CHAPTER TWO

SOVIET POLICY OF INTERVENTION

Introduction:

Foreign policy is the sum of all the attitudes reflected in myriads of relationships and numberless points of contact that one nation has with others, large and small. Foreign policy also includes the attitudes enshrined in the constitution, in legislative enactments, executive orders and regulations, judicial decisions that have import for relations with other nations or their nationals. It includes even unofficial attitudes of peoples and individuals, of domestic companies, trade unions and institutions, their actions and reactions which affect relations with others. In largest part, then, foreign policy is sometimes, undramatic, uncontroversial, "uninteresting"—I do not say unimportant—aimed at achieving national ends usually through stability, order, good relations. Like good health, or a good marriage, it is mostly unnoted and taken for granted—unless the routine is uninterrupted.

The concept of territory and territorial sovereignty is not prominent in foreign policy; but every foreign policy assumes the integrity and inviolability of the national territory, and any intentional violation would probably lead to major crisis.
Not least, by far, are particular prohibitions of the law deriving from the basic concepts, such as those designed to protect the independence of nations against various forms of intervention. Accusations of intervention are common fare; to refrain from “intervention” is a tenet of foreign policy for many nations¹.

World War II was a major watershed in Soviet Foreign policy. Before the war, the Soviet Union was at best a middle level power whose overriding concern was the preservation of the Bolshevik revolution and the protection of the nation’s security. World War II radically altered the structure of international politics. Europe no longer dominated world affairs. The great powers of the pre-war era (with the exception of the United States) were either vanquished or exhausted. Soviet Russia emerged for the first time in its history as a great power, surpassed in strength only by the United States. Within a short period of time, the Soviet Union and the United States acquired a special status in world affairs as not merely great powers but super powers. Since 1945, the central focus of Soviet foreign policy has been its relationship with the United States.

Now with the perspective of more than a generation, we can see rather clearly the main outlines of the changes that have operated upon Soviet

¹. Intervention is an effort to bring influence to bear on other govs. by particular means. Strictly, intervention is unlawful interference; what by definition constitutes intervention is unlawful. Strictly, too, intervention means dictatorial interference by force or threat of force, but the term is often used loosely for any impenissible interference or attempt to influence.
foreign policy. There are six general variables that stand out as fundamental: four of an external nature and two internal. They are as follow:

1. The change in the structure of the international system from bipolarity to multipolarity.

2. The growth of polycentrism in the international communist movement.

3. The development of a military technology that makes the total destruction of an adversary possible.

4. The achievement of military parity between the Soviet Union and the United States and the change from a regional to a global military power.

5. The change in Soviet regime from a totalitarian polity to an authoritarian bureaucratic oligarchy, and

6. The difference reflected in the leadership of different personalities from Stalin to Gorbachev.

The Soviet Union was the first great power to claim the ideas of Marxism as the basis for all public policy, both domestic and foreign. Every Soviet leader from Lenin to Gorbachev has explained and defended his actions as conforming to the principles of Marxism-Leninism.

As the cold war emerged in the aftermath of the Second World War, it was not necessary for Stalin to develop any new concept to describe the changing relationship between the Soviet Union and its former allies. He
had only to revive the old "two camps" thesis with its message about the danger of a capitalist attack against the Soviet Union. Andrei Zhdanov's speech at the founding conference of the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) in Poland in September 1947 heralded a new militant phase in Soviet Policy toward the West. He accused the United States of seeking world supremacy, of plotting to "hatch a new imperialist war".

What the cominform was designed to do in the way of enforcing uniformity in the "informational" sphere, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) was intended to accomplish in the economic arena. A crude imitation of the European Recovery Program, it helped to ensure Soviet access to East European resources and to bind the economies of these countries more closely to that of the USSR.

Shortly after the end of the Second World War, Communism had spread from one country (two counting Mongolia) to a system that held under its sway 100 million additional people in 11 more states of Europe: Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, the eastern zone of Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Albania. The first three were reannexed into the USSR----an act unrecognized but not strenuously protested by the West.

At the beginning of the War, communist parties were non existent in Albania, Germany and Poland, and almost so in Rumania and Hungary. They were stronger in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia and strongest of all in Czechoslovakia. All were under the tight control of the comintern and thus of Stalin himself. Most of East European Party leaders (with the notable exception of the Yugoslavs and Albanians) spent the war year in Moscow.³

The Soviet Union operates within four networks of relationships, all of which are interrelated⁴: (1) as a great power in the international system; (2) as one of the two dominant states of the world socialist system, (3) as the leading member of the "socialist commonwealth"; and (4) as a leading member of the international communist movement. The international system encompasses all the states of the world. The world socialist system, which can be considered a subsystem of the international system, consists of those states governed by communist parties. Formed in the aftermath of World War II with the creation of the people's democracies in Eastern Europe, the world socialist system today numbers eighteen states. A subgroup of this system is the "Socialist commonwealth", consisting of the members of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance and the Warsaw Pact. The international communist movement, antedating the Russian Revolution, comprises all the communist parties through out

³. Ibid., p.75.
⁴. Ibid., p. 211
the World whether in or out of power. Not only does the Soviet leadership distinguish between the world socialist system, the socialist commonwealth, and the international communist movement, but it observes different rules of behavior towards the members of these different networks.

From the moment the Red Army started moving across Eastern Europe in 1944, laying the foundations for communist rule in the liberated countries, the Soviet leadership was confronted with the problem of defining the relationship between the Soviet Union and other socialist states. There was never the slightest doubt that Stalin intended to subordinate the people's democracies to Soviet rule, but there were different ways by which this might be accomplished. Soviet control in such a relationship would put the countries of Eastern Europe in a position somewhere between that of a satellite or simply within the Soviet sphere of influence.

In 1947, however, Soviet policy changed. Stalin apparently became surer of the international situation and the conditions within Eastern Europe. It became increasingly clear that the Western powers would not interfere however far Stalin might go. Furthermore, the Soviet Union shortly became the dominant military power on the continent. Within the Soviet sphere of influence, Stalin was pleasantly surprised to observe that the non-communist forces were considerably weaker than he had anticipated.
The official signal for the change in Soviet policy was the establishment of the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) in September 1947 in the Polish resort town of Szklarska Poreba (Near Warsaw). Ironically, the only opposition to the creation of the Cominform came from Wladyslaw Gomulka, representing the host party. Another irony of the Cominform's origin was the strong support given to it by Josip-Broz-Tito, head of Yugoslavia's Communist Party. The principal function of the new communist international organization was ostensibly to promote the construction of communism by an exchange of information among Europe's leading parties. It was not supposed to be a policy making body like its predecessor, the Comintern. Besides the Soviet Union, membership in the organization included the parties of Yugoslavia, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, as well as the powerful Western Parties of Italy and France (Albania was not included because it was scheduled to be incorporated into Yugoslavia). To promote an exchange of information among Cominform members, a biweekly newspaper (later a weekly) was published with the cumbersome name, "For a lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy". It was at the Cominform's founding meeting that Andrei Zhdanov made the vitriolic speech that heralded a new Soviet hard line toward the West.

The real significance of the Cominform had less to do with relations between the Soviet Union and the West than it had to do with those between the Soviet Union and its Eastern European neighbors. Its
function were to curb the nationalistic and independent tendencies that had been growing within the communist elites of Europe and to accelerate the speedy takeover of power by communists in Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Though its accomplishment were meagre at best, it marked the beginning of a uniform system of satellite states.

