alongside the UN soldiers in Korea, but that only its difficulties with India stood in the way.

**United States-Japan Peace Treaty**

Another important development which caused disenchantment between the USA and India and brought the former closer to Pakistan was the signing of peace treaty and a military pact between the United States and Japan. With the emergence of a potentially strong communist China and the outbreak of the Korea War, the United States felt impelled to take urgent steps to convert Japan into an ally against communist inroads in the Far-East. Since the days of Japanese surrender, the American policy in the Far-East had been to keep Japan in a
state of perpetual impotency, both militarily and industrially, but after US sought to rehabilitate the Japanese industrial and military power and make use of that power to contain communist China. US called in a conference of 51 nations in San-Francisco to discuss how the status of war between Japan and Allied Power could be brought to an end. While Pakistan accepted the invitation. India refused to participate.

Pakistan not only signed the Japan Peace Treaty but also voiced powerful support for it from the floor of the conference. Foreign Minister Zafarullah Khan claimed it was a "good treaty" offering justice and reconciliation. He held the American proposal as an "evidence of a new departure in the relations of the East and West" and "harbinger of even happier consummations".\(^\text{29}\)

Contrary to Pakistani view, Nehru held that defensive alliance openly aiming some other country or countries defeat their own purpose of trying to maintain peace through strength\(^\text{30}\). The authorities in New Delhi interpreted the treaty as an extension of "power politics" and expressed grave apprehensions that it would lead to an era of new tensions in Asia. India considered these measures of Washington as acts of provocations against communist China which in addition brought the Cold War into the Indian Subcontinent thereby threatening India’s Security. The outright opposition of India to the treaty and Pakistan’s
unequivocal support at a critical juncture and enthusiastic approbation for it, certainly left a deep impression on the mind of American policy makers. The diametrically opposite stands of India and Pakistan on the Korean War and the Japanese Peace Treaty accelerated the process of US estrangement from India and friendship towards Pakistan.\(^\text{31}\)

**Military Alliance**

Pakistan moved for US help in its search for security, after being disappointed by Britain and the Muslim countries of the Middle East. Pakistan wanted to gain support from these countries but they refused to do so. The Commonwealth refused to take side with Pakistan because the dispute between India and Pakistan had involved two of its members.\(^\text{32}\) The Middle East Countries, which had just achieved their independence after prolonged struggle under the banner of Arab Nationalism, did not like the concept of Pan-Islamism of Pakistan. They had several internal problems of their own to cope with. They were, therefore, not in a position to bear responsibilities abroad and give material help to Pakistan in case of an outbreak of hostilities between India and Pakistan or between Pakistan and any other country.

Pakistan's attempt to secure friends among the Islamic States to take its side against India did not achieved much success because they attached greater value to friendly relations with India which was bigger and took more active interest in their anti-
colonial struggle. Another reason which can explain the failure of Pakistan’s efforts was its inability to give stout support to Egypt and Iran in their disputes with Britain concerning military bases at Suez and the nationalization of oil.

Thus, Pakistan left isolated and friendless, decided to enter into military alliance with the US in its desire to strengthen itself vis-a-vis India on the question of Kashmir for bargaining from a position of strength. The United States with its enormous military and economic resources and political influence was seen as the only Big Power with whom an alliance would enable Pakistan to meet its defence and economic requirements as well as boost up its international status.

It was the realization of its isolation and inadequacy of its own resources to guarantee its security in the context of its relation with India, which impelled Pakistan to seek the support of the USA. It had nothing to do with Soviet Union or threat of communism. One Pakistani scholar accepting this fact, had remarked that in Pakistan the danger of conquest by a communist power was very remote compared with the immediate and continuing danger of forcible merger with India. Pakistan’s alignment, thus was not based on genuine anti communism. The occasional flurry of anti-communist statements and the pledge to defend freedom, democracy and individual liberty were more a nature of lip services to their allies.
On the other hand US strategists also saw Pakistan as a valuable asset in their global search for allies and bases around the USSR. In their view the communist success in China had already increased the threat of communist expansion in Asia. The events in Egypt, Iran and Jordan in 1951 and 1952, and the disturbing situation in South East Asia created by Korean War, emergence of China a regional power, called for a reconciliation and reinforcement of the Western position in Asia. India had refused to line up with the United States anti-communist front, and remained unshaken in its non-alignment attitude. Pakistan appeared the most suitable as an alternative, commendable more for its willingness to join military pact and its strategic advantages than for its resources or stability.

**Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement:**
**Beginning of US Military Aid**

Against this backdrop it was only natural that Pakistan and United States should proceed to forge a military tie up. Pakistan took the first step to secure US military assistance in September-October, 1953 during a visit by General Ayub Khan to Washington D.C. He held discussions, among others, with General Mathew Bunker Ridgway, the US Army Chief of Staff, Admiral Arthur Redfort, and John Foster Dulles.

The next major step was taken during Governor General Ghulam Mohammad's November visit to Washington accompanied
by Foreign Minister Zafrullah Khan. He met President Eisenhower as well as Secretary Dulles. President Eisenhower appreciated Pakistan geostrategic location at the cross roads of Central, South, and South-West Asia. And an era of close US-Pakistan military security relationship was inaugurated. During all these visits by the head of the states and other officials, the establishment of Middle East defence and possible role of Pakistan in that was discussed. However, Middle East defence could not be realized. Meantime, Pakistan made some informal request for military aid from US, during autumn of 1953, US administration, considering Pakistan as part of “Northern Tier”, began to discuss the idea of providing some military aid to Pakistan.

Americans no doubt had for long agreed that their global strategy against communism demanded of a militarily stronger Pakistan but they still hesitated to take the final plunge for fear of offending India. A State Department officials admitted that informal discussion had been going on for last year or two, but President Eisenhower said at the press conference that the US would be most cautious about-doing any thing that would cause hysteria in India.

It was the visit of Vice President Nixon in December, 1953 to Pakistan and India, tipped the seals in favour of Pakistan. Nixon told the Pakistanis that he was convinced that the people of
Pakistan had a firm determination to thwart communist ambitions, and that the USA would be proud to support Pakistan in industrial development and also in defence.\(^3^9\)

Nixon was successful in persuading President Eisenhower that Pakistan was the best available option in South Asia in containment of communism and a suitable reply to India’s policy of “neutralism” or non-alignment.\(^4^0\) it was finally decided to offer military assistance to Pakistan.\(^4^1\)

The Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali Bogra announced at a Press conference in Karachi, on February, 22, 1954, that his country had formally requested the United States for military assistance within the scope of the Mutual Security Act, “for the purpose of achieving increased defensive strength and a higher and stronger degree of economic stability designed to foster international peace and security within the framework of the United Nations Charter”\(^4^2\). Three days later President Eisenhower announced in Washington that the United States had decided to respond favourably to Pakistan’s request.\(^4^3\)

In a statement before the Lok Sabha on March 1, 1954, Nehru vehemently criticized the US decision to supply arms to Pakistan. Commenting on Eisenhower assurance to him and his offer to similar military aid to India, he said “if we object to military aid being given to Pakistan, we could be hypocrites and unprincipled opportunists to accept such aid ourselves.”\(^4^4\)
On May 19, 1954 after months of intense negotiations, Pakistan and the United States signed an agreement on US aid, called the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement in Karachi: The agreement which consisted of seven Articles, came into force with immediate effect. It obliged United States to supply to Pakistan only “such equipments, materials, services or other assistance as the government of the US may authorized in accordance with such conditions and terms as may be agreed. It was stipulated that Pakistan should not undertake any act of aggression against any other nation and that it should use American Military aid exclusively for internal security and its legitimate self defence or to participate in the defence of area or in UN Collective Security arrangements and measures. Pakistan also agreed not to transfer American arms received under the agreement to any other country without the prior consent of the United States. In short the agreement bound Pakistan to the regional and global diplomatic and security objectives of the US. The US, thus found in the military alliances an opportunity to maintain its military and political presence on the territory of its allies.

**SEATO, CENTO, and Pakistan- US Strategic Relations**

The Mutual Defence Agreement of 1954 was the basis on which Pakistan received military equipment from the United States. In the belief that membership in American sponsored multinational arrangements would bring fourth an expanded
programme or arms supplies and more vigorous US support for its own diplomatic and military objectives, Pakistan became a member of South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Baghdad Pact (later CENTO, Central Treaty Organization in 1955).