The Council on Mutual Economic Cooperation (COMECON) was formed in January 1949 largely as response to the Marshall Plan. It too was an instrument under Stalin for economic exploitation, although its main activity was originally limited to coordinating trade among the satellites. The founding members were the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania and Czechoslovakia. They were joined subsequently by Albania (which broke away in 1961) East Germany, Mongolia, Cuba and Vietnam. In 1950, the rouble, became the standard currency for international transactions within COMECON, making the USSR the arbiter of all rates of exchange.

In sum, Stalin created a socialist system that was truly monolithic. Eastern Europe became part of a Soviet-bloc whose centre was Moscow. While he lived, Stalin controlled this empire through a variety of informal techniques. Chief among these was his personal selection or approval of every satellite leader. Those who held power did so not because they had indigenous support but solely by virtue of Stalin's approval.

5. Ibid., pp.216-17.
The official History of Soviet Foreign Policy describes the policy's four basic tasks as:

1. To secure, together with the other socialist countries, favorable conditions for the building of socialism and communism;
2. To strengthen the unity and solidarity of the socialist countries, their friendship and brotherhood;
3. To support the national-liberation movement and to effect all-round cooperation with the young, developing countries.
4. Consistently to uphold the principle of peaceful co-existence of states with different social systems, to offer decisive resistance to the aggressive forces of imperialism, and to save mankind from a new-world war.

The invasion of Czechoslovakia certainly demonstrated the paramount importance to the Soviet leadership of the first and second of the basic tasks of their foreign policy. But as for the third task (support of national-liberation movements), the Soviet Union gave North Vietnam enough help--and no more than that—both to keep it on its feet and to maintain Soviet influence in Indo-China against the Chinese; in Chile, the Soviet Union made no attempt to repeat its Cuban experience; Soviet commitment to this task is taken with a pinch of salt by Egyptians; and it is ridiculed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Above all, since 1972/3 the Leninist

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6. Robin Edmonds; Soviet Foreign Policy 1962-73, 1975,p.3.
7. Ibid., p. 4.
principle of peaceful coexistence has been given an interpretation that goes far beyond anything ever suggested by Lenin. In short, although Soviet Foreign Policy may have remained unaltered on paper for nearly twenty years, in fact a gap has developed between its theory and its practice. For a Marxist, there can be no difference between theory and practice. In non-Marxist terms such a difference may be regarded as a conflict that can not be tolerated indefinitely.

The Soviet Union is unique among the Great Powers in that neither the Foreign Minister nor the Defence Minister is a member of the policy-decision-making body, the Politburo. Foreign Policy is, therefore, formulated on the advice of professional experts, but the decisions are taken by the eleven Party leaders without the professional's participation. The following principles guide the Soviet leaders:

(a) The survival of the Soviet Union as a state and as a world super power, with some degree of parity with the United States.
(b) No military-strategic confrontation with the U.S.
(c) No foreign commitment beyond the reasonable capability of the Soviet armed forces to fulfil them.
(d) Some degree of injection of communist ideology into foreign policy, especially within the world communist movement, where China represents an ideological threat.
(e) Wherever consistent with any first two principles, the general increase of Soviet political influence and prestige throughout the world. In a clash between survival and ideology or prestige, survival will always win.

(f) The retention of an active role in the United Nations, with the proviso that UN decisions which run counter to Soviet National or ideological aims will be unacceptable.

The concept of peaceful coexistence has always been the general line of Soviet foreign policy. From its very inception, the Soviet state proclaimed peaceful coexistence as the basic principal of its foreign policy. The fact that the very first political act of the Soviet Russia was the Decree on peace, the decree on stopping the bloody war, is not to be considered an accident. Co-existence is a continuation of the struggle between the two social systems, but struggle by peaceful means, without resort to war, without interference by one state in the internal affairs of another.

In short, coexistence on a reasonable basis presupposes the recognition of the existence of different social systems, the recognition of the right of every people to deal independently with all political and social problems of its own country, respect for the sovereignty of other nations, adherence to the principle of non-interference in internal affairs of other countries and the settlement of all international issues by negotiation.
Thus, the Soviet view of peaceful co-existence of countries with different social and political systems does not simply imply an absence of war or a state of temporary and unstable armistice. It provides for the maintenance of friendly economic and political relations and envisages the establishment and development of a variety of forms of peaceful international cooperation.

If we have a look at the UN Charter itself we can find out that it is based on the principle of peaceful co-existence although it does not use this very word. In its Preamble, the UN Charter, for example, states that the member countries undertake “to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors”, and to unite their “strength to maintain international peace and security”.

**Soviet Concept of Intervention:**

To Soviet scholars, sovereignty is “the independence of the state of any other state, this independence amounts to the right to decide freely and according to its own judgement all its domestic and foreign affairs without interference on the part of other states” 8.

“Sovereignty” is the possession of supreme power (summa potestas) unlimited by any other state resulting in autonomy within a state and

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independence in relation to other states.¹⁰

Although claiming absolute respect for sovereignty, the Soviet Union does not advocate a 19th century classical concept of sovereignty. At the 1964, Mexico City Meeting of the UN Special Committee on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States, the Soviet Representative Mr. Khlestov, went on record as saying,

Some countries even considered that international Law, too, was an invasion of state sovereignty. His own delegation, however, did not share that view; it held that rules of international law restricted the freedom of states with a view to safeguarding international peace and security, without infringing the sovereignty of states concerned. His country’s policies and Soviet legal doctrine were consistent with that view.¹⁰

Although states may possess sovereignty they may not be able to exercise the independence of sovereignty. Injury to the socialist movement has been used by Soviet scholars to explain why the sovereignty of Soviet Republics or of national minorities within the USSR must be restricted. With the Czech crisis of 1968 this reasoning was elevated officially to the international plane in what has become known as

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10. Mr. Khlestov (USSR.), 1964Mexico City Meeting of the UN Special Committee on Principles of Int. Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States, A/AC. 119/SR22 (September 14, 1964), p.28.
the "Brezhnev Doctrine". The Soviet Union made it clear that Czechoslovakia could maintain its independence (sovereignty) only as a socialist country. "The sovereignty of individual countries", wrote S. Kovalyov explaining the Brezhnev Doctrine, "can not be used in opposition to the interests of world socialism and the revolutionary world movement". Czechoslovakian sovereignty had to be subordinated to the extent that it ran counter to the laws of the class struggle and of social development.

The imperialist, contrary to the United Nations Charter, openly interfere in the domestic affairs of independent states. The attempt to dispute the right of Egypt to nationalize the Suez Canal Company, and to establish international control over the Canal was an obvious example. An act of outright aggression was committed against Egypt in October-November 1956, by Israel, Britain and France with the aim of compelling the Egyptian people to renounce their independent policy both at home and abroad. British military intervention in Oman in 1957, the American intervention in Lebanon and that of the British in Jordan in 1958 were also examples of gross intervention by the imperialist powers in affairs of other countries.

11. Brezhnev clearly stated the Doctrine on November 12, 1968, in his Warsaw speech, "If the internal and external enemies of socialism think they can attempt to direct the development of any single socialist to a restoration of the capitalist system, if there then arises a threat to socialism in this country which is a threat to the security to the entire socialist community of states, then this is not merely a problem for the country concerned, but a general problem that must engage the attention of all socialist states". See Richard J. Erickson, op. cit., pp. 68-69.
12. Ibid., p. 52
13. Ibid., p. 53.
The imperialists do not hesitate to use the UN Charter as a cover for intervention in the internal affairs of other states. Thus, contrary to Article 2(7) of the Charter, and despite the protests of the legitimate govt. of Hungary, a discussion of the “Hungarian Question” was imposed on the United Nations\(^\text{15}\).

On the one hand the West’s activities in the Middle East were a violation of the principle of non-intervention while, on the other hand, Soviet action in Hungary in 1956 did not alter the essentially domestic character of Hungarian situation and that it was, on the contrary, the UN which had violated international law by submitting to Western demands for consideration of the “Hungarian Question”.

The Communists’ attitude towards intervention is very closely connected with their theory of sovereignty. The aim of the Soviet Government, as set forth by the Third International, being to foment world revolution and thereby establish a class-less commonwealth, when a foreign non-communist state is viewed as a struggle of classes, intervention on the part of the Soviets is a commendable and justifiable act by which the sovereign laboring class fulfills its duty of extending its own class achievement to those who are still deprived of the enjoyment of the privileges\(^\text{16}\).

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15. Ibid., p. 58
By the same token, no government based upon communist philosophy could brook intervention in Russian affairs by capitalist states. Thus the reaction of the Soviet Govt. to the intervention of the "Allies" from 1917-22 was one of strong protest. The whole intervention of Entente from 1917 to 1922 was viewed by the Soviet authorities as nothing more than a large scale attempt of the capitalist class to oppose the development of the proletarian movement, and, as such, it evoked violent opposition on their part.

The principle of opposition to intervention was consistently manifested by the Soviet Govt. even in favor of other states. Various treaties and agreements signed by the R.S.F.S.R. and the USSR. embody this attitude. A clear expression of it is to be found in the Polish-R.S.F.S.R. Treaty of Peace, signed on March 18, 1921. Article 5, of this Treaty provides that each Contracting Party under takes "...to respect in every way the political sovereignty of the other party, to abstain from interference in its internal affairs, and particularly, to refrain from all agitation, propaganda or interference of any kind and not to encourage any such movement".17

Where as, it may be argued that in all these instances the communist authorities were guided by practical interests in their opposition to

17. Ibid., p.38.
intervention, there interests were not always the same. In the beginning they were desirous of denouncing the invasion of territory under their jurisdiction; subsequently they feared that anti-proletarian propaganda might deprive them of the prestige they had gained. These practical considerations led the Soviet Govt. to subscribe to the view of the majority of non-communist authorities that intervention is an undesirable violation of the sovereign right of a state—so long as the state is looked upon objectively as the classical non-communist political person of international law. At the same time as a special method used for the propagation of communist philosophy, intervention is juridically acceptable during the transition period of state evolution\textsuperscript{18}. Indeed, it appears to be normal and inevitable between the communist and capitalist worlds.

The last measure of non-amicable settlement of international disputes, short of war to be considered is intervention. The theory, advanced as early as Grotius, that intervention was not illegal when undertaken for the purpose of liberating the masses from tyranny\textsuperscript{19}, is perfectly acceptable to the Soviets. Essentially, a manifestation of class differences for the communists, intervention is admissible for them in principle inspite of the fact that when materialized it is nothing but a forced subjection of the weak to the strong.

Wars of liberation, are waged to defend the people from foreign attack and

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., pp.39-40.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., p.301.
from attempts to enslave them; or to liberate the people from capitalist
slavery; or lastly, to liberate colonies and dependent countries from the
yoke of imperialism. As far back as 1939, for instance, Stalin\(^20\) himself and
publicly declared that "we stand for the support of nations which are the
victims of aggression and are fighting for the independence of their
country". For all Soviet spokesmen, from Khrushchev on down, make no
secret of where their sympathies lie, publicly declaring that "----- we are
against imperialistic, colonialistic and, in general, against all wars, accept
those wars which people wage in fighting for their own liberation. These
are sacred popular wars against slavery, against colonial regimes"\(^21\).

The socialist countries and the communists all over the world will continue
to aid and support the peoples who are waging an armed struggle against
colonialism. Far from contradicting the concept of peaceful-co-existence,
this is an affirmative of that concept, since the issue at stake is respect for
one of the basic principles of peaceful co-existence—the right of all
peoples to order their own life as they see fit, to be masters in their own
house\(^22\).

Traditionally, the Soviet Union has been a vigorous exponent of the
sovereign prerogatives of the nation-state, considering state sovereignty

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20. J. V. Stalin; Report on the Work of the Central Committee to the 18\(^{th}\) Congress of
the Communist Party of the S.U. (Bolsheviks) 15 (1939). as cited in Hans W.
21. N. S. Khrushchev (Communism—Peace and Happiness of Peoples) 379 (1962) as
cited in Hans W. Badde, op. cit., p. 90.
22. Ponomaryov, Some Problems of the Revolutionary Movement, 12 World Marxist
to be "the keystone of international law". Sovereignty is used both as a
shield to protect the Soviet Union from interference by capitalist states,
and as a weapon in its struggle with such states. Sovereignty is a
reliable means of defending the small states from the major imperialist
power's attempts to struggle them to their diktat.

The creation of aggressive blocs, the building of military basis abroad,
intervention in the internal affairs of other countries and the suppression of
the national liberation movements are all aggressive actions which are
incompatible with the sovereignty of states and peoples.

Soviet insistence upon sovereign prerogatives still serves a protective
function. The protective umbrella, however, has been expanded to include
the members of the socialist commonwealth of nations, other socialist
states, and the newly emerging states of Africa, Asia and Latin America. It
also takes into account the possibility of interference in internal affairs by
international organizations. For example, efforts of the United Nations to
delve into the events in Hungary in 1956 have been resisted on the basis
of the sovereign principle of non-interference in domestic affairs reflected
in Article 2(7) of the Charter of the United Nations. Similarly, despite the
continuing, bitter split between the Soviet Union and Chinese Communist
Parties, the Soviet delegate opposed consideration of the Tibet question.

at the Twentieth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations as an invasion of the sovereignty of the Chinese People's Republic.

The Soviet initiative opposing intervention is meaningful only in the context of the double standard used to determine the legality of intervention—a prime example of unilateral characterization in the Soviet interests. The legality of intervention depends upon the type of state involved as, by definition, only capitalist states "intervene" in the internal affairs of other states.

Intervention is the armed invasion or interference of one or several capitalist states in the internal affairs of another state aimed at suppression of a revolution, seizure of territory, acquisition of special privileges, establishing domination, etc.

The imperialist states have made repeated attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of the Soviet State and other socialist countries, and also in the internal affairs of countries which have freed themselves from the yoke of colonialism (Indonesia, the countries of the Near and Middle-East and others).

The United States in its "shameful role gendarme of the World" is said to have a long tradition of intervention under the doctrines of Monroe and

26. Ibid., p. 96.
27. Ibid., p. 96.
succeeding Presidents\textsuperscript{28}. In contrast, the socialist states are portrayed as opposed in principle to intervention because it negates the peaceful co-existence of states.