**South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO)**

The ceasefire in Korea in July, 1953 enabled the Chinese to concentrate on South East Asia and consequently China increased the scale of its assistance to North Vietnam, making the French position in Indo-China progressively worse. With a view to checking the perceived Chinese expansion, the Americans decided to extend the containment policy to South East Asia. The Americans thought that if any of the local state, battling communists, were allowed to fall then not only would the emerging communist regime in the region be eventually all linked ideologically, militarily, and politically with the USSR and Red China and deny the entire area to the USA, but there would also be a Chain reaction throughout the area. In responding to this perceived threat the Americans not only extended active support but also encouraged the States in the area to form a regional security alliance that would include the USA.

Thus, a conference at Manila resulted in the South East Asia Collective Defence Treaty[^47] on September 8, 1954, creating an alliance consisting of Pakistan, Thailand, Philippines, US, UK,
principles entitled the pacific charter.

Most interesting thing with SEATO was that almost all members of this pact joined it to attain their own objectives. Perhaps it would be true to say that SEATO had as many objectives as it had members. Admittedly, the American objectives was to foster collective efforts in the region to check the perceived expansion of communism but the objectives of the other members of SEATO were all different. Pakistan's decision to join SEATO appears to have been influenced by a desire to please the Americans than a conviction of its utility to cater for Pakistan's security needs.

Pakistan, however, was not too much happy with the SEATO because Pakistan was knowing well that it would receive no protection from SEATO against an Indian attack, which was its most immediate concern. No where in the entire document was there to be found even indirectly a hint of a suggestion that the treaty address itself to Pakistan's proclaimed concern-Hindu expansionism, Indian imperialism, helping Pakistan to recover Indian occupied Kashmir or even defending in case of unprovoked Indian attack. Moreover, the United States wrote a reservation into the treaty that its obligation under Article IV(1) would extend only to cases of communist aggression.
Pakistan's justification to join SEATO was that East Pakistan geographically could be regarded as part of South East Asia. Further it signed for development of economic measures and basic defence structure promotion. Art 29 of this Collective Defence Treaty lays down that "In order to be more effective to achieve the objective of this Treaty, the parties separately and jointly by means of continuous and active self help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and to prevent the counter subversive activities directed against their territorial integrity and political stability."

Three factors seem to have influenced the decision makers to opt for membership of SEATO. First, the desire to please the America, after the successful conclusion of the military aid agreement. Second, the purpose of signatories was to win more friends, as Pakistan was certainly looking for friends in order to at least strengthen its case on Kashmir Third, the development in East Pakistan which necessitated not only extra US aid but also strengthen fears regarding communist activities. A combination of the above mentioned factor could have influenced Pakistan decision makers to opt for membership in SEATO. That would at least please the USA, help procure much needed arms and to gain a kind of psychological defence against India.

The Baghdad Pact (CENTO)

Middle East has always been an area of great concern for US
due to presence of huge oil resources and its strategic location attracted more. After the Second World War both super-powers fully realized the strategic significance of oil for their own sake and as a means of denying vital oil supplies to the adversary. General Eisenhower, even commented that there was no area strategically more important than the Gulf.

In order to protect the interest of its own and its friends and allies, the USA, after the withdrawal of the UK, decided to establish military alliances with the countries of the region. First step in this direction was taken when it signed Mutual Defence Agreement with Iraq on April 21, 1954, subsequently Turkey and Iraq signed a pact of Mutual co-operation at Baghdad on February 24, 1955, for the purpose of collective defence arrangements for the Middle East. The same was later joined by the Britain on April 5, 1955, Pakistan on June 30, 1955, and Iran on November 3, 1955 which popularly came to be known as Baghdad Pact. After Iraq formally relinquished its membership, head quarter was shifted to Ankara and name of the organization was changed to the Central Treaty Organization in August 1959.

The Baghdad Pact provided that “the high contracting parties will cooperate for their security and defence, but that such measures as they agreed to take may form the subject of special agreements with each other (Art 1), also that this pact shall be
open for accession to any member state of the Arab league or any other state actively concerned with the securities and peace in this region and which is fully recognized by both the high contracting parties.  