The Soviet Union and all peace loving states consider the principle of non-interference the most important means of realizing the principle of the peaceful co-existence of states with different social systems and an effective means of developing collaboration between states\textsuperscript{29}.

When action comparable to intervention is taken by socialist countries, it can be characterize as fraternal assistance because, in the Soviet lexicon, intervention is defined as the exclusive sin of capitalist states. It can also be justified on the basis of the purpose served by the intervention. For example, assistance in the crushing of a popular uprising in a socialist country is not intervention since such an uprising, being non-socialist in character, is not sanctioned by the principle of self-determination, the violation of which constitutes the principal Soviet criterion of the intervention barred by international law\textsuperscript{30}. Similarly, the current anti-racist campaign has produced the soviet position that action in opposition to racism does not constitute intervention under international law\textsuperscript{31}.

\begin{itemize}
\item[28.] Ibid., p. 96.
\item[29.] Ibid., p. 97.
\item[30.] Ibid., p. 97
\item[31.] Racism has been branded as a crime against peace and humanity. It has ceased to be a private affair of individual countries and nation. Responsibility for racist crime has also ceased to be a question of domestic, national jurisdiction and has acquired int. significance.
\end{itemize}
The Soviet doctrine of intervention has been described by a competent Western observer as opposed “in principle—to all forms of intervention with the exception of those which answer the aims of Soviet policy and which may be characterized in a different way”\textsuperscript{32}.

Soviet initiatives in this area reflect a residual defensism vis-à-vis the existing legal order, and the ever-present courtship of neutralist states in a bid for extra-camp support for the policy and law of peaceful co-existence. At the very least, these initiatives are part of a continuing propaganda—diplomatic effort to maintain the integrity of the shield of sovereignty—in the United Nations context, the domestic jurisdiction limitation on its right of intervention [Article 2(7) of the Charter] and to neutralise or counter Western influence among neutralist states. More importantly, they reflect recognition that, if foreign policy objectives are to be realized, sovereignty, the key element in the law which is to assist in their realization, can not be used principally in a defensive role.

The principle of non-intervention, a corollary of sovereignty, is similarly influenced by socialist internationalism. The essence of the new content provides the legal basis for interference in internal affairs in the greater interest of the socialist commonwealth. The basis for Soviet license under this formulation is provided by the complimentary position that the foreign policy of the Soviet state always coincides with the needs of socialist

\textsuperscript{32} Bernard A. Ramundo; op. cit., p. 97.
internationalism and the interests of the proletariat of all countries\textsuperscript{33}.

Thus, the socialist, more progressive content of the principle of non-intervention is essentially a rationalization for the relationship of subordination by a large, powerful state of its smaller neighbors who have been sentenced by history and geography to a client-state status. Although the Soviets formally reject the legality of subversion, they approve of support to the forces of national liberation, and draw a self-serving distinction between the two types of intervention. When insurgency favorable to Soviet interests develops, they openly support it under the general banner of assistance to national liberation movements. The Soviet vehemently deny that support for wars of national liberation constitutes a form of aggression or unlawful intervention\textsuperscript{34}.

On 16\textsuperscript{th} September Victor Louis, The Soviet journalist who had scooped the fall of Khrushchev, wrote an article in the "Evening News" about the danger of war, which included the following passage:

\begin{quote}
\textit{The Soviet Union is adhering to the doctrine that socialist countries have the right to influence in each other's affairs in their own interest.}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., p. 104.

\textsuperscript{34} The Soviet policy to support national liberation movements reflects the view that this tide of revolution, although not socialist in character can be used in the struggle against capitalism and its international manifestation, imperialism, as a means of weakening it by enlisting the support of the emerging states in combating it. The Soviet Union advocates the use of the every form of struggle for national liberation. The peoples' right to freedom and independence, whether established by peaceful means or in armed struggle in sacred. The Soviet Union gives comprehensive assistance to the peoples fighting with weapons in hand against imperialism and colonialism. (Pravda, June 28, 1965).
or those of others who are threatened. The fact that China is many times larger than Czechoslovakia and might offer active resistance is, according to Marxist theoreticians, no reason for not applying this doctrine.

After the intervention in Czechoslovakia, Soviet ideologues soon launched the doctrine of the "Soviet community". Thus Pravda, on September 25, 1968, published the statement that "(each communist party) is responsible not only to its own people, but also to all the socialist countries, to the entire communist movement. As a social system, world socialism is the common gain of the working people of all lands; it is indivisible and its defense is the common cause of all communists and all progressives in the world, in the first place, the working folk of the socialist countries".

"People who 'disapprove' of the actions of the allied socialist states are ignoring the decisive fact that these countries are defending the interests of all, of world socialism, of the entire world revolutionary movement."  

Ul'ianovski and Kim, but also, with some reservations, the slightly less enthusiastic Solodovnikov and Manchkha, all spoke of the "obligation" or duty of the socialist world to help the national liberation movements. (Kim

spoke of this as a “basic law”)\(^37\). And starushenko provided the “legal” justification for the “right” of the socialist states to render assistance\(^38\). They all argued that, by helping these movements, the socialist world would be better able to influence their future socio-political orientation. Although Starushenko, in providing the legal justification for outside support, appeared to be advocating even military intervention. Thus, he spoke of Soviet assistance of all kinds against the (imperialist) export of counter-revolution\(^39\).

**Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe: An Overview**

The relationship between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe which emerged after World War II was shaped by a complex of factors which almost defy comprehensive analysis. History, geography, culture, language, religion, psychological attachments, national character, and ideology have all influenced the development of the relationship, although the impact of each factor has varied considerably with the individual countries of Eastern Europe. In each case, the particular complex has in turn contributed to determining relations between Moscow and the different countries of Eastern Europe. Thus, some of these factors have served to bind the countries of Eastern Europe to Moscow, while others have served to alienate them.

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39. Ibid., p. 83.
Consideration of history and geography alone would appear sufficient to explain the special role for Moscow in this region. Geographically, the area has been a buffer zone between Russia and other major powers of central Europe for many centuries, and, for the past two hundred years, Russia has sought to assert a dominant influence in the region. Many of the Eastern European attitudes and perceptions were shaped by the events and circumstances of nineteenth century European diplomacy. Less than two hundred years ago, all of the nationalities of Eastern Europe (except the Serbs and Montenegro) were languishing under Ottoman or Hapsburg domination. The circumstances of their liberation and independence were to shape national attitudes toward Russia for many decades.

Since all of the subject nationalities of the Ottoman and Hapsburg Empires in the region were either Slavic and/or Orthodox (with the exception of the Magyars who became a co-ruling nationality in 1848), the fact that Russia was the largest and most powerful Slavic and Orthodox state was destined to influence both Russia’s diplomatic calculations and Eastern Europe’s perceptions. Russia was instrumental in liberating the Rumanians, Bulgars, and Serbs and was eager to pose as the champion and potential deliverer of the Croats, Slovenes, Czechs, and Slovaks (all Catholic but Slavic) from Hapsburg domination. Thus was forged a symbiotic relationship between Russia and the Slavic/Orthodox nationalities of Eastern Europe, which was manifested before World War I.
in the Pan-Slavic movement that has in many ways survived the vicissitudes of revolutionary upheaval, social convulsions, elite hostilities, military occupation, territorial dismemberment, political subjugation, ideological conflict, and two World Wars. The Rumanians, being Orthodox but non-Slavic, have conflicting perceptions, for, while Russia was instrumental in freeing them from Ottoman rule, Moscow has insisted upon retaining Bessarabia, considered part of Rumania irredenta. Hungary and Poland have traditionally viewed Russia both as a rival for power in the region and as an oppressor. This is particularly true of Poland, a Catholic Slavic nation, with its own proud history as a great power in the area, the bulk of whose population languished under Russian rule and oppression for over a century.

The establishment of Soviet power in Eastern Europe can be seen, historically, as a continuation, perhaps the culmination, of a process of westward expansion began long ago under the Czars. Stalin’s bargain with Hitler and their subsequent disputes left no doubt about the Soviet Union’s interest and ambitions in Eastern Europe—whether for security, for imperial expansion, or for the cause of revolution—and those ambitions were not abandoned even when the Soviet State was fighting for its life and needed Western help. With the defeat of Hitler’s armies and the creation of a vacuum in the region, it was inevitable that the Soviets would move in. The Western powers were not there; they were not able or prepared to contest Soviet moves except by ineffective protest.
It was not entirely clear, in 1944 and 1945, how much of the area the Soviets would insist on dominating, or whether they would be satisfied in some cases with influence short of domination\(^4\).

As for Hungary and Balkans, Stalin’s famous percentage deal with Churchill in 1944 documented his insistence on Soviet primacy in Romania and Bulgaria (in return for British primacy in Greece), while in Yugoslavia and Hungary, where he agreed to a more even division of influence with the West, he must have had confidence that the cards were stacked in the Soviet Union’s favor.

It is often said that the boundaries of empire were set by the lines reached by the Soviet armies in World War II and that their presence made possible the imposition of satellite regimes in Eastern Europe. The lines of occupation in Germany and Austria were set by international agreement, not by the circumstances of military positions at the end of the War (and Khrushchev later gave up the Soviet zone in Austria in exchange for neutralization of the whole country); Soviet forces did not occupy all of Czechoslovakia (and withdrew very soon, in 1945), passed through only part of Yugoslavia and did not stay, and did not enter Albania at all.

The decisive events that established Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe were those that marked the seizure of political power by communist parties. The pace, pattern, and degree of Soviet involvement varied from country to country, taking account of local conditions. The Soviets were always prepared, however, to make their own conditions when necessary in order to bring about the desired result. The chosen instruments were the leaders of the local communist parties, some of whom returned to their countries in the baggage train of the Soviet armies, while others emerged from the anti-Nazi resistance. These leaders were helped from the start to gain a share of power, then to take full control by suppressing or coopting their erstwhile non-communist allies.

The eight communist states of East-Central Europe, all maintained basically the same apparatus of party over state hierarchies, economic planning, censorship and the like. Albania is independent and anti-Soviet, Yugoslavia independent and more or less pro-Soviet, and Romania independent so long as it does not seriously offend the Russians. Five states may be called Soviet vassals; four (Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland and Hungary) have Soviet military forces inside the home land. The Soviets have long regarded these countries as virtually theirs. A Soviet editor remarked in 1968 that “we” would not have elected Dubcek if it had been known what a “reactionary” he was. Asked if it was not the
Czechs who elected him, the editor said, "you know we run these countries. It is our duty, we are responsible for them----"41.

One component of the process which the foreign policy doctrine of the Soviet Union maintains will lead to the reshaping of the comparative strength of forces in the world is the growth of world socialism. It is noted with pride that the world socialist system covers one-third of the earth's surface and takes in one-third of the world's population. Apart from the Warsaw Pact and Comecon countries, the Soviets regarded Yugoslavia, North Korea, Laos and Cambodia as belonging to the world socialist system. The Comecon Countries rank as the centre of the socialist world. With slightly more than 10 percent of the world population they generate one-third of world industrial production, one fifth of world agricultural production and roughly one-quarter of world income42. At the Second Comintern Congress in 1920, the Soviet Union had promised that, in the cause of proletarian internationalism, the interests of the Soviet Union would also be subordinated to those of the international proletarian struggle. In fact, the reverse conclusion proved to be of greater political impact, namely that all socialist countries were obliged to give unconditional support to the Soviet Union in the name of internationalism.

Up until the Second World War, no "socialist camp" existed. Only Mongolia was made into a satellite in 1921 with the help of the Red Army, although Soviet Russia had recognised the sovereign right of China to Outer Mongolia only a year before.

Even after the Second World War, there is no evidence of a selective policy aimed at creating a socialist world system on the basis of a general plan. There would have been three potential routes for such a plan to follow:

1. The annexation of the Young People’s Democracies to the ‘Fatherland of Socialism’.
2. The creation of regional unions of socialist states would have been less suspicious a route towards a large-scale socialist complex but this was again forbidden by Stalin—especially the plans for a federation of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.
3. The organisation of unity through a network of bilateral relations between the Soviet Union and the People’s Democracies.

From 1939 to 1945, Stalin sought to regain for the Soviet Union the territory that had once constituted the Tsarist Russian Empire in 1914 with two exceptions: Poland and Finland. Although accepting separate Polish and Finnish States, Stalin was not prepared to recognise as final their frontiers as established after the First World War, not their right to follow
policies of enmity to the Soviet Union. The twin impulses of expanding Soviet power for its own sake and of creating a 'buffer' of greater security against the West motivated Soviet policies from 1934 to 1945. From 1939 to 1940, Stalin achieved his territorial objectives in alliance with Hitler.

In September 1939, the Soviet Union occupied eastern Poland and incorporated this territory some weeks later in the Soviet Union. As a result of the Winter War with Finland (November 1939- March 1940) the Soviet Union annexed Finnish territory of strategic importance. In June 1940, Romania under Soviet pressure and on German 'advice' returned Bessarabia to Russian rule; in August 1940, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were incorporated in the Soviet Union. In 1945, the Soviet Union retained all these gains of 1939-40 and added further relatively small but strategically important areas: Ukraine was acquired from Czechoslovakia, and thereby the Soviet Union regained a common frontier with Hungary which had been lost after the First World War.

A complimentary aspect of Soviet policy was to ensure that those independent states on her borders still surviving should be friendly to the Soviet Union and closely linked to her politically, economically and culturally. Before 1939, only Czechoslovakia had pursued a policy of friendship and alliance with the Soviet Union. Stalin's diplomatic methods were fore-shadowed in the Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty of Friendship, 12 December 1943. By friendly neighbours Stalin meant states which would
be bound by political treaties to the Soviet alliance, whose military resources would be dominated by the Soviet Union and which would permit the stationing or entry of Soviet troops for mutual protection.

The Soviet Union signed alliances with Poland on 21 April 1945 and with Yugoslavia on 11 April 1945, in addition to the Czech alliance already cited. During the first six months of 1945, under the aegis of the Red Army, communist-controlled Governments were set up in Romania and Bulgaria. In 1948, Czechoslovakia came under complete communist control. In Yugoslavia, Marshal Tito had established his communist Government without Russian help. Denounced by Stalin in June 1948 for national deviationism, Tito successfully resisted all Soviet pressure.