Although the USA had canvassed for Baghdad Pact and later fully participated in its work, but never officially signed the treaty. Then Ambassador Waldemar J. Gallman, United States observer at the council meeting in November 1955, gave two reasons why the US thought that it could contribute more by remaining out of the pact (i) It was perceived that formal US adherence to the Pact was likely to further estrange Egypt and other Arabs and (ii) It was thought that US participation might invoke an Israeli counter-demand for a Mutual Defence Treaty especially in view of the fact that the Baghdad Pact came into existence through the effort of an Arab country Iraq, and it could become an issue in the next presidential election. And a treaty with Israel would cause the Arabs, including Iraq, to reject alliances with the US and make them receptive to Soviet overtures.

Pakistan's perception of Baghdad Pact was different from that of the United States. The fear of communist aggression on Pakistan was only a myth. The raison de'tre of Pakistan's entry into military pacts was explained by Mohammad Ayub Khan who himself had vouched his close association with Baghdad Pact (CENTO) According to him "the crux of the problem from the very
beginning was the Indian attitude of hostility towards us: ‘we had to look for allies to secure our position’\textsuperscript{52}. Hence the primary motive of Pakistan’s participation in the SEATO and CENTO was the result of an extreme pathological “Indo-Phobia”. The other consideration seemed to have influenced the Pakistani decision makers to opt for formal membership of the pact were many. Pakistan has always stood for special ties with Muslim countries. Right from its birth, it had tried hard to forge stronger bonds with most Muslim countries in the Middle East and consequently it always demonstrated a keen interest in participating in all the schemes relating to the defence of the area. Moreover, having secured the most desired military assistance treaty with the USA, the Pakistan’s had been demonstrating overtly to undertake such ventures that would please the Americans.

By becoming member of Baghdad Pact, Pakistan became truly America’s “most allied ally in Asia” because Pakistan strategically located and only Asian country to be a member of SEATO and CENTO. Just like Turkey links the NATO and CENTO, Pakistan, however, never disguised the motivating compulsion that pushed it to join SEATO and the Baghdad Pact; what is more interesting to note that Americans were also fully aware of these when they decided to encourage Pakistan’s participation. As far as Pakistan was concerned the reason had little to do with the avowed objective of the pact which was to contain “international
communism” in the area. As usual, Pakistan’s foreign minister Firoz Khan Noon, asserted that “enmity of a powerful neighbouring country had obliged Pakistan to enter into defence alliances to preserve its freedom” and that “Pakistan will not agree to commit suicide by getting out of the Baghdad Pact which is its defence against India.”

The reason, thus why Pakistan joined the military alliance was very different from the reason why the United States created the alliances. Why then alliance if the aims and objectives of the two parties were so doubly divergent? Infact, the United States recognized Pakistan’s pre-occupation with India, but felt that it would be able to keep the Indo-Pakistan rivalry under control and that in any case, it would not allow that rivalry to interfere with its own global anti-communist strategy. In its anxiety to create the various military organization it ignored Pakistan’s special motives.

It was against this background that the United States took steps to extend military assistance to Pakistan.

Military Aid to Pakistan

Pakistan’s bilateral treaty with the United States and former’s membership of SEATO and CENTO made it eligible to receive massive military and economic assistance from Washington. According to a document of National Security Council
(USA) the total value of US military aid programmed for Pakistan during the period of 1950-58 was $411.6 million. Items valued at $276.4 million had been delivered during the period, leaving an undelivered balance as of 30 June, 1958 of item worth $135.2 million.

According to consolidated statistics published in December 1979 by the Comptroller of the Security Assistance Agency, Department of Defence, total deliveries and expenditure on the military assistance programmed for Pakistan (excluding "training") amounted to $650.28 million during the period 1950-1969. Assuming that all the deliveries had been made by the time the embargo was enforced in 1965, in the wake of Indo-Pak War and deducting the figures of $276.4 million acknowledged to have been expanded during 1950-1958, we get $373.88 million as the outer limit of grant military assistance that Pakistan could have received the United States during the period July 1, 1958 to September 1965.

During the period 1954-1965, the United States provided military grants assistance valued at $650 million, defence support assistance valued at $619 million and some $55 million worth of equipment on cash or concessional basis between 1954 and 1965.