The Soviet Union concluded alliance treaties with Romania on 4 February 1948, with Hungary on 18 February and Bulgaria on 18 March 1948. A few months earlier in September 1947 the Communist Information Bureau, Cominform, had been established with headquarters in Belgrade but with nothing really to do. Tito's successful defiance of Stalin's accusations, which Stalin had delivered through the cominform, soon made the Cominform totally ineffective, though as an organisation it remained formally into being until 1956. Soviet policy was laid down by the Party and backed by Soviet Army units, which could be used a last resort.
Western policies were viewed by Stalin as attempts under the leadership of the United States to revive in a new form a capitalist coalition of states, which would encircle the Soviet Union. Stalin saw in the same light Western protests over Russian Policy in the Soviet zone of Germany and in Central and Eastern Europe. Stalin interpreted the Marshall Plan and American economic aid as attempts to revive capitalism among Russia's neighbours to the detriment of the security of the Soviet Union. But the event which most alarmed Central and Eastern Europe was the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany and German rearmament. The Soviet response was to form an alliance of communist states, ostensibly among equals, with joint responsibilities and mutual decision-making organs giving the appearance of equality.

In Stalin's time, no one questioned the Soviet Union's complete control over its Eastern European domain; and no one ventured to rebel. The prestige of Stalin, the servility of the satellite parties, each with its little Stalin (Gottwald, Ulbricht, Rakosi, etc.) sufficed without direct military intervention. In 1953, Malenkov introduced a "New Course" for the satellites, paralleling relaxation at home. This was largely undone after his fall, but Khrushchev, and after him his successors, lacked strength to rule as Stalin did and had to depend much more on institutional, less on personal bonds.
Stalin was never reconciled with Tito, but it is significant that for nearly five years he lived with Tito's "intolerable" deviation. Meanwhile, he had to adjust Soviet military strategy to the loss, and tried to contain Titoism in Eastern Europe by a series of purges of the leadership, complete with show trials. It was left for Khrushchev, two years after Stalin's death, to make the grand gesture of reconciliation with Yugoslavia, a confession of Stalin's errors and his failure, and the beginning of a new Soviet approach to Eastern Europe.

Actually, the process of change had already started before the reconciliation with Tito. The end of the Stalin era brought decompression and new departures both in the USSR itself and, as if by reflex action, in Eastern Europe. The new Soviet rules, as they sorted out the distribution of power among themselves and debated what should be done at home, called into question the state of affairs in the satellites as well. The New Course of liberalization and reform begun in Hungary in 1953, putting Imre Nagy at the head of the Government and clipping the wings of Matyas Rakosi, the old Stalinist, could not have originated in Budapest alone. It emerged from decisions made in Moscow. Comparable manifestations of the thaw took place in East Germany, Poland, and other states of the bloc, although in some the change was negligible.

In seeking to maintain a reliable political base in Eastern Europe, Stalin's successors groped their way toward new relationships, acting to ease
tension and to dissociate themselves from failed and unpopular leaders but uncertain of their course, wavering between past practice and reform, and underestimating the extent of disaffection. The fact that individual Soviet leaders had differences with one another, and that their relations were linked to those between leaders and faction in the satellite states, contributed to the Soviet Union's surprise and unpreparedness when events began to spin out of control in Poland and Hungary in 1956.

Khrushchev's regime was innovative, in Eastern Europe as in other aspects of his policy. He knew he had to find substitutes for Stalinist terror and coercion. Thus, an indeterminate gray area was allowed to develop around the old Stalinist standards of conformity. Within that area the Soviet Union permitted the East European regimes considerable leeway in coping with their own problems responding to domestic pressures, stressing national interests, or even quarreling with each other (as Hungary and Romania did over minority rights in Transylvania).

Khrushchev introduced the concept of the socialist commonwealth, conceding that national conditions could differ on the road to socialism as long as essential Leninist principles were preserved. The idea was not purely propaganda, although ultimate power remained in the hands of only one member of the Commonwealth. The Soviet Union never accepted the concept of multiple centres of authority on ideology and doctrine, and
asserted the right to determine which policies were correct and which were revisionist.

The transition to Brezhnev and Kosygin brought no indications of new departures in policy toward Eastern Europe. Again, however, the uncertainty of where power resided in Moscow in a transitional period raised questions in the minds of East Europeans. In the first year Brezhnev's primacy was not clearly established, nor were his positions known. Kosygin's prominence and the encouragement of new thought on industrial management pointed to the possibility of economic reform throughout the Soviet bloc.

The main purpose of policy is to have the East European states serve as assets, not as burdens or points of vulnerability, in the strategy of the USSR as a global power. From the very beginning it was made clear that Eastern Europe, won at a high cost in Soviet lives, is vital to the security of the USSR. Stalin saw the territory as a glacis providing defensive depth and protecting the Soviet Union from invasion not just by some future Hitler but by a present and powerful America. By the beginning of 1980s the nature of the Soviet Union's relations to the other socialist states and parties had changed by comparison to the seizure of power phase. At the end of 1940s, Stalin used to summon the party leaders to the Crimea. At the start of 1980s, the Soviet Union had to send out invitations to win over
the other socialist countries. In reality, however, the Soviet Union had a hard job winning over her allies' comprehension for this policy.

**Soviet Instruments of Intervention:**

The means of Soviet domination are various. Most obvious and perhaps most decisive are the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), the Warsaw Pact and the Brezhnev Doctrine.

1. **The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon):**

What the Cominform was designed to do in the way of enforcing uniformity in the "informational" sphere, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) was intended to accomplish in the economic arena. Moscow has used Comecon to promote economic integration and thereby political stability and institutionalization of its authority in the bloc. A crude limitation of the European Recovery Program, it helped to ensure Soviet access to East European resources and to bind the economies of these countries more closely to that of the USSR. The Council on Mutual Economic Cooperation (Comecon) was formed in January 1949 largely as a response to the Marshall Plan. It too was an instrument under Stalin for economic exploitation, although its main activity was originally limited to coordinating trade among the satellites. The founding members were the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, and Czechoslovakia. They were joined subsequently by Albania (which broke away in 1961), East Germany in 1950, Mongolia in 1962, Cuba in 1972, and Vietnam. In
1950, the rouble became the standard currency for international transactions within Comecon, making the USSR the arbiter of all rates of exchange.

Under Stalin, there was no necessity for an effective regional organisation; the USSR was in physical control and preferred to maximize its exploitation on a bilateral basis. It felt no need to rationalize the Soviet-East European economic relationship. Starting under Khrushchev in 1955, Comecon went through a period of gradual upgrading: information was pooled, economic agreements were placed on a five-year instead of a one year basis, and an atmosphere of bargaining replaced that of acquiescence. On December 14, 1959, Comecon adopted a Charter (heavily amended in December 1962 and June 1974) defining its purposes and organisational structure. Standing commissions deal with a wide range of subjects, from electric power and nuclear energy to financial problems and transportation. In institutional terms, Comecon came of age in the 1960's but actual integration has proceeded very slowly.

At Khrushchev's behest, in June 1962, a programmic document, "The Basic Principles of the International Socialist Division of Labour", was adopted. In November, Khrushchev pushed for a supranational entity capable of rationalizing and transforming the economies of the bloc:

*We must move more boldly toward establishing a single planning agency for all countries that belong to the council for Mutual*
Economic Assistance. This planning agency should be empowered to draw up joint plans and settle organisational questions so as to coordinate the development of the countries of the socialist system\textsuperscript{43}.

Economic levers also hold the Soviet sphere together. Under the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), trade and to some extent production and planning are co-ordinated and interdependence is created, so that any break with the bloc would require extensive and costly readjustments. By such means, an artificially large proportion of the trade of the satellite countries is with the Soviet Union and one another, from about half to four fifths in the case of East Germany and Bulgaria, the most loyal. These were several reasons in Stalin's foreign policy for this new institution\textsuperscript{44}.

1. The People's Democracies had been forbidden to accept aid under the Marshall Plan. This negative step by Moscow had to be offset by positive incentives.

2. A counterweight was to be created to the OEEC (later the OCED) of the Western European States.

3. A co-ordination centre was required for the blockade measures against Yugoslavia following the break between Tito and Stalin.

\textsuperscript{43} Pravda, November 20, 1962.

\textsuperscript{44} Klaus Von Beyme; The Soviet Union in World Politics, 1987, pp.97-98.
4. The Sovietisation of the People’s Democracies was to be pursued in a more systematic fashion.

At first Comecon was little more than a paper organisation: it held only two meetings prior to the death of Stalin on 5 March 1953. After 1956 more life was breathed into the organisation, which the USSR sought to develop into a closed trading system under its control. But by the 1970s some members, notably Romania, Poland and Hungary, had succeeded in shaking loose to some extent from the restrictions of the system and built up sizable trading relations with capitalist economies.

2. The Warsaw Pact: Soviet Military Policy in Eastern Europe

Russia has always felt vulnerable to military pressure ever since its people tried to setup a national state in the vast plains of the northern parts of the Eurasian land mass. Lacking natural defenses, the Russians found their territory overrun by Tartars and Mongols from the east, by Turks from the South, and attacked by Poles, Swedes, French and Germans from the West. This experience fostered in the Russians a deep sense of the need to amass military power and to entrust their survival exclusively to their own military effort.

These historical and traditional attitudes to military power and defence combine today with more recent political and ideological trends to form the current Soviet attitudes to military power. The preservation of the Soviet
system wherever it exists as well as the defence of the homeland and its client state are the first priorities of the Soviet armed forces. Defence issues have also played an important part in Soviet attempts to protect the frontiers of the USSR by establishing pro-Soviet regimes in neighbouring states close to the Soviet border, in other words, the longstanding Soviet tradition of the buffer zone. The most important of three zones, which was setup after the Second World War, is, of course Eastern Europe. Military power is also essential to the Russians in the maintenance of the status of the Soviet Union as a super power.

In June 1953, the first of a series of upheavals among Russia's satellites was crushed in East Germany. The Post-Stalin period of flexibility over Germany drew to a close with the signature by the Western allies of the Paris Agreement, 23 October, 1954, which came into force in May 1955 and which restored sovereignty to the German Federal Republic and provided for her entry into NATO. The Soviet response was to convene a conference in Moscow from 29 November – 2 December 1954 attended by Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union. They jointly declared that if the Paris Agreements were ratified they would adopt measures to safeguard their security. On 6 May 1955, the day after the ratification of the Paris Agreements, the Soviet Union denounced the Anglo-Soviet Alliance Treaty of 1942. On 14 May 1955, the same eight
communist states signed the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance known as the Warsaw Pact.

It was not intended to be all-inclusive, and it did not extend to cover Yugoslavia (who had in effect excluded herself by her independent action in 1947), China, or the Asian Communist States. It was essentially a feature of the Soviet Union’s European defence policy. Militarily, a joint Command was established and Marshal Koniev appointed to head it, with Deputy Commanders from all the Pact countries. This in effect legalized the stationing of Soviet troops in the satellite states, and no mention was made of the possibility of a future withdrawal. A Political Consultative Committee was also established, and though it was not known at the time what form this would take, it was important in that the Pact had some political content and there was a chance that non-Soviet voices might be heard.

To promote bloc cohesion and integration, the Soviet Union increasingly relies on a number of multilateral institutions, most notably the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO; more commonly referred to as the Warsaw Pact). The Warsaw Pact was created on May 14, 1955, the day before the signing of the Austrian State treaty. Moscow decided that it needed a

45. Albania had defected from the Pact in all but name as a result of her alignment with China. In December 1961, Soviet diplomats and aid were withdrawn and all political relations ended. But Albania can not be stressed as an example. She was able to follow such an independent course only because she had no Soviet troops on her geo-political position, because she had no Soviet troops on her territory, and because she was willing to align herself with the Great Power—still nominally aligned with the Soviet Union.
formal alliance binding the bloc together. In shifting from an exclusive reliance on bilateralism to a heavy emphasis on multilateralism, it was motivated by several aims. The first and most immediate, given the imminence of the treaty with Austria, was to find a way to legitimize the continued pressure in Hungary and Romania of the Soviet troops, until then justified on the basis of assuring lines of communication for Soviet occupation forces in Austria. The second, after Moscow had failed to prevent the FRG’s rearmament and formal entry into NATO on May 9, 1955 was to carry through on its previously announced intention to have Soviet-bloc countries “take common measures for the organisation of armed forces and their commands”, and to create a counterpart to NATO. Third, Moscow wanted an effective instrument for safeguarding its interest in the area.

Though formally a military alliance protecting the bloc against external threats, the Warsaw Pact mainly serves an intrabloc policing function. This has been acknowledged by Soviet General Sergei Shtemenko\(^\text{46}\), who shortly before his death in April 1976 wrote in an article commemorating the WTO’s twenty first anniversary that alliance plays an important role in suppressing counter revolutionary activity against members of the “socialist community”; he mentioned Czechoslovakia as a case in point. The pact is also used by Moscow to pressure a reluctant member to go

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\(^{46}\) Alvin Z. Rubinstein; Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II: Imperial and Global (2\(^{\text{nd}}\) ed.), 1958, p.102.
along with the consensus view, to persuade bloc members to join with it in isolating a dissident member (for instance, excluding Albania from participation because of its pro-Beijing policies from 1961 to 1978), to rebut Chinese accusations that the USSR is a disintegrating rather than integrating influence within the Communist world, and to encourage a sense of common interest among the members.

Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe has many dimensions, including political, economic, and ideological factors. But most fundamentally, the Soviet stake in East Europe involves security considerations and is based on military power. The external and internal aspects of that military power have been inextricably linked since Stalin extended Soviet influence to the region in 1944-45. World War II demonstrated to Stalin and his successors the crucial importance of sufficient military power and secure border areas to counter opponents of the Soviet state. Security also implied, for Stalin and his successors, Soviet-style regimes in Eastern Europe. The reality of Soviet military power in Eastern Europe as a principal instrument of Soviet policy vis-à-vis Western Europe and as the ultimate guarantor of East European policies and regimes acceptable to the USSR has not changed — either in fact or in the minds of Soviet leaders. As Leonid Brezhnev, objecting to the liberalization in Czechoslovakia in 1968, told the Czechoslovak leadership at that time:
Your country is in the region occupied by Soviet soldiers in World War II. We paid for this with great sacrifices and we will never leave. Your borders are our borders. You do not follow our suggestions, and we feel threatened—we are completely justified in sending our soldiers to your country in order to be secure within our borders. It is a secondary matter whether or not there is an immediate threat from anyone; this is an issue of principle, which will hold, (as it has) since World War II, "forever".47

Soviet policy has been influenced by other factors as well. Soviet military forces in Eastern Europe serve a very real internal policing function, even though this role does not explain the numbers or (in most cases) the specific deployment of forces in the region. Soviet military power is the ultimate—indeed, the only real—guarantor of the stability and the very existence of the East European Communist regimes.