The USA also maintained a Military Assistance Advisory Group of about 100 personnel in Pakistan. The entire aid was
furnished under aide-memoirs signed in 1954, 1960, 1961 and 1962, in which the USA agreed to equip four specific units of Pakistan armed forces.  

The increase of US economic aid to Pakistan was also not without military implications. It seemed to have been subsidy to the main percentage of the huge War machinery which Pakistan had tried to set up during 1954-1964. American economic aid to Pakistan until the end of fiscal year 1965, was estimated worth $2.5 to 3 billion.  

The US interest in Pakistan as strategic partner in South Asia diminished gradually and steadily around 1959-1960. Pakistan which was termed as “most allied ally” of USA and pumped massive security, economic assistance by later fall of this trap owing to numerous development at international Scene. The thaw in the Cold War during that period changed the US perception towards Pakistan, resulted in the cut in military assistance programme.  

The efforts of Kennedy administration to win over “non-aligned” India brought watershed in Pakistan US security and strategic relations. The Sino-India War of 1962, was perceived by US as a change in geo-political condition of South Asia power status. Moreover, Sino-Soviet rift and China’s adventure in Taiwan, Tibbet convinced US policy makers that principal antagonist and
threat to the United States strategic interest was assumed by Peoples Republic of China in Asia.

The role of China in Asia and War with Vietnam loomed large in the United States major foreign policy dilemma of the 1960s. Hence US policy in the 1960's was much more concerned with the future of Asia than it had been previously.

**Irritants and Efforts Towards Rapprochements**

US-Pakistan relations received a serious setback when the former announced an embargo on the supply of military equipment to both India and Pakistan, in the wake of 1965 Indo-Pak War. The US embargo affected Pakistan more than India because of two reasons. Firstly, Soviet Union had not imposed any restriction on arms supply to India, and secondly, since Pakistan was almost dependent upon the US for military hardware, spare parts and other ammunitions. Thus, United States betrayed Pakistan. It closed the pipeline, with its arms supply dried and US threatening to release modern aircrafts and heavy armaments to India, Pakistan had to call off its counter offensive and go for ceasefire. However, one thing is important to note that in spite of embargo, US continued supplying military hard wares to Pakistan through Iran, Turkey, West Germany and Italy.

When US imposed embargo on arms supply to Pakistan during 1965 Indo-Pak War, Pakistan became conscious of inherent
dangers of too much reliance on single source of supply of weapons. With their traditional source of supply cut off. Pakistan looked for new sources of arms procurements, with China, France, Soviet Union (1968-69) and European markets. Henceforth China became very reliable and trusted friend of Pakistan.

After President Richard Nixon’s visit to Pakistan in August 1969, and conscious of Soviet, China inroads made into what had been an exclusive US sphere of influence, American tried to win back Pakistan by giving more armaments.\textsuperscript{61} Richard Nixon, who was known as a firm supporter of military aid and alliance with Pakistan.\textsuperscript{62} Efforts were soon made by Nixon administration to lift embargo on lethal weapons that had been imposed in 1965.\textsuperscript{63} In 1970, Pakistan was given military hardwares worth $15.40 million from the US at throwaway price as the market value of these arms was estimated to be $150 million, probably to save of opposition in the Senate.\textsuperscript{64}

Bangladesh crisis was another test of US-Pakistan strategic relationship. US “tilt” towards Pakistan in 1971 War was not committed for its integrity. America took half hearted interest when Pakistan’s very survival as a nation state was being questioned. Although an embargo was imposed in 1971 by the USA but in March 1973, it returned to the 1967 policy. However, a section of policy makers in Islamabad saw US role in the 1971 crisis with suspicion. Pakistan thought that the US had covertly connived.
with the Indian government in its plan for the creation of Bangladesh. It deliberately fed disinformation about the move of its seventh fleet in support of Pakistan. This disinformation turned into embarrassment for Pakistan when it was dismembered.\cite{65}

However, it is ironical that while the US was covertly conniving with and supporting India in the breakup of Pakistan, the latter, even while in the thick of battle of its survival, went out of its way to further US interests by laying the historical bridge for Sino-US relations by arranging Chou-enlai–Henry Kissinger Summit\cite{66}.

Rather than beefing up Pakistan's defence to enable it to maintain the minimal defensive deterrence. From now on US policy towards South Asia gradually shifted from a balance of power model in the fifties and sixties to a position of greater recognition of India's pre-dominance since 1971. Kissinger refers to the Bangladesh crisis as the most difficult of Nixon's first term, as far as US South Asia policy was concerned.\cite{67} Thus, the warming of relations between US Pakistan during Nixon period was lost with bitter experience of Pakistan in 1971 War with India. Similarly America also followed policy of disengagement in 70s in Asia because of frustrating experience in the Vietnam War.

The announcement of the lifting of the US arms embargo in 1975 stated that the US had no interest in upsetting the strategic
balance in the subcontinent or resuming America's pre 1965 role as the major arms supplier to the region. Now US was more interested to play role of a reconciliator between India and Pakistan.

In the War of 1971, Pakistan had lost a large part of its military equipments worth $ 200 million, with its military demoralized and India proving its ascendance. Once again Bhutto needed American military assistance. Since Pakistan had been striving hard to acquire arms from the USA and other sources. With the lifting of the embargo, Pakistan was free to get US lethal weapons short of nuclear ones. In 1975, just after lifting the embargo the US Defence Department approved sale of 110A-7 light bombers and it contracted with Pakistan worth $700 million for military aid.68

Ford administration faced a complex problem of Nuclear Development in South Asia. As India had already successfully conducted nuclear test at Pokhran on May 18, 1974, which completely changed the strategic balance in favour of India. On learning that Pakistan want to obtain nuclear device at any cost, Henry Kissinger, then US secretary of State, and US President Ford warned of making a horrible example out of Pakistan, if it persisted with its nuclear policy. This forced American foreign policy makers to deter Pakistan and India from acquisition of nuclear weapons, and US made non-proliferation a central issue in bilateral relations.
with Pakistan and India. Since 1974, successive US administration have pushed for restrain by both countries, utilizing a range of policy tools including diplomatic pressure, embargo on the export of nuclear technology, and the leverage of US assistance and arms sale. Infact, the United States had sought to oppose proliferation in South Asia through all available means at its disposal.69

In 1977, the United States Congress passed the Symington Glenn Amendment to Security Assistance Act, which forbade US military and economic assistance to any country receiving, “nuclear enriched equipment” which was not subject to Atomic Energy Safeguards. Pakistan fell into this forbidden category with the result that all US assistance was terminated in April, 1979. There was however, a revival of US interest in security co-operation with Pakistan in the wake of downfall of the Shah regime in Iran and the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan in the same year.70

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan shot Pakistan to immediate prominence in the US perception once again. From a totally ignored and forgotten ally who till recently was being bullied and served warnings on nuclear issue and whose President had spurned disdainfully paltry economic assistance as “peanuts” suddenly became the champion of free world and declared to play most decisive role in furtherance of US interests in fighting its proxy War.71
REFERENCE


5. Early Reports, of Pakistan-US negotiations indicated that the base facilities were an important consideration. The United States established a base near Peshawar in Northern Pakistan.

6. For details of Pakistan's Strategic importance and value, see Lord Birdwood-“Reflections on Pakistan in international Relations” *Pakistan Quarterly*. Spring 1955, p.6.

7. The Marshal Plan and the Truman Doctrine were the other measures implemented by the US along with NATO in this Process.
8. India’s population is Sixth times and its territory three times larger than Pakistan. Industrially also India is several times stronger. See Andrew Mellor, *India Since Partition*, London, 1951. pp.39-49.


31. Quoted in S.M. Burke, No. 28, p.135.


40. For details See Shelton Kodikara, Strategic Factor in International Relations in South Asia, Canberra 1979, pp.38-40.


47. SEACDT being hard to pronounce, the organization became popularly known as SEATO, and in 1955 the latter term was officially adopted.

49. After the fall of Premier Mosaddique in 1953, the Shah of Iran had began to incline towards alignment with the West.

50. As Iraq did not recognize Israel, the inclusion of latter in the Baghdad Pact was ruled out.


64. *The Time of India*, New Delhi, October 10, 1970.