The Warsaw Pact is the most important multilateral treaty between the communist states under Soviet leadership both militarily and politically. The treaty refers to a political consultative committee which has the power to setup auxiliary bodies. Militarily it formalized arrangements for Soviet control dating probably three years earlier to about August 1952, when a decision was taken to re-equip the satellite armies and place them under

Soviet command. In accordance with the agreement reached in May 1955, the following January a United Military Command was established with headquarters in Moscow. A Soviet officer, Marshal Konev, became commander-in-Chief, and the Defence Ministers of participating countries were to be deputy commander-in-chief. Joint military exercises have been held in member countries since the autumn of 1961.

At first the Asian communist countries—China, North Korea and North Vietnam—sent observers to the Warsaw Pact, but they withdrew by 1962. Albania excluded and withdrew after 1961, siding with China in the Sino-Soviet conflict.

In November 1956, Soviet troops crushed Hungarian resistance after the Hungarian Government of Imre Nagy on 1 November 1956, had seceded from the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet Union moved back into Hungary just as the Western Suez involvement was reaching its culmination.

The limitations of independence and of the alleged equality of Communist States were again exposed when on 21 August 1968, the Soviet Union and the other European Warsaw Pact countries (except Romania) acting as Socialist allies, invaded Czechoslovakia, itself a member of the Warsaw Pact. The reformist communist government of Alexander Dubcek was deposed, and a more pliant pro-Soviet regime installed. According to Pravda, the 'allied socialist' troops together with the Soviet Union, i.e., the
Warsaw Pact countries, had ‘as solemn commitment—to stand up in
defence of the gains of socialism’\(^{(48)}\). Participants of the Warsaw Treaty
Organization were involved, for to tolerate a breach in this organization
would contradict the vital interests of all the member countries, including
the Soviet Union. Although the Czech Government denounced the
invasion as illegal and Romania also condemned it, Czechoslovakia by
the end of August 1968, was occupied and forced to submit. The Soviet
justification on the basis of limited sovereignty within the socialist
community became known as the Brezhnev Doctrine.

3. The Brezhnev Doctrine:
The Communist countries, notably the USSR have evolved a new socialist
international law overriding the conventional law which takes into account
new developments in international relations. Lenin first propounded this
time in February 1918, by stating that the interests of socialism are
higher than the interests of the right of nations to self-determination.

Within a few weeks after the march into Prague the method behind
Brezhnev’s madness became apparent: it is embodied in the doctrine of
“limited sovereignty” of Communist countries, the “Brezhnev Doctrine”, as it
has come to be known.

\(^{(48)}\) J. A. S. Grenville and Bernard Wasserstein, The major International Treaties Since 1945,
1987, p. 140.
It had been expressed in rather vague terms in the August Bratislava communiqué, then reiterated more precisely by a Soviet theorist using the pseudonym sergei Kovalev, in a 26 September article in Pravda.

"There is no doubt", he wrote, "that the peoples of the socialist countries and the Communist parties have and must have freedom to determine their country's path of development. However, any decision of theirs must have damage neither socialism in their own country nor the fundamental interests of other socialist countries, nor the worldwide worker's movement--------. This means that every Communist Party is responsible not only to its own people but also to all socialist countries and to the entire Communist movement----".

In November, at the Polish Party Congress, Brezhnev formulated that doctrine more emphatically, underlying the "qualified sovereignty" of Communist countries and the USSR's obligation to intervene where "socialism is imperiled". In view of the fact that Moscow considers its own "model" of Communism as the only acceptable one, it follows naturally that Communism is "imperiled" whenever there is a deviation from the Soviet path.49

The Soviet justification for the invasion of Czechoslovakia appeared in Pravda on September 26, 1968. Quickly dubbed the "Brezhnev Doctrine".

it proclaimed the inherent right of the Soviet Union to be the sole judge and jury of when the limits of permissible autonomy in the socialist world had been exceeded and to intervene as it saw fit to preserve socialism. While reaffirming the principle of "many roads to socialism", it insisted that no action "should do harm either to socialism" in the country or party involved-----

or to the fundamental interests of other socialist countries and of their entire working class movement which is striving for socialism. This means that each Communist Party is responsible not only to its own people but also to all the socialist countries and to the entire Communist movement—Just as, in V. I. Lenin's world, some one living in a society can not be free of that society, so a socialist state that is in a system of other states constituting a socialist commonwealth can not be free of the common interests of that commonwealth.

The article warned that though every Communist Party is free to apply the basic principles of Marxism—Leninism, it is not free to depart from those principles or to adopt a non-affiliated attitude toward the rest of the socialist community:

It should be stressed that even if a socialist country seeks to take an "extra bloc" position, it in fact retains its national independence...
thanks precisely to the power of the socialist commonwealth—and primarily to its chief force, the Soviet Union—and the might of its armed forces. The weakening of any link in the world socialist system has a direct effect on all the socialist countries, which cannot be indifferent to this. Thus, the anti-socialist forces in Czechoslovakia were in essence using talk about the right to self-determination to cover up demands for so-called neutrality and the CSR's withdrawal from the socialist commonwealth. The Communists of the fraternal countries naturally could not allow the socialist states to remain idle in the name of abstract sovereignty while the country was endangered by anti-socialist degeneration.

Two months later, speaking in Poland, Brezhnev declared:

**Affirmation and defense of the sovereignty of states that have taken the path of socialist construction are of special significance to us Communists.** And when external and internal forces hostile to socialism try to turn the development of a given socialist country in the direction of restoration of the capitalist system, when a threat arises to the cause of socialism in that country—a threat to the security of the socialist commonwealth as a whole—this is no longer merely a problem for that country's people, but a common problem, the concern of all socialist countries. Let those who are wont to forget the lessons of history and who would like to engage again in
recarving the map of Europe know that the borders of Poland, the
GDR and Czechoslovakia, as well as of any other Warsaw Pact
member, are stable and inviolable. These borders are protected by
all the armed might of the socialist commonwealth.\textsuperscript{50}

According to the Brezhnev Doctrine, Socialist countries cannot go beyond
the communist orbit. Therefore, if any socialist country wants to be
independent of Soviet influence, other Communist countries have a right
to intervene\textsuperscript{51}.

The USSR's intervention in Czechoslovakia in August 1968 deplored by
all right thinking people of the world, and only proved that, until a more
equitable order was established, the smaller states would only serve as
factors in the grand design of the super powers\textsuperscript{52}.

\textsuperscript{50} Francis Anthony Boyle; World Politics and International Law, p. 278. See Richard J.
Erickson; International Law and Revolutionary State, 1972, pp. 68-69.
\textsuperscript{51} See Soviet Land, December 1968.
\textsuperscript{52} M. P. Tandon, Shorter International Law (5th ed.). 1975, p. 87.